TOP-SECRET – CIA Alec Station Memo of 9/11 Commission 01

alec-station-01

TOP-SECRET – Localizar y detener al Dr. Goiburú

Documentos del Archivo del Terror de Paraguay implican a Fuerzas de Seguridad paraguayas y argentinas en el secuestro

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 239 – Part III

Editado por Carlos Osorio y Marianna Enamoneta

Publicado – Diciembre 21, 2007

Para más información contactar a:
Carlos Osorio: (202) 994-7061

cosorio@gwu.edu

Peter Kornbluh: (202) 994-7116

peter.kornbluh@gmail.com

 

Menos de un mes antes de su desaparición, un agente de la inteligencia argentina remitió al Paraguay una serie de fotografías del seguimiento al Dr. Goiburú, incluyendo esta que muestra su casa y su automóvil.

Lazos Relacionados

En el 15 Aniversario del Archive del Terror
El National Security Archive pone en linea 60,000 registros de la Policia Secreta del Dictador Stroessner

Operación Cóndor en el Archivo del Terror
Evidencia contra la coordinación represiva de los militares en el Cono Sur

Centro de Documentación y Archivo para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (CDyA)
Repositorio del Archivo del Terror

CDyA [Sitio espejo]
en el National Security Archive

Catálogo en línea

60,000 registros del Archivo del Terror

CDyA [Sitio UNESCO]
Kansas State University 
AI Group 254 on Archive of Terror

Memoria Abierta
Catálogo de Archivos de Operación Cóndor

Archivo del Terror en YouTube

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Video2

Video3

Washington D.C., Septiembre 25, 2011 – En el marco de la celebración del 15 aniversario del descubrimiento del Archivo del Terror, el National Security Archive publica hoy evidencias que las autoridades Paraguayas y Argentinas están implicadas en la desaparición del  Doctor paraguayo refugiado en Argentina, Agustín Goiburú, el 9 de febrero de 1977. Los documentos demuestran que perpetradores daban un seguimiento minucioso a Goiburú desde un año atrás hasta solo horas antes que este fuera secuestrado.

La selección aquí presentada incluye desde un informe de la inteligencia militar paraguaya, requiriendo la “localización  y detención del Dr. Agustín Goiburú” en Argentina  a finales de 1975, pasando por una reunión de coordinación entre la Policía Federal Argentina con la Policía de Asunción en 1976, hasta el seguimiento día a día de la inteligencia argentina en enero de 1977 y los informes del Cónsul paraguayo  solo 48 horas antes de la desaparición de Goiburú. A decir del Director del Proyecto del Cono Sur del National Security Archive, Carlos Osorio, “Los documentos no dejan duda que las autoridades paraguayas tuvieron los medios, la motivación y la oportunidad de secuestrar al Dr. Goiburú”.

Goiburú que por años fuera dirigente de la oposición a la dictadura del General Alfredo Stroessner, se escapó de prisión del Paraguay y se refugió en Argentina en 1970. Para 1977 se encontraba viviendo en la ciudad argentina de Paraná y era dirigente del Movimiento Popular Colorado (MOPOCO) al momento de desaparecer. Según el informe de los testigos a la policía de la ciudad de Paraná, el 9 de febrero de 1977, personas desconocidas secuestraron al Dr. Agustín Goiburú; el  automóvil de este estacionado frente a su casa fue embestido y al salir a ver que ocurría, Goiburú “fue reducido mediante armas de fuego cortas por el conductor… [Goiburú] fue introducido al automóvil Ford Falcon desapareciendo con rumbo o desconocido.”

Los documentos se encuentran entre la voluminosa evidencia albergada en el Archivo del Terror de Paraguay que sirve hoy de prueba en el caso de extradición contra el ex Ministro de Interior Paraguayo en la época, actualmente viviendo en Honduras, Sabino Montanaro, y en la reciente condena a diez años de cárcel del ex Cónsul paraguayo en la ciudad de Posadas, Argentina, Francisco Ortiz Téllez,

La evidencia ha sido acumulada gracias a la excelente pesquisa en el Archivo del Terror por  los investigadores paraguayos Rosa Palau, Alfredo Boccia Paz y Miriam Gonzalez y resumida en su libro “Es mi informe: los archivos secretos de la policía de Stroessner (Asunción : CDE, 1994)”. Esta gacetilla electrónica fue estructurada en base a este libro que aun continua siendo referencia investigativa obligada sobre el Archivo del Terror.

La selección que presentamos hoy aquí, se complementa con nuevos documentos encontrados por medio de la máquina de búsqueda del Archivo del Terror Digital (ATD), instalada por el National Security Archive en convenio con La Corte Suprema de Paraguay, en apoyo del trabajo del Centro de Documentación y Archivo (CDyA) que alberga el Archivo del Terror del Paraguay. Entre la nueva evidencia, se encuentra informes del agente de inteligencia paraguayo basado en Argentina, alias “Gendar”, que entre otros  informa que en el control del tráfico fronterizo entre Argentina y Paraguay el día de la desaparición “Hay un coche que no figura el ingreso ni egreso. Esto tiene que ver algo con el caso Goiburú (secuestro)”.


Documentos
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Octubre 8, 1975 – Informe [Confidencial] Número 62
(Fotograma: 00050F 2475)

[Publicado originalmente en “Es mi Informe”]

El agudo interés de todo el aparataje de seguridad paraguayo por atrapar al Dr. Goiburú refugiado hacia cinco años en Argentina, transpira de este informe de agentes especiales paraguayos basados en Buenos Aires. Retransmitido por la  Dirección de Inteligencia del Estado Mayor General de las Fuerzas Armadas de Paraguay (D-2 ESMAGENFA) el informe requiere la “localización  y detención del Dr. Agustín Goiburú”  y termina diciendo  que si  Goiburú es capturado, “se solicita informar de inmediato a fin de viajar personal de esta que trabaja especialmente en este caso.”

Circa Junio, 1976 – Memorando del jefe de Investigaciones para su Excelencia, el Señor Presidente de la República
(Fotograma: 00088F 0171-0172)

[Publicado originalmente en “Es mi Informe”]

 

A pocos meses que el golpe de estado instalara la dictadura militar y desatara una ofensiva contrainsurgente en Argentina, el Jefe del Departamento de Investigaciones de Asunción Pastor Coronel, informa directamente al dictador Alfredo Stroessner que dos altos delegados de la Policía Federal Argentina han llegado a Asunción a “buscar la forma de coordinar labores.”  Pastor Coronel da cuenta que estableció con los Argentinos que “con mucho gusto intercambiaríamos  informaciones e incluso detenidos”.  “Que elementos subversivos de conocida militancia comunista… como Agustín Goiburú, trabajaron y trabajan libremente, en la Argentina…” “Que no tendríamos probablemente ningún inconveniente de entregarlo a [Amílcar] Santucho [hermano del líder guerrillero argentino Roberto Santucho,  capturado y detenido en Asunción desde mediados de 1975]  siempre y cuando también de parte de ellos tengamos la misma respuesta sobre algunos subversivos nuestros…” La coordinación entre la inteligencia paraguaya y argentina para monitorear y capturar al Dr. Agustín Goiburú dará un salto a mediados de 1976 luego de producido este Memorando y producirá numerosos informes de seguimiento al Dr. Goiburú.

Junio 18, 1976 – Antecedentes
(Fotograma: 00008F 0007-0009)

[Publicado originalmente en “Es mi Informe”]

 

En este informe de inteligencia del Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policía de Asunción, Paraguay sobre la historia política de Agustín Goiburú, se informa que el Dr. Goiburú es miembro del Ejército Popular Revolucionario (EPR), “apoyado económicamente por la Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria [JCR]” y que ha mantenido contacto con sus miembros a través del MIR chileno, ERP argentino, ELN uruguayo e incluso con el dirigente del MLN boliviano “General Juan Jose Torres recientemente fallecido” [el subrayado es del original]. La coordinación de los  aparatos de seguridad e inteligencia de Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay y Bolivia conocida como Operación Cóndor, tenía planteado destruir a la JCR. Así, al mismo tiempo que este Memorando era escrito, en Junio de 1976, en operaciones conjuntas en Buenos Aires, fueron asesinados el Senador uruguayo  Zelmar Michellini, el ex presidente boliviano, Juan José Torres y varios opositores de izquierda chilenos, uruguayos y bolivianos refugiados en Argentina.

Enero 1977 – [Seguimiento a Agustín Goiburú Giménez]
(Fotograma: 00050F 2445-2447)
[Fotografías de espionaje]
(Fotograma: 00050F 2448-2455)

[Publicado originalmente en “Es mi Informe”]

 

A mediados de Enero de 1977,  un par de semanas antes de la desaparición del Dr. Goiburú, un documento probablemente de la inteligencia Argentina enumera  información detallada sobre sus antecedentes, su familia, su cuenta bancaria, su horario de actividades, las personas con quien trabajaba, amistades personales, y sus actividades cotidianas. El documento que consta de 3 páginas, concluye con una descripción de sus actividades diarias descritas por una persona que lo siguió durante 5 días consecutivos entre el viernes 7 y el martes 11 de enero de 1977. El agente que escribe informa que los paraguayos residentes en Paraná, Argentina, realizaran una reunión “la próxima semana… lo que será auscultado convenientemente.” El documento es también acompañado por 8 fotografías de espionaje al  Dr. Goiburú en Paraná, su ciudad de exilio en Argentina: El Dr. y su hijo caminando por la calle, su lugar de residencia, las clínicas donde trabajaba y su automóvil.

Febrero 6, 1977 – Remitir Informe e Impartir Orden
(Fotograma: 00050F 1830)

[Inédito. Publicado por primera vez aquí]

 

Un documento de inteligencia “reservado” de origen desconocido redactado el 6 de febrero en la ciudad de Corrientes, Argentina, tres días antes de la desaparición del Dr. Goiburú, requiere que se eleve el nivel de control del paso de personas entre Paraguay y Argentina. El documento cita otro informe de inteligencia donde da cuenta de una reunión sostenida en la ciudad de Paraná, Argentina por opositores al régimen Paraguayo el 29 y 30 de enero de 1977 en la que habría participado el Dr. Goiburú. El documento da cuenta que los participantes venidos de Paraguay viajaban en tres vehículos “con patente de Asunción, Nros: 18559 – 18572 y 18573” y termina diciendo que “Se continuara investigando, se ampliara”

Febrero 7, 1977 – [Informe del Cónsul Paraguayo en Posadas]
(Fotograma: 00050F2460-1)

[Publicado originalmente en “Es mi Informe”]

 

Dos días antes de la desaparición del Doctor Goiburú, el Cónsul de  Paraguay en Posadas, Argentina,  Francisco Ortiz Téllez, informa al Ministro del Interior del Paraguay, Sabino Montanaro,  que según información del Servicio de Inteligencia del Ejército, los paraguayos de oposición residentes en la Ciudad de Paraná, Argentina, sostuvieron una reunión a finales de Enero  y se han organizado en un frente común incluyendo al MOPOCO (Movimiento Popular Colorado), Partido Comunista Paraguayo y Febrerista Liberal. “Entre las personas más conocidas se encontraban el Dr. Agustín Goiburú…” Según el informe, los opositores estarían planeando iniciar un movimiento de guerrilla armada en el Paraguay. La descripción relatada por el Cónsul paraguayo de la reunión durante la cual se formó el ‘Frente de Paraguayos Unidos’ coincide exactamente palabra por palabra, con el documento de inteligencia fechado el 6 de febrero de 1977.

Circa Marzo, 1977 – [Los Mopocos Tienen Miedo]
(Fotograma: 00153F 0155-0156)

[Inédito. Publicado por primera vez aqui]

 

Gendar, un agente secreto del Paraguay que informa regularmente al jefe del Departamento de Investigaciones Pastor Coronel sobre las actividades en las ciudades argentinas fronterizas con Paraguay, Clorinda y Formosa, envía un informe diciendo que los refugiados paraguayos del MOPOCO “se encuentran muy preocupados por el secuestro de Goiburú [en la ciudad de Paraná], que los de acá corren igual peligro.” Gendar, quien está infiltrado en la Gendarmería argentina y firma regularmente como “G5” y en una ocasión como “Benites”, termina informando que “se está controlando los elementos que arriban de otros puntos.”

Circa Marzo 1977 – [Tránsito fronterizo el día del secuestro]
(Fotograma: 00153F0149)

[Inédito. Publicado por primera vez aqui]

 

Gendar envía al jefe del Departamento de Investigaciones, “la nomina de las personas que pasaron a la Argentina en enero 1977 y que probablemente tendrían algo que ver con la reunión en Paraná” a la que asistió el Dr. Goiburú a finales de enero. Gendar confirma los números de las patentes de los automóviles en que se desplazaron los opositores Paraguayos que asistieron a la reunión, tal como lo indican informes de inteligencia previos. Sin embargo, de manera remarcable, termina diciendo “Hay un coche que no figura el ingreso ni egreso. Esto tiene que ver algo con el caso Goiburú (secuestro)”.

Septiembre 1º, 1977 – [Informe del Cónsul Paraguayo en Posadas]
(Fotograma: 0050F 2476-8)

[Publicado originalmente en “Es mi Informe”]

Siete meses tras el secuestro y desaparición del Doctor Goiburú, el Cónsul de  Paraguay en Posadas, Argentina, Francisco Ortiz Téllez informa sobre  “la versión elevada a este Consulado Nacional, por las Autoridades Militares del Servicio de Inteligencia del Ejército, sobre el supuesto secuestro del extremista Agustín Goiburú.” En lo que pareciera contradecir informes anteriores del cónsul Ortiz Téllez, la versión del Servicio de Inteligencia del Ejército en Argentina da a entender que este no tuvo nada que ver en el seguimiento los días previos al secuestro del Dr. Goiburú, y que solo tiene información policial recabada entre testigos sobre el caso del secuestro del Dr. Goiburú en la ciudad de Paraná. La aparente contradicción no es posible aclararla sin más documentación que explique el contexto de este documento. Mas allá de la contradicción sin embargo, el documento muestra el profundo interés que aun suscitaba el secuestro del Dr. Goiburú, y los esfuerzos de los aparatos de inteligencia de Argentina y Paraguay en desligarse del mismo. Por otra parte, el  informe policial contenido en este documento da una idea cabal de lo ocurrido: “El día 091115-Feb-1977, personas desconocidas secuestraron… al Dr. Agustín Goiburú…” El  automóvil de este estacionado frente a su casa fue embestido, dice el documento, y que al salir a ver que ocurría, Goiburú “fue reducido mediante armas de fuego cortas por el conductor… [Goiburú] fue introducido al automóvil Ford Falcon desapareciendo con rumbo o desconocido.”

Meridian Capital über die STASI-FÄLSCHUNGEN DER “GoMoPa”

http://meridiancapital.wordpress.com/

TOP-SECRET – EN EL 15 ANIVERSARIO DEL ARCHIVO DEL TERROR

EN EL 15 ANIVERSARIO DEL ARCHIVO DEL TERROR

EL NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE PONE EN LINEA 60,000 REGISTROS DE LA POLICIA SECRETA DEL DICTADOR STROESSNER

Bajo convenio de cooperación con la Corte Suprema de Justicia del Paraguay,
el Archive lanza simultáneamente en Asunción el Archivo del Terror Digital (ATD)

Más de 300,000 documentos digitalizados para fortalecer al Centro de Documentación y Archivo para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (CDyA)

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 239 – Part I

 

 

 

Washington, D.C., Septiembre 24, 2011 – En conmemoración del 15 aniversario del Archivo del Terror, el National Security Archive pone  hoy en línea el catálogo público de 60,000 registros de documentos del acervo y devela en Asunción el sistema Archivo del Terror Digital (ATD) con más de 300,000 documentos digitalizados. Acompañando la celebración el National Security Archive lanza una serie de iniciativas para dar más acceso a este acervo único en América Latina.

Carta del Jefe de la Inteligencia Chilena  al Jefe de Investigaciones Pastor Coronel del Paraguay en el marco de Operación Cóndor.

El catálogo puesto hoy en línea gracias a la cooperación del National Security Archive y la Biblioteca de la George Washington University, permite a los usuarios hacer búsquedas por nombres y fechas sobre 60,000 registros e identificar los documentos a consultar por su código de fotograma de microfilmación. Por su parte, el Archivo del Terror Digital (ATD) instalado  en las oficinas del Centro de Documentación y Archivo para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (CDyA), repositorio del Archivo del Terror, permite buscar sobre el acervo total de 300,000 documentos. Desde que fuera instalado como prueba en 2006, el ATD permitió doblar el número de respuestas documentales al público por el CDyA. Las dos iniciativas son el  resultado de varios convenios entre la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Paraguay y el National Security Archive, en apoyo y del CDyA.

Simultáneamente, hoy el National Security Archive pone en línea una imagen espejo del sitio web del CDyA y presenta dos gacetillas electrónicas conmemorativas con nuevas evidencias de la participación de los estados del Cono Sur en la desaparición de sus ciudadanos obtenidas con estas herramientas electrónicas junto a documentos famosos encontrados previamente en el Archivo del Terror sobre Operación Cóndor, y la desaparición del Doctor Paraguayo Agustin Goiburú en 1977.

El catálogo en línea fue originalmente desarrollado en 2002 bajo el  convenio Memoria Histórica, Democracia y Derechos Humanos (MHDDH) entre la Corte Suprema, la Universidad Católica de Asunción y el National Security Archive como un instrumento para apoyar el trabajo del CDyA. Desde entonces ha ayudado a multiplicar el número de respuesta al público. Los 60,000 documentos cuyos registros están en el MHDDH fueron  identificados por el personal experto del CDyA como más susceptibles de contener información pertinente en respuesta a peticiones de Habeas Data.

“La documentación del Archivo de Terror da prueba de cómo los estados del Cono Sur en su ceguera antiterrorista cometieron detenciones ilegales, torturas y extradiciones clandestinas. Hoy, en momentos en que estas prácticas son de común uso en aras de la guerra contra el terrorismo y cuando se destruyen documentos de este tipo por agencias de inteligencia en los Estados Unidos, es de encomiar el esfuerzo de la Corte Suprema de Justicia por preservar y hacer público este acervo para que estos abusos no se repitan.” Dice Carlos Osorio, Director del Proyecto de Documentación del Cono Sur del National Security Archive.

El National Security Archive se complace en unirse a la celebración de este 15 aniversario y se congratula de ser parte de aquellos que han apoyado a través de los años los esfuerzos de los paraguayos victimas, organismos de derechos humanos, investigadores y  jueces por preservar y dar acceso al Archivo del Terror.

***

COOPERACIÓN
National Security Archive – Corte Suprema de Justicia

En apoyo al Archivo del Terror

Carlos Osorio del National Security Archive, el Presidente de la Corte Suprema de Justicia Raúl Sapena Brugada, la Decana de Ciencias Sociales de la UCA, Carmen Quintana de Horak, y la Co-Directora del CDyA Rosa Palau durante el lanzamiento del proyecto MHDDH  

2000

Primer convenio de cooperación

El 17 de Febrero 2000 el National Security Archive y la Corte Suprema de Justicia lanzaron una iniciativa de cooperación a fin de recaudar fondos y recursos para digitalizar el acervo del CDyA, adquirir el hardware y software necesarios para hacer accesible el acervo a través del internet y capacitar al personal del CDyA. En esa ocasión se adquirió un nuevo equipo de computación y se estableció el acceso a internet del CDyA

2001 – 2002

Memoria Histórica, Democracia y Derechos Humanos (MHDDH)

En 2001, La Corte Suprema de Justicia y la Universidad Católica de Asunción, con el apoyo del National Security Archive en Washington DC, lanzaron un proyecto de dos años diseñado  para atender a los desafíos de responder al incremento de peticiones de habeas data y del público en general y el acelerado desarrollo  la tecnología digital y el internet.  El proyecto “Memoria Histórica, Democracia y Derechos Humanos (MHDDH)”. El proyecto fue financiado por el Fondo para la Democracia y los Derechos Humanos del Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos  y fue administrado por la US AID.  Un equipo asesor de la Corte Suprema de Justicia coordino el proyecto y sus miembros fueron Rosa Palau, Co-Directora del CDyA, el Embajador Jorge Lara Castro, catedrático de la UCA, y Carlos Osorio, Director del Proyecto de Documentación del Cono Sur del National Security Archive. Entre Septiembre 2001 y Diciembre 2002, el proyecto logro:

1)      Microfilmar 200,000 páginas del Acervo del CDyA.

El apoyo inicial proveído por US AID y la Corte Suprema de Justicia en 1993 permitió microfilmar el 60% del acervo del Archivo. El proyecto MHDDH proveyó los recursos financieros que permitieron al personal cualificado de la Corte Suprema de Justicia llevar a cabo el resto de la microfilmación. El proyecto ayudo a pagar salarios de operadores y técnicos, adquirir rollos y materiales para reencuadernar los libros microfilmados.

2) Catalogación de Sesenta Mil Documentos para responder a Habeas Data

Catálogo de 60,000 de los documentos mas pedidos

Un equipo supervisado por la Universidad Católica y dirigido por un archivista profesional, catálogo 60,000 documentos considerados los más pertinentes para responder a los centenares de peticiones de Habeas Data que recibe el CDyA anualmente. El catálogo montado en una base de datos WinIsis, permite realizar búsquedas en los campos básicos siguientes: Fecha, Nombres, Organizaciones, Términos Geográficos, Tipo de Documento, Fondo, Ubicación Física y Rollo y Número de Fotograma.

3) Acceso público al catálogo de 60,000 documentos

El proyecto diseñó el sistema para publicar este catálogo en el internet como una manera de facilitar el acceso del público al acervo del CDyA.

4) Digitalización de 300,000 documentos

El proyecto MHDDH financio la producción de más de 500,000 imágenes digitales de los documentos del acervo del CDyA, estableciendo así las bases para una futura instalación de un sistema de administración y búsqueda de un archivo digital.

5) Re equipamiento del CDyA

Se instalaron estanterías metálicas deslizantes y se adquirió material de computación

6) Gira por Washington DC

En diciembre 2002, el National Security Archive organizó una gira de capacitación para el personal del CDyA que incluyo visitas y talleres en la Universidad George Washington, el Instituto por una Sociedad Abierta, el Archivo Nacional, la Biblioteca del Congreso y la Biblioteca de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de los Estados Unidos.

 

2003 – 2007

Convenio de Archivo Digital

Se firma convenio de Cooperación entre la Corte Suprema de Justicia y el National Security Archive que busca construir el Archivo del Terror Digital (ATD) a fin de disminuir o eliminar la manipulación y así preservar los textos del acervo del CDyA: procesar las imágenes de los 300,000 documentos del acervo del CDyA por OCR, montar un sistema de administración y búsqueda sobre las imágenes, e instalar equipo  de computación e impresoras. El convenio establece las pautas para la publicación de análisis de documentación del CDyA en gacetillas electrónicas en la página web del National Security Archive. Se instaló el sistema ATD y se obtuvo impresora laser.

2007

Catálogo en Línea y Sitio Espejo

 

Se firma convenio de Cooperación entre la Corte Suprema de Justicia y el National Security Archive a fin de poner en línea el catálogo de 60,000 documentos con el apoyo de la Gelman Library de la George Washington University. El convenio incluye la puesta en línea de una imagen espejo del sitio web del CDyA

Die gesamte deutsche Presse verabscheut “GoMoPa”, deren “Kinderportal” und deren Tarnblogs wie “Schei**hausblog” sowie Extremnews und Die Bewertung

http://berndpulch.org/die-gesamte-deutsche-presse-verabscheut-die-tatsachlich-vorbestraften-%E2%80%9Cgomopa%E2%80%9D-tater-und-ihr-%E2%80%9Ckinderportal%E2%80%9D/

Published – Abbas, Netanyahu & Obama at the U.N. : responses from a Palestinian and a Jew

From: Tikkun <magazine[at]tikkun.org>
Subject: Abbas, Netanyahu & Obama at the U.N. : responses from a Palestinian and a Jew

Editor’s Note: As we often do in the magazine, the website, and these emails, here are responses you are unlikely to read or hear or see in the mass media to the President of Palestine Abbas and the Prime Minister of Israel Netanyahu in relationship to what they have been doing at the U.N. Our first respondent is a Palestinian activist in Ramallah, the second a Jewish columnist in NYC.

Kudos Mr. Abbas

Reply

Mazin Qumsiyeh mazin[at]qumsiyeh.org to rabbilerner, Human show details 11:18 AM (1 hour ago)

http://popular-resistance.blogspot.com/2011/09/kudos-mr-abbas.html

Mahmoud Abbas gave a brilliant speech at the United Nations, getting rounds of applause from most of the representatives.  I think it demonstrated clearly and unambiguously that the Palestinian leadership has been “unreasonably reasonable” and has instead seen the hopes of peace and of millions of Palestinians suffering for 63 years dashed on the rock of Israeli expansionist, colonial, and apartheid policies.  He explained that Israel has been taking one unilateral action after another each resulting in more pain and suffering for our people. Going to the UN, he explained is putting things back where the problems started (he did not use the last two words but I do).  He said a word that I think he should defend strongly that no person or country with an iota of logic or conscience should reject the Palestinian state membership in the UN or its formation in the 22% of historic Palestine that is the West Bank and Gaza.  I think he took a courageous step and gave a good performance.  Now we here on the ground in Palestine hope and will push for additional follow-up steps.  From our own perspective, three things are critical:

1)  That he and his administration now implement quickly the reconciliation agreement signed by all Palestinian factions most notably the one about creating a representative Palestinian National Council. In his speech he said he hopes this will be done in a few weeks.  We hope this  will be done quickly and not any longer than four weeks.

2) That he and his administration act quickly and decisively to really promote popular unarmed resistance throughout Palestine and among Palestinians in exile.  In forming a new government, the ministry that is now in charge of walls and settlements should be either a) dismantled or b) reconfigured.  A new strategy to encourage real nonviolent resistance must be adopted.  We must end the practice of holding a few demonstrative actions that do not disturb the occupation and that are used to enrich a few people. We must instead allow the kind of popular resistance that have been effective from our history (see my book that details challenges and opportunities learned from this history and available in Arabic and English). He also said he will pursue this.

3) The Palestinian people are waiting to see clear evidence of change; a new Palestinian Spring as Mr. Abbas called it.  This requires seeing visibly what Mr. Abbas talked about: transparency, accountability, democracy, and freedom.

There were those who worried that going to the UN will raise the expectations of the Palestinian people who then may turn to despair and more if they do not see a change on the ground.  I say a) it is great to raise the expectations, and b) we, the Palestinian people will never turn to despair but we will revolt if we do not see real changes and stronger steps. I share Abu Mazen’s hope that the international community steps up to the plate.  But I also hope that we all go back to our people and take those steps that will ensure our freedom.

I also listened to Netanyahu’s speech and was just amazed at how many lies can be packed in one speech. It is not even worth detailing except to refer you to this link: http://www.qumsiyeh.org/liesandtruths/

In this occasion, it might be worth comparing Israel and the Palestinians.

                          Israel                     Palestinians
Population----------------5.5 million Jewish---------11 million (7 million
refugees or displaced)
Land controlled ----------91.7%----------------------8.3% of historic
Palestine
Nature--------------------Occupier/colonizer---------Occupied people
Military Personnel--------Regular 175,000------------None
--------------------------Reserves, 500,000
Irregulars----------------10-50,000------------------3-5,000
--------------------------Armed settlers-------------Armed underground forces
Police/other security-----30,000---------------------50,000
Tanks----------------------3,800---------------------0
Artillery------------------1500 large----------------0
Submarines-----------------6 ------------------------0
Warships-------------------20-30---------------------0
Combat airplanes-----------2000----------------------0
Nuclear Weapons----------->300-----------------------0
GDP-----------------------$195 billion--------------$4 billion
Military expenditure------$10 billion----------------Negligible (security services)
Casuaties (63 years)-------6,000 killed--------------75,000 killed
---------------------------20,000 injured------------300,000 injured
Abducted/jailed------------30------------------------400,000
Homes demolished-----------0-------------------------50,000
Refugees created-----------0------------------------>6 million people

Mr. President, we don’t want a shortcut, we want our freedom by Abir Kopty

http://mondoweiss.net/2011/09/mr-president-we-dont-want-a-shortcut-we-want-our-freedom.html

Palestinians on statehood: ‘We want action, not votes at the UN’ Villagers who have often been at the sharp end of Palestinian-Israeli relations are skeptical about the UN route

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/14/palestinian-statehood-action-un

*************************************************************************

On Israel And Palestine, Obama Is Rick Perry

President Barack Obama’s speech to the U.N. General Assembly succeeded in making clear why the Palestinians had no other choice but to take their statehood bid to the U.N. and why the United States can no longer pretend to be an “honest broker” in the conflict.

For the first time since the U.N. conferred statehood on Israel 63 years ago, the sitting U.S president told the world body that the United States will back Israel, right or wrong. The president’s speech was so one-sided, in fact, that he sounded a lot like Texas Gov. Rick Perry, who gave a similar speech to a group of “pro-Israel” right-wingers one day earlier. Perry is not the president, so his speech was different, except for the motivation, which was same.

Both speeches were standard “pro-Israel” bloviating, but Perry gave his on the campaign trail and not in front of the entire world. (I hesitate to call a speech opposing Palestinian statehood “pro-Israel” when the latest comprehensive poll on the subject says that 70 percent of Israelis say Israel should support the U.N.’s decision if statehood is granted.)

The very best explanation of what Obama did at the United Nations came from Daniel Levy, a Brit who moved to Israel right out of college 18 years ago. Levy’s quote appeared on page one of the Washington Post.

“There is virtually no thread of reason running between the way he [Obama] related to the rest of the world and its developments, particularly in the Middle East, and the positions he espoused on Israel-Palestine a conflict apparently occurring on another planet,” said Daniel Levy, co-director of the Middle East Task Force at the New America Foundation. “Palestinian freedoms, rights and self-determination are somehow supposed to be attained without the recourse to leverage, international law or meaningful international support, considered to be necessary and legitimate virtually everywhere else.”

Of course, there is one “thread,” although it is not of “reason.” Every word in Obama’s speech was designed not to advance a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but to keep single-issue donors and, to a lesser extent, single-issue voters in his camp for the 2012 election. Not a week goes by without the Obama team sending emails out to people it deems Israel voters to remind them of all the wonderful things this president has done for Israel. One recently was dedicated to citing quotes from Prime Minister Netanyahu praising Obama, the first time I can remember that a president sought to validate himself by citing the praise of a foreign leader.

Obama isn’t lying about his “pro-Israel” record, however. This administration has been the most one-sided supporter of everything Israel asks for since 1948. There is no competition. Not even George W. Bush comes close.

When the Israelis, following Obama’s election, asked Bush to give Israel permission to bomb Iran, he said no, despite his vice president and neoconservative aides pushing the Israeli position hard. Bush also did more than Obama to advance the peace process that the Israeli right hates so much, convening an international summit at Aqaba and being the first president to say, in unambiguous terms, that the United States supports “two states, living side by side in peace and security.”

On Israel, Obama is to the right of Bush, to the right of Reagan, and certainly to the right of Clinton. On Israel and Palestine, Barack Obama is Rick Perry.

Of course, Obama’s outrageous surrender to Netanyahu still won’t impress the Israel-Firsters. They have despised him from day one, for all kinds of reasons, and predictably condemned the speech. Meanwhile, Israel’s thuggish far-right foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, told reporters that “I am ready to sign on this speech with both hands.”

Lieberman is telling the truth he could have written Obama’s speech and the neocons are lying. But neocons are adherents of the Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-KY) school: They have only one goal, which is to defeat this president. And although privately they celebrate their amazing success at intimidating Obama into submission, publicly they denounce him and send scary emails to senior citizens in Florida and New Jersey warning them that Obama wants to destroy Israel.

But these speeches and love-ins with Netanyahu accomplish nothing for Obama. The single-issue Israel voters and donors (3 percent of the Jewish community) will take their money and votes elsewhere.

And Netanyahu will, working from Jerusalem, do everything he can to help the Republicans win the next election. It’s almost funny how these people would exchange the person who is the most “pro-Israel” president ever (looking at it from their “maintain-the-occupation-at-all-costs” vantage point) for an unknown quantity like Perry or Romney. After all, a Republican whose main constituency is Wall Street would likely turn out to approach Israel with more skepticism than Obama does.

But it’s a game. Netanyahu and the lobby want to defeat Obama to demonstrate, yet again, who calls the shots on U.S. Middle East policy.

But forget the campaign for a moment which is what Obama should have done when addressing the U.N. The president’s speech was an embarrassing disaster. Since 2009, 1,600 Palestinians (overwhelmingly civilians and over 400 children) have been killed by the Israeli army. Thirteen Israelis have been killed over the same period. Despite that, Obama devoted 120 words of his speech to Israeli suffering (even going so far as to cite the Holocaust) and not one word to Palestinian suffering.

Example: An Australian newspaper reports on a new film about the tragedy of Palestinian women in Gaza (under full Israeli blockade) who are suffering with breast cancer but are not permitted by Israel to leave Gaza for treatment. (They used to go to Israeli hospitals or hospitals in the Arab states and Europe.) Nor does Israel permit the import of the radioactive isotopes used to treat breast cancers. So they die.

One could go on and on about the horrors of the occupation but it won’t matter to the politicians who determine U.S. foreign policy. They know which side their bread is buttered on, as Obama demonstrated at the U.N. this week.

But, I’m surprised to say, Obama did Palestinians and the 70 percent of Israelis who support statehood a big favor. By demonstrating that the United States refuses to play the role of “honest broker” and by telling the U.N. that we are Israel and Israel is us, the United States is yielding the role of Middle East peacemaker to others. The French, Turks, Indians, Brazilians, Chinese, South Africans, and Russians don’t agree on much. But they do agree on the urgency of the creation of a Palestinian state in the areas occupied in 1967. And they agree that the United States, no longer the superpower it once was, should move over and let countries not fully invested in one side play a more constructive role.

Those who wonder how these “other countries” could exert the leadership the U.S. has abdicated might consider the issue of economics, trade, etc. Israel does not live on an island with the United States. It is part of the world and not even the United States and the $3.5 billion it hands over to Israel each year (no strings attached) can save Israel if the rest of the world says “enough.”

Obama has chosen to abdicate. The rest of the world is eager to step up.

And that is why I have no doubt that the state of Palestine was created this week at the United Nations. By opting out, Obama did a tremendous favor to Palestinians and Israelis both. Palestinians will have their fully sovereign, contiguous state.  And the Jewish state of Israel will finally be secure. As Israelis like to say, “yhiyeh tov.” Or as Arabs say, “insha’Allah khair.” Everything will be fine.

———————————————–

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HANDELSBLATT ÜBER DIE KRIMINELLEN BETRÜGER DER “GoMoPa”

http://www.handelsblatt.com/finanzen/boerse-maerkte/boerse-inside/finanzaufsicht-untersucht-kursachterbahn-bei-wirecard/3406252.html

Zu den fingierten Betrügern der “GoMoPa” gehören auch der “Schei**hausblog” (Nomen est Omen), “Extremnews” und “Die Bewertung aus Leipzig

TOP-SECRET – FCC Preserving Open Internet

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 185 (Friday, September 23, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 59192-59235]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-24259]

[[Page 59191]]

Vol. 76

Friday,

No. 185

September 23, 2011

Part II

Federal Communications Commission

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

47 CFR Parts 0 and 8

Preserving the Open Internet; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 76 , No. 185 / Friday, September 23, 2011 /
Rules and Regulations

[[Page 59192]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Parts 0 and 8

[GN Docket No. 09-191; WC Docket No. 07-52; FCC 10-201]

Preserving the Open Internet

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This Report and Order establishes protections for broadband
service to preserve and reinforce Internet freedom and openness. The
Commission adopts three basic protections that are grounded in broadly
accepted Internet norms, as well as our own prior decisions. First,
transparency: fixed and mobile broadband providers must disclose the
network management practices, performance characteristics, and
commercial terms of their broadband services. Second, no blocking:
fixed broadband providers may not block lawful content, applications,
services, or non-harmful devices; mobile broadband providers may not
block lawful Web sites, or block applications that compete with their
voice or video telephony services. Third, no unreasonable
discrimination: fixed broadband providers may not unreasonably
discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic. These rules,
applied with the complementary principle of reasonable network
management, ensure that the freedom and openness that have enabled the
Internet to flourish as an engine for creativity and commerce will
continue. This framework thus provides greater certainty and
predictability to consumers, innovators, investors, and broadband
providers, as well as the flexibility providers need to effectively
manage their networks. The framework promotes a virtuous circle of
innovation and investment in which new uses of the network--including
new content, applications, services, and devices--lead to increased
end-user demand for broadband, which drives network improvements that
in turn lead to further innovative network uses.

DATES: Effective Date: These rules are effective November 20, 2011.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Matt Warner, (202) 418-2419 or e-mail,
matthew.warner@fcc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Report
and Order (Order) in GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52, FCC 10-
201, adopted December 21, 2010 and released December 23, 2010. The
complete text of this document is available on the Commission's Web
site at http://www.fcc.gov. It is also available for inspection and
copying during normal business hours in the FCC Reference Information
Center, Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-A257, Washington, DC
20554. This document may also be purchased from the Commission's
duplicating contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc., 445 12th Street,
SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554, telephone (800) 378-3160 or
(202) 863-2893, facsimile (202) 863-2898, or via e-mail at http://www.bcpiweb.com.

Synopsis of the Order

I. Preserving the Free and Open Internet

    In this Order the Commission takes an important step to preserve
the Internet as an open platform for innovation, investment, job
creation, economic growth, competition, and free expression. To provide
greater clarity and certainty regarding the continued freedom and
openness of the Internet, we adopt three basic rules that are grounded
in broadly accepted Internet norms, as well as our own prior decisions:
    i. Transparency. Fixed and mobile broadband providers must disclose
the network management practices, performance characteristics, and
terms and conditions of their broadband services;
    ii. No blocking. Fixed broadband providers may not block lawful
content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices; mobile
broadband providers may not block lawful Web sites, or block
applications that compete with their voice or video telephony services;
and
    iii. No unreasonable discrimination. Fixed broadband providers may
not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic.

We believe these rules, applied with the complementary principle of
reasonable network management, will empower and protect consumers and
innovators while helping ensure that the Internet continues to
flourish, with robust private investment and rapid innovation at both
the core and the edge of the network. This is consistent with the
National Broadband Plan goal of broadband access that is ubiquitous and
fast, promoting the global competitiveness of the United States.
    In late 2009, we launched a public process to determine whether and
what actions might be necessary to preserve the characteristics that
have allowed the Internet to grow into an indispensable platform
supporting our nation's economy and civic life, and to foster continued
investment in the physical networks that enable the Internet. Since
then, more than 100,000 commenters have provided written input.
Commission staff held several public workshops and convened a
Technological Advisory Process with experts from industry, academia,
and consumer advocacy groups to collect their views regarding key
technical issues related to Internet openness.
    This process has made clear that the Internet has thrived because
of its freedom and openness--the absence of any gatekeeper blocking
lawful uses of the network or picking winners and losers online.
Consumers and innovators do not have to seek permission before they use
the Internet to launch new technologies, start businesses, connect with
friends, or share their views. The Internet is a level playing field.
Consumers can make their own choices about what applications and
services to use and are free to decide what content they want to
access, create, or share with others. This openness promotes
competition. It also enables a self-reinforcing cycle of investment and
innovation in which new uses of the network lead to increased adoption
of broadband, which drives investment and improvements in the network
itself, which in turn lead to further innovative uses of the network
and further investment in content, applications, services, and devices.
A core goal of this Order is to foster and accelerate this cycle of
investment and innovation.
    The record and our economic analysis demonstrate, however, that the
openness of the Internet cannot be taken for granted, and that it faces
real threats. Indeed, we have seen broadband providers endanger the
Internet's openness by blocking or degrading content and applications
without disclosing their practices to end users and edge providers,
notwithstanding the Commission's adoption of open Internet principles
in 2005.\1\ In light of these considerations, as well as the limited
choices most consumers have for broadband service, broadband

[[Page 59193]]

providers' financial interests in telephony and pay television services
that may compete with online content and services, and the economic and
civic benefits of maintaining an open and competitive platform for
innovation and communication, the Commission has long recognized that
certain basic standards for broadband provider conduct are necessary to
ensure the Internet's continued openness. The record also establishes
the widespread benefits of providing greater clarity in this area--
clarity that the Internet's openness will continue, that there is a
forum and procedure for resolving alleged open Internet violations, and
that broadband providers may reasonably manage their networks and
innovate with respect to network technologies and business models. We
expect the costs of compliance with our prophylactic rules to be small,
as they incorporate longstanding openness principles that are generally
in line with current practices and with norms endorsed by many
broadband providers. Conversely, the harms of open Internet violations
may be substantial, costly, and in some cases potentially irreversible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ In this Order we use ``broadband'' and ``broadband Internet
access service'' interchangeably, and ``broadband provider'' and
``broadband Internet access provider'' interchangeably. ``End user''
refers to any individual or entity that uses a broadband Internet
access service; we sometimes use ``subscriber'' or ``consumer'' to
refer to those end users that subscribe to a particular broadband
Internet access service. We use ``edge provider'' to refer to
content, application, service, and device providers, because they
generally operate at the edge rather than the core of the network.
These terms are not mutually exclusive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The rules we proposed in the Open Internet NPRM and those we adopt
in this Order follow directly from the Commission's bipartisan Internet
Policy Statement, adopted unanimously in 2005 and made temporarily
enforceable for certain broadband providers in 2005 and 2007; openness
protections the Commission established in 2007 for users of certain
wireless spectrum; and a notice of inquiry in 2007 that asked, among
other things, whether the Commission should add a principle of
nondiscrimination to the Internet Policy Statement. Our rules build
upon these actions, first and foremost by requiring broadband providers
to be transparent in their network management practices, so that end
users can make informed choices and innovators can develop, market, and
maintain Internet-based offerings. The rules also prevent certain forms
of blocking and discrimination with respect to content, applications,
services, and devices that depend on or connect to the Internet.
    An open, robust, and well-functioning Internet requires that
broadband providers have the flexibility to reasonably manage their
networks. Network management practices are reasonable if they are
appropriate and tailored to achieving a legitimate network management
purpose. Transparency and end-user control are touchstones of
reasonableness.
    We recognize that broadband providers may offer other services over
the same last-mile connections used to provide broadband service. These
``specialized services'' can benefit end users and spur investment, but
they may also present risks to the open Internet. We will closely
monitor specialized services and their effects on broadband service to
ensure, through all available mechanisms, that they supplement but do
not supplant the open Internet.
    Mobile broadband is at an earlier stage in its development than
fixed broadband and is evolving rapidly. For that and other reasons
discussed below, we conclude that it is appropriate at this time to
take measured steps in this area. Accordingly, we require mobile
broadband providers to comply with the transparency rule, which
includes enforceable disclosure obligations regarding device and
application certification and approval processes; we prohibit providers
from blocking lawful Web sites; and we prohibit providers from blocking
applications that compete with providers' voice and video telephony
services. We will closely monitor the development of the mobile
broadband market and will adjust the framework we adopt in this Order
as appropriate.
    These rules are within our jurisdiction over interstate and foreign
communications by wire and radio. Further, they implement specific
statutory mandates in the Communications Act (``Act'') and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (``1996 Act''), including provisions
that direct the Commission to promote Internet investment and to
protect and promote voice, video, and audio communications services.
    The framework we adopt aims to ensure the Internet remains an open
platform--one characterized by free markets and free speech--that
enables consumer choice, end-user control, competition through low
barriers to entry, and the freedom to innovate without permission. The
framework does so by protecting openness through high-level rules,
while maintaining broadband providers' and the Commission's flexibility
to adapt to changes in the market and in technology as the Internet
continues to evolve.

II. The Need for Open Internet Protections

    In the Open Internet NPRM (FCC 09-93 published at 74 FR 62638,
November 30, 2009), we sought comment on the best means for preserving
and promoting a free and open Internet. We noted the near-unanimous
view that the Internet's openness and the transparency of its protocols
have been critical to its unparalleled success. Citing evidence of
broadband providers covertly blocking or degrading Internet traffic,
and concern that broadband providers have the incentive and ability to
expand those practices in the near future, we sought comment on
prophylactic rules designed to preserve the Internet's prevailing norms
of openness. Specifically, we sought comment on whether the Commission
should codify the four principles stated in the Internet Policy
Statement, plus proposed nondiscrimination and transparency rules, all
subject to reasonable network management.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ The Open Internet NPRM recast the Internet Policy Statement
principles as rules rather than consumer entitlements, but did not
change the fact that protecting and empowering end users is a
central purpose of open Internet protections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters agree that the open Internet is an important platform
for innovation, investment, competition, and free expression, but
disagree about whether there is a need for the Commission to take
action to preserve its openness. Commenters who favor Commission action
emphasize the risk of harmful conduct by broadband providers, and
stress that failing to act could result in irreversible damage to the
Internet. Those who favor inaction contend that the Internet generally
is open today and is likely to remain so, and express concern that
rules aimed at preventing harms may themselves impose significant
costs. In this part, we assess these conflicting views. We conclude
that the benefits of ensuring Internet openness through enforceable,
high-level, prophylactic rules outweigh the costs. The harms that could
result from threats to openness are significant and likely
irreversible, while the costs of compliance with our rules should be
small, in large part because the rules appear to be consistent with
current industry practices. The rules are carefully calibrated to
preserve the benefits of the open Internet and increase certainty for
all Internet stakeholders, with minimal burden on broadband providers.

A. The Internet's Openness Promotes Innovation, Investment,
Competition, Free Expression, and Other National Broadband Goals

    Like electricity and the computer, the Internet is a ``general
purpose technology'' that enables new methods of production that have a
major impact on the entire economy. The Internet's founders
intentionally built a network that is open, in the sense that it has no
gatekeepers limiting innovation and

[[Page 59194]]

communication through the network.\3\ Accordingly, the Internet enables
an end user to access the content and applications of her choice,
without requiring permission from broadband providers. This
architecture enables innovators to create and offer new applications
and services without needing approval from any controlling entity, be
it a network provider, equipment manufacturer, industry body, or
government agency. End users benefit because the Internet's openness
allows new technologies to be developed and distributed by a broad
range of sources, not just by the companies that operate the network.
For example, Sir Tim Berners-Lee was able to invent the World Wide Web
nearly two decades after engineers developed the Internet's original
protocols, without needing changes to those protocols or any approval
from network operators. Startups and small businesses benefit because
the Internet's openness enables anyone connected to the network to
reach and do business with anyone else, allowing even the smallest and
most remotely located businesses to access national and global markets,
and contribute to the economy through e-commerce \4\ and online
advertising.\5\ Because Internet openness enables widespread innovation
and allows all end users and edge providers (rather than just the
significantly smaller number of broadband providers) to create and
determine the success or failure of content, applications, services,
and devices, it maximizes commercial and non-commercial innovations
that address key national challenges--including improvements in health
care, education, and energy efficiency that benefit our economy and
civic life.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ The Internet's openness is supported by an ``end-to-end''
network architecture that was formulated and debated in standard-
setting organizations and foundational documents. See, e.g., WCB
Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 17-29, Vinton G. Cerf & Robert E. Kahn,
A Protocol for Packet Network Interconnection, COM-22 IEEE
Transactions of Commc'ns Tech. 637-48 (1974); WCB Letter 12/10/10,
Attach. at 30-39, J.H. Saltzer et al., End to End Arguments in
System Design, Second Int'l Conf. on Distributed Computing Systems,
509-12 (1981); WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 49-55, B. Carpenter,
Internet Engineering Task Force (``IETF''), Architectural Principles
of the Internet, RFC 1958, 1-8 (June 1996), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1958.txt; Lawrence Roberts, Multiple Computer Networks and
Intercomputer Communication, ACM Symposium on Operation System
Principles (1967). Under the end-to-end principle, devices in the
middle of the network are not optimized for the handling of any
particular application, while devices at network endpoints perform
the functions necessary to support networked applications and
services. See generally WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 40-48, J.
Kempf & R. Austein, IETF, The Rise of the Middle and the Future of
End-to-End: Reflections on the Evolution of the Internet
Architecture, RFC 3724, 1-14 (March 2004), ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc3724.txt.
    \4\ Business-to-consumer e-commerce was estimated to total $135
billion in 2009. See WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 81-180, Robert
D. Atkinson et al., The Internet Economy 25 Years After.com, Info.
Tech. & Innovation Found., at 24 (March 2010), available at http://www.itif.org/files/2010-25-years.pdf.
    \5\ The advertising-supported Internet sustains about $300
billion of U.S. GDP. See Google Comments at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Internet's openness is critical to these outcomes, because it
enables a virtuous circle of innovation in which new uses of the
network--including new content, applications, services, and devices--
lead to increased end-user demand for broadband, which drives network
improvements, which in turn lead to further innovative network uses.
Novel, improved, or lower-cost offerings introduced by content,
application, service, and device providers spur end-user demand and
encourage broadband providers to expand their networks and invest in
new broadband technologies.\6\ Streaming video and e-commerce
applications, for instance, have led to major network improvements such
as fiber to the premises, VDSL, and DOCSIS 3.0. These network
improvements generate new opportunities for edge providers, spurring
them to innovate further.\7\ Each round of innovation increases the
value of the Internet for broadband providers, edge providers, online
businesses, and consumers. Continued operation of this virtuous circle,
however, depends upon low barriers to innovation and entry by edge
providers, which drive end-user demand. Restricting edge providers'
ability to reach end users, and limiting end users' ability to choose
which edge providers to patronize, would reduce the rate of innovation
at the edge and, in turn, the likely rate of improvements to network
infrastructure. Similarly, restricting the ability of broadband
providers to put the network to innovative uses may reduce the rate of
improvements to network infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ We note that broadband providers can also be edge providers.
    \7\ For example, the increasing availability of multimedia
applications on the World Wide Web during the 1990s was one factor
that helped create demand for residential broadband services.
Internet service providers responded by adopting new network
infrastructure, modem technologies, and network protocols, and
marketed broadband to residential customers. See, e.g., WCB Letter
12/13/10, Attach. at 250-72, Chetan Sharma, Managing Growth and
Profits in the Yottabyte Era (2009), http://www.chetansharma.com/yottabyteera.htm (Yottabyte). By the late 1990s, a residential end
user could download content at speeds not achievable even on the
Internet backbone during the 1980s. See, e.g., WCB Letter 12/13/10,
Attach. at 226-32, Susan Harris & Elise Gerich, The NSFNET Backbone
Service: Chronicling the End of an Era, 10 ConneXions (April 1996),
available at http://www.merit.edu/networkresearch/projecthistory/nsfnet/nsfnet_article.php. Higher speeds and broadband's ``always
on'' capability, in turn, stimulated more innovation in
applications, from gaming to video streaming, which in turn
encouraged broadband providers to increase network speeds. WCB
Letter 12/13/10, Attach. at 233-34, Link Hoewing, Twitter, Broadband
and Innovation, PolicyBlog, Dec. 4, 2010, policyblog.verizon.com/BlogPost/626/TwitterBroadbandandInnovation.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Openness also is essential to the Internet's role as a platform for
speech and civic engagement. An informed electorate is critical to the
health of a functioning democracy, and Congress has recognized that the
Internet ``offer[s] a forum for a true diversity of political
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad
avenues for intellectual activity.'' Due to the lack of gatekeeper
control, the Internet has become a major source of news and
information, which forms the basis for informed civic discourse. Many
Americans now turn to the Internet to obtain news,\8\ and its openness
makes it an unrivaled forum for free expression. Furthermore, local,
State, and Federal government agencies are increasingly using the
Internet to communicate with the public, including to provide
information about and deliver essential services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ See WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 133-41, Pew Research
Ctr. for People and the Press, Americans Spend More Time Following
the News; Ideological News Sources: Who Watches and Why 17, 22
(Sept. 12, 2010), people-press.org/report/652/ (stating that ``44%
of Americans say they got news through one or more Internet or
mobile digital source yesterday''); WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at
131-32, TVB Local Media Marketing Solutions, Local News: Local TV
Stations are the Top Daily News Source, http://www.tvb.org/planning_buying/120562 (estimating that 61% of Americans get news
from the Internet) (``TVB''). However, according to the Pew Project
for Excellence in Journalism, the majority of news that people
access online originates from legacy media. See Pew Project for
Excellence in Journalism, The State of the News Media: An Annual
Report on American Journalism (2010), http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2010/overview_key_findings.php (``Of news
sites with half a million visitors a month (or the top 199 news
sites once consulting, government and information data bases are
removed), 67% are from legacy media, most of them (48%)
newspapers.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Television and radio broadcasters now provide news and other
information online via their own Web sites, online aggregation Web
sites such as Hulu, and social networking platforms. Local broadcasters
are experimenting with new approaches to delivering original content,
for example by creating neighborhood-focused Web sites; delivering news
clips via online video programming aggregators, including AOL and
Google's YouTube; and offering news from citizen journalists. In
addition, broadcast networks license their full-length entertainment
programs for downloading or streaming to edge providers such as Netflix
and Apple.

[[Page 59195]]

Because these sites are becoming increasingly popular with the public,
online distribution has a strategic value for broadcasters, and is
likely to provide an increasingly important source of funding for
broadcast news and entertainment programming.
    Unimpeded access to Internet distribution likewise has allowed new
video content creators to create and disseminate programs without first
securing distribution from broadcasters and multichannel video
programming distributors (MVPDs) such as cable and satellite television
companies. Online viewing of video programming content is growing
rapidly.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ See Google Comments at 28; Motorola Comments at 5; MPAA
Comments at 5-6; DISH Reply at 4-5; WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at
22-23, Online Video Goes Mainstream, eMarketer, Apr. 28, 2010,
http://www.emarketer.com/Article.aspx?R=1007664 (estimating that 29%
of Internet users younger than 25 say they watch all or most of
their TV online, that as of April 2010 67% of U.S. Internet users
watch online video each month, and that this figure will increase to
77% by 2014); WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 20-21, Chris Nuttall,
Web TVs bigger for manufacturers than 3D, Financial Times, Aug. 29,
2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/0b34043a-9fe3-11df-8cc5-00144feabdc0.html (stating that 28 million Internet-enabled TV sets
are expected to be sold in 2010, an increase of 125% from 2009); WCB
Letter 12/13/10, Attach. at 291-92, Sandvine, News and Events: Press
Releases, http://www.sandvine.com/news/pr_detail.asp?ID=288
(estimating that Netflix represents more than 20% of peak downstream
Internet traffic). Cisco expects online viewing to exert significant
influence on future demand for broadband capacity, ranking as the
top source of Internet traffic by the end of 2010 and accounting for
91% of global Internet traffic by 2014. WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach.
at 40-42, Press Release, Cisco, Annual Cisco Visual Networking Index
Forecast Projects Global IP Traffic To Increase More than Fourfold
by 2014 (June 10, 2010), http://www.cisco.com/web/MT/news/10/news_100610.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the Open Internet NPRM, the Commission sought comment on
possible implications that the proposed rules might have ``on efforts
to close the digital divide and encourage robust broadband adoption and
participation in the Internet community by minorities and other
socially and economically disadvantaged groups.'' As we noted in the
Open Internet NPRM, according to a 2009 study, broadband adoption
varies significantly across demographic groups.\10\ We expect that open
Internet protections will help close the digital divide by maintaining
relatively low barriers to entry for underrepresented groups and
allowing for the development of diverse content, applications, and
services.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ See Pew Internet & Am. Life Project, Home Broadband
Adoption (June 2009). Approximately 14 to 24 million Americans
remain without broadband access capable of meeting the requirements
set forth in Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as
amended. Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and
Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment
Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as
Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act et al., Sixth
Broadband Deployment Report, 25 FCC Rcd 9556, 9557, para. 1 (2010)
(Sixth Broadband Deployment Report).
    \11\ For example, Jonathan Moore founded Rowdy Orbit IPTV, an
online platform featuring original programming for minority
audiences, because he was frustrated by the lack of representation
of people of color in traditional media. Dec. 15, 2009 Workshop Tr.
at 39-40, video available at http://www.openinternet.gov/workshops/speech-democratic-engagement-and-the-open-internet.html. The
Internet's openness--and the low costs of online entry--enables
businesses like Rowdy Orbit to launch without having to gain
approval from traditional media gatekeepers. Id. We will closely
monitor the effects of the open Internet rules we adopt in this
Order on the digital divide and on minority and disadvantaged
consumers. See generally ColorOfChange Comments; Dec. 15, 2009
Workshop Tr. at 52-60 (remarks of Ruth Livier, YLSE); 100 Black Men
of America et al. Comments at 1-2; Free Press Comments at 134-36;
Center for Media Justice et al. Comments at 7-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For all of these reasons, there is little dispute in this
proceeding that the Internet should continue as an open platform.
Accordingly, we consider below whether we can be confident that the
openness of the Internet will be self-perpetuating, or whether there
are threats to openness that the Commission can effectively mitigate.

B. Broadband Providers Have the Incentive and Ability to Limit Internet
Openness

    For purposes of our analysis, we consider three types of Internet
activities: providing broadband Internet access service; providing
content, applications, services, and devices accessed over or connected
to broadband Internet access service (``edge'' products and services);
and subscribing to a broadband Internet access service that allows
access to edge products and services. These activities are not mutually
exclusive. For example, individuals who generate and share content such
as personal blogs or Facebook pages are both end users and edge
providers, and a single firm could both provide broadband Internet
access service and be an edge provider, as with a broadband provider
that offers online video content. Nevertheless, this basic taxonomy
provides a useful model for evaluating the risk and magnitude of harms
from loss of openness.
    The record in this proceeding reveals that broadband providers
potentially face at least three types of incentives to reduce the
current openness of the Internet. First, broadband providers may have
economic incentives to block or otherwise disadvantage specific edge
providers or classes of edge providers, for example by controlling the
transmission of network traffic over a broadband connection, including
the price and quality of access to end users. A broadband provider
might use this power to benefit its own or affiliated offerings at the
expense of unaffiliated offerings.
    Today, broadband providers have incentives to interfere with the
operation of third-party Internet-based services that compete with the
providers' revenue-generating telephony and/or pay-television services.
This situation contrasts with the first decade of the public Internet,
when dial-up was the primary form of consumer Internet access.
Independent companies such as America Online, CompuServe, and Prodigy
provided access to the Internet over telephone companies' phone lines.
As broadband has replaced dial-up, however, telephone and cable
companies have become the major providers of Internet access service.
Online content, applications, and services available from edge
providers over broadband increasingly offer actual or potential
competitive alternatives to broadband providers' own voice and video
services, which generate substantial profits. Interconnected Voice-
over-Internet-Protocol (VoIP) services, which include some over-the-top
VoIP services,\12\ ``are increasingly being used as a substitute for
traditional telephone service,'' \13\ and over-the-top

[[Page 59196]]

VoIP services represent a significant share of voice-calling minutes,
especially for international calls. Online video is rapidly growing in
popularity, and MVPDs have responded to this trend by enabling their
video subscribers to use the Internet to view their programming on
personal computers and other Internet-enabled devices. Online video
aggregators such as Netflix, Hulu, YouTube, and iTunes that are
unaffiliated with traditional MVPDs continue to proliferate and
innovate, offering movies and television programs (including broadcast
programming) on demand, and earning revenues from advertising and/or
subscriptions. Several MVPDs have stated publicly that they view these
services as a potential competitive threat to their core video
subscription service. Thus, online edge services appear likely to
continue gaining subscribers and market significance,\14\ which will
put additional competitive pressure on broadband providers' own
services. By interfering with the transmission of third parties'
Internet-based services or raising the cost of online delivery for
particular edge providers, telephone and cable companies can make those
services less attractive to subscribers in comparison to their own
offerings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ The Commission's rules define interconnected VoIP as ``a
service that: (1) Enables real-time, two-way voice communications;
(2) requires a broadband connection from the user's location; (3)
requires Internet protocol-compatible customer premises equipment
(CPE); and (4) permits users generally to receive calls that
originate on the public switched telephone network and to terminate
calls to the public switched telephone network.'' 47 CFR 9.3. Over-
the-top VoIP services require the end user to obtain broadband
transmission from a third-party provider, and providers of over-the-
top VoIP can vary in terms of the extent to which they rely on their
own facilities. See SBC Commc'ns Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applications
for Approval of Transfer of Control, WC Docket No, 05-65, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 20 FCC Rcd 18290, 18337-38, para. 86 (2005).
    \13\ Tel. Number Requirements for IP-Enabled Servs. Providers,
Report and Order, Declaratory Ruling, Order on Remand, and NPRM, 22
FCC Rcd 19531, 19547, para. 28 (2007); see also Vonage Comments at
3-4. In merger reviews and forbearance petitions, the Commission has
found the record ``inconclusive regarding the extent to which
various over-the-top VoIP services should be included in the
relevant product market for [mass market] local services.'' See,
e.g., Verizon Commc'ns Inc. and MCI, Inc. Application for Approval
of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 FCC Rcd
18433, 18480, para. 89 (2005); see also Petition of Qwest Corp. for
Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. sec. 160(c) in the Phoenix,
Arizona Metropolitan Statistical Area, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
25 FCC Rcd 8622, 8650, para. 54 (2010) (Qwest Phoenix Order). In
contrast to those proceedings, we are not performing a market power
analysis in this proceeding, so we need not and do not here
determine with specificity whether, and to what extent, particular
over-the-top VoIP services constrain particular practices and/or
rates of services governed by Section 201. Cf. Qwest Phoenix Order,
25 FCC Rcd at 8647-48, paras. 46-47 (discussing the general approach
to product market definition); id. at 8651-52, paras. 55-56
(discussing the need for evidence that one service constrains the
price of another service to include them in the same product market
for purposes of a market power analysis).
    \14\ See, e.g., WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 5763, Ryan
Fleming, New Report Shows More People Dropping Cable TV for Web
Broadcasts, Digital Trends, Apr. 16, 2010, available at http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/new-report-shows-that-more-and-more-people-are-dropping-cable-tv-in-favor-of-web-broadcasts. Congress
recently recognized these developments by expanding disabilities
access requirements to include advanced communications services. See
Twenty-First Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act,
Public Law 111-260; see also 156 CONG. REC. 6005 (daily ed. July 26,
2010) (remarks of Rep. Waxman) (this legislation before us * * *
ensur[es] that Americans with disabilities can access the latest
communications technology.); id. at 6004 (remarks of Rep. Markey)
(``[T]he bill we are considering today significantly increases
accessibility for Americans with disabilities to the indispensable
telecommunications * * * tools of the 21st century.''); Letter from
Rick Chessen, NCTA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket
No. 09-191 at 2 n.6 (filed Dec. 10, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, a broadband provider may act to benefit edge providers
that have paid it to exclude rivals (for example, if one online video
site were to contract with a broadband provider to deny a rival video
site access to the broadband provider's subscribers). End users would
be harmed by the inability to access desired content, and this conduct
could lead to reduced innovation and fewer new services.\15\ Consistent
with these concerns, delivery networks that are vertically integrated
with content providers, including some MVPDs, have incentives to favor
their own affiliated content.\16\ If broadband providers had
historically favored their own affiliated businesses or those incumbent
firms that paid for advantageous access to end users, some innovative
edge providers that have today become major Internet businesses might
not have been able to survive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ See generally WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 23-27, Steven
C. Salop & David Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Cost, 73 Am. Econ. Rev.
267-71 (1983); WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 1-23, Steven C. Salop
& Thomas Krattenmaker, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals'
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 214 (1986). See also
Andrew I. Gavil et al., Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases,
Concepts and Problems in Competition Policy 1153-92 (2d ed. 2008)
(describing how policies fostering competition spur innovation). To
similar effect, a broadband provider may raise access fees to
disfavored edge providers, reducing their ability to profit by
raising their costs and limiting their ability to compete with
favored edge providers.
    \16\ See Google Comments at 30-31; Netflix Comments at 7 n.10;
Vonage Reply at 4; WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 28-78, Austan
Goolsbee, Vertical Integration and the Market for Broadcast and
Cable Television Programming, Paper for the Federal Communications
Commission 31-32 (Sept. 5, 2007) (Goolsbee Study) (finding that
MVPDs excluded networks that were rivals of affiliated channels for
anticompetitive reasons). Cf. WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 85-87,
David Waterman & Andrew Weiss, Vertical Integration in Cable
Television 142-143 (1997) (MVPD exclusion of unaffiliated content
during an earlier time period); see also H.R. Rep. 102-628 (2d
Sess.) at 41 (1992) (``The Committee received testimony that
vertically integrated companies reduce diversity in programming by
threatening the viability of rival cable programming services.'').
In addition to the examples of actual misconduct that we provide,
the Goolsbee Study provides empirical evidence that cable providers
have acted in the past on anticompetitive incentives to foreclose
rivals, supporting our concern that these and other broadband
providers would act on analogous incentives in the future. We thus
disagree that we rely on ``speculative harms alone'' or have failed
to adduce ``empirical evidence.'' Baker Statement at * 1, * 4
(citing AT&T Reply Exh. 2 at 45 (J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece,
Innovation Spillovers and the ``Dirt Road'' Fallacy: The
Intellectual Bankruptcy of Banning Optional Transactions for
Enhanced Delivery over the Internet, 6 J. Competition L. & Econ.
521, 571-72 (2010)). To the contrary, the empirical evidence and the
misconduct that we describe below validate the economic theories
that inform our decision in this Order. Moreover, as we explain
below, by comparison to the benefits of the prophylactic measures we
adopt, the costs associated with these open Internet rules are
likely small.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, broadband providers may have incentives to increase
revenues by charging edge providers, who already pay for their own
connections to the Internet, for access or prioritized access to end
users. Although broadband providers have not historically imposed such
fees, they have argued they should be permitted to do so. A broadband
provider could force edge providers to pay inefficiently high fees
because that broadband provider is typically an edge provider's only
option for reaching a particular end user.\17\ Thus broadband providers
have the ability to act as gatekeepers.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ Some end users can be reached through more than one
broadband connection, sometimes via the same device (e.g., a
smartphone that has Wi-Fi and cellular connectivity). Even so, the
end user, not the edge provider, chooses which broadband provider
the edge provider must rely on to reach the end user.
    \18\ Also known as a ``terminating monopolist.'' See, e.g., CCIA
Comments at 7; Skype Comments at 10-11; Vonage Comments at 9-10;
Google Reply at 8-14. A broadband provider can act as a gatekeeper
even if some edge providers would have bargaining power in
negotiations with broadband providers over access or prioritization
fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Broadband providers would be expected to set inefficiently high
fees to edge providers because they receive the benefits of those fees
but are unlikely to fully account for the detrimental impact on edge
providers' ability and incentive to innovate and invest, including the
possibility that some edge providers might exit or decline to enter the
market. The unaccounted-for harms to innovation are negative
externalities,\19\ and are likely to be particularly large because of
the rapid pace of Internet innovation, and wide-ranging because of the
role of the Internet as a general purpose technology. Moreover, fees
for access or prioritized access could trigger an ``arms race'' within
a given edge market segment. If one edge provider pays for access or
prioritized access to end users, subscribers may tend to favor that
provider's services, and competing edge providers may feel that they
must respond by paying, too.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ A broadband provider may hesitate to impose costs on its
own subscribers, but it will typically not take into account the
effect that reduced edge provider investment and innovation has on
the attractiveness of the Internet to end users that rely on other
broadband providers--and will therefore ignore a significant
fraction of the cost of foregone innovation. See, e.g., OIC Comments
at 20-24. If the total number of broadband subscribers shrinks,
moreover, the social costs unaccounted for by the broadband provider
could also include the lost ability of the remaining end users to
connect with the subscribers that departed (foregone direct network
effects) and a smaller potential audience for edge providers. See,
e.g., id. at 23. Broadband providers are also unlikely to fully
account for the open Internet's power to enhance civic discourse
through news and information, or for its ability to enable
innovations that help address key national challenges such as
education, public safety, energy efficiency, and health care. See
ARL et al. Comments at 3; Google Reply at 39; American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, Public Law 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Fees for access or prioritization to end users could reduce the
potential profit

[[Page 59197]]

that an edge provider would expect to earn from developing new
offerings, and thereby reduce edge providers' incentives to invest and
innovate.\20\ In the rapidly innovating edge sector, moreover, many new
entrants are new or small ``garage entrepreneurs,'' not large and
established firms. These emerging providers are particularly sensitive
to barriers to innovation and entry, and may have difficulty obtaining
financing if their offerings are subject to being blocked or
disadvantaged by one or more of the major broadband providers. In
addition, if edge providers need to negotiate access or prioritized
access fees with broadband providers,\21\ the resulting transaction
costs could further raise the costs of introducing new products and
might chill entry and expansion.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ See, e.g., ALA Comments at 3-4; ColorOfChange Comments at
3; Free Press Comments at 69; Google Comments at 34; Netflix
Comments at 4; OIC Comments at 29-30; DISH Reply at 10. Such fees
could also reduce an edge provider's incentive to invest in existing
offerings, assuming the fees would be expected to increase to the
extent improvements increased usage of the edge provider's
offerings.
    \21\ Negotiations impose direct expenses and delay. See Google
Comments at 34. There may also be significant costs associated with
the possibility that the negotiating parties would reach an impasse.
See ALA Comments at 2 (``The cable TV industry offers a telling
example of the `pay to play' environment where some cable companies
do not offer their customers access to certain content because the
company has not successfully negotiated financial compensation with
the content provider.''). Edge providers may also bear costs arising
from their need to monitor the extent to which they actually receive
prioritized delivery.
    \22\ See, e.g., Google Comments at 34-35; Shane Greenstein
Notice of Ex Parte, GN Docket No. 09-191, Transaction Cost,
Transparency, and Innovation for the Internet at 19, available at
http://www.openinternet.gov/workshops/innovation-investment-and-the-open-internet.html; van Schewick Jan. 19, 2010 Ex Parte Letter,
Opening Statement at 7 (arguing that the low costs of innovation not
only make many more applications worth pursuing, but also allow a
large and diverse group of people to become innovators, which in
turn increases the overall amount and quality of innovation). There
are approximately 1,500 broadband providers in the United States.
See Wireline Competition Bureau, FCC, Internet Access Services:
Status as of December 31, 2009 at 7, tbl. 13 (Dec. 2010) (FCC
Internet Status Report), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2010/db1208/DOC-303405A1.pdf. The
innovative process frequently generates a large number of attempts,
only a few of which turn out to be highly successful. Given the
likelihood of failure, and that financing is not always readily
available to support research and development, the innovation
process in many sectors of the Internet's edge is likely to be
highly sensitive to the upfront costs of developing and introducing
new products. PIC Comments at 50 (``[I]t is unlikely that new
entrants will have the ability (both financially and with regard to
information) to negotiate with every ISP that serves the markets
that they are interested in.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters argue that an end user's ability to switch
broadband providers eliminates these problems. But many end users may
have limited choice among broadband providers, as discussed below.
Moreover, those that can switch broadband providers may not benefit
from switching if rival broadband providers charge edge providers
similarly for access and priority transmission and prioritize each edge
provider's service similarly. Further, end users may not know whether
charges or service levels their broadband provider is imposing on edge
providers vary from those of alternative broadband providers, and even
if they do have this information may find it costly to switch. For
these reasons, a dissatisfied end user, observing that some edge
provider services are subject to low transmission quality, might not
switch broadband providers (though they may switch to a rival edge
provider in the hope of improving quality).
    Some commenters contend that, in the absence of open Internet
rules, broadband providers that earn substantial additional revenue by
assessing access or prioritization charges on edge providers could
avoid increasing or could reduce the rates they charge broadband
subscribers, which might increase the number of subscribers to the
broadband network. Although this scenario is possible,\23\ no broadband
provider has stated in this proceeding that it actually would use any
revenue from edge provider charges to offset subscriber charges. In
addition, these commenters fail to account for the likely detrimental
effects of access and prioritization charges on the virtuous circle of
innovation described above. Less content and fewer innovative offerings
make the Internet less attractive for end users than would otherwise be
the case. Consequently, we are unable to conclude that the possibility
of reduced subscriber charges outweighs the risks of harm described
herein.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\  Economics literature recognizes that access charges could
be harmful under some circumstances and beneficial under others.
See, e.g., WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 1-62, E. Glen Weyl, A
Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms, 100 Am. Econ. Rev. 1642,
1642-72 (2010) (the effects of allowing broadband providers to
charge terminating rates to content providers are ambiguous); see
also WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 180-215, John Musacchio et al.,
A Two-Sided Market Analysis of Provider Investment Incentives with
an Application to the Net-Neutrality Issue, 8 Rev. of Network Econ.
22, 22-39 (2009) (noting that there are conditions under which ``a
zero termination price is socially beneficial''). Moreover, the
economic literature on two-sided markets is at an early stage of
development. AT&T Comments, Exh. 3, Schwartz Decl. at 16; Jeffrey A.
Eisenach (Eisenach) Reply at 11-12; cf., e.g., WCB Letter 12/10/10,
Attach. at 156-79, Mark Armstrong, Competition in Two-Sided Markets,
37 Rand J. of Econ. 668 (2006); WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 216-
302, Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-
Sided Markets, 1 J. Eur. Econ. Ass'n 990 (2003).
    \24\ Indeed, demand for broadband Internet access service might
decline even if subscriber fees fell, if the conduct of broadband
providers discouraged demand by blocking end user access to
preferred edge providers, slowing non-prioritized transmission, and
breaking the virtuous circle of innovation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, if broadband providers can profitably charge edge providers
for prioritized access to end users, they will have an incentive to
degrade or decline to increase the quality of the service they provide
to non-prioritized traffic. This would increase the gap in quality
(such as latency in transmission) between prioritized access and non-
prioritized access, induce more edge providers to pay for prioritized
access, and allow broadband providers to charge higher prices for
prioritized access. Even more damaging, broadband providers might
withhold or decline to expand capacity in order to ``squeeze'' non-
prioritized traffic, a strategy that would increase the likelihood of
network congestion and confront edge providers with a choice between
accepting low-quality transmission or paying fees for prioritized
access to end users.
    Moreover, if broadband providers could block specific content,
applications, services, or devices, end users and edge providers would
lose the control they currently have over whether other end users and
edge providers can communicate with them through the Internet. Content,
application, service, and device providers (and their investors) could
no longer assume that the market for their offerings included all U.S.
end users. And broadband providers might choose to implement
undocumented practices for traffic differentiation that undermine the
ability of developers to create generally usable applications without
having to design to particular broadband providers' unique practices or
business arrangements.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ See OIC Comments at 24; Free Press Comments at 45. The
transparency and reasonable network management guidelines we adopt
in this Order, in particular, should reduce the likelihood of such
fragmentation of the Internet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All of the above concerns are exacerbated by broadband providers'
ability to make fine-grained distinctions in their handling of network
traffic as a result of increasingly sophisticated network management
tools. Such tools may be used for beneficial purposes, but they also
increase broadband providers' ability to act on incentives to engage in

[[Page 59198]]

network practices that would erode Internet openness.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ See CCIA/CEA Comments at 4; Free Press Comments at 29-30,
143-46; Google Comments at 32-34; Netflix Comments at 3; OIC
Comments at 14, 79-82; DISH Reply at 8-9; IPI Reply at 9; Vonage
Reply at 5. For examples of network management tools, see, for
example, WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 1-8, Allot Service Gateway,
Pushing the DPI Envelope: An Introduction, at 2 (June 2007),
available at http://www.sysob.com/download/AllotServiceGateway.pdf
(``Reduce the performance of applications with negative influence on
revenues (e.g. competitive VoIP services).''); WCB Letter 12/13/10,
Attach. at 289-90, Procera Networks, PLR, http://www.proceranetworks.com/customproperties/tag/Products-PLR.html; WCB
Letter 12/13/10, Attach. at 283-88, Cisco, http//:www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/ps7045/ps6129/ps6133/ps6150/prod_brochure0900aecd8025258e.pdf (marketing the ability of equipment to
identify VoIP, video, and other traffic types). Vendors market their
offerings as enabling broadband providers to ``make only modest
incremental infrastructure investments and to control operating
costs.'' WCB Letter 12/13/10, Attach. at 283, Cisco.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although these threats to Internet-enabled innovation, growth, and
competition do not depend upon broadband providers having market power
with respect to end users,\27\ most would be exacerbated by such market
power. A broadband provider's incentive to favor affiliated content or
the content of unaffiliated firms that pay for it to do so, its
incentive to block or degrade traffic or charge edge providers for
access to end users, and its incentive to squeeze non-prioritized
transmission will all be greater if end users are less able to respond
by switching to rival broadband providers. The risk of market power is
highest in markets with few competitors, and most residential end users
today have only one or two choices for wireline broadband Internet
access service. As of December 2009, nearly 70 percent of households
lived in census tracts where only one or two wireline or fixed wireless
firms provided advertised download speeds of at least 3 Mbps and upload
speeds of at least 768 Kbps \28\--the closest observable benchmark to
the minimum download speed of 4 Mbps and upload speed of 1 Mbps that
the Commission has used to assess broadband deployment. About 20
percent of households are in census tracts with only one provider
advertising at least 3 Mbps down and 768 Kbps up. For Internet service
with advertised download speeds of at least 10 Mbps down and upload
speeds of at least 1.5 Mbps up, nearly 60 percent of households lived
in census tracts served by only one wireline or fixed wireless
broadband provider, while nearly 80 percent lived in census tracts
served by no more than two wireline or fixed wireless broadband
providers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ Because broadband providers have the ability to act as
gatekeepers even in the absence of market power with respect to end
users, we need not conduct a market power analysis.
    \28\ See FCC Internet Status Report at 7, fig. 3(a). A broadband
provider's presence in a census tract does not mean it offers
service to all potential customers within that tract. And the data
reflect subscriptions, not network capability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Including mobile broadband providers does not appreciably change
these numbers.\29\ The roll-out of next generation mobile services is
at an early stage, and the future of competition in residential
broadband is unclear.\30\ The record does not enable us to make a
predictive judgment that the future will be more competitive than the
past. Although wireless providers are increasingly offering faster
broadband services, we do not know, for example, how end users will
value the trade-offs between the benefits of wireless service (e.g.,
mobility) and the benefits of fixed wireline service (e.g., higher
download and upload speeds).\31\ We note that the two largest mobile
broadband providers also offer wireline or fixed service; \32\ this
could dampen their incentive to compete aggressively with wireline (or
fixed) services.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ In December 2009, nearly 60% of households lived in census
tracts where no more than two broadband providers offered service
with 3 Mbps down and 768 Kbps up, while no mobile broadband
providers offered service with 10 Mbps down and 1.5 Mbps up. Id. at
8, fig. 3(b). Mobile broadband providers generally have offered
bandwidths lower than those available from fixed providers. See
Yottabyte at 13-14.
    \30\ See National Broadband Plan at 40-42. A number of
commenters discuss impediments to increased competition. See, e.g.,
Ad Hoc Comments at 9; Google Comments, at 18-22; IFTA Comments at
10-11; see also WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 9-16, Thomas Monath
et al., Economics of Fixed Broadband Network Strategies, 41 IEEE
Comm. Mag. 132, 132-39 (Sept. 2003).
    \31\ See Ad Hoc Comments at 9; Google Comments at 21; Vonage
Comments at 8; IPI Reply at 14; WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 56-
65, Vikram Chandrasekhar & Jeffrey G. Andrews, Femtocell Networks: A
Survey, 46 IEEE Comm. Mag., Sept. 2008, 59, at 59-60 (explaining
mobile spectrum alone cannot compete with wireless connections to
fixed networks). We also do not know how offers by a single wireless
broadband provider for both fixed and mobile broadband services will
perform in the marketplace.
    \32\ See OIC Comments at 71-72. Large cable companies that
provide fixed broadband also have substantial ownership interests in
Clear, the 4G wireless venture in which Sprint has a majority
ownership interest.
    \33\ OIC Comments at 71-72; Skype Comments at 10. In cellular
telephony, multimarket conduct has been found to dampen competition.
See WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 1-24, P.M. Parker and L.H.
R[ouml]ller, Collusive conduct in duopolies: Multimarket contact and
cross ownership in the mobile telephone industry, 28 Rand J. Of
Econ. 304, 304-322 (Summer 1997); WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at
25-58, Meghan R. Busse, Multimarket contact and price coordination
in the cellular telephone industry, 9 J. of Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy
287, 287-320 (Fall 2000). Moreover, some fixed broadband providers
also provide necessary inputs to some mobile providers' offerings,
such as backhaul transport to wireline facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, customers may incur significant costs in switching
broadband providers \34\ because of early termination fees; \35\ the
inconvenience of ordering, installation, and set-up, and associated
deposits or fees; possible difficulty returning the earlier broadband
provider's equipment and the cost of replacing incompatible customer-
owned equipment; the risk of temporarily losing service; the risk of
problems learning how to use the new service; and the possible loss of
a provider-specific e-mail address or Web site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ ARL et al. Comments at 5; Google Comments at 21-22; Netflix
Comments at 5; New Jersey Rate Counsel (NJRC) Comments at 17; OIC
Comments at 40, 73; PIC Comments at 23; Skype Comments at 12; OIC
Reply at 20-21; Paul Misener (Amazon.com) Comments at 2; see also
WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 59-76, Patrick Xavier & Dimitri
Ypsilanti, Switching Costs and Consumer Behavior: Implications for
Telecommunications Regulation, 10(4) Info 2008, 13, 13-29 (2008).
Churn is a function of many factors. See, e.g., WCB Letter 12/10/10,
Attach. at 1-53, 97-153, AT&T Comments, WT Docket No. 10-133, at 51
(Aug. 2, 2010). The evidence in the record, e.g., AT&T Comments at
83, is not probative as to the extent of competition among broadband
providers because it does not appropriately isolate a connection
between churn levels and the extent of competition.
    \35\ Google Comments at 21-22. Of broadband end users with a
choice of broadband providers, 32% said paying termination fees to
their current provider was a major reason why they have not switched
service. FCC, Broadband Decision: What Drives Consumers to Switch--
Or Stick With--Their Broadband Internet Provider 8 (Dec. 2010) (FCC
Internet Survey), available at hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-303264A1.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Broadband Providers Have Acted To Limit Openness

    These dangers to Internet openness are not speculative or merely
theoretical. Conduct of this type has already come before the
Commission in enforcement proceedings. As early as 2005, a broadband
provider that was a subsidiary of a telephone company paid $15,000 to
settle a Commission investigation into whether it had blocked Internet
ports used for competitive VoIP applications. In 2008, the Commission
found that Comcast disrupted certain peer-to-peer (P2P) uploads of its
subscribers, without a reasonable network management justification and
without disclosing its actions. Comparable practices have been observed
in the provision of mobile broadband services. After entering into a
contract with a company to handle online payment services, a mobile
wireless provider allegedly blocked customers' attempts to use
competing services to make purchases using their mobile phones. A
nationwide mobile provider restricted the types of lawful applications
that could be accessed over its 3G mobile wireless network.

[[Page 59199]]

    There have been additional allegations of blocking, slowing, or
degrading P2P traffic. We do not determine in this Order whether any of
these practices violated open Internet principles, but we note that
they have raised concerns among edge providers and end users,
particularly regarding lack of transparency. For example, in May 2008 a
major cable broadband provider acknowledged that it had managed the
traffic of P2P services. In July 2009, another cable broadband provider
entered into a class action settlement agreement stating that it had
``ceased P2P Network Management Practices,'' but allowing the provider
to resume throttling P2P traffic.\36\ There is evidence that other
broadband providers have engaged in similar degradation.\37\ In
addition, broadband providers' terms of service commonly reserve to the
provider sweeping rights to block, degrade, or favor traffic. For
example, one major cable provider reserves the right to engage,
``without limitation,'' in ``port blocking, * * * traffic
prioritization and protocol filtering.'' Further, a major mobile
broadband provider prohibits use of its wireless service for
``downloading movies using peer-to-peer file sharing services'' and
VoIP applications. And a cable modem manufacturer recently filed a
formal complaint with the Commission alleging that a major broadband
Internet access service provider has violated open Internet principles
through overly restrictive device approval procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ See RCN Settlement Agreement sec. 3.2. RCN denied any
wrongdoing, but it acknowledges that in order to ease network
congestion, it targeted specific P2P applications. See Letter from
Jean L. Kiddo, RCN, to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No.
09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 2-5 (filed May 7, 2010).
    \37\ A 2008 study by the Max Planck Institute revealed
significant blocking of BitTorrent applications in the United
States. Comcast and Cox were both cited as examples of providers
blocking traffic. See generally WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 75-
80, Marcel Dischinger et al., Max Planck Institute, Detecting
BitTorrent Blocking (2008), available at broadband.mpi-sws.org/transparency/results/08_imc_blocking.pdf; see also WCB Letter 12/
13/10, Attach. at 235-39, Max Planck Institute for Software Systems,
Glasnost: Results from Tests for BitTorrent Traffic Blocking,
broadband.mpi-sws.org/transparency/results; WCB Letter 12/13/10,
Attach. at 298-315, Christian Kreibich et al., Netalyzr:
Illuminating Edge Network Neutrality, Security, and Performance 15
(2010), available at http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/pubs/techreports/TR-10-006.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These practices have occurred notwithstanding the Commission's
adoption of open Internet principles in the Internet Policy Statement;
enforcement proceedings against Madison River Communications and
Comcast for their interference with VoIP and P2P traffic, respectively;
Commission orders that required certain broadband providers to adhere
to open Internet obligations; longstanding norms of Internet openness;
and statements by major broadband providers that they support and are
abiding by open Internet principles.

D. The Benefits of Protecting the Internet's Openness Exceed the Costs

    Widespread interference with the Internet's openness would likely
slow or even break the virtuous cycle of innovation that the Internet
enables, and would likely cause harms that may be irreversible or very
costly to undo. For example, edge providers could make investments in
reliance upon exclusive preferential arrangements with broadband
providers, and network management technologies may not be easy to
change.\38\ If the next revolutionary technology or business is not
developed because broadband provider practices chill entry and
innovation by edge providers, the missed opportunity may be
significant, and lost innovation, investment, and competition may be
impossible to restore after the fact. Moreover, because of the
Internet's role as a general purpose technology, erosion of Internet
openness threatens to harm innovation, investment in the core and at
the edge of the network, and competition in many sectors, with a
disproportionate effect on small, entering, and non-commercial edge
providers that drive much of the innovation on the Internet.\39\
Although harmful practices are not certain to become widespread, there
are powerful reasons for immediate concern, as broadband providers have
interfered with the open Internet in the past and have incentives and
an increasing ability to do so in the future. Effective open Internet
rules can prevent or reduce the risk of these harms, while helping to
assure Americans unfettered access to diverse sources of news,
information, and entertainment, as well as an array of technologies and
devices that enhance health, education, and the environment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ As one example, Comcast's transition to a protocol-agnostic
network management practice took almost nine months to complete. See
Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, V.P., Regulatory Affairs, Comcast
Corp., to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 07-52 at 2
(filed July 10, 2008); Letter from Kathryn A. Zachem, V.P.,
Regulatory Affairs, Comcast Corp., to Marlene Dortch, Secretary,
FCC, WC Docket No. 07-52 at Attach. B at 3, 9 (filed Sept. 19, 2008)
(noting that the transition required ``lab tests, technical trials,
customer feedback, vendor evaluations, and a third-party consulting
analysis,'' as well as trials in five markets).
    \39\ See, e.g., ALA Comments at 2; IFTA Comments at 14. Even
some who generally oppose open Internet rules agree that extracting
access fees from entities that produce content or services without
the anticipation of financial reward would have significant adverse
effects. See WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 35-80, C. Scott
Hemphill, Network Neutrality and the False Promise of Zero-Price
Regulation, 25 Yale J. on Reg. 135, 161-62 (2008) (``[S]ocial
production has distinctive features that make it unusually valuable,
but also unusually vulnerable, to a particular form of exclusion.
That mechanism of exclusion is not subject to the prohibitions of
antitrust law, moreover, presenting a relatively stronger argument
for regulation.''), cited in Prof. Tim Wu Comments at 9 n.22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    By comparison to the benefits of these prophylactic measures, the
costs associated with the open Internet rules adopted here are likely
small. Broadband providers generally endorse openness norms--including
the transparency and no blocking principles--as beneficial and in line
with current and planned business practices (though they do not
uniformly support rules making them enforceable).\40\ Even to the
extent rules require some additional disclosure of broadband providers'
practices, the costs of compliance should be modest. In addition, the
high-level rules we adopt carefully balance preserving the open
Internet against avoiding unduly burdensome regulation. Our rules
against blocking and unreasonable discrimination are subject to
reasonable network management, and our rules do not prevent broadband
providers from offering specialized services such as facilities-based
VoIP. In short, rules that reinforce the openness that has supported
the growth of the Internet, and do not substantially change this highly
successful status quo, should not entail significant compliance costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ We note that many broadband providers are, or soon will be,
subject to open Internet requirements in connection with grants
under the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP). The
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 required that
nondiscrimination and network interconnection obligations be
``contractual conditions'' of all BTOP grants. Public Law 111-5,
sec. 6001(j), 123 Stat. 115 (codified at 47 U.S.C. sec. 1305). These
nondiscrimination and interconnection conditions require BTOP
grantees, among other things, to adhere to the principles in the
Internet Policy Statement; to display any network management
policies in a prominent location on the service provider's Web site;
and to offer interconnection where technically feasible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters contend that open Internet rules are likely to
reduce investment in broadband deployment. We disagree. There is no
evidence that prior open Internet obligations have discouraged
investment; \41\ and

[[Page 59200]]

numerous commenters explain that, by preserving the virtuous circle of
innovation, open Internet rules will increase incentives to invest in
broadband infrastructure. Moreover, if permitted to deny access, or
charge edge providers for prioritized access to end users, broadband
providers may have incentives to allow congestion rather than invest in
expanding network capacity. And as described in Part III, below, our
rules allow broadband providers sufficient flexibility to address
legitimate congestion concerns and other network management
considerations. Nor is there any persuasive reason to believe that in
the absence of open Internet rules broadband providers would lower
charges to broadband end users, or otherwise change their practices in
ways that benefit innovation, investment, competition, or end users.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ See, e.g., Free Press Comments at 4, 23-25; Google Comments
at 38-39; XO Comments at 12. In making prior investment decisions,
broadband providers could not have reasonably assumed that the
Commission would abstain from regulating in this area, as the
Commission's decisions classifying cable modem service and wireline
broadband Internet access service as information services included
notices of proposed rulemaking seeking comment on whether the
Commission should adopt rules to protect consumers. See Appropriate
Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline
Facilities et al., Report and Order and NPRM, 20 FCC Rcd 14853,
14929-35, paras. 146-59 (2005); Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access
to the Internet Over Cable & Other Facilities et al., Declaratory
Ruling and NPRM, 17 FCC-- Rcd 4798, 4839-48, paras. 72-95 (2002)
(seeking comment on whether the Commission should require cable
operators to give unaffiliated ISPs access to broadband cable
networks); see also AT&T Comments at 8 (``[T]he existing principles
already address any blocking or degradation of traffic and thus
eliminate any theoretical leverage providers may have to impose
[unilateral `tolls'].'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The magnitude and character of the risks we identify make it
appropriate to adopt prophylactic rules now to preserve the openness of
the Internet, rather than waiting for substantial, pervasive, and
potentially irreversible harms to occur before taking any action. The
Supreme Court has recognized that even if the Commission cannot
``predict with certainty'' the future course of a regulated market, it
may ``plan in advance of foreseeable events, instead of waiting to
react to them.'' Moreover, as the Commission found in another context,
``[e]xclusive reliance on a series of individual complaints,'' without
underlying rules, ``would prevent the Commission from obtaining a clear
picture of the evolving structure of the entire market, and addressing
competitive concerns as they arise. * * * Therefore, if the Commission
exclusively relied on individual complaints, it would only become aware
of specific * * * problems if and when the individual complainant's
interests coincided with those of the interest of the overall `public.'
''
    Finally, we note that there is currently significant uncertainty
regarding the future enforcement of open Internet principles and what
constitutes appropriate network management, particularly in the wake of
the court of appeals' vacatur of the Comcast Network Management
Practices Order. A number of commenters, including leading broadband
providers, recognize the benefits of greater predictability regarding
open Internet protections.\42\ Broadband providers benefit from
increased certainty that they can reasonably manage their networks and
innovate with respect to network technologies and business models. For
those who communicate and innovate on the Internet, and for investors
in edge technologies, there is great value in having confidence that
the Internet will remain open, and that there will be a forum available
to bring complaints about violations of open Internet standards.\43\
End users also stand to benefit from assurances that services on which
they depend ``won't suddenly be pulled out from under them, held ransom
to extra payments either from the sites or from them.'' Providing clear
yet flexible rules of the road that enable the Internet to continue to
flourish is the central goal of the action we take in this Order.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ For example, AT&T has recognized that open Internet rules
``would reduce regulatory uncertainty, and should encourage
investment and innovation in next generation broadband services and
technologies.'' See WCB Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 94, AT&T
Statement on Proposed FCC Rules to Preserve an Open Internet, AT&T
Public Policy Blog, Dec. 1, 2010, attpublicpolicy.com/government-policy/att-statement-on-proposed-fcc-rules-to-preserve-an-open-internet. Similarly, Comcast acknowledged that our proposed rules
would strike ``a workable balance between the needs of the
marketplace and the certainty that carefully-crafted and limited
rules can provide to ensure that Internet freedom and openness are
preserved.'' See David L. Cohen, FCC Proposes Rules to Preserve an
Open Internet, comcastvoices, Dec. 1, 2010, blog.comcast.com/2010/12/fcc-proposes-rules-to-preserve-an-open-internet.html; see also,
e.g., Final Brief for Intervenors NCTA and NBC Universal, Inc. at
11-13; 19-22, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (DC Cir. 2010) (No.
08-1291). In addition to broadband providers, an array of industry
leaders, venture capitalists, and public interest groups have
concluded that our rules will promote investment in the Internet
ecosystem by removing regulatory uncertainty. See Free Press
Comments at 10; Google Comments at 40; PIC Comments at 28; WCB
Letter 12/10/10, Attach. at 91 (statement of CALinnovates.org), 96
(statement of Larry Cohen, president of the Communications Workers
of America), 98 (statement of Ron Conway, founder of SV Angel), 99
(statement of Craig Newmark, founder of craigslist), 105 (statement
of Dean Garfield, president and CEO of the Information Technology
Industry Council), 111 (Dec. 8, 2010 letter from Jeremy Liew,
Managing Director, Lightspeed Venture Partners to Julius
Genachowski, FCC Chairman), 112 (Dec. 1, 2010 letter from Jed Katz,
Managing Director, Javelin Venture Partners to Julius Genachowski,
FCC Chairman), 127 (statement of Gary Shapiro, president and CEO of
the Consumer Electronics Association), 128 (statement of Ram
Shriram, founder of Sherpalo Ventures), 132 (statements of Rey
Ramsey, President and CEO of TechNet, and John Chambers, Chairman
and CEO of Cisco), 133 (statement of John Doerr, Kleiner Perkins
Caufield & Byers); XO Reply at 6.
    \43\ For this reason, we are not persuaded that alternative
approaches, such as rules that lack a formal enforcement mechanism,
a transparency rule alone, or reliance entirely on technical
advisory groups to resolve disputes, would adequately address the
potential harms and be less burdensome than the rules we adopt here.
See, e.g., Verizon Comments at 130-34. In particular, we reject the
notion that Commission action is unnecessary because the Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ``are well
equipped to cure any market ills.'' Id. at 9. Our statutory
responsibilities are broader than preventing antitrust violations or
unfair competition. See, e.g., News Corp. and DIRECTV Group, Inc.,
23 FCC Rcd 3265, 3277-78, paras. 23-25 (2008). We must, for example,
promote deployment of advanced telecommunications capability, ensure
that charges in connection with telecommunications services are just
and reasonable, ensure the orderly development of local television
broadcasting, and promote the public interest through spectrum
licensing. See CDT Comments at 8-9; Comm'r Jon Liebowitz, FTC,
Concurring Statement of Commissioner Jon Leibowitz Regarding the
Staff Report: ``Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy'' (2007),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/V070000statement.pdf (``[T]here is little agreement over whether
antitrust, with its requirements for ex post case by case analysis,
is capable of fully and in a timely fashion resolving many of the
concerns that have animated the net neutrality debate.'').
    \44\ Contrary to the suggestion of some, neither the Department
of Justice nor the FTC has concluded that the broadband market is
competitive or that open Internet rules are unnecessary. See
McDowell Statement at *4; Baker Statement at *3. In the submission
in question, the Department observed that: (1) The wireline
broadband market is highly concentrated, with most consumers served
by at most two providers; (2) the prospects for additional wireline
competition are dim due to the high fixed and sunk costs required to
provide wireline broadband service; and (3) the extent to which
mobile wireless offerings will compete with wireline offerings is
unknown. See DOJ Ex Parte Jan. 4, 2010, GN Dkt. No. 09-51, at 8, 10,
13-14. The Department specifically endorsed requiring greater
transparency by broadband providers, id. at 25-27, and recognized
that in concentrated markets, like the broadband market, it is
appropriate for policymakers to limit ``business practices that
thwart innovation.'' Id. at 11. Finally, although the Department
cautioned that care must be taken to avoid stifling infrastructure
investment, it expressed particular concern about price regulation,
which we are not adopting. Id. at 28. In 2007, the FTC issued a
staff report on broadband competition policy. See FTC, Broadband
Connectivity Competition Policy (June 2007). Like the Department,
the FTC staff did not conclude that the broadband market is
competitive. To the contrary, the FTC staff made clear that it had
not studied the state of competition in any specific markets. Id. at
8, 105, 156. With regard to the merits of open Internet rules, the
FTC staff report recited arguments pro and con, see, e.g., id. at
82, 105, 147-54, and called for additional study, id. at 7, 9-10,
157.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Open Internet Rules

    To preserve the Internet's openness and broadband providers'
ability to manage and expand their networks, we adopt high-level rules
embodying four core principles: transparency, no blocking, no
unreasonable discrimination, and reasonable network management. These
rules are generally consistent with, and should not require

[[Page 59201]]

significant changes to, broadband providers' current practices, and are
also consistent with the common understanding of broadband Internet
access service as a service that enables one to go where one wants on
the Internet and communicate with anyone else online.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ The definition of ``broadband Internet access service''
proposed in the Open Internet NPRM encompassed any ``Internet
Protocol data transmission between an end user and the Internet.''
Open Internet NPRM, 24 FCC Rcd at 13128, App. A. Some commenters
argued that this definition would cover a variety of services that
do not constitute broadband Internet access service as end users and
broadband providers generally understand that term, but that merely
offer data transmission between a discrete set of Internet endpoints
(for example, virtual private networks, or videoconferencing
services). See, e.g., AT&T Comments at 96-100; Communications
Workers of America (CWA) Comments at 10-12; Sprint Reply at 16-17;
see also CDT Comments at 49-50 (distinguishing managed (or
specialized) services from broadband Internet access service by
defining the former, in part, as data transmission ``between an end
user and a limited group of parties or endpoints'') (emphasis
added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Scope of the Rules

    We find that open Internet rules should apply to ``broadband
Internet access service,'' which we define as:

    A mass-market retail service by wire or radio that provides the
capability to transmit data to and receive data from all or
substantially all Internet endpoints, including any capabilities
that are incidental to and enable the operation of the
communications service, but excluding dial-up Internet access
service. This term also encompasses any service that the Commission
finds to be providing a functional equivalent of the service
described in the previous sentence, or that is used to evade the
protections set forth in this Part.

The term ``broadband Internet access service'' includes services
provided over any technology platform, including but not limited to
wire, terrestrial wireless (including fixed and mobile wireless
services using licensed or unlicensed spectrum), and satellite.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ In the Open Internet NPRM, we proposed separate definitions
of the terms ``broadband Internet access,'' and ``broadband Internet
access service.'' Open Internet NPRM, 24 FCC Rcd at 13128, App. A
sec. 8.3. For purposes of these rules, we find it simpler to define
just the service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ``Mass market'' means a service marketed and sold on a standardized
basis to residential customers, small businesses, and other end-user
customers such as schools and libraries. For purposes of this
definition, ``mass market'' also includes broadband Internet access
services purchased with the support of the E-rate program that may be
customized or individually negotiated. The term does not include
enterprise service offerings, which are typically offered to larger
organizations through customized or individually negotiated
arrangements.
    ``Broadband Internet access service'' encompasses services that
``provide the capability to transmit data to and receive data from all
or substantially all Internet endpoints.'' To ensure the efficacy of
our rules in this dynamic market, we also treat as a ``broadband
Internet access service'' any service the Commission finds to be
providing a functional equivalent of the service described in the
previous sentence, or that is used to evade the protections set forth
in these rules.
    A key factor in determining whether a service is used to evade the
scope of the rules is whether the service is used as a substitute for
broadband Internet access service. For example, an Internet access
service that provides access to a substantial subset of Internet
endpoints based on end users preference to avoid certain content,
applications, or services; Internet access services that allow some
uses of the Internet (such as access to the World Wide Web) but not
others (such as e-mail); or a ``Best of the Web'' Internet access
service that provides access to 100 top Web sites could not be used to
evade the open Internet rules applicable to ``broadband Internet access
service.'' Moreover, a broadband provider may not evade these rules
simply by blocking end users' access to some Internet endpoints.
Broadband Internet access service likely does not include services
offering connectivity to one or a small number of Internet endpoints
for a particular device, e.g., connectivity bundled with e-readers,
heart monitors, or energy consumption sensors, to the extent the
service relates to the functionality of the device.\47\ Nor does
broadband Internet access service include virtual private network
services, content delivery network services, multichannel video
programming services, hosting or data storage services, or Internet
backbone services (if those services are separate from broadband
Internet access service). These services typically are not mass market
services and/or do not provide the capability to transmit data to and
receive data from all or substantially all Internet endpoints.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ To the extent these services are provided by broadband
providers over last-mile capacity shared with broadband Internet
access service, they would be specialized services.
    \48\ We also note that our rules apply only as far as the limits
of a broadband provider's control over the transmission of data to
or from its broadband customers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although one purpose of our open Internet rules is to prevent
blocking or unreasonable discrimination in transmitting online traffic
for applications and services that compete with traditional voice and
video services, we determine that open Internet rules applicable to
fixed broadband providers should protect all types of Internet traffic,
not just voice or video Internet traffic. This reflects, among other
things, our view that it is generally preferable to neither require nor
encourage broadband providers to examine Internet traffic in order to
discern which traffic is subject to the rules. Even if we were to limit
our rules to voice or video traffic, moreover, it is unlikely that
broadband providers could reliably identify such traffic in all
circumstances, particularly if the voice or video traffic originated
from new services using uncommon protocols.\49\ Indeed, limiting our
rules to voice and video traffic alone could spark a costly and
wasteful cat-and-mouse game in which edge providers and end users
seeking to obtain the protection of our rules could disguise their
traffic as protected communications.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ This is true notwithstanding the increasing sophistication
of network management tools, described above in Part II.B. See
Arthur Callado et al., A Survey on Internet Traffic Identification,
11 IEEE Commnc'ns Surveys & Tutorials 37, 49 (2009).
    \50\ See IETF, Reflections on Internet Transparency, RFC 4924 at
5 (Jul. 2007) (RFC 4924) (``In practice, filtering intended to block
or restrict application usage is difficult to successfully implement
without customer consent, since over time developers will tend to
re-engineer filtered protocols so as to avoid the filters. Thus over
time, filtering is likely to result in interoperability issues or
unnecessary complexity. These costs come without the benefit of
effective filtering. * * *''); IETF, Considerations on the Use of a
Service Identifier in Packet Headers, RFC 3639 at 3 (Oct. 2003) (RFC
3639) (``Attempts by intermediate systems to impose service-based
controls on communications against the perceived interests of the
end parties to the communication are often circumvented. Services
may be tunneled within other services, proxied by a collaborating
external host (e.g., an anonymous redirector), or simply run over an
alternate port (e.g., port 8080 vs port 80 for HTTP).''). Cf. RFC
3639 at 4 (``From this perspective of network and application
utility, it is preferable that no action or activity be undertaken
by any agency, carrier, service provider, or organization which
would cause end-users and protocol designers to generally obscure
service identification information from the IP packet header.'').
Our rules are nationwide and do not vary by geographic area,
notwithstanding potential variations across local markets for
broadband Internet access service. Uniform national rules create a
more predictable policy environment for broadband providers, many of
which offer services in multiple geographic areas. See, e.g., Level
3 Comments at 13; Charter Comments at iv. Edge providers will
benefit from uniform treatment of their traffic in different
localities and by different broadband providers. Broadband end users
will also benefit from uniform rules, which protect them regardless
of where they are located or which broadband provider they obtain
service from.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We recognize that there is one Internet (although it is comprised
of a multitude of different networks), and that it should remain open
and

[[Page 59202]]

interconnected regardless of the technologies and services end users
rely on to access it. However, for reasons discussed in Part III.E
below related to mobile broadband--including the fact that it is at an
earlier stage and more rapidly evolving--we apply open Internet rules
somewhat differently to mobile broadband than to fixed broadband at
this time. We define ``fixed broadband Internet access service'' as a
broadband Internet access service that serves end users primarily at
fixed endpoints using stationary equipment, such as the modem that
connects an end user's home router, computer, or other Internet access
device to the network. This term encompasses fixed wireless broadband
services (including services using unlicensed spectrum) and fixed
satellite broadband services. We define ``mobile broadband Internet
access service'' as a broadband Internet access service that serves end
users primarily using mobile stations. Mobile broadband Internet access
includes services that use smartphones as the primary endpoints for
connection to the Internet.\51\ The discussion in this Part applies to
both fixed and mobile broadband, unless specifically noted. Part III.E
further discusses application of open Internet rules to mobile
broadband.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ We note that Section 337(f)(1) of the Act excludes public
safety services from the definition of mobile broadband Internet
access service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For a number of reasons, these rules apply only to the provision of
broadband Internet access service and not to edge provider activities,
such as the provision of content or applications over the Internet.
First, the Communications Act particularly directs us to prevent harms
related to the utilization of networks and spectrum to provide
communication by wire and radio. Second, these rules are an outgrowth
of the Commission's Internet Policy Statement.\52\ The Statement was
issued in 2005 when the Commission removed key regulatory protections
from DSL service, and was intended to protect against the harms to the
open Internet that might result from broadband providers' subsequent
conduct. The Commission has always understood those principles to apply
to broadband Internet access service only, as have most private-sector
stakeholders.\53\ Thus, insofar as these rules translate existing
Commission principles into codified rules, it is appropriate to limit
the application of the rules to broadband Internet access service.
Third, broadband providers control access to the Internet for their
subscribers and for anyone wishing to reach those subscribers.\54\ They
are therefore capable of blocking, degrading, or favoring any Internet
traffic that flows to or from a particular subscriber.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ When the Commission adopted the Internet Policy Statement,
it promised to incorporate the principles into ``ongoing
policymaking activities.'' Internet Policy Statement, 20 FCC Rcd at
14988, para. 5.
    \53\ See, e.g., Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to
the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Report and Order and Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd 14853, 14976 (2005) (Wireline
Broadband Order) (separate statement of Chairman Martin); id. at
14980 (Statement of Commissioner Copps, concurring); id. at 14983
(Statement of Commissioner Adelstein, concurring); Verizon June 8,
2009 Comments, GN Docket No. 09-51, at 86 (``These principles have
helped to guide wireline providers' practices and to ensure that
consumers' expectations for their public Internet access services
are met.''). The Commission has conditioned wireline broadband
provider merger approvals on the merged entity's compliance with
these obligations. See, e.g., SBC Commc'ns Inc. and AT&T Corp.
Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 20 FCC Rcd 18290, 18392, para. 211 (2005).
    \54\ We thus find broadband providers distinguishable from other
participants in the Internet marketplace. See, e.g., Verizon
Comments at 36-39 (discussing a variety of other participants in the
Internet ecosystem); Verizon Reply at 36-37 (same); NCTA Comments at
47-49 (same); NCTA Reply at 22 (same).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We also do not apply these rules to dial-up Internet access service
because telephone service has historically provided the easy ability to
switch among competing dial-up Internet access services. Moreover, the
underlying dial-up Internet access service is subject to protections
under Title II of the Communications Act. The Commission's
interpretation of those protections has resulted in a market for dial-
up Internet access that does not present the same concerns as the
market for broadband Internet access. No commenters suggested extending
open Internet rules to dial-up Internet access service.
    Finally, we decline to apply our rules directly to coffee shops,
bookstores, airlines, and other entities when they acquire Internet
service from a broadband provider to enable their patrons to access the
Internet from their establishments (we refer to these entities as
``premise operators'').\55\ These services are typically offered by the
premise operator as an ancillary benefit to patrons. However, to
protect end users, we include within our rules broadband Internet
access services provided to premise operators for purposes of making
service available to their patrons.\56\ Although broadband providers
that offer such services are subject to open Internet rules, we note
that addressing traffic unwanted by a premise operator is a legitimate
network management purpose.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and
Broadband Access and Services, First Report and Order and Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd 14989, 15006-07, para. 36,
n.99 (2005) (CALEA Order). Consistent with the Commission's approach
in the CALEA Order, ``[w]e note * * * that the provider of
underlying [broadband service] facilities to such an establishment
would be subject to [the rules].'' Id. at 15007, para. 36.
    \56\ We note that the premise operator that purchases the
Internet service remains the end user for purposes of our rules,
however. Moreover, although not bound by our rules, we encourage
premise operators to disclose relevant restrictions on broadband
service they make available to their patrons.
    \57\ We also do not include within the rules free access to
individuals' wireless networks, even if those networks are
intentionally made available to others. See Electronic Frontier
Foundation (EFF) Comments at 25-28. No commenter argued that open
Internet rules should apply to individual operators of wireless
networks in these circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Transparency

    Promoting competition throughout the Internet ecosystem is a
central purpose of these rules. Effective disclosure of broadband
providers' network management practices and the performance and
commercial terms of their services promotes competition--as well as
innovation, investment, end-user choice, and broadband adoption--in at
least five ways. First, disclosure ensures that end users can make
informed choices regarding the purchase and use of broadband service,
which promotes a more competitive market for broadband services and can
thereby reduce broadband providers' incentives and ability to violate
open Internet principles.\58\ Second, and relatedly, as end users'
confidence in broadband providers' practices increases, so too should
end users' adoption of broadband services--leading in turn to
additional investment in Internet infrastructure as contemplated by
Section 706 of the 1996 Act and other provisions of the communications
laws.\59\ Third,

[[Page 59203]]

disclosure supports innovation, investment, and competition by ensuring
that startups and other edge providers have the technical information
necessary to create and maintain online content, applications,
services, and devices, and to assess the risks and benefits of
embarking on new projects. Fourth, disclosure increases the likelihood
that broadband providers will abide by open Internet principles, and
that the Internet community will identify problematic conduct and
suggest fixes.\60\ Transparency thereby increases the chances that
harmful practices will not occur in the first place and that, if they
do, they will be quickly remedied, whether privately or through
Commission oversight. Fifth, disclosure will enable the Commission to
collect information necessary to assess, report on, and enforce the
other open Internet rules. For all of these reasons, most commenters
agree that informing end users, edge providers, and the Commission
about the network management practices, performance, and commercial
terms of broadband Internet access service is a necessary and
appropriate step to help preserve an open Internet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ Broadband providers may have an incentive not to provide
such information to end users, as doing so can lessen switching
costs for end users. Third-party information sources such as
Consumer Reports and the trade press do not routinely provide such
information. See CDT Comments at 31; CWA Comments at 21; DISH
Comments at 2; Google Comments at ii, 64-66; Level 3 Comments at 13;
Sandoval Reply at 60. Economic literature in this area also confirms
that policies requiring firms to disclose information generally
benefit competition and consumers. See, e.g., Mark Armstrong,
Interactions Between Competition and Consumer Policy, 4 Competition
Policy Int'l 97 113-16 (Spring 2008), eprints.ucl.ac.uk/7634/1/7634.pdf.
    \59\ See PIC Reply at 16-18; Free Press Comments at 43-45; Ad
Hoc Comments at ii; CDT Comments at 5-7; ALA Comments at 3; National
Hispanic Media Coalition (NHMC) Comments at 8; National Broadband
Plan at 168, 174 (lack of trust in Internet is significant factor
preventing non-adopters from subscribing to broadband services); 47
U.S.C. secs. 151, 230, 254, 1302. A recent FCC survey found that
among non-broadband end users, 46% believed that the Internet is
dangerous for kids, and 57% believed that it was too easy for
personal information to be stolen online. John B. Horrigan, FCC
Survey: Broadband Adoption & Use in America 17 (Mar. 2010),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/DiversityFAC/032410/consumer-survey-horrigan.pdf.
    \60\ On a number of occasions, broadband providers have blocked
lawful traffic without informing end users or edge providers. In
addition to the Madison River and Comcast-BitTorrent incidents
described above, broadband providers appear to have covertly blocked
thousands of BitTorrent uploads in the United States throughout
early 2008. See Marcel Dischinger et al.; Catherine Sandoval,
Disclosure, Deception, and Deep-Packet Inspection, 78 Fordham L.
Rev. 641, 666-84 (2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Open Internet NPRM sought comment on what end users and edge
providers need to know about broadband service, how this information
should be disclosed, when disclosure should occur, and where
information should be available. The resulting record supports adoption
of the following rule:

    A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access
service shall publicly disclose accurate information regarding the
network management practices, performance, and commercial terms of
its broadband Internet access services sufficient for consumers to
make informed choices regarding use of such services and for
content, application, service, and device providers to develop,
market, and maintain Internet offerings.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ For purposes of these rules, ``consumer'' includes any
subscriber to the broadband provider's broadband Internet access
service, and ``person'' includes any ``individual, group of
individuals, corporation, partnership, association, unit of
government or legal entity, however organized,'' cf. 47 CFR
54.8(a)(6). We also expect broadband providers to disclose
information about the impact of ``specialized services,'' if any, on
last-mile capacity available for, and the performance of, broadband
Internet access service.

    The rule does not require public disclosure of competitively
sensitive information or information that would compromise network
security or undermine the efficacy of reasonable network management
practices.\62\ For example, a broadband provider need not publicly
disclose information regarding measures it employs to prevent spam
practices at a level of detail that would enable a spammer to defeat
those measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ Commenters disagree on the risks of requiring disclosure of
information regarding technical, proprietary, and security-related
management practices. Compare, e.g., American Cable Association
(ACA) Comments at 17; AFTRA et al. Comments at ii, 16; Cox Comments
at 11; Fiber-to-the-Home Council (FTTH) Comments at 3, 27; Libove
Comments at 4; Sprint Comments at 16; T-Mobile Comments at 39, with,
e.g., Free Press Comments at 117-18; Free Press Reply at 17-19;
Digital Education Coalition (DEC) Comments at 14; NJRC Comments at
20-21. We may subsequently require disclosure of such information to
the Commission; to the extent we do, we will ensure that such
information is protected consistent with existing Commission
procedures for treatment of confidential information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Despite broad agreement that broadband providers should disclose
information sufficient to enable end users and edge providers to
understand the capabilities of broadband services, commenters disagree
about the appropriate level of detail required to achieve this goal. We
believe that at this time the best approach is to allow flexibility in
implementation of the transparency rule, while providing guidance
regarding effective disclosure models. We expect that effective
disclosures will likely include some or all of the following types of
information, timely and prominently disclosed in plain language
accessible to current and prospective end users and edge providers, the
Commission, and third parties who wish to monitor network management
practices for potential violations of open Internet principles: \63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ In setting forth the following categories of information
subject to the transparency principle, we assume that the broadband
provider has chosen to offer its services on standardized terms,
although providers of ``information services'' are not obligated to
do so. If the provider tailors its terms of service to meet the
requirements of an individual end user, those terms must at a
minimum be disclosed to the end user in accordance with the
transparency principle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Network Practices
     Congestion Management: If applicable, descriptions of
congestion management practices; types of traffic subject to practices;
purposes served by practices; practices' effects on end users'
experience; criteria used in practices, such as indicators of
congestion that trigger a practice, and the typical frequency of
congestion; usage limits and the consequences of exceeding them; and
references to engineering standards, where appropriate.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ We note that the description of congestion management
practices provided by Comcast in the wake of the Comcast-BitTorrent
incident likely satisfies the transparency rule with respect to
congestion management practices. See Comcast, Network Management
Update, http://www.comcast.net/terms/network/update; Comcast,
Comcast Corporation Description of Planned Network Management
Practices to be Deployed Following the Termination of Current
Practices, downloads.comcast.net/docs/Attachment_B_Future_Practices.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Application-Specific Behavior: If applicable, whether and
why the provider blocks or rate-controls specific protocols or protocol
ports, modifies protocol fields in ways not prescribed by the protocol
standard, or otherwise inhibits or favors certain applications or
classes of applications.
     Device Attachment Rules: If applicable, any restrictions
on the types of devices and any approval procedures for devices to
connect to the network. (For further discussion of required disclosures
regarding device and application approval procedures for mobile
broadband providers, see infra.)
     Security: If applicable, practices used to ensure end-user
security or security of the network, including types of triggering
conditions that cause a mechanism to be invoked (but excluding
information that could reasonably be used to circumvent network
security).
Performance Characteristics
     Service Description: A general description of the service,
including the service technology, expected and actual access speed and
latency, and the suitability of the service for real-time applications.
     Impact of Specialized Services: If applicable, what
specialized services, if any, are offered to end users, and whether and
how any specialized services may affect the last-mile capacity
available for, and the performance of, broadband Internet access
service.
Commercial Terms
     Pricing: For example, monthly prices, usage-based fees,
and fees for early termination or additional network services.
     Privacy Policies: For example, whether network management
practices entail inspection of network traffic, and

[[Page 59204]]

whether traffic information is stored, provided to third parties, or
used by the carrier for non-network management purposes.
     Redress Options: Practices for resolving end-user and edge
provider complaints and questions.

We emphasize that this list is not necessarily exhaustive, nor is it a
safe harbor--there may be additional information, not included above,
that should be disclosed for a particular broadband service to comply
with the rule in light of relevant circumstances. Broadband providers
should examine their network management practices and current
disclosures to determine what additional information, if any, should be
disclosed to comply with the rule.
    In the Open Internet NPRM, we proposed that broadband providers
publicly disclose their practices on their Web sites and in promotional
materials. Most commenters agree that a provider's Web site is a
natural place for end users and edge providers to find disclosures, and
several contend that a broadband provider's only obligation should be
to post its practices on its Web site. Others assert that disclosures
should also be displayed prominently at the point-of-sale, in bill
inserts, and in the service contract. We agree that broadband providers
must, at a minimum, prominently display or provide links to disclosures
on a publicly available, easily accessible Web site that is available
to current and prospective end users and edge providers as well as to
the Commission, and must disclose relevant information at the point of
sale. Current end users must be able to easily identify which
disclosures apply to their service offering. Broadband providers'
online disclosures shall be considered disclosed to the Commission for
purposes of monitoring and enforcement. We may require additional
disclosures directly to the Commission.
    We anticipate that broadband providers may be able to satisfy the
transparency rule through a single disclosure, and therefore do not at
this time require multiple disclosures targeted at different
audiences.\65\ We also decline to adopt a specific format for
disclosures, and instead require that disclosure be sufficiently clear
and accessible to meet the requirements of the rule.\66\ We will,
however, continue to monitor compliance with this rule, and may require
adherence to a particular set of best practices in the future.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ But we expect that broadband providers will make
disclosures in a manner accessible by people with disabilities.
    \66\ Some commenters advocate for a standard disclosure format.
See, e.g., Adam Candeub et al. Reply at 7; Level 3 Comments at 13;
Sprint Comments at 17. Others support a plain language requirement.
See, e.g., NATOA Comments at 7; NJRC Comments at 19; IFTA Comments
at 16. Other commenters, however, argue against the imposition of a
standard format as inflexible and difficult to implement. See, e.g.,
Cox Comments at 10; National Telecommunications Cooperative
Association (NTCA) Comments at 9; Qwest Comments at 11. The approach
we adopt is similar to the approach adopted in the Commission's
Truth-in-Billing Proceeding, where we set out basic guidelines.
Truth-in-Billing and Billing Format, First Report and Order and
Further NPRM, 14 FCC Rcd 7492, 7495-96, paras. 3-5 (1999).
    \67\ We may address this issue as part of a separate, ongoing
proceeding regarding transparency for communications services more
generally. Consumer Information and Disclosure, Notice of Inquiry,
FCC 09-68 (rel. Aug. 28, 2010). Relatedly, the Commission has begun
an effort, in partnership with broadband providers, to measure the
actual speed and performance of broadband service, and we expect
that the data generated by this effort will inform Commission
efforts regarding disclosure. See Comment Sought on Residential
Fixed Broadband Services Testing and Measurement Solution, Pleading
Cycle Established, Public Notice, 25 FCC Rcd 3836 (2010) (SamKnows
project); Comment Sought on Measurement of Mobile Broadband Network
Performance and Coverage, Public Notice, 25 FCC Rcd 7069 (2010)
(same).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although some commenters assert that a disclosure rule will impose
significant burdens on broadband providers, no commenter cites any
particular source of increased costs, or attempts to estimate costs of
compliance. For a number of reasons, we believe that the costs of the
disclosure rule we adopt in this Order are outweighed by the benefits
of empowering end users and edge providers to make informed choices and
of facilitating the enforcement of the other open Internet rules.
First, we require only that providers post disclosures on their Web
sites and provide disclosure at the point of sale, not that they bear
the cost of printing and distributing bill inserts or other paper
documents to all existing customers.\68\ Second, although we may
subsequently determine that it is appropriate to require that specific
information be disclosed in particular ways, the transparency rule we
adopt in this Order gives broadband providers some flexibility to
determine what information to disclose and how to disclose it. We also
expressly exclude from the rule competitively sensitive information,
information that would compromise network security, and information
that would undermine the efficacy of reasonable network management
practices. Third, as discussed below, by setting the effective date of
these rules as November 20, 2011, we give broadband providers adequate
time to develop cost effective methods of compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ In a separate proceeding, the Commission has determined
that the costs of making disclosure materials available on a service
provider's Web site are outweighed by the public benefits where the
disclosure requirement applies only to entities already using the
Internet for other purposes. See Standardized and Enhanced
Disclosure Requirements for Television Broadcast Licensee Public
Interest Obligations, Report and Order, 23 FCC Rcd 1274, 1277-78,
paras. 7-10 (2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A key purpose of the transparency rule is to enable third-party
experts such as independent engineers and consumer watchdogs to monitor
and evaluate network management practices, in order to surface concerns
regarding potential open Internet violations. We also note the
existence of free software tools that enable Internet end users and
edge providers to monitor and detect blocking and discrimination by
broadband providers.\69\ Although current tools cannot detect all
instances of blocking or discrimination and cannot substitute for
disclosure of network management policies, such tools may help
supplement the transparency rule we adopt in this Order.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ See Sandoval Comments at 4-5. For example, the Max Planck
Institute analyzed data collected by the Glasnost tool from
thousands of end user, and found that broadband providers were
discriminating against application-specific traffic. See WCB Letter
12/13/10, Attach. at 235-39, Max Planck Institute for Software
Systems, Glasnost: Results from Tests for BitTorrent Traffic
Blocking, broadband.mpi-sws.org/transparency/results. Netalyzr is a
National Science Foundation-funded project that tests a wide range
of network characteristics. See International Computer Science
Institute, Netalyzer, netalyzr.icsi.berkeley.edu. Similar tools are
being developed for mobile broadband services. See, e.g., WindRider,
Mobile Network Neutrality Monitoring System, http://
www.cs.northwestern.edu/~ict992/mobile.htm.
    \70\ For an example of a public-private partnership that could
encourage the development of new tools to assess network management
practices, see FCC Open Internet Apps Challenge, http://www.openinternet.gov/challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although transparency is essential for preserving Internet
openness, we disagree with commenters that suggest it is alone
sufficient to prevent open Internet violations. The record does not
convince us that a transparency requirement by itself will adequately
constrain problematic conduct, and we therefore adopt two additional
rules, as discussed below.

C. No Blocking and No Unreasonable Discrimination

1. No Blocking
    The freedom to send and receive lawful content and to use and
provide applications and services without fear of blocking is essential
to the Internet's openness and to competition in adjacent markets such
as voice communications and video and audio programming. Similarly, the
ability to connect and use

[[Page 59205]]

any lawful devices that do not harm the network helps ensure that end
users can enjoy the competition and innovation that result when device
manufacturers can depend on networks' openness.\71\ Moreover, the no-
blocking principle has been broadly accepted since its inclusion in the
Commission's Internet Policy Statement. Major broadband providers
represent that they currently operate consistent with this principle
and are committed to continuing to do so.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ The Commission has long protected end users' rights to
attach lawful devices that do not harm communications networks. See,
e.g., Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone
Service, 13 FCC 2d 420, 424 (1968); Amendment of Section 64.702 of
the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry),
Final Decision, 77 FCC 2d 384, 388 (1980); see also Michael T.
Hoeker, From Carterfone to the iPhone: Consumer Choice in the
Wireless Telecommunications Marketplace, 17 CommLaw Conspectus 187,
192 (2008); Kevin Werbach, The Federal Computer Commission, 84 N.C.
L. Rev. 1, 21 (2005).
    \72\ As Qwest states, ``Qwest and virtually all major broadband
providers have supported the FCC Internet Policy Principles and
voluntarily abide by those principles as good policy.'' Qwest PN
Comments at 2-3, 5; see also, e.g., Comcast Comments at 27;
Clearwire Comments at 1; Margaret Boles, AT&T on Comcast v. FCC
Decision, AT&T Pub. Pol'y Blog (Apr. 6, 2010), attpublicpolicy.com/broadband-policy/att-statement-on-comcast-v-fcc-decision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the Open Internet NPRM, the Commission proposed codifying the
original three Internet Policy Statement principles that addressed
blocking of content, applications and services, and devices. After
consideration of the record, we consolidate the proposed rules into a
single rule for fixed broadband providers: \73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ As described below, we adopt a tailored version of this
rule for mobile broadband providers.

    A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet
access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not
block lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
devices, subject to reasonable network management.

    The phrase ``content, applications, services'' refers to all
traffic transmitted to or from end users of a broadband Internet access
service, including traffic that may not fit cleanly into any of these
categories.\74\ The rule protects only transmissions of lawful content,
and does not prevent or restrict a broadband provider from refusing to
transmit unlawful material such as child pornography.\75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ See William Lehr et al. Comments at 27 (``While the
proposed rules of the FCC appear to make a clear distinction between
applications and services on the one hand (rule 3) and content (rule
1), we believe that there will be some activities that do not fit
cleanly into these two categories''); PIC Comments at 39; RFC 4924
at 5. For this reason the rule may prohibit the blocking of a port
or particular protocol used by an application, without blocking the
application completely, unless such practice is reasonable network
management. See Distributed Computing Industry Ass'n (DCIA) Comments
at 7 (discussing work-arounds by P2P companies facing port blocking
or other practices); Sandvine Reply at 3; RFC 4924. The rule also is
neutral with respect to where in the protocol stack or in the
network blocking could occur.
    \75\ The ``no blocking'' rule does not impose any independent
legal obligation on broadband Internet access service providers to
be the arbiter of what is lawful. See, e.g., WISPA Comments at 12-
13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We also note that the rule entitles end users to both connect and
use any lawful device of their choice, provided such device does not
harm the network.\76\ A broadband provider may require that devices
conform to widely accepted and publicly-available standards applicable
to its services.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ We note that MVPDs, pursuant to Section 629 and the
Commission's implementing regulations, are already subject to
similar requirements that give end users the right to attach devices
to an MVPD system provided that the attached equipment does not
cause electronic or physical harm or assist in the unauthorized
receipt of service. See Implementation of Section 304 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Commercial Availability of
Navigation Devices, Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 14775 (1998); 47
U.S.C.. 549; 47 CFR 76.1201-03. Nothing in this Order is intended to
alter those existing rules.
    \77\ For example, a DOCSIS-based broadband provider is not
required to support a DSL modem. See ACA Comments at 13-14; see also
Satellite Broadband Commenters Comments at 8-9 (noting that an
antenna and associated modem must comply with equipment and protocol
standards set by satellite companies, but that ``consumers can
[then] attach * * * any personal computer or wireless router they
wish'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We make clear that the no-blocking rule bars broadband providers
from impairing or degrading particular content, applications, services,
or non-harmful devices so as to render them effectively unusable
(subject to reasonable network management).\78\ Such a prohibition is
consistent with the observation of a number of commenters that
degrading traffic can have the same effects as outright blocking, and
that such an approach is consistent with the traditional interpretation
of the Internet Policy Statement. The Commission has recognized that in
some circumstances the distinction between blocking and degrading (such
as by delaying) traffic is merely ``semantic.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ We do not find it appropriate to interpret our rule to
impose a blanket prohibition on degradation of traffic more
generally. Congestion ordinarily results in degradation of traffic,
and such an interpretation could effectively prohibit broadband
providers from permitting congestion to occur on their networks.
Although we expect broadband providers to continue to expand the
capacity of their networks--and we believe our rules help ensure
that they continue to have incentives to do so--we recognize that
some network congestion may be unavoidable. See, e.g., AT&T Comments
at 65; TWC Comments at 16-18; Internet Freedom Coalition Reply at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some concerns have been expressed that broadband providers may seek
to charge edge providers simply for delivering traffic to or carrying
traffic from the broadband provider's end-user customers. To the extent
that a content, application, or service provider could avoid being
blocked only by paying a fee, charging such a fee would not be
permissible under these rules.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ We do not intend our rules to affect existing arrangements
for network interconnection, including existing paid peering
arrangements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. No Unreasonable Discrimination
    Based on our findings that fixed broadband providers have
incentives and the ability to discriminate in their handling of network
traffic in ways that can harm innovation, investment, competition, end
users, and free expression, we adopt the following rule:

    A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet
access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not
unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic
over a consumer's broadband Internet access service. Reasonable
network management shall not constitute unreasonable discrimination.

    The rule strikes an appropriate balance between restricting harmful
conduct and permitting beneficial forms of differential treatment. As
the rule specifically provides, and as discussed below, discrimination
by a broadband provider that constitutes ``reasonable network
management'' is ``reasonable'' discrimination.\80\ We provide further
guidance regarding distinguishing reasonable from unreasonable
discrimination:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ We also make clear that open Internet protections coexist
with other legal and regulatory frameworks. Except as otherwise
described in this Order, we do not address the possible application
of the no unreasonable discrimination rule to particular
circumstances, despite the requests of certain commenters. See,
e.g., AT&T Comments at 64-77, 108-12; PAETEC Comments at 13; see
also AT&T Comments at 56 (arguing that some existing agreements
could be at odds with limitations on pay for priority arrangements).
Rather, we find it more appropriate to address the application of
our rule in the context of an appropriate Commission proceeding with
the benefit of a more comprehensive record.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Transparency. Differential treatment of traffic is more likely to
be reasonable the more transparent to the end user that treatment is.
The Commission has previously found broadband provider practices to
violate open Internet principles in part because they were not
disclosed to end users. Transparency is particularly important with
respect to the discriminatory treatment of traffic as it is often
difficult for end users to determine the causes of slow or poor
performance of content, applications, services, or devices.
    End-User Control. Maximizing end-user control is a policy goal
Congress

[[Page 59206]]

recognized in Section 230(b) of the Communications Act, and end-user
choice and control are touchstones in evaluating the reasonableness of
discrimination.\81\ As one commenter observes, ``letting users choose
how they want to use the network enables them to use the Internet in a
way that creates more value for them (and for society) than if network
providers made this choice,'' and ``is an important part of the
mechanism that produces innovation under uncertainty.'' Thus, enabling
end users to choose among different broadband offerings based on such
factors as assured data rates and reliability, or to select quality-of-
service enhancements on their own connections for traffic of their
choosing, would be unlikely to violate the no unreasonable
discrimination rule, provided the broadband provider's offerings were
fully disclosed and were not harmful to competition or end users.\82\
We recognize that there is not a binary distinction between end-user
controlled and broadband-provider controlled practices, but rather a
spectrum of practices ranging from more end-user controlled to more
broadband provider-controlled.\83\ And we do not suggest that practices
controlled entirely by broadband providers are by definition
unreasonable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ ``The rapidly developing array of Internet and other
interactive computer services * * * offer[ ] users a great degree of
control over the information that they receive, as well as the
potential for even greater control in the future as technology
develops.'' 47 U.S.C. 230(a)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).
    \82\ In these types of arrangements ``[t]he broadband provider
does not get any particular leverage, because the ability to select
which traffic gets priority lies with individual subscribers.
Meanwhile, an entity providing content, applications, or services
does not need to worry about striking up relationships with various
broadband providers to obtain top treatment. All it needs to worry
about is building relationships with users and explaining to those
users whether and how they may want to select the particular
content, application, or service for priority treatment.'' CDT
Comments at 27; see also Amazon Comments at 2-3; SureWest Comments
at 32-33.
    \83\ We note that default settings set by broadband providers
would likely be considered more broadband provider-controlled than
end-user controlled. See generally Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic
Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100
Yale L.J. 615 (1990); Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. Econ.
Persp. 193, 197-99 (1991).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters suggest that open Internet protections would
prohibit broadband providers from offering their subscribers different
tiers of service or from charging their subscribers based on bandwidth
consumed. We are, of course, always concerned about anti-consumer or
anticompetitive practices, and we remain so here. However, prohibiting
tiered or usage-based pricing and requiring all subscribers to pay the
same amount for broadband service, regardless of the performance or
usage of the service, would force lighter end users of the network to
subsidize heavier end users. It would also foreclose practices that may
appropriately align incentives to encourage efficient use of networks.
The framework we adopt in this Order does not prevent broadband
providers from asking subscribers who use the network less to pay less,
and subscribers who use the network more to pay more.
    Use-Agnostic Discrimination. Differential treatment of traffic that
does not discriminate among specific uses of the network or classes of
uses is likely reasonable. For example, during periods of congestion a
broadband provider could provide more bandwidth to subscribers that
have used the network less over some preceding period of time than to
heavier users. Use-agnostic discrimination (sometimes referred to as
application-agnostic discrimination) is consistent with Internet
openness because it does not interfere with end users' choices about
which content, applications, services, or devices to use. Nor does it
distort competition among edge providers.
    Standard Practices. The conformity or lack of conformity of a
practice with best practices and technical standards adopted by open,
broadly representative, and independent Internet engineering,
governance initiatives, or standards-setting organizations is another
factor to be considered in evaluating reasonableness. Recognizing the
important role of such groups is consistent with Congress's intent that
our rules in the Internet area should not ``fetter[ ]'' the free market
with unnecessary regulation,\84\ and is consistent with broadband
providers' historic reliance on such groups.\85\ We make clear,
however, that we are not delegating authority to interpret or implement
our rules to outside bodies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \84\ 47 U.S.C. 230(b)(2).
    \85\ Broadband providers' practices historically have relied on
the efforts of such groups, which follow open processes conducive to
broad participation. See, e.g., William Lehr et al. Comments at 24;
Comcast Comments at 53-59; FTTH Comments at 12; Internet Society
(ISOC) Comments at 1-2; OIC Comments at 50-52; Comcast Reply at 5-7.
Moreover, Internet community governance groups develop and encourage
widespread implementation of best practices, supporting an
environment that facilitates innovation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In evaluating unreasonable discrimination, the types of practices
we would be concerned about include, but are not limited to,
discrimination that harms an actual or potential competitor to the
broadband provider (such as by degrading VoIP applications or services
when the broadband provider offers telephone service), that harms end
users (such as by inhibiting end users from accessing the content,
applications, services, or devices of their choice), or that impairs
free expression (such as by slowing traffic from a particular blog
because the broadband provider disagrees with the blogger's message).
    For a number of reasons, including those discussed above in Part
II.B, a commercial arrangement between a broadband provider and a third
party to directly or indirectly favor some traffic over other traffic
in the broadband Internet access service connection to a subscriber of
the broadband provider (i.e., ``pay for priority'') would raise
significant cause for concern.\86\ First, pay for priority would
represent a significant departure from historical and current practice.
Since the beginning of the Internet, Internet access providers have
typically not charged particular content or application providers fees
to reach the providers' retail service end users or struck pay-for-
priority deals, and the record does not contain evidence that U.S.
broadband providers currently engage in such arrangements. Second this
departure from longstanding norms could cause great harm to innovation
and investment in and on the Internet. As discussed above, pay-for-
priority arrangements could raise barriers to entry on the Internet by
requiring fees from edge providers, as well as transaction costs
arising from the need to reach agreements with one or more broadband
providers to access a critical mass of potential end users. Fees
imposed on edge providers may be excessive because few edge providers
have the ability to bargain for lesser fees, and because no broadband
provider internalizes the full costs of reduced innovation and the exit
of edge providers from the market. Third, pay-for-priority arrangements
may particularly harm non-commercial end users, including individual
bloggers, libraries, schools, advocacy organizations, and other
speakers, especially those who communicate through video or other
content sensitive

[[Page 59207]]

to network congestion. Even open Internet skeptics acknowledge that pay
for priority may disadvantage non-commercial uses of the network, which
are typically less able to pay for priority, and for which the Internet
is a uniquely important platform. Fourth, broadband providers that
sought to offer pay-for-priority services would have an incentive to
limit the quality of service provided to non-prioritized traffic. In
light of each of these concerns, as a general matter, it is unlikely
that pay for priority would satisfy the ``no unreasonable
discrimination'' standard. The practice of a broadband Internet access
service provider prioritizing its own content, applications, or
services, or those of its affiliates, would raise the same significant
concerns and would be subject to the same standards and considerations
in evaluating reasonableness as third-party pay-for-priority
arrangements.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ The Open Internet NPRM proposed a flat ban on
discrimination and interpreted that requirement to prohibit
broadband providers from ``charg[ing] a content, application, or
service provider for enhanced or prioritized access to the
subscribers of the broadband Internet access service provider.''
Open Internet NPRM, 24 FCC Rcd at 13104-05, paras. 104, 106. In the
context of a ``no unreasonable discrimination'' rule that leaves
interpretation to a case-by-case process, we instead adopt the
approach to pay for priority described in this paragraph.
    \87\ We reject arguments that our approach to pay-for-priority
arrangements is inconsistent with allowing content-delivery networks
(CDNs). See, e.g., Cisco Comments at 11-12; TWC Comments at 21-22,
65, 89-90; AT&T Reply at 49-53; Bright House Reply at 9. CDN
services are designed to reduce the capacity requirements and costs
of the CDN's edge provider clients by hosting the content for those
clients closer to end users. Unlike broadband providers, third-party
CDN providers do not control the last-mile connection to the end
user. And CDNs that do not deploy within an edge provider's network
may still reach an end user via the user's broadband connection. See
CDT Comments at 25 n.84; George Ou Comments (Preserving the Open and
Competitive Bandwidth Market) at 3; see also Cisco Comments at 11;
FTTH Comments at 23-24. Moreover, CDNs typically provide a benefit
to the sender and recipient of traffic without causing harm to
third-party traffic. Though we note disagreement regarding the
impact of CDNs on other traffic, the record does not demonstrate
that the use of CDNs has any material adverse effect on broadband
end users' experience of traffic that is not delivered via a CDN.
Compare Letter from S. Derek Turner, Free Press, to Chairman
Genachowski et al., FCC, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52,
at 1-2 (filed July 29, 2010) with Letter from Richard Bennett, ITIF,
to Chairman Genachowski et al., FCC, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket
No. 07-52, Attach. at 12 (filed Aug. 9, 2010). Indeed, the same
benefits derived from using CDNs can be achieved if an edge
provider's own servers happen to be located in close proximity to
end users. Everything on the Internet that is accessible to an end
user is not, and cannot be, in equal proximity from that end user.
See John Staurulakis Inc. Comments at 5; Bret T. Swanson Reply at 4.
Finally, CDN providers unaffiliated with broadband providers
generally do not compete with edge providers and thus generally lack
economic incentives (or the ability) to discriminate against edge
providers. See Akamai Comments at 12; NASUCA Reply at 7; NCTA Reply
at 25. We likewise reject proposals to limit our rules to actions
taken at or below the ``network layer.'' See, e.g., Google Comments
at 24-26; Vonage Reply at 2; CDT Reply at 18; Prof. Scott Jordan
(Jordan) Comments at 3; see also Scott Jordan, A Layered Network
Approach to Net Neutrality, Int'l J. of Commc'n 427, 432-33 (2007)
(describing the OSI layers model and the actions of routers at and
below the network layer) attached to Letter from Scott Jordan,
Professor, University of California-Irvine, to Office of the
Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52 (filed
Mar. 22, 2010). We are not persuaded that the proposed limitation is
necessary or appropriate in this context.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because we agree with the diverse group of commenters who argue
that any nondiscrimination rule should prohibit only unreasonable
discrimination, we decline to adopt the more rigid nondiscrimination
rule proposed in the Open Internet NPRM. A strict nondiscrimination
rule would be in tension with our recognition that some forms of
discrimination, including end-user controlled discrimination, can be
beneficial. The rule we adopt provides broadband providers' sufficient
flexibility to develop service offerings and pricing plans, and to
effectively and reasonably manage their networks. We disagree with
commenters who argue that a standard based on ``reasonableness'' or
``unreasonableness'' is too vague to give broadband providers fair
notice of what is expected of them. This is not so. ``Reasonableness''
is a well-established standard for regulatee conduct.\88\ As other
commenters have pointed out, the term ``reasonable'' is ``both
administrable and indispensable to the sound administration of the
nation's telecommunications laws.''\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ As recently as 1995, Congress adopted the venerable
``reasonableness'' standard when it recodified provisions of the
Interstate Commerce Act. ICC Termination Act of 1995, Public Law
104-88, sec. 106(a) (now codified at 49 U.S.C. 15501).
    \89\ AT&T Reply at 33-34 (``And no one has seriously suggested
that Section 202 should itself be amended to remove the
`unreasonable' qualifier on the ground that the qualifier is too
`murky' or `complex.' Seventy-five years of experience have shown
that qualifier to be both administrable and indispensable to the
sound administration of the nation's telecommunications laws.'');
see also Comcast Reply at 26 (``[T]he Commission should embrace the
strong guidance against an overbroad rule and, instead, develop a
standard based on `unreasonable and anticompetitive discrimination.'
''); Sprint Reply at 23 (``The unreasonable discrimination standard
contained in Section 202(a) of the Act contains the very flexibility
the Commission needs to distinguish desirable from improper
discrimination.''); Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316,
324 (2002) (holding that denial of a permit ``when the intended use
would present an unreasonable danger to the health and safety of
park users or Park District employees'' is a standard that is
``reasonably specific and objective, and do[es] not leave the
decision `to the whim of the administrator' '') (citation omitted);
Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1968) (stating that
``unreasonably'' ``is a widely used and well understood word, and
clearly so when juxtaposed with `obstruct' and `interfere' '').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We also reject the argument that only ``anticompetitive''
discrimination yielding ``substantial consumer harm'' should be
prohibited by our rules. We are persuaded those proposed limiting terms
are unduly narrow and could allow discriminatory conduct that is
contrary to the public interest. The broad purposes of this rule--to
encourage competition and remove impediments to infrastructure
investment while protecting consumer choice, free expression, end-user
control, and the ability to innovate without permission--cannot be
achieved by preventing only those practices that are demonstrably
anticompetitive or harmful to consumers. Rather, the rule rests on the
general proposition that broadband providers should not pick winners
and losers on the Internet--even for reasons that may be independent of
providers' competitive interests or that may not immediately or
demonstrably cause substantial consumer harm.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ For example, slowing BitTorrent packets might only affect a
few end users, but it would harm BitTorrent. More significantly, it
would raise concerns among other end users and edge providers that
their traffic could be slowed for any reason--or no reason at all--
which could in turn reduce incentives to innovate and invest, and
change the fundamental nature of the Internet as an open platform.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We disagree with commenters who argue that a rule against
unreasonable discrimination violates Section 3(51) of the
Communications Act for those broadband providers that are
telecommunications carriers but do not provide their broadband Internet
access service as a telecommunications service.\91\ Section 3(51)
provides that a ``telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a
common carrier under this Act only to the extent that it is engaged in
providing telecommunications services.'' \92\ This limitation is not
relevant to the Commission's actions here.\93\ The hallmark of common

[[Page 59208]]

carriage is an ``undertak[ing] to carry for all people indifferently.''
\94\ An entity ``will not be a common carrier where its practice is to
make individualized decisions, in particular cases, whether and on what
terms to deal'' with potential customers.\95\ The customers at issue
here are the end users who subscribe to broadband Internet access
services.\96\ With respect to those customers, a broadband provider may
make individualized decisions. A broadband provider that chooses not to
offer its broadband Internet access service on a common carriage basis
can, for instance, decide on a case-by-case basis whether to serve a
particular end user, what connection speed(s) to offer, and at what
price. The open Internet rules become effective only after such a
provider has voluntarily entered into a mutually satisfactory
arrangement with the end user, which may be tailored to that user. Even
then, as discussed above, the allowance for reasonable disparities
permits customized service features such as those that enhance end user
control over what Internet content is received. This flexibility to
customize service arrangements for a particular customer is the
hallmark of private carriage, which is the antithesis of common
carriage.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\ See, e.g., AT&T Comments at 209-11; Verizon Comments at 93-
95; CTIA PN Reply at 20-21. We do not read the Supreme Court's
decision in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. as addressing rules like the
rules we adopt in this Order. 440 U.S. 689 (1979). There, the Court
held that obligations on cable providers to ``hold out dedicated
channels on a first-come, nondiscriminatory basis * * * relegated
cable systems, pro tanto, to common-carrier status.'' Id. at 700-01.
None of the rules adopted in this Order requires a broadband
provider to ``hold out'' any capacity for the exclusive use of third
parties or make a public offering of its service.
    \92\ 47 U.S.C. 153(51). Section 332(c)(2) contains a restriction
similar to that of sec. 3(51): ``A person engaged in the provision
of a service that is a private mobile service shall not, insofar as
such person is so engaged, be treated as a common carrier for any
purpose under this Act.'' Id. sec. 332(c)(2). Because we are not
imposing any common carrier obligations on any broadband provider,
including providers of ``private mobile service'' as defined in
Section 332(d)(3), our requirements do not violate the limitation in
Section 332(c)(2).
    \93\ Courts have acknowledged that the Commission is entitled to
deference in interpreting the definition of ``common carrier.'' See
AT&T v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17, 24 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing Red Lion Broad.
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969)). In adopting the rule against
unreasonable discrimination, we rely, in part, on our authority
under section 706, which is not part of the Communications Act.
Congress enacted section 706 as part of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 and more recently codified the provision in Chapter 12 of
Title 47, at 47 U.S.C. 1302. The seven titles that comprise the
Communications Act appear in Chapter 5 of Title 47. Consequently,
even if the rule against unreasonable discrimination were
interpreted to require common carriage in a particular case, that
result would not run afoul of Section 3(51) because a network
operator would be treated as a common carrier pursuant to Section
706, not ``under'' the Communications Act.
    \94\ Nat'l Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641
(DC Cir. 1976) (NARUC I) (quoting Semon v. Royal Indemnity Co., 279
F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir. 1960) and other cases); see also Verizon
Comments at 93 (`` `[T]he primary sine qua non of common carrier
status is a quasi-public character, which arises out of the
undertaking `to carry for all people indifferently * * *.' ''
(quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608
(DC Cir. 1976) (NARUC II)). But see CTIA Reply at 57 (suggesting
that nondiscrimination is the sine qua non of common carrier
regulation referred to in NARUC II).
    \95\ NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 641 (citing Semon, 279 F.2d at 739-
40). Commenters assert that any obligation that is similar to an
obligation that appears in Title II of the Act is a ``common
carrier'' obligation. See, e.g., AT&T Comments at 210-11. We
disagree. Just because an obligation appears within Title II does
not mean that the imposition of that obligation or a similar one
results in ``treating'' an entity as a common carrier. For the
meaning of common carriage treatment, which is not defined in the
Act, we look to caselaw as discussed in the text.
    \96\ Even if edge providers were considered ``customers'' of the
broadband provider, the broadband provider would not be a common
carrier with regard to the role it plays in transmitting edge
providers' traffic. Our rules permit broadband providers to engage
in reasonable network management and, under certain circumstances,
block traffic and devices, engage in reasonable discrimination, and
prioritize traffic at subscribers' request. Blocking or
deprioritizing certain traffic is far from ``undertak[ing] to carry
for all [edge providers] indifferently.'' See NARUC I, 525 F.2d at
641.
    \97\ See Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475, 1481 (DC Cir.
1994) (``If the carrier chooses its clients on an individual basis
and determines in each particular case whether and on what terms to
serve and there is no specific regulatory compulsion to serve all
indifferently, the entity is a private carrier for that particular
service and the Commission is not at liberty to subject the entity
to regulation as a common carrier.'') (internal quotation marks
omitted). Although promoting competition throughout the Internet
ecosystem is a central purpose of these rules, we decline to adopt
as a rule the Internet Policy Statement principle regarding
consumers' entitlement to competition. We agree with those
commenters that argue that the principle is too vague to be reduced
to a rule and that the proposed rule as stated failed to provide any
meaningful guidance regarding what conduct is and is not
permissible. See, e.g., Verizon Comments at 4, 53; TPPF Comments at
7. A rule barring broadband providers from depriving end users of
their entitlement to competition does not appear to be a viable
method of promoting competition. We also do not wish to duplicate
competitive analyses carried out by the Department of Justice, the
FTC, or the Commission's merger review process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Reasonable Network Management

    Since at least 2005, when the Commission adopted the Internet
Policy Statement, we have recognized that a flourishing and open
Internet requires robust, well-functioning broadband networks, and
accordingly that open Internet protections require broadband providers
to be able to reasonably manage their networks. The open Internet rules
we adopt in this Order expressly provide for and define ``reasonable
network management'' in order to provide greater clarity to broadband
providers, network equipment providers, and Internet end users and edge
providers regarding the types of network management practices that are
consistent with open Internet protections.
    In the Open Internet NPRM, the Commission proposed that open
Internet rules be subject to reasonable network management, consisting
of ``reasonable practices employed by a provider of broadband Internet
access service to: (1) Reduce or mitigate the effects of congestion on
its network or to address quality-of-service concerns; (2) address
traffic that is unwanted by users or harmful; (3) prevent the transfer
of unlawful content; or (4) prevent the unlawful transfer of content.''
The proposed definition also stated that reasonable network management
consists of ``other reasonable network management practices.''
    Upon reviewing the record, we conclude that the definition of
reasonable network management should provide greater clarity regarding
the standard used to gauge reasonableness, expressly account for
technological differences among networks that may affect reasonable
network management, and omit elements that do not relate directly to
network management functions and are therefore better handled elsewhere
in the rules--for example, measures to prevent the transfer of unlawful
content. We therefore adopt the following definition of reasonable
network management:

    A network management practice is reasonable if it is appropriate
and tailored to achieving a legitimate network management purpose,
taking into account the particular network architecture and
technology of the broadband Internet access service.

Legitimate network management purposes include: ensuring network
security and integrity, including by addressing traffic that is harmful
to the network; addressing traffic that is unwanted by end users
(including by premise operators), such as by providing services or
capabilities consistent with an end user's choices regarding parental
controls or security capabilities; and reducing or mitigating the
effects of congestion on the network. The term ``particular network
architecture and technology'' refers to the differences across access
platforms such as cable, DSL, satellite, and fixed wireless.
    As proposed in the Open Internet NPRM, we will further develop the
scope of reasonable network management on a case-by-case basis, as
complaints about broadband providers' actual practices arise. The
novelty of Internet access and traffic management questions, the
complex nature of the Internet, and a general policy of restraint in
setting policy for Internet access service providers weigh in favor of
a case-by-case approach.
    In taking this approach, we recognize the need to balance clarity
with flexibility.\98\ We discuss below certain

[[Page 59209]]

principles and considerations that will inform the Commission's case-
by-case analysis. Further, although broadband providers are not
required to seek permission from the Commission before deploying a
network management practice, they or others are free to do so, for
example by seeking a declaratory ruling.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ Some parties contend that there will be uncertainty
associated with open Internet rules, subject to reasonable network
management, which will limit provider flexibility, stifle
innovation, and slow providers' response time in managing their
networks. See, e.g., ADTRAN Comments at 11-13; Barbara Esbin (Esbin)
Comments at 7. For example, some parties express concern that that
the definition proposed in the Open Internet NPRM provided
insufficient guidance regarding what standard will be used to
determine whether a given practice is ``reasonable.'' See, e.g.,
ADTRAN Comments at 13; AT&T Comments at 13; CDT Comments at 38; PIC
Comments at 35-36, 39; Texas PUC Comments at 6-7; Verizon Reply at
8, 75, 78. Others contend that although clarity is needed, the
Commission should not list categories of activities considered
reasonable. See, e.g., Free Press Comments at 82, 85-86. We seek to
balance these interests through general rules designed to give
providers sufficient flexibility to implement necessary network
management practices, coupled with guidance regarding certain
principles and considerations that will inform the Commission's
case-by-case analysis.
    \99\ See 47 CFR 1.2 (providing for ``a declaratory ruling
terminating a controversy or removing uncertainty'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We reject proposals to define reasonable network management
practices more expansively or more narrowly than stated above. We agree
with commenters that the Commission should not adopt the ``narrowly or
carefully tailored'' standard discussed in the Comcast Network
Management Practices Order.\100\ We find that this standard is
unnecessarily restrictive and may overly constrain network engineering
decisions. Moreover, the ``narrowly tailored'' language could be read
to import strict scrutiny doctrine from constitutional law, which we
are not persuaded would be helpful here. Broadband providers may employ
network management practices that are appropriate and tailored to the
network management purpose they seek to achieve, but they need not
necessarily employ the most narrowly tailored practice theoretically
available to them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \100\ See Comcast Network Management Practices Order, 23 FCC Rcd
at 13055-56, para. 47 (stating that, to be considered ``reasonable''
a network management practice ``should further a critically
important interest and be narrowly or carefully tailored to serve
that interest''); see also AT&T Comments at 186-87 (arguing that the
Comcast standard is too narrow); Level 3 Comments at 14; PAETEC
Comments at 17-18. But see Free Press Comments at 91-92 (stating
that the Commission should not retreat from the fundamental
framework of the Comcast standard). A ``reasonableness'' standard
also has the advantage of being administrable and familiar.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We also acknowledge that reasonable network management practices
may differ across platforms. For example, practices needed to manage
congestion on a fixed satellite network may be inappropriate for a
fiber-to-the-home network. We also recognize the unique network
management challenges facing broadband providers that use unlicensed
spectrum to deliver service to end users. Unlicensed spectrum is shared
among multiple users and technologies and no single user can control or
assure access to the spectrum. We believe the concept of reasonable
network management is sufficiently flexible to afford such providers
the latitude they need to effectively manage their networks.\101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ See Appendix A, sec. 8.11. We recognize that the standards
for fourth-generation (4G) wireless networks include the capability
to prioritize particular types of traffic, and that other broadband
Internet access services may incorporate similar features. Whether
particular uses of these technologies constitute reasonable network
management will depend on whether they are appropriate and tailored
to achieving a legitimate network management purpose.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The principles guiding case-by-case evaluations of network
management practices are much the same as those that guide assessments
of ``no unreasonable discrimination,'' and include transparency, end-
user control, and use- (or application-) agnostic treatment. We also
offer guidance in the specific context of the legitimate network
management purposes listed above.
    Network Security or Integrity and Traffic Unwanted by End Users.
Broadband providers may implement reasonable practices to ensure
network security and integrity, including by addressing traffic that is
harmful to the network.\102\ Many commenters strongly support allowing
broadband providers to implement such network management practices.
Some commenters, however, express concern that providers might
implement anticompetitive or otherwise problematic practices in the
name of protecting network security. We make clear that, for the
singling out of any specific application for blocking or degradation
based on harm to the network to be a reasonable network management
practice, a broadband provider should be prepared to provide a
substantive explanation for concluding that the particular traffic is
harmful to the network, such as traffic that constitutes a denial-of-
service attack on specific network infrastructure elements or exploits
a particular security vulnerability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \102\ In the context of broadband Internet access service,
techniques to ensure network security and integrity are designed to
protect the access network and the Internet against actions by
malicious or compromised end systems. Examples include spam,
botnets, and distributed denial of service attacks. Unwanted traffic
includes worms, malware, and viruses that exploit end-user system
vulnerabilities; denial of service attacks; and spam. See IETF,
Report from the IAB workshop on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006,
RFC 4948, at 31 (Aug. 2007), available at http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4948.txt.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Broadband providers also may implement reasonable practices to
address traffic that a particular end user chooses not to receive.
Thus, for example, a broadband provider could provide services or
capabilities consistent with an end user's choices regarding parental
controls, or allow end users to choose a service that provides access
to the Internet but not to pornographic Web sites. Likewise, a
broadband provider serving a premise operator could restrict traffic
unwanted by that entity, though such restrictions should be disclosed.
Our rule will not impose liability on a broadband provider where such
liability is prohibited by Section 230(c)(2) of the Act.\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \103\ See 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(2) (no provider of an interactive
computer service shall be held liable on account of ``(A) any action
voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing,
or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or
make available to information content providers or others the
technical means to restrict access to material described in
[subparagraph (A)]'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We note that, in some cases, mechanisms that reduce or eliminate
some forms of harmful or unwanted traffic may also interfere with
legitimate network traffic. Such mechanisms must be appropriate and
tailored to the threat; should be evaluated periodically as to their
continued necessity; and should allow end users to opt-in or opt-out if
possible.\104\ Disclosures of network management practices used to
address network security or traffic a particular end user does not want
to receive should clearly state the objective of the mechanism and, if
applicable, how an end user can opt in or out of the practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \104\ For example, a network provider might be able to assess a
network endpoint's posture--see IETF, Network Endpoint Assessment
(NEA): Overview and Requirements, RFC 5209 (Jun. 2008); Internet
Engineering Task Force, PA-TNC: A Posture Attribute (PA) Protocol
Compatible with Trusted Network Connect (TNC), RFC 5792 (Mar.
2010)--and tailor port blocking accordingly. With the posture
assessment, an end user might then opt out of the network management
mechanism by upgrading the operating system or installing a suitable
firewall.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Network Congestion. Numerous commenters support permitting the use
of reasonable network management practices to address the effects of
congestion, and we agree that congestion management may be a legitimate
network management purpose. For example, broadband providers may need
to take reasonable steps to ensure that heavy users do not crowd out
others. What constitutes congestion and what measures are reasonable to
address it may vary depending on the technology platform for a
particular broadband Internet access service. For example, if cable
modem subscribers in a particular neighborhood are experiencing
congestion, it may be reasonable for a broadband provider to
temporarily limit

[[Page 59210]]

the bandwidth available to individual end users in that neighborhood
who are using a substantially disproportionate amount of bandwidth.
    We emphasize that reasonable network management practices are not
limited to the categories described here, and that broadband providers
may take other reasonable steps to maintain the proper functioning of
their networks, consistent with the definition of reasonable network
management we adopt. As we stated in the Open Internet NPRM, ``we do
not presume to know now everything that providers may need to do to
provide robust, safe, and secure Internet access to their subscribers,
much less everything they may need to do as technologies and usage
patterns change in the future.'' Broadband providers should have
flexibility to experiment, innovate, and reasonably manage their
networks.

E. Mobile Broadband

    There is one Internet, which should remain open for consumers and
innovators alike, although it may be accessed through different
technologies and services. The record demonstrates the importance of
freedom and openness for mobile broadband networks, and the rationales
for adopting high-level open Internet rules, discussed above, are for
the most part as applicable to mobile broadband as they are to fixed
broadband. Consumer choice, freedom of expression, end-user control,
competition, and the freedom to innovate without permission are as
important when end users are accessing the Internet via mobile
broadband as via fixed. And there have been instances of mobile
providers blocking certain third-party applications, particularly
applications that compete with the provider's own offerings; relatedly,
concerns have been raised about inadequate transparency regarding
network management practices. We also note that some mobile broadband
providers affirmatively state they do not oppose the application of
openness rules to mobile broadband.
    However, as explained in the Open Internet NPRM and subsequent
Public Notice, mobile broadband presents special considerations that
suggest differences in how and when open Internet protections should
apply. Mobile broadband is an earlier-stage platform than fixed
broadband, and it is rapidly evolving. For most of the history of the
Internet, access has been predominantly through fixed platforms--first
dial-up, then cable modem and DSL services. As of a few years ago, most
consumers used their mobile phones primarily to make phone calls and
send text messages, and most mobile providers offered Internet access
only via ``walled gardens'' or stripped down Web sites. Today, however,
mobile broadband is an important Internet access platform that is
helping drive broadband adoption, and data usage is growing rapidly.
The mobile ecosystem is experiencing very rapid innovation and change,
including an expanding array of smartphones, aircard modems, and other
devices that enable Internet access; the emergence and rapid growth of
dedicated-purpose mobile devices like e-readers; the development of
mobile application (``app'') stores and hundreds of thousands of mobile
apps; and the evolution of new business models for mobile broadband
providers, including usage-based pricing.
    Moreover, most consumers have more choices for mobile broadband
than for fixed (particularly fixed wireline) broadband.\105\ Mobile
broadband speeds, capacity, and penetration are typically much lower
than for fixed broadband, though some providers have begun offering 4G
service that will enable offerings with higher speeds and capacity and
lower latency than previous generations of mobile service.\106\ In
addition, existing mobile networks present operational constraints that
fixed broadband networks do not typically encounter. This puts greater
pressure on the concept of ``reasonable network management'' for mobile
providers, and creates additional challenges in applying a broader set
of rules to mobile at this time. Further, we recognize that there have
been meaningful recent moves toward openness in and on mobile broadband
networks, including the introduction of third-party devices and
applications on a number of mobile broadband networks, and more open
mobile devices. In addition, we anticipate soon seeing the effects on
the market of the openness conditions we imposed on mobile providers
that operate on upper 700 MHz C Block (``C Block'') spectrum,\107\
which includes Verizon Wireless, one of the largest mobile wireless
carriers in the U.S.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ Compare National Broadband Plan at 37 (Exh. 4-A) with 39-
40 (Exh. 4-E). However, in many areas of the country, particularly
in rural areas, there are fewer options for mobile broadband. See
Fourteenth Wireless Competition Report at para. 355, tbl. 39 & chart
48. This may result in some consumers having fewer options for
mobile broadband than for fixed.
    \106\ Some fixed broadband providers contend that current mobile
broadband offerings directly compete with their offerings. See
Letter from Michael D. Saperstein, Jr., Director of Regulatory
Affairs, Frontier Communications, to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, FCC,
GN Docket No. 09-191 (filed Dec. 15, 2010) (discussing entry of
wireless service into the broadband market and its effect on
wireline broadband subscribership) and Attach. at 1 (citing reports
that LTE is ``a very practical and encouraging substitution for DSL,
particularly when you look at rural markets''); Letter from Malena
F. Barzilai, Federal Government Affairs, Windstream Communications,
Inc., to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 09-191 (filed
Dec. 15, 2010). As part of our ongoing monitoring, we will track
such competition and any impact these rules may have on it.
    \107\ The first network using spectrum subject to these rules
has recently started offering service. See Press Release, Verizon
Wireless, Blazingly Fast: Verizon Wireless Launches The World's
Largest 4G LTE Wireless Network On Sunday, Dec. 5 (Dec. 5, 2010),
available at news.vzw.com/news/2010/12/pr2010-12-03.html.
Specifically, licensees subject to the rule must provide an open
platform for third-party applications and devices. See 700 MHz
Second Report and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 15289; 47 CFR 27.16. The rules
we adopt in this Order are independent of those open platform
requirements. We expect our observations of how the 700 MHz open
platform rules affect the mobile broadband sector to inform our
ongoing analysis of the application of openness rules to mobile
broadband generally. 700 MHz Second Report and Order, 22 FCC Rcd at
15364-65, 15374, paras. 205, 229. A number of commenters support the
Commission's waiting to determine whether to apply openness rules to
mobile wireless until the effects of the C Block openness
requirement can be observed. See, e.g., AT&T PN Reply, at 32-37;
Cricket PN Reply at 11. We also note that some providers tout
openness as a competitive advantage. See, e.g., Clearwire Comments
at 7; Verizon Reply at 47-52.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In light of these considerations, we conclude it is appropriate to
take measured steps at this time to protect the openness of the
Internet when accessed through mobile broadband. We apply certain of
the open Internet rules, requiring compliance with the transparency
rule and a basic no-blocking rule.\108\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \108\ We note that section 332(a) requires us, ``[i]n taking
actions to manage the spectrum to be made available for use by the
private mobile service,'' to consider various factors, including
whether our actions will ``improve the efficiency of spectrum use
and reduce the regulatory burden,'' and ``encourage competition.''
47 U.S.C. 332(a)(2), (3). To the extent section 332(a) applies to
our actions in this Order, we note that we have considered these
factors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Application of Openness Principles to Mobile Broadband
a. Transparency
    The wide array of commenters who support a disclosure requirement
generally agree that all broadband providers, including mobile
broadband providers, should be required to disclose their network
management practices. Although some mobile broadband providers argue
that the dynamic nature of mobile network management makes meaningful
disclosure difficult, we conclude that end users need a clear
understanding of network management practices, performance, and
commercial terms, regardless of the broadband platform they use to
access the Internet. Although a number of mobile broadband

[[Page 59211]]

providers have adopted voluntary codes of conduct regarding disclosure,
we believe that a uniform rule applicable to all mobile broadband
providers will best preserve Internet openness by ensuring that end
users have sufficient information to make informed choices regarding
use of the network; and that content, application, service, and device
providers have the information needed to develop, market, and maintain
Internet offerings. The transparency rule will also aid the Commission
in monitoring the evolution of mobile broadband and adjusting, as
appropriate, the framework adopted in this Order.
    Therefore, as stated above, we require mobile broadband providers
to follow the same transparency rule applicable to fixed broadband
providers. Further, although we do not require mobile broadband
providers to allow third-party devices or all third-party applications
on their networks, we nonetheless require mobile broadband providers to
disclose their third-party device and application certification
procedures, if any; to clearly explain their criteria for any
restrictions on use of their network; and to expeditiously inform
device and application providers of any decisions to deny access to the
network or of a failure to approve their particular devices or
applications. With respect to the types of disclosures required to
satisfy the rule, we direct mobile broadband providers to the
discussion in Part III.B, above. Additionally, mobile broadband
providers should follow the guidance the Commission provided to
licensees of the upper 700 MHz C Block spectrum regarding compliance
with their disclosure obligations, particularly regarding disclosure to
third-party application developers and device manufacturers of criteria
and approval procedures (to the extent applicable).\109\ For example,
these disclosures include, to the extent applicable, establishing a
transparent and efficient approval process for third parties, as set
forth in Section 27.16(d).\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ 700 MHz Second Report and Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 15371-72,
para. 224 (``[A] C Block licensee must publish [for example, by
posting on the provider's Web site] standards no later than the time
at which it makes such standards available to any preferred vendors
(i.e., vendors with whom the provider has a relationship to design
products for the provider's network). We also require the C Block
licensee to provide to potential customers notice of the customers'
rights to request the attachment of a device or application to the
licensee's network, and notice of the licensee's process for
customers to make such requests, including the relevant network
criteria.'').
    \110\ See 47 CFR 27.16(d) (``Access requests. (1) Licensees
shall establish and publish clear and reasonable procedures for
parties to seek approval to use devices or applications on the
licensees' networks. A licensee must also provide to potential
customers notice of the customers' rights to request the attachment
of a device or application to the licensee's network, and notice of
the licensee's process for customers to make such requests,
including the relevant network criteria. (2) If a licensee
determines that a request for access would violate its technical
standards or regulatory requirements, the licensee shall
expeditiously provide a written response to the requester specifying
the basis for denying access and providing an opportunity for the
requester to modify its request to satisfy the licensee's
concerns.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. No Blocking
    We adopt a no blocking rule that guarantees end users' access to
the Web and protects against mobile broadband providers' blocking
applications that compete with their other primary service offering--
voice and video telephony--while ensuring that mobile broadband
providers can engage in reasonable network management:

    A person engaged in the provision of mobile broadband Internet
access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not
block consumers from accessing lawful Web sites, subject to
reasonable network management; nor shall such person block
applications that compete with the provider's voice or video
telephony services, subject to reasonable network management.

We understand a ``provider's voice or video telephony services'' to
include a voice or video telephony service provided by any entity in
which the provider has an attributable interest.\111\ We emphasize that
the rule protects any and all applications that compete with a mobile
broadband provider's voice or video telephony services. Further,
degrading a particular Web site or an application that competes with
the provider's voice or video telephony services so as to render the
Web site or application effectively unusable would be considered
tantamount to blocking (subject to reasonable network management).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \111\ For the purposes of these rules, an attributable interest
includes equity ownership interest in or de facto control of, or by,
the entity that provides the voice or video telephony service. An
attributable interest also includes any exclusive arrangement for
such voice or video telephony service, including de facto exclusive
arrangements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    End users expect to be able to access any lawful Web site through
their broadband service, whether fixed or mobile. Web browsing
continues to generate the largest amount of mobile data traffic, and
applications and services are increasingly being provisioned and used
entirely through the Web, without requiring a standalone application to
be downloaded to a device. Given that the mobile Web is well-developed
relative to other mobile applications and services, and enjoys similar
expectations of openness that characterize Web use through fixed
broadband, we find it appropriate to act here. We also recognize that
accessing a Web site typically does not present the same network
management issues that downloading and running an app on a device may
present. At this time, a prohibition on blocking access to lawful Web
sites (including any related traffic transmitted or received by any
plug-in, scripting language, or other browser extension) appropriately
balances protection for the ability of end users to access content,
applications, and services through the Web and assurance that mobile
broadband providers can effectively manage their mobile broadband
networks.
    Situations have arisen in which mobile wireless providers have
blocked third-party applications that arguably compete with their
telephony offerings.\112\ This type of blocking confirms that mobile
broadband providers may have strong incentives to limit Internet
openness when confronted with third-party applications that compete
with their telephony services. Some commenters express concern that
wireless providers could favor their own applications over the
applications of unaffiliated developers, under the guise of reasonable
network management. A number of commenters assert that blocking or
hindering the delivery of services that compete with those offered by
the mobile broadband provider, such as over-the-top VoIP, should be
prohibited. According to Skype, for example, there is ``a consensus
that at a minimum, a `no blocking' rule should apply to voice and video
applications that compete with broadband network operators' own service
offerings.'' Clearwire argues that the Commission should restrict only
practices that appear to have an element of anticompetitive intent.
Although some commenters support a broader no-blocking rule, we believe
that a targeted prophylactic rule is appropriate at this

[[Page 59212]]

time,\113\ and necessary to deter this type of behavior in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \112\  See, e.g., Letter from James W. Cicconi, AT&T Services,
Inc., to Ruth Milkman, Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau,
FCC, RM-11361, RM-11497 at 6-8 (filed Aug. 21, 2009); DISH PN Reply
at 7 (``VoIP operators such as Skype have faced significant
difficulty in gaining access across wireless Internet
connections.''). Mobile providers blocking VoIP services is an issue
not only in the United States, but worldwide. In Europe, the Body of
European Regulators for Electronic Communications reported, among
other issues, a number of cases of blocking or charging extra for
VoIP services by certain European mobile operators. See European
Commission, Information Society and Media Directorate-General Report
on the Public Consultation on ``The Open Internet and Net Neutrality
in Europe'' 2, (Nov. 9, 2010), ec.europa.eu/information--society/
policy/ecomm/library/public--consult/net--neutrality/index--en.htm.
    \113\ See Letter from Jonathan Spalter, Chairman, Mobile Future,
to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket Nos. 09-191 & 10-
127, at 3 n.16 (filed Dec. 13, 2010) (supporting tailored
prohibition on blocking applications), citing AT&T Comments at 65;
T-Mobile Comments, Declaration of Grant Castle at 4. The no blocking
rule that we adopt for mobile broadband involves distinct treatment
of applications that compete with the provider's voice and video
telephony services, whereas we have adopted a broader traffic-based
approach for fixed broadband. We acknowledge that this rule for
mobile broadband may lead in some limited measure to the traffic-
identification difficulties discussed with respect to fixed
broadband. We find, however, that the reasons for taking our
cautious approach to mobile broadband outweigh this concern,
particularly in light of our intent to monitor developments
involving mobile broadband, including this and other aspects of the
practical implementation of our rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The prohibition on blocking applications that compete with a
broadband provider's voice or video telephony services does not apply
to a broadband provider's operation of application stores or their
functional equivalent. In operating app stores, broadband providers
compete directly with other types of entities, including device
manufacturers and operating system developers,\114\ and we do not
intend to limit mobile broadband providers' flexibility to curate their
app stores similar to app store operators that are not subject to these
rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \114\ For example, app stores are operated by manufacturers and
operating system developers such as Nokia, Apple, RIM, Google,
Microsoft, and third parties such as GetJar. See also AT&T PN
Comments at 63-66 (emphasizing the competitiveness of the market for
mobile apps, including the variety of sources from which consumers
may obtain applications); T-Mobile PN Comments at 21 (``The
competitive wireless marketplace will continue to discipline app
store owners * * * that exclude third-party apps from their app
stores entirely, eliminating the need for Commission action.''). We
note, however, that for a few devices, such as Apple's iPhone, there
may be fewer options for accessing and distributing apps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As indicated in Part III.D above, the reasonable network management
definition takes into account the particular network architecture and
technology of the broadband Internet access service. Thus, in
determining whether a network management practice is reasonable, the
Commission will consider technical, operational, and other differences
between wireless and other broadband Internet access platforms,
including differences relating to efficient use of spectrum. We
anticipate that conditions in mobile broadband networks may necessitate
network management practices that would not be necessary in most fixed
networks, but conclude that our definition of reasonable network
management is flexible enough to accommodate such differences.
2. Ongoing Monitoring
    Although some commenters support applying the no unreasonable
discrimination rule to mobile broadband,\115\ for the reasons discussed
above, we decline to do so, preferring at this time to put in place
basic openness protections and monitor the development of the mobile
broadband marketplace. We emphasize that our decision to proceed
incrementally with respect to mobile broadband at this time should not
suggest that we implicitly approve of any provider behavior that runs
counter to general open Internet principles. Beyond those practices
expressly prohibited by our rules, other conduct by mobile broadband
providers, particularly conduct that would violate our rules for fixed
broadband, may not necessarily be consistent with Internet openness and
the public interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ See, e.g, Free Press Comments at 125-26; OIC Comments at
36-39. See also, e.g., Leap Comments at 17-22; Sprint Reply at 24-
26. A number of commenters suggest that openness rules should be
applied identically to all broadband platforms. See, e.g.,
CenturyLink Comments at 22-23; Comcast Comments at 32; DISH Network
PN Comments at 17; NCTA PN Comments at 11; Qwest PN Comments at 12-
19; SureWest PN Comments at 18-20; TWC PN Comments at 33-35; Vonage
PN Comments at 10-18; Windstream PN Comments at 6-19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We are taking measured steps to protect openness for mobile
broadband at this time in part because we want to better understand how
the mobile broadband market is developing before determining whether
adjustments to this framework are necessary. To that end, we will
closely monitor developments in the mobile broadband market, with a
particular focus on the following issues: (1) The effects of these
rules, the C Block conditions, and market developments related to the
openness of the Internet as accessed through mobile broadband; (2) any
conduct by mobile broadband providers that harms innovation,
investment, competition, end users, free expression or the achievement
of national broadband goals; (3) the extent to which differences
between fixed and mobile rules affect fixed and mobile broadband
markets, including competition among fixed and mobile broadband
providers; and (4) the extent to which differences between fixed and
mobile rules affect end users for whom mobile broadband is their only
or primary Internet access platform.\116\ We will investigate and
evaluate concerns as they arise. We also will adjust our rules as
appropriate. To aid the Commission in these tasks, we will create an
Open Internet Advisory Committee, as discussed below, with a mandate
that includes monitoring and regularly reporting on the state of
Internet openness for mobile broadband.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \116\ We note that mobile broadband is the only or primary
broadband Internet access platform used by many Americans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, we reaffirm our commitment to enforcing the open platform
requirements applicable to upper 700 MHz C Block licensees. The first
networks using this spectrum are now becoming operational.

F. Other Laws and Considerations

    Open Internet rules are not intended to expand or contract
broadband providers' rights or obligations with respect to other laws
or safety and security considerations, including the needs of emergency
communications and law enforcement, public safety, and national
security authorities. Similarly, open Internet rules protect only
lawful content, and are not intended to inhibit efforts by broadband
providers to address unlawful transfers of content. For example, there
should be no doubt that broadband providers can prioritize
communications from emergency responders, or block transfers of child
pornography. To make clear that open Internet protections can and must
coexist with these other legal frameworks, we adopt the following
clarifying provisions:

    Nothing in this part supersedes any obligation or authorization
a provider of broadband Internet access service may have to address
the needs of emergency communications or law enforcement, public
safety, or national security authorities, consistent with or as
permitted by applicable law, or limits the provider's ability to do
so.
    Nothing in this part prohibits reasonable efforts by a provider
of broadband Internet access service to address copyright
infringement or other unlawful activity.
1. Emergency Communications and Safety and Security Authorities
    Commenters are broadly supportive of our proposal to state that
open Internet rules do not supersede any obligation a broadband
provider may have--or limit its ability--to address the needs of
emergency communications or law enforcement, public safety, or homeland
or national security authorities (together, ``safety and security
authorities''). Broadband providers have obligations under statutes
such as the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act that could in some circumstances intersect
with open Internet protections, and most commenters recognize the
benefits of clarifying that these obligations are not inconsistent with
open Internet rules. Likewise, in connection with an emergency, there

[[Page 59213]]

may be Federal, state, Tribal, and local public safety entities;
homeland security personnel; and other authorities that need guaranteed
or prioritized access to the Internet in order to coordinate disaster
relief and other emergency response efforts, or for other emergency
communications. In the Open Internet NPRM we proposed to address the
needs of law enforcement in one rule and the needs of emergency
communications and public safety, national, and homeland security
authorities in a separate rule. We are persuaded by the record that
these rules should be combined, as the interests at issue are
substantially similar.\117\ We also agree that the rule should focus on
the needs of ``law enforcement * * * authorities'' rather than the
needs of ``law enforcement.'' The purpose of the safety and security
provision is first to ensure that open Internet rules do not restrict
broadband providers in addressing the needs of law enforcement
authorities, and second to ensure that broadband providers do not use
the safety and security provision without the imprimatur of a law
enforcement authority, as a loophole to the rules. As such, application
of the safety and security rule should be tied to invocation by
relevant authorities rather than to a broadband provider's independent
notion of law enforcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ See PIC Comments at 42-44. We intend the term ``national
security authorities'' to include homeland security authorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters urge us to limit the scope of the safety and
security rule, or argue that it is unnecessary because other statutes
give broadband providers the ability and responsibility to assist law
enforcement. Several commenters urge the Commission to revise its
proposal to clarify that broadband providers may not take any voluntary
steps that would be inconsistent with open Internet principles, beyond
those steps required by law. They argue, for example, that a broad
exception for voluntary efforts could swallow open Internet rules by
allowing broadband providers to cloak discriminatory practices under
the guise of protecting safety and security.\118\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \118\ See EFF Comments at 20-22. EFF would require a pre-
deployment waiver from the Commission if the needs of law
enforcement would require broadband providers to act inconsistently
with open Internet rules. Id. at 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We agree with commenters that the safety and security rule should
be tailored to avoid the possibility of broadband providers using their
discretion to mask improper practices. But it would be a mistake to
limit the rule to situations in which broadband providers have an
obligation to assist safety and security personnel. For example, such a
limitation would prevent broadband providers from implementing the
Cellular Priority Access Service (also known as the Wireless Priority
Service (WPS)), which allows for but does not legally require the
prioritization of public safety communications on wireless networks. We
do not think it necessary or advisable to provide for pre-deployment
review by the Commission, particularly because time may be of the
essence in meeting safety and security needs.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \119\ The National Emergency Number Association (NENA) would
encourage or require network managers to provide public safety users
with advance notice of changes in network management that could
affect emergency services. See NENA Comments at 5-6. Although we do
not adopt such a requirement, we encourage broadband providers to be
mindful of the potential impact on emergency services when
implementing network management policies, and to coordinate major
changes with providers of emergency services when appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Transfers of Unlawful Content and Unlawful Transfers of Content
    In the NPRM, we proposed to treat as reasonable network management
``reasonable practices to * * * prevent the transfer of unlawful
content; or * * * prevent the unlawful transfer of content.'' For
reasons explained above we decline to include these practices within
the scope of ``reasonable network management.'' However, we conclude
that a clear statement that open Internet rules do not prohibit
broadband providers from making reasonable efforts to address the
transfer of unlawful content or unlawful transfers of content is
helpful to ensure that open Internet rules are not used as a shield to
enable unlawful activity or to deter prompt action against such
activity. For example, open Internet rules should not be invoked to
protect copyright infringement, which has adverse consequences for the
economy, nor should they protect child pornography. We emphasize that
open Internet rules do not alter copyright laws and are not intended to
prohibit or discourage voluntary practices undertaken to address or
mitigate the occurrence of copyright infringement.\120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \120\ See, e.g., Stanford University--DMCA Complaint Resolution
Center; User Generated Content Principles, http://www.ugcprinciples.com (cited in Letter from Linda Kinney, MPAA, to
Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket Nos. 09-191, 10-137, WC
Docket No. 07-52 at 1 (filed Nov. 29, 2010)). Open Internet rules
are not intended to affect the legal status of cooperative efforts
by broadband Internet access service providers and other service
providers that are designed to curtail infringement in response to
information provided by rights holders in a manner that is timely,
effective, and accommodates the legitimate interests of providers,
rights holders, and end users.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. Specialized Services

    In the Open Internet NPRM, the Commission recognized that broadband
providers offer services that share capacity with broadband Internet
access service over providers' last-mile facilities, and may develop
and offer other such services in the future. These ``specialized
services,'' such as some broadband providers' existing facilities-based
VoIP and Internet Protocol-video offerings, differ from broadband
Internet access service and may drive additional private investment in
broadband networks and provide end users valued services, supplementing
the benefits of the open Internet. At the same time, specialized
services may raise concerns regarding bypassing open Internet
protections, supplanting the open Internet, and enabling
anticompetitive conduct. For example, open Internet protections may be
weakened if broadband providers offer specialized services that are
substantially similar to, but do not meet the definition of, broadband
Internet access service, and if consumer protections do not apply to
such services. In addition, broadband providers may constrict or fail
to continue expanding network capacity allocated to broadband Internet
access service to provide more capacity for specialized services. If
this occurs, and particularly to the extent specialized services grow
as substitutes for the delivery of content, applications, and services
over broadband Internet access service, the Internet may wither as an
open platform for competition, innovation, and free expression. These
concerns may be exacerbated by consumers' limited choices for broadband
providers, which may leave some end users unable to effectively
exercise their preferences for broadband Internet access service (or
content, applications, or services available through broadband Internet
access service) over specialized services.
    We agree with the many commenters who advocate that the Commission
exercise its authority to closely monitor and proceed incrementally
with respect to specialized services, rather than adopting policies
specific to such services at this time. We will carefully observe
market developments to verify that specialized services promote
investment, innovation, competition, and end-user benefits without
undermining or threatening the open Internet.\121\ We note also that
our rules

[[Page 59214]]

define broadband Internet access service to encompass ``any service
that the Commission finds to be providing a functional equivalent of
[broadband Internet access service], or that is used to evade the
protections set forth in these rules.'' \122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \121\ Our decision not to adopt rules regarding specialized
services at this time involves an issue distinct from the regulatory
classification of services such as VoIP and IPTV under the
Communications Act, a subject we do not address in this Order.
Likewise, the Commission's actions here do not affect any existing
obligation to provide interconnection, unbundled network elements,
or special access or other wholesale access under Sections 201, 251,
256, and 271 of the Act. 47 U.S.C. 201, 251, 256, 271.
    \122\ Some commenters, including Internet engineering experts
and analysts, emphasize the importance of distinguishing between the
open Internet and specialized services and state that ``this
distinction must continue as a most appropriate and constructive
basis for pursuing your policy goals.'' Various Advocates for the
Open Internet PN Reply at 3; see also id. at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We will closely monitor the robustness and affordability of
broadband Internet access services, with a particular focus on any
signs that specialized services are in any way retarding the growth of
or constricting capacity available for broadband Internet access
service. We fully expect that broadband providers will increase
capacity offered for broadband Internet access service if they expand
network capacity to accommodate specialized services. We would be
concerned if capacity for broadband Internet access service did not
keep pace. We also expect broadband providers to disclose information
about specialized services' impact, if any, on last-mile capacity
available for, and the performance of, broadband Internet access
service. We may consider additional disclosure requirements in this
area in our related proceeding regarding consumer transparency and
disclosure. We would also be concerned by any marketing, advertising,
or other messaging by broadband providers suggesting that one or more
specialized services, taken alone or together, and not provided in
accordance with our open Internet rules, is ``Internet'' service or a
substitute for broadband Internet access service. Finally, we will
monitor the potential for anticompetitive or otherwise harmful effects
from specialized services, including from any arrangements a broadband
provider may seek to enter into with third parties to offer such
services. The Open Internet Advisory Committee will aid us in
monitoring these issues.

IV. The Commission's Authority To Adopt Open Internet Rules

    Congress created the Commission ``[f]or the purpose of regulating
interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so
as to make available, so far as possible, to all people of the United
States * * * a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and
radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges, for the purpose of the national defense, [and] for the purpose
of promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire and
radio communication.'' Section 2 of the Communications Act grants the
Commission jurisdiction over ``all interstate and foreign communication
by wire or radio.'' As the Supreme Court explained in the radio
context, Congress charged the Commission with ``regulating a field of
enterprise the dominant characteristic of which was the rapid pace of
its unfolding'' and therefore intended to give the Commission
sufficiently ``broad'' authority to address new issues that arise with
respect to ``fluid and dynamic'' communications technologies.\123\
Broadband Internet access services are clearly within the Commission's
subject matter jurisdiction and historically have been supervised by
the Commission. Furthermore, as explained below, our adoption of basic
rules of the road for broadband providers implements specific statutory
mandates in the Communications Act and the Telecommunications Act of
1996.
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    \123\ Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
219-20 (1943) (Congress did not ``attempt[] an itemized catalogue of
the specific manifestations of the general problems'' that it
entrusted to the Commission); see also FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co.,
309 U.S. 134, 137, 138 (1940) (the Commission's statutory
responsibilities and authority amount to ``a unified and
comprehensive regulatory system'' for the communications industry
that allows a single agency to ``maintain, through appropriate
administrative control, a grip on the dynamic aspects'' of that
ever-changing industry).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Congress has demonstrated its awareness of the importance of the
Internet and advanced services to modern interstate communications. In
Section 230 of the Act, for example, Congress announced ``the policy of
the United States'' concerning the Internet, which includes
``promot[ing] the continued development of the Internet'' and
``encourag[ing] the development of technologies which maximize user
control over what information is received by individuals, families, and
schools who use the Internet,'' while also ``preserv[ing] the vibrant
and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and
other interactive computer services'' and avoiding unnecessary
regulation. Other statements of congressional policy further confirm
the Commission's statutory authority. In Section 254 of the Act, for
example, Congress charged the Commission with designing a Federal
universal program that has as one of several objectives making
``[a]ccess to advanced telecommunications and information services''
available ``in all regions of the Nation,'' and particularly to
schools, libraries, and health care providers. To the same end, in
Section 706 of the 1996 Act, Congress instructed the Commission to
``encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced
telecommunications capability to all Americans (including, in
particular, elementary and secondary schools and classrooms)'' and, if
it finds that advanced telecommunications capability is not being
deployed to all Americans ``on a reasonable and timely basis,'' to
``take immediate action to accelerate deployment of such capability.''
This mandate provides the Commission both ``authority'' and
``discretion'' ``to settle on the best regulatory or deregulatory
approach to broadband.'' As the legislative history of the 1996 Act
confirms, Congress believed that the laws it drafted would compel the
Commission to protect and promote the Internet, while allowing the
agency sufficient flexibility to decide how to do so.\124\ As explained
in detail below, Congress did not limit its instructions to the
Commission to one Section of the communications laws. Rather, it
expressed its instructions in multiple Sections which, viewed as a
whole, provide broad authority to promote competition, investment,
transparency, and an open Internet through the rules we adopt in this
Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ S. Rep. No. 104-23, at 51 (1995) (``The goal is to
accelerate deployment of an advanced capability that will enable
subscribers in all parts of the United States to send and receive
information in all its forms--voice, data, graphics, and video--over
a high-speed switched, interactive, broadband, transmission
capability.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Section 706 of the 1996 Act Provides Authority for the Open Internet
Rules

    As noted, Section 706 of the 1996 Act directs the Commission (along
with state commissions) to take actions that encourage the deployment
of ``advanced telecommunications capability.'' ``[A]dvanced
telecommunications capability,'' as defined in the statute, includes
broadband Internet access.\125\

[[Page 59215]]

Under Section 706(a), the Commission must encourage the deployment of
such capability by ``utilizing, in a manner consistent with the public
interest, convenience, and necessity,'' various tools including
``measures that promote competition in the local telecommunications
market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to
infrastructure investment.'' For the reasons stated in Parts II.A, II.D
and III.B, above, our open Internet rules will have precisely that
effect.
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    \125\ 47 U.S.C. 1302(d)(1) (defining ``advanced
telecommunications capability'' as ``high-speed, switched, broadband
telecommunications capability that enables users to originate and
receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video
telecommunications using any technology''). See National Broadband
Plan for our Future, Notice of Inquiry, 24 FCC Rcd 4342, 4309, App.
para. 13 (2009) (``advanced telecommunications capability'' includes
broadband Internet access); Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of
Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and
Timely Fashion, 14 FCC Rcd 2398, 2400, para. 1 (Section 706
addresses ``the deployment of broadband capability''), 2406 para. 20
(same). Even when broadband Internet access is provided as an
``information service'' rather than a ``telecommunications
service,'' see Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 977-78 (2005), it involves
``telecommunications.'' 47 U.S.C. 153(24). Given Section 706's
explicit focus on deployment of broadband access to voice, data, and
video communications, it is not important that the statute does not
use the exact phrase ``Internet network management.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In Comcast, the DC Circuit identified Section 706(a) as a provision
that ``at least arguably * * * delegate[s] regulatory authority to the
Commission,'' and in fact ``contain[s] a direct mandate--the Commission
`shall encourage.' '' \126\ The court, however, regarded the Commission
as ``bound by'' a prior order that, in the court of appeals'
understanding, had held that Section 706(a) is not a grant of
authority. In the Advanced Services Order, to which the court referred,
the Commission held that Section 706(a) did not permit it to encourage
advanced services deployment through the mechanism of forbearance
without complying with the specific requirements for forbearance set
forth in Section 10 of the Communications Act. The issue presented in
the 1998 proceeding was whether the Commission could rely on the broad
terms of Section 706(a) to trump those specific requirements. In the
Advanced Services Order, the Commission ruled that it could not do so,
noting that it would be ``unreasonable'' to conclude that Congress
intended Section 706(a) to ``allow the Commission to eviscerate
[specified] forbearance exclusions after having expressly singled out
[those exclusions] for different treatment in Section 10.'' The
Commission accordingly concluded that Section 706(a) did not give it
independent authority--in other words, authority over and above what it
otherwise possessed \127\--to forbear from applying other provisions of
the Act. The Commission's holding thus honored the interpretive canon
that ``[a] specific provision * * * controls one[ ] of more general
application.''
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    \126\ See Comcast, 600 F.3d at 658; see also 47 U.S.C. 1302(a)
(``The Commission * * * shall encourage the deployment on a
reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications
capability to all Americans * * * by utilizing * * * price cap
regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that promote
competition in the local telecommunications market, or other
regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure
investment.''). Because Section 706 contains a ``direct mandate,''
we reject the argument pressed by some commenters (see, e.g., AT&T
Comments at 217-18; Verizon Comments at 100-01; Qwest Comments at
58-59; Letter from Rick Chessen, Senior Vice President, Law and
Regulatory Policy, NCTA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN
Docket Nos. 09-191 & 10-127, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 7 (filed Dec.
10, 2010) (NCTA Dec. 10, 2010 Ex Parte Letter)) that Section 706
confers no substantive authority.
    \127\ Consistent with longstanding Supreme Court precedent, we
have understood this authority to include our ancillary jurisdiction
to further congressional policy. See, e.g., Amendment of Section
64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer
Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 FCC 2d 384, 474 (1980), aff'd, Computer
& Commc'ns Indus. Ass'n. v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 211-14 (DC Cir. 1982)
(CCIA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While disavowing a reading of Section 706(a) that would allow the
agency to trump specific mandates of the Communications Act, the
Commission nonetheless affirmed in the Advanced Services Order that
Section 706(a) ``gives this Commission an affirmative obligation to
encourage the deployment of advanced services'' using its existing
rulemaking, forbearance and adjudicatory powers, and stressed that
``this obligation has substance.'' The Advanced Services Order is,
therefore, consistent with our present understanding that Section
706(a) authorizes the Commission (along with state commissions) to take
actions, within their subject matter jurisdiction and not inconsistent
with other provisions of law, that encourage the deployment of advanced
telecommunications capability by any of the means listed in the
provision.\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \128\ To the extent the Advanced Services Order can be construed
as having read Section 706(a) differently, we reject that reading of
the statute for the reasons discussed in the text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In directing the Commission to ``encourage the deployment on a
reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability
to all Americans * * * by utilizing * * * price cap regulation,
regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local
telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove
barriers to infrastructure investment,'' Congress necessarily invested
the Commission with the statutory authority to carry out those acts.
Indeed, the relevant Senate Report explained that the provisions of
Section 706 are ``intended to ensure that one of the primary objectives
of the [1996 Act]--to accelerate deployment of advanced
telecommunications capability--is achieved,'' and stressed that these
provisions are ``a necessary fail-safe'' to guarantee that Congress's
objective is reached. It would be odd indeed to characterize Section
706(a) as a ``fail-safe'' that ``ensures'' the Commission's ability to
promote advanced services if it conferred no actual authority. Here,
under our reading, Section 706(a) authorizes the Commission to address
practices, such as blocking VoIP communications, degrading or raising
the cost of online video, or denying end users material information
about their broadband service, that have the potential to stifle
overall investment in Internet infrastructure and limit competition in
telecommunications markets.
    This reading of Section 706(a) obviates the concern of some
commenters that our jurisdiction under the provision could be
``limitless'' or ``unbounded.'' To the contrary, our Section 706(a)
authority is limited in three critical respects. First, our mandate
under Section 706(a) must be read consistently with Sections 1 and 2 of
the Act, which define the Commission's subject matter jurisdiction over
``interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio.''
\129\ As a result, our authority under Section 706(a) does not, in our
view, extend beyond our subject matter jurisdiction under the
Communications Act. Second, the Commission's actions

[[Page 59216]]

under Section 706(a) must ``encourage the deployment on a reasonable
and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all
Americans.'' Third, the activity undertaken to encourage such
deployment must ``utilize[e], in a manner consistent with the public
interest, convenience, and necessity,'' one (or more) of various
specified methods. These include: ``price cap regulation, regulatory
forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local
telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove
barriers to infrastructure investment.'' Actions that do not fall
within those categories are not authorized by Section 706(a). Thus, as
the DC Circuit has noted, while the statutory authority granted by
Section 706(a) is broad, it is ``not unfettered.'' \130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \129\ 47 U.S.C. 151, 152. The Commission historically has
recognized that services carrying Internet traffic are
jurisdictionally mixed, but generally subject to Federal regulation.
See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs Petition for
Clarification or Declaratory Ruling that No FCC Order or Rule Limits
State Authority to Collect Broadband Data, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 25 FCC Rcd 5051, 5054, paras. 8-9 & n. 24 (2010). Where, as
here, ``it is not possible to separate the interstate and intrastate
aspects of the service,'' the Commission may preempt state
regulation where ``Federal regulation is necessary to further a
valid Federal regulatory objective, i.e., state regulation would
conflict with Federal regulatory policies.'' Minn. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n v. FCC, 483 F.3d 570, 578 (8th Cir. 2007); see also La. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 375 n. 4 (1986). Except to the
extent a state requirement conflicts on its face with a Commission
decision herein, the Commission will evaluate preemption in light of
the fact-specific nature of the relevant inquiry, on a case-by-case
basis. We recognize, for example, that states play a vital role in
protecting end users from fraud, enforcing fair business practices,
and responding to consumer inquiries and complaints. See, e.g.,
Vonage Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 22404-05, para. 1. We have no intention
of impairing states' or local governments' ability to carry out
these duties unless we find that specific measures conflict with
Federal law or policy. In determining whether state or local
regulations frustrate Federal policies, we will, among other things,
be guided by the overarching congressional policies described in
Section 230 of the Act and Section 706 of the 1996 Act. 47 U.S.C.
230, 1302.
    \130\ Ad Hoc Telecomms. Users Comm., 572 F.3d at 906-07 (``The
general and generous phrasing of sec. 706 means that the FCC
possesses significant albeit not unfettered, authority and
discretion to settle on the best regulatory or deregulatory approach
to broadband.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 706(a) accordingly provides the Commission a specific
delegation of legislative authority to promote the deployment of
advanced services, including by means of the open Internet rules
adopted in this Order. Our understanding of Section 706(a) is,
moreover, harmonious with other statutory provisions that confer a
broad mandate on the Commission. Section 706(a)'s directive to
``encourage the deployment [of advanced telecommunications capability]
on a reasonable and timely basis'' using the methods specified in the
statute is, for example, no broader than other provisions of the
Commission's authorizing statutes that command the agency to ensure
``just'' and ``reasonable'' rates and practices, or to regulate
services in the ``public interest.'' Indeed, our authority under
Section 706(a) is generally consistent with--albeit narrower than--the
understanding of ancillary jurisdiction under which this Commission
operated for decades before the Comcast decision.\131\ The similarities
between the two in fact explain why the Commission has not heretofore
had occasion to describe Section 706(a) in this way: In the particular
proceedings prior to Comcast, setting out the understanding of Section
706(a) that we articulate in this Order would not meaningfully have
increased the authority that we understood the Commission already to
possess.\132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \131\ In Comcast, the court stated that `` `[t]he Commission * *
* may exercise ancillary jurisdiction only when two conditions are
satisfied: (1) The Commission's general jurisdictional grant under
Title I [of the Communications Act] covers the regulated subject and
(2) the regulations are reasonably ancillary to the Commission's
effective performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities.'
'' 600 F.3d at 646 (quoting Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689,
691-92 (DC Cir. 2005)) (alterations in original). The court further
ruled that the second prong of this test requires the Commission to
rely on specific delegations of statutory authority. 600 F.3d at
644, 654.
    \132\ Ignoring that Section 706(a) expressly contemplates the
use of ``regulating methods'' such as price regulation, some
commenters read prior Commission orders as suggesting that Section
706 authorizes only deregulatory actions. See AT&T Comments at 216
(citing Petition for Declaratory Ruling that pulver.com's Free World
Dialup is Neither Telecomm. Nor A Telecomms. Serv., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 3307, 3319, para. 19 n. 69 (2004)
(Pulver Order)); Esbin Comments at 52 (citing Inquiry Concerning
High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities et
al., Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC
Rcd 4798, 4801, 4826, 4840, paras. 4, 47, 73, (2002) (Cable Modem
Declaratory Ruling) and Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access
to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities et al., Report and Order
and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd 14853, 14894 para. 77
(2005) (Wireline Broadband Report and Order)). They are mistaken.
The Pulver Order stated only that Section 706 did not contemplate
the application of ``economic and entry/exit regulation inherent in
Title II'' to information service Internet applications. Pulver
Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 3379, para. 19 n. 69 (emphasis added). The open
Internet rules that we adopt in this Order do not regulate Internet
applications, much less impose Title II (i.e., common carrier)
regulation on such applications. Moreover, at the same time the
Commission determined in the Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling and the
Wireline Broadband Report and Order that cable modem service and
wireline broadband services (such as DSL) could be provided as
information services not subject to Title II, it proposed new
regulations under other sources of authority including Section 706.
See Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, 17 FCC Rcd at 4840, para. 73;
Wireline Broadband Report and Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 14929-30, 14987,
para. 146. On the same day the Commission adopted the Wireline
Broadband Report and Order, it also adopted the Internet Policy
Statement, which rested in part on Section 706. 20 FCC Rcd 14986,
para. 2 (2005). Our prior orders therefore do not construe Section
706 as exclusively deregulatory. And to the extent that any prior
order does suggest such a construction, we now reject it. See Ad Hoc
Telecomms. Users Comm., 572 F.3d at 908 (Section 706 ``direct[s] the
FCC to make the major policy decisions and to select the mix of
regulatory and deregulatory tools the Commission deems most
appropriate in the public interest to facilitate broadband
deployment and competition'') (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 706(b) of the 1996 Act provides additional authority to
take actions such as enforcing open Internet principles. It directs the
Commission to undertake annual inquiries concerning the availability of
advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans and requires
that, if the Commission finds that such capability is not being
deployed in a reasonable and timely fashion, it ``shall take immediate
action to accelerate deployment of such capability by removing barriers
to infrastructure investment and by promoting competition in the
telecommunications market.'' In July 2010, the Commission ``conclude[d]
that broadband deployment to all Americans is not reasonable and
timely'' and noted that ``[a]s a consequence of that conclusion,''
Section 706(b) was triggered. Section 706(b) therefore provides express
authority for the pro-investment, pro-competition rules we adopt in
this Order.

B. Authority To Promote Competition and Investment in, and Protect End
Users of, Voice, Video, and Audio Services

    The Commission also has authority under the Communications Act to
adopt the open Internet rules in order to promote competition and
investment in voice, video, and audio services. Furthermore, for the
reasons stated in Part II, above, even if statutory provisions related
to voice, video, and audio communications were the only sources of
authority for the open Internet rules (which is not the case), it would
not be sound policy to attempt to implement rules concerning only
voice, video, or audio transmissions over the Internet.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \133\ Many broadband providers offer their service on a common
carriage basis under Title II of the Act. See Framework for
Broadband Internet Serv., Notice of Inquiry, 25 FCC Rcd 7866, 7875,
para. 21 (2010). With respect to these providers, the rules we adopt
in this Order are additionally supported on that basis. With the
possible exception of transparency requirements, however, the open
Internet rules are unlikely to create substantial new duties for
these providers in practice.
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1. The Commission Has Authority To Adopt Open Internet Rules To Further
Its Responsibilities Under Title II of the Act
    Section 201 of the Act delegates to the Commission ``express and
expansive authority'' to ensure that the ``charges [and] practices * *
* in connection with'' telecommunications services are ``just and
reasonable.'' As described in Part II.B, interconnected VoIP services,
which include some over-the-top VoIP services, ``are increasingly being
used as a substitute for traditional telephone service.''\134\ Over-
the-top services therefore do, or will, contribute to the marketplace
discipline of voice telecommunications services regulated under Section
201.\135\ Furthermore,

[[Page 59217]]

companies that provide both voice communications and broadband Internet
access services (for example, telephone companies that are broadband
providers) have the incentive and ability to block, degrade, or
otherwise disadvantage the services of their online voice competitors.
Because the Commission may enlist market forces to fulfill its Section
201 responsibilities, we possess authority to prevent these
anticompetitive practices through open Internet rules.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ Tel. No. Requirements for IP-Enabled Servs. Providers,
Report and Order, Declaratory Ruling, Order on Remand, and NPRM, 22
FCC Rcd 19531, 19547, para. 28 (2007). By definition, interconnected
VoIP services allow calls to and from traditional phone networks.
    \135\ See NCTA Dec. 10, 2010 Ex Parte Letter (arguing that the
Commission could exercise authority ancillary to several provisions
of Title II of the Act, including Sections 201 and 202, ``to ensure
that common carrier services continue to be offered on just and
reasonable terms and conditions'' and to ``facilitate consumer
access to broadband-based alternatives to common carrier services
such as Voice over Internet Protocol''); Vonage Comments at 11-12
(``The Commission's proposed regulations would help preserve the
competitive balance between providers electing to operate under
Title II and those operating under Title I.''); Google Comments at
45-46 (``The widespread use of VoIP and related services as cheaper
and more feature-rich alternatives to Title II services has
significant effects on traditional telephone providers' practices
and pricing, as well [as] on network interconnection between Title
II and IP networks that consumers use to reach each other, going to
the heart of the Commission's Title II responsibilities.'')
(footnotes and citations omitted); Letter from Devendra T. Kumar,
Counsel to Skype Communications S.A.R.L., to Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52 (filed
Nov. 30, 2010) (arguing that the Commission has authority ancillary
to Section 201 to protect international VoIP calling); XO Comments
at 20 (noting the impact of, inter alia, VoIP on the Commission's
``traditional framework'' for regulating voice services under Title
II); Letter from Alan Inouye et al., on behalf of ALA, ARL and
EDUCAUSE, to Chairman Julius Genachowski et al., GN Docket No. 09-
191, WC Docket No. 07-52 at 4-5 (filed Dec. 13, 2010) (citing
examples of how libraries and higher education institutions are
using broadband services, including VoIP, to replace traditional
common carrier services). In previous orders, the Commission has
embraced the use of VoIP to avoid or constrain high international
calling rates. See Universal Serv. Contribution Methodology et al.,
Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 21 FCC Rcd 7518,
7546, para. 55 & n.187 (2006) (``[I]nterconnected VoIP service is
often marketed as an economical way to make interstate and
international calls, as a lower-cost substitute for wireline toll
service.''), rev'd in part sub nom. Vonage Holdings Corp. v. FCC,
489 F.3d 1232 (DC Cir. 2007); Reporting Requirements for U.S.
Providers of Int'l Telecomms. Servs., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
19 FCC Rcd 6460, 6470, para. 22 (2004) (``Improvements in the
packet-switched transmission technology underlying the Internet now
allow providers of VoIP to offer international voice transmission of
reasonable quality at a price lower than current IMTS rates.'')
(footnote omitted); Int'l Settlements Policy Reform, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd 19954, 19964, para. 13 (2002)
(``This ability to engage in least-cost routing, as well as
alternative, non-traditional services such as IP Telephony or Voice-
Over-IP, in conjunction with the benchmarks policy have created a
market dynamic that is pressuring international settlement rates
downward.''). In addition, NCTA has explained that, ``[b]y enabling
consumers to make informed choices regarding broadband Internet
access service,'' the Commission could conclude that transparency
requirements ``would help promote the competitiveness of VoIP and
other broadband-based communications services'' and ``thereby
facilitate the operation of market forces to discipline the charges
and other practices of common carriers, in fulfillment of the
Commission's obligations under Sections 201 and 202'' of the Act.
NCTA Dec. 10, 2010 Ex Parte Letter at 2-3.
    \136\ We reject the argument asserted by some commenters (see,
e.g., AT&T Comments at 218-19; Verizon Comments at 98-99) that the
various grants of rulemaking authority in the Act, including the
express grant of rulemaking authority in Section 201(b) itself, do
not authorize the promulgation of rules pursuant to Section 201(b).
See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378 (1999) (``We
think that the grant in sec. 201(b) means what it says: The FCC has
rulemaking authority to carry out the `provisions of this Act.' '').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 251(a)(1) of the Act imposes a duty on all
telecommunications carriers ``to interconnect directly or indirectly
with the facilities of other telecommunications carriers.'' Many over-
the-top VoIP services allow end users to receive calls from and/or
place calls to traditional phone networks operated by
telecommunications carriers. The Commission has not determined whether
any such VoIP providers are telecommunications carriers. To the extent
that VoIP services are information services (rather than
telecommunications services), any blocking or degrading of a call from
a traditional telephone customer to a customer of a VoIP provider, or
vice-versa, would deny the traditional telephone customer the intended
benefits of telecommunications interconnection under Section 251(a)(1).
Over-the-top VoIP customers account for a growing share of telephone
usage. If calls to and from these VoIP customers were not delivered
efficiently and reliably by broadband providers, all users of the
public switched telephone network would be limited in their ability to
communicate, and Congress's goal of ``efficient, Nation-wide, and
world-wide'' communications across interconnected networks would be
frustrated. To the extent that VoIP services are telecommunications
services, a broadband provider's interference with traffic exchanged
between a provider of VoIP telecommunications services and another
telecommunications carrier would interfere with interconnection between
two telecommunications carriers under Section 251(a)(1).\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \137\ See also 47 U.S.C. 256(b)(1) (directing the Commission to
``establish procedures for * * * oversight of coordinated network
planning by telecommunications carriers and other providers of
telecommunications service for the effective and efficient
interconnection of public telecommunications networks used to
provide telecommunications service''); Comcast, 600 F.3d at 659
(acknowledging Section 256's objective, while adding that Section
256 does not `` `expand[ ] * * * any authority that the Commission'
otherwise has under law'') (quoting 47 U.S.C. 256(c)).
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2. The Commission Has Authority To Adopt Open Internet Rules To Further
Its Responsibilities Under Titles III and VI of the Act
    ``The Commission has been charged with broad responsibilities for
the orderly development of an appropriate system of local television
broadcasting,'' \138\ which arise from the Commission's more general
public interest obligation to ``ensure the larger and more effective
use of radio.'' \139\ Similarly, the Commission has broad jurisdiction
to oversee MVPD services, including direct-broadcast satellite
(DBS).\140\ Consistent with these mandates, our jurisdiction over video
and audio services under Titles III and VI of the Communications Act
provides additional authority for open Internet rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \138\ See United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177
(1968); see also id. at 174 (``[T]hese obligations require for their
satisfaction the creation of a system of local broadcasting
stations, such that `all communities of appreciable size (will) have
at least one television station as an outlet for local self-
expression.' ''); 47 U.S.C. 307(b) (Commission shall ``make such
distribution of licenses, * * * among the several States and
communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable
distribution of radio service to each of the same''), 303(f) & (h)
(authorizing the Commission to allocate broadcasting zones or areas
and to promulgate regulations ``as it may deem necessary'' to
prevent interference among stations) (cited in Sw. Cable, 392 U.S.
at 173-74).
    \139\ Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 216 (public interest to be
served is the ``larger and more effective use of radio'') (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
    \140\ See 47 U.S.C. 303(v); see also N.Y. State Comm'n on Cable
Television v. FCC, 749 F.2d 804, 807-12 (DC Cir. 1984) (upholding
the Commission's exercise of ancillary authority over satellite
master antenna television service); 47 U.S.C. 548 (discussed below).
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    First, such rules are necessary to the effective performance of our
Title III responsibilities to ensure the ``orderly development * * * of
local television broadcasting'' \141\ and the ``more effective use of
radio.'' \142\ As discussed in Parts II.A and II.B, Internet video
distribution is increasingly important to all video programming
services, including local television broadcast service. Radio stations
also are providing audio and video content on the Internet. At the same
time,

[[Page 59218]]

broadband providers--many of which are also MVPDs--have the incentive
and ability to engage in self-interested practices that may include
blocking or degrading the quality of online programming content,
including broadcast content, or charging unreasonable additional fees
for faster delivery of such content. Absent the rules we adopt in this
Order, such practices jeopardize broadcasters' ability to offer news
(including local news) and other programming over the Internet, and, in
turn, threaten to impair their ability to offer high-quality broadcast
content.\143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \141\ Sw. Cable, 392 U.S. at 177; see 47 U.S.C. 303(f) & (h)
(establishing Commission's authority to allocate broadcasting zones
or areas and to promulgate regulations ``as it may deem necessary''
to prevent interference among stations) (cited in Sw. Cable, 392
U.S. at 173-74).
    \142\ Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 216; see also 47 U.S.C.
303(g) (establishing Commission's duty to ``generally encourage the
larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest''),
307(b) (``[T]he Commission shall make such distribution of licenses
* * * among the several States and communities as to provide a fair,
efficient, and equitable distribution of radio service to each of
the same.'').
    \143\ NCTA has noted that ``[t]he Commission could decide that,
based on the growing importance of broadcast programming distributed
over broadband networks to both television viewers and the business
of broadcasting itself, ensuring that broadcast video content made
available over broadband networks is not subject to unreasonable
discrimination or anticompetitive treatment is necessary to preserve
and strengthen the system of local broadcasting.'' NCTA Dec. 10,
2010 Ex Parte Letter at 3; see also id. (``Facilitating the
availability of broadcast content on the Internet may also help to
foster more efficient and intensive use of spectrum, thereby
supporting the Commission's duty in Section 303(g) to `generally
encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public
interest.' '') (quoting 47 U.S.C. 303(g)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission likewise has authority under Title VI of the Act to
adopt open Internet rules that protect competition in the provision of
MVPD services. A cable or telephone company's interference with the
online transmission of programming by DBS operators or stand-alone
online video programming aggregators that may function as competitive
alternatives to traditional MVPDs \144\ would frustrate Congress's
stated goals in enacting Section 628 of the Act, which include
promoting ``competition and diversity in the multichannel video
programming market''; ``increase[ing] the availability of satellite
cable programming and satellite broadcast programming to persons in
rural and other areas not currently able to receive such programming'';
and ``spur[ring] the development of communications technologies.''
\145\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \144\ The issue whether online-only video programming
aggregators are themselves MVPDs under the Communications Act and
our regulations has been raised in pending program access complaint
proceedings. See, e.g., VDC Corp. v. Turner Network Sales, Inc.,
Program Access Complaint (Jan. 18, 2007); Sky Angel U.S., LLC v.
Discovery Commc'ns LLC, Program Access Complaint (Mar. 24, 2010).
Nothing in this Order should be read to state or imply any
determination on this issue.
    \145\ 47 U.S.C. sec. 548(a). The Act defines ``video
programming'' as ``programming provided by, or generally considered
comparable to programming provided by, a television broadcast
station.'' 47 U.S.C. sec. 522(20). Although the Commission stated
nearly a decade ago that video `` `streamed' over the Internet'' had
``not yet achieved television quality'' and therefore did not
constitute ``video programming'' at that time, see Cable Modem
Declaratory Ruling, 17 FCC Rcd at 4834, para. 63 n.236, intervening
improvements in streaming technology and broadband availability
enable such programming to be ``comparable to programming provided
by * * * a television broadcast station,'' 47 U.S.C. sec. 522(20).
This finding is consistent with our prediction more than five years
ago that ``[a]s video compression technology improves, data transfer
rates increase, and media adapters that link TV to a broadband
connection become more widely used, * * * video over the Internet
will proliferate and improve in quality.'' Ann. Assessment of the
Status of Competition in the Mkt. for the Delivery of Video
Programming, Notice of Inquiry, 19 FCC Rcd 10909, 10932, para. 74
(2004) (citation omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When Congress enacted Section 628 in 1992, it was specifically
concerned about the incentive and ability of cable operators to use
their control of video programming to impede competition from the then-
nascent DBS industry.\146\ Since that time, the Internet has opened a
new competitive arena in which MVPDs that offer broadband service have
the opportunity and incentive to impede DBS providers and other
competing MVPDs--and the statute reaches this analogous arena as well.
Section 628(b) prohibits cable operators from engaging in ``unfair or
deceptive acts or practices the purpose or effect of which is to
prevent or hinder significantly the ability of an MVPD to deliver
satellite cable programming or satellite broadcast programming to
consumers.'' An ``unfair method of competition or unfair act or
practice'' under Section 628(b) includes acts that can be
anticompetitive.\147\ Thus, Section 628(b) proscribes practices by
cable operators that (i) can impede competition, and (ii) have the
purpose or effect of preventing or significantly hindering other MVPDs
from providing consumers their satellite-delivered programming (i.e.,
programming transmitted to MVPDs via satellite for retransmission to
subscribers).\148\ Section 628(c)(1), in turn, directs the Commission
to adopt rules proscribing unfair practices by cable operators and
their affiliated satellite cable programming vendors. Section 628(j)
provides that telephone companies offering video programming services
are subject to the same rules as cable operators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \146\ See Cable Act of 1992, Public Law 102-385, sec. 2(a)(5),
106 Stat. 1460, 1461 (``Vertically integrated program suppliers * *
* have the incentive and ability to favor their affiliated cable
operators over nonaffiliated cable operators and programming
distributors using other technologies.''); H.R. Rep. No. 102-862, at
93 (1992) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1231, 1275
(``In adopting rules under this section, the conferees expect the
Commission to address and resolve the problems of unreasonable cable
industry practices, including restricting the availability of
programming and charging discriminatory prices to non-cable
technologies.''); S. Rep. No. 102-92, at 26 (1991), reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1159 (``[C]able programmers may simply
refuse to sell to potential competitors. Small cable operators,
satellite dish owners, and wireless cable operators complain that
they are denied access to, or charged more for, programming than
large, vertically integrated cable operators.'').
    \147\ Review of the Commission's Program Access Rules and
Examination of Programming Tying Arrangements, First Report and
Order, 25 FCC Rcd 746, 779, para. 48 & n. 190 (2010) (citing
Exclusive Contracts for Provision of Video Serv. in Multiple
Dwelling Units and Other Real Estate Devs., Report and Order and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 FCC Rcd 20235, 20255,
para. 43, aff'd, NCTA, 567 F.3d 659); see also NTCA, 567 F.3d at
664-65 (referring to ``unfair dealing'' and ``anticompetitive
practices'').
    \148\ See 47 U.S.C. 548(b); NCTA, 567 F.3d at 664. In NCTA, the
court held that the Commission reasonably concluded that the ``broad
and sweeping terms'' of Section 628(b) authorized it to ban
exclusive agreements between cable operators and building owners
that prevented other MVPDs from providing their programming to
residents of those buildings. The court observed that ``the words
Congress chose [in Section 628(b)] focus not on practices that
prevent MVPDs from obtaining satellite cable or satellite broadcast
programming, but on practices that prevent them from `providing'
that programming `to subscribers or consumers.' '' NCTA, 567 F.3d at
664 (emphasis in original).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The open Internet rules directly further our mandate under Section
628. Cable operators, telephone companies, and DBS operators alike are
seeking to keep and win customers by expanding their MVPD offerings to
include online access to their programming.\149\ For example, in
providing its MVPD service, DISH (one of the nation's two DBS
providers) relies significantly on online dissemination of programming,
including video-on-demand and other programming, that competes with
similar offerings by cable operators.\150\

[[Page 59219]]

As DISH explains, ``[a]s more and more video consumption moves online,
the competitive viability of stand-alone MVPDs depends on their ability
to offer an online video experience of the same quality as the online
video offerings of integrated broadband providers.'' The open Internet
rules will prevent practices by cable operators and telephone
companies, in their role as broadband providers, that have the purpose
or effect of significantly hindering (or altogether preventing)
delivery of video programming protected under Section 628(b).\151\ The
Commission therefore is authorized to adopt open Internet rules under
Section 628(b), (c)(1), and (j).\152\
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    \149\ DISH Reply at 4-5 (``Pay-TV services continue to evolve at
a rapid pace and providers increasingly are integrating their vast
offerings of linear channels with online content,'' while
``consumers are adopting online video services as a complement to
traditional, linear pay-TV services'' and ``specifically desire
Internet video as a complement to * * * [MVPDs'] traditional TV
offerings.'') (footnotes and citations omitted). We find
unpersuasive the contention that this Order fails to ``grapple with
the implications of the market forces that are driving MVPDs * * *
to add Internet connectivity to their multichannel video
offerings.'' McDowell Statement at *24 (footnote omitted). Our
analysis takes account of these developments, which are discussed at
length in Part II.A, above.
    \150\ Id. at 5-8 & n. 20 (discussing ``DishOnline service,''
which ``allows DISH to offer over 3,000 movies and TV shows through
its `DishOnline' Internet video service,'' and noting that ``the
success of DishOnline is critically dependent on broadband access
provided and controlled by DISH's competitors in the MVPD market'');
DISH PN Comments at 2-3; DISH Network, Watch Live TV Online OR
Recorded Programs with DishOnline, http://www.dish-systems.com/products/dish_online.php (`` `DISHOnline.com integrates DISH
Network's expansive TV programming lineup with the vast amount of
online video content, adding another dimension to our `pay once,
take your TV everywhere' product platform.' ''). Much of the regular
subscription programming that DISH offers online is satellite-
delivered programming. See DISH Network, Watch Live TV Online OR
Recorded Programs with DishOnline, http://www.dish-systems.com/products/dish_online.php (noting that customers can watch content
from cable programmers such as the Discovery Channel and MTV). Thus,
we reject NCTA's argument that ``[t]here is no basis for asserting
that any cable operator or common carrier's practices with respect
to Internet-delivered video could * * * `prevent or significantly
hinder' an MVPD from providing satellite cable programming.'' NCTA
Dec. 10, 2010 Ex Parte Letter at 5.
    \151\ Notwithstanding suggestions to the contrary, the
Commission is not required to wait until anticompetitive harms are
realized before acting. Rather, the Commission may exercise its
ancillary jurisdiction to ``plan in advance of foreseeable events,
instead of waiting to react to them.'' Sw. Cable, 392 U.S. at 176-77
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Star
Wireless, LLC v. FCC, 522 F.3d at 475.
    \152\ See Open Internet NRPM, 24 FCC Rcd at 13099, para. 85
(discussing role of the Internet in fostering video programming
competition and the Commission's authority to regulate video
services).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similarly, open Internet rules enable us to carry out our
responsibilities under Section 616(a) of the Act, which confers
additional express statutory authority to combat discriminatory network
management practices by broadband providers. Section 616(a) directs the
Commission to adopt regulations governing program carriage agreements
``and related practices'' between cable operators or other MVPDs and
video programming vendors.\153\ The program carriage regulations must
include provisions that prevent MVPDs from ``unreasonably restrain[ing]
the ability of an unaffiliated video programming vendor to compete
fairly by discriminating in video programming distribution,'' on the
basis of a vendor's affiliation or lack of affiliation with the MVPD,
in the selection, terms, or conditions of carriage of the vendor's
programming.\154\ MVPD practices that discriminatorily impede competing
video programming vendors' online delivery of programming to consumers
affect the vendors' ability to ``compete fairly'' for viewers, just as
surely as MVPDs' discriminatory selection of video programming for
carriage on cable systems has this effect. We find that discriminatory
practices by MVPDs in their capacity as broadband providers, such as
blocking or charging fees for termination of online video programming
to end users, are ``related'' to program carriage agreements and within
our mandate to adopt regulations under Section 616(a).\155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \153\ An MVPD is ``a person such as, but not limited to, a cable
operator, a multichannel multipoint distribution service, a direct
broadcast satellite service, or a television receive-only satellite
program distributor, who makes available for purchase, by
subscribers or customers, multiple channels of video programming.''
47 U.S.C. 522(13). A ``video programming vendor'' is any ``person
engaged in the production, creation, or wholesale distribution of
video programming for sale.'' 47 U.S.C. 536(b). A number of video
programming vendors make their programming available online. See,
e.g., Hulu.com, http://www.hulu.com/about; Biography Channel, http://www.biography.com; Hallmark Channel, http://www.hallmarkchannel.com.
    \154\ 47 U.S.C. 536(a)(1)-(3); see also 47 CFR 76.1301
(implementing regulations to address practices specified in Section
616(a)(1)-(3)).
    \155\ The Act does not define ``related practices'' as that
phrase is used in Section 616(a). Because the term is neither
explicitly defined in the statute nor susceptible of only one
meaning, we construe it, consistent with dictionary definitions, to
cover practices that are ``akin'' or ``connected'' to those
specifically identified in Section 616(a)(1)-(3). See Black's Law
Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979); Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary
1916 (1993). The argument that Section 616(a) has no application to
Internet access service overlooks that the statute expressly covers
these ``related practices.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Authority To Protect the Public Interest Through Spectrum Licensing

    Open Internet rules for wireless services are further supported by
our authority, under Title III of the Communications Act, to protect
the public interest through spectrum licensing. Congress has entrusted
the Commission with ``maintain[ing] the control of the United States
over all the channels of radio transmission.'' Licensees hold
Commission-granted authorizations to use that spectrum subject to
conditions the Commission imposes on that use.\156\ In considering
whether to grant a license to use spectrum, therefore, the Commission
must ``determine * * * whether the public interest, convenience, and
necessity will be served by the granting of such application.'' \157\
Likewise, when identifying classes of licenses to be awarded by auction
and the characteristics of those licenses, the Commission ``shall
include safeguards to protect the public interest'' and must seek to
promote a number of goals, including ``the development and rapid
deployment of new technologies, products, and services.'' Even after
licenses are awarded, the Commission may change the license terms ``if
in the judgment of the Commission such action will promote the public
interest, convenience, and necessity.'' The Commission may exercise
this authority on a license-by-license basis or through a rulemaking,
even if the affected licenses were awarded at auction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \156\ 47 U.S.C. 304, 316(a)(1). We thus disagree with commenters
who suggest in general that there is nothing in Title III to support
the imposition of open Internet rules. See, e.g., EFF Comments at 6
n. 13.
    \157\ 47 U.S.C. 309(a); see also 47 U.S.C. 307(a) (``The
Commission, if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be
served thereby, subject to the limitations of this [Act], shall
grant to any applicant therefor a station license provided for by
this [Act].'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission previously has required wireless licensees to comply
with open Internet principles, as appropriate in the particular
situation before it. In 2007, when it modified the service rules for
the 700 MHz band, the Commission took ``a measured step to encourage
additional innovation and consumer choice at this critical stage in the
evolution of wireless broadband services.'' Specifically, the
Commission required C block licensees ``to allow customers, device
manufacturers, third-party application developers, and others to use or
develop the devices and applications of their choosing in C Block
networks, so long as they meet all applicable regulatory requirements
and comply with reasonable conditions related to management of the
wireless network (i.e., do not cause harm to the network).'' The open
Internet conditions we adopt in this Order likewise are necessary to
advance the public interest in innovation and investment.\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \158\ In addition, the use of mobile VoIP applications is likely
to constrain prices for CMRS voice services, similar to what we
described earlier with regard to VoIP and traditional phone
services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    AT&T contends that the Commission cannot apply ``neutrality''
regulations to wireless broadband services outside the upper 700 MHz C
Block spectrum because any such regulations ``would unlawfully rescind
critical rulings in the Commission's 700 MHz Second Report and Order on
which providers relied in making multi-billion dollar investments,''
\159\ and that adopting these regulations more broadly to all mobile
providers would violate the Administrative Procedure Act. We disagree.
As explained above, the Commission retains the statutory authority to
impose new requirements on existing licenses beyond those that were in
place at the time of grant, whether the licenses were assigned by

[[Page 59220]]

auction or by other means.\160\ In this case, parties were made well
aware that the agency might extend openness requirements beyond the C
Block, diminishing any reliance interest they might assert.\161\ To the
extent that AT&T argues that application of openness principles reduced
auction bids on the C Block spectrum, we find that the reasons for the
price differences between the C Block and other 700 MHz spectrum blocks
are far more complex. A number of factors, including unique auction
dynamics and significant differences between the C Block spectrum and
other blocks of 700 MHz spectrum contributed to these price
differences. In balancing the public interest factors we are required
to consider, we have determined that adopting a targeted set of rules
that apply to all mobile broadband providers is necessary at this time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \159\ AT&T PN Reply at 32. AT&T asserts that winners of non-C-
Block licenses paid a premium for licenses not subject to the open
platform requirements that applied to the upper 700 MHz C Block
licenses. Id. at 33-34.
    \160\ The Commission may act by rulemaking to modify or impose
rules applicable to all licensees or licensees in a particular
class; in order to modify specific licenses held by particular
licensees, however, the Commission generally is required to follow
the modification procedure set forth in 47 U.S.C. 316. See Comm. for
Effective Cellular Rules v. FCC, 53 F.3d 1309, 1319-20 (DC Cir.
1995).
    \161\ See generally 700 MHz Second Report and Order, 22 FCC Rcd
at 15358-65. In the 700 MHz Second Report and Order, the Commission
stated that its decision to limit open-platform requirements to the
C Block was based on the record before it ``at this time,'' id. at
15361, and noted that openness issues in the wireless industry were
being considered more broadly in other proceedings. Id. at 15363.
The public notice setting procedures for the 2008 auction advised
bidders that the rules governing auctioned licenses would be subject
to ``pending and future proceedings'' before the Commission. See
Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Scheduled for January 24, 2008,
Public Notice, 22 FCC Rcd 18141, 18156, para. 42 (2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Authority To Collect Information To Enable the Commission To Perform
Its Reporting Obligations to Congress

    Additional sections of the Communications Act provide authority for
our transparency requirement in particular. Section 4(k) provides for
an annual report to Congress that ``shall contain * * * such
information and data collected by the Commission as may be considered
of value in the determination of questions connected with the
regulation of interstate * * * wire and radio communication'' and
provide ``recommendations to Congress as to additional legislation
which the Commission deems necessary or desirable.'' \162\ The
Commission has previously relied on Section 4(k), among other
provisions, as a basis for its authority to gather information.\163\
The Comcast court, moreover, ``readily accept[ed]'' that ``certain
assertions of Commission authority could be `reasonably ancillary' to
the Commission's statutory responsibility to issue a report to
Congress. For example, the Commission might impose disclosure
requirements on regulated entities in order to gather data needed for
such a report.'' \164\ We adopt such disclosure requirements here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \162\ 47 U.S.C. 154(k). In a similar vein, Section 257 of the
Act directs the Commission to report to Congress every three years
on ``market entry barriers'' that the Commission recommends be
eliminated, including ``barriers for entrepreneurs and other small
businesses in the provision and ownership of telecommunications
services and information services.'' 47 U.S.C. 257(a) & (c); see
also Comcast, 600 F.3d at 659; NCTA Dec. 10, 2010 Ex Parte Letter at
3 (``[S]ection 257's reporting mandate provides a basis for the
Commission to require providers of broadband Internet access service
to disclose the terms and conditions of service in order to assess
whether such terms hamper small business entry and, if so, whether
any legislation may be required to address the problem.'') (footnote
omitted).
    \163\ See, e.g., New Part 4 of the Commission's Rules Concerning
Disruptions to Commc'ns, Report and Order and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd 16830, 16837, paras. 1, 12 (2004)
(extending Commission's reporting requirements for communications
disruptions to certain providers of non-wireline communications, in
part based on Section 4(k)); DTV Consumer Educ. Initiative, Report &
Order, 23 FCC Rcd 4134, 4147, paras. 1, 2, 28 (2008) (requiring
various entities, including broadcasters, to submit quarterly
reports to the Commission detailing their consumer education efforts
related to the DTV transition, in part based on section 4(k));
Review of the Commission's Broad. Cable and Equal Emp't Opportunity
Rules and Policies, Second Report and Order and Third Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd 24018, 24077, paras. 5, 195 (2002)
(promulgating recordkeeping and reporting requirements for broadcast
licensees and other regulated entities to show compliance with equal
opportunities hiring rules, in part based on section 4(k)).
    \164\ 600 F.3d at 659. All, or nearly all, providers of
broadband Internet access service are regulated by the Commission
insofar as they operate under certificates to provide common
carriage service, or under licenses to use radio spectrum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the Commission has broad authority under Section 218 of
the Act to obtain ``full and complete information'' from common
carriers and their affiliates. To the extent broadband providers are
affiliated with communications common carriers, Section 218 allows the
Commission to require the provision of information such as that covered
by the transparency rule we adopt in this Order.\165\ We believe that
these disclosure requirements will assist us in carrying out our
reporting obligations to Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \165\ Cf. US West, Inc. v. FCC, 778 F.2d 23, 26-27 (DC Cir.
1985) (acknowledging Commission's authority under Section 218 to
impose reporting requirements on holding companies that owned local
telephone companies).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Constitutional Issues

    Some commenters contend that open Internet rules violate the First
Amendment and amount to an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth
Amendment. We examine these constitutional arguments below, and find
them unfounded.
1. First Amendment
    Several broadband providers argue that open Internet rules are
inconsistent with the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment.
These commenters generally contend that because broadband providers
distribute their own and third-party content to customers, they are
speakers entitled to First Amendment protections. Therefore, they
argue, rules that prevent broadband providers from favoring the
transmission of some content over other content violate their free
speech rights. Other commenters contend that none of the proposed rules
implicate the First Amendment, because providing broadband service is
conduct that is not correctly understood as speech.
    In arguing that broadband service is protected by the First
Amendment, AT&T compares its provision of broadband service to the
operation of a cable television system, and points out that the Supreme
Court has determined that cable programmers and cable operators engage
in speech protected by the First Amendment. The analogy is inapt. When
the Supreme Court held in Turner I that cable operators were protected
by the First Amendment, the critical factor that made cable operators
``speakers'' was their production of programming and their exercise of
``editorial discretion over which programs and stations to include''
(and thus which to exclude).
    Unlike cable television operators, broadband providers typically
are best described not as ``speakers,'' but rather as conduits for
speech. The broadband Internet access service at issue here does not
involve an exercise of editorial discretion that is comparable to cable
companies' choice of which stations or programs to include in their
service. In this proceeding broadband providers have not, for instance,
shown that they market their services as benefiting from an editorial
presence.\166\ To the contrary, Internet end users expect that they can
obtain access to all or substantially all content that is available on
the Internet, without the editorial

[[Page 59221]]

intervention of their broadband provider.\167\
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    \166\ See, e.g., AT&T, AT&T U-verse, http://www.att-services.net/att-u-verse.html (AT&T U-verse: ``Customers can get the
information they want, when they want it''); Verizon, FiOS Internet,
http://www22.verizon.com/Residential/FiOSInternet/Overview.htm and
Verizon, High Speed Internet, http://www22.verizon.com/Residential/HighSpeedInternet (Verizon FiOS and High Speed Internet: ``Internet,
plus all the free extras'').
    \167\ See Verizon Comments at 117 (``[B]roadband providers today
provide traditional Internet access services that offer subscribers
access to all lawful content and have strong economic incentives to
continue to do so.'') (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consistent with that understanding, broadband providers maintain
that they qualify for statutory immunity from liability for copyright
violations or the distribution of offensive material precisely because
they lack control over what end users transmit and receive.\168\ In
addition, when defending themselves against subpoenas in litigation
involving alleged copyright violations, broadband providers typically
take the position that they are simply conduits of information provided
by others.\169\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \168\ See 17 U.S.C. 512(a) (a ``service provider shall not be
liable * * * for infringement of copyright by reason of the
provider's transmitting, routing, or providing connections for''
material distributed by others on its network); 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1)
(``[N]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider''); see also Recording Indus.
Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229,
1234 (DC Cir. 2003) (discussing in context of subpoena issued to
Verizon under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Section 512(a)'s
``four safe harbors, each of which immunizes ISPs from liability
from copyright infringement''), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 924 (2004).
For example ``Verizon.net, the home page for Verizon Internet
customers, contains a notice explicitly claiming copyright over the
contents of the page. In contrast, the terms of service of Verizon
Internet access explicitly disclaim any affiliation with content
transmitted over the network.'' PK Reply at 22.
    \169\ See, e.g., Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Subpoena Enforcement
Matter, 393 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2005) (subpoenas served on
Charter were not authorized because ``Charter's function'' as a
broadband provider ``was limited to acting as a conduit for the
allegedly copyright protected material'' at issue); Verizon Internet
Servs., 351 F.3d at 1237 (accepting Verizon's argument that Federal
copyright law ``does not authorize the issuance of a subpoena to an
ISP acting as a mere conduit for the transmission of information
sent by others'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To be sure, broadband providers engage in network management
practices designed to protect their Internet services against spam and
malicious content, but that practice bears little resemblance to an
editor's choosing which programs, among a range of programs, to
carry.\170\ Furthermore, this Order does not limit broadband providers'
ability to modify their own Web pages, or transmit any lawful message
that they wish, just like any other speaker. Broadband providers are
also free under this Order to offer a wide range of ``edited''
services. If, for example, a broadband provider wanted to offer a
service limited to ``family friendly'' materials to end users who
desire only such content, it could do so under the rules we promulgate
in this Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \170\ We recognize that in two cases, Federal district courts
have concluded that the provision of broadband service is ``speech''
protected by the First Amendment. In Itasca, the district court
reasoned that broadband providers were analogous to cable and
satellite television companies, which are protected by the First
Amendment. Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. Vill. of Itasca, 503 F. Supp. 2d
928, 947-49 (N.D. Ill. 2007). And in Broward County, the district
court determined that the transmission function provided by
broadband service could not be separated from the content of the
speech being transmitted. Comcast Cablevision of Broward Cnty., Inc.
v. Broward Cnty., 124 F. Supp. 2d 685, 691-92 (S.D. Fla. 2000). For
the reasons stated, we disagree with the reasoning of those
decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    AT&T and NCTA argue that open Internet rules interfere with the
speech rights of content and application providers to the extent they
are prevented from paying broadband providers for higher quality
service. Purchasing a higher quality of termination service for one's
own Internet traffic, though, is not speech--just as providing the
underlying transmission service is not. Telephone common carriers, for
instance, transmit users' speech for hire, but no court has ever
suggested that regulation of common carriage arrangements triggers
First Amendment scrutiny.
    Even if open Internet rules did implicate expressive activity, they
would not violate the First Amendment. Because the rules are based on
the characteristics of broadband Internet access service, independent
of content or viewpoint, they would be subject to intermediate First
Amendment scrutiny.\171\ The regulations in this Order are triggered by
a broadband provider offering broadband Internet access, not by the
message of any provider. Indeed, the point of open Internet rules is to
protect traffic regardless of its content. Verizon's argument that such
regulation is presumptively suspect because it makes speaker-based
distinctions likewise lacks merit: Our action is based on the
transmission service provided by broadband providers rather than on
what providers have to say. In any event, speaker-based distinctions
are permissible so long as they are ```justified by some special
characteristic of' the particular medium being regulated''--here the
ability of broadband providers to favor or disfavor Internet traffic to
the detriment of innovation, investment, competition, public discourse,
and end users.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \171\ See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 642. Regulations generally are
content neutral if justified without reference to content or
viewpoint. Id. at 643; BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 69 (DC
Cir. 1998); Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 966-67
(DC Cir. 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under intermediate scrutiny, a content-neutral regulation will be
sustained if ``it furthers an important or substantial government
interest * * * unrelated to the suppression of free expression,'' and
if ``the means chosen'' to achieve that interest ``do not burden
substantially more speech than is necessary.'' The government interests
underlying this Order--preserving an open Internet to encourage
competition and remove impediments to infrastructure investment while
enabling consumer choice, end-user control, free expression, and the
freedom to innovate without permission--ensure the public's access to a
multiplicity of information sources and maximize the Internet's
potential to further the public interest. As a result, these interests
satisfy the intermediate-scrutiny standard.\172\ Indeed, the interest
in keeping the Internet open to a wide range of information sources is
an important free speech interest in its own right. As Turner I
affirmed, ``assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of
information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order, for
it promotes values central to the First Amendment.'' \173\ This Order
protects the speech interests of all Internet speakers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \172\ These interests are consistent with the Communications
Act's charge to the Commission to make available a ``rapid and
efficient'' national communications infrastructure, 47 U.S.C. 151;
to promote, consistent with a ``vibrant and competitive free
market,'' ``the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services''; and to ``encourage the development
of technologies which maximize user control over what information is
received,'' 47 U.S.C. 230(b)(1)-(3). Indeed, AT&T concedes that
``[t]here is little doubt that preservation of an open and free
Internet is an `important or substantial government interest.' ''
AT&T Comments at 237 (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 662).
    \173\ 512 U.S. at 663. The Turner I Court continued: ``Indeed,
it has long been a basic tenet of national communications policy
that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the
public.'' Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See also FCC v.
Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978) (NCCB)
(quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Time Warner and Verizon contend that the government lacks important
or substantial interests because the harms from prohibited practices
supposedly are speculative. This ignores actual instances of harmful
practices by broadband providers, as discussed in Part II.B. In any
event, the Commission is not required to stay its hand until
substantial harms already have occurred. On the contrary, the
Commission's predictive judgments as to the development of a problem
and likely injury to the public interest are entitled to great
deference.
    In sum, the rules we adopt are narrowly tailored to advance the
important government interests at stake.

[[Page 59222]]

The rules apply only to that portion of the end user's link to the
Internet over which the end user's broadband provider has control. They
forbid only those actions that could unfairly impede the public's use
of this important resource. Broadband providers are left with ample
opportunities to transmit their own content, to maintain their own Web
sites, and to engage in reasonable network management. In addition,
they can offer edited services to their end users. The rules are
narrowly tailored because they address the problem at hand, and go no
farther.\174\
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    \174\ AT&T contends (AT&T Comments at 219-20) that our rules
would conflict with prohibitions contained in Section 326 of the Act
against ``censorship'' of ``radio communications'' or interference
with ``the right of free speech by means of radio communication.''
47 U.S.C. 326. For the same reasons that our rules do not violate
the First Amendment, they do not violate Section 326's statutory
prohibition.
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2. Fifth Amendment Takings
    Contrary to the claims of some broadband providers, open Internet
rules pose no issue under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. Our
rules do not compel new services or limit broadband providers'
flexibility in setting prices for their broadband Internet access
services, but simply require transparency and prevent broadband
providers--when they voluntarily carry Internet traffic--from blocking
or unreasonably discriminating in their treatment of that traffic.
Moreover, this Order involves setting policies for communications
networks, an activity that has been one of this Commission's central
duties since it was established in 1934.
    Absent compelled permanent physical occupations of property,\175\
takings analysis involves ``essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries''
regarding such factors as the degree of interference with ``investment-
backed expectations,'' the ``economic impact of the regulation'' and
``the character of the government action.'' In this regard, takings law
makes clear that property owners cannot, as a general matter, expect
that existing legal requirements regarding their property will remain
entirely unchanged. As discussed in Part II, the history of broadband
Internet access services offers no basis for reasonable reliance on a
policy regime in which providers are free to conceal or discriminate
without limit, and the rules we adopt in this Order should not impose
substantial new costs on broadband providers.\176\ Accordingly, our
Order does not raise constitutional concerns under regulatory takings
analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \175\ Verizon contends that ``[t]o the extent the proposed rules
would prohibit the owner of a broadband network from setting the
terms on which other providers can occupy its property, the rule
would give those providers the equivalent of a permanent easement on
the network--a form of physical occupation.'' Verizon Comments at
119 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 430 (1982)). Not so. Such transmissions are neither
``occupations'' nor ``permanent.'' See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435
n.12; see also Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 570 F.3d 83, 98 (2d
Cir. 2009) (upholding Commission's finding that a must-carry
obligation did not constitute a physical occupation because ``the
transmission of WRNN's signal does not involve a physical occupation
of Cablevision's equipment or property''). In addition, to the
extent broadband providers voluntarily allow any customer to
transmit or receive information, the imposition of reasonable non-
discrimination requirements would not be a taking under Loretto. See
Hilton Washington Corp. v. District of Columbia, 777 F.2d 47 (DC
Cir. 1985); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 531 (1992).
    \176\ This history likewise refutes the assertion that prior
Commission decisions ``engendered serious reliance interests'' that
would be unsettled by our adoption of open Internet rules. Baker
Statement at *11 n.41 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Enforcement

    Prompt and effective enforcement of the rules adopted in this Order
is crucial to preserving an open Internet and providing clear guidance
to stakeholders. We anticipate that many of the disputes that will
arise regarding alleged open Internet violations--particularly those
centered on engineering-focused questions--will be resolvable by the
parties without Commission involvement. We thus encourage parties to
endeavor to resolve disputes through direct negotiation focused on
relevant technical issues, and to consult with independent technical
bodies. Many commenters endorse this approach.\177\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \177\ See, e.g., Bright House Networks Comments at 10; CCIA
Comments at 2, 34; Google-Verizon Joint Comments at 4 (``A robust
role for technical and industry groups should be encouraged to
address any challenges or problems that may arise and to help guide
the practices of all players. * * *''); WISPA Comments at 14-16;
DISH Network Reply at 24-26; Qwest Reply at 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Should issues develop that are not resolved through private
processes, the Commission will provide backstop mechanisms to address
such disputes.\178\ In the Open Internet NPRM, the Commission proposed
to enforce open Internet rules through case-by-case adjudication, a
proposal that met with almost universal support among commenters. The
Commission also sought comment on whether it should adopt complaint
procedures specifically governing alleged violations of open Internet
rules, and whether any of the Commission's existing rules provide a
suitable model.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \178\ Providers and other parties may also seek guidance from
the Commission on questions about the application of the open
Internet rules in particular contexts, for instance by requesting a
declaratory ruling. See 47 CFR 1.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Informal Complaints

    Many commenters urge the Commission to adopt informal complaint
procedures that equip end users and edge providers with a simple and
cost-effective option for calling attention to open Internet rule
violations. We agree that end users, edge providers, and others should
have an efficient vehicle to bring potential open Internet violations
to the Commission, and indeed, such a vehicle is already available.
Parties may submit complaints to the Commission pursuant to Section
1.41 of the Commission's rules. Unlike formal complaints, no filing fee
is required. We recommend that end users and edge providers submit any
complaints through the Commission's Web site, at http://esupport.fcc.gov/complaints.htm. The Consumer and Governmental Affairs
Bureau will also make available resources explaining these rules and
facilitating the filing of informal complaints. Although individual
informal complaints will not typically result in written Commission
orders, the Enforcement Bureau will examine trends or patterns in
complaints to identify potential targets for investigation and
enforcement action.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \179\ As with our other complaint rules, the availability of
complaint procedures does not bar the Commission from initiating
separate and independent enforcement proceedings for potential
violations. See 47 CFR 0.111(a)(16).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Formal Complaints

    Many commenters propose that the Commission adopt formal complaint
procedures to address open Internet disputes. We agree that such
procedures should be available in the event an open Internet dispute
cannot be resolved through other means. Formal complaint processes
permit anyone--including individual end users and edge providers--to
file a claim alleging that another party has violated a statute or
rule, and asking the Commission to rule on the dispute. A number of
commenters suggest that existing Commission procedural rules could
readily be utilized to govern open Internet complaints.
    We conclude that adopting a set of procedures based on our Part 76
cable access complaint rules will best suit the needs of open Internet
disputes that may arise.\180\ Although similar to the

[[Page 59223]]

complaint rules under Section 208, we find that the part 76 rules are
more streamlined and thus preferable.\181\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \180\ The Commission is authorized to resolve formal
complaints--and adopt procedural rules governing the process--
pursuant to Sections 4(i) and 4(j) of the Act. 47 U.S.C.. 154(i),
154(j). In addition, Section 403 of the Act enables the Commission
to initiate inquiries and enforce orders on its own motion. 47
U.S.C. 403. Inherent in such authority is the ability to resolve
disputes concerning violations of the open Internet rules.
    \181\ The Part 76 rules were promulgated to address complaints
against cable systems. See 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review--Part
76--Cable Television Service Pleading and Complaint Rules, Report
and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 418, 420, para. 6 (1999) (``1998 Biennial
Review''). For example, a local television station may bring a
complaint, pursuant to the Part 76 rules, claiming that it was
wrongfully denied carriage on a cable system. See 47 CFR 76.61. Some
complaints alleging open Internet violations may be analogous, such
as those brought by a content or application provider claiming that
broadband providers--many of which are cable companies--are
unlawfully blocking or degrading access to end users.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the rules we adopt in this Order, any person may file a
formal complaint. Before filing a complaint, a complainant must first
notify the defendant in writing that it intends to file a complaint
with the Commission for violation of rules adopted in this Order.\182\
After the complaint has been filed, the defendant must submit an
answer, and the complainant may submit a reply. In some cases, the
facts might be uncontested, and the proceeding can be completed based
on the pleadings. In other cases, a thorough analysis of the challenged
conduct might require further factual development and briefing.\183\
Based on the record developed, Commission staff (or the Commission
itself) will issue an order determining the lawfulness of the
challenged practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \182\ As with other formal complaint procedures, a filing fee
will be required. See 47 CFR 1.1106.
    \183\ The rules give the Commission discretion to order other
procedures as appropriate, including briefing, status conferences,
oral argument, evidentiary hearings, discovery, or referral to an
administrative law judge. See 47 CFR 8.14(e) through (g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As in other contexts, complainants in open Internet proceedings
will ultimately bear the burden of proof to demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that an alleged violation of the rules
has occurred. A number of commenters propose, however, that once a
complainant makes a prima facie showing that an open Internet rule has
been violated, the burden should shift to the broadband provider to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is reasonable. This approach
is appropriate in the context of certain open Internet complaints, when
the evidence necessary to apply the open Internet rules is
predominantly in the possession of the broadband provider. Accordingly,
we require a complainant alleging a violation of the open Internet
rules to plead fully and with specificity the basis of its claims and
to provide facts, supported when possible by documentation or
affidavit, sufficient to establish a prima facie case of an open
Internet violation. In turn, the broadband provider must answer each
claim with particularity and furnish facts, supported by documentation
or affidavit, demonstrating the reasonableness of the challenged
practice. At that point, the complainant will have the opportunity to
demonstrate that the practice is not reasonable. Should experience
reveal the need to adjust the burden of proof in open Internet
disputes, we will do so as appropriate.
    Several commenters urge the Commission to adopt timelines for the
complaint process. We recognize the need to resolve alleged violations
swiftly, and accordingly will allow requests for expedited treatment of
open Internet complaints under the Enforcement Bureau's Accelerated
Docket procedures.\184\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \184\ See 47 CFR 1.730. Furthermore, for good cause, pursuant to
47 CFR 1.3, the Commission may shorten the deadlines or otherwise
revise the procedures herein to expedite the adjudication of
complaints.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In resolving formal complaints, the Commission will draw on
resources from across the agency--including engineering, economic, and
legal experts--to resolve open Internet complaints in a timely manner.
In addition, we will take into account standards and best practices
adopted by relevant standard-setting organizations, and such
organizations and outside advisory groups also may provide valuable
technical assistance in resolving disputes. Further, in order to
facilitate prompt decision-making, when possible we will resolve open
Internet formal complaints at the bureau level, rather than the
Commission level.\185\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \185\ The rules adopted in this Order explicitly authorize the
Enforcement Bureau to resolve complaints alleging open Internet
violations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. FCC Initiated Actions

    As noted above, in addition to ruling on complaints, the Commission
has the authority to initiate enforcement actions on its own motion.
For instance, Section 403 of the Act permits the Commission to initiate
an inquiry concerning any question arising under the Act, and Section
503(b) authorizes us to issue citations and impose forfeiture penalties
for violations of our rules. Should the Commission find that a
broadband Internet provider is engaging in activity that violates the
open Internet rules, we will take appropriate enforcement action,
including the issuance of forfeitures.

VI. Effective Date, Open Internet Advisory Committee, and Commission
Review

    Some of the rules adopted in this Order contain new information
collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA).
Our rules addressing transparency are among those requiring PRA
approval. The disclosure rule is essential to the proper functioning of
our open Internet framework, and we therefore make all the rules we
adopt in this Order effective November 20, 2011.
    To assist the Commission in monitoring the state of Internet
openness and the effects of our rules, we intend to create an Open
Internet Advisory Committee. The Committee, to be created in
consultation with the General Services Administration pursuant to the
Federal Advisory Committee Act, will be an inclusive and transparent
body that will hold public meetings. It will be comprised of a balanced
group including consumer advocates; Internet engineering experts;
content, application, and service providers; network equipment and end-
user-device manufacturers and suppliers; investors; broadband service
providers; and other parties the Commission may deem appropriate. The
Committee will aid the Commission in tracking developments with respect
to the freedom and openness of the Internet, in particular with respect
to issues discussed in this Order, including technical standards and
issues relating to mobile broadband and specialized services. The
Committee will report to the Commission and make recommendations it
deems appropriate concerning our open Internet framework.
    In light of the pace of change of technologies and the market for
broadband Internet access service, and to evaluate the efficacy of the
framework adopted in this Order for preserving Internet openness, the
Commission will review all of the rules in this Order no later than two
years from their effective date, and will adjust its open Internet
framework as appropriate.

VII. Procedural Matters

A. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended
(RFA), an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was included
in the Open Internet NPRM in GN Docket No. 09-191 and WC Docket No. 07-
52. The Commission sought written public

[[Page 59224]]

comment on the proposals in these dockets, including comment on the
IRFA. This Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) conforms to the
RFA.
Need for, and Objectives of, the Rules
    In this Order the Commission takes an important step to preserve
the Internet as an open platform for innovation, investment, job
creation, economic growth, competition, and free expression. To provide
greater clarity and certainty regarding the continued freedom and
openness of the Internet, we adopt three basic rules that are grounded
in broadly accepted Internet norms, as well as our own prior decisions:
    i. Transparency. Fixed and mobile broadband providers must disclose
the network management practices, performance characteristics, and
terms and conditions of their broadband services;
    ii. No blocking. Fixed broadband providers may not block lawful
content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices; mobile
broadband providers may not block lawful Web sites, or block
applications that compete with their voice or video telephony services;
and
    iii. No unreasonable discrimination. Fixed broadband providers may
not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic.

We believe these rules, applied with the complementary principle of
reasonable network management, will empower and protect consumers and
innovators while helping ensure that the Internet continues to
flourish, with robust private investment and rapid innovation at both
the core and the edge of the network. This is consistent with the
National Broadband Plan goal of broadband access that is ubiquitous and
fast, promoting the global competitiveness of the United States.
    In late 2009, we launched a public process to determine whether and
what actions might be necessary to preserve the characteristics that
have allowed the Internet to grow into an indispensable platform
supporting our nation's economy and civic life, and to foster continued
investment in the physical networks that enable the Internet. Since
then, more than 100,000 commenters have provided written input.
Commission staff held several public workshops and convened a
Technological Advisory Process with experts from industry, academia,
and consumer advocacy groups to collect their views regarding key
technical issues related to Internet openness.
    This process has made clear that the Internet has thrived because
of its freedom and openness--the absence of any gatekeeper blocking
lawful uses of the network or picking winners and losers online.
Consumers and innovators do not have to seek permission before they use
the Internet to launch new technologies, start businesses, connect with
friends, or share their views. The Internet is a level playing field.
Consumers can make their own choices about what applications and
services to use and are free to decide what content they want to
access, create, or share with others. This openness promotes
competition. It also enables a self-reinforcing cycle of investment and
innovation in which new uses of the network lead to increased adoption
of broadband, which drives investment and improvements in the network
itself, which in turn lead to further innovative uses of the network
and further investment in content, applications, services, and devices.
A core goal of this Order is to foster and accelerate this cycle of
investment and innovation.
    The record and our economic analysis demonstrate, however, that the
openness of the Internet cannot be taken for granted, and that it faces
real threats. Indeed, we have seen broadband providers endanger the
Internet's openness by blocking or degrading content and applications
without disclosing their practices to end users and edge providers,
notwithstanding the Commission's adoption of open Internet principles
in 2005. In light of these considerations, as well as the limited
choices most consumers have for broadband service, broadband providers'
financial interests in telephony and pay television services that may
compete with online content and services, and the economic and civic
benefits of maintaining an open and competitive platform for innovation
and communication, the Commission has long recognized that certain
basic standards for broadband provider conduct are necessary to ensure
the Internet's continued openness. The record also establishes the
widespread benefits of providing greater clarity in this area--clarity
that the Internet's openness will continue; that there is a forum and
procedure for resolving alleged open Internet violations; and that
broadband providers may reasonably manage their networks and innovate
with respect to network technologies and business models. We expect the
costs of compliance with our prophylactic rules to be small, as they
incorporate longstanding openness principles that are generally in line
with current practices and with norms endorsed by many broadband
providers. Conversely, the harms of open Internet violations may be
substantial, costly, and in some cases potentially irreversible.
    The rules we proposed in the Open Internet NPRM and those we adopt
in this Order follow directly from the Commission's bipartisan Internet
Policy Statement, adopted unanimously in 2005 and made temporarily
enforceable for certain providers in 2005 and 2006; openness
protections the Commission established in 2007 for users of certain
wireless spectrum; and a notice of inquiry in 2007 that asked, among
other things, whether the Commission should add a principle of
nondiscrimination to the Internet Policy Statement. Our rules build
upon these actions, first and foremost by requiring broadband providers
to be transparent in their network management practices, so that end
users can make informed choices and innovators can develop, market, and
maintain Internet-based offerings. The rules also prevent certain forms
of blocking and discrimination with respect to content, applications,
services, and devices that depend on or connect to the Internet.
    An open, robust, and well-functioning Internet requires that
broadband providers have the flexibility to reasonably manage their
networks. Network management practices are reasonable if they are
appropriate and tailored to achieving a legitimate network management
purpose. Transparency and end-user control are touchstones of
reasonableness.
    We recognize that broadband providers may offer other services over
the same last-mile connections used to provide broadband service. These
``specialized services'' can benefit end users and spur investment, but
they may also present risks to the open Internet. We will closely
monitor specialized services and their effects on broadband service to
ensure, through all available mechanisms, that they supplement but do
not supplant the open Internet.
    Mobile broadband is at an earlier stage in its development than
fixed broadband and is evolving rapidly. For that and other reasons
discussed below, we conclude that it is appropriate at this time to
take measured steps in this area. Accordingly, we require mobile
providers to comply with the transparency rule, which includes
enforceable disclosure obligations regarding device and application
certification and approval processes; we prohibit providers from
blocking lawful Web sites; and we prohibit providers from blocking
applications that compete with providers' voice and video telephony
services. We will closely

[[Page 59225]]

monitor the development of the mobile broadband market and will adjust
the framework we adopt in this Order as appropriate.
    These rules are within our jurisdiction over interstate and foreign
communications by wire and radio. Further, they implement specific
statutory mandates in the Communications Act (``Act'') and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (``1996 Act''), including provisions
that direct the Commission to promote Internet investment and to
protect and promote voice, video, and audio communications services.
    The framework we adopt in this Order aims to ensure the Internet
remains an open platform--one characterized by free markets and free
speech--that enables consumer choice, end-user control, competition
through low barriers to entry, and the freedom to innovate without
permission. The framework does so by protecting openness through high-
level rules, while maintaining broadband providers' and the
Commission's flexibility to adapt to changes in the market and in
technology as the Internet continues to evolve.
Summary of the Significant Issues Raised by the Public Comments in
Response to the IRFA and Summary of the Assessment of the Agency of
Such Issues
    A few commenters discussed the IRFA from the Open Internet NPRM.
The Center for Regulatory Effectiveness (CRE) argued that the Open
Internet NPRM's IRFA was defective because it ineffectively followed 5
U.S.C. secs. 603(a) (``Such analysis shall describe the impact of the
proposed rule on small entities.'') and 603(c) (``Each initial
regulatory flexibility analysis shall also contain a description of any
significant alternatives to the proposed rule which accomplish the
stated objectives of applicable statutes and which minimize any
significant economic impact of the proposed rule on small entities.'').
CRE does not provide any case law to support its interpretation that
the Commission is in violation of these aspects of the statute, nor
does CRE attempt to argue that SBEs have actually or theoretically been
harmed. Rather, CRE is concerned that by not following its reading of
these parts of the law, the Commission is being hypocritical by not
being transparent enough. CRE recommends that the Commission publish a
revised IRFA for public comment. We disagree: we believe that the IRFA
was adequate and that the opportunity for SBEs to comment in a publicly
accessible docket should remove any potential harm to openness that CRE
is concerned with, as well as any harms to SBEs that could occur by not
following CRE's interpretation of the law.
    The Smithville Telephone Company (Smithville) notes that many ILECs
have vastly fewer employees than the 1500 or less that is required to
be recognized as a small business under the SBA. For instance,
Smithville states that it has seven employees. Smithville also observes
that some other small ILECs in Mississippi have staffs of 8, 4, 2, 3,
and 21. Smithville argues that companies of this size do not have the
resources to fully analyze issues and participate in Commission
proceedings. Smithville would like the Commission to use the data that
it regularly receives from carriers to set a carrier size where
exemptions from proposed rules and less complex reporting requirements
can be set. In the present case, however, we determine that this is not
necessary. We expect the costs of compliance with these rules to be
small, as the high-level rules incorporate longstanding openness
principles that appear to be generally in line with most broadband
providers' current practices. We note that Smithville does not cite any
particular source of increased costs, or attempt to estimate costs of
compliance. Nonetheless, the Commission attempts to ease any burden
that the transparency rule may cause by only requiring disclosure on a
Web site and at the point of sale, making the transparency rule
flexible. In addition, by setting the effective date of these rules as
November 20, 2011, the Order gives broadband providers adequate time to
develop cost-effective methods of compliance. Finally, to the extent
that the transparency rule imposes a new obligation on small
businesses, we find that the flexibility built into the rule addresses
any compliance concerns.
    The American Cable Association (ACA) notes that the Commission has
an obligation to ``include in the FRFA a comprehensive discussion of
the economic impact its actions will have on small cable operators.''
The ACA cites its other comments, which ask the Commission to clarify
that the codified principles would not obligate broadband service
providers to (1) ``employ specific network management practices,'' (2)
``impose affirmative obligations dealing with unlawful content or the
unlawful transfer of content,'' (3) ``accommodate lawful devices that
are not supported by a broadband provider's network,'' and (4)
``provide information regarding a company's network management
practices through any reporting, recordkeeping, or means other than
through a company's Web site or Web page.'' Addressing ACA's arguments
with regard to cable operators, and fixed broadband providers in
particular, (1), the Commission is not requiring specific network
management practices. The Commission only requires that any network
management be reasonable; the Commission does not require that any
specific practice be employed. Regarding (2), the rules do not impose
affirmative obligations dealing with unlawful content or the unlawful
transfer of content. We state that the ``no blocking'' rule does not
prevent or restrict a broadband provider from refusing to transmit
material such as child pornography. In response to (3), the Order
clarifies that the ``no blocking'' rule protects only devices that do
not harm the network and only requires fixed broadband service
providers to allow devices that conform to publicly available industry
standards applicable to the providers' services. Directly addressing
ACA's concern, the Order notes that a DOCSIS-based provider is not
required to support a DSL modem. In response to (4), the disclosure
requirement in this Order does not require additional forms of
disclosure, other than, at a minimum, requiring broadband providers to
prominently display or provide links to disclosures on a publicly
available, easily accessible Web site that is available to current and
prospective end users and edge providers as well as to the Commission,
and disclosing relevant information at the point of sale.
Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which the
Rules Apply
    The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and, where
feasible, an estimate of, the number of small entities that may be
affected by the rules adopted herein. The RFA generally defines the
term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms ``small
business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same
meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the Small Business
Act. A ``small business concern'' is one which: (1) Is independently
owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and
(3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the Small Business
Administration (SBA).
1. Total Small Entities
    Our action may, over time, affect small entities that are not
easily categorized at present. We therefore

[[Page 59226]]

describe here, at the outset, three comprehensive, statutory small
entity size standards. First, nationwide, there are a total of
approximately 27.2 million small businesses, according to the SBA. In
addition, a ``small organization'' is generally ``any not-for-profit
enterprise which is independently owned and operated and is not
dominant in its field.'' Nationwide, as of 2002, there were
approximately 1.6 million small organizations. Finally, the term
``small governmental jurisdiction'' is defined generally as
``governments of cities, towns, townships, villages, school districts,
or special districts, with a population of less than fifty thousand.''
Census Bureau data for 2002 indicate that there were 87,525 local
governmental jurisdictions in the United States. We estimate that, of
this total, 84,377 entities were ``small governmental jurisdictions.''
Thus, we estimate that most governmental jurisdictions are small.
2. Internet Access Service Providers
    Internet Service Providers. The 2007 Economic Census places these
firms, whose services might include voice over Internet Protocol
(VoIP), in either of two categories, depending on whether the service
is provided over the provider's own telecommunications facilities
(e.g., cable and DSL ISPs), or over client-supplied telecommunications
connections (e.g., dial-up ISPs). The former are within the category of
Wired Telecommunications Carriers, which has an SBA small business size
standard of 1,500 or fewer employees. These are also labeled
``broadband.'' The latter are within the category of All Other
Telecommunications, which has a size standard of annual receipts of $25
million or less. These are labeled non-broadband. The most current
Economic Census data for all such firms are 2007 data, which are
detailed specifically for ISPs within the categories above. For the
first category, the data show that 396 firms operated for the entire
year, of which 159 had nine or fewer employees. For the second
category, the data show that 1,682 firms operated for the entire year.
Of those, 1,675 had annual receipts below $25 million per year, and an
additional two had receipts of between $25 million and $ 49,999,999.
Consequently, we estimate that the majority of ISP firms are small
entities.
    The ISP industry has changed since 2007. The 2007 data cited above
may therefore include entities that no longer provide Internet access
service and may exclude entities that now provide such service. To
ensure that this FRFA describes the universe of small entities that our
action might affect, we discuss in turn several different types of
entities that might be providing Internet access service.
3. Wireline Providers
    Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (Incumbent LECs). Neither the
Commission nor the SBA has developed a small business size standard
specifically for incumbent local exchange services. The appropriate
size standard under SBA rules is for the category Wired
Telecommunications Carriers. Under that size standard, such a business
is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. According to Commission
data, 1,311 carriers have reported that they are engaged in the
provision of incumbent local exchange services. Of these 1,311
carriers, an estimated 1,024 have 1,500 or fewer employees and 287 have
more than 1,500 employees. Consequently, the Commission estimates that
most providers of incumbent local exchange service are small businesses
that may be affected by our proposed action.
    Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (Competitive LECs), Competitive
Access Providers (CAPs), Shared-Tenant Service Providers, and Other
Local Service Providers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has
developed a small business size standard specifically for these service
providers. The appropriate size standard under SBA rules is for the
category Wired Telecommunications Carriers. Under that size standard,
such a business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. According
to Commission data, 1005 carriers have reported that they are engaged
in the provision of either competitive access provider services or
competitive local exchange carrier services. Of these 1005 carriers, an
estimated 918 have 1,500 or fewer employees and 87 have more than 1,500
employees. In addition, 16 carriers have reported that they are
``Shared-Tenant Service Providers,'' and all 16 are estimated to have
1,500 or fewer employees. In addition, 89 carriers have reported that
they are ``Other Local Service Providers.'' Of the 89, all have 1,500
or fewer employees. Consequently, the Commission estimates that most
providers of competitive local exchange service, competitive access
providers, Shared-Tenant Service Providers, and other local service
providers are small entities that may be affected by our action.
    We have included small incumbent LECs in this present RFA analysis.
As noted above, a ``small business'' under the RFA is one that, inter
alia, meets the pertinent small business size standard (e.g., a
telephone communications business having 1,500 or fewer employees), and
``is not dominant in its field of operation.'' The SBA's Office of
Advocacy contends that, for RFA purposes, small incumbent LECs are not
dominant in their field of operation because any such dominance is not
``national'' in scope. We have therefore included small incumbent LECs
in this RFA analysis, although we emphasize that this RFA action has no
effect on Commission analyses and determinations in other, non-RFA
contexts.
    Interexchange Carriers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has
developed a small business size standard specifically for providers of
interexchange services. The appropriate size standard under SBA rules
is for the category Wired Telecommunications Carriers. Under that size
standard, such a business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees.
According to Commission data, 300 carriers have reported that they are
engaged in the provision of interexchange service. Of these, an
estimated 268 have 1,500 or fewer employees and 32 have more than 1,500
employees. Consequently, the Commission estimates that the majority of
IXCs are small entities that may be affected by our action.
    Operator Service Providers (OSPs). Neither the Commission nor the
SBA has developed a small business size standard specifically for
operator service providers. The appropriate size standard under SBA
rules is for the category Wired Telecommunications Carriers. Under that
size standard, such a business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer
employees. According to Commission data, 33 carriers have reported that
they are engaged in the provision of operator services. Of these, an
estimated 31 have 1,500 or fewer employees and 2 has more than 1,500
employees. Consequently, the Commission estimates that the majority of
OSPs are small entities that may be affected by our proposed action.
4. Wireless Providers--Fixed and Mobile
    For reasons discussed above in the text of the Order, the
Commission has distinguished wireless fixed broadband Internet access
service from wireless mobile broadband Internet access service.
Specifically, the Commission decided that fixed broadband Internet
access service providers, whether wireline or wireless, must disclose
their network management practices and the performance characteristics
and commercial terms of their broadband services; may not block lawful
content, applications, services or non-harmful

[[Page 59227]]

devices; and may not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful
network traffic. Also for the reasons discussed above, the Commission
decided that wireless mobile broadband Internet access service
providers must disclose their network management practices and
performance characteristics and commercial terms of their broadband
service and may not block lawful Web sites or block applications that
compete with their voice or video telephony service. Thus, to the
extent the wireless services listed below are used by wireless firms
for fixed and mobile broadband Internet access services, the actions in
this Order may have an impact on those small businesses as set forth
above and further below. In addition, for those services subject to
auctions, we note that, as a general matter, the number of winning
bidders that claim to qualify as small businesses at the close of an
auction does not necessarily represent the number of small businesses
currently in service. Also, the Commission does not generally track
subsequent business size unless, in the context of assignments and
transfers or reportable eligibility events, unjust enrichment issues
are implicated.
    Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite). Since
2007, the Census Bureau has placed wireless firms within this new,
broad, economic census category. Prior to that time, such firms were
within the now-superseded categories of ``Paging'' and ``Cellular and
Other Wireless Telecommunications.'' Under the present and prior
categories, the SBA has deemed a wireless business to be small if it
has 1,500 or fewer employees. For the category of Wireless
Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite), preliminary data for
2007 show that there were 11,927 firms operating that year. While the
Census Bureau has not released data on the establishments broken down
by number of employees, we note that the Census Bureau lists total
employment for all firms in that sector at 281,262. Since all firms
with fewer than 1,500 employees are considered small, given the total
employment in the sector, we estimate that the vast majority of
wireless firms are small.
    Wireless Communications Services. This service can be used for
fixed, mobile, radiolocation, and digital audio broadcasting satellite
uses. The Commission defined ``small business'' for the wireless
communications services (WCS) auction as an entity with average gross
revenues of $40 million for each of the three preceding years, and a
``very small business'' as an entity with average gross revenues of $15
million for each of the three preceding years. The SBA has approved
these definitions. The Commission auctioned geographic area licenses in
the WCS service. In the auction, which commenced on April 15, 1997 and
closed on April 25, 1997, seven bidders won 31 licenses that qualified
as very small business entities, and one bidder won one license that
qualified as a small business entity.
    1670-1675 MHz Services. This service can be used for fixed and
mobile uses, except aeronautical mobile. An auction for one license in
the 1670-1675 MHz band commenced on April 30, 2003 and closed the same
day. One license was awarded. The winning bidder was not a small
entity.
    Wireless Telephony. Wireless telephony includes cellular, personal
communications services, and specialized mobile radio telephony
carriers. As noted, the SBA has developed a small business size
standard for Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite).
Under the SBA small business size standard, a business is small if it
has 1,500 or fewer employees. According to Trends in Telephone Service
data, 413 carriers reported that they were engaged in wireless
telephony. Of these, an estimated 261 have 1,500 or fewer employees and
152 have more than 1,500 employees. Therefore, more than half of these
entities can be considered small.
    Broadband Personal Communications Service. The broadband personal
communications services (PCS) spectrum is divided into six frequency
blocks designated A through F, and the Commission has held auctions for
each block. The Commission initially defined a ``small business'' for
C- and F-Block licenses as an entity that has average gross revenues of
$40 million or less in the three previous calendar years. For F-Block
licenses, an additional small business size standard for ``very small
business'' was added and is defined as an entity that, together with
its affiliates, has average gross revenues of not more than $15 million
for the preceding three calendar years. These small business size
standards, in the context of broadband PCS auctions, have been approved
by the SBA. No small businesses within the SBA-approved small business
size standards bid successfully for licenses in Blocks A and B. There
were 90 winning bidders that claimed small business status in the first
two C-Block auctions. A total of 93 bidders that claimed small business
status won approximately 40 percent of the 1,479 licenses in the first
auction for the D, E, and F Blocks. On April 15, 1999, the Commission
completed the reauction of 347 C-, D-, E-, and F-Block licenses in
Auction No. 22. Of the 57 winning bidders in that auction, 48 claimed
small business status and won 277 licenses.
    On January 26, 2001, the Commission completed the auction of 422 C
and F Block Broadband PCS licenses in Auction No. 35. Of the 35 winning
bidders in that auction, 29 claimed small business status. Subsequent
events concerning Auction 35, including judicial and agency
determinations, resulted in a total of 163 C and F Block licenses being
available for grant. On February 15, 2005, the Commission completed an
auction of 242 C-, D-, E-, and F-Block licenses in Auction No. 58. Of
the 24 winning bidders in that auction, 16 claimed small business
status and won 156 licenses. On May 21, 2007, the Commission completed
an auction of 33 licenses in the A, C, and F Blocks in Auction No. 71.
Of the 12 winning bidders in that auction, five claimed small business
status and won 18 licenses. On August 20, 2008, the Commission
completed the auction of 20 C-, D-, E-, and F-Block Broadband PCS
licenses in Auction No. 78. Of the eight winning bidders for Broadband
PCS licenses in that auction, six claimed small business status and won
14 licenses.
    Specialized Mobile Radio Licenses. The Commission awards ``small
entity'' bidding credits in auctions for Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR)
geographic area licenses in the 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands to firms that
had revenues of no more than $15 million in each of the three previous
calendar years. The Commission awards ``very small entity'' bidding
credits to firms that had revenues of no more than $3 million in each
of the three previous calendar years. The SBA has approved these small
business size standards for the 900 MHz Service. The Commission has
held auctions for geographic area licenses in the 800 MHz and 900 MHz
bands. The 900 MHz SMR auction began on December 5, 1995, and closed on
April 15, 1996. Sixty bidders claiming that they qualified as small
businesses under the $15 million size standard won 263 geographic area
licenses in the 900 MHz SMR band. The 800 MHz SMR auction for the upper
200 channels began on October 28, 1997, and was completed on December
8, 1997. Ten bidders claiming that they qualified as small businesses
under the $15 million size standard won 38 geographic area licenses for
the upper 200 channels in the 800 MHz SMR band. A second auction for
the 800 MHz band was held

[[Page 59228]]

on January 10, 2002 and closed on January 17, 2002 and included 23 BEA
licenses. One bidder claiming small business status won five licenses.
    The auction of the 1,053 800 MHz SMR geographic area licenses for
the General Category channels began on August 16, 2000, and was
completed on September 1, 2000. Eleven bidders won 108 geographic area
licenses for the General Category channels in the 800 MHz SMR band and
qualified as small businesses under the $15 million size standard. In
an auction completed on December 5, 2000, a total of 2,800 Economic
Area licenses in the lower 80 channels of the 800 MHz SMR service were
awarded. Of the 22 winning bidders, 19 claimed small business status
and won 129 licenses. Thus, combining all four auctions, 41 winning
bidders for geographic licenses in the 800 MHz SMR band claimed status
as small businesses.
    In addition, there are numerous incumbent site-by-site SMR licenses
and licensees with extended implementation authorizations in the 800
and 900 MHz bands. We do not know how many firms provide 800 MHz or 900
MHz geographic area SMR service pursuant to extended implementation
authorizations, nor how many of these providers have annual revenues of
no more than $15 million. In addition, we do not know how many of these
firms have 1,500 or fewer employees, which is the SBA-determined size
standard. We assume, for purposes of this analysis, that all of the
remaining extended implementation authorizations are held by small
entities, as defined by the SBA.
    Lower 700 MHz Band Licenses. The Commission previously adopted
criteria for defining three groups of small businesses for purposes of
determining their eligibility for special provisions such as bidding
credits. The Commission defined a ``small business'' as an entity that,
together with its affiliates and controlling principals, has average
gross revenues not exceeding $40 million for the preceding three years.
A ``very small business'' is defined as an entity that, together with
its affiliates and controlling principals, has average gross revenues
that are not more than $15 million for the preceding three years.
Additionally, the lower 700 MHz Service had a third category of small
business status for Metropolitan/Rural Service Area (MSA/RSA)
licenses--``entrepreneur''--which is defined as an entity that,
together with its affiliates and controlling principals, has average
gross revenues that are not more than $3 million for the preceding
three years. The SBA approved these small size standards. An auction of
740 licenses (one license in each of the 734 MSAs/RSAs and one license
in each of the six Economic Area Groupings (EAGs)) commenced on August
27, 2002, and closed on September 18, 2002. Of the 740 licenses
available for auction, 484 licenses were won by 102 winning bidders.
Seventy-two of the winning bidders claimed small business, very small
business or entrepreneur status and won a total of 329 licenses. A
second auction commenced on May 28, 2003, closed on June 13, 2003, and
included 256 licenses: 5 EAG licenses and 476 Cellular Market Area
licenses. Seventeen winning bidders claimed small or very small
business status and won 60 licenses, and nine winning bidders claimed
entrepreneur status and won 154 licenses. On July 26, 2005, the
Commission completed an auction of 5 licenses in the Lower 700 MHz band
(Auction No. 60). There were three winning bidders for five licenses.
All three winning bidders claimed small business status.
    In 2007, the Commission reexamined its rules governing the 700 MHz
band in the 700 MHz Second Report and Order. An auction of 700 MHz
licenses commenced January 24, 2008 and closed on March 18, 2008, which
included, 176 Economic Area licenses in the A Block, 734 Cellular
Market Area licenses in the B Block, and 176 EA licenses in the E
Block. Twenty winning bidders, claiming small business status (those
with attributable average annual gross revenues that exceed $15 million
and do not exceed $40 million for the preceding three years) won 49
licenses. Thirty three winning bidders claiming very small business
status (those with attributable average annual gross revenues that do
not exceed $15 million for the preceding three years) won 325 licenses.
    Upper 700 MHz Band Licenses. In the 700 MHz Second Report and
Order, the Commission revised its rules regarding Upper 700 MHz
licenses. On January 24, 2008, the Commission commenced Auction 73 in
which several licenses in the Upper 700 MHz band were available for
licensing: 12 Regional Economic Area Grouping licenses in the C Block,
and one nationwide license in the D Block. The auction concluded on
March 18, 2008, with 3 winning bidders claiming very small business
status (those with attributable average annual gross revenues that do
not exceed $15 million for the preceding three years) and winning five
licenses.
    700 MHz Guard Band Licensees. In 2000, in the 700 MHz Guard Band
Order, the Commission adopted size standards for ``small businesses''
and ``very small businesses'' for purposes of determining their
eligibility for special provisions such as bidding credits and
installment payments. A small business in this service is an entity
that, together with its affiliates and controlling principals, has
average gross revenues not exceeding $40 million for the preceding
three years. Additionally, a very small business is an entity that,
together with its affiliates and controlling principals, has average
gross revenues that are not more than $15 million for the preceding
three years. SBA approval of these definitions is not required. An
auction of 52 Major Economic Area licenses commenced on September 6,
2000, and closed on September 21, 2000. Of the 104 licenses auctioned,
96 licenses were sold to nine bidders. Five of these bidders were small
businesses that won a total of 26 licenses. A second auction of 700 MHz
Guard Band licenses commenced on February 13, 2001, and closed on
February 21, 2001. All eight of the licenses auctioned were sold to
three bidders. One of these bidders was a small business that won a
total of two licenses.
    Air-Ground Radiotelephone Service. The Commission has previously
used the SBA's small business size standard applicable to Wireless
Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite), i.e., an entity
employing no more than 1,500 persons. There are fewer than 10 licensees
in the Air-Ground Radiotelephone Service, and under that definition, we
estimate that almost all of them qualify as small entities under the
SBA definition. For purposes of assigning Air-Ground Radiotelephone
Service licenses through competitive bidding, the Commission has
defined ``small business'' as an entity that, together with controlling
interests and affiliates, has average annual gross revenues for the
preceding three years not exceeding $40 million. A ``very small
business'' is defined as an entity that, together with controlling
interests and affiliates, has average annual gross revenues for the
preceding three years not exceeding $15 million. These definitions were
approved by the SBA. In May 2006, the Commission completed an auction
of nationwide commercial Air-Ground Radiotelephone Service licenses in
the 800 MHz band (Auction No. 65). On June 2, 2006, the auction closed
with two winning bidders winning two Air-Ground Radiotelephone Services
licenses. Neither of the winning bidders claimed small business status.
    AWS Services (1710-1755 MHz and 2110-2155 MHz bands (AWS-1); 1915-

[[Page 59229]]

1920 MHz, 1995-2000 MHz, 2020-2025 MHz and 2175-2180 MHz bands (AWS-2);
2155-2175 MHz band (AWS-3)). For the AWS-1 bands, the Commission has
defined a ``small business'' as an entity with average annual gross
revenues for the preceding three years not exceeding $40 million, and a
``very small business'' as an entity with average annual gross revenues
for the preceding three years not exceeding $15 million. For AWS-2 and
AWS-3, although we do not know for certain which entities are likely to
apply for these frequencies, we note that the AWS-1 bands are
comparable to those used for cellular service and personal
communications service. The Commission has not yet adopted size
standards for the AWS-2 or AWS-3 bands but proposes to treat both AWS-2
and AWS-3 similarly to broadband PCS service and AWS-1 service due to
the comparable capital requirements and other factors, such as issues
involved in relocating incumbents and developing markets, technologies,
and services.
    3650-3700 MHz band. In March 2005, the Commission released a Report
and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order that provides for
nationwide, non-exclusive licensing of terrestrial operations,
utilizing contention-based technologies, in the 3650 MHz band (i.e.,
3650-3700 MHz). As of April 2010, more than 1270 licenses have been
granted and more than 7433 sites have been registered. The Commission
has not developed a definition of small entities applicable to 3650-
3700 MHz band nationwide, non-exclusive licensees. However, we estimate
that the majority of these licensees are Internet Access Service
Providers (ISPs) and that most of those licensees are small businesses.
    Fixed Microwave Services. Microwave services include common
carrier, private-operational fixed, and broadcast auxiliary radio
services. They also include the Local Multipoint Distribution Service
(LMDS), the Digital Electronic Message Service (DEMS), and the 24 GHz
Service, where licensees can choose between common carrier and non-
common carrier status. At present, there are approximately 31,428
common carrier fixed licensees and 79,732 private operational-fixed
licensees and broadcast auxiliary radio licensees in the microwave
services. There are approximately 120 LMDS licensees, three DEMS
licensees, and three 24 GHz licensees. The Commission has not yet
defined a small business with respect to microwave services. For
purposes of the IRFA, we will use the SBA's definition applicable to
Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except satellite)--i.e., an
entity with no more than 1,500 persons. Under the present and prior
categories, the SBA has deemed a wireless business to be small if it
has 1,500 or fewer employees. For the category of Wireless
Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite), preliminary data for
2007 show that there were 11,927 firms operating that year. While the
Census Bureau has not released data on the establishments broken down
by number of employees, we note that the Census Bureau lists total
employment for all firms in that sector at 281,262. Since all firms
with fewer than 1,500 employees are considered small, given the total
employment in the sector, we estimate that the vast majority of firms
using microwave services are small. We note that the number of firms
does not necessarily track the number of licensees. We estimate that
virtually all of the Fixed Microwave licensees (excluding broadcast
auxiliary licensees) would qualify as small entities under the SBA
definition.
    Broadband Radio Service and Educational Broadband Service.
Broadband Radio Service systems, previously referred to as Multipoint
Distribution Service (MDS) and Multichannel Multipoint Distribution
Service (MMDS) systems, and ``wireless cable,'' transmit video
programming to subscribers and provide two-way high speed data
operations using the microwave frequencies of the Broadband Radio
Service (BRS) and Educational Broadband Service (EBS) (previously
referred to as the Instructional Television Fixed Service (ITFS)). In
connection with the 1996 BRS auction, the Commission established a
small business size standard as an entity that had annual average gross
revenues of no more than $40 million in the previous three calendar
years. The BRS auctions resulted in 67 successful bidders obtaining
licensing opportunities for 493 Basic Trading Areas (BTAs). Of the 67
auction winners, 61 met the definition of a small business. BRS also
includes licensees of stations authorized prior to the auction. At this
time, we estimate that of the 61 small business BRS auction winners, 48
remain small business licensees. In addition to the 48 small businesses
that hold BTA authorizations, there are approximately 392 incumbent BRS
licensees that are considered small entities. After adding the number
of small business auction licensees to the number of incumbent
licensees not already counted, we find that there are currently
approximately 440 BRS licensees that are defined as small businesses
under either the SBA or the Commission's rules. In 2009, the Commission
conducted Auction 86, the sale of 78 licenses in the BRS areas. The
Commission offered three levels of bidding credits: (i) A bidder with
attributed average annual gross revenues that exceed $15 million and do
not exceed $40 million for the preceding three years (small business)
will receive a 15 percent discount on its winning bid; (ii) a bidder
with attributed average annual gross revenues that exceed $3 million
and do not exceed $15 million for the preceding three years (very small
business) will receive a 25 percent discount on its winning bid; and
(iii) a bidder with attributed average annual gross revenues that do
not exceed $3 million for the preceding three years (entrepreneur) will
receive a 35 percent discount on its winning bid. Auction 86 concluded
in 2009 with the sale of 61 licenses. Of the ten winning bidders, two
bidders that claimed small business status won 4 licenses; one bidder
that claimed very small business status won three licenses; and two
bidders that claimed entrepreneur status won six licenses.
    In addition, the SBA's Cable Television Distribution Services small
business size standard is applicable to EBS. There are presently 2,032
EBS licensees. All but 100 of these licenses are held by educational
institutions. Educational institutions are included in this analysis as
small entities. Thus, we estimate that at least 1,932 licensees are
small businesses. Since 2007, Cable Television Distribution Services
have been defined within the broad economic census category of Wired
Telecommunications Carriers; that category is defined as follows:
``This industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in operating
and/or providing access to transmission facilities and infrastructure
that they own and/or lease for the transmission of voice, data, text,
sound, and video using wired telecommunications networks. Transmission
facilities may be based on a single technology or a combination of
technologies.'' The SBA has developed a small business size standard
for this category, which is: all such firms having 1,500 or fewer
employees. To gauge small business prevalence for these cable services
we must, however, use the most current census data that are based on
the previous category of Cable and Other Program Distribution and its
associated size standard; that size standard was: all such firms having
$13.5 million or less in annual receipts. According to Census Bureau
data for 2002, there were a total of 1,191 firms

[[Page 59230]]

in this previous category that operated for the entire year. Of this
total, 1,087 firms had annual receipts of under $10 million, and 43
firms had receipts of $10 million or more but less than $25 million.
Thus, the majority of these firms can be considered small.
5. Satellite Service Providers
    Satellite Telecommunications Providers. Two economic census
categories address the satellite industry. The first category has a
small business size standard of $15 million or less in average annual
receipts, under SBA rules. The second has a size standard of $25
million or less in annual receipts. The most current Census Bureau data
in this context, however, are from the (last) economic census of 2002,
and we will use those figures to gauge the prevalence of small
businesses in these categories.
    The category of Satellite Telecommunications ``comprises
establishments primarily engaged in providing telecommunications
services to other establishments in the telecommunications and
broadcasting industries by forwarding and receiving communications
signals via a system of satellites or reselling satellite
telecommunications.'' For this category, Census Bureau data for 2002
show that there were a total of 371 firms that operated for the entire
year. Of this total, 307 firms had annual receipts of under $10
million, and 26 firms had receipts of $10 million to $24,999,999.
Consequently, we estimate that the majority of Satellite
Telecommunications firms are small entities that might be affected by
our action.
    The second category of All Other Telecommunications comprises,
inter alia, ``establishments primarily engaged in providing specialized
telecommunications services, such as satellite tracking, communications
telemetry, and radar station operation. This industry also includes
establishments primarily engaged in providing satellite terminal
stations and associated facilities connected with one or more
terrestrial systems and capable of transmitting telecommunications to,
and receiving telecommunications from, satellite systems.'' For this
category, Census Bureau data for 2002 show that there were a total of
332 firms that operated for the entire year. Of this total, 303 firms
had annual receipts of under $10 million and 15 firms had annual
receipts of $10 million to $24,999,999. Consequently, we estimate that
the majority of All Other Telecommunications firms are small entities
that might be affected by our action.
6. Cable Service Providers
    Because Section 706 requires us to monitor the deployment of
broadband regardless of technology or transmission media employed, we
anticipate that some broadband service providers may not provide
telephone service. Accordingly, we describe below other types of firms
that may provide broadband services, including cable companies, MDS
providers, and utilities, among others.
    Cable and Other Program Distributors. Since 2007, these services
have been defined within the broad economic census category of Wired
Telecommunications Carriers; that category is defined as follows:
``This industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in operating
and/or providing access to transmission facilities and infrastructure
that they own and/or lease for the transmission of voice, data, text,
sound, and video using wired telecommunications networks. Transmission
facilities may be based on a single technology or a combination of
technologies.'' The SBA has developed a small business size standard
for this category, which is: all such firms having 1,500 or fewer
employees. To gauge small business prevalence for these cable services
we must, however, use current census data that are based on the
previous category of Cable and Other Program Distribution and its
associated size standard; that size standard was: all such firms having
$13.5 million or less in annual receipts. According to Census Bureau
data for 2002, there were a total of 1,191 firms in this previous
category that operated for the entire year. Of this total, 1,087 firms
had annual receipts of under $10 million, and 43 firms had receipts of
$10 million or more but less than $25 million. Thus, the majority of
these firms can be considered small.
    Cable Companies and Systems. The Commission has also developed its
own small business size standards, for the purpose of cable rate
regulation. Under the Commission's rules, a ``small cable company'' is
one serving 400,000 or fewer subscribers, nationwide. Industry data
indicate that, of 1,076 cable operators nationwide, all but eleven are
small under this size standard. In addition, under the Commission's
rules, a ``small system'' is a cable system serving 15,000 or fewer
subscribers. Industry data indicate that, of 7,208 systems nationwide,
6,139 systems have under 10,000 subscribers, and an additional 379
systems have 10,000-19,999 subscribers. Thus, under this second size
standard, most cable systems are small.
    Cable System Operators. The Communications Act of 1934, as amended,
also contains a size standard for small cable system operators, which
is ``a cable operator that, directly or through an affiliate, serves in
the aggregate fewer than 1 percent of all subscribers in the United
States and is not affiliated with any entity or entities whose gross
annual revenues in the aggregate exceed $250,000,000.'' The Commission
has determined that an operator serving fewer than 677,000 subscribers
shall be deemed a small operator, if its annual revenues, when combined
with the total annual revenues of all its affiliates, do not exceed
$250 million in the aggregate. Industry data indicate that, of 1,076
cable operators nationwide, all but ten are small under this size
standard. We note that the Commission neither requests nor collects
information on whether cable system operators are affiliated with
entities whose gross annual revenues exceed $250 million, and therefore
we are unable to estimate more accurately the number of cable system
operators that would qualify as small under this size standard.
7. Electric Power Generators, Transmitters, and Distributors
    Electric Power Generators, Transmitters, and Distributors. The
Census Bureau defines an industry group comprised of ``establishments,
primarily engaged in generating, transmitting, and/or distributing
electric power. Establishments in this industry group may perform one
or more of the following activities: (1) Operate generation facilities
that produce electric energy; (2) operate transmission systems that
convey the electricity from the generation facility to the distribution
system; and (3) operate distribution systems that convey electric power
received from the generation facility or the transmission system to the
final consumer.'' The SBA has developed a small business size standard
for firms in this category: ``A firm is small if, including its
affiliates, it is primarily engaged in the generation, transmission,
and/or distribution of electric energy for sale and its total electric
output for the preceding fiscal year did not exceed 4 million megawatt
hours.'' According to Census Bureau data for 2002, there were 1,644
firms in this category that operated for the entire year. Census data
do not track electric output and we have not determined how many of
these firms fit the SBA size standard for small, with no more than 4
million megawatt hours of electric output. Consequently, we

[[Page 59231]]

estimate that 1,644 or fewer firms may be considered small under the
SBA small business size standard.
Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance
Requirements for Small Entities
    As indicated above, the Internet's legacy of openness and
transparency has been critical to its success as an engine for
creativity, innovation, and economic development. To help preserve this
fundamental character of the Internet, the Order requires that
broadband providers must, at a minimum, prominently display or provide
links to disclosures on a publicly available, easily accessible Web
site that is available to current and prospective end users and edge
providers as well as to the Commission, and at the point of sale.
Providers should ensure that all Web site disclosures are accessible by
persons with disabilities. We do not require additional forms of
disclosure. Broadband providers' disclosures to the public include
disclosure to the Commission; that is, the Commission will monitor
public disclosures and may require additional disclosures directly to
the Commission. We anticipate that broadband providers may be able to
satisfy the transparency rule through a single disclosure, and
therefore do not require multiple disclosures targeted at different
audiences. This affects all classes of small entities mentioned in
Appendix B, part C, and requires professional skills of entering
information onto a Web page and an understanding of the entities'
network practices, both of which are easily managed by staff of these
types of small entities.
Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered
    The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant alternatives
that it has considered in reaching its proposed approach, which may
include (among others) the following four alternatives: (1) The
establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or
timetables that take into account the resources available to small
entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of
compliance or reporting requirements under the rule for small entities;
(3) the use of performance, rather than design, standards; and (4) an
exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for small
entities.
    The rules adopted in this Order are generally consistent with
current industry practices, so the costs of compliance should be small.
Although some commenters assert that a disclosure rule will impose
significant burdens on broadband providers, no commenter cites any
particular source of increased costs, or attempts to estimate costs of
compliance. For a number of reasons, we believe that the costs of the
disclosure rule we adopt in this Order are outweighed by the benefits
of empowering end users to make informed choices and of facilitating
the enforcement of the other open Internet rules. First, we require
only that providers post disclosures on their Web sites and at the
point of sale, not that they bear the cost of printing and distributing
bill inserts or other paper documents to all existing customers.
Second, although we may subsequently determine that it is appropriate
to require that specific information be disclosed in particular ways,
the transparency rule we adopt in this Order gives broadband providers
flexibility to determine what information to disclose and how to
disclose it. We also expressly exclude from the rule competitively
sensitive information, information that would compromise network
security, and information that would undermine the efficacy of
reasonable network management practices. Third, by setting the
effective date of these rules as November 20, 2011, we give broadband
providers adequate time to develop cost effective methods of
compliance. Thus, the rule gives broadband providers--including small
entities--sufficient time and flexibility to implement the rules in a
cost-effective manner. Finally, these rules provide certainty and
clarity that are beneficial both to broadband providers and to their
customers.
Report to Congress
    The Commission has sent a copy of the Order, including this FRFA,
in a report to Congress and the Government Accountability Office
pursuant to the Congressional Review Act. In addition, the Commission
will send a copy of the Order, including this FRFA, to the Chief
Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA.

B. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis

    This document contains new information collection requirements
subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104-
13.

C. Congressional Review Act

    The Commission has sent a copy of this Report and Order to Congress
and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional
Review Act, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

D. Data Quality Act

    The Commission certifies that it has complied with the Office of
Management and Budget Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer
Review, 70 FR 2664, January 14 (2005), and the Data Quality Act, Public
Law 106-554 (2001), codified at 44 U.S.C. 3516 note, with regard to its
reliance on influential scientific information in the Report and Order
in GN Docket No. 09-191 and WC Docket No. 07-52.

E. Accessible Formats

    To request materials in accessible formats for people with
disabilities (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format),
send an e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental
Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432 (tty). Contact the
FCC to request reasonable accommodations for filing comments
(accessible format documents, sign language interpreters, CARTS, etc.)
by e-mail: FCC504@fcc.gov; phone: (202) 418-0530 (voice), (202) 418-
0432 (TTY).

VIII. Ordering Clauses

    Accordingly, it is ordered that, pursuant to Sections 1, 2, 3, 4,
201, 218, 230, 251, 254, 256, 257, 301, 303, 304, 307, 309, 316, 332,
403, 503, 602, 616, and 628, of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, and Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. secs. 151, 152, 153, 154, 201, 218, 230, 251, 254,
256, 257, 301, 303, 304, 307, 309, 316, 332, 403, 503, 522, 536, 548,
1302, this Report and Order is adopted.
    It is further ordered that Part 0 of the Commission's rules is
amended as set forth in Appendix B.
    It is further ordered that Part 8 of the Commission's Rules, 47 CFR
Part 8, is added as set forth in Appendix A and B.
    It is further ordered that this Report and Order shall become
effective November 20, 2011.
    It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer and
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, shall send a
copy of this Report and Order, including the Final Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small
Business Administration.

List of Subjects

47 CFR Part 0

    Cable television, Communications, Common carriers, Communications
common carriers, Radio, Satellites, Telecommunications, Telephone.

[[Page 59232]]

47 CFR Part 8

    Cable television, Communications, Common carriers, Communications
common carriers, Radio, Satellites, Telecommunications, Telephone.

Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary.
    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal
Communications Commission amends 47 CFR part 0 to read as follows:

PART 0--COMMISSION ORGANIZATION

0
1. The authority citation for part 0 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Sec. 5, 48 Stat. 1068, as amended; 47 U.S.C. 155,
225, unless otherwise noted.

0
2. Section 0.111 is amended by adding paragraph (a)(24) to read as
follows:

Sec.  0.111  Functions of the Bureau.

    (a) * * *
    (24) Resolve complaints alleging violations of the open Internet
rules.
* * * * *

0
3. Add part 8 to read as follows:

PART 8--PRESERVING THE OPEN INTERNET

Sec.
8.1 Purpose.
8.3 Transparency.
8.5 No Blocking.
8.7 No Unreasonable Discrimination.
8.9 Other Laws and Considerations.
8.11 Definitions.
8.12 Formal Complaints.
8.13 General pleading requirements.
8.14 General formal complaint procedures.
8.15 Status conference.
8.16 Confidentiality of proprietary information.
8.17 Review.

    Authority: 47 U.S.C. secs. 151, 152, 153, 154, 201, 218, 230,
251, 254, 256, 257, 301, 303, 304, 307, 309, 316, 332, 403, 503,
522, 536, 548, 1302.

Sec.  8.1  Purpose.

    The purpose of this part is to preserve the Internet as an open
platform enabling consumer choice, freedom of expression, end-user
control, competition, and the freedom to innovate without permission.

Sec.  8.3  Transparency.

    A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access
service shall publicly disclose accurate information regarding the
network management practices, performance, and commercial terms of its
broadband Internet access services sufficient for consumers to make
informed choices regarding use of such services and for content,
application, service, and device providers to develop, market, and
maintain Internet offerings.

Sec.  8.5  No Blocking.

    (a) A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet
access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not block
lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices, subject
to reasonable network management.
    (b) A person engaged in the provision of mobile broadband Internet
access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not block
consumers from accessing lawful Web sites, subject to reasonable
network management; nor shall such person block applications that
compete with the provider's voice or video telephony services, subject
to reasonable network management.

Sec.  8.7  No Unreasonable Discrimination.

    A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet
access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not
unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic over a
consumer's broadband Internet access service. Reasonable network
management shall not constitute unreasonable discrimination.

Sec.  8.9  Other Laws and Considerations.

    (a) Nothing in this part supersedes any obligation or authorization
a provider of broadband Internet access service may have to address the
needs of emergency communications or law enforcement, public safety, or
national security authorities, consistent with or as permitted by
applicable law, or limits the provider's ability to do so.
    (b) Nothing in this part prohibits reasonable efforts by a provider
of broadband Internet access service to address copyright infringement
or other unlawful activity.

Sec.  8.11  Definitions.

    (a) Broadband Internet access service. A mass-market retail service
by wire or radio that provides the capability to transmit data to and
receive data from all or substantially all Internet endpoints,
including any capabilities that are incidental to and enable the
operation of the communications service, but excluding dial-up Internet
access service. This term also encompasses any service that the
Commission finds to be providing a functional equivalent of the service
described in the previous sentence, or that is used to evade the
protections set forth in this part.
    (b) Fixed broadband Internet access service. A broadband Internet
access service that serves end users primarily at fixed endpoints using
stationary equipment. Fixed broadband Internet access service includes
fixed wireless services (including fixed unlicensed wireless services),
and fixed satellite services.
    (c) Mobile broadband Internet access service. A broadband Internet
access service that serves end users primarily using mobile stations.
    (d) Reasonable network management. A network management practice is
reasonable if it is appropriate and tailored to achieving a legitimate
network management purpose, taking into account the particular network
architecture and technology of the broadband Internet access service.

Sec.  8.12  Formal Complaints.

    Any person may file a formal complaint alleging a violation of the
rules in this part.

Sec.  8.13  General pleading requirements.

    (a) General pleading requirements. All written submissions, both
substantive and procedural, must conform to the following standards:
    (1) A pleading must be clear, concise, and explicit. All matters
concerning a claim, defense or requested remedy should be pleaded fully
and with specificity.
    (2) Pleadings must contain facts that, if true, are sufficient to
warrant a grant of the relief requested.
    (3) Facts must be supported by relevant documentation or affidavit.
    (4) The original of all pleadings and submissions by any party
shall be signed by that party, or by the party's attorney. Complaints
must be signed by the complainant. The signing party shall state his or
her address and telephone number and the date on which the document was
signed. Copies should be conformed to the original. Each submission
must contain a written verification that the signatory has read the
submission and to the best of his or her knowledge, information and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification or reversal of existing law; and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose. If any pleading or other
submission is signed in violation of this provision, the Commission
shall upon motion or upon its own initiative impose appropriate
sanctions.
    (5) Legal arguments must be supported by appropriate judicial,
Commission, or statutory authority.

[[Page 59233]]

Opposing authorities must be distinguished. Copies must be provided of
all non-Commission authorities relied upon which are not routinely
available in national reporting systems, such as unpublished decisions
or slip opinions of courts or administrative agencies.
    (6) Parties are responsible for the continuing accuracy and
completeness of all information and supporting authority furnished in a
pending complaint proceeding. Information submitted, as well as
relevant legal authorities, must be current and updated as necessary
and in a timely manner at any time before a decision is rendered on the
merits of the complaint.
    (7) Parties seeking expedited resolution of their complaint may
request acceptance on the Enforcement Bureau's Accelerated Docket
pursuant to the procedures at Sec.  1.730 of this chapter.
    (b) Copies to be Filed. The complainant shall file an original copy
of the complaint, accompanied by the correct fee, in accordance with
part 1, subpart G (see Sec.  1.1106 of this chapter) and, on the same
day:
    (1) File three copies of the complaint with the Office of the
Commission Secretary;
    (2) Serve two copies on the Market Disputes Resolution Division,
Enforcement Bureau;
    (3) Serve the complaint by hand delivery on either the named
defendant or one of the named defendant's registered agents for service
of process, if available, on the same date that the complaint is filed
with the Commission.
    (c) Prefiling notice required. Any person intending to file a
complaint under this section must first notify the potential defendant
in writing that it intends to file a complaint with the Commission
based on actions alleged to violate one or more of the provisions
contained in this part. The notice must be sufficiently detailed so
that its recipient(s) can determine the specific nature of the
potential complaint. The potential complainant must allow a minimum of
ten (10) days for the potential defendant(s) to respond before filing a
complaint with the Commission.
    (d) Frivolous pleadings. It shall be unlawful for any party to file
a frivolous pleading with the Commission. Any violation of this
paragraph shall constitute an abuse of process subject to appropriate
sanctions.

Sec.  8.14  General formal complaint procedures.

    (a) Complaints. In addition to the general pleading requirements,
complaints must adhere to the following requirements:
    (1) Certificate of service. Complaints shall be accompanied by a
certificate of service on any defendant.
    (2) Statement of relief requested--(i) The complaint shall state
the relief requested. It shall state fully and precisely all pertinent
facts and considerations relied on to demonstrate the need for the
relief requested and to support a determination that a grant of such
relief would serve the public interest.
    (ii) The complaint shall set forth all steps taken by the parties
to resolve the problem.
    (iii) A complaint may, on request of the filing party, be dismissed
without prejudice as a matter of right prior to the adoption date of
any final action taken by the Commission with respect to the petition
or complaint. A request for the return of an initiating document will
be regarded as a request for dismissal.
    (3) Failure to prosecute. Failure to prosecute a complaint, or
failure to respond to official correspondence or request for additional
information, will be cause for dismissal. Such dismissal will be
without prejudice if it occurs prior to the adoption date of any final
action taken by the Commission with respect to the initiating pleading.
    (b) Answers to complaints. Unless otherwise directed by the
Commission, any party who is served with a complaint shall file an
answer in accordance with the following requirements:
    (1) The answer shall be filed within 20 days of service of the
complaint.
    (2) The answer shall advise the parties and the Commission fully
and completely of the nature of any and all defenses, and shall respond
specifically to all material allegations of the complaint. Collateral
or immaterial issues shall be avoided in answers and every effort
should be made to narrow the issues. Any party against whom a complaint
is filed failing to file and serve an answer within the time and in the
manner prescribed by these rules may be deemed in default and an order
may be entered against defendant in accordance with the allegations
contained in the complaint.
    (3) Facts must be supported by relevant documentation or affidavit.
    (4) The answer shall admit or deny the averments on which the
adverse party relies. If the defendant is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment,
the defendant shall so state and this has the effect of a denial. When
a defendant intends in good faith to deny only part of an averment, the
answer shall specify so much of it as is true and shall deny only the
remainder, and state in detail the basis of that denial.
    (5) Averments in a complaint are deemed to be admitted when not
denied in the answer.
    (c) Reply. In addition to the general pleading requirements,
replies must adhere to the following requirements:
    (1) The complainant may file a reply to a responsive pleading that
shall be served on the defendant and shall also contain a detailed full
showing, supported by affidavit, of any additional facts or
considerations relied on. Unless expressly permitted by the Commission,
replies shall not contain new matters.
    (2) Failure to reply will not be deemed an admission of any
allegations contained in the responsive pleading, except with respect
to any affirmative defense set forth therein.
    (3) Unless otherwise directed by the Commission, replies must be
filed within ten (10) days after submission of the responsive pleading.
    (d) Motions. Except as provided in this section, or upon a showing
of extraordinary circumstances, additional motions or pleadings by any
party will not be accepted.
    (e) Additional procedures and written submissions. (1) The
Commission may specify other procedures, such as oral argument or
evidentiary hearing directed to particular aspects, as it deems
appropriate. In the event that an evidentiary hearing is required, the
Commission will determine, on the basis of the pleadings and such other
procedures as it may specify, whether temporary relief should be
afforded any party pending the hearing and the nature of any such
temporary relief.
    (2) The Commission may require the parties to submit any additional
information it deems appropriate for a full, fair, and expeditious
resolution of the proceeding, including copies of all contracts and
documents reflecting arrangements and understandings alleged to violate
the requirements set forth in the Communications Act and in this part,
as well as affidavits and exhibits.
    (3) The Commission may, in its discretion, require the parties to
file briefs summarizing the facts and issues presented in the pleadings
and other record evidence.
    (i) These briefs shall contain the findings of fact and conclusions
of law which that party is urging the Commission to adopt, with
specific citations to the record, and supported by relevant authority
and analysis.
    (ii) The schedule for filing any briefs shall be at the discretion
of the Commission. Unless ordered otherwise

[[Page 59234]]

by the Commission, such briefs shall not exceed fifty (50) pages.
    (iii) Reply briefs may be submitted at the discretion of the
Commission. Unless ordered otherwise by the Commission, reply briefs
shall not exceed thirty (30) pages.
    (f) Discovery. (1) The Commission may in its discretion order
discovery limited to the issues specified by the Commission. Such
discovery may include answers to written interrogatories, depositions,
document production, or requests for admissions.
    (2) The Commission may in its discretion direct the parties to
submit discovery proposals, together with a memorandum in support of
the discovery requested. Such discovery requests may include answers to
written interrogatories, admissions, document production, or
depositions. The Commission may hold a status conference with the
parties, pursuant to Sec.  8.15, to determine the scope of discovery,
or direct the parties regarding the scope of discovery. If the
Commission determines that extensive discovery is required or that
depositions are warranted, the Commission may advise the parties that
the proceeding will be referred to an administrative law judge in
accordance with paragraph (g) of this section.
    (g) Referral to administrative law judge. (1) After reviewing the
pleadings, and at any stage of the proceeding thereafter, the
Commission may, in its discretion, designate any proceeding or discrete
issues arising out of any proceeding for an adjudicatory hearing before
an administrative law judge.
    (2) Before designation for hearing, the Commission shall notify,
either orally or in writing, the parties to the proceeding of its
intent to so designate, and the parties shall be given a period of ten
(10) days to elect to resolve the dispute through alternative dispute
resolution procedures, or to proceed with an adjudicatory hearing. Such
election shall be submitted in writing to the Commission.
    (3) Unless otherwise directed by the Commission, or upon motion by
the Enforcement Bureau Chief, the Enforcement Bureau Chief shall not be
deemed to be a party to a proceeding designated for a hearing before an
administrative law judge pursuant to this paragraph (g).
    (h) Commission ruling. The Commission (or the Enforcement Bureau on
delegated authority), after consideration of the pleadings, shall issue
an order ruling on the complaint.

Sec.  8.15  Status conference.

    (a) In any proceeding subject to the part 8 rules, the Commission
may in its discretion direct the attorneys and/or the parties to appear
for a conference to consider:
    (1) Simplification or narrowing of the issues;
    (2) The necessity for or desirability of amendments to the
pleadings, additional pleadings, or other evidentiary submissions;
    (3) Obtaining admissions of fact or stipulations between the
parties as to any or all of the matters in controversy;
    (4) Settlement of the matters in controversy by agreement of the
parties;
    (5) The necessity for and extent of discovery, including objections
to interrogatories or requests for written documents;
    (6) The need and schedule for filing briefs, and the date for any
further conferences; and
    (7) Such other matters that may aid in the disposition of the
proceeding.
    (b) Any party may request that a conference be held at any time
after an initiating document has been filed.
    (c) Conferences will be scheduled by the Commission at such time
and place as it may designate, to be conducted in person or by
telephone conference call.
    (d) The failure of any attorney or party, following advance notice
with an opportunity to be present, to appear at a scheduled conference
will be deemed a waiver and will not preclude the Commission from
conferring with those parties or counsel present.
    (e) During a status conference, the Commission may issue oral
rulings pertaining to a variety of matters relevant to the conduct of
the proceeding including, inter alia, procedural matters, discovery,
and the submission of briefs or other evidentiary materials. These
rulings will be promptly memorialized in writing and served on the
parties. When such rulings require a party to take affirmative action,
such action will be required within ten (10) days from the date of the
written memorialization unless otherwise directed by the Commission.

Sec.  8.16  Confidentiality of proprietary information.

    (a) Any materials filed in the course of a proceeding under this
part may be designated as proprietary by that party if the party
believes in good faith that the materials fall within an exemption to
disclosure contained in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.
552(b). Any party asserting confidentiality for such materials shall so
indicate by clearly marking each page, or portion thereof, for which a
proprietary designation is claimed. If a proprietary designation is
challenged, the party claiming confidentiality will have the burden of
demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the material
designated as proprietary falls under the standards for nondisclosure
enunciated in FOIA.
    (b) Submissions containing information claimed to be proprietary
under this section shall be submitted to the Commission in confidence
pursuant to the requirements of Sec.  0.459 of this chapter and clearly
marked ``Not for Public Inspection.'' An edited version removing all
proprietary data shall be filed with the Commission for inclusion in
the public file within five (5) days from the date the unedited reply
is submitted, and shall be served on the opposing parties.
    (c) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, materials
marked as proprietary may be disclosed solely to the following persons,
only for use in the proceeding, and only to the extent necessary to
assist in the prosecution or defense of the case:
    (1) Counsel of record representing the parties in the proceeding
and any support personnel employed by such attorneys;
    (2) Officers or employees of the parties in the proceeding who are
named by another party as being directly involved in the proceeding;
    (3) Consultants or expert witnesses retained by the parties;
    (4) The Commission and its staff; and
    (5) Court reporters and stenographers in accordance with the terms
and conditions of this section.
    (d) The Commission will entertain, subject to a proper showing, a
party's request to further restrict access to proprietary information
as specified by the party. The other parties will have an opportunity
to respond to such requests.
    (e) The persons designated in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this
section shall not disclose information designated as proprietary to any
person who is not authorized under this section to receive such
information, and shall not use the information in any activity or
function other than the prosecution or defense of the case before the
Commission. Each individual who is provided access to the information
by the opposing party shall sign a notarized statement affirmatively
stating, or shall certify under penalty of perjury, that the individual
has personally reviewed the Commission's rules and understands the
limitations they impose on the signing party.
    (f) No copies of materials marked proprietary may be made except
copies

[[Page 59235]]

to be used by persons designated in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this
section. Each party shall maintain a log recording the number of copies
made of all proprietary material and the persons to whom the copies
have been provided.
    (g) Upon termination of the complaint proceeding, including all
appeals and petitions, all originals and reproductions of any
proprietary materials, along with the log recording persons who
received copies of such materials, shall be provided to the producing
party. In addition, upon final termination of the proceeding, any notes
or other work product derived in whole or in part from the proprietary
materials of an opposing or third party shall be destroyed.

Sec.  8.17  Review.

    (a) Interlocutory review. (1) Except as provided below, no party
may seek review of interlocutory rulings until a decision on the merits
has been issued by the Commission's staff, including an administrative
law judge.
    (2) Rulings listed in this paragraph are reviewable as a matter of
right. An application for review of such ruling may not be deferred and
raised as an exception to a decision on the merits.
    (i) If the staff's ruling denies or terminates the right of any
person to participate as a party to the proceeding, such person, as a
matter of right, may file an application for review of that ruling.
    (ii) If the staff's ruling requires production of documents or
other written evidence, over objection based on a claim of privilege,
the ruling on the claim of privilege is reviewable as a matter of
right.
    (iii) If the staff's ruling denies a motion to disqualify a staff
person from participating in the proceeding, the ruling is reviewable
as a matter of right.
    (b) Petitions for reconsideration. Petitions for reconsideration of
interlocutory actions by the Commission's staff or by an administrative
law judge will not be entertained. Petitions for reconsideration of a
decision on the merits made by the Commission's staff should be filed
in accordance with Sec. Sec.  1.104 through 1.106 of this chapter.
    (c) Application for review. (1) Any party to a part 8 proceeding
aggrieved by any decision on the merits issued by the staff pursuant to
delegated authority may file an application for review by the
Commission in accordance with Sec.  1.115 of this chapter.
    (2) Any party to a part 8 proceeding aggrieved by any decision on
the merits by an administrative law judge may file an appeal of the
decision directly with the Commission, in accordance with Sec. Sec.
1.276(a) and 1.277(a) through (c) of this chapter.

[FR Doc. 2011-24259 Filed 9-22-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P

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Sie werben damit natürlich über die Medien….

Da meldet sich bei Ihnen möglicherweise ein Beauftragter des Finanz-Nachrichtendienstes GoMoPamit der Mitteilung, dass im GoMoPa-Forum sehr negative Forenbeiträge über Ihre Person oder Ihr Vorhaben stünden. Äusserst Schlimmes wir über Sie berichtet. Zum Beispiel, dass Sie bisher schonIhr Geld mit betrügerischen Machenschaften verdient hätten oder Ihr Sohn als erfolgreicher Sportler nach neuesten Ermittlungen in einem Kokain-Dealer-Ring verwickelt sei.

Ein anonymer User ( Schreiberling) habe dies geschrieben, wird vom GoMoPa-Beauftragten berichtet. Man könne jetzt noch nicht feststellen, ob dies so wahr sei. Man könne aber auch nicht den Beitrag einfach rausnehmen, denn es könne ja auch was Wahres daran sein!

Falls Sie selbst an der Wahrheitsfindung interessiert seien, könnten Sie auch beim ´seriösen Nachrichtendienst` GoMoPa als Gesellschafter oder als Premium-Mitglied einsteigen, dann könne man ja…..usf. …ganz einfach den Beitrag herausnehmen!

So ähnlich könnte es geschehen und glauben Sie mir: ´Dies ist kein böser Traum,-keine Fata Morgana`, sondern schon Zigtausendmal in der fast 10-Jährigen GoMoPa- Geschichte so abgelaufen.

Wir, von der CSA-Agency, wurden selbst aus Wettbewerbsgründen seit 2002 von GoMoPa auf primitivste Weise im Forum diffamiert oder die von uns als seriöse Dienstleister empfohlenen Unternehmungen wurden per Rufmord mit schmutzigsten, unwahren Verleumdungs-Attacken vonanonymen Bloggern ( bezahlte Helfershelfer vom GoMoPa) nahezu ruiniert. Nicht nur finanziell , sondern auch gesundheitlich nieder gemacht! Nicht umsonst heisst es RUFMORD.

Der Begriff ´Stalking` ist da noch eine vornehme Bezeichnung.

Auf gut deutsch passt Rufmord besser.

Geschäftlicher und gesundheitlicher RUFMORD gehört auch entsprechend bestraft.

Die Justiz tut sich sehr schwer damit. Vor allem, wenn die Rufmörder mit Ihren Machenschaften mit Gesellschaften wie z.B. ´GoMoPa` als Briefkastenfirma aus dem Ausland agieren. UND zum anderen, weil sich die Stalking-Terror-Experten von GoMoPa sich mit ihren Methoden auch der Justiz und der Medien bedienen.

TOP-SECRET – Confirmed Identity of the CIA Official behind 9/11, Rendition & Torture Cases is Revealed

BFP Breaking News: Confirmed Identity of the CIA Official behind 9/11, Rendition & Torture Cases is Revealed

Wednesday, 21. September 2011 by Sibel Edmonds

Alfreda Frances Bikowsky: The Current Director of the CIA Global Jihad Unit

BNBoiling Frogs Post has now confirmed the identity of the CIA analyst at the heart of a notorious failure in the run-up to the September 11th tragedy. Her name is Alfreda Frances Bikowsky and she is the current director of the CIA Jihad Unit. Through three credible sources and documents we have confirmed Ms. Bikowsky’s former titles and positions, including her start at the CIA as an analyst for the Soviet Desk, her position as one of the case officers at the CIA’s Bin Laden Unit-Alec Station, her central role and direct participation in the CIA’s rendition-torture and black sites operations, and her current position as director of the CIA’s Global Jihad Unit.

The producers Nowosielski and Duffy have now made both names available at their website. They also identify the second CIA culprit as Michael Anne Casey. We have not been able to obtain confirmation by other sources on this person yet, but we are still working on it.

Alfreda Frances Bikowsky is the person described in New Yorker journalist Jane Mayer’s book The Dark Side as having flown in to watch the waterboarding of terrorist Khalid Sheikh Mohammad without being assigned to do so. “Its not supposed to be entertainment,” superiors were said to have told her. She was also at the center of “the el-Masri incident,” in which an innocent German citizen was kidnapped by the CIA in 2003 and held under terrible conditions without charges for five months in a secret Afghan prison. The AP characterized it as “one of the biggest diplomatic embarrassments of the U.S. war on terrorism.”

Both the previous and current administrations appear to have deemed Alfreda Frances Bikowsky’s direct involvement in intentional obstruction of justice, intentional cover up, lying to Congress, and overseeing rendition-kidnapping-torture practices as qualifying factors to have kept promoting her. She now leads the CIA’s Global Jihad Unit and is a close advisor to the President.

TOP-SECRET – State Dept Background Briefing on Nuclear Safety

Background Briefing: Preview of High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Safety

Special Briefing

Via Teleconference

Washington, DC

September 21, 2011

MODERATOR: Thank you callers for joining us today for this background briefing on tomorrow’s High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Safety at the United Nations. We are delighted to have as our briefer today [Senior State Department Official], hereafter known as Senior State Department Official.

Go ahead and start, [Senior State Department Official].

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Thank you very much, [Moderator]. Thanks for being on the call, everyone. The United States welcomed UN Secretary General Ban’s call for the High-Level Meeting, that will be conducted tomorrow, on Nuclear Security and Safety. This meeting is intended to build political support and momentum at the highest levels for international efforts to strengthen nuclear safety and security.

As you know, the international community has a lot of lessons to learn from the recent Fukushima accident in Japan, which resulted from the tragic earthquake and tsunami that devastated Japan. Indeed, we’re still learning lessons from the Chernobyl disaster, which took place over 25 years ago. The most fundamental lesson for our countries is that nuclear accidents can transcend national borders and have international consequences. A nuclear accident anywhere affects all of us, and it is also important that all states do everything they can to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism because of the global implications and consequences.

Another critical lesson is the necessity of being prepared for the unexpected, especially when it comes to nuclear matters. The double disaster of an earthquake and a tsunami was hard for many to imagine. All states with nuclear power must apply the highest standards for nuclear safety. And the United States wants to set the gold standard for nuclear safety and, frankly, that should be the goal of every state. It’s everyone’s responsibility to own– of each country’s own regulatory body to ensure that its nuclear facilities meet the highest standards of safety.

The United States remains committed to nuclear power as an important component of our energy (inaudible) as well as the world’s. We cannot take nuclear energy off the table, but it must be safe and secure, which is why the United States continues to reaffirm the importance of strengthening the IAEA.

This meeting will welcome the IAEA action on nuclear safety, which calls for states to request voluntary peer reviews on a regular basis to facilitate transparency and improve standards of nuclear safety. The meeting also highlights the importance of nuclear safety and compliments the Nuclear Security Summit that will be hosted next year by South Korea. The South Korea summit is a follow-on to the Nuclear Security Summit that President Obama hosted in April 2010.

I’m happy to answer any questions you might have about the High-Level Meeting tomorrow.

MODERATOR: Great. Before we jump into the questions, just to tell callers that [Senior State Department Official] is on a train, so we are hoping that the line holds. And if you hear funky noise in the background, that’s what it’s about.

Tanya, why don’t you go ahead.

OPERATOR: Thank you. We will now begin the question and answer session. If you would like to ask a question, please press * then 1. To withdraw your question, press * then 2. Once again, to ask a question, please press * then 1. One moment, please, for the first question.

Once again, to ask a question, please press * than 1. One moment please. We do have a question from Bill Freebairn. Your line is open.

QUESTION: Good afternoon. Thanks for holding the call. I was wondering whether the U.S. is going to push or press for additional measures that go, perhaps, beyond what the IAEA is saying about sort of voluntary peer reviews and suggest something a little more mandatory and/or support strengthening of a emergency response capacity, which IAEA has also talked about.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Right. The United States has always been a strong supporter of the IAEA’s peer review programs, both in conducting regular missions in the United States and also urging other countries to do the same. And we always send our senior experts, many of them in leadership capacities, to represent the United States on missions in other countries.

Establishing a mandatory requirement for member-states to submit to regular IAEA peer reviews would require the negotiation of a binding international agreement among member-states that most likely would take several years to come to fruition and no guarantee that all member-states would join in. And that’s why we settled on the voluntary peer review part of this. We are very much open to exploring longer term approaches that could including legally binding requirements, but in the meantime, we believe that these are important voluntary peer reviews that can happen and that will add to the data and the knowledge that we have and the kind of cooperation that we think we need to have.

Bill, your second question was?

QUESTION: It was on the emergency response capacity. IAEA is talking about regional centers, possibly for emergency response. So how does the U.S. support that, and do they see the IAEA as the right organization to coordinate this?

MODERATOR: [Senior State Department Official], are you still on the line? I wonder if we have lost her.

OPERATOR: I show her line as still connected.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Hello?

MODERATOR: Hi. Did you hear the question, [Senior State Department Official]? Do you need it again?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes. No. I just —

MODERATOR: Okay. Go ahead.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I dropped off, I’m now back.

MODERATOR: Okay. Good.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The – after Fukushima, President Obama ordered a comprehensive safety review of all 104 active power plants in the United States – almost a quarter of all nuclear reactors operating around the world. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has already completed its near term inspections, and we believe that it’s important that because you cannot take nuclear energy off the table, we must be able to assert that these plants are safe and secure, which is why the United States continues to reaffirm the importance of strengthening the IAEA. And we also are looking forward to welcoming the IAEA action plan on nuclear safety in this meeting tomorrow, which calls for states to request voluntary peer reviews on a regular basis to facilitate transparency and improve standards of nuclear safety.

QUESTION: Yeah. But on the emergency response capability, there’s been talk about IAEA taking a strong role in putting together regional centers that could respond quickly–

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes.

QUESTION: — to an emergency.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes. And we are looking for the opportunity to support these efforts. We think that the regional approach is a smart one because it provides for the fastest response and gives regions a sense of empowerment, and we look forward to making sure that we can support these issues and hearing more about them tomorrow.

QUESTION: Thank you.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: You’re welcome.

OPERATOR: Once again, if you would like to ask a question, please press * then 1. At this time we have no further questions.

MODERATOR: Thank you very much, and thank you, [Senior State Department Official].

PRN: 2011/1557



	

TOP-SECRET – Protection of Critical Cyber Assets

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 184 (Thursday, September 22, 2011)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 58730-58741]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-24102]



[[Page 58730]]

=======================================================================
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Part 40

[Docket No. RM11-11-000]


Version 4 Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability 
Standards

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: 

-----------------------------------------------------------------------N
otice of proposed rulemaking.

SUMMARY: Under section 215 of the Federal Power Act, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (Commission) proposes to approve eight modified 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Reliability Standards, CIP-
002-4 through CIP-009-4, developed and submitted to the Commission for 
approval by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), 
the Electric Reliability Organization certified by the Commission. In 
general, the CIP Reliability Standards provide a cybersecurity 
framework for the identification and protection of ``Critical Cyber 
Assets'' to support the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. 
Proposed Reliability Standard CIP-002-4 requires the identification and 
documentation of Critical Cyber Assets associated with Critical Assets 
that support the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. The 
``Version 4'' CIP Reliability Standards propose to modify CIP-002-4 to 
include ``bright line'' criteria for the identification of Critical 
Assets. The proposed Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards would replace 
the currently effective Version 3 CIP Reliability Standards. The 
Commission also proposes to approve the related Violation Risk Factors 
and Violation Severity Levels with modifications, the implementation 
plan, and effective date proposed by NERC.

DATES: Comments are due November 21, 2011.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket number and in 
accordance with the requirements posted on the Commission's Web site 
http://www.ferc.gov. Comments may be submitted by any of the following 
methods:
     Agency Web Site: Documents created electronically using 
word processing software should be filed in native applications or 
print-to-PDF format and not in a scanned format, at 
http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling.asp.
     Mail/Hand Delivery: Commenters unable to file comments 
electronically must mail or hand deliver an original copy of their 
comments to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the 
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426. These 
requirements can be found on the Commission's Web site, see, e.g., the 
``Quick Reference Guide for Paper Submissions,'' available at 
http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling.asp or via phone from FERC Online 
Support at 202-502-6652 or toll-free at 1-866-208-3676.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Jan Bargen (Technical Information), Office of Electric Reliability, 
Division of Logistics and Security, Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-
6333.
Edward Franks (Technical Information), Office of Electric Reliability, 
Division of Logistics and Security, Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-
6311.
Kevin Ryan (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 
20426, (202) 502-6840.
Matthew Vlissides (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8408.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

September 15, 2011.
    1. Under section 215 of the Federal Power Act (FPA),\1\ the 
Commission proposes to approve eight modified Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (CIP) Reliability Standards, CIP-002-4 through CIP-009-4. 
The proposed ``Version 4'' CIP Standards were developed and submitted 
for approval to the Commission by the North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC), which the Commission certified as the 
Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) responsible for developing and 
enforcing mandatory Reliability Standards.\2\ In general, the CIP 
Reliability Standards provide a cybersecurity framework for the 
identification and protection of ``Critical Cyber Assets'' to support 
the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System.\3\ In particular, the 
Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards propose to modify CIP-002-4 to 
include ``bright line'' criteria for the identification of Critical 
Assets, in lieu of the currently-required risk-based assessment 
methodology that is developed and applied by applicable entities. In 
addition, NERC developed proposed conforming modifications to the 
remaining cybersecurity Reliability Standards, CIP-003-4 through CIP-
009-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 16 U.S.C. 824o (2006).
    \2\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116 FERC ] 
61,062, order on reh'g & compliance, 117 FERC ] 61,126 (2006), aff'd 
sub nom. Alcoa, Inc. v. FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
    \3\ The NERC Glossary of Terms defines Critical Assets to mean 
``Facilities, systems, and equipment which, if destroyed, degraded, 
or otherwise rendered unavailable, would affect the reliability or 
operability of the Bulk Electric System.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. The Commission proposes to approve Version 4, the Violation Risk 
Factors (VRFs),the Violation Severity Levels (VSLs) with modifications, 
the implementation plan, and effective date proposed by NERC. The 
Commission also proposes to approve the retirement of the currently 
effective Version 3 CIP Reliability Standards, CIP-002-3 to CIP-009-3. 
The Commission seeks comments on these proposals to approve.
    3. While we propose to approve the Version 4 CIP Standards, like 
NERC, we recognize that the Version 4 CIP Standards represent an 
``interim step'' \4\ to addressing all of the outstanding directives 
set forth in Order No. 706.\5\ We believe that the electric industry, 
through the NERC standards development process, should continue to 
develop an approach to cybersecurity that is meaningful and 
comprehensive to assure that the nation's electric grid is capable of 
withstanding a Cybersecurity Incident.\6\ Below, we reiterate several 
topics set forth in Order No. 706 that pertain to a tiered approach to 
identifying Cyber Assets, protection from misuse, and a regional 
perspective. We expect NERC will continue to improve the CIP Standards 
to address these and other outstanding matters addressed in Order No. 
706.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ NERC Petition at 6.
    \5\ Mandatory Reliability Standards for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040, order on reh'g, Order 
No. 706-A, 123 FERC ] 61,174 (2008), order on clarification, Order 
No. 706-B, 126 FERC ] 61,229 (2009).
    \6\ Section 215(a) of the FPA defines Cybersecurity Incident as 
``a malicious act or suspicious event that disrupts, or was an 
attempt to disrupt, the operation of those programmable electronic 
devices and communication networks including hardware, software and 
data that are essential to the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power 
System.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. Moreover, as discussed below, the Commission seeks comments from 
NERC and other interested persons on establishing a reasonable deadline 
for NERC to satisfy the outstanding directives in Order No. 706 
pertaining to the CIP Standards, using NERC's development timeline.

[[Page 58731]]

I. Background

A. Mandatory Reliability Standards

    5. Section 215 of the FPA requires a Commission-certified ERO to 
develop mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards, which are 
subject to Commission review and approval. Once approved, the 
Reliability Standards may be enforced by the ERO, subject to Commission 
oversight, or by the Commission independently.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ See 16 U.S.C. 824o(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    6. Pursuant to section 215 of the FPA, the Commission established a 
process to select and certify an ERO \8\ and, subsequently, certified 
NERC as the ERO.\9\ On January 18, 2008, the Commission issued Order 
No. 706 approving eight CIP Reliability Standards proposed by NERC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability 
Organization; and Procedures for the Establishment, Approval and 
Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, FERC 
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,204, order on reh'g, Order No. 672-A, FERC 
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,212 (2006).
    \9\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116 FERC ] 
61,062, order on reh'g & compliance, 117 FERC ] 61,126 (2006), aff'd 
sub nom., Alcoa, Inc. v. FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (DC Cir. 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    7. In addition, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA,\10\ the 
Commission directed NERC to develop modifications to the CIP 
Reliability Standards to address various concerns discussed in the 
Final Rule. In relevant part, the Commission directed the ERO to 
address the following issues regarding CIP-002-1: (1) Need for ERO 
guidance regarding the risk-based assessment methodology for 
identifying Critical Assets; (2) scope of Critical Assets and Critical 
Cyber Assets; (3) internal, management, approval of the risk-based 
assessment; (4) external review of Critical Assets identification; and 
(5) interdependency between Critical Assets of the Bulk-Power System 
and other critical infrastructures. Subsequently, the Commission 
approved Version 2 and Version 3 of the CIP Reliability Standards, each 
version including changes responsive to some but not all of the 
directives in Order No. 706.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5).
    \11\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 128 FERC ] 
61,291 (2009), order denying reh'g and granting clarification, 129 
FERC ] 61,236 (2009) (approving Version 2 of the CIP Reliability 
Standards); North American Electric Reliability Corp., 130 FERC ] 
61,271 (2010) (approving Version 3 of the CIP Reliability 
Standards).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Current Version 3 CIP Reliability Standards

    8. Reliability Standard CIP-002-3 addresses the identification of 
Critical Assets and associated Critical Cyber Assets. Pursuant to CIP-
002-3, a responsible entity must develop a risk-based assessment 
methodology to identify its Critical Assets. Requirement R1 specifies 
certain types of assets that an assessment must consider for Critical 
Asset status and also allows the consideration of additional assets 
that the responsible entity deems appropriate. Requirement R2 requires 
the responsible entity to develop a list of Critical Assets based on an 
annual application of the risk-based assessment methodology developed 
pursuant to Requirement R1. Requirement R3 provides that the 
responsible entity must use the list of Critical Assets to develop a 
list of associated Critical Cyber Assets that are essential to the 
operation of the Critical Assets.
    9. In addition, the Commission approved the following ``Version 3'' 
CIP Standards:
     CIP-003-3 (Security Management Controls);
     CIP-004-3 (Personnel & Training);
     CIP-005-3 (Electronic Security Perimeter(s));
     CIP-006-3 (Physical Security of Critical Cyber Assets);
     CIP-007-3 (Systems Security Management);
     CIP-008-3 (Incident Reporting and Response Planning);
     CIP-009-3 (Recovery Plans for Critical Cyber Assets).

II. Proposed Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards

A. NERC Petition

    10. On February 10, 2011, NERC filed a petition seeking Commission 
approval of proposed Reliability Standards CIP-002-4 to CIP-009-4 and 
requesting the concurrent retirement of the currently effective Version 
3 CIP Reliability Standards, CIP-002-3 to CIP-009-3.\12\ The principal 
differences are found in CIP-002, where NERC replaced the risk-based 
assessment methodology for identifying Critical Assets with 17 uniform 
bright line criteria for identifying Critical Assets. NERC does not 
propose any changes to the process of identifying the associated 
Critical Cyber Assets that are then subject to the cyber security 
protections required by CIP-003 through CIP-009. NERC also submitted 
proposed VRFs and VSLs and an implementation plan governing the 
transition to Version 4. NERC proposed that the Version 4 CIP 
Reliability Standards become effective the first day of the eighth 
calendar quarter after applicable regulatory approvals have been 
received.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ NERC Petition at 1. The proposed Reliability Standards are 
not attached to the NOPR. They are, however, available on the 
Commission's eLibrary document retrieval system in Docket No. RM11-
11-000 and are available on the ERO's Web site, http://www.nerc.com. 
Reliability Standards approved by the Commission are 
not codified in the CFR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    11. On April 12, 2011, NERC made an errata filing correcting 
certain errors in the petition and furnishing corrected exhibits and 
the standard drafting team minutes. In the errata, NERC also replaced 
the VRFs and VSLs in the February 10 petition with new proposed VRFs 
and VSLs.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ NERC states that the Version 4 VRFs and VSLs are carried 
over in part from the VRFs and VSLs in the Version 3 CIP Reliability 
Standards. NERC Petition at 46. The Commission approved the Version 
2 and 3 VRFs and VSLs in Docket Nos. RD10-6-001 and RD09-7-003 on 
January 20, 2011 but required NERC to make modifications in a 
compliance filing due by March 21, 2011. North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation, 134 FERC ] 61,045 (2011). The February 10 
petition did not carry over the modified Version 3 VRFs and VSLs 
since it was filed before the March 21 compliance filing. NERC 
submitted new Version 4 VRFs and VSLs that carried over the modified 
Version 3 VRFs and VSLs in the April 12 errata. On June 6, 2011, 
NERC filed the March 21, 2011 compliance filing in the present 
docket, Docket No. RM11-11-000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    12. In its Petition, NERC states that the Version 4 CIP Standards 
satisfy the Commission's criteria, set forth in Order No. 672, for 
determining whether a proposed Reliability Standard is just, 
reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential and in the public 
interest.\14\ According to NERC, CIP-002-4 achieves a specified 
reliability goal by requiring the identification and documentation of 
Critical Cyber Assets associated with Critical Assets that support the 
reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. NERC opines that the 
Reliability Standard ``improves reliability by establishing uniform 
criteria across all Responsible Entities for the identification of 
Critical Assets.'' \15\ Further, NERC states that CIP-002-4 contains a 
technically sound method to achieve its reliability goal by requiring 
the identification and documentation of Critical Assets through the 
application of the criteria set forth in Attachment 1 of CIP-002-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ Order No. 672, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,204 at P 323-337.
    \15\ NERC Petition at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    13. NERC states that CIP-002-4 establishes clear and uniform 
criteria for identifying Critical Assets on the Bulk-Power System.\16\ 
NERC also states that CIP-002-4 does not reflect any differentiation in 
requirements based on size of the responsible entity. NERC asserts that 
CIP-002-4 will not have negative effects on competition or restriction 
of the grid. NERC also contends that the two-year implementation period 
for CIP-002-4 is reasonable given the time it will take responsible 
entities to determine

[[Page 58732]]

whether assets meet the criteria included in Attachment 1 and to 
implement the controls required in CIP-003-4 through CIP-009-4 for the 
newly identified assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ Id. at 38.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    14. Finally, NERC acknowledges that CIP-002-4 addresses some, but 
not all, of the Commission's directives in Order No. 706. NERC explains 
that the standard drafting team limited the scope of requirements in 
the development of CIP Version 4 ``as an interim step'' limited to the 
concerns raised by the Commission regarding CIP-002.\17\ NERC states 
that it has taken a ``phased'' approach to meeting the Commission's 
directives from Order No. 706 and, according to NERC, the standard 
drafting team continues to address the remaining Commission directives. 
According to NERC, the team will build on the bright line approach of 
CIP Version 4.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ NERC Petition at 6 (citing Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 
at P 236).
    \18\ NERC Petition at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Proposed Reliability Standard CIP-002-4

    15. Proposed Reliability Standard CIP-002-4 contains 3 
requirements. Requirement R1, which pertains to the identification of 
Critical Assets, provides:

    The Responsible Entity shall develop a list of its identified 
Critical Assets determined through an annual application of the 
criteria contained in CIP-002-4 Attachment 1--Critical Asset 
Criteria. The Responsible Entity shall update this list as 
necessary, and review it at least annually.

Attachment 1 provides seventeen criteria to be used by all responsible 
entities for the identification of Critical Assets pursuant to 
Requirement R1. The thresholds pertain to specific types of facilities 
such as generating units, transmission lines and control centers. For 
example, Criterion 1.1 provides ``[e]ach group of generating units 
(including nuclear generation) at a single plant location with an 
aggregate highest rated net Real Power capability of the preceding 12 
months equal to or exceeding 1500 MW in a single Interconnection.'' 
With regard to transmission, Criterion 1.6 provides ``Transmission 
Facilities operated at 500 kV or higher,'' and Criterion 1.7 provides 
``Transmission Facilities operated at 300 kV or higher at stations or 
substations interconnected at 300 kV or higher with three or more other 
transmission stations or substations.''
    16. Reliability Standard CIP-002-4, Requirement R2 requires 
responsible entities to develop a list of Critical Cyber Assets 
associated with the Critical Assets identified pursuant to Requirement 
R1. As in previous versions, the Requirement further states that to 
qualify as a Critical Cyber Asset, the Cyber Asset must: (1) Use a 
routable protocol to communicate outside the Electronic Security 
Perimeter; (2) use a routable protocol within a control center; or (3) 
be dial-up accessible. In the proposed version, in the context of 
generating units at a single plant location, the Requirement limits the 
designation of Critical Cyber Assets only to Cyber Assets shared by a 
combination of generating units whose compromise could within 15 
minutes result in the loss of generation capability equal to or higher 
than 1500 MW.
    17. Requirement R3 requires that a senior manager or delegate for 
each responsible entity approve annually the list of Critical Assets 
and the list of Critical Cyber Assets, even if the lists contain no 
elements. As mentioned above, proposed Reliability Standards CIP-003-4 
to CIP-009-4 only reflect conforming changes to accord with the CIP-
002-4 Reliability Standard.

C. Additional Information Regarding Attachment 1 Criteria

    18. In response to a Commission data request, NERC provided 
additional information regarding the bright line criteria for 
identifying Critical Assets.\19\ NERC provided some information 
regarding the development of the criteria. Further, based on an 
industry survey, NERC provided information regarding the estimated 
number of Critical Assets and the number of Critical Assets that have 
associated Critical Cyber Assets located in the United States that 
would be identified pursuant to CIP-002-4. For example, NERC indicates 
that the Version 4 CIP Standards would result in the identification of 
532 control centers as Critical Assets with Critical Cyber Assets, and 
another 21 control centers as Critical Assets without any associated 
Critical Cyber Assets.\20\ Further, 201 control centers would not be 
identified as Critical Assets. With regard to Blackstart Resources, 
NERC's survey results indicate that CIP-002-4 would result in the 
identification of approximately 234 Blackstart Resources as Critical 
Assets with associated Critical Cyber Assets, 273 identified as 
Critical Assets without Critical Cyber Assets, and 35 Blackstart 
Resources not classified as Critical Assets.\21\
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    \19\ See April 17, 2011 Commission staff data request issued in 
Docket No. RM11-11-000. NERC responded to the data request in 
staggered filings, on May 27, 2011 and June 30, 2011.
    \20\ NERC June 30, 2011 Data Response at 2-3.
    \21\ Id. at 3-4. In the June 30, 2011 Data Response, NERC stated 
that with respect to Blackstart Resources some responsible entities 
indicated that they had not performed a complete analysis of their 
systems based on CIP-002-4 and are unsure whether some units may be 
classified as Critical Assets. Id. at 4.
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III. Discussion

    19. Pursuant to FPA section 215(d)(2), the Commission proposes to 
approve CIP-002-4 to CIP-009-4 as just, reasonable, not unduly 
discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest. The 
Commission proposes to approve the VRFs and VSLs, implementation plan, 
and effective date proposed by NERC. The Commission also proposes to 
approve the retirement of the currently effective Version 3 CIP 
Reliability Standards CIP-002-3 to CIP-009-3 upon the effective date of 
CIP-002-4 to CIP-009-4. The Commission seeks comments on these 
proposals.
    20. Further, as discussed below, the Commission seeks comments from 
NERC and other interested persons on the proposal to establish a 
reasonable deadline for NERC to satisfy the outstanding directives in 
Order No. 706. Specifically, as explained in detail later, the 
Commission requests comments on: (1) The proposal to establish a 
deadline using NERC's development timeline for the next version of the 
CIP Reliability Standards; (2) how much time NERC needs to develop and 
file the next version of the CIP Reliability Standards; (3) other 
potential approaches to Critical Cyber Asset identification; and (4) 
whether the next version is anticipated to satisfy all of the 
directives in Order No. 706.

A. The Commission Proposes To Approve the Version 4 CIP Reliability 
Standards

    21. The Commission, in giving due weight to NERC's Filing, proposes 
to approve the Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards. The Commission also 
proposes to approve the implementation plan and effective date proposed 
by NERC. Version 4 provides a change in three respects: (1) Version 4 
will result in the identification of certain types of Critical Assets 
that may not be identified under the current approach; (2) Version 4 
uses bright line criteria to identify Critical Assets, eliminating the 
use of existing entity-defined risk-based assessment methodologies that 
generally do not adequately identify Critical Assets; and (3) Version 4 
provides a level of consistency and clarity regarding the 
identification of Critical Assets lacking under Version 3. We

[[Page 58733]]

separately address each of these reasons for proposing to approve 
Version 4 below.
1. Critical Asset Identification
    22. In its Petition, NERC indicates that, after conducting reviews 
of CIP-002 compliance, NERC ``determined that the existing 
methodologies generally do not adequately identify all Critical 
Assets.'' \22\ While recognizing that CIP version 4 is intended as an 
``interim step,'' it appears that the proposed bright line criteria 
will result in the identification of certain types of Critical Assets 
(e.g. 500 kV substations) that may not be identified by the approach 
that is currently in effect. This is reflected in NERC's June 30, 2011 
data response, in which NERC presented industry survey data reflecting 
the application of the bright line criteria in Version 4. To facilitate 
an analysis of the data, NERC also provided observations and data from 
several of its earlier industry surveys, including the 2009 ``CIP Self-
Certification Survey'' and 2010 ``CIP-002 Critical Asset Methodology 
Data Request.''. For example, NERC states in the June 30, 2011 data 
response that in the 2009 survey only 50 percent of substations rated 
300 kV and above are classified as Critical Assets while that figure 
would increase to 70 percent under Version 4.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ NERC Petition at 11.
    \23\ Id. at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    23. The NERC petition indicates that 270 transmission substations 
rated 500 kV and above are classified as Critical Assets under Version 
3 while, according to the data response, the figure would rise to 437 
under Version 4.\24\ This increase is consistent with Criterion 1.6 of 
Attachment 1 to CIP-002-4, which identifies all transmission 
substations rated 500 kV as Critical Assets. According to the data 
response, the 25 percent of generation units rated 300 MVA and above 
would be identified as Critical Assets under Version 4. Moreover, the 
proportion of total Blackstart Resources classified as Critical Assets 
increases due to the required 100 percent coverage of these under 
Version 4.\25\ Further, the number of control centers identified as 
Critical Assets increases from 425 under Version 3 to 553 under Version 
4, the latter figure representing 74 percent of all control centers. 
These figures represent increases in certain categories in Critical 
Asset identification among generation, transmission, and control 
centers. We also note that NERC's industry survey data indicates 
decreases in the number of generation and blackstart resources 
identified as Critical Assets with Critical Cyber Assets. While the 
bright line thresholds result in the identification of a significant 
number of additional generation plants rated above 1500 MVA as Critical 
Assets, the thresholds also result in the identification of less 
generation below 300 MVA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ Id. at 5.
    \25\ NERC Petition at 17 (explaining that each Blackstart 
Resource identified in a Transmission Operator's restoration plan is 
a Critical Asset). In the June 30, 2011 Data Response, NERC's survey 
found that responsible entities identified 93 percent of Blackstart 
Resources as Critical Assets. NERC stated that confusion over the 
term Blackstart Resource may have contributed to the lower 
percentage, and that responsible entities will be educated on the 
definition of Blackstart Resource prior to the effective date of 
CIP-002-4. NERC June 30, 2011 Data Response at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    24. As NERC recognizes in its filing, the improvements in Critical 
Asset identification under Version 4 represent an interim step in 
complying with the directives in Order No. 706.\26\ As we discuss 
below, Version 4 should not be viewed as an endpoint but as a step 
towards eventual full compliance with Order No. 706.
2. Version 4 Removes Discretion in Identifying Critical Assets
    25. The proposed Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards discards the 
current risk-based methodology for identifying Critical Assets. Under 
the current CIP-002-3, responsible entities are tasked with identifying 
Critical Assets based on their own risk-based methodology. In the 
Petition NERC points out that in Order No. 706 the Commission directed 
NERC to ``provide reasonable technical support to assist entities in 
determining whether their assets are critical to the Bulk-Power 
System.'' \27\ NERC explains that it responded to the Commission's 
direction by developing guidance documents to assist entities in 
developing their risk-based methodologies and Critical Asset 
identification.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ Id. at 10-11 (citing Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 
255).
    \28\ Id. at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    26. In its Petition, NERC states that it ``conducted various 
reviews of risk-based methodologies developed by many entities of 
varying sizes * * * and determined that the existing methodologies 
generally do not adequately identify all Critical Assets.'' \29\ To 
address this, NERC proposes to replace the current risk-based 
methodology with uniform, bright line criteria, which will be used by 
all responsible entities to identify Critical Assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    27. While risk-based assessment methodologies have merit, we share 
NERC's concerns about the existing application of the currently 
effective CIP-002-3, Requirement 1. Thus, in this context, we believe 
that a shift away from responsible entity-designed risk-based 
methodologies for identifying Critical Assets, which NERC has found to 
be inadequate, to the use of NERC-developed criteria is an improvement.
3. Version 4 Provides Consistency and Clarity in the Identification of 
Critical Assets
    28. In its June 30, 2011 data response, NERC states that the survey 
results from 2009 generated concern ``about the apparent inconsistency 
in the application of the standards across the system, as evidenced by 
the apparent variation from region to region.'' \30\ NERC states that 
it subsequently engaged with the Regional Entities and stakeholders to 
better understand the data, with these efforts resulting in the 
development of Version 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ NERC June 30, 2011 Data Response at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    29. We believe that the application of uniform criteria is an 
improvement over the current approach because they add greater 
consistency and clarity in identifying Critical Assets. The risks posed 
by cyber threats suggest a different approach than the possibly 
inconsistent, inadequate methodologies for identifying Critical Assets, 
as evidenced by NERC's conclusion that insufficient numbers of Critical 
Assets were identified using the risk-based assessment methodology. As 
an integrated system, the protection afforded for Critical Assets and 
their Critical Cyber Assets is only as strong as its weakest link. In 
this respect, allowing responsible entities to devise their own 
methodologies for identifying Critical Assets, especially if these 
methodologies prove to be weak, may compromise the Critical Assets and 
Critical Cyber Assets of other responsible entities even if they have 
adopted a more stringent methodology. The uniform system of Critical 
Asset identification proposed by NERC in Version 4 helps to address 
this weakness and places all responsible entities on an equal footing 
with respect to Critical Asset identification.
    30. In addition, clear, bright line criteria should make it easier 
for Regional Entities, NERC and the Commission to monitor responsible 
entities and evaluate how they are identifying Critical Assets. A 
single set of bright line criteria, as opposed to

[[Page 58734]]

myriad entity-designed risk-based methodologies, should improve the CIP 
compliance process.
    31. However, under the currently-effective CIP-002-3, an entity 
that applies its risk-based assessment methodology considers specific 
types of assets identified in Requirement R1, as well as ``any 
additional assets that support the operation of the Bulk Electric 
System that the Responsible Entity deems appropriate to include in its 
assessment.'' Thus, currently, a responsible entity has the flexibility 
to consider any assets it deems appropriate. The Commission also notes 
that there are assets currently identified as Critical Assets which 
would no longer be identified as Critical Assets under the Proposed 
Reliability Standard CIP-002-4 bright line criteria for Critical Asset 
identification. The Commission seeks comment whether, under CIP Version 
4, a responsible entity retains the flexibility to identify assets 
that, although outside of the bright line criteria, are essential to 
Bulk-Power System reliability. Further, we seek comment whether the ERO 
and/or Regional Entities would have the ability, either in an event-
driven investigation or compliance audit, to identify specific assets 
that fall outside the bright-line criteria yet are still essential to 
Bulk-Power System reliability and should be subject prospectively to 
compliance with the CIP Reliability. If so, on what basis should that 
decision be made?
    32. In addition, the Commission is cognizant of one caution that 
remains concerning a binary bright line criteria protection philosophy, 
i.e., either an asset satisfies the threshold and is subject to 
compliance or is below the threshold and not subject to compliance (as 
opposed to a tiered approach to compliance as discussed below), in 
terms of applying cybersecurity protections to Cyber Assets. 
Specifically, bright line criteria that limit legally-mandated 
cybersecurity protections to certain classes of Bulk-Power System 
assets may indicate to an adversary the types of assets that fail to 
meet the threshold and, therefore, are not subject to mandatory CIP 
compliance. Therefore, the Commission encourages NERC to accelerate 
development of the next version of the CIP Reliability Standards and to 
address the concerns discussed herein in Section B.
4. Violation Risk Factors/Violation Severity Levels
    33. NERC states that the proposed VRFs and VSLs are consistent with 
those approved for the Version 3 CIP Reliability Standards.\31\ NERC 
explains that each requirement in Version 4 is assigned a VRF and a set 
of VSLs and that these elements support the determination of an initial 
value range for the base penalty amount regarding violations of 
requirements in Commission-approved Reliability Standards, as defined 
in the ERO Sanction Guidelines.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 134 FERC ] 
61,045 (2011) (approving Version 2 and 3 CIP Reliability Standards 
VRFs and VSLs but requiring modifications in a compliance filing).
    \32\ NERC Petition at 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    34. The principal changes in the proposed Version 4 VRFs and VSLs 
relate to CIP-002-4. NERC proposes to carry forward the Version 3 VRFs 
and VSLs for all other Requirements (in CIP-003-4 through CIP-009-4), 
for which no substantive revisions are proposed. CIP-002-4 no longer 
contains sub-Requirements and, instead, each of three main Requirements 
has a single VRF and set of VSLs, consistent with the methodology 
proposed by NERC and approved by the Commission.\33\ The VRF 
designations for the three Requirements in CIP-002-4 are consistent 
with those assigned to similar Requirements in previous versions of the 
CIP Reliability Standards and satisfy our established guidelines. 
Therefore, the Commission proposes to approve the Version 4 VRFs 
proposed by NERC and incorporate appropriately the modifications 
directed to prior versions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 135 FERC ] 
61,166, at 8 (2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    35. With regard to the proposed Version 4 VSLs for CIP-002-4, we 
are concerned that the VSLs for Requirement R1 and Requirement R2, 
while carrying forward the wording from corresponding Version 3 VSLs, 
do not adequately address the purpose of NERC's proposed bright line 
criteria: To ensure accurate and complete identification of all 
Critical Assets, so that all associated Critical Cyber Assets become 
subject to the protections required by the CIP Standards.
    36. More importantly, neither set of VSLs address the failure to 
properly identify either Critical Assets or Critical Cyber Assets in 
the first place. The failure to identify a Critical Asset, whether 
inadvertently or through misapplication of the bright line criteria, is 
paramount because if an Asset is not identified and included on the 
Critical Asset list, its associated Cyber Assets will not be considered 
under Requirement R2. Failure to identify those Cyber Assets as 
Critical Cyber Assets under Requirement R2 then creates the ``weakest 
link'' circumstance discussed in the Commission's order establishing 
two CIP VSL Guidelines for analyzing the validity of VSLs pertaining to 
cyber security.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ CIP VSL Guideline 1 states, ``Requirements where a single 
lapse in protection can compromise computer network security, i.e., 
the ``weakest link'' characteristic, should apply binary rather than 
gradated VSLs.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    37. Therefore, the Commission proposes to direct the ERO to modify 
the VSLs for CIP-002-4, Requirements R1 and R2, to address a failure to 
identify either Critical Assets or Critical Cyber Assets, as shown in 
Appendix 1.\35\ The Commission proposes to approve the Version 4 VSLs 
proposed by NERC, as modified, because they would then satisfy our 
established guidelines, fully address the purpose of NERC's bright line 
criteria, and incorporate appropriately the modifications directed to 
prior versions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ NERC proposes to assign a Severe VSL for a violation of 
Requirement R1 if a responsible entity does not develop a list of 
its identified Critical Assets ``even if such list is null.'' NERC 
does not propose to assign a VSL for a violation of Requirement R1 
when a responsible entity fails to identify a Critical Asset that 
falls within any of the Critical Asset Criteria in Attachment 1, or 
fails to include an identified Critical Asset in its Critical Asset 
list. NERC further proposes to assign a Severe VSL to a responsible 
entity's violation of Requirement R2 only when it fails to include 
in its list of Critical Cyber Assets a Critical Cyber Asset it has 
identified. NERC does not propose to assign a VSL for a violation of 
Requirement R2 resulting from a responsible entity's failure to 
identify as a Critical Cyber Asset a Cyber Asset that qualifies as a 
Critical Cyber Asset.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Implementation Plan and Effective Date
    38. NERC proposes an effective date for full compliance with the 
Version 4 CIP Standards of the first day of the eighth calendar quarter 
after applicable regulatory approvals have been received. In addition, 
NERC provides a detailed implementation plan for newly identified 
Critical Assets and newly registered entities. NERC also presents a 
number of scenarios intended to explain how CIP-002-4 will be 
implemented. Depending on the situation, the implementation plan 
establishes timelines and milestones for entities to reach full 
compliance with CIP-002-4.
    39. The Commission proposes to approve the effective date and 
implementation plan for CIP-002-4. Under the scenarios presented by 
NERC, we understand that entities with existing CIP compliance 
implementation programs will effectively no longer use CIP-002-3 to 
identify Critical Assets after approval of CIP-002-4 but rather will 
apply the criteria in Attachment 1 of CIP-002-4. While some responsible 
entities have already installed the necessary equipment and software to 
address

[[Page 58735]]

cybersecurity, we recognize that other responsible entities may need to 
purchase and install new equipment and software to achieve compliance 
for assets that are brought within the scope of the protections under 
the CIP-002-4 bright line criteria. Based on these considerations, the 
Commission believes that the implementation plan proposed by NERC sets 
reasonable deadlines for industry compliance.

B. Ongoing Development Efforts To Satisfy Directives Set Forth in Order 
No. 706

    40. As acknowledged by NERC, the proposed Version 4 CIP Reliability 
Standards do not address all of the directives set forth in Order No. 
706. Although the Commission proposes to approve CIP-002-4, we 
highlight the need for NERC, working through the Reliability Standards 
development process, to address all outstanding Order No. 706 
directives as soon as possible.
    41. Below, we discuss several directives in Order No. 706 that have 
yet to be satisfied and propose to give guidance regarding the next 
version of the CIP Reliability Standards, such as the need to address 
the NIST framework, data network connectivity, and the potential misuse 
of control centers or control systems and the adoption of a regional 
perspective and oversight. Our guidance is intended to more fully 
ensure that all Cyber Assets serving reliability functions of the Bulk-
Power System are within scope of the CIP Reliability Standards. In 
addition, as discussed below, we seek comments from NERC and other 
interested persons on a proposal to establish a deadline for NERC to 
submit modified CIP Reliability Standards that address the outstanding 
directives set forth in Order No. 706, using NERC's development 
timeline.
    42. The stated purpose of Reliability Standard CIP-002 is the 
accurate identification of Critical Cyber Assets. Both the currently-
effective and proposed CIP-002 Reliability Standards, along with 
guidance NERC provided to industry,\36\ are structured in a staged 
approach. First, an entity must identify Critical Assets. NERC defines 
Critical Assets as ``facilities, systems, and equipment which, if 
destroyed, degraded, or otherwise rendered unavailable, would affect 
the reliability or operability of the Bulk Electric System.'' \37\ 
Second, based on the Critical Assets identified in the first step, an 
entity must identify Cyber Assets supporting the Critical Assets. The 
NERC Glossary defines Cyber Assets as ``programmable electronic devices 
and communication networks including hardware, software, and data.'' 
\38\ Third, an entity should identify the Critical Cyber Assets by 
determining, in accordance with the NERC Glossary, the ``Cyber Assets 
essential to the reliable operation of the Critical Assets.'' \39\ In 
Order No. 706, the Commission did not address whether or not the staged 
approach outlined above was the only method for identifying Critical 
Cyber Assets. Rather at that time, focus was placed on addressing 
specific concerns with the first step--the identification of Critical 
Assets. Recognizing CIP-002 as the cornerstone of the CIP Reliability 
Standards,\40\ a failure to accurately identify Critical Assets could 
greatly impact accurate Critical Cyber Asset identification and the 
overall applicability of the protection measures afforded in CIP-003 
through CIP-009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ North American Reliability Corporation Security Guideline 
for the Electric Sector: ``Identifying Critical Cyber Assets'' 
Version 1.0, Effective June 17, 2010, at 4-5, and North American 
Reliability Corporation Security Guideline for the Electric Sector: 
``Identifying Critical Assets'' Version 1.0, Effective September 17, 
2009.
    \37\ NERC Glossary of Terms at 11.
    \38\ Id.
    \39\ Id.
    \40\ Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 234.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    43. In light of recent cybersecurity vulnerabilities, threats and 
attacks that have exploited the interconnectivity of cyber systems,\41\ 
the Commission seeks comments regarding the method of identification of 
Critical Cyber Assets \42\ to ensure sufficiency and accuracy. The 
Commission recognizes that control systems that support Bulk-Power 
System reliability are ``only as secure as their weakest links,'' and 
that a single vulnerability opens the computer network and all other 
networks with which it is interconnected to potential malicious 
activity.\43\ Accordingly, the Commission believes that any criteria 
adopted for the purposes of identifying a Critical Cyber Asset under 
CIP-002 should be based upon a Cyber Asset's connectivity and its 
potential to compromise the reliable operation \44\ of the Bulk-Power 
System, rather than focusing on the operation of any specific Critical 
Asset(s). The Commission seeks comments on this approach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ These include the discovery of Stuxnet, Night Dragon and 
RSA breaches from advanced persistent threats in July 2010, February 
2011 and March 2011 respectively, where systems were compromised.
    \42\ In Order No. 706, the Commission declined to direct a 
method for identifying Critical Cyber Assets, but stated that it may 
revisit this circumstance in a future proceeding. See Order No. 706, 
122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 284.
    \43\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 130 FERC ] 
61,211, at P 15 (2010).
    \44\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(a)(4). The term ``reliable operation'' means 
``operating the elements of the bulk-power system within equipment 
and electric system thermal, voltage, and stability limits so that 
instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of such 
system will not occur as a result of a sudden disturbance, including 
a cybersecurity incident, or unanticipated failure of system 
elements.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    44. Further, the Commission seeks comments on how to ensure that 
the directives of Order No. 706 relative to CIP-002 with respect to the 
concerns discussed below are addressed, resulting in a method that will 
lead to sufficient and accurate Critical Cyber Asset identification.
    45. The Commission believes that NERC should consider the following 
three strategies to meet the outstanding directives and seeks comments 
on these strategies. First, NERC should consider applicable features of 
the NIST Risk Management Framework to ensure protection of all cyber 
systems connected to the Bulk-Power System, including establishing CIP 
requirements based on entity functional characteristics rather than 
focusing on Critical Asset size. Second, such as in the consideration 
of misuse, NERC should consider mechanisms for identifying Critical 
Cyber Assets by examining all possible communication paths between a 
given cyber resource and any asset supporting a reliability function. 
Third, NERC should provide a method for review and approval of Critical 
Cyber Asset lists from external sources such as the Regional Entities 
or NERC. Each of these strategies is discussed below.
1. NIST Framework
    46. In Order No. 706, the Commission directed NERC to ``monitor the 
development and implementation'' of cybersecurity standards then being 
developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST).\45\ The Commission also directed NERC to consider the 
effectiveness of the NIST standards.\46\ At that time, the Commission 
directed NERC to address any NIST provisions that will better protect 
the Bulk-Power System in the Reliability Standards development 
process.\47\ While the Commission determined not to require NERC to 
adopt or incorporate elements of the NIST standards, Order No. 706 left 
open the option of revisiting the NIST standards at a later time.\48\ 
The Commission is not here proposing to direct that NERC use elements 
of the NIST standards. However, we continue

[[Page 58736]]

to believe that the NIST framework could provide beneficial input into 
the NERC CIP Reliability Standards and we urge NERC to consider any 
such provisions that will better protect the Bulk-Power System.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 233.
    \46\ Id.
    \47\ Id.
    \48\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    47. The NIST Risk Management Framework was developed to manage the 
risks associated with all information systems, and offers a structured 
yet flexible approach that can now be applied to the electric industry. 
The NIST Risk Management Framework guides selection and specification 
of cybersecurity controls and measures necessary to protect individuals 
and the operations and assets of the organization, while considering 
effectiveness, efficiency, and constraints due to applicable laws, 
directives, policies, standards, or regulations. Each of the activities 
in the Risk Management Framework has an associated NIST security 
standard and/or guidance document that can be used by organizations 
implementing the framework. The management of risk is a key element.
    48. Two primary features of the NIST Framework are: (1) Customizing 
protection to the mission of the cyber systems subject to protection 
(similar to the role identified by the NERC Functional Model); and (2) 
ensuring that all connected cyber systems associated with the Bulk-
Power System, based on their function, receive some level of 
protection.\49\ The Bulk-Power System could benefit from each of these 
tested approaches.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ NIST SP800-53, Section 1.4, Organizational 
Responsibilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. NIST Approach and the NERC Functional Model
    49. The purpose of the NERC CIP Reliability Standards is to specify 
mandatory Requirements for responsible entities to establish, maintain, 
and preserve the cybersecurity of key information technology systems' 
assets, the use of which is essential to reliable operation of the 
Bulk-Power System. The CIP Reliability Standards include Requirements 
which are based upon the functional roles of the responsible entities 
as specified in the NERC Functional Model.\50\ The identification of 
cyber systems and assets used to execute these functional roles should 
be the first step in identifying the systems for coverage under the CIP 
Reliability Standards for protection. The Functional Model should be 
used as a starting point when considering the applicability of the NIST 
Framework for securing the operation of cyber assets to provide for the 
Reliable Operation of the Bulk-Power System.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ Reliability Functional Model, Function Definitions and 
Functional Entities, Version 5, approved by NERC Board of Trustees 
May 2010; and, Reliability Functional Model Technical Document 
Version 5, approved by NERC Board of Trustees May 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. NIST Tiered Approach
    50. If applied to the Bulk-Power System, the NIST Framework would 
specify the level of protection appropriate for systems based upon 
their importance to the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. 
Cyber systems connected to the Bulk-Power System require availability, 
integrity, and confidentiality to effectively ensure the reliability of 
the Bulk-Power System.
    51. The NIST Framework provides for a tiered approach to 
cybersecurity protection where protection of some type would be applied 
to all cyber assets connected to the Bulk-Power System. Under the NIST 
Framework, cyber assets whose compromise or loss of operability could 
result in a greater risk to Bulk-Power System reliability would be 
subject to more rigorous cybersecurity protections compared to a less 
important asset. The NIST Framework recognizes that all connected 
assets require a baseline level of protection to prevent attackers from 
gaining a foothold to launch further, even more devastating attacks on 
other critical systems.
    52. Using the NIST framework, all cyber assets would also be 
reviewed to determine the appropriate level of cyber protection. The 
level of protection required for a given cyber asset is based upon its 
mission criticality and its innate technological risks.
2. Misuse of Control Systems
    53. In Order No. 706, the Commission directed NERC to consider the 
misuse of control centers and control systems in the determination of 
Critical Assets.\51\ If a perpetrator is able to misuse an asset, the 
attacker may navigate across and between control system data networks 
in order to gain access to multiple sites, which could enable a 
coordinated multi-site attack. Recent cybersecurity incidents \52\ 
illustrate the importance of restricting connectivity between control 
systems and external networks, emphasizing the inherent risk exposure 
created by networking critical cyber control systems. Future mechanisms 
for identifying when cyber assets require protection will have to 
examine all possible paths between a given cyber resource and any asset 
supporting a reliability function.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 282.
    \52\ These include the discovery of Stuxnet, Night Dragon and 
RSA breaches from advanced persistent threats in July 2010, February 
2011 and March 2011 respectively, where systems were compromised.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    54. In Order No. 706, the Commission expressed concerns regarding 
the classification of control centers and the potential misuse of 
control systems.\53\ With regard to control centers, the Commission 
noted that responsible entities should be required to ``examine the 
impact on reliability if the control centers are unavailable, due for 
example to power or communications failures, or denial of service 
attacks.'' \54\ In addition, the Commission stated that ``[r]esponsible 
entities should also examine the impact that misuse of those control 
centers could have on the electric facilities they control and what the 
combined impact of those electric facilities could be on the 
reliability of the Bulk-Power System.'' \55\ The Commission stated that 
``when these matters are taken into account, it is difficult to 
envision a scenario in which a reliability coordinator, transmission 
operator or transmission owner control center or backup control center 
would not properly be identified as a critical asset.'' \56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 280-281.
    \54\ Id. P 280.
    \55\ Id.
    \56\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    55. In addition, the Commission raised concerns about the misuse of 
a control system that controls more than one asset.\57\ Specifically, 
the Commission noted that multiple assets, whether multiple generating 
units, multiple transmission breakers, or perhaps even multiple 
substations, could be taken out of service simultaneously due to a 
failure or misuse of the control system. The Commission stated that 
even if one or all of the assets would not be considered as a Critical 
Asset on a stand alone basis, a simultaneous outage resulting from the 
single point of control might affect the reliability or operability of 
the Bulk-Power System. The Commission stated ``[i]n that case, the 
common control system should be considered a Critical Cyber Asset.'' 
\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ Id. P 281.
    \58\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    56. The Commission is concerned that the proposed CIP-002-4 bright 
line criteria do not adequately address the Commission's prior 
directive regarding the classification of control centers or take the 
potential misuse of control systems into account in the identification 
of Critical Assets. For example, the proposed bright line criteria 
leave a number of Critical Assets

[[Page 58737]]

with potentially unprotected cyber assets, including a total of 222 
\59\ control centers with no legal obligation to apply cybersecurity 
measures. These potentially unprotected control centers involve an 
unknown number of associated control systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ NERC June 30, 2011 Data Response at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    57. Consider the following example: Electric grid control system 
operation in part consists of the collection of raw data needed to run 
the grid, collected by a SCADA system from intelligent electronic 
devices (IEDs) (e.g., RTUs and synchrophasors). The SCADA data is 
typically aggregated by an energy management system (EMS). The EMS may, 
in some cases, calculate area control error (ACE) and transmit it to a 
balancing authority, which in turn makes computer based decisions about 
balancing load and generation. Those decisions are then used by the 
balancing authority or generation operator as part of an automated 
generation control (AGC) process. At each of these one or more sites, 
there are many data network interconnection points with other entities, 
(e.g., neighboring transmission operators, generation operators, and 
reliability coordinators) and additional connectivity to corporate data 
networks and elsewhere, employing several communications technologies. 
This results in a complex interconnection of cyber assets (including 
the data of those cyber assets) demanding vigilant protection.\60\ 
These cyber systems require comprehensive protection because the 
interconnected system is only as strong as its weakest link.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ See generally, Ron Ross, Managing Enterprise Risk in 
Today's World of Sophisticated Threats, National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    58. Any failure to take into account the interconnectivity of 
control systems represents a significant reliability gap. Where modern 
data networking technology is used for operation of the Bulk-Power 
System (e.g., control systems, synchrophasors, smart grid), a network-
based cyber attack could result in multiple simultaneous outages of 
grid equipment and cyber systems alike through misuse of a single point 
of control (e.g., a SCADA control host system). Such an attack could 
take place by way of a cyber system associated with an asset that falls 
outside the CIP-002-4 bright line criteria yet is connected in common 
with other cyber systems on the Bulk-Power System. The risk of a cyber 
attack is greater now than when Order No. 706 was issued, as borne out 
by the recent increased frequency and sophistication of cyber attacks. 
It is critical, therefore, that the Commission's concerns regarding the 
potential misuse of control centers and associated control systems be 
addressed in the CIP Reliability Standards.
3. Regional Perspective
    59. In Order No. 706, the Commission directed NERC to ``develop a 
process of external review and approval of critical asset lists based 
on a regional perspective.'' \61\ The Commission found that ``Regional 
Entities must have a role in the external review to assure that there 
is sufficient accountability in the process [and] * * * because the 
Regional Entities and ERO are ultimately responsible for ensuring 
compliance with Reliability Standards.'' \62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ Order No. 706, 122 FERC ] 61,040 at P 329.
    \62\ Id. P 327.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    60. The Commission is concerned that the lack of a regional review 
in the identification of cyber assets might result in a reliability 
gap. In Order No. 706, the Commission expressed concerns regarding the 
need for developing a process of external review and approval of 
Critical Asset lists based on a regional perspective, and that such 
lists are considered from a wide-area view. This process would help to 
identify trends in Critical Asset identification. Further, while we 
recognize that individual circumstances may likely vary, an external 
review will provide an appropriate level of consistency.\63\ For 
example, reliability coordinators may communicate through a common 
system and compromise of that system could propagate across multiple 
regions. A cyber compromise can easily propagate across these data and 
control networks with potential adverse consequences to the Bulk-Power 
System on multi-region basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ Id. P 322.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    61. This problem may become exacerbated by any future revisions to 
the CIP Reliability Standards that opt to reserve a high level of 
independent authority to the registered entity to categorize and 
prioritize its cyber assets. Looking forward, it will be essential for 
NERC and the Regional Entities to actively review the designation of 
cyber assets that are subject to the CIP Reliability Standards, 
including those which span regions, in order to determine whether 
additional cyber assets should be protected.
4. Summary
    62. In summary, the Commission proposes to approve NERC's proposed 
Version 4 CIP Standards pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the FPA. As 
discussed above, it appears that the Version 4 CIP Standards represent 
an improvement in three respects in that they: (1) Will result in the 
identification of certain types of Critical Assets that may not be 
identified under the current approach; (2) use bright line criteria to 
identify Critical Assets, thus limiting the discretion of responsible 
entities when identifying Critical Assets; and (3) provide a level of 
consistency and clarity regarding the identification of Critical 
Assets.
    63. While we believe that the Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards 
satisfy the statutory standard for approval, we also believe that more 
improvement is needed. As NERC explains in its Petition, the Version 4 
CIP Reliability Standards are intended as ``interim'' and future 
versions will build on Version 4. We believe that the electric 
industry, through the NERC standards development process, should 
continue to develop an approach to cybersecurity that is meaningful and 
comprehensive to assure that the nation's electric grid is capable of 
withstanding a Cybersecurity Incident.\64\ As discussed above, we 
believe that some of the essential components of such a meaningful and 
comprehensive approach to cybersecurity are set forth in Order No. 706.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ Section 215(a) of the FPA defines Cybersecurity Incident as 
``a malicious act or suspicious event that disrupts, or was an 
attempt to disrupt, the operation of those programmable electronic 
devices and communication networks including hardware, software and 
data that are essential to the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power 
System.''

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[[Page 58738]]

5. Reasonable Deadline for Full Compliance With Order No. 706
    64. The Commission issued Order No. 706 on January 18, 2008. In 
Order No. 706, the Commission approved Version 1 of the CIP Reliability 
Standards while also directing modifications pursuant to section 
215(d)(5) of the FPA, some of which are described above. Later approved 
versions of the CIP Reliability Standards, and now the proposed Version 
4 CIP Reliability Standards, addressed some of the directives in Order 
No. 706, but other directives remain unsatisfied.
    65. Over three years have elapsed since the Commission issued the 
Final Rule in January 2008. As discussed above, we believe that it is 
important for the successful implementation of a comprehensive approach 
to cybersecurity that NERC timely addresses the modifications directed 
by the Commission in Order No. 706. Accordingly, the Commission 
proposes to set a deadline for NERC to file the next version of the CIP 
Reliability Standards, which NERC indicates will address all 
outstanding Order No. 706 directives.\65\ This proposal is consistent 
with the views expressed in the January 2011 Audit Report of the 
Department of Energy's Inspector General, who found ``that the 
Commission could have, but did not impose specific deadlines for the 
ERO to incorporate changes to the CIP standards.'' \66\ Similarly, our 
proposal is responsive to the Audit Report finding that ``the CIP 
standards implementation approach and schedule approved by the 
Commission were not adequate to ensure that systems-related risks to 
the Nation's power grid were mitigated or addressed in a timely 
manner.'' \67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ See NERC's May 27, 2011 Responses to Data Requests, 
Response 1 (``[t]he standard drafting team expects that the filing 
for the next version of the CIP Reliability Standards will address 
the remaining FERC Order No. 706 directives'').
    \66\ Department of Energy Inspector General Audit Report, 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Monitoring of Power Grid 
Cybersecurity at 6 (January 2011).
    \67\ Id. at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    66. The Commission understands that, under NERC's timeline for the 
ongoing effort to address all outstanding Order No. 706 directives, it 
anticipates submitting the next version of the CIP Reliability 
Standards to the NERC Board of Trustees by the second quarter of 2012, 
and filing that version the Commission by the end of the third quarter 
of 2012.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ See NERC's May 27, 2011 Responses to Data Requests, 
Response 1. See also North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
Reliability Standards Development Plan 2011-2013 Informational 
Filing Pursuant to Section 310 of the NERC Rules of Procedure, 
Docket Nos. RM05-17-000, RM05-25-000, RM06-16-000 at 14 (filed April 
5, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    67. The Commission proposes to establish NERC's current development 
timeline above as a deadline for compliance with the outstanding Order 
No. 706 CIP Standard directives. The Commission seeks comments from 
NERC and other parties concerning this proposal. Further, NERC and 
other parties may propose and support an alternative compliance 
deadline.

IV. Information Collection Statement

    68. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regulations require 
that OMB approve certain reporting and recordkeeping requirements 
(collections of information) imposed by an agency.\69\ The information 
contained here is also subject to review under section 3507(d) of the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.\70\ We will submit this proposed rule 
to OMB for review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ 5 CFR 1320.11.
    \70\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    69. As stated above, the Commission previously approved Reliability 
Standards similar to the proposed Reliability Standards that are the 
subject of the current rulemaking.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 130 FERC ] 
61,271 (2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    70. The principal differences in the information collection 
requirements and resulting burden imposed by the proposed Reliability 
Standards in this rule are triggered by the proposed changes in 
Reliability Standard CIP-002-4. The previous risk-based assessment 
methodology for identifying Critical Assets will be replaced by 17 
uniform ``bright line'' criteria for identifying Critical Assets (in 
CIP-002-4, Attachment 1, ``Critical Asset Criteria''). Proposed 
Reliability Standard CIP-002-4 would require each responsible entity to 
use the bright line criteria as a ``checklist'' to identify Critical 
Assets, initially and in an annual review, instead of performing the 
more technical and individualized risk analysis involved in complying 
with the currently-effective CIP Reliability Standards. As in past 
versions, each Responsible Entity will then identify the Critical Cyber 
Assets associated with its updated list of Critical Assets. If 
application of the bright line criteria result in the identification of 
new Critical Cyber Assets, such assets become subject to the remaining 
standards (proposed CIP-003-4, CIP-004-4, CIP-005-4a, CIP-006-4c, CIP-
007-4, CIP-008-4, and CIP-009-4), and the information collection 
requirements contained therein.
    71. We estimate that the burden associated with the annual review 
of the assets (by the estimated 1,501 entities) will be simplified by 
the ``Critical Asset Criteria'' in proposed Reliability Standard CIP-
002-4. Rather than each entity annually reviewing and updating a Risk-
Based Assessment Methodology that frequently required technical 
analysis and judgment decisions, the proposed bright line criteria will 
provide a straight forward checklist for all entities to use. Thus, we 
estimate that the proposal will reduce the burden associated with the 
annual review, as well as provide a consistent and clear set of 
criteria for all entities to follow.
    72. The estimated changes to burden as contained in the proposed 
rule in RM11-11 follow.

[[Page 58739]]



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                         Annual burden
   FERC-725B Data  collection (per      Number of  respondents   Average number of     Average number of     Effect of NOPR in RM11-      hours upon
         proposed Version 4)                     \72\            annual responses       burden hours per       11, on total  annual    implementation of
                                                                  per respondent         response \73\                hours                 RM11-11
                                       (1)....................                 (2)  (3)....................  (1) x (2) x (3)........
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Entities that (previously and now)     345 [no change]........                   1  1,880 [reduction of 40   reduction of 13,800                 648,600
 will identify at least one Critical                                                 hours from 1,920 to      hours.
 Cyber Asset [category a].                                                           1,880 hours].
Entities that (previously and now)     1,144 [reduction of 12                    1  120 [no change]........  Reduction of 1,440                  137,280
 will not identify any Critical Cyber   entities from 1156 to                                                 hours [for the 12
 Assets [category b].                   1,144].                                                               entities].
Entities that will newly identify a    increase of 12                            1  3,840 \75\.............  increase of 46,080.....              46,080
 Critical Asset/Critical Cyber Asset    [formerly 0].
 due to the requirements in RM11-11
 \74\ [category c].
                                      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Net Total........................  1,501 \72\.............  ..................  .......................  +30,840................             831,960
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The revisions to the cost estimates based on requirements of this 
proposed rule are:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ The NERC Compliance Registry as of 9/28/2010 indicated that 
2,079 entities were registered for NERC's compliance program. Of 
these, 2,057 were identified as being U.S. entities. Staff concluded 
that of the 2,057 U.S. entities, approximately 1,501 were registered 
for at least one CIP related function. According to an April 7, 2009 
memo to industry, NERC noted that only 31% of entities responding to 
an earlier survey reported that they had at least one Critical 
Asset, and only 23% reported having a Critical Cyber Asset. Staff 
applied the 23% (an estimate unchanged for Version 4 standards) to 
the 1,501 figure to estimate the number of entities that identified 
Critical Assets under Version 3 CIP Standards.
    \73\ Calculations for figures prior to applying reductions:
    Respondent category b:
    3 employees x (working 50%) x (40 hrs/week) x (2 weeks) = 120 
hours.
    Respondent category c:
    20 employees x (working 50%) x (40 hrs/week) x (8 weeks) = 3200 
hours.
     20 employees x (working 20%) x (3200 hrs) = 640 hours.
     Total = 3840.
    Respondent category a:
    50% of 3840 hours (category d) = 1920.
    \74\ We estimate 12 (or 1%) of the existing entities that 
formerly had no identified Critical Cyber Assets will have them 
under the proposed Reliability Standards. This proposed rule does 
not affect the burden for the 6 new U.S. Entities that were 
estimated to newly register or otherwise become subject to the CIP 
Standards each year in FERC-725B, and therefore are not included in 
this chart.
    \75\ This estimated burden estimate applies only to the first 
three year audit cycle. In subsequent audit cycles these entities 
will move into category a, or be removed from the burden as an 
entity that no longer is registered for a CIP related function.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Each entity that has identified Critical Cyber Assets has 
a reduction of 40 hours (345 entities x 40 hrs. x @$96/hour = 
$1,324,800 reduction).
     12 Entities that formerly had not identified Critical 
Cyber Assets, but now will have them, has
    [cir] A reduction of 120 hours and an increase of 3,840 hours (for 
a net increase of 3,720 annual hours), giving 12 entities x 3,720 
hrs.@$96/hour = $4,285,440.
    [cir] Storage costs = 12 entities@$15.25/entity = $183.
    Total Net Annual Cost for the FERC-725B requirements contained in 
the NOPR in RM11-11 = $2,960,823 ($4,285,440 + $183 -$1,324,800).
    The estimated hourly rate of $96 is the average cost of legal 
services ($230 per hour), technical employees ($40 per hour) and 
administrative support ($18 per hour), based on hourly rates from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the 2009 Billing Rates and 
Practices Survey Report.\76\ The $15.25 per entity for storage costs is 
an estimate based on the average costs to service and store 1 GB of 
data to demonstrate compliance with the CIP Standards.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ Bureau of Labor Statistics figures were obtained from 
http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics2_22.htm, and 2009 Billing 
Rates figure were obtained from http://www.marylandlawyerblog.com/2009/07
/average_hourly_rate_for_lawyer.html. Legal services were 
based on the national average billing rate (contracting out) from 
the above report and BLS hourly earnings (in-house personnel). It is 
assumed that 25% of respondents have in-house legal personnel.
    \77\ Based on the aggregate cost of an advanced data protection 
server.
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    Title: Mandatory Reliability Standards, Version 4 Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Standards.
    Action: Proposed Collection FERC-725B.
    OMB Control No.: 1902-0248.
    Respondents: Businesses or other for-profit institutions; not-for-
profit institutions.
    Frequency of Responses: On Occasion.
    Necessity of the Information: This proposed rule proposes to 
approve the requested modifications to Reliability Standards pertaining 
to critical infrastructure protection. The proposed Reliability 
Standards help ensure the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System 
by providing a cybersecurity framework for the identification and 
protection of Critical Assets and associated Critical Cyber Assets. As 
discussed above, the Commission proposes to approve NERC's proposed 
Version 4 CIP Standards pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the FPA 
because they represent an improvement to the currently-effective CIP 
Reliability Standards.
    Internal Review: The Commission has reviewed the proposed 
Reliability Standards and made a determination that its action is 
necessary to implement section 215 of the FPA.
    73. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting 
requirements by contacting the following: Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: 
Ellen Brown, Office of the Executive Director, e-mail: 
DataClearance@ferc.gov, phone: (202) 502-8663, fax: (202) 273-0873].
    74. For submitting comments concerning the collection(s) of 
information and the associated burden estimate(s), please send your 
comments to the Commission, and to the Office of Management and Budget, 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,

[[Page 58740]]

Washington, DC 20503 [Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, phone: (202) 395-4638, fax: (202) 395-7285]. For 
security reasons, comments to OMB should be submitted by e-mail to: 
oira_submission@omb.eop.gov. Comments submitted to OMB should include 
Docket Number RM11-11 and OMB Control Number 1902-0248.

V. Environmental Analysis

    75. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental 
Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may 
have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\78\ The 
Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from this 
requirement as not having a significant effect on the human 
environment. Included in the exclusion are rules that are clarifying, 
corrective, or procedural or that do not substantially change the 
effect of the regulations being amended.\79\ The actions proposed here 
fall within this categorical exclusion in the Commission's regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ Order No. 486, Regulations Implementing the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, FERC Stats. & Regs., Regulations 
Preambles 1986-1990 ] 30,783 (1987).
    \79\ 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii).
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VI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

    76. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \80\ generally 
requires a description and analysis of final rules that will have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
The RFA mandates consideration of regulatory alternatives that 
accomplish the stated objectives of a proposed rule and that minimize 
any significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. The Small Business Administration's (SBA) Office of Size 
Standards develops the numerical definition of a small business.\81\ 
The SBA has established a size standard for electric utilities, stating 
that a firm is small if, including its affiliates, it is primarily 
engaged in the transmission, generation and/or distribution of electric 
energy for sale and its total electric output for the preceding twelve 
months did not exceed four million megawatt hours.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ 5 U.S.C. 601-612.
    \81\ 13 CFR 121.101.
    \82\ 13 CFR 121.201, Sector 22, Utilities & n.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    77. The Commission analyzed the affect of the proposed rule on 
small entities. The Commission's analysis found that the DOE's Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) reports that there were 3,276 electric 
utility companies in the United States in 2009,\83\ and 3,015 of these 
electric utilities qualify as small entities under the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) definition. Of these 3,276 electric utility 
companies, the EIA subdivides them as follows: (1) 875 Cooperatives of 
which 843 are small entity cooperatives; (2) 1,841 municipal utilities, 
of which 1,826 are small entity municipal utilities; (3) 128 political 
subdivisions, of which 115 are small entity political subdivisions; (4) 
171 power marketers, of which 113 individually could be considered 
small entity power marketers; \84\ (5) 200 privately owned utilities, 
of which 93 could be considered small entity private utilities; (6) 24 
state organizations, of which 14 are small entity state organizations; 
and (7) 9 federal organizations of which 4 are small entity federal 
organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ See Energy Information Administration Database, Form EIA-
861, Dept. of Energy (2009), available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia861.html.
    \84\ Most of these small entity power marketers and private 
utilities are affiliated with others and, therefore, do not qualify 
as small entities under the SBA definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    78. Many of the entities that have not previously identified 
Critical Assets and Critical Cyber Assets are considered small 
entities. The new CIP version 4 bright line criteria generally result 
in the identification of relatively larger Bulk-Power System equipment 
as Critical Assets. For the most part, the small entities do not own or 
operate these larger facilities. There is a limited possibility that 
these entities would have facilities that meet the bright line criteria 
and therefore be subject to the full CIP standards (CIP-002 through 
CIP-009). The Commission expects only a marginal increase in the number 
of small entities that will identify at least one Critical Asset under 
the Version 4 CIP Reliability Standards that have not done so 
previously.
    79. The Commission estimates that only one percent (12) of the 
small and medium-sized entities that have not previously identified 
Critical Assets and Critical Cyber Assets will have an increased cost 
due to the proposed Reliability Standards and their identification of 
new Critical Cyber Assets. For each of those 12 entities, we anticipate 
a cost increase associated with creating a cyber security program along 
with the actual cyber security protections associated with the 
identified Critical Cyber Assets. The Commission requests comment on 
the potential implementation cost and subsequent cost increases that 
could be experienced by such small entities. Small and medium-sized 
entities that continue to have no Critical Assets will not see any 
change in their burden.
    80. In general, the majority of small entities are not required to 
comply with mandatory Reliability Standards because they are not 
regulated by NERC pursuant to the NERC Registry Criteria. Moreover, a 
small entity that is registered but does not identify critical cyber 
assets pursuant to CIP-002-4 will not have compliance obligations 
pursuant to CIP-003-4 through CIP-009-4.
    81. The Commission also investigated possible alternatives. These 
included the Commission's adoption in Order No. 693 of the NERC 
definition of bulk electric system, which reduces significantly the 
number of small entities responsible for compliance with mandatory 
Reliability Standards. The Commission also noted that small entities 
could join a joint action agency or similar organization, which could 
accept responsibility for compliance with mandatory Reliability 
Standards on behalf of its members and also may divide the 
responsibility for compliance with its members.
    82. Based on the foregoing, the Commission certifies that the 
proposed Reliability Standards will not have a significant impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. Accordingly, no regulatory 
flexibility analysis is required.

VII. Comment Procedures

    83. The Commission invites interested persons to submit comments on 
the matters and issues proposed in this notice to be adopted, including 
any related matters or alternative proposals that commenters may wish 
to discuss. Comments are due November 21, 2011. Comments must refer to 
Docket No. RM11-11-000, and must include the commenter's name, the 
organization they represent, if applicable, and their address in their 
comments.
    84. The Commission encourages comments to be filed electronically 
via the eFiling link on the Commission's Web site at http://www.ferc.gov. 
The Commission accepts most standard word processing 
formats. Documents created electronically using word processing 
software should be filed in native applications or print-to-PDF format 
and not in a scanned format. Commenters filing electronically do not 
need to make a paper filing.
    85. Commenters unable to file comments electronically must mail or 
hand deliver an original copy of their comments to: Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the Commission, 888 First Street, 
NE., Washington, DC 20426.

[[Page 58741]]

    86. All comments will be placed in the Commission's public files 
and may be viewed, printed, or downloaded remotely as described in the 
Document Availability section below. Commenters on this proposal are 
not required to serve copies of their comments on other commenters.

VIII. Document Availability

    87. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the 
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an 
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the 
Internet through the Commission's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and 
in the Commission's Public Reference Room during normal business hours 
(8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street, NE., Room 2A, 
Washington, DC 20426.
    88. From the Commission's Home Page on the Internet, this 
information is available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is 
available on eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, 
printing, and/or downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type 
the docket number excluding the last three digits of this document in 
the docket number field.
    89. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission's 
Web site during normal business hours from FERC Online Support at 202-
502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or e-mail at 
ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY (202) 502-8659. E-mail the Public Reference Room at  
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.

List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 40

    Electric power, Electric utilities, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.

    By direction of the Commission.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2011-24102 Filed 9-21-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P



Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) über die Wirtschaftskriminellen der “GoMoPa” und Ihre “Partner”

http://www.faz.net/artikel/C30350/wirtschaftskriminalitaet-grossrazzia-wegen-verdachts-auf-insiderhandel-30309286.html

Occupy Wall Street Photos 21 September 2011, Day 5

Occupy Wall Street Photos 21 September 2011, Day 5

Wall and Broad Streets at the New York Stock Exchange Closed[Image][Image]
Liberty Square Camp, 7:20 AM, Mostly Asleep[Image]
Preliminary Schedule for 21 September 2011[Image]
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TOP-SECRET – Colombian Paramilitaries and the United States: “Unraveling the Pepes Tangled Web”

Wanted Poster: Pablo Escobar Gaviria, ca. 1993

Washington, D.C., September 21, 2011 – U.S. espionage operations targeting top Colombian government officials in 1993 provided key evidence linking the U.S.-Colombia task force charged with tracking down fugitive drug lord Pablo Escobar to one of Colombia’s most notorious paramilitary chiefs, according to a new collection of declassified documents published today by the National Security Archive. The affair sparked a special CIA investigation into whether U.S. intelligence was shared with Colombian terrorists and narcotraffickers every bit as dangerous as Escobar himself.

The new documents, released under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, are the most definitive declassified evidence to date linking the U.S. to a Colombian paramilitary group and are the subject of an investigation published today in Colombia’s Semana magazine.

The documents reveal that the U.S.-Colombia Medellin Task Force, known in Spanish as the Bloque de Búsqueda or ‘Search Block,’ was sharing intelligence information with Fidel Castaño, paramilitary leader of Los Pepes (Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar or ‘People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar’), a clandestine terrorist organization that waged a bloody campaign against people and property associated with the reputed narcotics kingpin. One cable describes a key meeting from April 1993 where, according to sensitive US intelligence sources, Colombian National Police director General Miguel Antonio Gómez Padilla said “that he had directed a senior CNP intelligence officer to maintain contact with Fidel Castano, paramilitary leader of Los Pepes, for the purposes of intelligence collection.”

The no-holds-barred search for Escobar began in July 1992 after his escape from a luxury prison where he had been confined since surrendering under a special plea agreement with Colombian authorities. U.S. anti-narcotics strategy in Colombia was intensely focused on Escobar, the legendary Medellín Cartel kingpin who for years had waged a violent campaign of bombings and assassinations against Colombian law enforcement. This gloves-off strategy forged alliances between Colombian intelligence agencies, rival drug traffickers and disaffected former Escobar associates like Castaño, the godfather of a new generation of narcotics-fueled paramilitary forces that still plagues Colombia today.

The new collection also sheds light on the role of U.S. intelligence agencies in Colombia’s conflict—both the close cooperation with Colombian security forces evident in the Task Force as well as the highly-sensitive U.S. intelligence operations that targeted the Colombian government itself. Key information about links between the Task Force and the Pepes was derived from U.S. intelligence sources that closely monitored meetings between the Colombian president and his top security officials.

Several of the documents included in this collection were released as the result of a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act brought by the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), a Washington-based policy group. To support its request, IPS relied on information revealed in Mark Bowden’s 2001 book, Killing Pablo, a work that drew heavily on classified sources and interviews with former U.S. and Colombian officials. Since then, the National Security Archive has been working to assemble a definitive collection of declassified documents on the Pepes episode, precisely because the documents cited by Bowden have yet to see the light of day.

“The collaboration between paramilitaries and government security forces evident in the Pepes episode is a direct precursor of today’s ‘para-political’ scandal,” said Michael Evans, director of the National Security Archive’s Colombia Documentation Project. “The Pepes affair is the archetype for the pattern of collaboration between drug cartels, paramilitary warlords and Colombian security forces that developed over the next decade into one of the most dangerous threats to Colombian security and U.S. anti-narcotics programs. Evidence still concealed within secret U.S. intelligence files forms a critical part of that hidden history.”

“Sensitive PALO Reporting”

The documents include two heavily-censored CIA memos (Documents 25 and 28) describing briefings provided by members of a “Blue Ribbon Panel” of CIA investigators to members of U.S. congressional intelligence committees and the National Security Council. The Panel—which included personnel from the CIA’s directorate for clandestine intelligence operations—had been investigating the possibility that intelligence shared with the Medellín Task Force in 1993 ended up in the hands of Colombian paramilitaries and narcotraffickers from the Pepes. That investigation concluded on December 3, 1993, the day Escobar was killed.

The CIA Panel aimed to compile a complete inventory of all U.S. intelligence information shared with the Task Force that may have been passed to the Pepes. And while the group’s conclusions were not declassified, the briefing led one congressional staffer to comment that it was “one of the most bizarre stories” that he had ever heard, and to question why the CIA had been chosen to look into the matter rather than “some outside element.” Why, in other words, would the CIA be put in charge of an investigation that so directly implicated the Agency itself?

For months, U.S. intelligence had been reporting about Task Force links with the Pepes:

  • The Embassy suspected some level of cooperation between Los Pepes and the Task Force as early as February 1993, when it reported that the Pepes attacks could be the work of “rogue policemen taking advantage of the rash of bombings to give Escobar a taste of his own medicine.” (Document 8)
  • A secret CIA report from March 1993 found that, “Unofficial paramilitary groups with a variety of backgrounds and motives are assisting Bogota’s efforts against both the Medellin druglord Pablo Escobar and radical leftist insurgents. (Document 10)
  • Around the same time, the CIA reported that the Colombian defense minister, Rafael Pardo, was “concerned that the police are providing intelligence to Los Pepes.” In a document titled, “Colombia: Extralegal Steps Against Escobar Possible,” Agency analysts predicted that President Gaviria’s “demand for an intensified effort to capture Escobar may lead some subordinates to rely more heavily on Los Pepes and on extralegal means.” [Emphasis added] (Document 15)

By far the most detailed declassified record on the Pepes affair, the August 1993 Embassy cable, “Unraveling the Pepes Tangled Web,” reveals that the Colombian government was both the recipient of U.S. intelligence information and the target of U.S. intelligence operations. Just as technical and investigative intelligence techniques tracked Escobar’s movements and communications, other agents eavesdropped on the Colombian president’s inner circle.

The most important information in the cable is attributed to “PALO” sources, an acronym that likely refers to the CIA. One indication of this is the fact that the cable—which includes the sensitive “NODIS” designation, limiting its distribution to a highly-select group of addressees—was referred to CIA before declassification.

According to the cable, Colombian prosecutor Gustavo DeGreiff had “new, ‘very good’ evidence linking key members of the police task force in Medellin charged with capturing Pablo Escobar Gaviria (the “Bloque de Busqueda”) to criminal activities and human rights abuses committed by Los Pepes.”

The cable describes a series of meetings from the previous April, including one where, according to “PALO” intelligence sources, Colombian National Police director General Miguel Antonio Gómez Padilla said “that he had directed a senior CNP intelligence officer to maintain contact with Fidel Castano, paramilitary leader of Los Pepes, for the purposes of intelligence collection.”

A few days later, “PALO” reported that Colombian President César Gaviria ordered intelligence cooperation with Los Pepes to cease and told police intelligence commander General Luis Enrique Montenegro Rinco, “to ‘pass the word’ that Los Pepes must be dissolved immediately.” Montenegro, according to the source, “was not a member of Los Pepes, but as commander of police intelligence knew some of the members, and was aware of their activities.”

The very fact that Gaviria chose to deliver his message to Los Pepes through one of his senior police commanders was also significant, according to the Embassy, as an indication that “the president believed police officials were in contact with Los Pepes.”

“Fidel Castano, Super Drug-Thug”

Besides the possible transfer of U.S. intelligence to the Pepes, a big concern among U.S. officials was the possibility that information connecting the Pepes to the Task Force—or an official investigation into the matter—would undermine the anti-Escobar effort and could provide significant leverage to the Cali Cartel in surrender negotiations with the Colombian government.

The Embassy reported in the “Tangled Web” cable that President Gaviria “must deal with the issue in such a way as to remove the offenders, but at the same time, not discredit the police efforts against Escobar.” (Document 20)

If Cali has concrete information of Bloque misdeeds that could embarrass the [Government of Colombia], it could be a powerful tool as they pursue surrender negotiations… The implication of key police officials and perhaps other high-level [Colombian government] officials in these activities, or the fact that high-level officers may be operating in the pay of the Cali cartel, could dramatically improve Cali’s position.

An Embassy post-mortem cable on the Escobar affair, written less than a month after his death, similarly reported that “any substantiation of Cali-police complicity in the activities of Los Pepes would have seriously damaged the Bloque’s credibility in their efforts against Escobar.” (Document 30)

More importantly, U.S. military intelligence doubted that the Gaviria government was sincere about cracking down on Castaño’s gang, questioning whether it made sense to target a group that shared a common enemy: leftist Colombian guerrilla groups. One briefing document prepared by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency in the midst of the Pepes episode concluded that the Colombian government’s willingness to pursue Pepes military chief Castaño “may depend more on how his paramilitary agenda complements Bogota’s counterinsurgent objectives rather than on his drug trafficking activities.” (Document 16)

By May 1994, only five months after the Task Force was dissolved, the State Department’s intelligence branch was calling Fidel Castaño a “super drug-thug” and “one of Colombia’s most ruthless criminals” who “could become a new Escobar.” Castaño, the report read, “is more ferocious than Escobar, has more military capability, and can count on fellow antiguerrillas in the Colombian Army and the Colombian National Police.” It was, State reported, “unlikely that police or military officials would be willing to vigorously search for him if he did, in fact, act as an intermediary to deliver Cali bribes to senior police and military officers.” (Document 32)

The warnings proved to be deadly accurate. While Fidel disappeared in the mid-1990s and is presumed dead, his brother, Carlos Castaño, took over after Fidel’s disappearance, uniting and strengthening Colombia’s paramilitary armies under the banner of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), a ruthless killing machine that vied with guerrilla groups for control of the country’s lurcrative drug trade and which for many years met with little to no resistance from government security forces. A third Castaño brother, Vicente, allegedly murdered his brother Carlos and is said to be leading a new generation of Colombian narco-paramilitary groups.

Concerns that former Pepes would use their knowledge of official corruption to extract concessions from the Colombian government in surrender agreements resontate in the ongoing negotations with demobilized paramilitary leaders under the Justice and Peace law. Unlike the Cali traffickers–many of whom actually were taken down by authorities in the years that followed–Castaño and many of the other paramilitary thugs from Los Pepes largely escaped justice and have gone on to become major drug trafficking and paramilitary bosses in their own right. Former Pepe Diego Fernando “Don Berna” Murillo is currently in custody and seeking a reduced sentence under the law.

Hidden History

Unfortunately, the vast majority of U.S. diplomatic and intelligence reporting on Los Pepes remains classified. A more complete declassified account of the matter—including the conclusions of the CIA investigation—would be of tremendous value both to historians and to ongoing peace and reconciliation efforts in Colombia. Among other things, the release of this material would support the Colombian government’s National Commission on Reparation and Reconciliation (CNRR) in the production of its report on the emergence and evolution of Colombia’s illegal armed groups.

At issue is the exact nature of the relationship between the U.S.-Colombia Task Force and narco-terrorists led by Fidel Castaño, perhaps the most important single figure in the birth of Colombia’s modern paramilitary movement. While it is certain that the Task Force was exchanging information with Castaño and Los Pepes, we do not know how long the Task Force maintained these ties and whether the relationship was sanctioned—either tacitly or explicitly—by U.S. participants in the Task Force, the Embassy, or at a more senior level of the U.S. government.

And while we know about the CIA’s investigation, its conclusions are far from clear. Nor is it at all certain that the “Blue Ribbon Panel,” which issued its findings only days after Escobar was killed, was the final word on the matter. Until the CIA is forced to open its files on the Pepes, we may never fully understand one of the key periods in the history of Colombian paramilitarism.


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U.S. Intelligence and Colombian Narcotics Cartels

Document 1
1992 July 29
ARA Guidances, Wednesday, July 29, 1992 [Colombia: Chasing Escobar]

Department of State cable, Unclassified, 4 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

Department of State press guidance prepared just after Escobar’s escape from confinement indicates that Colombia has the “full support” of the U.S. in the search for Escobar.

Document 2
1992 July 31
Council of State Plans Hearings on Overflights, Gaviria Responds
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 5 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

Challenged over his decision permitting U.S. overflights of Colombian territory, Colombian President César Gaviria says that his order was constitutional and, according to this cable, “that the Colombian police authorities need the technical assistance of the [U.S. government] in order to find Pablo Escobar. Gaviria’s explains that the U.S. C-130 aircraft “carry technical equipment, not armament” and are not “warplanes,” and that his authorization of the overflights without informing the Council of State should thus not trigger any constitutional concerns.

Document 3
1992 August 10

GoC to Begin Hitting Narcs on All Fronts
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 17 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

Shortly after Escobar’s escape from confinement, Colombian Defense Minister Rafael Pardo assured Ambassador Busby that Colombia would “apply pressure on all the narco trafficking fronts” and that he had “ordered acting Armed Forces Commander General Manual Alberto Murillo Gonzalez to develop a plan that fully involved the Army, Navy and Air Force. The heavily-excised document adds that, “Pardo’s enthusiasm and determination to go after the narcos using all of the above tactics fits squarely with our counternarcotics interests in Colombia. We need to be as responsive as possible to the [Colombian government’s] requests for assistance.”

Document 4
1992 August 11

Monthly Status Report – July 1992
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 16 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

A brief Embassy post-mortem on Escobar’s escape during an operation to move him to a conventional prison, calls the affair “an example of the correct strategic decision (to shut Escobar down) executed with unbelievable incompetence,” concluding that corruption was “the determining factor.” The cable reports that the Colombian government “has launched a full-court press to capture Escobar” and that the Embassy was “now looking at longer-range tactics.” Well-publicized U.S. intelligence overflights of Colombia “may have spooked” Escobar, according to the report.

Document 5
1992 September 28

Results of General Joulwan Visit to Colombia
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 16 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

Following the visit to Colombia by General George Joulwan, commander-in-chief of U.S. Southern Command, the Embassy reports that he met with Embassy staff for a discussion focused on “the US/Colombian effort to capture Escobar.” Much of the remainder of this heavily-censored cable concerns the importance of strengthening  both U.S.-Colombia intelligence cooperation and military-police coordination in Colombia.

Document 6
1992 December 04

Colombians to Continue the Fight Through the Holidays
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Secret, 4 pp.
Source: State Department Appeals Review Panel declassification release under FOIA

Colombian government contacts have assured U.S. Embassy staff “that no operational unit commanders are being granted holiday leave” and that, “Police continue planning operations involving interdiction, fumigation, hunt for Pablo Escobar, and visits by senior officers to field operating units.”

Document 7
1993 March 29

Beyond Support Justice IV (SJIV)
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Secret, 12 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

As the hunt for Escobar continues, Embassy reporting reflects its recommendation that the U.S. widen the scope of the counternarcotics effort in Colombia “to include the full array of military support” and going “far beyond” previous levels of assistance. The Embassy contrasts “increasingly successful” intelligence and operational cooperation under the “Support Justice” program with other bilateral policy issues where there is more friction (like trade). Among many other issues, the Embassy lauds the “great strides in tactical capability (which we provided) made in the search for Pablo Escobar.”

Los Pepes

Document 8
1993 February 01

Escobar Family Target of Medellin Bombings
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Secret, 3 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

The Embassy speculates that recent attacks directed against Escobar family members are “almost certainly related, [and] perhaps carried out by[,] members of the Galeano-Moncada organization retaliating for Escobar’s murder of the two former colleagues.” Another possibility is that the attacks were the work of “rogue policemen taking advantage of the rash of bombings to give Escobar a taste of his own medicine.”

Document 9
1993 February 24

[Operation Envigado / Pablo Escobar-Gaviria]
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Limited Official Use, 6 pp.
Source: DEA declassification release under FOIA

The DEA reports on the emergence of a new anti-Escobar group called Colombia Libre (Free Colombia) whose alleged purpose is “to employ and pay informants for information in connection with the whereabouts of Escobar and his cohorts.” The group claims to be non-violent and is said to “cooperate fully with government officials.” The report adds that “the Colombia Libre group does not command a great deal of credibility at this time.”

Document 10
1993 March
“Alliances of Military Convenience,” from Latin American Military Issues, Number 3
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Secret, extract, 2pp.

Source: CIA declassification release under FOIA

A classified CIA periodical on Latin American military issues reports that, “Unofficial paramilitary groups with a variety of backgrounds and motives are assisting Bogota’s efforts against both the Medellin druglord Pablo Escobar and radical leftist insurgents.”

Document 11
1993 April 06

Monthly Status Report – March 1993
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 7 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

This Embassy “summary of significant events” for March 1993 reports that the ebb in terrorist attacks attributed to Escobar’s organization “could be attributed to a combination of the unrelenting pressure exerted by the Colombian security forces and the Pepes (People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar) against Escobar and his associates.” So far in March, “four top lieutenants of Pablo Escobar were killed—two by Colombian security forces and two by the Pepes,” according to the Embassy.

Document 12
1993 April 06

GoC Denies Negotiations in Response to Pepes
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 3 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

In response to allegations advanced by Los Pepes,Colombian officials deny that the government is negotiating the surrender of Pablo Escobar, adding that they “energetically reject any criminal form of fighting crime, as well as all types of private justice which attempt to assume responsibilities which correspond constitutionally to law enforcement authorities and the judiciary.”

Document 13
1993 April 15

GoC Foreign Policy Advisor on Latest Development in the Search for Escobar
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 3 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

In the midst of a series of high-level Colombian government meetings concerning ties between the Medellín Task Force and Los Pepes (see Document 20), the Embassy reports that President Gaviria’s foreign policy advisor, Gabriel Silva, had said in an April 13 meeting “that it was not entirely coincidental that publicity regarding the search for Pablo Escobar had cooled off somewhat in the past few weeks.” Silva told Ambassador Busby “that the GoC had become concerned about the expectations which had been built up concerning the Pablo Escobar Task Force (Bloque de Busqueda) in Medellin in the minds of the public” and that “expectations were running away from reality.”

Interestingly, a subsequent reference to this same meeting from the “Tangled Web” cable (Document 20) reports that Busby had met with Silva that day “to express his strongest reservations” about Los Pepes, indicating that he suspected links between Colombian security forces and the terrorist group. These reservations are not mentioned in the April 15 account of the meeting.

Document 14
1993 April 26

Los Pepes Declare Victory and Call it Quits
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 3 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

Shortly after the mid-April meetings described above (and in greater detail in the “Tangled Web” cable), Los Pepes announced that the group’s “military objective” against Escobar “has been completed in its majority” and that they would dissolve their organization in an effort to “assist the authorities, who in the end will be the ones to bring Pablo Escobar to justice.” The letter further requests that “if military actions against Pablo Escobar and his organization continue in the name of the ‘Pepes,’ that they launch an exhaustive investigation to determine the real perpetrators.”

Commenting, the Embassy says: “The entire Pepes episode has been bizarre at best,” citing “rumors … of government involvement with the Pepes at the local police and military level.” However, discussions with the Colombian government “lead us to believe it rejected the Pepes’ tactics, were [sic] fearful of the implications of the appearance of yet another criminal organization, and were [sic] sincere in their offer of rewards to try to stop the organization.”

The cable concludes with the Embassy’s promise to “offer our own speculation and such information as we have in a separate cable.”

Document 15
Undated, Ca. April 1993

Colombia: Extralegal Steps Against Escobar Possible
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Classification unknown, extract, 3pp.
Source: CIA declassification release under FOIA

A heavily-censored CIA intelligence report finds that Colombian President César Gaviria “is worried that his political leverage and economic program will suffer unless Pablo Escobar is captured soon.” Minster of Defense Rafael Pardo, meanwhile, “is concerned that the police are providing intelligence to Los Pepes, a violent paramilitary group of anti-Escobar traffickers.” The report concludes that while there is “no evidence Gaviria would sanction police support for Los Pepes, his demand for an intensified effort to capture Escobar my lead some subordinates to rely more heavily on Los Pepes and on extralegal means.”

Document 16
Undated, Ca. April 1993
Information Paper on “Los Pepes”
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Secret, 4 pp.
Source: DIA declassification decision under FOIA

This DIA information paper prepared for the FBI provides general background information on Los Pepes, including its origins, composition and activities. The report finds that “Fidel Castano Gil,” identified as “chief of operations” for the Pepes, could pose new and different challenges in a post-Escobar era,” noting that “Castano’s drug trafficking activities provide him the financing necessary to further an anti-left agenda.” DIA concludes that the Colombian government’s willingness to take on Castaño “may depend more on how his paramilitary agenda complements Bogota’s counterinsurgent activities rather than on his drug trafficking activities.”

Document 17
1993 May 07
Text of Escobar’s Latest Letter to the Fiscal
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Limited Official Use, 5 pp.

Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

The Embassy forwards the unreleased text of a letter from Pablo Escobar to the Colombian attorney general, Gustavo De Greiff. Escobar says that the Pepes have not disbanded and that “it is simply a stratagem” to “get the government to stop running its little television reward offer” for information on the Pepes. Escobar blames Fidel Castaño, the Cali cartel, and others for his problems and suggests that he could never get justice in Colombia’s corrupt judicial system.

Document 18
1993 June 08
Los Pepes Deny Involvement in Anti-Escobar Terrorism
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Classification unknown, 2 pp.

Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

After the Pepes issued a communiqué denying responsibility for continuing attacks against Escobar associates, the Embassy comments that the Pepes likely are still involved in anti-Escobar terrorism “but publicly deny this in order to avoid [Colombian govnerment] persecution.”

Document 19
1993 July 08
Family Diaspora: Tracking Down the Escobars
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 5 pp.

Source: State Department Appeals Review Panel declassification release under FOIA

By July 1993, the Medellín Task Force and Los Pepes had Escobar on the run, and his family had spread out across the globe, as reported in this cable. The Embassy speculates that one reason for this might be that, “Pablo and his brother Roberto are trying to protect family members from reprisals similar to those the anti-Escobar group ‘Los Pepes’ conducted” earlier in 1993.

Document 20
1993 August 06

Unraveling the Pepes Tangled Web
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Secret/NODIS, 10 pp.
Source: State Department Appeals Review Panel declassification release under FOIA
[NOTE: Portions of this document released on appeal appear with white letters on black background and can be difficult to read.]

By far the most detailed declassified record on the Pepes affair, this August 1993 Embassy cable reveals that the Colombian government was both the recipient of U.S. intelligence information and the target of U.S. intelligence operations. Just as technical and investigative intelligence techniques tracked Escobar’s movements and communications, other agents eavesdropped on the Colombian president’s inner circle.

The most important information in the cable is attributed to “PALO” sources, an acronym that probably refers to the CIA. One indication of this is the fact that the cable—which includes the sensitive “NODIS” designation, limiting its distribution to a highly-select group of addressees—was referred to CIA before declassification.

According to the cable, Colombian prosecutor Gustavo DeGreiff had “new, ‘very good’ evidence linking key members of the police task force in Medellin charged with capturing Pablo Escobar Gaviria (the “Bloque de Busqueda”) to criminal activities and human rights abuses committed by Los Pepes.”

The cable describes a series of meetings from the previous April, including one where, according to “PALO” intelligence sources, Colombian National Police director General Miguel Antonio Gómez Padilla said “that he had directed a senior CNP intelligence officer to maintain contact with Fidel Castano, paramilitary leader of Los Pepes, for the purposes of intelligence collection.”

A few days later, “PALO” reported that Colombian President César Gaviria ordered intelligence cooperation with Los Pepes to cease and told police intelligence commander General Luis Enrique Montenegro Rinco, “to ‘pass the word’ that Los Pepes must be dissolved immediately.” Montenegro, according to the source, “was not a member of Los Pepes, but as commander of police intelligence knew some of the members, and was aware of their activities.”

The very fact that Gaviria chose to deliver his message to Los Pepes through one of his senior police commanders was also significant, according to the Embassy, as an indication that “the president believed police officials were in contact with Los Pepes.”

The Embassy concludes that President Gaviria “must deal with the issue in such a way as to remove the offenders, but at the same time, not discredit the police efforts against Escobar.” Incriminating information about the Task Force known by the Cali Cartel “could be a powerful tool as they pursue surrender negotiations,” according to the cable, and “the implication of key police officials and perhaps other high-level [Colombian government] officials in these activities, or the fact that high-level officers may be operating in the pay of the Cali cartel, could dramatically improve Cali’s position.”

Document 21
1993 October 26
The Hunt for Escobar: Next Steps
U.S. State Department cable, Secret/NODIS, 2 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

In another highly-sensitve “NODIS” cable, the State Department, in a message meant exclusively for Ambassador Morris Busby or his deputy, requests a “detailed analysis” of certain U.S. support operations in Colombia connected to the “hunt for Pablo Escobar.” The analysis is to focus on the contribution of each support element and also “put into perspective the evolution of our participation and the Colombian effort.”

Noting with concern allegations of “human rights abuses” connected to the Escobar Task Force, the State Department also instructs the Embassy to press President Gaviria for the “immediate removal from duty” of a member of the Task Force “pending resolution of the investigation into the charges against him.” The cable references the August 6, 1993, “Tangled Web” cable, indicating that the issues discussed in that message–including specific information tying the U.S.-Colombia Task Force and the Colombian National Police to the Pepes–was probably the source of the State Department’s concern.

Document 22
1993 October 27
The Hunt for Escobar: Next Steps
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Secret/NODIS, 2 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

Resonding to the State Department’s cable of October 26 (Document 21), Ambassador Busby says that the so-called “debate” about the future of U.S. “hunt for Pablo Escobar” operations “frankly mystifies” the Embassy. Busby notes that a “complete review of our intelligence and operations traffic so far reveals nothing extraordinary” and that nothing had changed over the last two-and-a-half months “which would prompt such a ‘debate.'” Busby adds that the Embassy “would very much appreciate the Department articulating to us the origin and substance of this debate.”

Document 23
1993 December 06

Colombian Law Enforcement Action Against Pablo Escobar
U.S. Department of State cable, Unclassified, 1 p.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

Acting Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff sends a congratulatory cable to Ambassador Busby, commending his “success in coordinating the many U.S. government agencies which worked with the Colombian government for more than seventeen months to end Pablo Escobar’s ability to evade Colombian law.” Tarnoff wants to maintain momentum as they continue “efforts to strengthen Colombia’s ability to arrest, prosecute and imprison cartel kingpins.”

The Aftermath: Colombia After Escobar

Document 24
1993 November

The Illicit Drug Situation in Colombia
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Drug Intelligence Report, Classification unknown, 67 pp.
Source: DEA declassification release under FOIA

This is an unclassified DEA overview of the illegal narcotics industry in Colombia.

Document 25
1993 December 06

Briefing of NSC and SSCI on “Los Pepes” Affair
Central Intelligence Agency memorandum for the record, Secret, 3 pp.
Source: CIA declassification release under FOIA

In two separate briefings, members of the CIA’s “Blue Ribbon Panel” on the Pepes matter—including officials from the Directorate of Operations and the chief of the CIA’s independent investigations unit—brief the National Security Council and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staffers just days after Escobar is killed. Assembled in early November, the Panel was to look at whether U.S. intelligence information provided to the anti-Escobar Task Force was shared with members of the Pepes terror group, which was by then known to have connections to senior Colombian police officials leading the Task Force. The Panel told the NSC that the “Embassy Joint Task Force” on Escobar “maintained no record of information passed to the Colombians,” but that another source, excised from the declassified memo on the briefing, “kept a log of all information passed to the Colombians,” that the Panel was trying to obtain. The SSCI staff received a shorter briefing, asked no questions, and was not told about the existence of a separate log.

A separate memo reports the briefing given by the Panel to members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (see Document 28)

Document 26
1993 December 17

President Gaviria Threatened by Escobar Associates
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Secret, 4 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

A ‘Secret’ cable from the Embassy reports that President Gaviria had received a letter from Escobar’s group “The Extraditables” threatening to assassinate the president. Commenting, the Embassy says that “the threat from the Escobar organization is being interpreted as a retaliation against the government not only for the death of Escobar, but also for the favoritism the [Government of Colombia] is showing towards the Cali cartel.”

Document 27
1993 December 20

New National Police Chief Appointed
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 3 pp.
Source: State Department Appeals Review Panel declassification release under FOIA

Longtime Colombian National Police director General Miguel Antonio Gomez Padilla has resigned and will be replaced by General Octavio Vargas Silva, the man “who headed the successful anti-Escobar task force.” A portion of the cable redacted upon first review but later released by the State Department’s Appeals Review Panel says that Gomez “was especially disturbed over the influence of the Cali cartel in numerous levels of government” and that he “had simply had enough of the situation.” The career of General Vargas, the Embassy adds, has been tainted by “press reports which attributed part of his success in hunting Escobar to assistance by Cali traffickers.”

Document 28
1993 December 27

Briefing for HPSCI Staff on Results of “Los Pepes” Panel and on Death of Pablo Escobar
Central Intelligence Agency memorandum for the record, Secret, 6 pp.
Source: CIA declassification release under FOIA

In a briefing similar to those reported in Document 25, the CIA’s “Blue Ribbon Panel” on the Pepes affair met with staffers from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on December 6.

Attached to a memo about the meeting is a heavily-redacted copy of a paper on the “findings and conclusions” of the Panel. Also attached is a “background” paper on the Panel itself. The Panel “met full time from 8 November through 3 December 1993” and produced “daily ‘fact sheets’ for the [Executive Director] beginning on 15 November” as well as a “final Panel report” that “integrates these fact sheets.”

After the briefing, HPSCI staffer Dick Giza called the issue “one of the most bizarre stories” he’d ever heard of, “both in how it arose and how it was investigated,” asking why the investigation had not been assigned to an “outside element” like the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).

Document 29
1994 January 04

Secret Witness Linked to Villa Alzate Missing
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 4 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

A news item on the disappearance of a former member of the anti-Escobar Task Force and secret paid witness of the attorney general’s office catches the Embassy’s attention. Ex-police agent Jaime Rincon Lezama (“Fernando”) disappeared in May 1993 and had been allegedly providing prosecutors with “information on the identities and activities of Los Pepes within the Bloque [Task Force].” Rincon reportedly worked for the former delegate attorney general for judicial police affairs, Guillermo Villa Alzate, who has been linked to the Cali cartel and “whose exact whereabouts remain unclear.” Despite Villa’s ties to the cartel, the Embassy comments that “it would be premature to discount altogether unofficial police participation in his disappearance considering that Fernando supposedly fingered over 10 of his former colleagues as operatives of Los Pepes.”

Document 30
1994 January 07

Villa Alzate Speaks: Denies Any Connection with Disappearance of Secret Witness
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 5 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

Former delegate attorney general for judicial police affairs and alleged Cali cartel conspirator Guillermo Villa Alzate reemerges to defend himself following accusations (detailed above) that he is connected to the disappearance of a former police official who had been providing him information on the Task Force’s connections to Los Pepes. The Embassy notes that the development “once again raises questions as to the extent of possible Cali cartel influence,” adding that “it is also clear that any substantiation of Cali-police complicity in the activities of Los Pepes would have seriously damaged the Bloque’s credibility in their efforts against Escobar.”

Document 31
1994 February 11

Presidential Contender Samper and Ambassador Discuss Narcotics, Political, and Economic Issues
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 9 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

Amidst a discussion about the death of Pablo Escobar, Colombian presidential candidate and later president Ernesto Samper tells U.S. Ambassador Myles Frechette that the Cali cartel “is worse” than Escobar “because its level of sophistication has permitted it to penetrate Colombian society at virtually all levels.” However, Samper says that “the door should be kept open for those who wish to exercise the option to use legal procedures” to dismantle the Cali cartel. Ambassador Frechette doubts that the Cali capos would hold up their end of the bargain, observing that “the cartel’s armed branch, the ‘Pepes’ was capable of assassinations and violent crime.” Samper campaign finance director and ex-justice minister Monica DeGreiff replies that “her sources within the cartel had warned her that the deal would greatly reduce the possibility of violence from ‘difficult to control cartel elements.'”

Document 32
1994 May 26
Profile of Fidel Castano, Super Drug-Thug
Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Assessment, Secret, 3 pp.

Source: State Department Appeals Review Panel declassification release under FOIA

This State Department intelligence profile of Fidel Castano says that the former Escobar strongman was “a principal leader of Los Pepes, which provided officials with information on the whereabouts of Escobar and attacked supporters and properties of Escobar.” Castano “reportedly acted as an intermediary between the Cali cartel and the Escobar search force.” The Pepes were “financially backed by the Cali cartel” and “reportedly had the tacit support of some senior Colombian police officials,” according to the report. The report details the Castano family’s long history of involvement in violent narcotrafficking and anti-guerrilla activities. According to the report, Castano is “more ferocious than Escobar, has more military capability, and can count on fellow antiguerrillas in the Colombian Army and the Colombian National Police.” The report says that Castano “hopes his work with Los Pepes will earn him judicial leniency,” adding that “it is unlikely that police or military officials would be willing to vigorously search for him if he did, in fact, act as an intermediary to deliver Cali bribes to senior police and military officers.”

Document 33
1994 June 30

Delivery of Demarche to President Gaviria
U.S. Department of State cable, Secret, 5 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

A toughly-worded diplomatic note to Colombian president-elect Ernesto Samper makes clear that the State Department expects results from the new administration, which has been tainted by a narcotics scandal. The State Department says that it is “deeply troubled by the information pointing to the influence of drug trafficking organizations” in Samper’s presidential campaign,” which create the impression “that drug traffickers have used intimidation and financial power to purchase influence in your administration.” The State Department also reminds the Embassy that “our bilateral relationship will be predicated on Samper taking a tough counternarcotics stance.”

Document 34
1994 September 07

GoC Overhauls Police Leadership
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 7 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

Colonel Hugo Martinez, commander of the “Search Bloc” that hunted down Pablo Escobar in 1993, is named director of the National Judicial Police (DIJIN) a special police intelligence organization. The Embassy notes that Martinez, “as head of the unit,” was “responsible for directing the actions of the Bloque,” which, according to the Colombian attorney general, had “a high incidence of human rights complaints” and about which there were “allegations that the Bloque (and Martinez) was closely tied with “Los Pepes” (a group committed to killing Pablo Escobar) because of their common goal.”

Document 35
1997 January 17

Police General Montenegro to Head DAS
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 3 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

In January 1997, Colombian National Police commander General Rosso Jose Serrano named Gen. Luis Enrique Montenegro Rinco, the former police intelligence commander, as the new director of the Administrative Security Department (DAS – similar to U.S. FBI). As police intelligence chief, Montenegro had been a key informational link between the Medellín Task Force and Los Pepes.

Document 36
2003 October 03

Medellin Snapshot
U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, Confidential, 3 pp.
Source: State Department declassification release under FOIA

This 2003 ‘snapshot’ of Medellín reports that unidentified individuals had told the Embassy that, “elements of the army” were supportive of paramilitaries from the Nutibara Block, “composed of former leaders of the ultra-violent ‘Pepes’ group that played a key role in bringing down drug kingpin Pablo Escobar.”

TOP-SECRET – SOUTHERN CONE RENDITION PROGRAM: PERU’S PARTICIPATION

Former Peruvian President General Enrique Morales Bermudez (left) and and his Army chief Pedro Richter Prada (right) are among 140 South American military officers indicted in the investigation.
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 244

Washington, D.C., September 21, 2011 – Declassified U.S. documents posted today on the Web by the National Security Archive (www.nsarchive.org) show that the U.S. government had detailed knowledge of collaboration between the Peruvian, Bolivian and Argentine secret police forces to kidnap, torture and “permanently disappear” three militants in a Cold War rendition operation in Lima in June 1980—but took insufficient action to save the victims.

The Archive’s documents are part of a sweeping Italian investigation of Condor that has issued arrest warrants for 140 former top officials from seven South American countries and, in the words of today’s New York Times, has “agitated political establishments up and down the continent.”

The documents address what has become known as “the case of the missing Montoneros,” a covert operation by a death squad unit of Argentina’s feared Battalion 601 to kidnap three members of a militant group living in Lima, Peru, on June 12, 1980, and render them through Bolivia back to Argentina. (A fourth member, previously captured, was brought to Lima to identify his colleagues and then disappeared with them.) “The present situation is that the four Argentines will be held in Peru and then expelled to Bolivia where they will be expelled to Argentina,” a U.S. official reported from Buenos Aires four days after Esther Gianetti de Molfino, María Inés Raverta and Julio César Ramírez were kidnapped in broad daylight in downtown Lima. “Once in Argentina they will be interrogated and then permanently disappeared.”

The case was first detailed at length in The Condor Years, a book by National Security Archive board member John Dinges. In his own book, The Pinochet File, Archive senior analyst Peter Kornbluh identified the Montonero operation as “one of the last recorded cases of a Condor operation.” Condor was founded in November 1975, in Santiago, Chile, by the Pinochet regime, which became known as “Condor One.” Operation Condor became infamous for terrorist activities after Chilean agents, in collaboration with Paraguay, planted a bomb under the car of former ambassador Orlando Letelier in September 1976, killing him and his colleague, Ronni Moffitt, in Washington D.C.

Peru’s former military ruler, General Enrique Morales Bermudez, has admitted authorizing the Montonero kidnappings but continues to deny that Peru was a member of Operation Condor. But a secret CIA report, dated August 22, 1978, and titled “A Brief Look at Operation Condor” described Condor as “a cooperative effort by intelligence/security services in several South American countries to combat terrorism and subversion. The original members included services from Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil and Bolivia. Peru and Ecuador recently became members.” (Emphasis added) A Chilean intelligence document confirms that Peru formally joined Operation Condor in March 1978.

A State Department cable dated several weeks after the kidnapping stated that “there seems to be little doubt that the Peruvian army, acting in concert with its Argentine counterpart, resorted to the kinds of illegal repressive measures more familiar in the Southern Cone” than Peru.

Italy’s indictments include General Morales Bermudez and his military deputy Pedro Richter Prada, among 138 other military officers from Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay who were involved in the kidnapping, torture and disappearances of 25 Latin Americans who had dual Italian citizenship. The indictments, in a 250-page court filing by Italian judge Luisianna Figliolia last December, come after a six-year investigation by investigative magistrate Giancarlo Capaldo, who drew on hundreds of declassified documents provided by the National Security Archive’s Southern Cone project. “These documents provide hard evidence of Condor crimes,” according to project director Carlos Osorio, “that almost 30 years later still demand the resolution of justice.”

The New York Times story, “Italy Follows Trail of Secret South American Abductions,” noted that the Italian effort at universal jurisdiction “deals not only with individual cases involving Italian citizens but also with the broader responsibilities of Condor’s cross-border kidnapping and torture operations.” The story also suggested that Condor’s allied effort to track down, kidnap, and secretly transport targets to third countries, according to historians, was “reminiscent of the United States’ modern terrorist rendition program.”

The Archive’s Peter Kornbluh noted “sinister similarities between Condor and the current U.S. rendition, enhanced interrogation, and black site detention operations.”


Read the Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.

Document 1: CIA, Secret report, “A Brief Look at Operation Condor,” August 22, 1978.

In August 1978, the CIA prepared a short briefing paper for Department of Justice lawyers who were investigating the September 21, 1976, assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt in Washington D.C.  The report identifies the members of Condor, including Peru. The report also identifies Condor’s use of “executive action”—assassination—against specific targets outside the territory of member nations.

Document 2: State Department, memo, “Meeting with Argentine Intelligence Service, June 19, 1980.

Four days after the Montoneros were seized in a public park in Lima, the Regional Security Officer in Buenos Aires, James Blystone, met with a high-level source in Argentina’s intelligence service. Blystone reports to U.S. Ambassador Raul H. Castro in this memo that the source has told him: “The present situation is that the four Argentines will be held in Peru and then expelled to Bolivia where they will be expelled to Argentina. Once in Argentina they will be interrogated and then permanently disappeared.” The three seized Argentines are Esther Gianetti de Molfino, who was a member of “Madres del Plaza de Mayo,” María Inés Raverta and Julio César Ramírez. A fourth Argentine, Federico Frias Alberga, had been previously captured and taken to Lima by Argentine agents to identify his colleagues. He then disappeared along with them. This document was discovered by Long Island University professor J. Patrice McSherry, who provided it to Newsweek Magazine several years ago.

Document 3: State Department, cable, “Argentine Involvement in Lima Kidnappings,” June 19, 1980.

The U.S. Ambassador to Buenos Aires, Raul H. Castro, cables the State Department with some of the information Blystone had learned. The cable states that the rendition operation “hit a snag” because it became public, and that Battalion 601 agents had decided to take the Montoneros to a third country, Bolivia.

Document 4: State Department, INR Report, Argentina-Peru: Attempted Repatriation of Montoneros Apparently Foiled,” June 25, 1980.

The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research attempts to analyze the covert rendition operation run by Argentina in Peru. The report concludes that “this incident is not unique. In recent years, there have been several similar cases that attest to the high degree of cooperation among intelligence and security agencies of the southern South American countries and to their tendency to resort to illegal means of treating suspected subversives.”

Document 5: State Department, Cable, “Montoneros: Amnesty International Reportedly Claims 3 Killed in Peru; Foreign Minister Comments Further, July 3, 1980. 

In this nearly illegible cable, the U.S. Embassy analyzes the uproar in Peru over new allegations made by Amnesty International on the fate of the three Montoneros. On page 3, the cable notes that the situation is “very clearly” a serious matter but that the details are still “obscured.” But Embassy analysts conclude that “there seems to be little doubt that the Peruvian army, acting in concert with its Argentine counterpart, resorted to the kinds of illegal repressive measures more familiar in the Southern Cone than here.”

Document 6: State Department, Cable, “The Case of the Missing Montoneros,” July 11, 1980.

In a cable from Lima, U.S. Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman reports on his conversation with Prime Minister Richter Prada about the missing Montoneros. Richter claims that the three Argentines were “legally expelled and delivered to a Bolivian immigration official in accordance with long-standing practice.” Shlaudeman concludes that two other Montoneros who Richter says are fugitives are probably “permanent disappearances.”

Document 7: State Department, Cable, “Purported Discovery of Missing Montonero,” August 4, 1980.

The body of one of those seized in Peru, Esther Gianetti de Molfino, is discovered in an apartment in Madrid. The apartment is supposedly rented by another of the kidnapped Montoneros. The elaborate effort by Battalion 601 to cover up their disappearances by making her body reappear in Spain is reminiscent of Operation Colombo, when disfigured bodies appeared on the streets of Buenos Aires with identification cards of missing Chilean political figures. (Medical examinations proved that the bodies were not those individuals.) The Argentine Foreign Ministry used the discovery of de Molfino’s corpse to denounce the “falseness of the campaign against Argentina and Peru” over the missing Montoneros, according to the cable.

Document 8: State Department, Memo, “Hypothesis—The GOA as Prisoner of Army Intelligence,” August 18, 1980.

A political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, Townsend Friedman, offers a strange assessment of the implications of the Montonero case on the equations of power in the Argentine military regime. “Disappearance is 601 work,” he writes. Due to the embarrassment factor, he suggests, “Anyone with an ounce of political sense in the GOA would have aborted, if he had been able, these operations.” Rather than obvious collaborators, Friedman concludes that General Videla and the Junta are “victims” of Battalion 601 and the secret police.

Document 9: State Department, Memo, “The Case of the Missing Montoneros,” August 19, 1980.

In another memo to the Embassy Charge, Townsend Friedman provides a short chronology and reevaluation of the Montonero case. He focuses on what he calls “the intimate relationship” between Argentina’s and Bolivia’s intelligence services. He cites a July communication between Prime Minister Richter and Argentine Army Commander, Galtieri, who tells Richter that there could be “an interesting development” in the case. That development turns out to be the discovery of the corpse of Esther Gianetti de Molfino in an apartment in Madrid, clearly planted there by agents of Battalion 601 to suggest that the Montoneros had not been kidnapped after all.

Document 10: State Department, Memo, “Conversation with Argentine Intelligence Source,” April 7, 1980.

The interest of Italian judge Giancarlo Capaldo in the case of the Montoneros derives from his belief that it is connected to other Condor operations that took the lives of Italian-Argentines, among them the case of the disappearance of Horacio Campiglia who was abducted in March 1980 in Rio de Janiero by Argentine agents collaborating with Brazil’s intelligence service. This report from Regional Security Officer James Blystone provides perhaps the most comprehensive detail on joint secret police collaboration to track down, abduct and render targeted victims in the Southern Cone. Blystone reports on the communications, travel, and even type of plane used in this rendition operation, and on the steps taken to provide a cover up of the plot.

Contents of this website Copyright 1995-2008 National Security Archive. All rights reser

DIE FINANCIAL TIMES und die seriöse Presse über die erfundenen “Goldman, Morgenstern und Partner” alias “GoMoPa”

http://www.victims-opfer.com/?page_id=11764

TOP-SECRET – Spy Jules Kroll Bond Gets Favor

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 182 (Tuesday, September 20, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58319-58321]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-24028]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-65339]

 Order Granting Temporary Exemption of Kroll Bond Rating Agency,
Inc. From the Conflict of Interest Prohibition in Rule 17g-5(c)(1) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

September 14, 2011.

I. Introduction

    Rule 17g-5(c)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (``Exchange
Act'') prohibits a nationally recognized statistical rating
organization (``NRSRO'') from issuing or maintaining a credit rating
solicited by a person that, in the most recently ended fiscal year,
provided the NRSRO with net revenue equaling or exceeding 10% of the
total net revenue of the NRSRO for the fiscal year. In adopting this
rule, the Commission stated that such a person would be in a position
to exercise substantial influence on the NRSRO, which in turn would
make it difficult for the NRSRO to remain impartial.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Release No. 34-55857 (June 5, 2007), 72 FR 33564, 33598
(June 18, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Application and Exemption Request of Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc.

    Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc. (``Kroll''), f/k/a LACE Financial
Corp. (``LACE''), is a credit rating agency registered with the
Commission as an NRSRO under Section 15E of the Exchange Act for the
classes of credit ratings described in clauses (i) through (v) of
Section 3(a)(62)(B) of the Exchange Act. Kroll traditionally has
operated mainly under the ``subscriber-paid'' business model, in which
the NRSRO derives its revenue from restricting access to its ratings to
paid

[[Page 58320]]

subscribers. Kroll has informed the Commission that it intends to
expand its existing NRSRO business by establishing a new ``issuer-
paid'' rating service under which it will issue ratings paid for by the
issuer, underwriter, or sponsor of the security being rated. In
connection with this planned expansion, Kroll has requested a temporary
and limited exemption from Rule 17g-5(c)(1) on the grounds that the
restrictions imposed by Rule 17g-5(c)(1) would pose a substantial
constraint on the firm's ability to compete effectively with large
rating agencies offering comparable ratings services. Specifically,
Kroll argues that given that the fees typically associated with issuer-
paid engagements tend to be relatively high when compared to the fees
associated with its existing subscriber-based business, it is possible
that in the early stages of its expansion the fees associated with a
single issuer-paid engagement could exceed ten percent of its total net
revenue for the fiscal year. Accordingly, Kroll has requested that the
Commission grant it an exemption from Rule 17g-5(c)(1) for any revenues
derived from non-subscription based business during the remainder of
calendar years 2011 and 2012, which are also the end of Kroll's 2011
and 2012 fiscal years, respectively.

III. Discussion

    The Commission, when adopting Rule 17g-5(c)(1), noted that it
intended to monitor how the prohibition operates in practice,
particularly with respect to asset-backed securities, and whether
exemptions may be appropriate.\2\ The Commission has previously granted
two temporary exemptions from Rule 17g-5(c)(1), including one on
February 11, 2008 to LACE, as Kroll was formerly known, in connection
with its initial registration as an NRSRO (``LACE Exemptive
Order'').\3\ The Commission noted several factors in granting that
exemption, including the fact that the revenue in question was earned
prior to the adoption of the rule, the likelihood of smaller firms such
as LACE being more likely to be affected by the rule, LACE's
expectation that the percentage of total revenue provided by the
relevant client would decrease, and the increased competition in the
asset-backed securities class that could result from LACE's
registration. In granting the LACE Exemptive Order, the Commission also
noted that an exemption would further the primary purpose of the Credit
Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (``Rating Agency Act'') as set forth
in the Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs accompanying the Rating Agency Act: To ``improve ratings
quality for the protection of investors and in the public interest by
fostering accountability, transparency, and competition in the credit
rating industry.'' \4\ On June 23, 2008, the Commission, citing the
same factors set forth in the LACE Exemptive Order, issued a similar
order granting Realpoint LLC a temporary exemption from the
requirements of Rule 17g-5(c)(1) in connection with Realpoint LLC's
registration as an NRSRO.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Release No. 34-55857 (June 5, 2007), 72 FR 33564, 33598
(June 18, 2007).
    \3\ Release No. 34-57301 (February 11, 2008), 73 FR 8720
(February 14, 2008).
    \4\ See Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs to Accompany S. 3850, Credit Rating Agency Reform Act
of 2006, S. Report No. 109-326, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 6,
2006).
    \5\ Release No. 34-58001 (June 23, 2008), 73 FR 36362 (June 26,
2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On September 2, 2010, the Commission issued an Order Instituting
Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings (``LACE/Putnam Order'')
against LACE and Barron Putnam, LACE's founder as well as its majority
owner during the relevant time period. The LACE/Putnam Order found,
among other things, that the firm made misrepresentations in its
application to become registered as an NRSRO and its accompanying
request for an exemption from Rule 17g-5(c)(1). Specifically, the
Commission found that the firm materially misstated the amount of
revenue it received from its largest customer during 2007.\6\ On
November 9, 2010, the Commission issued an Order Making Findings and
Imposing A Cease-and-Desist Order (the ``Mouzon Order'') against LACE's
former president, Damyon Mouzon. The Mouzon Order found, among other
things, that as LACE's president, Mouzon was responsible for ensuring
the accuracy of the information provided to the Commission in
connection with the firm's NRSRO application and its request for an
exemption, and that he knew or should have known that the financial
information that LACE provided to the Commission in connection with its
NRSRO application and its request for an exemption from Rule 17g-
5(c)(1) was inaccurate.\7\ LACE, Putnam and Mouzon each consented to
the entry of those orders on a neither admit nor deny basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ In the Matter of LACE Financial Corp. and Barron Putnam,
Respondents: Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist
Proceedings, Pursuant to Sections 15E(d) and 21C of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial
Sanctions and Cease-and-Desist Orders, Release No. 62834 (September
2, 2010).
    \7\ In the Matter of Damyon Mouzon, Respondent: Order Making
Findings and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order Pursuant to Section
21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 63280
(November 9, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the request that is subject to this Order, Kroll acknowledged
the recent orders against LACE and its former owner and president and
stated that it has taken significant steps to enhance the compliance
and other functions associated with the traditional subscriber-based
business, including replacing senior management, retaining new
compliance and financial personnel, and adding new independent
directors comprising a majority of the board. Kroll has informed
Commission staff that LACE's former ownership and management personnel
no longer have any ownership or other relationship, financial or
otherwise, with Kroll. Kroll has further informed Commission staff that
LACE ceased performing any work or analysis in connection with the
issuer-paid ratings that were the subject of the LACE Exemptive Order
in December 2008.
    The Commission believes that a temporary, limited and conditional
exemption allowing Kroll to enter the market for rating structured
finance products is consistent with the Commission's goal of improving
ratings quality for the protection of investors and in the public
interest by fostering accountability, transparency, and competition in
the credit rating industry. In order to maintain this exemption, Kroll
will be required to publicly disclose in Exhibit 6 to Form NRSRO, as
applicable, that the firm received more than 10% of its net revenue in
fiscal years 2011 and 2012 from a client or clients that paid it to
rate asset-backed securities. This disclosure is designed to alert
users of credit ratings to the existence of this specific conflict and
is consistent with exemptive relief the Commission has previously
granted to LACE and Realpoint LLC. Furthermore, in addition to Kroll's
existing obligations as an NRSRO to maintain policies, procedures, and
internal controls, by the terms of this order, Kroll will also be
required to maintain policies, procedures, and internal controls
specifically designed to address the conflict created by exceeding the
10% threshold. Finally, the Commission notes that Kroll is subject to
the September 2, 2010 Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-
Desist Proceedings against LACE Financial Corp.
    Section 15E(p) of the Exchange Act, as added by Section 932(a)(8)
of the Dodd-

[[Page 58321]]

Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, requires
Commission staff to conduct an examination of each NRSRO at least
annually. As part of this annual examination regimen for NRSROs,
Commission staff will closely review Kroll's activities with respect to
managing this conflict and meeting the conditions set forth below and
will consider whether to recommend that the Commission take additional
action, including administrative or other action.
    The Commission therefore finds that a temporary, limited and
conditional exemption allowing Kroll to enter the market for rating
structured finance products is consistent with the Commission's goal,
as established by the Rating Agency Act, of improving ratings quality
by fostering accountability, transparency, and competition in the
credit rating industry, subject to Kroll's making public disclosure of
the conflict created by exceeding the 10% threshold and maintaining
policies, procedures and internal controls to address that conflict, is
necessary and appropriate in the public interest and is consistent with
the protection of investors.

IV. Conclusion

    Accordingly, pursuant to Section 36 of the Exchange Act,
    It is hereby ordered that Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc., formerly
known as LACE Financial Corp., is exempt from the conflict of interest
prohibition in Exchange Act Rule 17g-5(c)(1) until January 1, 2013,
with respect to any revenue derived from issuer-paid ratings, provided
that: (1) Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc. publicly discloses in Exhibit
6 to Form NRSRO, as applicable, that the firm received more than 10% of
its total net revenue in fiscal year 2011 or 2012 from a client or
clients; and (2) in addition to fulfilling its existing obligations as
an NRSRO to maintain policies, procedures, and internal controls, Kroll
Bond Rating Agency, Inc. also maintains policies, procedures, and
internal controls specifically designed to address the conflict created
by exceeding the 10% threshold.

    By the Commission.
Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2011-24028 Filed 9-19-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P

Die “GoMoPa” – Wirecard Lüge

http://www.usag24-betrug.com/index.php/gomopas-wirecard-behauptungen-zweifelhaft-schuett-hat-keinerlei-behauptungen-zu-wirecard-gemacht/

Unveiled – Occupy Wall Street Photos 19 September 2011

Occupy Wall Street Photos 19 September 2011

Wall Street at the New York Stock Exchange Closed[Image]
Wall Street Pedestrian Traffic Corraled by Barriers[Image][Image]
Wall Street Area Financial Buildings Looming over Liberty Camp (aka Zuccotti Park)[Image]
Camp Speakers Corner[Image]
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Bystanders Observing the Speakers[Image]
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Main Camp Pizza Supplier[Image]
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Federal Reserve Bank of New York Ostensible Regulator of Wall Street Banks, One Block From Liberty Camp[Image]

TOP-SECRET – NEW KISSINGER ‘TELCONS’ REVEAL CHILE PLOTTING AT HIGHEST LEVELS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT

NEW KISSINGER ‘TELCONS’ REVEAL CHILE PLOTTING
AT HIGHEST LEVELS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT

Nixon Vetoed Proposed Coexistence with an Allende Government
Kissinger to the CIA: “We will not let Chile go down the drain.”

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 255

Washington D.C., September 19, 2011 – On the eve of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the military coup in Chile, the National Security Archive today published for the first time formerly secret transcripts of Henry Kissinger’s telephone conversations that set in motion a massive U.S. effort to overthrow the newly-elected socialist government of Salvador Allende. “We will not let Chile go down the drain,” Kissinger told CIA director Richard Helms in one phone call. “I am with you,” the September 12, 1970 transcript records Helms responding.

The telephone call transcripts—known as ‘telcons’—include previously-unreported conversations between Kissinger and President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers.  Just eight days after Allende’s election, Kissinger informed the president that the State Department had recommended an approach to “see what we can work out [with Allende].”   Nixon responded by instructing Kissinger: “Don’t let them do it.

After Nixon spoke directly to Rogers, Kissinger recorded a conversation in which the Secretary of State agreed that “we ought, as you say, to cold-bloodedly decide what to do and then do it,” but warned it should be done “discreetly so that it doesn’t backfire.” Secretary Rogers predicted that “after all we have said about elections, if the first time a Communist wins the U.S. tries to prevent the constitutional process from coming into play we will look very bad.”

The telcons also reveal that just nine weeks before the Chilean military, led by Gen. Augusto Pinochet and supported by the CIA, overthrew the Allende government on September 11, 1973, Nixon called Kissinger on July 4 to say “I think that Chilean guy might have some problems.” “Yes, I think he’s definitely in difficulties,” Kissinger responded. Nixon then blamed CIA director Helms and former U.S. Ambassador Edward Korry for failing to block Allende’s inauguration three years earlier. “They screwed it up,” the President declared.

Although Kissinger never intended the public to know about these conversations, observed Peter Kornbluh, who directs the National Security Archive’s Chile Documentation Project, he “bestowed on history a gift that keeps on giving by secretly taping and transcribing his phone calls.”  The transcripts, Kornbluh noted, provide historians with the ability to “eavesdrop on the most candid conversations of the highest and most powerful U.S. officials as they plotted covert intervention against a democratically-elected government.”

Kissinger began secretly taping all his incoming and outgoing phone conversations when he became national security advisor in 1969; his secretaries transcribed the calls from audio tapes that were later destroyed.  When Kissinger left office in January 1977, he took more than 30,000 pages of the transcripts, claiming they were “personal papers,” and used them, selectively, to write his memoirs.  In 1999, the National Security Archive initiated legal proceedings to force Kissinger to return these records to the U.S. government so they could be subject to the freedom of information act and declassification.  At the request of Archive senior analyst William Burr, telcons on foreign policy crises from the early 1970s, including these four previously-unknown conversations on Chile, were recently declassified by the Nixon Presidential library.

On November 30, 2008 the National Security Archive will publish a comprehensive collection of Kissinger telcons in the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA). Comprising 15,502 telcons, this collection documents Kissinger’s conversations with top officials in the Nixon and Ford administrations, including President Richard Nixon; Defense Secretaries Melvin Laird, Elliot Richardson, and James Schlesinger; Secretary of State William P. Rogers; Ambassador to the U.N. George H.W. Bush; and White House Counselor Donald Rumsfeld; along with noted journalists, ambassadors, and business leaders with close White House ties.  Wide-ranging topics discussed in the telcons include détente with Moscow, military actions during the Vietnam War and the negotiations that led to its end, Middle East peace talks, the 1970 crisis in Jordan, U.S. relations with Europe, Japan, and Chile, rapprochement with China, the Cyprus crisis (1974- ), and the unfolding Watergate affair.  When combined with the Archive’s previous electronic publication of Kissinger’s memoranda of conversation — The Kissinger Transcripts: A Verbatim Record of U.S. Diplomacy, 1969-1977 — users of the DNSA will have access to comprehensive records of Kissinger’s talks with myriad U.S. officials and world leaders.  Like the Archive’s earlier publication, the Kissinger telcons will be comprehensively and expertly indexed, providing users with have easy access to the information they seek.  The collection also includes 158 White House tapes, some of which dovetail with transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations with Nixon and others.  Users of the set will thus be able to read the “telcon” and listen to the tape simultaneously.

READ THE DOCUMENTS

l. Helms/Kissinger, September 12, 1970, 12:00 noon.

Eight days after Salvador Allende’s narrow election, Kissinger tells CIA director Richard Helms that he is calling a meeting of the 40 committee—the committee that determines covert operations abroad.  “We will not let Chile go down the drain,” Kissinger declares.  Helms reports he has sent a CIA emissary to Chile to obtain a first-hand assessment of the situation.

2. President/Kissinger, September 12, 1970, 12:32 p.m.

In the middle of a Kissinger report to Nixon on the status of a terrorist hostage crisis in Amman, Jordan, he tells the president that “the big problem today is Chile.”  Former CIA director and ITT board member John McCone has called to press for action against Allende; Nixon’s friend Pepsi CEO Donald Kendall has brought Chilean media mogul Augustine Edwards to Washington.  Nixon blasts a State Department proposal to “see what we can work out [with Allende], and orders Kissinger “don’t let them do that.” The president demands to see all State Department cable traffic on Chile and to get an appraisal of “what the options are.”

3. Secretary Rogers, September 14, 1970, 12:15pm (page 2)

After Nixon speaks to Secretary of State William Rogers about Chile, Kissinger speaks to him on September 14. Rogers reluctantly agrees that the CIA should “encourage a different result” in Chile, but warns it should be done discreetly lest U.S. intervention against a democratically-elected government be exposed.  Kissinger firmly tells Secretary Rogers that “the president’s view is to do the maximum possible to prevent an Allende takeover, but through Chilean sources and with a low posture.”

4) President/Kissinger, July 4, 1973, 11:00 a.m.

Vacationing in San Clemente, Nixon calls Kissinger and discusses the deteriorating situation in Chile.  Two weeks earlier, a coup attempt against Allende failed, but Nixon and Kissinger predict further turmoil.  “I think that Chilean guy may have some problems,” Nixon states.  “Oh, he has massive problems.  He has massive problems…he’s definitely in difficulties,” Kissinger responds.  The two share recollections of three years earlier when they had covertly attempted to block Allende’s inauguration.  Nixon blames CIA director Richard Helms and former U.S. ambassador Edward Korry for failing to stop Allende; “they screwed it up,” he states.  The conversation then turns to Kissinger’s evaluation of the Los Angeles premiere of the play “Gigi.”

5) President/Kissinger, September 16, 1973, 11:50 a.m. (previously posted May 26, 2004)

In their first substantive conversation following the military coup in Chile, Kissinger and Nixon discuss the U.S. role in the overthrow of Allende, and the adverse reaction in the new media. When Nixon asks if the U.S. “hand” will show in the coup, Kissinger admits “we helped them” and that “[deleted reference] created conditions as great as possible.”  The two commiserate over what Kissinger calls the “bleating” liberal press. In the Eisenhower period, he states, “we would be heroes.” Nixon assures him that the people will appreciate what they did: “let me say they aren’t going to buy this crap from the liberals on this one.”

Börse-Online berichtet über die Organisierten Kriminellen der “GoMoPa” und wie sie die Finanzbranche bedrohen

http://www.immovation-ag.de/medienpool/meldungen/BoerseOnline_Nr38_16.09.2010_Wo_gehobelt_wird.pdf

Börse Online über “GoMoPa”-Betrüger und RA Jochen Resch

http://www.graumarktinfo.de/gm/aktuell/diskussion/:Gomopa–Anwaelte-als-Finanzierungsquelle/616477.html

TOP-SECRET – Deep Packet Spying Breaches Gmail and All Security

Date: Sat, 17 Sep 2011 20:37:56 -0500
From: Marsh Ray <marsh[at]extendedsubset.com>
To: Discussion of cryptography and related <cryptography[at]randombit.net>
Subject: [cryptography] Another data point on SSL “trusted” root CA reliability (S Korea)

Been seeing Twitter from [at]ralphholz, [at]KevinSMcArthur, and [at]eddy_nigg about some goofy certs surfacing in S Korea with CA=true. via Reddit http://www.reddit.com/tb/kj25j

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/496473.html [below]

It’s not entirely clear that a trusted CA cert is being used in this attack, however the article comes to the conclusion that HTTPS application data is being decrypted so it’s the most plausible assumption. Quoting extensively here because I don’t have a sense of how long “The Hankyoreh” keeps their English language text around. – Marsh

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cryptography mailing list cryptography[at]randombit.net
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Date: Sun, 18 Sep 2011 12:11:59 +0200
From: Ralph Holz <holz[at]net.in.tum.de>
To: cryptography[at]randombit.net
Subject: Re: [cryptography] Another data point on SSL “trusted” root CA reliability (S Korea)

True, we found about 80 distinct certificates that had subject “Government of Korea” and CA:TRUE [1].

In our full dataset from April 2011, however, we found about 30k certificates with this property. None of them had valid chains to the NSS root store. The numbers do not seem to change over time: in Nov 2009, it was about 30k, and about the same in Sep 2010. In the EFF dataset of the full IPv4 space, I find 773,512 such certificates. *Distinct* ones – and the EFF dataset has 5.5m distinct certs. It is a wide-spread problem.

For the case of Korea, [at]KevinSMcArthur found that the issuing certificates have a pathlen of 0, which makes it impossible for the end-host cert to operate as a CA *as long as the client actually checks that extension*. I don’t know which ones do, but it would be a question to ask the NSS developers.

As of now, I don’t think these are really attacker certs, also because the overall numbers seem to point more at some CA software that creates certs with the CA flag on by default.

Although your article seems to indicate something bad is going on over there…

[1] If you want to check, CSVs at:

www.meleeisland.de/korean_hosts_CA_on.csv

www.meleeisland.de/korean_hosts_CA_on_fullchains.csv

www.meleeisland.de/scan_apr2011_ca_on_issuers_not_selfsigned.csv

Ralph


NIS admits to packet tapping Gmail

If proven, international fallout could occur over insecurity of the HTTP Secure system

By Noh Hyung-woong

It has come to light that the National Intelligence Service has been using a technique known as “packet tapping” to spy on emails sent and received using Gmail, Google’s email service. This is expected to have a significant impact, as it proves that not even Gmail, previously a popular “cyber safe haven” because of its reputation for high levels of security, is safe from tapping.

The NIS itself disclosed that Gmail tapping was taking place in the process of responding to a constitutional appeal filed by 52-year-old former teacher Kim Hyeong-geun, who was the object of packet tapping, in March this year.

As part of written responses submitted recently to the Constitutional Court, the NIS stated, “Mr. Kim was taking measures to avoid detection by investigation agencies, such as using a foreign mail service [Gmail] and mail accounts in his parents’ names, and deleting emails immediately after receiving or sending them. We therefore made the judgment that gathering evidence through a conventional search and seizure would be difficult, and conducted packet tapping.”

The NIS went on to explain, “[Some Korean citizens] systematically attempt so-called ‘cyber asylum,’ in ways such as using foreign mail services (Gmail, Hotmail) that lie beyond the boundaries of Korea‘s investigative authority, making packet tapping an inevitable measure for dealing with this.”

The NIS asserted the need to tap Gmail when applying to a court of law for permission to also use communication restriction measures [packet tapping]. The court, too, accepted the NIS’s request at the time and granted permission for packet tapping.

Unlike normal communication tapping methods, packet tapping is a technology that allows a real-time view of all content coming and going via the Internet. It opens all packets of a designated user that are transmitted via the Internet. This was impossible in the early days of the Internet, but monitoring and vetting of desired information only from among huge amounts of packet information became possible with the development of “deep packet inspection” technology. Deep packet inspection technology is used not only for censorship, but also in marketing such as custom advertising on Gmail and Facebook.

The fact that the NIS taps Gmail, which uses HTTP Secure, a communication protocol with reinforced security, means that it possesses the technology to decrypt data packets transmitted via Internet lines after intercepting them.

“Gmail has been using an encrypted protocol since 2009, when it was revealed that Chinese security services had been tapping it,” said one official from a software security company. “Technologically, decrypting it is known to be almost impossible. If it turns out to be true [that the NIS has been packet tapping], this could turn into an international controversy.”

“The revelation of the possibility that Gmail may have been tapped is truly shocking,” said Jang Yeo-gyeong, an activist at Jinbo.net. “It has shown once again that the secrets of people’s private lives can be totally violated.” Lawyer Lee Gwang-cheol of MINBYUN-Lawyers for a Democratic Society, who has taken on Kim’s case, said, “I think it is surprising, and perhaps even good, that the NIS itself has revealed that it uses packet tapping on Gmail. I hope the Constitutional Court will use this appeal hearing to decide upon legitimate boundaries for investigations, given that the actual circumstances of the NIS’s packet tapping have not been clearly revealed.”

Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani[at]hani.co.kr]

How 250,000 US embassy cables were leaked

Bradley Manning, left, is accused of stealing classified files released by Julian Assange, right

US soldier Bradley Manning, left, who is accused of stealing the classified files and handing the database to the WikiLeaks website of Julian Assange, right. Photograph: Associated Press/AFP/Getty Images

An innocuous-looking memory stick, no longer than a couple of fingernails, came into the hands of a Guardian reporter earlier this year. The device is so small it will hang easily on a keyring. But its contents will send shockwaves through the world’s chancelleries and deliver what one official described as “an epic blow” to US diplomacy.

The 1.6 gigabytes of text files on the memory stick ran to millions of words: the contents of more than 250,000 leaked state department cables, sent from, or to, US embassies around the world.

What will emerge in the days and weeks ahead is an unprecedented picture of secret diplomacy as conducted by the planet’s sole superpower. There are 251,287 dispatches in all, from more than 250 US embassies and consulates. They reveal how the US deals with both its allies and its enemies – negotiating, pressuring and sometimes brusquely denigrating foreign leaders, all behind the firewalls of ciphers and secrecy classifications that diplomats assume to be secure. The leaked cables range up to the “SECRET NOFORN” level, which means they are meant never to be shown to non-US citizens.

As well as conventional political analyses, some of the cables contain detailed accounts of corruption by foreign regimes, as well as intelligence on undercover arms shipments, human trafficking and sanction-busting efforts by would-be nuclear states such as Iran and Libya. Some are based on interviews with local sources while others are general impressions and briefings written for top state department visitors who may be unfamiliar with local nuances.

Intended to be read by officials in Washington up to the level of the secretary of state, the cables are generally drafted by the ambassador or subordinates. Although their contents are often startling and troubling, the cables are unlikely to gratify conspiracy theorists. They do not contain evidence of assassination plots, CIA bribery or such criminal enterprises as the Iran-Contra scandal in the Reagan years, when anti-Nicaraguan guerrillas were covertly financed.

One reason may be that America’s most sensitive “top secret” and above foreign intelligence files cannot be accessed from Siprnet, the defence department network involved.

The US military believes it knows where the leak originated. A soldier, Bradley Manning, 22, has been held in solitary confinement for the last seven months and is facing a court martial in the new year. The former intelligence analyst is charged with unauthorised downloads of classified material while serving on an army base outside Baghdad. He is suspected of taking copies not only of the state department archive, but also of video of an Apache helicopter crew gunning down civilians in Baghdad, and hundreds of thousands of daily war logs from military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

It was childishly easy, according to the published chatlog of a conversation Manning had with a fellow-hacker. “I would come in with music on a CD-RW labelled with something like ‘Lady Gaga’ … erase the music … then write a compressed split file. No one suspected a thing … [I] listened and lip-synched to Lady Gaga’s Telephone while exfiltrating possibly the largest data spillage in American history.” He said that he “had unprecedented access to classified networks 14 hours a day 7 days a week for 8+ months”.

Manning told his correspondent Adrian Lamo, who subsequently denounced him to the authorities: “Hillary Clinton and several thousand diplomats around the world are going to have a heart attack when they wake up one morning and find an entire repository of classified foreign policy is available, in searchable format, to the public … Everywhere there’s a US post, there’s a diplomatic scandal that will be revealed. Worldwide anarchy in CSV format … It’s beautiful, and horrifying.”

He added: “Information should be free. It belongs in the public domain.”

Manning, according to the chatlogs, says he uploaded the copies to WikiLeaks, the “freedom of information activists” as he called them, led by Australian former hacker Julian Assange.

Assange and his circle apparently decided against immediately making the cables public. Instead they embarked on staged disclosure of the other material – aimed, as they put it on their website, at “maximising political impact”.

In April at a Washington press conference the group released the Apache helicopter video, titling it Collateral Murder.

The Guardian’s Nick Davies brokered an agreement with Assange to hand over in advance two further sets of military field reports on Iraq and Afghanistan so professional journalists could analyse them. Published earlier this year simultaneously with the New York Times and Der Spiegel in Germany, the analyses revealed that coalition forces killed civilians in previously unreported shootings and handed over prisoners to be tortured.

The revelations shot Assange and WikiLeaks to global prominence but led to angry denunciations from the Pentagon and calls from extreme rightwingers in the US that Assange be arrested or even assassinated. This month Sweden issued an international warrant for Assange, for questioning about alleged sexual assaults. His lawyer says the allegations spring from unprotected but otherwise consensual sex with two women.

WikiLeaks says it is now planning to post a selection of the cables. Meanwhile, a Guardian team of expert writers has been spending months combing through the data. Freedom of information campaigner Heather Brooke obtained a copy of the database through her own contacts and joined the Guardian team. The paper is to publish independently, but simultaneously with the New York Times and Der Spiegel, along with Le Monde in Paris and El País in Madrid. As on previous occasions the Guardian is redacting information likely to cause reprisals against vulnerable individuals.

TOP-SECRET – COMPLETE PENTAGON PAPERS AT LAST!

June 13, 1971: The New York Times begins to publish the Pentagon Papers.

COMPLETE PENTAGON PAPERS AT LAST!
All Three Versions Posted, Allowing Side-by-Side Comparison

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 359

Posted – September 16, 2011

Edited By John Prados

For more information contact:
John Prados – 202/994-7000

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The Complete
Pentagon PapersA Side-By-Side Comparison of the Three Major Editions

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In the news

“After 40 Years, the Complete Pentagon Papers”
By Michael Cooper and Sam Roberts
The New York Times
June 7, 2011

More on the Pentagon Papers

Pentagon Papers Home

The Secret Briefs and the Secret Evidence.
Expert commentary from Archive analyst John Prados

Supreme Court Briefs and Opinions.
Audio and transcripts

White House Telephone Conversations.
Audio and transcripts

Intelligence and Vietnam.
The Top Secret 1969 State Department Study

Excerpts from Nixon, Kissinger and Haldeman Memoirs

Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp. 508-515.

Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), pp. 115-118.

H.R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries (New York: Berkeley Books, 1995), pp. 363-371, 378.

Inside the Pentagon Papers
Edited by John Prados and Margaret Pratt Porter
University Press of Kansas
ISBN: 0-7006-1325-0

 

What Were the 11 Missing Words?
Enter the National Security Archive’s Reader Contest!

Washington, DC, September 16, 2011 – For the first time ever, all three major editions of the Pentagon Papers are being made available simultaneously online. The posting today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University (www.nsarchive.org), allows for a unique side-by-side comparison, showing readers exactly what the U.S. government tried to hide for 40 years by means of deletions from the original text.

To make the most of this new resource, the Archive is unveiling a special contest inviting readers to make their own nominations for the infamous “11 words” that some officials tried to keep secret even this year!

Today’s posting includes the full texts of the “Gravel” edition entered into Congressional proceedings in 1971 by Sen. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) and later published by the Beacon Press, the authorized 1971 declassified version issued by the House Armed Services Committee with deletions insisted on by the Nixon administration, and the new 2011 “complete” edition released in June by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

Accompanying the posting is the National Security Archive’s invitation for readers to identify their own favorite nominees for the “11 words” that securocrats attempted to delete during the declassification process for the Papers earlier this year, until alert NARA staffers realized those words actually had been declassified back in 1971.  Best submissions for the “11 words” — as judged by National Security Archive experts — will appear in the Archive’s blog, Unredacted, and on the Archive’s Facebook page.  National Security Archive senior fellow John Prados wrote the introduction and analysis for the posting. Archive analyst Carlos Osorio coordinated the data processing for publication. Archive staff Wendy Valdes and Charlotte Karrlsson-Willis did the input, indexing and cross-referencing, and the Archive’s webmaster Michael Evans managed the online publication of the Pentagon Papers.

*               *               *

With a simple press release on June 8, 2011 the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) announced that five days later the United States Government would declassify and make public the full forty-seven volumes of the set of studies universally known as the “Pentagon Papers.” The studies acquired that name when they were leaked by Daniel Ellsberg, one of the analysts who had worked on them but had subsequently gone into the opposition on U.S. policy in the Vietnam war. The National Security Archive here posts, for the first time anywhere, a combined, comparative, and searchable set of all the major editions of the Pentagon Papers together with a cross-referencing index to all the sets.

As it happens NARA’s release of the Pentagon Papers coincided exactly with the 40th anniversary of the day in 1971 when the leaked documents began to appear in the press, at first the New York Times, but then also the Washington Post and many other news media. The Nixon administration attempted to suppress the leak of the Papers by seeking a prior injunction against their publication from the U.S. Court. It succeeded thereby in making the Pentagon Papers into one of the significant political documents of the 20th Century. The case went to the Supreme Court, which decided against the government in a notable First Amendment decision affirming freedom of the press.

With this background the reader can begin to understand the secrecy issues that swirled around this set of materials. The first point is that the Ellsberg leak involved the disclosure of official documents. The study’s actual title, “United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967,” reveals that the contents of the papers concerned the Vietnam policies of Lyndon B. Johnson and previous presidents back to Franklin D. Roosevelt. Second, these were official documents classified at a high level. Those who worked on the Pentagon Papers have affirmed that the materials were classified this way in order to prevent the Johnson White House from discovering that this review was underway, but Nixon officials argued the documents were secret only because they included information whose disclosure damaged the national security of the United States. The administration argued this both in the Pentagon Papers court case and in the subsequent criminal prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg and his confederate, Anthony J. Russo. For forty years from 1971 until 2011 the U.S. Government has continued to take the position that the Pentagon Papers remained secret even though anyone could read them. Repeated efforts to secure the declassification of the Pentagon Papers were denied or ignored.

In the meantime the clamor for access to the Pentagon Papers resulted in the appearance of several editions of the documents. The most widely available and best-known of these versions is The Pentagon Papers as Published by the New York Times, which compiled in one place the series of articles and set of documents that newspaper had published. (Note 1) This edition attracted huge public attention and went through many printings but was flawed in that it represented a very narrow selection among the plethora of materials contained in the original. The Times reporters had distilled the 43 studies of the original to which they had access into a single volume. That version was far surpassed after an Alaska Democrat, Senator Mike Gravel, read the Pentagon Papers into the Congressional Record. This material was taken by the Beacon Press of Boston and published as a four-volume (2,901 page) set that contained nearly all the material in the actual studies and also added in a series of documents that the original had lacked (this will be called the “Gravel Edition”). (Note 2) Meanwhile the Nixon administration itself had promised to release a set of the Pentagon Papers and it did so through the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives. This appeared in twelve volumes, or “books” (6,742 pages), and was published by the U.S. Government Printing Office. (Note 3) This edition (hereafter termed the “HASC edition”) exactly reproduced the original, minus numerous deletions that reflected the Nixon administration’s claims for national security damage framed in its court cases.

As a result of the way the Pentagon Papers surfaced there have always been difficulties in using them. The Times version, widely available, only scratched the surface. Both the Gravel and HASC editions appeared in only a few, or one printing, and were therefore not very accessible to the public. Restricted availability—in many cases limited to good college libraries—kept the full set of materials away from most of the public. The Gravel edition had the virtues of having a straightforward presentation and including Johnson administration documents. The HASC edition’s advantage lay in its much more ample documentation on the presidencies of FDR, Harry Truman, and Dwight D. Eisenhower. On the other hand this version used the pagination of the original Department of Defense compilation, which was confusing and changed almost as often as the studies themselves.

None of the 1971 editions included four volumes of diplomatic accounts of Johnson administration peace feelers to North Vietnam, which Ellsberg had withheld when leaking the rest of the Pentagon Papers. An expurgated set of those studies only became available in 1983. (Note 4) The complete Diplomatic Volumes were finally declassified in 2002. That release resulted in the stunning contradiction that the Diplomatic Volumes of the Pentagon Papers—deemed too sensitive even to leak in 1971—were fully available to the public while the major portion of the review—which has been available to the public ever since 1971—remained secret.

In any case, until now the United States Government has insisted that the Pentagon Papers are secret while those who sought to learn from them have been able to read whatever version they could access, each with its own flaws. The NARA action in releasing the full set of studies, a token of its commitment to major declassification initiatives, permits comprehensive examination of the Pentagon Papers for the first time.

However, readers remain hampered by the confusing organization and structure of the original Department of Defense review. Using the Gravel edition to find material, and then looking it up in the original actually remains a suitable way to proceed. This has been problematical not only because of the confusing pagination in the original but due to the differences in availability of the various editions. Even the new NARA release, although it is online, limits the user to one item at a time because it is organized by file corresponding to study volume.

The National Security Archive has undertaken to make the full Pentagon Papers completely accessible. We have done this by arranging a full-matrix display. This presentation shows each page of the fully declassified NARA version of the Pentagon Papers side-by-side with the corresponding page of the HASC edition and corresponding material from the Gravel set. From this display it is possible to instantly identify the passages deleted by the Nixon administration in 1971, as well as how editors changed material in the original when compiling the Gravel edition. We have excluded the Times version because that consists of the summarizations of authors and only a limited portion of text.

The Archive has also undertaken to make available an Index that permits cross-referencing among the various versions we are displaying—not only the pdf panels but also the page numbers in the printed editions of these works. An introduction to the Index makes clear how it is organized and can be used.

This posting of nearly 20,000 pages has been an enormous undertaking and required the cooperation of many Archive personnel. Information technology and Latin America specialist Carlos Osorio conceptualized and coordinated the data processing for the multi version publication. Analyst Wendy Valdes organized and verified the inputs. Analyst Charlotte Karrlsson-Willis created the Index with assistance from Valdes. Webmaster Michael Evans (also a Latin Americanist) accomplished the final work of getting the page matrix display up on our website.

*               *               *

NARA’s release of the Pentagon Papers was accompanied by a fresh demonstration of inappropriate secrecy policy. In reviewing these documents for declassification, one authority sought to suppress eleven words on one page. What was silly about this exercise was that the “11 Words” were not classified. That is, in effect an agency sought to make secret a passage of the Pentagon Papers that had already been reviewed and declassified by the United States Government in 1971. Since classification is supposed to protect information that can damage the national security of the United States, the idea that the “11 Words” pose a danger to the nation in 2011 after having been in the open for four decades was startling. Calmer heads finally prevailed and the government relented and released the documents with no deletions. But it has not revealed what the “11 Words” actually were.

Needless to say, the “11 Words” episode occasioned a playful guessing game in which people have tried to identify the offending passage. The National Security Archive posted its own set of eleven candidates. Here we would like to extend an invitation to interested readers to send us your own guesses. Accordingly we are sponsoring an “11 Words Contest.” Good candidate passages will be posted as articles in our blog Unredacted and on the Archive’s Facebook page, and the best ones will be incorporated into an Electronic Briefing Book as we proceed. There will be prizes for the best candidate passage and for runners-up.

“11  WORDS”  CONTEST  RULES 

Beginning with the date of this posting we open a contest for readers to nominate their own favorite candidates for the “11 Words” a government agency wanted to suppress in the Pentagon Papers. Readers can examine the side-by-side page display of all the Pentagon Papers content posted here to find items to nominate. All entries must be received by 12:00 Midnight of Friday, November 16, 2011. Entries will be judged by National Security Archive panelists. The Grand Prize winner and Runners-Up will be announced by posting in the blog Unredacted on the National Security Archive website during the week that starts on December 17th.

Prizes: The National Security Archive will award the best Pentagon Papers candidate for deletion a Grand Prize consisting of a set of the available Archive Readers—books on major international issues which include compilations of documents obtained by the Archive along with analysis by Archive experts. In keeping with the “11 Words” theme, in addition to the Grand Prize winner there will be ten Runners-Up. Each of these winners will receive a copy of the book Inside the Pentagon Papers edited by John Prados and Margaret Pratt Porter.

Entries: Enter early and often! There is no limit to the number of candidate passages a reader may submit to the “11 Words” competition. However, entries must follow the format prescribed below. Only one candidate passage may be nominated in any single entry. Multiple entries must be submitted separately. All entries must be in writing, in an email to the Archive (at nsarchiv@gwu.edu ) or through our Facebook page. Please do not use Twitter, as a proper entry cannot be fitted within the Twitter message format. By submitting an entry the reader agrees in advance to cede to the National Security Archive the right to publish her/his entry in our blog Unredacted, on our Facebook page,and/or in one of our Electronic Briefing Books. The National Security Archive will be solely responsible for the selection of entries that we publish and when they may appear. Entries that are published become finalists in the prize competition but there will be no monetary or other compensation. Those which do not rise to that level will not be circulated. Entries that do not follow the prescribed format will automatically be rejected. When entries do appear in Unredacted or on Facebook, readers should feel free to comment on them just as they do regarding any of our other articles.

Format: All contest submissions must contain the true name and address of the entrant for purposes of the Prize awards. Each entry must contain the following information:

  • Quotation: The entrant must pick a specific phrase of the Pentagon Papers, precisely 11 words long, and the phrase nominated must be quoted verbatim in the text, enclosed in quotation marks. The entrant is free to nominate an 11 word passage embedded in a longer sentence—but in that case the full sentence must appear as the quotation and the 11 word phrase must be highlighted in bold. Candidate phrases longer than 11 words are not acceptable.
  • Reference: The entry must provide the exact Pentagon Papers page citation for the 11 Words nominee. The page numbers will be found on our side-by-side display or they may be taken from the original published NARA/HASC edition. Page numbers taken from the Gravel or other editions of the Pentagon Papers are not acceptable.
  • Eligibility of Phrases: What made the 11 Words controversial was that this exercise was an attempt to make secret anew a text that had been declassified and lay in the public domain since 1971. At that time the declassified version of the Pentagon Papers was the HASC edition. Consequently, to be eligible for nomination a phrase must appear in the HASC edition of the Pentagon Papers. Readers will easily be able to establish whether any given text was published in the HASC edition simply by referring to the side-by-side pages we have displayed in this posting. The eleven phrases already nominated by the Archive (in EBB 350) are not eligible for selection. Any entries that do nominate them will simply be regarded as thoughtful comments on work already done.
  • Argumentation: The entry must explain precisely why the reader believes the nominated phrase could be the 11 Words the government wished to suppress. It should also comment on what agency or agencies could expect to profit from such a deletion. The reader’s argument should be clear and concise. It may rely on historical analysis or arguments regarding government secrecy policy, or both, and the reader may weigh the factors in any way she/he wishes. Remember, there is no “right” answer until the U.S. Government reveals which were the real 11 Words. There is no set word count to the length of the reader’s argument, but the Archive reserves the right to exclude entries of excessive length. (For a sample of the kind of argumentation an entry should contain see the candidate phrases nominated by the Archive in EBB 350.)

Judging: All entries will be reviewed by a panel of National Security Archive experts. Our criteria will be the plausibility of a government secrecy claim with respect to each set of 11 Words nominated, along with the substance and quality of the reader’s argument for why a particular phrase must be the real 11 Words. Since there is no “right” answer, everything will depend on the reader’s selections and the quality of her/his argumentation. The Archive has no preconceived notion as to the true identity of the 11 Words. Entries will be judged solely on the basis of the case they make. Inaccurate quotation or source referencing, frivolous argumentation, and failure to incorporate required elements of the format will be grounds for rejection. All decisions of the judges will be final.


Notes

1. Neil Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, E. W. Kenworthy, and Fox Butterfield, The Pentagon Papers as Published by the New York Times. New York: Bantam Books, 1971.

2. The Senator Gravel Edition: The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.

3. Leslie H. Gelb, et. al, eds., United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971.

4. George C. Herring, ed. The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers. Austin (TX): University of Texas Press, 1983.

OP-SECRET – CIA Domestic Spying Authorized T

cia-domestic-spy

TOP-SECRET – ARCHIVE EXPERT TESTIFIES IN FUJIMORI TRIAL

Senior Analyst Kate Doyle providing testimony in the trial against former-president Alberto Fujimori (center)

 

 

ARCHIVE EXPERT TESTIFIES IN FUJIMORI TRIAL

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 256


Lima, Perú (September 16, 2011) – National Security Archive Senior Analyst Kate Doyle testified yesterday before Peru’s Special Tribunal of the Supreme Court of Justice in the case against former-president Alberto Fujimori. Doyle provided expert testimony, explaining how 21 declassified U.S. documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) provide illuminating information on human rights abuses carried out under the Fujimori government (1990-2000)

The 21 documents, produced by the U.S. Embassy in Lima, describe how the Fujimori government tried to hide the involvement of government security forces in human rights crimes. Doyle emphasized that, “over time, and after years of study, the declassified documents produced by the U.S. Embassy reveal that the extra-legal operations were a part of official state policy and not a result rogue elements out of control of the military, police or intelligence services.”

During her testimony before the tribunal Kate explained how the documents reveal evidence of two-sided government strategy in the fight against terrorism, one was public and “the other was secret, a clandestine strategy of aggressively fighting subversion with the use of state-sponsored terrorism. The operations were carried out outside the state’s legal process, without respect for the rule of law or basic human rights.”

The Fujimori trial is yet another case that has benefited from access to declassified U.S. government records. The National Security Archive has provided documents for legal cases in twelve different countries; in Mexico, Guatemala, Uruguay, Chile, Peru, Argentina, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Indonesia, Rwanda, Italy, and Spain. Archive analysts have provided expert testimony in other human rights cases as well, most recently in the case of the Diario Militar, presented before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission in October 2007 (see Kate Doyle’s testimony in previous posting on the Death Squad Dossier).

To see the text in Spanish click here

Related Links

Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (APRODEH)

Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema

 

Video

Click here to watch the video

TOP-SECRET – 2 DE OCTUBRE DE 1968 – Verdad Bajo Resguardo

Mexican President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (right) and Government Minister Luis Echeverría Alvarez

2 DE OCTUBRE DE 1968 – Verdad Bajo Resguardo

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 258

Mexican army soldiers with detainees from the Tlatelolco massacre, October 2, 1968
Washington D.C., September 17, 2011 – We have arrived at the fortieth anniversary of the massacre at Tlatelolco with little to report. The events of that terrible day remain shrouded in the kind of secrecy that characterizes repressive dictatorships rather than the modern, developed and democratic nation that Mexico is today. This shameful state of affairs is due first and foremost to the lies, misinformation and equivocations of those originally responsable: the late President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz; his hardline deputy, Government Minister Luis Echeverría Alvarez; Marcellino García Barragán, Secretary of National Defense; Chief of the Presidential Staff Luis Gutiérrez Oropeza; Mario Ballesteros Prieto, Chief of Staff to the Secretary of National Defense; and Alfonso Corona del Rosal, Regent of the Federal District.But those men, and the era they represented, have receded into the distant past and no longer pose the greatest obstacle to understanding what happened to Tlatelolco. That honor belongs to the current government of Mexico, which has steadfastly refused to provide the records and testimony necessary to clarify October 2nd once and for all. The dishonest and incomplete efforts of ex-President Vicente Fox to compel his agencies to turn over their files related to Tlatelolco and to launch competent criminal investigations of former Mexican officials is exacerbated today by stonewalling on the part of President Calderón’s government. To investigate Tlatelolco among the files preserved at the Archivo General de la Naciónis to lose oneself in a black hole of missing documentation, enduring secrecy and an intransigent and arrogant staff.To mark the solemn occasion of the anniversary of Tlatelolco, Archivos Abiertos offers the most complete account to date of what files exist on October 2nd – and what remains hidden.  It is our hope that the survivors of Tlatelolco, families of the victims, historians, journalists and human rights investigators will use this account as a guide to insist on a full and truthful version of the events of the massacre. Así – y solo así – podamos llegar a un México verdaderamente abierto. Washington D.C., 2 de octubre 2008 – Nosotros hemos arrivado en el cuadragésimo aniversario de la masacre de Tlatelolco con poco que reportar. Los eventos de ese terrible día continuan envolviendo los secretos que caracterizaron el régimen represivo y dictatorial que se vivió en México en aquella época, a diferencia de la actualidad en donde México es una nación moderna, desarrollada y democrática. Este vergonzoso suceso se dió gracias a las mentiras, a la desinformación y a los errores de los originales responsables: el ex Presidente Gustavo Díaz Ordaz; su segundo al mando, el Secretario de Gobernación Luis Echeverría Álvarez; Marcellino García Barragán secretario de la Defensa Nacional; al Jefe del Estado Mayor Presidencial Luis Gutiérrez Oropeza; a mario Ballesteros Prieto, Jefe del Estado Mayor de la Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional; y a Alfonso Corona del Rosal, regente del Distrito Federal.Pero esos hombres, la era que representaron y los grandes obstáculo para entender lo que sucedio en Tlatelolco quedaron enterrados en el pasado. Ese honor correponde al gobierno actual de México, el cual se ha negado a dar información que pudiese aclarar todo lo que sucedio el 2 de Octubre de una vez por todas. Lo deshonesto y los esfuerzos incompletos del ex Presidente Vicente Fox para obligar a sus agencias a abrir los archivos e iniciar una investigación criminal, es agravado hoy en día por el gobierno del actual Presidente Felipe Calderón el cual obstruye la investigación entre los archivos preservados en el Archivo General de la Nación, en donde esforzarse a investigar es perderse en un hoyo negro de falta de documentación, aguantando al personal intransigente y prepotente.Para marcar la solemne ocasión del aniversario de Tlatelolco, Archivos Abiertos ofrece la más completa información hasta la fecha de los archivos que existen acerca del 2 de Octubre, y lo que permanece escondido bajo resguardo. Es nuestra esperanza que los sobrevivientes de Tlatelolco, las familias de las víctimas, los historiadores,  los periodistas y los investigadores de los derechos humanos utilizen esta información como guía para insistir en una versión completa y veraz de los acontecimientos de la masacre. Así – y sólo así – podamos llegar a un México verdaderamente abierto.

2 DE OCTUBRE DE 1968 – Verdad Bajo Resguardo
Editado por Kate Doyle y Susana Zavala

Para Mayor Información Contactar a
Kate Doyle kadoyle@gwu.edu
Susana Zavala  zavalasusana@gmail.com

Durante el sexenio de Vicente Fox Quesada, se decretó el acuerdo presidencial, 27 de noviembre de 2001, mediante el cual se disponía de diversas medidas para la procuración de justicia por delitos cometidos contra personas vinculadas con movimientos sociales y políticos del pasado.

Una de las disposiciones ordenó que la documentación en poder de las dependencias federales fuera transferida al Archivo General de la Nación (AGN) para atender la recomendación 26/2001 de la Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos (CNDH), que había documentado 532 casos de desaparición forzada de personas por motivos políticos. A estas investigaciones se les daría seguimiento a través de una fiscalía especial dependiente de la Procuraduría General de la República.

En 2002 la Oficina del Fiscal Especial para Movimientos Sociales y Políticos del Pasado (OFEMOSPP), encabezada por Ignacio Carrillo Prieto, abrió sus puertas para integrar las averiguaciones previas de los casos investigados previamente por la CNDH. Tiempo después, Carrillo atrajo también las denuncias de los acontecimientos del 2 de octubre de 1968 y los hechos del 10 de junio de 1971. Su misión era comprobar la responsabilidad de funcionarios, de todos los niveles (que ejercieron funciones en las décadas de los sesenta, setenta y ochenta) en delitos en contra de personas vinculadas a grupos de oposición al gobierno mexicano de aquellos años.

Pero, ¿cuáles fueron las Secretarías de Estado que atendieron esta medida? ¿Cuáles no cumplieron y estaban obligadas? ¿Cuándo y en dónde se resguardó la documentación de aquellas que acataron el acuerdo? ¿Quiénes pueden tener acceso a estos documentos? ¿Quiénes se hicieron cargo de monitorear el total cumplimiento del mandado presidencial? Estas y muchas otras preguntas motivaron a The National Security Archive a realizar una exhaustiva investigación haciendo uso de la Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública Gubernamental (LFTAIPG) para conocer los detalles del cumplimiento a la disposición presidencial y su vigencia actual.

Dependencias que cumplieron

SEDENA (DOCUMENTO 1)

Former Mexican President Vicente Fox

Sólo algunas de las Secretarías de Estado atendieron el acuerdo de Fox. De las primeras en hacer entrega de parte de su archivo histórico fueron las Fuerzas Armadas.  El 22 de enero de 2002, la SEDENA, mediante Acta de Transferencia, hace entrega de información generada desde 1965 hasta 1985.

 “En la Ciudad de México, DF, siendo las dieciocho horas del día veintidós del mes de enero del año dos mil dos, en las instalaciones del Archivo General de la Nación, se precede a suscribir la presente acta de cumplimiento al acuerdo presidencial. Publicado en el Diario Oficial de la Federación el 27 de noviembre del 2001. Mediante el cual dispone diversas medidas para la procuración de justicia por delitos cometidos contra personas vinculadas con movimientos sociales y políticos del pasado, con la representación por parte de la Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional el C. General de División EM Roberto Miranda Sánchez, Director General de Archivo e Historia y por parte de la Secretaría de Gobernación la C. Dra. Stella María González Cicero, Directora del Archivo General de la Nación…”

El documento termina asentando “Por lo anterior la Dirección del Archivo General de la Nación, custodiará y conservará el acervo documental que constituye la información que le es transferida en estricto acatamiento al Acuerdo Presidencial de mérito.”  El acta consta de 9 fojas de las que se resume la siguiente cifra: Cajas 486, legajos 1,653 y un total de 150,713 hojas de 36 Zonas Militares de las 45 que actualmente existen.

La consulta de este fondo documental no tiene mayores restricciones que las señaladas por el área de referencia del AGN. Sin embargo, éste no cuenta con  un índice temático completo que facilite la búsqueda de información, aunque el AGN en su Centro de Referencias tiene a disposición de los investigadores el que le entregó SEDENA.

Por otra parte, hemos identificado documentos que adjuntan anexos los cuales aportan información complementaria en las comunicaciones entre las áreas militares u otras dependencias. Realizamos una exhaustiva búsqueda tratando de ubicar estos anexos en la colección transferida al AGN sin éxito. Y haciendo uso del Sistema de Solicitudes de Información (SISI) del IFAI cuestionamos al respecto a la dependencia castrense, lamentablemente los funcionarios actuales del Archivo Histórico Militar desconocen el paradero de los anexos ya que categóricamente pronunciaron la inexistencia de esta información.

CISEN (DOCUMENTO 2)

El Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional (CISEN) envió a las instalaciones del ex Palacio de Lecumberri, en febrero de 2002, el fondo documental perteneciente a la extinta Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) y la información de la Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (DGIPS) que se encontraban bajo su custodia desde 1947 hasta 1985.

El Acta entrega-recepción signada por el entonces director del CISEN, Eduardo Medina Mora y la directora del AGN Stella María González Cicero, contabilizaron 4223 cajas con un número aproximado de 58,302 (expedientes). Además se transfirieron de una serie de tarjetas, contabilizadas en aproximadamente 7 millones y que hacen posible la búsqueda de los documentos en sus expedientes, que no fueron especificadas en el  acta de entrega.

También el acta de recepción omite detalles sobre la descripción y el formato de la información resguardada en la Galería No. 1. Sólo señala la procedencia de ésta. Cabe mencionar que las autoridades actuales del AGN aseguran que existen miles de imágenes en diversos tamaños, no obstante descartan por completo que la colección incluyera audiocintas o vídeos.

Para corroborar lo dicho por las autoridades hemos solicitado al CISEN y al AGN un cotejo entre la información resguardada y lo que realmente se trasladó mediante el acta de entrega. Esto debido a las contradicciones en que ambas dependencias han incurrido pues el CISEN manifiesta haber remitido al AGN todo los documentos y el AGN ha respondido que no llegó información en formatos de audio y video.

Sobre su acceso, cuando se trate de un personaje, la vía corta es una solicitud electrónica a través del SISI, en su modalidad de Versión Pública (VP). En los documentos que el AGN entrega en esta modalidad se testan (se suprime con cintos negros) los datos personales del individuo en cuestión. Cuando se desee consultar sobre un tema en particular es decir algún grupo armado, institución, dependencia, etc., lo recomendable es visitar la Galería No. 1 del AGN.

El AGN, desde 1998, ya tenía en resguardo un fondo documental perteneciente a la DGIPS, órgano que dependía de la Secretaría de Gobernación (SEGOB) también extinta DFS reportaba a esta dependencia. Este fondo actualmente se  ubican en la Galería No. 2 del archivo y cuenta con 3052 cajas de información. En este fondo está totalmente abierto al público y fue trasladado al AGN en otro momento y circunstancias. En parte de esta colección es posible consultar cerca de 500 cajas con copia de informes de la DFS de 1969 a 1976.

Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (DOCUMENTO 3)

Esta dependencia da respuesta al acuerdo presidencial el 14 de enero de 2002.  Por parte de la Dirección General de Derechos Humanos de la SER, la Subsecretaría para Derechos Humanos y Democracia, Mariclaire Acosta, manifiesta:

“En cumplimiento del citado Acuerdo y después de haberlo conversado con el titular de la Unidad de Estudios Legislativos de la Secretaría de Gobernación, le transmito los citados expedientes en paquetes de 4 y 10 sobres cerrados, respectivamente, con el fin de que los mismos se integren al Archivo General de la Nación.”

Los citados paquetes no han sido posibles de localizar ni en la SER ni en el AGN, ignorándose pues el total de fojas, tipo de material y descripción de su contenido.

La Secretaría de Gobernación (DOCUMENTO 4)

El entonces Secretario de Gobernación, Santiago Creel Miranda, dio instrucciones a las Direcciones Generales a su cargo de enviar, a más tardar al 31 de enero de 2002, la documentación relativa al acuerdo presidencial.

Por su parte, el 16 de enero de 2002, Felipe de Jesús Preciado Coronado, Comisionado del Instituto Nacional de Migración informa: “…me permito transferir al Archivo General de la Nación un total de 15 expedientes originales pertenecientes al archivo de la Coordinación de Control y Verificación Migratoria y que contiene información presumiblemente relacionada con los hechos materia del citado Acuerdo Presidencial…”

Su lista no cuantifica el número de fojas o formato de la información, sólo precisa una breve descripción y algunas fechas. Por ello sabemos que la celda número 7 menciona un informe confidencial del año 1968 y la 13 refiere uno a los disturbios estudiantiles en el mes de julio en la Ciudad de México.

El comisionado finaliza comentando “… se carece de elementos para determinar cuales (expedientes) estarían vinculados con hechos del pasado relacionados con violaciones a los derechos humanos o probablemente constitutivos de delitos cometidos en contra de personas vinculadas con movimientos sociales y políticos, por lo que desde luego, dicho acervo está a disposición de las instancias competentes que requieran consultarlo.”

A pesar de que este memorándum está dirigido a la entonces Directora Stella María González haciendo entrega del mismo, esta información no se encuentra disponible al público pues se desconoce su ubicación dentro del AGN.

Los que no acataron la disposición

Hubo direcciones generales dependientes de la SEGOB que no cumplieron el acuerdo argumentando no contar con expedientes que aportaran datos a las investigaciones. Por ejemplo, la Dirección General del Registro Nacional de Población e Identificación Personal, informó lo siguiente el 22 de enero: “…esta Unidad Administrativa no cuenta con archivo documental de acuerdo a lo solicitado.”  El memorándum lo firma el Director General, Fernando Tovar y de Teresa. (DOCUMENTO 5)

La Dirección General de Asociaciones Religiosas, Dirección de Registro y Certificaciones refiere el titular, Guillermo Fuentes Maldonado, el 10 de enero de 2002: “Sobre el particular me permito informarle que en los archivos dependientes de la Dirección General de Asociaciones Religiosas de la Subsecretaría de Población, Migración y Asuntos Religiosos, no existen expedientes, documentos e información general que pudiera ser considerado como relevante para la investigación de los hechos del pasado.”  (DOCUMENTO 6)

Entre las negativas que más afectaron el proceso de acopio sin duda fueron la hechas por el Estado Mayor Presidencial y la Procuraduría General de la República, pues estas dependencias fueron protagonistas de los hechos sus archivos en 1968 seguramente generaron pilas de información. Sus registros podrían resolver dudas que por años han dejado incompleta la verdad sobre su injerencia en el conflicto.

Además muchas otras como el Tribunal Superior de Justicia, la Secretaría de Educación Pública, la Secretaría de Salud, la Secretaría de Telecomunicaciones y Transporte no realizaron búsquedas en sus archivos para contribuir con la recopilación de expedientes relacionados a las investigaciones del pasado ni tuvieron siquiera la intención de transferir documentación solicitada. No son creíbles los argumentos de estas secretarías que dicen carecer de documentos que pudieran ayudar a descifrar algunas de las incógnitas que por años sólo se han quedado en especulaciones y otras ni siquiera se tomaron la molestia de responder al acuerdo.

Es importante señalar que el decreto presidencial incluía sólo dependencias federales. Sin embargo, para garantizar el buen cumplimiento de esta medida se debió  incluir también dependencias del Gobierno del Distrito Federal, ya que en los registros del servicio forense, delegaciones, hospitales, corporaciones policíacas, departamento de limpia, panteones, etc. es posible obtener datos imprescindibles para la reconstrucción de los hechos.

Intentos fallidos de justicia y esclarecimiento

El año pasado la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación (SCJN) consideró que las causas penales para resolver el caso del 2 de octubre de 1968 ya habían prescrito. Esta resolución prácticamente da por concluido el proceso judicial que se había iniciado en contra del ex presidente Luis Echeverría Álvarez por el delito de genocidio. Esto originó que se descalificara la actuación del ex fiscal Carrillo Prieto, ya que repetidamente se le señalaron las escasas probabilidades de enjuiciar al ex mandatario bajo el delito de genocidio, dejando en duda su capacidad de integrar correctamente la averiguación previa.

A 40 años de aquella noche en la Plaza de las Tres Culturas, el caso aparentemente cerrado continúa siendo objeto de controversia. La demanda de justicia para quienes el 2 de octubre de 1968 perdieron a un ser querido o que purgaron un condena por delitos que no habían cometido sigue vigente más que nunca a pesar del dictamen de la Corte.

Muchos pensaron que de no concluir el caso en una sentencia jurídica promovida por la OFEMOSPP, por lo menos sería posible que su titular determinara, a través de un “Libro Blanco”, una sanción histórica a los funcionarios que reprendieron ferozmente la manifestación estudiantil pacífica. La tarea de esclarecer los hechos del 2 de octubre de 1968 sigue pendiente, pues ni el “Informe a la Sociedad Mexicana 2006” que elaboró el Fiscal Carrillo, al término de sus funciones, ni el informe elaborado por sus colaboradores del área histórica, “Que jamás vuelva a suceder” dio cabal respuesta a la sociedad mexicana.

La verdad bajo resguardo.

Uno de los problemas que denunciaron los integrantes del Comité 68, conformado en 1998 por el Congreso de la Unión (LVII Legislatura), fue la magra voluntad de las autoridades federales de esclarecer los hechos del 2 de octubre. Su desinterés y nulo apoyo se reflejó en los resultados obtenidos. La intención del Comité fue frustrada cuando solicitaron acceso a los archivos de las dependencias federales, pues éste fue restringido en la mayoría de los casos. Sin la documentación generada por las administraciones de Gustavo Díaz Ordaz y Luis Echeverría Álvarez este trabajo no pasó de ser un mero anecdotario.

La OFEMOSPP tenía la ventaja del contar, previo a su creación, con un acuerdo que disponía otorgarle todas las facilidades para su indagación y aún así los resultados fueron cuestionados. ¿Qué sigue? ¿Una comisión de la verdad? No lo sabemos. Lo que sí sabemos es que la información trasladada al AGN está incompleta y que la propia fiscalía dejó al final de sus funciones miles de documentos en la bóveda se seguridad del AGN, lugar a donde van a parar los documentos que por alguna razón de suma delicadeza tienen que ser sacados de sus colecciones de origen. Dichos documentos no pueden ser consultados por los ciudadanos. Peor aún, la Unidad de Coordinación de Investigaciones Especiales de la Procuraduría General de la República, la cual atrajo los casos sin resolver, continúa con esta practica de secretismo.

Existe un catálogo de 350 expedientes en reserva, todos ellos pertenecientes a información que Agentes de Ministerio Público de la Federación (AMPF), colaboradores de la OFEMOSPP y ahora de la Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales sacaron de sus fondos documentales impidiendo que investigadores de DDHH, abogados, periodistas, académicos o estudiantes puedan consultarlos.

De acuerdo con el índice proveído por el AGN, la práctica de ocultamiento se inicio en 2003. En una primera etapa los resguardos fueron decisión de Ministerios Públicos adscritos a la OFEMOSPP, los fechados después de noviembre de 2006 fueron designados a la unidad especial. Cada página en resguardo fue seleccionada según el criterio de los agentes con el argumento de servir como evidencia fundamental de una determinada averiguación previa.

La lista completa puede ser consultada en la página electrónica del AGN, ya que es obligación de toda dependencia contar con un Portal de Obligaciones de Transparencia (POT) el cual debe ser actualizado periódicamente. En el rubro XII del POT del AGN, refiere la Información Relevante del archivo y en esta pestaña está incorporado el Índice de Expedientes Reservados, es decir toda aquella información que haya sido etiquetada como reservada. (DOCUMENTO 7)

Un total de 9,294 fojas y 27 fotografías fueron separadas de sus expedientes, volúmenes y legajos originales; además de tres cajas íntegras. Si bien el índice de expedientes señala la fecha de resguardo, fundamento legal, periodo, número de fojas, dependencia donde se encuentra en reserva y el responsable de ésta.

La autoridad (PGR) que llevó a cabo el resguardo es una distinta del depositario (AGN). Debido a esto los datos no son suficientes para saber si dicha información en reserva fue destinada a una averiguación previa del caso 68 o a algún caso de desaparición forzada. Sólo sabemos que la documentación en resguardo se encuentra físicamente en el AGN.

Las 350 celdas, que describen los resguardos ejecutados por el Ministerio Público,  no especifican datos sobre el fondo documental al que pertenecen, el número de averiguación previa que motiva su resguardo, la clasificación del documento dentro de su acervo o la descripción del documento.

Se entiende que algunos de los resguardos deben continuar bajo este esquema, pues las AP siguen su proceso de integración, sobre todo las que denuncian casos de desaparición forzada. Pero es indispensable que la PGR garantice a las víctimas y familiares que la documentación integrada a las AP es protegida, además debe ser integrada a los Índices de Expedientes Reservados de su POT con una descripción de cada página señalando a que averiguación pertenece de esa manera los denunciantes y representantes legales podrán llevar registro de los avances en sus casos pero mientras se buscan mecanismos para optimizar esto, la documentación sobre los disturbios de 1968 debe ser depositada inmediatamente en sus acervos originales y ponerla a disposición de público de nueva cuenta.

Con estas acciones nos queda claro que los pasos que se dieron en la administración de Vicente Fox, para esclarecer uno de los pasajes más obscuros de la historia reciente de México, fueron discretamente en retroceso. No obstante la reconstrucción de los acontecimientos en Tlatelolco que el decreto presidencial en 2001 preveía debe ser un reclamo que trascienda en cualquier administración federal.

El Estado Mexicano está obligado a garantizar el derecho a conocer la verdad sin importar el partido político en turno. Debe ordenar a las Secretarías de Estado, sobre todo aquellas que hicieron caso omiso en 2002, que continúen trasfiriendo al AGN la documentación que vayan identificando en sus archivos; que localicé la que se perdió o se traspapeló en el AGN, que decrete máxima publicidad a los documentos bajo resguardo y que ordene inmediatamente a la PGR integrar a sus expedientes originales la información relativa a los acontecimientos del 2 de octubre para su libre consulta.

Esta investigación concluye que la verdad sobre el conflicto estudiantil en 1968 estará lejos todavía si el gobierno en turno no tiene interés o voluntad en que se conozca. No hay explicaciones congruentes de por qué siguen en reserva cerca de 10.000 documentos, si el proceso en las instancias procuradoras de justicia ya finalizó; no las hay para el extravío de documentos y menos para el desacato en que incurrieron muchas dependencias.


DOCUMENTOS

DOCUMENTO 1
Enero 22, 2002
Acta de Transferencia de Documentación
9 páginas

El acta da cumplimiento al acuerdo presidencial, publicado en el Diario Oficial de la Federación el 27 de noviembre de 2001, mediante el cual se disponen diversas medidas para la procuración de justicia por delitos cometidos contra personas vinculadas con movimientos sociales y políticos del pasado.  Se resume la siguiente cifra: cajas 486, legajos 1,653 y un total de 150,713 hojas generadas en 36 Zonas Militares. El documento se encuentra firmado por la Dra. Stella María González Cicero, Directora General del Archivo General de la Nación y el Gral. De Div. DEM Roberto Miranda Sánchez, Director de la Dirección General del Archivo e Historia.

Fuente:
Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional

DOCUMENTO 2
Febrero 19, 2002
Acta Administrativa de Entrega-Recepción del Acervo Documental Transferido al Archivo General de la Nación
6 páginas

En cumplimiento al acuerdo presidencial del 27 de noviembre de 2002, la Secretaría de Gobernación transferiría al Archivo General de la Nación la totalidad de los archivos, expedientes, documentos e información en general que fueron generados por las extintas Dirección General de Seguridad y Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales. Dicha información actualmente se encuentran bajo custodia y conservación del Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional a efecto de que pueda ser consultada en los términos de dicho acuerdo. El Acta entrega-recepción fue signada por el entonces director del CISEN Eduardo Medina Mora Icaza y la directora del Archivo General de la Nación Dra. Stella María González Cicero contabilizaron 4223 cajas con un número aproximado de 58,302 (expedientes).

Fuente:
Archivo General de la Nación

DOCUMENTO 3
Enero 14, 2002
Memorándum Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores
1 página

Para cumplimiento del Acuerdo, del 27 de noviembre de 2001, la Subsecretaria para Derechos Humanos y Democracia, Mariclaire Acosta, transfiere dos expedientes relacionados con violaciones, generados hasta 1985, mismos que pudieran ser relevantes para la investigación. Los citados expedientes son remitidos en paquetes de 4 y 10 sobres cerrados, respectivamente, con el fin de que los mismos se integren al Archivo General de la Nación.

Fuente:
Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores

DOCUMENTO 4
Enero 16, 2002
Memorándum

Felipe de Jesús Preciado Coronado, Comisionado del Instituto Nacional de Migración informa: “…me permito transferir al Archivo General de la Nación un total de 15 expedientes originales pertenecientes al archivo de la Coordinación de Control y Verificación Migratoria y que contiene información presumiblemente relacionada con los hechos materia del citado Acuerdo Presidencial…”

El Comisionado concluye: “… se carece de elementos para determinar cuales (expedientes) estarían vinculados con hechos del pasado relacionados con violaciones a los derechos humanos o probablemente constitutivos de delitos cometidos en contra de personas vinculadas con movimientos sociales y políticos, por lo que desde luego, dicho acervo está a disposición de las instancias competentes que requieran consultarlo.”

Fuente:
Archivo General de la Nación

DOCUMENTO 5
Enero 22, 2002
Memorándum

La Dirección General del Registro Nacional de Población e Identificación Personal, informó lo siguiente el 22 de enero: “…esta Unidad Administrativa no cuenta con archivo documental de acuerdo a lo solicitado.”  El memorándum lo firma el Director General, Fernando Tovar y de Teresa.

Fuente:
Archivo General de la Nación

DOCUMENTO 6
Enero 10, 2002
Memorándum

La Dirección General de Asociaciones Religiosas, Dirección de Registro y Certificaciones refiere el titular, Guillermo Fuentes Maldonado, el 10 de enero de 2002: “Sobre el particular me permito informarle que en los archivos dependientes de la Dirección General de Asociaciones Religiosas de la Subsecretaría de Población, Migración y Asuntos Religiosos, no existen expedientes, documentos e información general que pudiera ser considerado como relevante para la investigación de los hechos del pasado.”

Fuente:
Archivo General de la Nación

DOCUMENTO 7
De junio 26, 2003 a enero 29, 2007
Lista de resguardos POT-AGN

Esta lista describe la información que Agentes de Ministerio Público de la Federación (AMPF), colaboradores de la OFEMOSPP y ahora de la Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales sacaron de sus fondos documentales Un total de 9294 fojas y 27 fotografías fueron separadas de sus expedientes, volúmenes y legajos originales; además de tres cajas íntegras. El índice de expedientes señala la fecha de resguardo, fundamento legal, periodo, número de fojas, dependencia donde se encuentra en reserva y el responsable de ésta.

TOP-SECRET – Bureau of Public Debt Records Eyeball

Bureau of Public Debt Records Eyeball

Federal Register, August 17, 2011

Systems Covered by this Notice

    This notice covers all systems of records adopted by the Bureau of
the Public Debt up to April 1, 2011. The systems notices are reprinted
in their entirety following the Table of Contents.

    Dated: August 11, 2011.
Veronica Marco,
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Privacy, Transparency, and
Records.

Table of Contents

Bureau of the Public Debt
BPD.001--Human Resources and Administrative Records
BPD.002--United States Savings-Type Securities
BPD.003--United States Securities (Other than Savings-Type
Securities)
BPD.004--Controlled Access Security System
BPD.005--Employee Assistance Records
BPD.006--Health Service Program Records
BPD.007--Gifts to Reduce the Public Debt
BPD.008--Retail Treasury Securities Access Application
BPD.009--U.S. Treasury Securities Fraud Information System

TREASURY/BPD.001

System Name:
    Human Resources and Administrative Records--Treasury/BPD.

System Location(s):
    Records are maintained at the following Bureau of the Public Debt
locations: 200 Third Street, Parkersburg, WV; 320 Avery Street,
Parkersburg, WV; Second and Avery Streets, Parkersburg, WV; and 799 9th
Street, NW., Washington, DC.

Bureau of Public Debt Records

Eyeball

200 Third Street, Parkersburg, WV[Image]
[Image]
[Image]
[Image]

TOP-SECRET – TEMPEST and Countermeasures Cables

A sends:

The following 5 cables contain both the word “TEMPEST” and “countermeasures”, all are SECRET//NOFORN:

08BISHKEK293

09STATE869

09STATE23578

09STATE29526

09STATE29527 (Appears to be duplicate of 09STATE29526)

Also:

– 09STATE23578 (Appears to be duplicate of 09STATE29526)

Source: http://laurelai.info/mirrors/cablegate/

The State Department section 12 FAH (Foreign Affairs Handbook) is classified.


VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEK #0293/01 0870902
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 270902Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0846

S E C R E T BISHKEK 000293 

SIPDIS 

NOFORN
SIPDIS 

DEPT FOR ACTION OF OIG
DEPT FOR NEA/SCA/EX BILL HAUGH
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN DAVID GEHRENBECK 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2033
TAGS: AMGT ASEC ASIG AISG
SUBJECT: EMBASSY BISHKEK RESPONSES TO RECOMMENDATIONS
LISTED IN OIG REPORT NUMBER ISP-S-08-14A, FEBRUARY 2008 

REF: A. MCCORMICK/AMBASSADOR YOVANOVITCH E-MAIL DATED
        FEBRUARY 29 2008
     B. OIG REPORT NUMBER ISP-S-08-14A FEBRUARY 2008 

Classified By: DCM Lee Litzenberger for Reasons 1.4(g) 

Here follows Embassy Bishkek responses to the formal and
informal recommendations listed in OIG report number
ISP-S-08-14A. 

1.  (C/NF)  Recommendation 1: Embassy Bishkek should continue
to coordinate with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings
Operations to ensure near term installation of locally
fabricated mantraps for the vehicle entrances to the embassy
compound.
(Action: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination with OBO) 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: Post has contracted via RPSO Frankfurt with a
German Architectural and Engineering firm to provide 100%
design and construction documents for the Mantrap project. To
date, Post and OBO have received the 35% design submittal for
review and have returned comments. Although most recently
some contractual problems have slowed the design effort, Post
is confident these issues will be resolved quickly and 100%
design documents can be delivered by 30 April. After
receiving the final construction documents and OBO Building
Permit, Post will proceed to the contracting and construction
phase. 

2.  (C/NF)  Recommendation 2: The Bureau of Overseas
Buildings Operations, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek,
should replace the damaged forced-entry/ballistic-resistant
window on the compound access control guard booth servicing
the employee parking lot. (Action: OBO, in coordination with
Embassy Bishkek) 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: Post identified the proper replacement glass and
ordered the glass directly from Norshield in coordination
with OBO/PE/CC/SPE via purchases order SKG-100-08-M-0057. The
order for the replacement glass was placed on 01/17/08. On
03/05/08, Post learned that the window reached our dispatch
agent in New Jersey. Post anticipates the window will arrive
06/08. Once the replacement glass is received, Post will
coordinate with Larry Best and Koburn Stoll from
OBO/PE/CC/SPE to request an FE/BR door and window team for
installation. 

3.  (SBU)  Recommendation 3: Embassy Bishkek should implement
flexible work hours for embassy personnel and encourage
employees to vary their arrival and departure times. (Action:
Embassy Bishkek) 

Management decision: Post concurs in part. 

Response: Post is not prepared to implement flexible working
hours Embassy wide, but prefers a stepped approach to arrival
times by section to help alleviate vehicles waiting outside
of the compound to be screened, which is a the security
concern that prompted this recommendation. Post has analyzed
the congestion problems and contends that the congestion is
primarily focused at Post 26 (vehicle CAC) from between 0800
to 0830 while vehicles are waiting for security screening.
Post Management has instructed the Facilities Maintenance
Section to alter their working hours so that this section
would start work at 0800 vice 0830. The Facilities
Maintenance Section is by far the largest section that
reports directly to the Embassy every morning and modifying
their arrival time by 30 minutes should eliminate waiting
lines for security screening while still maintaining positive
management controls over staff. In addition, the RSO
regularly advises all American Staff to vary their routes and
times to and from work. 

4.  (C/NF)  Recommendation 4: The Bureau of Overseas
Buildings Operations should assess the integrity of all
affected chancery windows and advise the embassy of any
needed work to bring the windows into compliance with
security standards. (Action: OBO) 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: Yvonne Manderville from OBO/PE/DE/SEB visited Post
in March 2008. Manderville stated that adhesive properties of
the gasket material have failed and caused the gasket to 

separate from the window pane which has resulted in the
degradation of the ballistic properties of the window
assemblies. Manderville recommended that Post petition for
inclusion in the FEBR window and door   replacement program.
Post is drafting a cable to OBO and DS requesting a formal
condition survey of all FE/BR windows and doors. In this
cable Post will also petition for inclusion in the Life Cycle
Replacement program. Request will be submitted by May 1, 2008. 

5.  (S/NF)  Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek, should
conduct a complete TEMPEST review of all permanent and
temporary classified processing areas at post and provide
detailed instructions regarding countermeasures that should
be employed to mitigate any proven TEMPEST noncompliance or
threat. (Action: DS in coordination with Embassy Bishkek) 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: Post will review and implement the recommendations
from the May 2007 Technical Security Assessment. Post has
contacted Lee Mason and Mark Steakley from DS/ST/CMP/ECB to
request and schedule a TEMPEST review. Mason and Steakley
were contacted in mid March and Post is waiting follow-up and
confirmation. 

6.  (SBU)  Recommendation 6: Embassy Bishkek should establish
a viable alternate command center. (Action: Embassy Bishkek) 

Management decision: Post does not concur. 

Response: The current alternate command center represents the
best option presently available to Embassy Bishkek. The
alternate command center is located south of Bishkek not far
from the Kyrgyz Presidential mansion and the Diplomatic
village. While the road infrastructure could be improved, the
location is not remote. In addition, the location is well
suited for a helicopter landing zone.  There is a large field
approximately 600 meters wide and 2 kilometers in length that
could accommodate several transport helicopters in the event
of an evacuation. The alternate command center has a HF radio
base station that when last tested in December 2007 had
excellent link quality between Embassy Dushanbe (82%) and
Embassy Tashkent (91%). The alternate command center has two
computer workstations with dial-up internet access, a
photocopier, and a fax. There are two landlines, one IVG line
and two satellite phones. The alternate command center can be
placed into operation within 30 minutes as demonstrated in a
test in December 2007. Furthermore, the location has been
fully stocked with medical supplies, emergency rations and
water. Embassy Bishkek could not find any blast protection
requirements in the applicable Alternate Command Center
references in 12 FAH-1 H-261c and 12 FAH 1, Appendix 3. As
the Post housing pool evolves, Post will continue to seek a
better Alternate Command Center, but the current location is
the best option at the present time. 

7.  (SBU)  Recommendation 7: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings
Operations, in coordination with Embassy Bishkek, should
evaluate post's current safe haven and initiate a physical
security upgrade project to bring the safe haven into
conformance with current requirements. (Action: OBO, in
coordination with Embassy Bishkek) 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: Post's safe haven area is too small to protect all
employees assigned to Embassy Bishkek.  Until the annex is
built, Post initiated coordination with Yvonne Manderville
OBO/PE/DE/SEB and Dale Amdahl DS/PCB/PSD to identify and
implement viable alternatives such as constructing safe areas
in the warehouse, facilities maintenance building and health
unit/caf. Post's floor warden training addresses refuge
locations within the Chancery. 

8.  (SBU)  Recommendation 8: Embassy Bishkek should develop
and implement a formal agreement with Manas Air Base for the
evacuation of Americans and qualifying locally employed staff
members. (Action: Embassy Bishkek) 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: The Embassy has explored the recommendation. In
doing so we have learned that a formal agreement between
Embassy Bishkek and Manas Coalition Airbase for the
evacuation of Americans and qualifying locally employed staff
members and selected foreign nationals, is not necessary to
ensure Noncombatant Evacuation Operations are accomplished, 

and the base is not authorized by USCENTCOM to conclude such
an agreement. There are mechanisms in place for the efficient
and proper coordination and planning for this contingency
which should be followed to ensure forces and assets are
available during emergency situations. Embassy Bishkek has
therefore  coordinated with USCENTCOM to ensure contingency
planning options are in-place, to include evacuation of
Embassy personnel, and fully coordinated with other affected
agencies (USTRANSCOM, DOS, and JCS) IAW applicable
directives. 

9.  (SBU)  Recommendation 9: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination
with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should conduct a
security assessment to determine whether static residential
guards are required in addition to the centralized alarm
monitoring system and mobile patrol. (Action: Embassy
Bishkek, in coordination with DS) 

Management decision: Post concurs, with comment. 

Response: Post will conduct, in coordination with the Bureau
of Diplomatic security an assessment outlined in 12 FAH-6
H-521.1. Post is confident the assessment will reaffirm that
the residential security program is necessary for the safety
and security of personnel assigned to Embassy Bishkek.
Targeted date for completion is 30 June 2008. 

The greatest threat against Americans in Bishkek is crime. In
February 1994 Embassy Bishkek instructed the Local Guard
Commander to implement a night residential security program.
In October 2002, the RSO identified a local alarm company
that had the technical capability to install and monitor
alarms and panic buttons at Embassy residences. However, in
January 2008 the new Minister of Internal Affairs announced
that MVD would no longer provide a quick reaction force to
respond to alarms. In addition, RSO Bishkek is only
authorized one, 24 hour mobile patrol. This means that
response time to residences in the event of an emergency is
too slow. Although the distance between the southernmost and
northernmost residence is only 8 miles, the infrastructure
and traffic can delay response time by more than 30 minutes.
In addition, Mobile Patrol can only check each residence two
or three times in a 12 hour shift.  This situation is
untenable. 

Since 2006, residential LGF have detected and deterred 4
instances of attempted vandalism to Embassy employee vehicles
at their residences. LGF residential guards have deterred
assault and when tasked provided temporary 24 hour
residential security for American Officers who the RSO had
reason to believe were being threatened by host nation
intelligence and or organized crime. Finally, residential
security guards were able to monitor and report regarding an
incident in which a vehicle belonging to the son-in-law of
the former deputy chief of the Kyrgyz Intelligence service
was deliberately torched within 30 feet of an apartment
building which, at the time, housed four Embassy employees
and their families. Since the Embassy began using the alarm
company, the Police have not had to respond to incidents at
residences during the night when the guards were present. The
alarms have only been needed during the day when the guards
are not present. The statistic speaks for itself. The
residential guards are a definite deterrent against acts of
violence and vandalism against American Officers. Embassy
Bishkek, if required to choose between residential alarms and
residential guards, would choose to maintain the residential
guards, as a more viable means of protecting the lives of the
American officers and their dependents. 

10.  (C/NF)  Recommendation 10: Embassy Bishkek should
install shatter-resistant window film on all windows that the
regional security officer considers vulnerable at the chief
of mission residence. (Action: Embassy Bishkek) 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: Post's Facilities Maintenance Section has scheduled
a survey of the CMR to identify all windows that are not
currently protected by shatter-resistant window film. Post
currently has film on hand and will contract with a local
contractor for installation. Targeted date of completion is
May 31, 2008. 

11.  (SBU)  Recommendation 11: Embassy Bishkek should install
grilles on all accessible windows in the chief of mission
residence safe area and fit one window grille with an
interior emergency release device for emergency egress.
(Action: Embassy Bishkek) 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: RSO in conjunction with the FM at Post has
scheduled a review and update of the existing physical
security assessment of the CMR in accordance with residential
security standards 12 FAH-6 H-400, 12 FAH-6 H-113.10 and 12
FAH-8 H-520. Any deficiencies discovered during this review
will be corrected to conform to the standards. Targeted date
of completion is July 31, 2008. 

12.  (U)  Recommendation 12: Embassy Bishkek should pursue
and secure a formal agreement with Manas Air force Base,
including reimbursement, for investigative support provided
by the regional security office. (Action: Embassy Bishkek) 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: Post FMO has contacted Manas Air Base Chief
Financial Officer regarding this recomendation and has
requested a meeting to explore the concept of reimbursement
for investigative services provided by the Embassy on behalf
of Manas Air Base. Post RSO and FMO are working closley to
accurately identify and quantify associated cost related to
investigations. Once Post's analysis is complete the FMO will
coordinate with Manas Air Base Chief Finance Officer to
establish a formal agreement that outlines workload counts
and a reimbursement plan for investigations completed by RSO
Foreign Service National Investigators on behalf of Manas Air
Base. 

13.  (C/NF)  Recommendation 13: Embassy Bishkek, in
coordination with the Bureaus of Overseas Buildings
Operations and Diplomatic Security, should modify the
facility manager's existing office space to bring it into
compliance with current physical security protection
standards. (Action: Embassy Bishkek, in coordination with OBO
and DS) 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: Although Post concurs with this recommendation, a
short term solution is unlikely. The existing Facilities
Managers Office is a loft in the Maintenance Shop Building.
This building is a pre-engineered building (Butler Building)
and is physically unable to handle the load that would be
applied to the structure by the addition of making this area
compliant with current physical security protection
standards. Post has been actively pursuing with OBO a new
office annex (NOX), which is a long term solution to
holistically address all of our space and space related
security concerns. Post is currently on the "Top 80 List" for
2011 and a back-up for 2010. However, Embassy Bishkek
Facilities Maintenance Officer and the Regional Security
Officer will prepare a waiver and exception package for
DS/PSD/PCB review and approval. Targeted date for submission
of the waiver and exception request to DS/PSD/PCB is June
2008. 

14.  (C/NF)  Informal Recommendation 1: The inner CAC
building (post two) lacks any form of protective window
treatment on its windows. Occupants are susceptible to flying
glass if a bomb attack occurred on the east side of the
compound. Embassy Bishkek should install shatter-resistant
window film on all post two windows that the regional
security officer deems vulnerable to blast. 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: Post's Facilities Maintenance Section will conduct
a survey of Post 2 and identify all windows that are not
currently protected by shatter-resistant window film. Post
currently has film on hand and will contract with a local
contractor for installation. Targeted date of completion is
May 31, 2008. 

15.  (C/NF)  Informal Recommendation 2: The presence of a
concrete barrier adjacent to the east side vehicular CAC, a
large boulder adjacent to the northwest corner of the
compound wall, and a stoplight fixture adjacent to the
service CAC provide footholds that an intruder could use to
scale the compound wall. Embassy Bishkek should remove or
relocate the concrete barrier, boulder, and stoplight that
are adjacent to the embassy compound fence. 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: In March Post relocated the concrete barriers and 

large boulders so that they are at least 2.75 meters from the
compound wall and can no longer be used as a foothold. The
location of the stoplight fixture will be relocated during
the construction of the mantrap for that CAC later this year. 

16.  (C/NF)  Informal Recommendation 3: The rear hardline
door leading to the temporary trailers is not covered by an
exterior camera. The Marine at Post One cannot positively
determine who he is letting into the chancery. Without
a camera, he could either allow an intruder to enter or deny
entry to a trusted employee in an emergency. Embassy Bishkek
should install a camera to cover this area. 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: The regional ESO from Astana concurs with this
recommendation; ESO will relocate camera #28 so that it
provides video coverage of this entrance to the Chancery.
Additional materials required for this project are on-hand
and this project has been added to the active work list as a
priority. Targeted completion date is June 30th 

17.  (SBU)  Informal Recommendation 4: The emergency plan for
Embassy Bishkek has not been entered into the crisis and
emergency planning application. Embassy Bishkek should direct
section heads to input the missing data before February 2008. 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: In February Post completed the unclassified portion
of the EAP and entered it into the crisis and emergency
planning application. Post is waiting for DS/IP/SPC/EP to
advise that the software glitch has been fixed to allow Post
to publish the classified sections as well. 

18.  (SBU)  Informal Recommendation 5: The emergency
notification system does not cover the embassy's built-in
conference room or the workspace just outside the two CAA
temporary office trailers. Embassy Bishkek should install
speaker systems at these two locations. 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: The regional ESO from Astana concurs with this
recommendation; additional speakers and other materials
required for this project are on-hand and this project has
been added to the active work list as a priority. Targeted
completion date is June 30th. 

19. (SBU)  Informal Recommendation 6: The physical security
exceptions for three locations within the compound are not
valid. Embassy Bishkek should update the existing physical
security exceptions for the medical unit, cafeteria, and CAA
office trailers. 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: The waiver for exceptions to physical security
standards for the CAA office trailer is valid.  However, the
Health Unit/Caf waiver is no longer valid. As a result of
post growth, the Health Unit and Cafeteria are now staffed by
employees more than 4 hours per day.  Embassy Bishkek will
resubmit a waiver and exception packet for the health
unit/cafeteria. Targeted submission date is 30 June. 

20.  (U)  Informal Recommendation 7: Several apartment
stairwells do not have lighting at night. Embassy Bishkek
should explore gaining landlord agreement to install motion
activated lights in stairwells and issue flashlights to
employees in the interim. 

Management decision: Post does not concur. 

Response: Post has conducted an informal survey of all direct
hire American staff who receive Embassy provide housing and
other than individual incidents of actual light bulbs being
burned out, all stairwells have adequate lighting installed.
In addition to this, every Friday, the Facilities Maintenance
Section Electricians in conjunction with the Local Guard
Force make inspections of existing security lighting. Lights
are tested in guard booths and stairwells and any maintenance
work orders that have been submitted citing security lighting
issues are repaired at this time. 

21.  (C/NF)  Informal Recommendation 8: The grilles on the
CMR rear doors do not have latches and cannot be secured from
inside the residence. Embassy Bishkek should secure these
grilles. 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: RSO in conjunction with the FM at Post will review
and update the existing physical security assessment of the
CMR in accordance with residential security standards 12
FAH-6 H-400, 12 FAH-6 H-113.10 and 12 FAH-8 H-520. Any
deficiencies discovered during this review will be corrected
to conform to the standards. Expected completion date is 1
May 2008. 

22.  (C/NF)  Informal Recommendation 9: The passive infrared
sensor in the living room of the CMR on the rear of the
building is inoperative. Embassy Bishkek should repair this
infrared sensor. 

Management decision: Post concurs. 

Response: The local security company that installs and
maintains all of our residential alarm systems visited the
CMR on March 19, 2008. The entire alarm system was inspected
and tested. It was found that some faulty wiring was causing
the infrared sensor from operating properly, wiring was
repaired and a complete operational test was  conducted with
satisfactory results. 

YOVANOVITCH

R 061518Z JAN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
CIA WASHINGTON DC/DO/MSP-MCGSOC/ 2364
DIA WASHINGTON DC/
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3SOD//
HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL/
HQ EUCOM VAIHINGEN GE/
COMSOCEUR/
USASOC FT BRAGG NC/
AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL

S E C R E T STATE 000869 

DDSO FOR CAPT. SONG
USSOCOM FOR MR. BRIAN MILLER
POST FOR RSO
POST FOR IMO
POST FOR ADANA
PRETORIA FOR RIMC 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2018
TAGS: ACOA AEMR AMGT ASEC
SUBJECT: EUCOM(AF) REGIONAL SURVEY TEAM PCC ACCESS -
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 

REF: A. USSOCOM SCSO J2 MACDILL AFB
     B. FL 111131Z DEC 08
     C. 08 ANKARA 2153 

Classified By: JAMES MCDERMOTT, DIRECTOR, DS/IP/SPC,
REASON 1.4(G) 

1. (U) ACTION POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF
THIS TELEGRAM  VIA CABLE TO INFO DS/IP/SPC AND
IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/CSB STATING CONCURRENCE AND/OR  NONCONCURRENCE. 

2. (U) FOR ATO AF: PLEASE FORWARD YOUR ACCESS AUTHORIZATION
REQUEST TO  IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/CSB AND INFO DS/IP/SPC.  ANY
FURTHER INQUIRIES CAN BE DIRECTED  TO YOUR OC/COMSEC. 

3. (U) IRM/BPC/CST/LD/OB AND IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/CSB HAVE CLEARED
THIS TELEGRAM. 

4. (S) THE FOLLOWING RST MEMBERS WILL VISIT AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AS WELL AS CONSULATE GENERAL ISTANBUL AND US CONSULATE ADANA
ON JANUARY 14, 2009 TO FEBRUARY 14, 2009 TO  CONDUCT A
SECURITY PROGRAM SURVEY OF THE  FACILITY.  THE FOLLOWING TEAM
MEMBERS WHO POSSESS TOP SECRET (TS)  CLEARANCES ARE
AUTHORIZED ESCORTED ACCESS TO THE PCC IN ACCORDANCE WITH
5FAH-6 H124.4 E, G, H: 

NAME                    SSN         CLEARANCE 

MANN, JAMES R.          XXX-XX-XXXX TS/SCI
MCKINNON, ISAIAH        XXX-XX-XXXX TS/SCI
DRAPER, DONALD W.       XXX-XX-XXXX TS/SCI 

5. (S) PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE PCC IS AUTHORIZED UNDER THE
FOLLOWING CONDITIONS: 

     (A) THE SHIELDED ENCLOSURE, MG SET, AC POWER FILTERS,
AND ISOLATION  TRANSFORMER ARE NOT TO BE FILMED OR
PHOTOGRAPHED; THEREFORE, ARRANGE TO  HAVE THIS EQUIPMENT
COVERED DURING FILMING/PHOTOGRAPHY OF AREA. 

     (B) ALL ELECTRONIC PROCESSING OF CLASSIFIED DATA MUST
HALT DURING THE  USE OF ANY ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT UTILIZED BY
THE TEAM. 

     (C) ANY VIDEO TAPE OR PHOTOS TAKEN WITHIN THE PCC SHALL
BE CLASSIFIED  CONFIDENTIAL AND MARKED AND HANDLED AS SUCH. 

     (D) PLAY BACK OF CLASSIFIED VIDEO/AUDIO TAPE MUST BE
ACCOMPLISHED IN  A TEMPEST APPROVED MANNER. 

     (E) CLASSIFIED PLAIN TEXT MUST BE SECURED AND THE SURVEY
TEAM MUST  REMAIN UNDER ESCORT BY PCC PERSONNEL. 

6. (U) POC: DS/IP/SPC/SO: JAMES SPOO, BRANCH CHIEF, STE (571)
345-2532. 

RICE

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #3578 0711843
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 121826Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0000
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 0000
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0000
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0000

S E C R E T STATE 023578 

NOFORN
SEOUL FOR RSO IMO AND ESO
BEIJING FOR ESC
MANILA FOR RDSE (ACTING)
BANGKOK FOR RIMC
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: UPON CLOSURE OF U.S. EMBASSY SEOUL
TAGS: AADP ABLD ACOA AMGT ASEC KSEO KRIM KGIT KNET KCIP
SUBJECT: TEMPEST COUNTERMEASURES REQUIREMENTS - SEOUL 

REF: 00 STATE 126075 

Classified By: M.J. STEAKLEY, DS/ST/CMP, REASON: 1.4 (C) AND (G) 

1. (S/NF) These revised TEMPEST countermeasures requirements
are effective immediately. Requirements apply to the Chancery
at Seoul, located at 82 Sejong-ro.  Post's relevant threat
levels at the time of this  telegram are High for Technical
and High for Human Intelligence. 

2. (S) TEMPEST requirements are determined by the Certified
TEMPEST Technical Authority (CTTA) and approved by the
Countermeasures Division Director.  These requirements apply
to all information processing systems for this facility. 

A. (S) TOP SECRET and SCI CLASSIFIED Automated Information
System (AIS): Post is authorized to use TEMPEST Level 1 AIS
equipment for processing classified national security
information (NSI) at the TOP SECRET or SCI level within the
Embassy core area of the CAA.  Post is authorized to use
Commercial-off- the-Shelf (COTS) AIS equipment within a CSE
or equivalent that meets NSA 94-106 specifications. Use of
higher level equipment is approved. 

B. (S) SECRET (COLLATERAL) CLASSIFIED (AIS): Seoul is
authorized to use  TEMPEST Level 1 AIS equipment for
processing classified NSI at the SECRET level within
restricted and core areas of the CAA.  Post was previously
authorized Zone A equipment, but that equipment category is
being phased out and is no longer being procured.  By October
1, 2013, Seoul must have replaced all Zone A classified
processing equipment with TEMPEST Level 1 equipment.  Post is
authorized to use COTS AIS equipment within a certified
shielded enclosure (CSE) or equivalent that meets NSA 94-106
specifications. 

C. (S) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED AIS: Use of COTS AIS for
processing unclassified and sensitive but unclassified (SBU)
within the Embassy restricted area and core area of the CAA
is approved.  Unclassified and multimedia equipped
unclassified processing equipment to be used within a CAA
must be purchased, shipped, stored, installed, maintained and
repaired in accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-542, and may not be
located inside a CSE. 

3. (S) Secure video teleconferencing (SVDC), if requested,
will be addressed in a SEPTEL following completion of
coordination with VCI/VO. 

4. (S) All Classified Automated Information System (CAIS)
equipment, components and peripherals must be secured in
accordance with Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB)
requirements for classified discussion, processing and/or
storage overseas.  Thin Clients with embedded flash memory,
at facilities with 24-hour cleared American presence, are
permitted to remain unsecured within the Controlled Access
Areas (CAA) as long as the equipment is rebooted prior to
vacating the premises. 

5. (S) Fiber optic cabling is required for classified
connectivity.  Fiber optic cabling is also required for
unclassified (SBU) connectivity for any IT equipment located
within a CSE.  Equipment used to process classified
information outside a CSE must be installed, to the maximum
extent possible, in accordance with Recommendation A of
NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2-95 with the following additional
requirements: 

- Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical)
from other computer and electronic equipment used for
unclassified information processing. 

- Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical)
from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded
telephone or signal lines that do not leave USG-controlled
property (for example, phone lines that go to the post phone
switch). 

- Be located a minimum of two meters (six feet spherical)
from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded
telephone or signal lines that transit USG-controlled
property (for example, direct phone lines that do not go
through the post telephone switch, telephone switch lines
going out, any wire going to antennas on the roof, etc). 

- Be located a minimum of 3 meters (ten feet spherical) from
active radio transmitters (two-way radios, high frequency
transceivers, satellite transceivers, cellular devices,
Wi-Fi devices, Bluetooth, etc.) and must not use the same AC
power circuit as active radio transmitters (to include cell
phone chargers). 

- Be located a minimum of three meters (ten feet spherical)
from cable television antenna feeds and any Warren switch
with the switch on.  This distance can be reduced to one
meter if the Warren switch is off when processing classified. 

- Be located to have no physical contact with any other
office equipment or cabling. 

6. (S) Classified conversations up to SECRET may be conducted
in the CAA offices or vaults in accordance with 12 FAH-6
H-313.10-4. Classified discussions shall be conducted in CAA
spaces with DS-approved acoustic countermeasures or in secure
conference rooms (SCRs) or equivalent according to the OSPB
Conduct of Classified Conversations standard.  Classified
conversations above the SECRET level are restricted to
relevant core areas. 

7. (U) All requirements apply to all agencies under Chief of
Mission authority and pertain to the Chancery building only.
Tenant agencies may employ additional TEMPEST countermeasures
within their respective offices. 

8. (U) For further information or clarification regarding 12
FAH-6 H-540 Automated Information Systems Standards, please
contact DS/CS/ETPA.  For other, TEMPEST related issues,
please contact the Department CTTA at DSCTTA@state.sgov.gov. 

9. (U) Post must verify that these TEMPEST countermeasures
have been implemented and report so in an updated Technical
Security Assessment (TSA).  All proposed change requests to a
CAA countermeasures environment must be sent to the
Department, identified for DS/ST/CMP action. 

10. (U) This telegram should be retained by Post until
superseding requirements are received.
CLINTON

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #9526 0861053
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 271035Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0000
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0000
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0000
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 0000
RUEHNW/DIR DTSPO WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T STATE 029526 

NOFORN
AMMAN FOR RSO IMO AND ESO
ABU DHABI FOR ESC
CAIRO FOR RDSE
FRANKFURT FOR RIMC
DTSPO FOR BRS/CMD/TCSC
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: UPON CLOSURE OF U.S. EMBASSY AMMAN
TAGS: AADP ABLD ACOA AMGT ASEC KSEO KRIM KGIT KNET KCIP
SUBJECT: TEMPEST COUNTERMEASURES REQUIREMENTS - AMMAN 

REF: A. 95 STATE 230596
     B. 06 STATE 13022 

Classified By: M.J. STEAKLEY, DS/ST/CMP, REASON: 1.4 (C) AND (G) 

1. (S/NF) These revised TEMPEST countermeasures requirements
are effective immediately.  Requirements apply to the
Chancery at Amman, Jordan, located at Abdoun, Al-Umawyeen
Street, Amman, Jordan.  Amman,s threat levels at the time of
this telegram are MEDIUM for Technical and MEDIUM for Human
Intelligence. 

2. (S) TEMPEST requirements are determined by the Certified
TEMPEST Technical Authority (CTTA) and approved by the
Countermeasures Division Director.  These requirements apply
to all information processing systems for this facility. 

A. (S) TOP SECRET and Sensitive Compartmented Information
(SCI) CLASSIFIED Automated Information System (AIS): Post is
authorized to use TEMPEST Level 2 AIS equipment for
processing classified national security information (NSI) at
the TOP SECRET or SCI level within the Embassy core area of
the controlled access area (CAA).  Within a certified
shielded enclosure (CSE) or equivalent that meets NSA 94-106
specifications, post is authorized to use
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) AIS equipment. 

B. (S) SECRET (COLLATERAL) CLASSIFIED (AIS): Post is
authorized to use TEMPEST Level 2 AIS equipment for
processing classified NSI at the SECRET level  within
restricted and core areas of the CAA.  Post is authorized to
use COTS AIS equipment within a certified shielded enclosure
(CSE) or equivalent that meets NSA 94-106 specifications. 

NOTE: Post currently has COTS equipment installed for
classified processing at the SECRET level outside of a CSE.
This equipment must be replaced with TEMPEST Level 2 or
TEMPEST Level 1 compliant AIS within 24 months of the date of
this telegram.  Effective immediately, all new procurements
must be for TEMPEST Level 2 or TEMPEST Level 1 compliant
equipment. 

C. (S) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED AIS: Use of COTS AIS for
processing unclassified and sensitive but unclassified (SBU)
within the Embassy restricted and core area of the CAA is
approved.  Unclassified and multimedia-equipped unclassified
processing equipment to be used within a CAA must be
purchased, shipped, stored, installed, maintained and
repaired in accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-542, and may not be
located inside a CSE. 

3. (S) Secure video-teleconferencing and data collaboration
(SVDC) system installation and operation was previously
authorized in REFTEL (B).  As a result of the TEMPEST
requirements change announced in this telegram, the current
SVDC equipment must either be replaced with TEMPEST Level 1
compliant equipment or the existing SVDC COTS equipment must
be relocated and installed inside a CSE. Request that Post,s
RSO notify DS/CMP/ECB within 60 days of this telegram whether
SVDC equipment will remain in its current location and be
upgraded to TEMPEST Level 1 or if the existing SVDC COTS
equipment will be moved inside a CSE.  Should Post decide to
move the existing SVDC COTS equipment to a different location
inside a CSE, a new SVDC check list must be prepared and
submitted, and a new authorization telegram will be issued by
DS/ST/CMP to formalize the decision. 

4. (S) All Classified Automated Information System (CAIS)
equipment, components and peripherals must be secured in
accordance with Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB)
requirements for classified discussion, processing and/or
storage overseas.  Thin clients with embedded flash memory,
at facilities with 24-hour cleared American presence, are
permitted to remain unsecured within the CAA as long as the
equipment is rebooted prior to vacating the premises. 

5. (S) Fiber optic cabling is required for classified
connectivity.  Fiber optic cabling is also required for
unclassified (SBU) connectivity for any information
technology equipment located within a CSE.  Equipment used to
process classified information outside a CSE must be
installed, to the maximum extent possible, in accordance with
Recommendation E of NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95A with the following
additional requirements: 

- Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical)
from other computer and electronic equipment used for
unclassified information processing. 

- Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical)
from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded
telephone or signal lines that do not leave USG-controlled
property (for example, phone lines that go to the post phone
switch). 

- Be located a minimum of two meters (six feet spherical)
from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded
telephone or signal lines that transit USG-controlled
property (for example, direct phone lines that do not go
through the post telephone switch, telephone switch lines
going out, any wire going to antennas on the roof, etc). 

- Be located a minimum of 3 meters (ten feet spherical) from
active radio transmitters (two-way radios, high frequency
transceivers, satellite transceivers, cellular devices,
Wi-Fi devices, Bluetooth, etc.) and must not use the same AC
power circuit as active radio transmitters (to include cell
phone chargers). 

- Be located a minimum of three meters (ten feet spherical)
from cable television antenna feeds and any Warren switch
with the switch on.  This distance can be reduced to one
meter if the Warren switch is off when processing classified. 

- Be located to have no physical contact with any other
office equipment or cabling. 

6. (S) Classified conversations up to SECRET may be conducted
in the CAA offices or vaults in accordance with 12 FAH-6
H-311.10-4.  Classified conversations above the SECRET level
are restricted to relevant core areas. 

7. (U) All requirements apply to all agencies under Chief of
Mission authority, and pertain to the Chancery building only.
 Tenant agencies may employ additional TEMPEST
countermeasures within their respective offices. 

8. (U) For further information or clarification regarding 12
FAH-6 H-540 Automated Information Systems Standards, please
contact DS/CS/ETPA.  For other TEMPEST-related issues, please
contact Department CTTA at DSCTTA@state.sgov.gov. 

9. (U) In accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-533.2, Post must verify
that these TEMPEST countermeasures have been implemented;
DS/ST/CMP requests Post report so in an updated Technical
Security Assessment (TSA).  All proposed change requests to a
CAA countermeasures environment must be sent to the
Department, identified for DS/ST/CMP action. 

10. (U) This telegram should be retained by Post until
superseding requirements are received.
CLINTON

VZCZCXRO1998
RR RUEHCI
DE RUEHC #9527/01 0861055
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 271037Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 3202
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 9276
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0314
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3759
RUEHNW/DIR DTSPO WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 029527 

NOFORN
KOLKATA FOR RSO AND IMO
NEW DELHI FOR ESC AND RIMC
MANILA FOR RDSE (ACTING)
BANGKOK FOR RIMC
DTSPO FOR BRS/CMD/TCSC
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: UPON CLOSURE OF U.S. CONSULATE KOLKATA
TAGS: AADP ABLD AMGT ACOA ASEC KSEO KRIM KGIT KNET KCIP
SUBJECT: TEMPEST COUNTERMEASURES REQUIREMENTS - KOLKATA 

REF: 94 STATE 261557 

Classified By: M.J. STEAKLEY, DS/ST/CMP, REASON: 1.4 (C) AND (G) 

1. (S/NF) These revised TEMPEST countermeasures requirements
are effective immediately.  Requirements apply to the
Chancery at Kolkata, located at 5/1 Ho Chi Minh Sarani,
Kolkata West Bengal, India.  Kolkata,s relevant threat
levels at the time of this telegram are Medium for Technical
and Medium for Human Intelligence. 

2. (S) TEMPEST requirements are determined by the Certified
TEMPEST Technical Authority (CTTA) and approved by the
Countermeasures Division Director.  These requirements apply
to all information processing systems for this facility. 

A. (S) TOP SECRET and Sensitive Compartmented Information
(SCI) CLASSIFIED Automated Information System (AIS): Post is
not currently authorized for processing classified national
security information (NSI) at the TOP SECRET or SCI level.
TEMPEST requirements will be provided for processing at this
level once authorized. 

B. (S) SECRET (COLLATERAL) CLASSIFIED AIS: Post is authorized
to use TEMPEST Zone B or TEMPEST Level 2 AIS equipment for
processing classified NSI at the SECRET level within
restricted and core areas of the controlled access area
(CAA).  Use of higher level equipment is approved.  Post is
authorized to use commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) AIS
equipment within a certified shielded enclosure (CSE) or
equivalent that meets NSA 94-106 specifications. 

NOTE: Post currently has Zone B compliant equipment installed
for classified processing, and this equipment may continue to
be used for processing at the SECRET level until September,
2011.  All new procurements must be for TEMPEST Level 2
compliant equipment.  By October 2011, all classified
processing at Post must be on TEMPEST Level 2 equipment.  Use
of higher level equipment is approved. 

C. (S) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED (SBU) AIS: Use of COTS AIS
for processing SBU information within the restricted and core
area of the Embassy CAA is approved. 

3. (S) Secret-High Video-teleconferencing and Data
Collaboration (SVDC), if requested, will be addressed in a
SEPTEL following completion of coordination with VCI/VO. 

4. (S) All Classified Automated Information System (CAIS)
equipment, components and peripherals must be secured in
accordance with Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB)
requirements for classified discussion, processing and/or
storage overseas.  Thin clients with embedded flash memory,
at facilities with a 24-hour cleared American presence, are
permitted to remain unsecured within the CAA as long as the
equipment is rebooted prior to vacating the premises. 

5. (S) Fiber optic cabling is required for classified
connectivity.  Fiber optic cabling is also required for SBU
connectivity for any information technology equipment located
within a CSE.  Equipment used to process classified
information outside a CSE must be installed, to the maximum
extent possible, in accordance with Recommendation E of
NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2-95 with the following additional
requirements: 

- Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical)
from other computer and electronic equipment used for
unclassified information processing. 

- Be located a minimum of one meter (three feet spherical)
from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded
telephone or signal lines that do not leave USG-controlled
property (for example, phone lines that go to the post phone
switch). 

- Be located a minimum of two meters (six feet spherical) 

STATE 00029527  002 OF 002 

from telephones, modems, facsimile machines, and unshielded
telephone or signal lines that transit USG-controlled
property (for example, direct phone lines that do not go
through the post telephone switch, telephone switch lines
going out, any wire going to antennas on the roof, etc). 

- Be located a minimum of 3 meters (ten feet spherical) from
active radio transmitters (two-way radios, high frequency
transceivers, satellite transceivers, cellular devices,
Wi-Fi devices, Bluetooth, etc.) and must not use the same AC
power circuit as active radio transmitters (to include cell
phone chargers). 

- Be located a minimum of three meters (ten feet spherical)
from cable television antenna feeds and any Warren switch
with the switch on.  This distance can be reduced to one
meter if the Warren switch is off when processing classified. 

- Be located to have no physical contact with any other
office equipment or cabling. 

6. (S) Classified conversations up to SECRET may be conducted
in the CAA offices or vaults in accordance with 12 FAH-6
H-312.10-4.  Classified conversations above the SECRET level
are restricted to relevant core areas. 

7. (U) All requirements apply to all agencies under Chief of
Mission authority and pertain to the Chancery building only.
Tenant agencies may employ additional TEMPEST countermeasures
within their respective offices. 

8. (U) For further information or clarification regarding 12
FAH-6 H-540 Automated Information Systems Standards, please
contact DS/CS/ETPA.  For other TEMPEST-related issues, please
contact the Department CTTA at DSCTTA@state.sgov.gov. 

9. (U) In accordance with 12 FAH-6 H-533.2, Post must verify
that these TEMPEST countermeasures have been implemented;
DS/ST/CMP requests Post report so in an updated Technical
Security Assessment (TSA).  All proposed change requests to a
CAA countermeasures environment must be sent to the
Department, identified for DS/ST/CMP action. 

10. (U) This telegram should be retained by Post until
superseding requirements are received.
CLINTON

TOP-SECRET – Electronic Filing of Bank Secrecy Act Reports

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 180 (Friday, September 16, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 57799-57801]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-23841]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposal That
Electronic Filing of Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) Reports Be Required;
Comment Request

AGENCY: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Treasury.

ACTION: Notice and request for comments.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: FinCEN is proposing to require electronic filing of certain
Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) reports not later than June 30, 2012. This
requirement will significantly enhance the quality of our electronic
data, improve our analytic capabilities in supporting law enforcement
requirements and result in significant reduction in real costs to the
United States Government and ultimately to U.S. taxpayers.
Specifically, we propose mandatory electronic submission of all BSA
reports excluding the Report of International Transportation of
Currency or Monetary Instruments (CMIR).\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ All CMIRs are filed with the Department of Homeland
Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at the port of entry/
exit or mailed to the Commissioner of Customs in Washington, DC.
There are no electronic filing capabilities at the ports. A CBP
contractor keys the data on the completed form into a data tape that
is electronically uploaded to the BSA database. FinCEN receives no
paper filed CMIRs.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DATES: Comments should be submitted on or before November 15, 2011.

ADDRESSES: Written comments should be submitted to: Regulatory Policy
and Programs Division, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Department
of the Treasury, P.O. Box 39, Vienna, Virginia 22183, Attention: PRA
Comments--BSA Required Electronic Filing. BSA Required Electronic
Filing comments also may be submitted by electronic mail to the
following Internet address: regcomments@fincen.gov, with the caption,
``Attention: BSA Required Electronic Filing,'' in the body of the text.
    Inspection of comments. Comments may be inspected, between 10 a.m.
and 4 p.m., in the FinCEN reading room in Vienna, VA. Persons wishing
to inspect the comments submitted must request an appointment with the
Disclosure Officer by telephoning (703) 905-5034 (not a toll free
call).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The FinCEN Regulatory Helpline at 800-
949-2732, select option 7.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
    Title: Bank Secrecy Act, Reporting Forms, (31 CFR chapter X).
    Abstract: The statute generally referred to as the ``Bank Secrecy
Act,'' Titles I and II of Public Law 91-508, as amended, codified at 12
U.S.C. 1829b, 12 U.S.C. 1951-1959, and 31 U.S.C. 5311-5332, authorizes
the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary), inter alia, to require
financial institutions to file reports that are determined to have a
high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory matters, or
in the conduct of intelligence or counter-intelligence activities to
protect against international terrorism, and to implement counter-money
laundering programs and compliance procedures.\2\ Regulations
implementing Title II of the BSA appear at 31 CFR Chapter X. The
authority of the Secretary to administer the BSA has been delegated to
the Director of FinCEN.
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    \2\ Language expanding the scope of the BSA to intelligence or
counter-intelligence activities to protect against international
terrorism was added by Section 358 of the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (the USA PATRIOT Act), Public Law
107-56.
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    The Secretary was granted authority with the enactment of Title 31
U.S.C., to require financial institutions and other persons to file
various BSA reports. The information collected on the reports is
required to be provided pursuant to Title 31 U.S.C., as implemented by
FinCEN regulations found throughout 31 CFR chapter X. The information
collected pursuant to this authority is made available to appropriate
agencies and organizations as disclosed in FinCEN's Privacy Act System
of Records Notice.\3\
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    \3\ Treasury Department bureaus such as FinCEN renew their
System of Records Notices every three years unless there is cause to
amend them more frequently. FinCEN's System of Records Notice was
most recently published at 73 FR 42405, 42407-9 (July 21, 2008).
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    Current Action: In support of Treasury's paperless initiative and
efforts to make the government operations more efficient, FinCEN has
chosen to mandate electronic filing of certain BSA reports effective
June 30, 2012.
    This requirement will significantly enhance the quality of our
electronic data, improve our analytic capabilities in supporting law
enforcement requirements, and result in a significant reduction in real
costs to the U.S. government and ultimately to U.S. taxpayers.
Specifically, we propose to make mandatory the electronic submission of
all BSA reports excluding the CMIR.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ See supra note 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Background: Since October 2002, FinCEN has provided financial
institutions with the capability of electronically filing BSA reports
through its system called BSA E-Filing. Effective August 2011, the
system was expanded to support individuals filing the Report of Foreign
Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) report. BSA E-Filing is a secure,
Web-based electronic filing system. It is a flexible solution for
financial institutions or individuals, whether they file one BSA report
or thousands. BSA E-Filing is an accessible service that filers can
access by using their existing internet connections regardless of
connection speed. In addition, it is designed to minimize filing errors
and provide enhanced feedback to filing institutions or individuals,
thereby providing a significant improvement in data quality.
    BSA E-Filing, which is provided free of charge, features
streamlined BSA information submission; faster routing of information
to law enforcement; greater data security and privacy compared with
paper forms; long-term

[[Page 57800]]

cost savings to institutions, individuals, and the government; and
insures compatibility with future versions of BSA reports.
    In addition, BSA E-Filing offers the following features not
available on paper:
     Electronic notification of submissions, receipt of
submission, and errors, warnings, and alerts;
     Batch validation;
     Acknowledgement that a currency transaction report (CTR)
and or suspicious activity report (SAR) was filed;
     Feedback reports to filers;
     Faster receipt for money services businesses of
registration acknowledgement letter;
     Ability to send and receive secure messages;
     Use of Adobe forms that allows users to create templates,
reducing data entry but still providing for printing paper copies if
the filer wants to use a paper copy for its internal review and
approval processes;
     Ability for supervisory users to assign system roles to
their staff; and
     Availability of helpful training materials.
    In 2010, we initiated a complete redesign and rebuilding of a new
system-of-record that significantly enhances FinCEN's current technical
capabilities to receive, process, share, and store BSA data. A
significant part of this upgrade was the implementation of state-of-
the-art electronic reporting or information collection tools. As of
July 1, 2011, over 84% of BSA reports are filed electronically with
FinCEN.\5\ FinCEN annually measures customer satisfaction with BSA E-
Filing and has a performance goal of at least 90% satisfaction; in
Fiscal Year 2010, 96% of customers were satisfied with BSA E-Filing.\6\
To enroll with BSA E-Filing financial institutions or individuals go to
http://bsaefiling.fincen.treas.gov/main.html and follow four easy
steps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ As of July 2011, there are over 12,000 registered e-filers.
Of the 1250 major filers, 659 are currently e-filing. FinCEN
anticipates that many current paper filers will convert to e-file
when the new BSA E-Filing system becomes available.
    \6\ See FinCEN's 2010 Annual Report, available at
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/annual_report_fy2010.pdf.
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    As a result of the 2010 initiative, FinCEN is in the process of
fielding a new BSA Collection, Processing, and Analytic system. The new
system, which includes significant e-filing improvements, is designed
to support the most efficient state-of-the-art electronic filing. The
database will accept XML-based dynamic reports as well as certain other
file formats. The various file formats \7\ will be provided to permit
integration into in-house systems or for use by service providers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ The XML Schema, ACSII, and the electronic file
specifications will be provided at no cost to filers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All filings (batch, computer-to-computer, and discrete) will be
initiated through the BSA E-Filing system \8\ using current
registration and log-in procedures. Although batch and computer-to-
computer filing processes will remain unchanged, the file format will
change to match the database. Batch and computer-to-computer filers
will file reports, which are based on an electronic file specification
that will be provided free of charge. Discrete filings (the replacement
for submitting a single paper report) will be based on Adobe LiveCycle
Designer ES dynamic forms. The discrete function is available for all
small business report filers (as well as individuals). The discrete
filing function will be accessed by logging into the BSA E-Filing
System and entering a pre-approved user ID and password. During log-in
to the discrete filing option, filers will be prompted through a series
of questions.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ BSA E-Filing is a free Web-based service provided by FinCEN.
More information on the filing methods may be accessed at
http://bsaefiling.fincen.treas.gov/main.html.
    \9\ A series of predetermined questions designed to establish
the type of institution and filing in much the same manner as used
in widely accepted income tax filing software.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After log-in, a financial institution filing a report through the
discrete function will answer another set of questions that will
establish a subset of the data fields appropriate to the filer's
specific type of filing institution.
    Today's proposal requiring filers to submit certain BSA reports
electronically using the free FinCEN BSA E-Filing system will provide a
range of benefits. Electronic filing will also facilitate the rapid
dissemination of financial and suspicious activity information in
connection with BSA filings, making information contained in these
filings more readily available to--and more easily searchable by--law
enforcement, the financial regulatory community, and other users of BSA
data. Additionally, the proposal to require certain BSA reports to be
filed electronically will result in a significant reduction in the use
of paper, producing a positive environmental impact. Further, the
implementation of the proposal has the potential to save the government
a few million dollars per year through the reduction of expenditures
associated with current paper processing, in particular the physical
intake and sorting of incoming reports, and the electronic keying of
reported information into the database.
    Security: Mandatory electronic filing will provide increased
security not available with paper filings. At the present time, all
paper reports are mailed to the IRS Enterprise Computing Center--
Detroit (ECC-D) as unclassified mail with no special handling via the
U.S. Postal Service system. On occasion, mailed paper reports have been
delayed, and in some cases damaged beyond readability. A financial
institution may not discover that a report was not received by ECC-D
until many months after the report was due.\10\ For example, problems
with delivery of reports may not be discovered until the financial
institution is examined by its regulator, and the regulator compares a
list of the reports that are posted to the database against the
institution's official files. The BSA E-Filing System is a secure 128-
bit single socket layer protected Web-based filing system. Reports
received are acknowledged and any noted errors are reported back to the
filer. This process provides the filer with a record that the required
filing was received, as well as suggestions on how to improve the
accuracy of their future reports. Reports originated by the filer are
posted securely directly to the database, thereby significantly
reducing or eliminating possibility of data compromise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ The missing report becomes more critical if it was
reporting suspicious activity--especially when relating to terrorist
financing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Filer Impact Assessment

    a. Depository institutions: Based on information available we
believe this change in filing procedures will have minimal impact on
depository institutions. All depository institutions are currently
required to file quarterly call or thrift financial reports with their
regulator electronically through a Web-based portal provided by the
appropriate federal regulator. This same electronic connectivity may be
used to file BSA reports with FinCEN by logging in to the BSA E-Filing
System Web-based portal.
    b. Broker-Dealers, Future-Commission Merchants (FCMs), Introducing
Brokers in Commodities (IB-Cs), and Mutual Funds: \11\ Based on
information available we believe this change in filing procedures will
have minimal impact on these filing institutions. This group is highly
automated and enjoys robust electronic buying and selling systems with
sophisticated processing

[[Page 57801]]

and reporting systems.\12\ Currently the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) mandates electronic filing,\13\ as does the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ FinCEN is considering adding a SAR reporting requirement to
Investment Adviser's (IA's) registered with the SEC. Mandatory e-
filing will have minimum impact on this group.
    \12\ Currently both the SEC and the CFTC require electronic
reporting, The SEC through the EDGAR system and the CFTC through the
NFC Windjammer and Easy File systems.
    \13\ See http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/regoverview.htm.
    \14\ For financial institutions subject to CFTC oversight See
NFA Electronic Filings at
http://www.nfa.futures.org/NFA-electronic-filings/index.HTML.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    c. Insurance companies: Based on information available we believe
this change in filing procedures will have minimal impact on these
institutions. This group is highly automated.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ See the National Insurance Producer Registry (NIPR) at
http://www.nipr.com/. NIPR is a unique public-private partnership
that supports the work of the states and the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) in making the producer-licensing
process more cost-effective, streamlined and uniform for the benefit
of regulators, the insurance industry and the consumers they protect
and serve.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    d. Casinos and Card Clubs: \16\ Based on information available we
believe this change in filing procedures will have minimal impact on
these institutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ Casinos and Card Clubs with gross annual gaming revenues in
excess of $1 million (see 31 CFR1010.100 (t)(5)(ii) and (6)(ii)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    e. Money Services Businesses (MSBs): Information gained from a
review of the MSB filings of the currency transaction report (CTR),
SAR, and Registration of Money Services Business (RMSB) forms indicates
that some impact to this group can be expected. Information in trade
journals and other publications, along with informal comments from the
Internal Revenue Service Small Business/Self Employed, indicate that
most filers have Internet connectivity. MSBs routinely accept and
process credit card transactions requiring automated communications
with the approving card center. They also routinely place orders for
goods and services through the Internet and electronically access bill
paying services. Additionally, basic Internet access can be obtained
through a simple inexpensive dial-up connection or at professional
external Internet facilities such as service providers for those MSBs
without Internet connectivity. Lastly, FinCEN has included provisions
for requesting a hardship exception in this notice in case unforeseen
situations arise.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ See Filer impact paragraph ``g.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    f. Service Providers: There is a network of third-party service
providers with which financial institutions may contract to provide
electronic filing services to the BSA E-Filing System. FinCEN believes
this group to be highly automated and many are already using the BSA E-
Filing System. We do not anticipate that this proposal will have an
impact on this group.
    g. Small businesses: \18\ In support of small businesses, FinCEN's
Office of Compliance will provide a temporary hardship exemption
capability. A small business may request, and may be granted, an
emergency extension of up to one year if it can document a sufficiently
serious problem that prevents compliance with the new filing
requirements. The approved extension will be effective for one year
from the effective date of this notice.\19\ A hardship request based
solely on a lack of Internet connectivity or a business decision to
restrict Internet connectivity will not be considered adequate
justification for an extension.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ See the Small Business Administration's (SBA) Web site
http://www.sba.gov/content/what-sbas-definition-small-business-concern
for SBA's definition of a small business concern.
    \19\ Request for emergency extension will be mailed to:
Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network,
Attention RPP-CP, PO Box 39, Vienna, VA 22183 or may be e-mailed to:
regcomments@fincen.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    h. Individual filers: Effective August 2011, FinCEN expanded its
support of electronic filing to individuals.\20\ The capability to file
the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR Form TD F 90-
22.1) became available and individuals worldwide can sign up to file
their individual FBAR's by accessing the FinCEN E-Filing Web site.
Based on new applications to date, there is no indication of any issues
with individuals using this new capability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ See page 3 Background.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)

    Type of Review: Review of a new proposal to mandate the electronic
filing of BSA reports.
    Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profit and non-profit
institutions.
    Frequency: As required.
    Estimated Burden: Effective with the FinCEN IT Modernization, BSA
reporting will be supported by seven BSA reports.\21\ The burden for
electronic filing and recordkeeping of each BSA report is reflected in
the OMB approved burden \22\ for each of these reports. The non-
reporting recordkeeping burden is reflected separately.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ BSA-SAR, BSA-CTR, Designation Of Exempt Person, CMIR, RMSB,
Foreign Bank Account Report, and the Report of Cash Over $10,000
Received in a Trade or Business (Form 8300).
    \22\ See OMB Control Numbers 1506-0065, 1506-0064, 1506-0009,
1506-0013, 1506-0014, 1506-0018.
    \23\ See OMB Control Numbers 1506-0051 through 1506-0059.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Estimated number of respondents for all reports = 74,900.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ All filers subject to BSA reporting requirements excluding
CMIR. See supra note 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Estimated Total Annual Responses for all reports = 16,172,770.
    Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours = 20,874,761.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ Includes all reporting and recordkeeping burden associated
with filing BSA reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required
to respond to, a collection of information unless the collection of
information displays a valid OMB control number. Records required to be
retained pursuant to the BSA must be retained for five years.

Request for Comments

    Comments submitted in response to this notice will be summarized
and/or included in the request for OMB approval. All comments will
become a matter of public record. Comments are invited on: (a) Whether
the collection of information only by electronic means is necessary for
the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including
whether the information shall have practical utility; (b) the accuracy
of the agency's estimate of the burden of the collection of
information; (c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of
the information to be collected; (d) ways to minimize the burden of the
collection of information on respondents (filers), including through
the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of
information technology; (e) the practicality of utilizing external
Internet facilities or service providers to occasionally file BSA
reports, (f) estimates of capital or start-up costs and costs of
operation, maintenance, or purchase of services to provide information
by filers that currently do not have Internet access, and (g) the
enhanced security of sensitive information and significant cost savings
of electronic filing.

    Dated: September 13, 2011.
James H. Freis, Jr.,
Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.
[FR Doc. 2011-23841 Filed 9-15-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-02-P

TOP-SECRET – EIS of Huge Security Complex Along US-Canadian Border

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 180 (Friday, September 16, 2011)] [Notices] [Pages 57751-57754] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov] [FR Doc No: 2011-23993] ———————————————————————– DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Customs and Border Protection Notice of Availability of a Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Northern Border Activities AGENCY: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, DHS. ACTION: Notice of availability; Request for comments; Notice of public meetings. ———————————————————————– SUMMARY: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) announces that a Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) is now available and open for public comment. The Draft PEIS analyzes the potential environmental and socioeconomic effects associated with its ongoing and potential future activities along the Northern Border between the United States and Canada. The overall area of study analyzed in the document extends approximately 4,000 miles from Maine to Washington and 100 miles south of the U.S.-Canada Border. CBP also announces that it will be holding a series of public meetings in October to obtain comments regarding the Draft PEIS. DATES: CBP invites comments on the Draft PEIS during the 45 day comment period, which begins on September 16, 2011. To ensure consideration, comments must be received by October 31, 2011. Comments may be submitted as set forth in the ADDRESSES section of this document. CBP will hold public meetings on the Draft PEIS. The locations, dates, and times are listed in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document. ADDRESSES: You may submit comments related to the Draft PEIS by any of the following methods. Please include your name and address and the state or region to which the comment applies, as appropriate. To avoid duplication, please use only one of the following methods for providing comments: Project Web site: http://www.NorthernBorderPEIS.com/public-
involvement/comments.html
; E-mail: Comments@NorthernBorderPEIS.com; Mail: CBP Northern Border PEIS, P.O. Box 3625, McLean, Virginia 22102; Phone voicemail box: (866) 760-1421 (comments recorded in the voicemail box will be transcribed). You may download the Draft PEIS from the project Web site: http://www.NorthernBorderPEIS.com. It will also be made available on the Department of Homeland Security Web site (http://www.dhs.gov). Copies of the Draft PEIS may also be obtained by submitting a request through one of the methods listed below. Please include your name and mailing address in your request. E-mail: Comments@NorthernBorderPEIS.com and write “Draft PEIS” in the subject line; Mail: CBP Northern Border PEIS, (Draft PEIS Request), P.O. Box 3625, McLean, VA 22102; Phone: (866) 760-1421. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jennifer Hass, CBP, Office of Administration, telephone (202) 344-1929. You may also visit the project’s Web site at: http://www.NorthernBorderPEIS.com. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Public Meetings and Invitation To Comment CBP invites comments on all aspects of the Draft PEIS. Comments that will provide the most assistance to CBP will reference a specific section of the Draft PEIS, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include data, information, or authority that support such recommended change. Substantive comments received during the comment period will be addressed in, and included as an appendix to, the Final PEIS. The Final PEIS will be made available to the public through a Notice of Availability in the Federal Register. Comments may be submitted as described in the ADDRESSES section of this document. Respondents may request to withhold names or street addresses, except for city or town, from public view or from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. Such a request must be stated prominently at the beginning of the comment. Such requests will be honored to the extent allowed by law. This request to withhold personal information does not apply to submissions from organizations or businesses, or from individuals identifying themselves as representatives or officials of organizations or businesses. CBP will hold public meetings to inform the public and solicit comments about the Draft PEIS. Meetings will be held from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m. at each of the locations and dates provided below. The meeting in the Washington, DC area is for interested parties located outside of the project’s areas of interest. Meetings will include displays, handouts, and a presentation by CBP, and will provide an opportunity for the public to record their comments on the Draft PEIS. Changes in meeting plans, due to inclement weather or other causes, will be announced on the project’s Web site at: http://www.NorthernBorderPEIS.com, and on a telephone message at: (866) 760-1421. —————————————————————————————— Date City, state Location —————————————————————————————— October 3…. Duluth, MN…………. Holiday Inn, 200 West First Street, Duluth, MN 55802. October 4…. Massena, NY………… VFW, 101 W Hatfield St., Massena, NY 13662. October 4…. Caribou, ME………… Caribou Inn and Convention Center, 19 Main Street, Caribou, ME 04736. October 5…. Augusta, ME………… The Senator Inn & Spa, 284 Western Ave., Augusta, ME 04330. October 5…. Bottineau, ND………. Twin Oaks Resort & Convention Center, 10723 Lake Loop Road, Bottineau, ND 58318. October 6…. St. Albans, VT……… The Senator Historical Museum, 9 Church Street, St. Albans, VT 05478. October 6…. Detroit, MI………… Holiday Inn Express, 1020 Washington Boulevard, Detroit, MI 48226. October 6…. Havre, MT………….. The Town House Inn, 627 1st Street West, Havre, MT 59501. October 11… Bellingham, WA……… Hampton Inn, 3958 Bennett Drive, Bellingham, WA 98225. October 11… Rochester, NY………. Holiday Inn–Rochester Airport, 911 Brooks Avenue, Rochester, NY 14624. October 12… Erie, PA…………… Ambassador Banquet Center, 7794 Peach Street, Erie, PA 16509. October 13… Naples, ID…………. The Great Northwest Territories Event Center, 336 County Road 8, Naples, ID 83847. October 17… Washington, DC……… Crystal City Marriott at Regan National Airport, 1999 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, VA 22201. —————————————————————————————— [[Page 57752]] The public may obtain information concerning the status and progress of the PEIS, as well as view and download the document, via the project’s Web site at: http://www.NorthernBorderPEIS.com. Background U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is charged with the mission of enforcing customs, immigration, agriculture, and numerous other laws and regulations at the Nation’s borders and facilitating legitimate trade and travel through legal ports of entry. As the guardian of the United States’ borders, CBP protects the roughly 4,000 miles of Northern Border between United States and Canada, from Maine to Washington. The terrain ranges from densely forested lands on the west and east coasts to open plains in the middle of the country. CBP has completed a Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) for its ongoing and potential future activities along the Northern Border. The Draft PEIS is now available for public review and comment. (For instructions on obtaining a copy of the PEIS or on submitting comments, please see the ADDRESSES section of this document.) An Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is a study of the potential effects on the environment from a specific Federal action. A Programmatic EIS (PEIS) is an EIS that looks at the general types of effects of a whole broad program of actions. It often forms the foundation for a “regular” or site-specific EIS, which looks in general detail at the effects of a specific project slated for a particular place. Because this effort is programmatic in nature, the Draft PEIS does not define effects for a specific or planned action. Instead, it analyzes the overall environmental and socioeconomic effects of activities supporting the homeland security mission of CBP focused on applying alternative approaches to better secure the border. On July 6, 2010, CBP published in the Federal Register (75 FR 38822) a notice announcing that CBP intended to prepare four PEISs to analyze the environmental effects of current and potential future CBP border security activities along the Northern Border. Each PEIS was to cover one region of the Northern Border: the New England region, the Great Lakes region, the region east of the Rocky Mountains, and the region west of the Rocky Mountains. The notice also announced and initiated the public scoping process to gather information from the public in preparation for drafting the PEISs. As indicated in the notice, the scoping period concluded on August 5, 2010. However, CBP continued to take comments past the initial scoping period. For more information on this process, please see the section of this document entitled Public Scoping Process. Subsequently, and in part due to comments received during public scoping, CBP decided to refocus its approach and develop one PEIS covering the entire Northern Border, rather than four separate, regional PEISs. This new approach was designed to ensure that CBP could effectively analyze and convey impacts that occur across regions of the Northern Border. CBP published a notice in the Federal Register announcing this intention on November 9, 2010 (75 FR 68810). While this makes for a somewhat larger single document, it offers the advantage of less duplication and greater usefulness as a CBP planning tool. Aided by the information gained during the public scoping process, CBP has prepared the Draft PEIS to analyze the environmental and socioeconomic effects of current and potential future CBP border security activities along the Northern Border between the United States and Canada, including an area extending approximately 100 miles south of the Northern Border. For the purposes of the PEIS, the Northern Border is defined as the area between the United States and Canada extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean encompassing all the States between Maine and Washington, inclusively. (The Alaska- Canada border is not included in this effort.) CBP is evaluating the environmental and socioeconomic impacts of routine aspects of its operations along the Northern Border and considering enhancements to its infrastructure, technologies, and application of manpower to continue to deter existing and evolving threats to the Nation’s physical and economic security. Due to the diverse and natural environments along the Northern Border, the Draft PEIS analyzes four Northern Border regions, referred to above: the New England region, the Great Lakes region, the region east of the Rocky Mountains, and the region west of the Rocky Mountains. CBP plans to use the information derived from the analysis in the PEIS in management, planning, and decision-making for its mission and its environmental stewardship responsibilities. It will also be used to establish a foundation for future impact analyses. More specifically, CBP plans to use the PEIS analysis over the next five to seven years as CBP works to improve security along the Northern Border. To protect the Northern Border against evolving terrorist and criminal threats, CBP plans to implement a diversified approach to border security over the next five to seven years that responds most effectively to those threats. This will involve some combination of facilities, security infrastructure, technologies, and operational activities, although the specific combination of elements that will be used over this period cannot be determined at this time. CBP will use this PEIS as a foundation for future environmental analyses of specific programs or locations as CBP’s plans for particular Northern Border security activities develop. Alternatives Considered The Draft PEIS considers the environmental impacts of several alternative approaches CBP may use to protect the Northern Border against evolving threats. These alternatives would all support continued deployment of existing CBP personnel in the most effective manner while maintaining officer safety and continued use of partnerships with other Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the United States and Canada. CBP needs to maintain effective control of the Northern Border via all air, land, and maritime pathways for cross-border movement. The No Action Alternative (or “status quo”) would be to continue with the same facilities, technology, infrastructure, and approximate level of personnel currently in use, deployed, or currently planned by CBP. Normal maintenance of existing facilities is included in this alternative. This alternative would not meet CBP’s goals as it would not allow CBP to improve its capability to interdict cross-border violators or to identify and resolve threats at the ports of entry in a manner that avoids adverse effects on legal trade and travel. However, it is evaluated in this Draft PEIS because it provides a baseline against which the impacts of the other reasonable alternatives can be compared. The Facilities Development and Improvement Alternative would focus on providing new permanent facilities or improvements to existing facilities such as Border Patrol stations, ports of entry, and other facilities to allow CBP agents to operate more efficiently and respond to situations more quickly. This alternative would help meet CBP’s goals because the new and improved facilities would make it more difficult for cross-border violators to cross the border. It [[Page 57753]] would also divert traffic from or increase the capacity of the more heavily used ports of entry, decreasing waiting times. The applicability of this alternative would be limited, as most roads crossing the Northern Border already have a crossing facility. The Detection, Inspection, Surveillance and Communications Technology Expansion Alternative would focus on deploying more effective detection, inspection surveillance and communication technologies in support of CBP activities. This alternative would involve utilizing upgraded systems that would enable CBP to focus efforts on identifying threat areas, improving agent and officer communication systems, and deploying personnel to resolve incidents with maximum efficiency. This alternative would help meet CBP’s goals by improving CBP’s situational awareness and allowing CBP to more efficiently and effectively direct its resources for interdicting cross-border violators. The Tactical Security Infrastructure Deployment Alternative would focus on constructing additional barriers, access roads, and related facilities. The barriers would include selective fencing and vehicle barriers at selected points along the border and would deter and delay cross-border violators. The access roads and related facilities would increase the mobility of agents, and enhance their capabilities for surveillance and for responding to various international border violations. This alternative would help meet CBP’s goals by discouraging cross-border violators and improving CBP’s capacity to respond. The Flexible Direction Alternative (the Preferred Alternative) would allow CBP to follow any of the above directions in order to employ the most effective response to the changing threat environment along the Northern Border. This approach would allow CBP to respond more appropriately to a constantly changing threat environment. Public Scoping Process CBP developed and executed a public scoping program for the PEIS to identify public concerns to be examined in the PEIS. “Scoping” of an EIS is a process of informing diverse stakeholders about an action that an agency is planning and seeking those stakeholders’ feedback on the environmental concerns that the action could generate. The intent of the scoping effort is to adopt the scope of the planned environmental document to ensure that it addresses relevant concerns identified by interested members of the public as well as organizations, Native American Tribes, and other government agencies and officials. CBP’s public scoping period for the Northern Border PEIS commenced on July 6, 2010 and concluded on August 5, 2010. See 75 FR 38822. The public scoping process was initiated with the publishing of a notice of intent (NOI) notifying the public of CBP’s decision to prepare the PEISs. In coordination with the publication of the NOI, display advertisements were published in various newspapers serving local communities, public service announcements were broadcasted on local radio stations, scoping letters were mailed to potentially interested stakeholders consisting of agencies, organizations, and individuals, and a project Web site was developed. Following the publication of the NOI, a series of public scoping meetings were held in July 2010. CBP encouraged the public to submit comments concerning the scope of the PEIS during the public meetings, or via Web site, e-mail, or letter. The comments CBP received during the public scoping process were used to adapt the scope of the Draft PEIS and to ensure that it addressed relevant concerns identified by interested members of the public as well as organizations, Native American Tribes, and other government agencies and officials. CBP has compiled a list of comments received in a scoping report. This report is available on the project’s Web site at: http://www.NorthernBorderPEIS.com. NEPA This environmental analysis is being conducted pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., the Council on Environmental Quality Regulations for Implementing the NEPA (40 CFR parts 1500-1508), and Department of Homeland Security Directive 023-01 (renumbered from 5100.1), Environmental Planning Program of April 19, 2006. NEPA addresses concerns about environmental quality and the government’s role in protecting it. The essence of NEPA is the requirement that every Federal agency examine the environmental effects of any proposed action before deciding to proceed with it or with some alternative. NEPA and the implementing regulations issued by the President’s Council on Environmental Quality call for agencies to document the potential environmental effects of actions they are proposing. Generally, agencies must make those documents public, and seek public feedback on them. In accordance with NEPA, the PEIS analyzes the effects on the environment of the Northern Border Security Program. CBP will seek public input on these studies and will use them in agency planning and decision making. Because NEPA is a uniquely broad environmental law and covers the full spectrum of the natural and human environment, the PEIS will also address environmental considerations governed by other environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, and National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). NHPA Programmatic Agreement CBP is developing a Programmatic Agreement (PA) for operations along the Northern Border in accordance with Section 106 of NHPA, 16 U.S.C. 470f, and its implementing regulations (36 CFR part 800). While the PA is being pursued as an independent action from the PEIS, it will be applied to future activities occurring within the Northern Border study area and therefore is relevant to the Northern Border PEIS project. The Northern Border is defined for purposes of the PA as extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean encompassing all the States between Maine to Washington, including an area extending approximately 100 miles south of the U.S.-Canada border. This area is identical to the area of study of the PEIS. CBP is currently consulting and coordinating with the Historic Preservation Officers of the states of Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Vermont, and Washington, and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) to finalize an agreed upon framework for future Section 106 reviews for CBP actions. The PA will be signed by CBP, the ACHP, State Historic Preservation Officers, and other consulting parties. The signed PA will identify (1) activities and projects carried out by CBP that are agreed do not have the potential to affect properties either listed or eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places, and (2) activities that are considered undertakings that do not require consultation under Section 106. Additionally, the PA identifies actions that may have an effect but that will not require Section 106 review by CBP, State or Tribal Historic Preservation Officers, Tribes and other consulting parties, so long as all terms and conditions as described in the PA are satisfactorily met. The signed PA will be valid for five years from the date of [[Page 57754]] execution, as verified with CBP filing the PA with the ACHP. Next Steps After the public comment period on the draft PEIS, CBP will complete a Final PEIS. The Final PEIS will be made available to the public through a Notice of Availability in the Federal Register. CBP will then select a programmatic course of action to guide CBP’s activities along the Northern Border for the next five to seven years. That decision will be published in the Federal Register in a Record of Decision. Dated: September 14, 2011. Trent Frazier, Acting Executive Director, Facilities Management and Engineering, Office of Administration. [FR Doc. 2011-23993 Filed 9-15-11; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 9111-14-P

TOP-SECRET – Trujillo Declassified

Citizens of Trujillo gather at a memorial for the victims (Semana.com)

Trujillo Declassified
Documenting Colombia’s ‘tragedy without end’

Documents Detail U.S. Concerns about Impunity in Major Human Rights Case

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 259

“Justice, Reparation, Memory, Truth”: Stones at the entrance to the memorial for the victims of the Trujillo massacre. (Michael Evans)

Washington D.C., Septemnber 16, 2011 – As Colombian prosecutors begin to reopen investigations against individuals connected to one of the worst massacres in the country’s modern history, the National Security Archive today publishes on the Web a collection of declassified documents detailing U.S. concerns about the wall of impunity that has long surrounded the case. These documents are central to an article published this weekend in Spanish on the Web site of Semana magazine, Colombia’s largest newsweekly. An English version of the article is available below and on the Web site of the new Semana International.

The new movement on the Trujillo massacre follows closely the release of a major new report on the case, the first issued by the Historical Memory Group (GMH) of the National Commission on Reparations and Reconciliation (CNRR). Led by a distinguished group of researchers, the GMH is charged with writing a comprehensive history of the Colombian conflict focusing on the country’s illegal armed groups.

The Archive’s Colombia Documentation Project is proud to be assisting the GMH and other researchers with investigations of the major human rights cases over the last four decades of violence in Colombia.


Trujillo Declassified: Documenting a ‘tragedy without end’
By Michael Evans

[NOTE: Click on the highlighted links to read the source documents in PDF.]

With a number of recent arrests connected to the infamous Trujillo massacres of 1988-1994, Colombia reopens one of the most enduring cases of impunity in its modern history. The investigation of these drug traffickers, assassins and paramilitaries, along with at least 12 retired members of the Colombian security forces, is another hopeful sign that Colombia will finally come to grips with a case that has long foundered on the rocky shoals of Colombian justice. But it also raises an uncomfortable question: Will the investigations pursue senior military officials responsible for the pattern of impunity that has perpetuated the suffering over these many years? And what, if any, responsibility does the United States bear for having supported the institutions behind this wall of silence?

To truly understand the Trujillo case, it is important to recognize the pervasive climate of impunity that lies at the core of the tragedy. Thirteen years after President Ernesto Samper accepted responsibility for the state’s role in the Trujillo killings, and 18 years after the murders themselves, not a single perpetrator has been sentenced in connection to the case.

Earlier this month, a special report on the Trujillo killings assembled by the Historical Memory Group (GMH) established under the “Justice and Peace” law found that impunity in the Trujillo case was not simply a symptom of state impotence or a lack of resources.“To the contrary,” writes Gonzalo Sánchez, the group’s director,

“it is part of the logic that surrounds and/or causes these crimes. It is precisely this impunity that guarantees that the crimes can continue being committed, that the perpetrators can continue committing them, and that those responsible are not punished.”

As Colombia revisits this “tragedy without end,” the country is faced with the possibility that yet another investigation will end without convictions.

Inscription at a special memorial for Father Tiberio Fernandez, one of some 342 victims of violence in Trujillo. (Michael Evans)

The ongoing political violence and the history of impunity that surrounds this case make it all the more important that groups investigating human rights crimes have access to a broad array of data from international organizations, courts and advocacy groups. One particularly rich source on Colombia’s impunity problem turns out to be one of its closest friends: the United States government. Colombia’s human rights record has been on the radar of American diplomats and intelligence officials for over 30 years, particularly those cases tied to the U.S. through training or other support. Thanks to hundreds of Freedom of Information Act requests by the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C., many of these formerly secret documents have now been declassified. These records tell us what U.S. officials said behind the scenes about their top Andean ally, and whether they believed that Colombia’s senior military and civilian leaders were serious about pursuing justice in Trujillo and other cases.

By the mid-1990s, increasing international outcry over the human rights situation in Colombia meant that the U.S. had to be much more careful about which units and officers of the Colombian armed forces it could support. Credible reports focused specifically on the abuses of U.S.-supported military units and officers complicated the U.S.-Colombia security relationship, particularly when meaningful prosecutions were practically non-existent.

For the U.S., Trujillo would be an important test of President Samper’s stated commitment to improve Colombia’s human rights record and his pledge to break the military’s ties to paramilitaries. The mere admission of state responsibility would not be enough. Clinton administration officials wanted to see real progress on the case, including the prosecution of military officials connected to the killings.

Chief among these was Maj. Alirio Uruena, a Third Brigade officer who, in addition to his association with the paramilitaries and drug traffickers behind Trujillo, had an uncomfortably close connection to the U.S. One Embassy cable noted that Uruena had “received USG [U.S. Government]-sponsored training on two occasions”: in 1976, at a “cadet orientation at the School of the Americas,” and at a “DIA-sponsored intelligence officer course” in December 1988 and January 1989, just a year or so before the killings in which he was specifically implicated. [19950207.pdf]

The sheer brutality of the killings made Uruena’s connection to the U.S. especially worrisome. Uruena had “personally directed the torture of 11 detainees and their subsequent execution,” according to one cable. The key witness in the case, a civilian army informant who participated in the murders, said that the killings “were carried out by cutting off the limbs and heads of the still living victims with a chain saw.” His testimony, according to the Embassy, was corroborated by “more than a dozen witnesses.” [19900727.pdf] Perhaps even more troubling, the case also tied Maj. Uruena to a narco-paramilitary group led by infamous paramilitary chiefs Diego Montoya and Henry Loaiza (both of whom are now under investigation for the Trujillo killings).

The U.S. connection to Trujillo, and the U.S. desire to continue supporting the strategically-located Third Brigade, made it all the more important that Samper back up his historic acceptance of state responsibility with punitive action against the perpetrators. The State Department’s top human rights official, John Shattuck, told Samper in one 1995 meeting that “rhetorical advances” needed to be followed by “evidence that the Colombian state can and will attack the underlying cause of its high levels of human rights violations and general violence: impunity.”Referring to Trujillo and two other cases, Shattuck said that “until the Colombian military and/or civilian justice systems are capable of investigating, trying, convicting, and sentencing those responsible for the massacres, the institutional reforms would be empty gestures.” What mattered, Shattuck said, was that Colombia begin to “show results … in instances of human rights violations attributed to the state security forces.” [19950327.pdf]

U.S. intelligence was also skeptical that Colombia was serious about its promise to break ties with paramilitary groups. The CIA reported in March 1995 that Samper had “yet to demonstrate resolve in addressing abuses by paramilitary groups that operate with the tacit approval of the military.” Samper had also “failed to arrest and prosecute [notorious paramilitary chief] Fidel Castano” and had “endorsed [Minister of Defense] Botero’s proposal to create rural security cooperatives,” many of which operated alongside illegal paramilitary groups, according to the CIA.[19950322.pdf]

Neither did Samper’s admission of state responsibility in the Trujillo case atone for the Colombian Army’s failure to bring charges against personnel involved in other serious abuses. Army commander Gen. Harold Bedoya’s response, in December 1996, to an Embassy request for information on 18 human rights cases tied to the military by Amnesty International was a “de facto admission of institutional culpability,” according to one cable. But rather than embarrass Bedoya by publicly challenging his shameful” response, the cable suggested that it be used “to pressure him into beginning to genuinely clean up the [Colombian Army’s] sordid performance on human rights, particularly the pattern of quasi-impunity posing as military justice.” “We should not shirk at some gentlemanly blackmail,” the Embassy added, “if that is what it takes to get our human rights agenda moving forward.” [19961227.pdf]

One year later, things had only gotten worse.  The CIA’s December 1997 “Update on Links Between Military, Paramilitary Forces” grimly predicted that “prospects for a concerted effort by the military high command to crack down on paramilitaries—and the officers that cooperate with them—appear dim.” The new Armed Forces commander, Gen. Manuel Bonett, “like his predecessor Harold Bedoya,” showed “little inclination to combat paramilitary groups.” [19971202.pdf]

Despite overwhelming evidence, Uruena was never convicted for his role in Trujillo, and his eventual dismissal from the Army was openly opposed by senior military officers. Even firing Uruena came at great political cost for Samper, who was subsequently unwilling to push for the actual prosecution of the perpetrators—most especially Uruena, but also those that the Embassy said had “whitewashed” and “perverted” the initial investigations, including Gen. Bonett, who had served as the first instance military judge in the case. [19980306.pdf]

Nevertheless, the reopening of the Trujillo case in the immediate wake of the GMH report is a hopeful sign that the recovery of historical memory in Colombia may finally be helping to lift the veil of impunity. It is perhaps too early to know whether these latest developments are signs of real progress or merely “empty gestures” without tangible legal consequences, but they are clearly part of a trend that has seen a number of high-profile military officers put under investigation in recent months.

Given Colombia’s recent history, it is perhaps not surprising that the U.S. may now hold the evidence that could make or break these cases. Fourteen top Colombian paramilitary commanders await prosecution in the U.S. on drug trafficking charges. It is not yet clear whether Colombian investigators will have the opportunity to question these men, who are responsible for some of the worst atrocities of the conflict, or if the memories of their crimes, their victims, and their collaborators in the Colombian security forces, will remain locked inside the U.S. prison system.

Either way, as Colombians boldly press forward with these investigations, declassified U.S. documents could prove to be a valuable source of evidence otherwise unavailable to prosecutors on Colombia’s conflict and, above all, the system of unchecked impunity that lies at its core.

TOP-SECRET – “Body count mentalities” Colombia’s “False Positives” Scandal, Declassified

Gen. Mario Montoya Uribe announces his resigation as Colombian Army Commander in November 2008. (Photo credit: Semana.com)

Body count mentalities”
Colombia’s “False Positives” Scandal, Declassified

Documents Describe History of Abuses by Colombian Army

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 266

Washington, D.C., September 16, 2011 – The CIA and senior U.S. diplomats were aware as early as 1994 that U.S.-backed Colombian security forces engaged in “death squad tactics,” cooperated with drug-running paramilitary groups, and encouraged a “body count syndrome,” according to declassified documents published on the Web today by the National Security Archive. These records shed light on a policy—recently examined in a still-undisclosed Colombian Army report—that influenced the behavior of Colombian military officers for years, leading to extrajudicial executions and collaboration with paramilitary drug traffickers. The secret report has led to the dismissal of 30 Army officers and the resignation of Gen. Mario Montoya Uribe, the Colombian Army Commander who had long promoted the idea of using body counts to measure progress against guerrillas.

Archive Colombia analyst, Michael Evans, whose article on the matter was published today in Spanish on the Web site of Colombia’s Semana magazine, said that, “These documents and the recent scandal over the still-secret Colombian Army report raise important questions about the historical and legal responsibilities the Army has to come clean about what appears to be a longstanding, institutional incentive to commit murder.”

Highlights from today’s posting include:

  • A 1994 report from U.S. Ambassador Myles Frechette decrying “body count mentalities” among Colombian Army officers seeking to advance through the ranks. “Field officers who cannot show track records of aggressive anti-guerrilla activity (wherein the majority of the military’s human rights abuses occur) disadvantage themselves at promotion time.”
  • A CIA intelligence report from 1994 finding that the Colombian security forces “employ death squad tactics in their counterinsurgency campaign” and had “a history of assassinating leftwing civilians in guerrilla areas, cooperating with narcotics-related paramilitary groups in attacks against suspected guerrilla sympathizers, and killing captured combatants.”
  • A Colombian Army colonel’s comments in 1997 that there was a “body count syndrome” in the Colombian Army that “tends to fuel human rights abuses by well-meaning soldiers trying to get their quota to impress superiors” and a “cavalier, or at least passive, approach when it comes to allowing the paramilitaries to serve as proxies … for the COLAR in contributing to the guerrilla body count.”
  • The same colonel’s assertion that military collaboration with illegal paramilitary groups “had gotten much worse” under Gen. Rito Alejo Del Río Rojas, who is now under investigation for a murder that occurred during that same era.
  • A declassified U.S. Embassy cable describing a February 2000 false positives operation in which both the ACCU paramilitaries and the Colombian Army almost simultaneously claimed credit for having killed two long-demobilized guerrillas near Medellín. Ambassador Curtis Kamman called it “a clear case of Army-paramilitary complicity,” adding that it was “difficult to conclude anything other than that the paramilitary and Army members simply failed to get their stories straight in advance.”

“Body count mentalities”
Colombia’s “False Positives” Scandal, Declassified

By Michael Evans

Recently, the Colombian and U.S. media have been fixated on the scandal over “false positives”—the extrajudicial killing by the Colombian Army of civilians who are subsequently presented as guerrilla casualties to inflate the combat “body count.” A still-undisclosed military report on the matter has led to the dismissal of 30 Army officers in relation to the scandal and the resignation of Gen. Mario Montoya Uribe, the Army commander who had long promoted the idea of using body counts to measure progress against guerrillas. But the manner in which the investigation was conducted—in absolute secrecy and with little or no legal consequences for those implicated—raises a number of important questions. Is yet another personnel purge absent an impartial, civilian-led, criminal investigation really enough to change the culture in the Colombian Army? And when, if ever, will the Colombian Army divulge the contents of its internal report?

Amidst these lingering questions, a new collection of declassified U.S. diplomatic, military and intelligence documents published today by the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C., describe the “body count syndrome” that has been one of the guiding principles of Colombian military behavior in Colombia for years, leading to human rights abuses—such as false positives—and encouraging collaboration with illegal paramilitary groups. As such, the documents raise important questions about the historical and legal responsibilities the Army has to come clean about what appears to be a longstanding, institutional incentive to commit murder.

The earliest record in the Archive’s collection referring specifically to the phenomenon dates back to 1990. That document, a cable approved by U.S. Ambassador Thomas McNamara, reported a disturbing increase in abuses attributed to the Colombian Army. In one case, McNamara disputed the military’s claim that it had killed nine guerrillas in El Ramal, Santander, on June 7 of that year.

The investigation by Instruccion Criminal and the Procuraduria strongly suggests … that the nine were executed by the Army and then dressed in military fatigues. A military judge who arrived on the scene apparently realized that there were no bullet holes in the military uniforms to match the wounds in the victims’ bodies…”

At the same time, the Embassy was also beginning to see a connection between the Colombian security forces and the country’s burgeoning paramilitary groups. Many of the Army’s recent abuses had “come in the course of operations by armed para-military groups in which Army officers and enlisted men have participated,” according to the declassified cable. [19900727.pdf]

Similar tendencies were highlighted four years later in a cable cleared by U.S. Ambassador Myles Frechette. He found that “body count mentalities” persisted among Colombian Army officers seeking promotions. The Embassy’s Defense Attaché Office (DAO) had reported that, “Field officers who cannot show track records of aggressive anti-guerrilla activity (wherein the majority of the military’s human rights abuses occur) disadvantage themselves at promotion time.” Moreover, the claim by Minister of Defense Fernando Botero that there was “a growing awareness that committing human rights abuses will block an officer’s path to promotion” reflected “wishful thinking,” according to the DAO. [19941021.pdf]

A CIA intelligence report, also from 1994, went even further, finding that the Colombian security forces continued to “employ death squad tactics in their counterinsurgency campaign.” The document, a review of President César Gaviria’s anti-guerrilla policy, noted that the Colombian military had “a history of assassinating leftwing civilians in guerrilla areas, cooperating with narcotics-related paramilitary groups in attacks against suspected guerrilla sympathizers, and killing captured combatants.” Traditionally, the Army had “not taken guerrilla prisoners,” according to report, and the military had “treated Gaviria’s new human rights guidelines as pro forma.” [19940126.pdf]

Just over ten years ago, another U.S. intelligence report, previously published by the National Security Archive, and based on a conversation with a Colombian Army colonel, suggested that the steep rise in paramilitarism during that era was related to a “body count syndrome” in the Colombian Army.

This mindset tends to fuel human rights abuses by well-meaning soldiers trying to get their quota to impress superiors. It could also lead to a cavalier, or at least passive, approach when it comes to allowing the paramilitaries to serve as proxies for the COLAR  [Colombian Army] in contributing to the guerrilla body count.

The unidentified officer was also “intimately familiar” with General Rito Alejo Del Río Rojas, “about whom he had [few] nice things to say.” Military cooperation with paramilitaries “had been occurring for a number of years,” he said, but “had gotten much worse under Del Río.” Two other commanders, Gen. Jorge Enrique Mora and Gen. Harold Bedoya Pizarro were among those “who looked the other way” with respect to military-paramilitary collusion, the colonel said, referring to “the time frame when Mora was a BG [brigadier general] commanding the large and critical 4th Brigade in Medellín … back in 1994-95.” [19971224.pdf]

The 4th Brigade, a traditional launching point for officers seeking to move up the military chain-of-command, has long been accused of collusion with local paramilitary groups. The Los Angeles Times reported in 2007 on a classified CIA report linking Gen. Montoya to joint military-paramilitary operations in Medellín while he served as brigade commander in 2002. His replacement as Army commander, General Oscar Gonzalez, also commanded the 4th Brigade, as well as other units in the conflictive area around Medellín.

In no case were the 4th Brigade’s paramilitary ties more evident than in a February 2000 false positives operation in which both the ACCU paramilitaries and the Colombian Army almost simultaneously claimed credit for having killed two long-demobilized guerrillas near Medellín. A declassified U.S. Embassy cable on the matter, signed by Ambassador Curtis Kamman, reported the case with shocked disbelief.

The ACCU (which witnesses say kidnapped the two) claims its forces executed them, while the Army’s Fourth Brigade (which released the bodies the next day) presented the dead as ELN guerrillas killed in combat with the Army. After these competing claims sparked localized fear and confusion, armed men stole the cadavers from the morgue…

Kamman called the killings “a clear case of Army-paramilitary complicity” that would “further increase the already high-level of international NGO interest in the issue of 4th Brigade ties to paramilitaries.” The ambassador added that it was “difficult to conclude anything other than that the paramilitary and Army members simply failed to get their stories straight in advance.” [20000208.pdf]

So while Colombian Army officials scramble to get their “stories straight” in response to the recent scandal, it seems worth noting that “body counts” and “false positives” have an institutional history in the Colombian armed forces going back many years. And while recent steps to cleanse the Army’s ranks of officials associated with the policy are welcome, they are clearly not enough. What are the facts? Who is responsible? How long has this been happening? Who are the victims? And where are the bodies buried?

Declassified U.S. documents can provide some clues, but it seems unlikely that we will learn the answers to these questions unless the Colombian Army declassifies and releases its full report on the “false positives” scandal. Until then, it seems, secrecy and impunity will continue to prevail over transparency and justice in Colombia.


Michael Evans is director of the Colombia Documentation Project at the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C. The Colombia Documentation Project would like to thank the John Merck Fund for their generous support of this project.

TOP-SECRET – The August 1991 Coup in Moscow, 20 Years Later

Documents Show Hardliners Tried to Topple Gorbachev but Brought Down the Soviet Union

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 357

Washington D.C., September 16, 2011 -The hardline coup d’etat 20 years ago today in Moscow surprised its plotters with unexpected resistance from Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev, from Russian democratic opposition forces, and from the international community including the Bush administration, according to documents posted today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University (www.nsarchive.org).

The documents include the most complete account of the coup by a Gorbachev insider, the British ambassador’s immediate skeptical analysis of the plot, the Russian Supreme Soviet’s debate as the coup dissipated on August 21, and telcons of President Bush’s talks during the coup with foreign leaders including Gorbachev and Russian president Boris Yeltsin.

The posting marks the 20th anniversary of the August 19, 1991 announcement by the so-called Committee on the State of Emergency (GKChP), as USSR state television replaced regular programming with the ominous chords of “Swan Lake,” that Gorbachev was allegedly sick and the Committee was taking power in the country.  The coup pre-empted the scheduled August 20 signing of the new Union Treaty, intended to create a new decentralized and democratic Union.  The plotters, led by KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov and Minister of Defense Dmitry Yazov, held Gorbachev under house arrest at his dacha in Foros, Crimea; but as the diary of Gorbachev aide Anatoly Chernyaev shows, Gorbachev refused to cooperate with the coup plotters and demanded that he return to Moscow and face the Supreme Soviet.

However, already on August 19, demonstrators surrounded the tanks sent by the coup plotters to guard the White House – the building of the democratically elected Russian Parliament.  The freshly elected Russian President Boris Yeltsin assumed leadership of the opposition and demanded that Gorbachev be reinstalled as the lawful President of the Soviet Union.  Yeltsin standing on a tank (actually an armored personnel carrier) outside the White House became the symbol of the Russian democratic revolution, which prevented the right-wing takeover, but also led directly to the collapse of the Union.  In effect, the coup plotters speeded up the outcome they were trying to prevent.

The Chernyaev diary provides the most complete account of the Foros experience of the Gorbachev circle; excerpts have appeared in Foreign Policy (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/21/three_days_in_foros) while the Archive has published the full text.  The August 20 telegram from British Ambassador Rodric Braithwaite describes the indecisiveness of the coup plotters and prescribes a policy of the strongest possible support for Gorbachev.  The memoranda of telephone conversations with foreign leaders from the Bush Library show that the Bush administration was carefully following the developments in Moscow and projecting clear support for Gorbachev.

The final document published in today’s posting – for the first time anywhere – brings the reader into the halls of the legendary Russian White House, to the extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation at the exact moment of the triumph of the democratic resistance to the coup.  The discussions show the resoluteness of the democratic opposition and the decisive role of the Soviet army, in which key units ultimately disobeyed orders and sided with the democratic forces.


Document 1.  “Three Days in Foros,” excerpt from Anatoly Chernyaev Diary.
[Source:  Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, Donated Manuscript, on file at the National Security Archive, translated by Anna Melyakova]

Document 2.  Rodric Braithwaite, “Moscow, August 19:  The First Day of the Coup,” Telegram of 20 August 1991.
[Source:  Rodric Braithwaite, Correspondence, 1988 to 1993, Donated Manuscript, on file at the National Security Archive]

Document 3.  George Bush-Felipe Gonzalez Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, August 19, 1991.
[Source;  Bush Presidential Library, NSArchive foia 1999-0303-F]

Document 4.  George Bush-Vaclav Havel Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, August 19, 1991.
[Source;  Bush Presidential Library, NSArchive foia 1999-0303-F]

Document 5.  George Bush-Jozsef Antall Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, August 19, 1991.
[Source;  Bush Presidential Library, NSArchive foia 1999-0303-F]

Document 6.  George Bush-Boris Yeltsin Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, August 20, 1991.
[Source;  Bush Presidential Library, NSArchive foia 1999-0303-F]

Document 7.  George Bush-Boris Yeltsin Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, August 21, 1991.
[Source;  Bush Presidential Library, NSArchive foia 1999-0303-F]

Document 8.  George Bush-Mikhail Gorbachev Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, August 21, 1991.
[Source;  Bush Presidential Library, NSArchive foia 1999-0303-F]

Document 9.  Transcript of the First Extraordinary Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, August 21, 1991.
[Source:  State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), Fond 10026, Translated by Matthew McGorrin]

Boris Yeltsin in front of the Parliament 08.19.1991

911 x 10 Photos

911 x 10

[Image]In this Monday, July 25, 2011 photo, Vladimir Gavriushin sits at the grave he built for his daughter Yelena in a cemetery outside Vilnius, Lithuania. Yelena was one of the nearly 3,000 people killed on Sept. 11, 2001. Gavriushin has buried rocks from ground zero under these tombstone towers, far from the place Yelena died _ a place he can no longer afford to visit. And so, as the 10-year anniversary of the terrorist attacks approaches, he mourns for her here, at his own ground zero.
[Image]Andrew Kinard, a Marine lieutenant, lost both legs in an I.E.D. attack two months into his first tour in Iraq, in 2006. Now he’s at Harvard, pursuing a joint law and business degree. He was photographed at his summer internship, at the Fortress Investment Group. (Christopher Anderson)
[Image]In a May 23, 2011 photo, Sukhwinder Singh sits next to the memorial for his father, Balbir Singh Sodhi, in Mesa, Arizona. Singh’s father was shot and killed in front of the family owned gas station as he was placing flowers at a makeshift memorial the family set up shortly after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. The Sikh was killed during the anti-muslim backlash after the 9/11 attacks. Some have objected to including Balbair Singh Sodhi’s name on a Phoenix Sept. 11 memorial, saying he was not a victim of the attack.
[Image]A police officer stands guard in New York’s Times Square as the ABC news ticker displays news of an al-Qaida terror threat, Friday, Sept. 9, 2011. Just days before the 10th anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, U.S. counterterrorism officials are chasing a credible but unconfirmed al-Qaida threat to use a car bomb on bridges or tunnels in New York City or Washington. It is the first “active plot” timed to coincide with the somber commemoration.
[Image](L-R) New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, Janice Fedarcyk, assistant director in charge New York Field Office for the FBI, and New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly speak to media about a threat in New York September 8, 2011. President Barack Obama on Thursday ordered a redoubling of U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in the face of a “credible but unconfirmed” threat ahead of the 10th anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. Reuters
[Image]New York City police officers stop a commercial truck at a checkpoint in New York’s financial district, Friday, Sept. 9, 2011. U.S. officials said Thursday that they were chasing a credible but unconfirmed al-Qaida threat to use a car bomb on bridges or tunnels in New York or Washington. Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly said that police are beefing up security at bridges and tunnels, setting up vehicle checkpoints and doing bomb sweeps of parking garages. (Mark Lennihan)
[Image]The U.S. embassy in Paris during a ceremony to pay tribute to the victims of the 9/11 attacks, Friday, Sept. 9, 2011, ahead of the 10-year anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks on Sunday. (Charles Platiau)
[Image]Construction workers install model twin towers representing the towers of the World Trade Center in preparation to commemorate the 10 anniversary of the Sept. 11 this Sunday, at Trocadero plazamin Paris Friday Sept. 9, 2011. The Eiffel tower is seen in the background. The towers will be finished on Saturday in advance of the commemoration on upcoming Sunday. (Michel Euler)
[Image]Workers at the new Flight 93 National Memorial work on final preparations for Saturday’s dedication ceremony Sept. 8. 2011 in Shanksville, Pa.. The boulder in the background marks the location of the crash crater. Sunday will mark the tenth anniversary of the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. (Gene J. Puskar)
[Image]Family members of police officers killed during or as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks stand to be recognized during a ceremony in New York, Thursday, Sept. 8, 2011. (Seth Wenig)
[Image]Developer Larry Silverstein, left, and Joe Daniels, President of the September 11 Memorial, attend a news conference Wednesday, Aug. 24, 2011 in New York where they discussed Silverstein’s buildings at the World Trade Center and the plans for the opening of the memorial. (Mark Lennihan)
[Image]This Tuesday, Aug 16, 2011 photo shows Michael Lewin in his office in the town of Lod, central Israel. His brother, Daniel Lewin, was killed during the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. Daniel’s family honors his memory with a traditional Jewish yahrzeit, an annual memorial observance of a loved one’s death. They talk about his life and study the Torah, the Hebrew Bible, in his name. Over the years, Michael has visited ground zero several times on business trips to New York.
[Image]ADVANCE FOR USE LABOR DAY WEEKEND, SEPT. 3-5, 2011 AND THEREAFTER – This Wednesday, Aug. 10 2011 photo shows a tent which houses a chapel and a storage of the remains of victims of the attacks on the World Trade Center near Chief Medical Examiner Office Forensic Biology Lab in New York. (Mary Altaffer)
[Image]ADVANCE FOR USE LABOR DAY WEEKEND, SEPT. 3-5, 2011 AND THEREAFTER – This Wednesday, Aug. 10 2011 photo shows posters on a wall of the garden behind a tent which houses a chapel and a storage of the remains of victims of the attacks on the World Trade Center near Chief Medical Examiner Office Forensic Biology Lab in New York. (Mary Altaffer)
[Image]FILE – In this Sept. 2001 file photo, dust still covers the streets near ground zero as Associated Press photographer Amy Sancetta pushes her bike on the streets a few days after the terrorist attacks in New York. On Sept. 11, 2001, the Ohio-based national photographer was in New York City to cover her tenth the U.S. Open Tennis tournament. The desk had a report that a plane might have hit one of the World Trade Center towers, so she caught a cab downtown.
[Image]FILE – In this Tuesday, Sept. 11, 2001 file photo, pedestrians in lower Manhattan watch smoke rise from the World Trade Tower after an early morning terrorist attack on the New York landmark. Television brought the 2001 attacks to the world in real time, and forever linked the thousands who lived through it and the millions who watched. It became a collective experience, and, from every angle, one of the most digitally documented events ever. And so it remains. (Amy Sancetta, file)

Börse Online über “GoMoPa”-Betrüger und RA Jochen Resch

http://www.graumarktinfo.de/gm/aktuell/diskussion/:Gomopa–Anwaelte-als-Finanzierungsquelle/616477.html

“SPIEGEL” über die STASI-Connection des mutmasslichen “GoMoPa”-Chefs Jochen Resch

http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-65717414.html

TOP-SECRET-Getting Access to the Secrets of the Osama Bin Laden Kill

Getting Access to the Secrets of the Osama Bin Laden Kill

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Nicholas Schmidle has written Getting Bin Laden, a dramatic and detailed account of the raid to kill Osama bin Laden, in The New Yorker, August 1, 2011. The story shows that Schmidle had extraordinary access to participants in the operation, in the White House, the DoD, the CIA, and Special Operations — members of the latter two providing details of personnel, training, location, scheduling and travel well beyond what is usually revealed about covert actions. The persuasive spin of the account parallels that of Associated Press covering the bin Laden hunter “CIA John” which was also based on privileged access to official informants.

Highly secret meeting details and quotes by President Obama, Vice President Biden, Robert Gates, Leon Panetta, Admiral Mullen, Admiral McRaven, John Brennan, Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes and a number of special operations members are used to produce a dramatic narrative in which there are no failures, no journalistic counterbalance to a complex and risky operation. Even the unexpected helicopter crash is transformed into a success:

“I’m glad no one was hurt in the crash, but, on the other hand, I’m sort of glad we left the helicopter there,” the special-operations officer said. “It quiets the conspiracy mongers out there and instantly lends credibility. You believe everything else instantly, because there’s a helicopter sitting there.”

While Schmidle is an experienced journalist with service in Pakistan and elsewhere, his access to those involved in the kill’s top secret planning and operation, and his unrelenting positive spin of the story (in accord with Obama’s campaign to valorize the singular accomplishment), could be explained by his access to  his father, Richard Schmidle, a general in Special Operations and now deputy commander for U.S. Cyber Command.

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USMC BGEN Rorbert E. Schmidle Jr., The Special Operations Command (SOCOM) War Fighter Conference held at the Officer’s Club aboard Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Lejeune, North Carolina (NC). Photographer’s Name: LCPL NATHAN L. BARNES, USMC. Location: MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP LEJEUNE. Date Shot: 3/4/2004. Date Posted: unknown. VIRIN: 040304-M-RT524-001 [Clipped and enlarged from original photo (2.4MB).]


https://slsp.manpower.usmc.mil/gosa/biographies/rptBiography.asp?PERSON_ID=5&PERSON_TYPE=General

Lieutenant General Robert E. Schmidle, Jr.

Deputy Commander, U. S. Cyber Command

Lieutenant General Robert E. Schmidle, Jr., USMC, serves as the Deputy Commander for U.S. Cyber Command, Ft. George G. Meade, MD. As the Deputy Commander, he directs the forces and daily activities of U.S. Cyber Command. In this capacity, he also coordinates the Department of Defense computer network attack and computer network defense missions.

Lieutenant General Schmidle is a native of Newtown, Connecticut.

His command assignments include: Commanding General of First Marine Aircraft Wing, Commanding Officer of Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (Experimental), and Commanding Officer of Marine Fighter/Attack Squadrons 251 and 115.

Previous operational assignments include multiple tours flying the F-4 and F/A-18 aircraft as well as serving as the operations officer and air officer of an Infantry Battalion, First Battalion 9th Marines.

Additionally, Lieutenant General Schmidle has served in the following key staff assignments: Assistant Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Programs and Resources (Programs), Deputy Chief of Staff for Integrated Product Team 1 for the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and USMC lead for the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, Deputy Director for Resources and Acquisition in the Joint Staff J-8, Director of the USMC Expeditionary Force Development Center and the Military Secretary for the 32nd and 33rd Commandants of the Marine Corps.

Lieutenant General Schmidle graduated from Drew University with a Bachelor of Arts degree in History. He also holds a Master of Arts in Philosophy from American University and is currently working on his doctorate at Georgetown University He is a distinguished graduate and prior faculty member of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College as well as a distinguished graduate of the Marine Corps War College. Additionally, he has been published on a range of topics from military history to social psychology and philosophy.


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Source

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Source

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Lt. Gen. Robert Schmidle, the deputy commander for U.S. Cyber Command during the Evening Parade reception at Marine Barracks Washington in Washington, D.C., May 27, 2011. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Tia Dufour/Released) Date Posted: 6/3/2011. VIRIN: 110527-M-KS211-009

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http://newamerica.net/user/122
Nicholas Schmidle, Bernard L. Schwartz Fellow, schmidle[at]newamerica.net

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Nicholas Schmidle, May 12, 2009. Source

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Major General Robert E. “Rooster” Schmidle Jr., P. W. Singer, New America Foundation, Uploaded to Flickr on May 26, 2010 Source

TOP-SECRET – Meyer Lansky – THE FBI FILES PART 2

Meyer Lansky (1902-1983) was involved in a wide-range of organized criminal activity and was associated with many other well known criminal figures from the 1920s to the 1970s. Lansky was especially active in gambling ventures, including the rise of Las Vegas and efforts to build casinos in Cuba before the communist revolution there. In 1972, he was indicted on charges that he and others had skimmed millions of dollars from a Vegas casino that they owned; the indictment on Lansky was later dismissed since he was considered too ill to face trial. The files in this release range from 1950 to 1978.

By clicking on the links below you can download the files a pdf documents

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92-2831 section 9 -99

92-2831 section 10 -181

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92-2831 section 13 -66

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92-2831 section 21 -13

92-2831 Sub A -42

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Miscellaneous -3

Meyer Lansky

Meyer Lansky in 1958
Born Meyer Suchowljansky
July 4, 1902(1902-07-04)
Grodno, Russian Empire
Died January 15, 1983(1983-01-15) (aged 80)
Miami Beach, Florida
Cause of death lung cancer
Nationality United States
Known for Mob activity

Meyer Lansky (born Meyer Suchowljansky[1]; July 4, 1902 – January 15, 1983), known as the “Mob’s Accountant”, was a Russian Empire-born American organized crime figure who, along with his associate Charles “Lucky” Luciano, was instrumental in the development of the “National Crime Syndicate” in the United States. For decades he was thought to be one of the most powerful people in the country.

Lansky developed a gambling empire which stretched from Saratoga, New York to Miami to Council Bluffs and Las Vegas; it is also said that he oversaw gambling concessions in Cuba. Although a member of the Jewish Mafia, Lansky undoubtedly had strong influence with the Italian Mafia and played a large role in the consolidation of the criminal underworld (although the full extent of this role has been the subject of some debate).

Lansky was born Meyer Suchowljansky in Grodno (then in the Russian Empire, now in Belarus), to a Jewish family who experienced pogroms at the hands of the local Christian Polish and Russian population.[2] In 1911, he emigrated to the United States through the port of Odessa[3] with his mother and brother and joined his father, who had previously emigrated to the United States in 1909, and settled on the Lower East Side of Manhattan, New York.[4]

Lansky met Bugsy Siegel when he was a teenager. They became lifelong friends, as well as partners in the bootlegging trade, and together with Lucky Luciano, formed a lasting partnership. Lansky was instrumental in Luciano’s rise to power by organizing the 1931 murder of Mafia powerhouse Salvatore Maranzano. As a youngster, Siegel saved Lansky’s life several times, a fact which Lansky always appreciated. The two adroitly managed the Bug and Meyer Mob despite its reputation as one of the most violent Prohibition gangs.

Lansky was the brother of Jacob “Jake” Lansky, who in 1959 was the manager of the Nacional Hotel in Havana, Cuba.

 Gambling operations

By 1936, Lansky had established gambling operations in Florida, New Orleans, and Cuba. These gambling operations were very successful as they were founded upon two innovations. First, in Lansky and his connections there existed the technical expertise to effectively manage them based upon Lansky’s knowledge of the true mathematical odds of most popular wagering games. Second, mob connections were used to ensure legal and physical security of their establishments from other crime figures, and law enforcement (through payoffs).

But there was also an absolute rule of integrity concerning the games and wagers made within their establishments. Lansky’s “carpet joints” in Florida and elsewhere were never “clip-joints”; where gamblers were unsure of whether or not the games were rigged against them. Lansky ensured that the staff (the croupiers and their management) actually consisted of men of high integrity. And it was widely known what would happen to a croupier or a table manager who attempted to cheat or steal from a customer or the house.[clarification needed]

In 1936, Lansky’s partner Luciano was sent to prison. As Alfred McCoy records:

“During the 1930s, Meyer Lansky ‘discovered’ the Caribbean for Northeastern United States syndicate bosses and invested their illegal profits in an assortment of lucrative gambling ventures…. He was also reportedly responsible for organized crime’s decision to declare Miami a ‘free city’ (i.e., not subject to the usual rules of territorial monopoly).”

[citation needed]

Lansky later convinced the Mafia to place Bugsy Siegel in charge of Las Vegas, and became a major investor in Siegel’s Flamingo Hotel.

After Al Capone‘s 1931 conviction for tax evasion and prostitution, Lansky saw that he too was vulnerable to a similar prosecution. To protect himself, he transferred the illegal earnings from his growing casino empire to a Swiss numbered bank account, whose anonymity was assured by the 1934 Swiss Banking Act. Lansky eventually even bought an offshore bank in Switzerland, which he used to launder money through a network of shell and holding companies.[5]

War work

In the 1930s, Meyer Lansky and his gang claimed to have stepped outside their usual criminal activities to break up rallies held by Nazi sympathizers. Lansky recalled a particular rally in Yorkville, a German neighborhood in Manhattan, that he claimed he and 14 other associates disrupted:

The stage was decorated with a swastika and a picture of Adolf Hitler. The speakers started ranting. There were only fifteen of us, but we went into action. We threw some of them out the windows. Most of the Nazis panicked and ran out. We chased them and beat them up. We wanted to show them that Jews would not always sit back and accept insults.[6]

During World War II, Lansky was also instrumental in helping the Office of Naval Intelligence‘s Operation Underworld, in which the US government recruited criminals to watch out for German infiltrators and submarine-borne saboteurs.

According to Lucky Luciano’s authorized biography, during this time, Lansky helped arrange a deal with the US Government via a high-ranking U.S. Navy official. This deal would secure the release of Lucky Luciano from prison; in exchange the Italian Mafia would provide security for the war ships that were being built along the docks in New York Harbor. German submarines were sinking allied shipping outside the coast on a daily basis and there was great fear of attack or sabotage by Nazi sympathizers.

The Flamingo

During the 1940s, Lansky’s associate Benjamin “Bugsy” Siegel persuaded the crime bosses to invest in a lavish new casino hotel project in Las Vegas, the Flamingo. After long delays and large cost overruns, the Flamingo Hotel was still not open for business. To discuss the Flamingo problem, the Mafia investors attended a secret meeting in Havana, Cuba in 1946. While the other bosses wanted to kill Siegel, Lansky begged them to give his friend a second chance. Despite this reprieve, Siegel continued to lose Mafia money on the Flamingo Hotel. A second family meeting was then called. However, by the time this meeting took place, the casino turned a small profit. Lansky again, with Luciano’s support, convinced the family to give Siegel some more time.

The Flamingo was soon losing money again. At a third meeting, the family decided that Siegel was finished. He had humiliated the organized crime bosses and never had a chance. It is widely believed that Lansky himself was compelled to give the final okay on eliminating Siegel due to his long relationship with Siegel and his stature in the family.

On June 20, 1947, Siegel was shot and killed in Beverly Hills, California. Twenty minutes after the Siegel hit, Lansky’s associates, including Gus Greenbaum and Moe Sedway, walked into the Flamingo Hotel and took control of the property. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Lansky retained a substantial financial interest in the Flamingo for the next twenty years. Lansky said in several interviews later in his life that if it had been up to him, Ben Siegel would be alive today.

This also marked a power transfer in Vegas from the New York crime families to the Chicago Outfit. Although his role was considerably more restrained than in previous years, Lansky is believed to have both advised and aided Chicago boss Tony Accardo in initially establishing his hold.

Lansky in Cuba

After World War II, Lansky associate Lucky Luciano was paroled from prison on the condition that he permanently return to Sicily. However, Luciano secretly moved to Cuba, where he worked to resume control over American Mafia operations. Luciano also ran a number of casinos in Cuba with the sanction of Cuban president General Fulgencio Batista, though the American government succeeded in pressuring the Batista regime to deport Luciano.

Batista’s closest friend in the Mafia was Lansky. They formed a renowned friendship and business relationship that lasted for three decades. During a stay at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York in the late 1940s, it was mutually agreed upon that, in exchange for kickbacks, Batista would offer Lansky and the Mafia control of Havana’s racetracks and casinos. Batista would open Havana to large scale gambling, and his government would match, dollar for dollar, any hotel investment over $1 million, which would include a casino license. Lansky, of course, would place himself at the center of Cuba’s gambling operations. He immediately called on his “associates” to hold a summit in Havana.

The Havana Conference was held on December 22, 1946 at the Hotel Nacional. This was the first full-scale meeting of American underworld leaders since the Chicago meeting in 1932. Present were such notable figures as Joe Adonis and Albert “The Mad Hatter” Anastasia, Frank Costello, Joseph “Joe Bananas” Bonanno, Vito Genovese, Moe Dalitz, Thomas Luchese, from New York, Santo Trafficante Jr. from Tampa, Carlos “The Little Man” Marcello from New Orleans, and Stefano Magaddino, Joe Bonanno’s cousin from Buffalo. From Chicago there was Anthony Accardo and the Fischetti brothers, “Trigger-Happy” Charlie and his brother Rocco, and, representing the Jewish interest, Lansky and “Dandy” Phil Kastel from Florida. The first to arrive was Salvatore Charles Lucky Luciano, who had been deported to Italy, and had to travel to Havana with a false passport. Lansky shared with them his vision of a new Havana, profitable for those willing to invest the right sum of money. A city that could be their “Latin Las Vegas,” where they would feel right at home since it was a place where drugs, prostitution, labor racketeering, and extortion were already commonplace. According to Luciano’s evidence, and he is the only one who ever recounted details of the events in any detail, he confirmed that he was appointed as kingpin for the mob, to rule from Cuba until such time as he could find a legitimate way back into the U.S. Entertainment at the conference was provided by, among others, Frank Sinatra who flew down to Cuba with their friends, the Fischetti brothers.

In 1952, Lansky even offered then President Carlos Prío Socarrás a bribe of U.S. $250,000 to step down so Batista could return to power. Once Batista retook control of the government he quickly put gambling back on track. The dictator contacted Lansky and offered him an annual salary of U.S. $25,000 to serve as an unofficial gambling minister. By 1955, Batista had changed the gambling laws once again, granting a gaming license to anyone who invested $1 million in a hotel or U.S. $200,000 in a new nightclub. Unlike the procedure for acquiring gaming licenses in Vegas, this provision exempted venture capitalists from background checks. As long as they made the required investment, they were provided with public matching funds for construction, a 10-year tax exemption and duty-free importation of equipment and furnishings. The government would get U.S. $250,000 for the license plus a percentage of the profits from each casino. Cuba’s 10,000 slot machines, even the ones which dispensed small prizes for children at country fairs, were to be the province of Batista’s brother-in-law, Roberto Fernandez y Miranda. An Army general and government sports director, Fernandez was also given the parking meters in Havana as a little something extra. Import duties were waived on materials for hotel construction and Cuban contractors with the right “in” made windfalls by importing much more than was needed and selling the surplus to others for hefty profits. It was rumored that besides the U.S. $250,000 to get a license, sometimes more was required under the table. Periodic payoffs were requested and received by corrupt politicians.

Lansky set about reforming the Montmartre Club, which soon became the in place in Havana. He also long expressed an interest in putting a casino in the elegant Hotel Nacional, which overlooked El Morro, the ancient fortress guarding Havana harbor. Lansky planned to take a wing of the 10-storey hotel and create luxury suites for high stakes players. Batista endorsed Lansky’s idea over the objections of American expatriates such as Ernest Hemingway and the elegant hotel opened for business in 1955 with a show by Eartha Kitt. The casino was an immediate success.[7]

Once all the new hotels, nightclubs and casinos had been built Batista wasted no time collecting his share of the profits. Nightly, the “bagman” for his wife collected 10 percent of the profits at Trafficante’s interests; the Sans Souci cabaret, and the casinos in the hotels Sevilla-Biltmore, Commodoro, Deauville and Capri (part-owned by the actor George Raft). His take from the Lansky casinos, his prized Habana Riviera, the Nacional, the Montmartre Club and others, was said to be 30 percent. What exactly Batista and his cronies actually received in total in the way of bribes, payoffs and profiteering has never been certified. The slot machines alone contributed approximately U.S. $1 million to the regime’s bank account.

Revolution

The fast times soon rolled to a stop. The 1959 Cuban revolution and the rise of Fidel Castro changed the climate for mob investment in Cuba. On that New Year’s Eve of 1958, while Batista was preparing to flee to the Dominican Republic and then on to Spain (where he died in exile in 1973), Lansky was celebrating the $3 million he made in the first year of operations at his 440-room, $18 million palace, the Habana Riviera. Many of the casinos, including several of Lansky’s, were looted and destroyed that night.

On January 8, 1959, Castro marched into Havana and took over, setting up shop in the Hilton. Lansky had fled the day before for the Bahamas and other Caribbean destinations. The new Cuban president, Manuel Urrutia Lleó, took steps to close the casinos.

In October 1960, Castro nationalized the island’s hotel-casinos and outlawed gambling. This action essentially wiped out Lansky’s asset base and revenue streams. He lost an estimated $7 million. With the additional crackdown on casinos in Miami, Lansky was forced to depend on his Las Vegas revenues.

Later years

In his later years, Lansky lived a low-profile, routine existence in Miami Beach, making life difficult for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). He dressed like the average grandfather, walked his dog every morning, and portrayed himself as a harmless retiree. Lansky’s associates usually met him in malls and other crowded locations. Lansky would change drivers, who chauffeured him around town to look for new pay phones almost every day. Lansky was so elusive that the FBI essentially gave up monitoring him by the mid-1970s.

Attempted escape to Israel and trial

In 1970, Lansky fled to Herzliya Pituah, Israel, to escape federal tax evasion charges. Although the Israeli Law of Return allows any Jew to settle in the State of Israel, it excludes those with criminal pasts. Two years after Lansky fled to Israel, Israeli authorities deported him back to the U.S. However, the government’s best shot at convicting Lansky was with the testimony of loan shark Vincent “Fat Vinnie” Teresa, an informant with little or no credibility. The jury was unreceptive and Lansky was acquitted in 1974.

Death

Lansky’s last years were spent quietly at his home in Miami Beach. He died of lung cancer on January 15, 1983, age 80, leaving behind a widow and three children.[8] On paper, Lansky was worth almost nothing. At the time, the FBI believed he left behind over $300 million in hidden bank accounts, but they never found any money.

However, his biographer Robert Lacey describes Lansky’s financially strained circumstances in the last two decades of his life and his inability to pay for health care for his relatives. For Lacey, there was no evidence “to sustain the notion of Lansky as king of all evil, the brains, the secret mover, the inspirer and controller of American organized crime.”[9] He concludes from evidence including interviews with the surviving members of the family that Lansky’s wealth and influence had been grossly exaggerated, and that it would be more accurate to think of him as an accountant for gangsters rather than a gangster himself. His granddaughter told author T.J. English that at his death in 1983, Lansky left only $37,000 in cash.[10] When asked in his later years what went wrong in Cuba, the gangster offered no excuses. “I crapped out,” he said. He would also tell people he had lost every single penny in Cuba. In all likelihood, it was only an excuse to keep the IRS off his back. According to Lansky’s daughter Sandra, he had transferred at least $15 million to his brother Jake due to his problems with the IRS. Lansky was known to keep money in other people’s names, but how much will likely never be known. Meyer Lansky was and continues to be a mystery.

In September 1982, Forbes listed him as one of the 400 wealthiest people in America. His net worth was estimated at $100 million.

 In popular culture

 In film

  • The character Hyman Roth, portrayed by Lee Strasberg, and certain aspects of the main character Michael Corleone from the film The Godfather Part II (1974), are based on Lansky. In fact, shortly after the premiere in 1974, Lansky phoned Strasberg and congratulated him on a good performance (Strasberg was nominated for an Oscar for his role), but added “You could’ve made me more sympathetic.” Roth’s statement to Michael Corleone that “We’re bigger than U.S. Steel” was actually a direct quote from Lansky, who said the same thing to his wife while watching a news story on the Cosa Nostra. The character Johnny Ola is similar to Lansky’s associate Vincent Alo. Additionally, the character Moe Greene, who was a friend of Roth’s, is modeled upon Bugsy Siegel.[11][12] The film reflects real life in that Lansky was denied the Right of Return to Israel and returned to the U.S. to face criminal charges, but fabricated details regarding Roth’s attempts to bribe Latin American dictators for entry to their countries, as well as Roth’s ultimate fate.
  • Maximilian “Max” Bercovicz, the gangster played by James Woods in Sergio Leone‘s opus Once Upon A Time In America was inspired by Meyer Lansky.[13]
  • Mark Rydell plays Lansky in the 1990 Sydney Pollack film Havana, starring Robert Redford.
  • The film Bugsy (1991), a biography of Bugsy Siegel, included Lansky as a major character, played by Ben Kingsley.
  • In the 1991 film Mobsters, he is played by the actor Patrick Dempsey.
  • In a 1999 movie biopic entitled Lansky, the dramatized role of Lansky is portrayed by Richard Dreyfuss.
  • Meyer Lansky is portrayed by Dustin Hoffman in the 2005 film The Lost City.

 In television

  • In the current (2010) series on HBO, Boardwalk Empire, Meyer Lansky is played by Anatol Yusef.
  • The 1981 NBC mini series, The Gangster Chronicles, the character of Michael Lasker, played by Brian Benben, was based on Lansky. Because Lansky was still living at the time, the producers derived the “Michael Lasker” name for the character to avoid legal complications.
  • A 1999 made-for-TV movie called Lansky was released starring Richard Dreyfuss as Lansky, Eric Roberts as Bugsy Siegel, and Anthony LaPaglia as Lucky Luciano.
  • Manny Wiesbord, the mob chieftain played by Joseph Wiseman on Crime Story, was based on Lansky.
  • Lansky’s grandson, Meyer Lansky II, appeared in the “Jesse James vs. Al Capone” episode of Spike‘s Deadliest Warrior as a Capone expert, credited as “Mafioso Descendant.” The senior Lansky was briefly referenced during the episode.

 In literature

  • In the 2010 book of photographs “New York City Gangland”,[14] Meyer Lansky is seen “loitering” on Little Italy’s famed “Whiskey Curb” with partners Benjamin “Bugsy” Siegel, Vincent “Jimmy Blue Eyes” Alo, and waterfront racketeer Eddie McGrath.
  • In the 1996 novel The Plan, by Stephen J. Cannell, Lansky and fellow mobster Joseph Alo are involved in putting an anti-Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act presidential candidate into office.
  • In the 2009 theatrical adaption by Joseph Bologna “Lansky” is portrayed by Mike Burstyn in a one act play.
  • In the book Havana by Stephen Hunter, Lansky and Fidel Castro are both included as main characters.
  • In the 2009 novel If The Dead Rise Not by Philip Kerr the hero, Bernie Gunther, meets Lansky in Havana.
  • In the 2009 novel Ride of the Valkyries by Stuart Slade, Meyer Lansky is the President of Mafia run Cuba.
  • In the 2011 historical novel, “The Devil Himself” by Eric Dezenhall, Meyer Lansky coordinates counterespionage operations with the U.S. Navy to prevent Nazi sabotage in New York and help plan the invasion of Sicily.
  • He portrays himself in Harold Robbins 1995 follow-up to The Carpetbaggers, The Raiders.

In music

  • In his 2007 song “Party Life,” Jay-Z raps, “So tall and Lanky / My suit, it should thank me / I make it look good to be this hood Meyer Lansky.”
  • Raekwon, a member of the Wu-tang Clan referred to himself as “rap’s Meyer Lansky” in his song “Glaciers of Ice,” a single on his classic 1995 release “Only Built 4 Cuban Linx…
  • A member of the rap group Wu-Syndicate uses Myalansky as his stage name, referring to Meyer Lansky.
  • In the 2010 mixtape “Albert Anastasia” by Rick Ross refers to Meyer Lansky in his song White Sand Pt.II: “I put the team together like I’m Meyer Lansky.”
  • On Obie Trice’s “Outro” off the Cheers album Proof raps, ” Know much about Meyer Lansky? / Don’t tustle with my hand speed / Clutch your burner, bust it and watch your man bleed.”
  • In 2011 50 Cent’s Run Up On Me Freestyle raps, “Got a fetish for the guns Calico drums / Rap Meyer Lansky steady counting my ones”

TOP-SECRET – LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ALLIANCE

Cryptome
13 September 2011
Members of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance
INSA Home
“INSA is the premier not-for-profit, nonpartisan, private sector professional organization providing a structure and interactive forum for thought leadership, the sharing of ideas, and networking within the intelligence and national security communities. INSA has over 150 corporate members, as well as several hundred individual members, who are industry leaders within the government, private sector, and academia.” Includes ex-directors of spy agencies and current spies, ex-White House national security staff, members and ex-members of Congress and their staff, senior military officers, senior corporate personnel and other notables. The list is not in full alphabetic order. 95 members use an nsa.gov e-mail address. RFTYGAR@NSA.GOV (Major General David B. Lacquement, Cybercom) dfmuzzy@nsa.gov or dbmuzzy@nsa.gov algorin@nsa.gov bkind@nsa.gov bmcrumm@nsa.gov bmkaspa@nsa.gov bmstite@nsa.gov ceander@nsa.gov dabonan@nsa.gov dahatch@nsa.gov daplunk@nsa.gov dbbuie@nsa.gov dcover@nsa.gov dpcargo@nsa.gov dpmatth@nsa.gov drennis@nsa.gov dvheinb@nsa.gov eejorda@nsa.gov elbauma@nsa.gov fdbedar@nsa.gov fjfleis@nsa.gov fjorlos@nsa.gov gafrisv@nsa.gov gcnolte@nsa.gov gdbartk@nsa.gov ghevens@nsa.gov grcotte@nsa.gov hadavis@nsa.gov hlriley@nsa.gov jaemmel@nsa.gov jcingli@nsa.gov jcmorti@nsa.gov jcsmart@nsa.gov jdcohen@nsa.gov jdheath@nsa.gov jewhite@nsa.gov jgrusse@nsa.gov jhdoody@nsa.gov jhohara@nsa.gov jimathe@nsa.gov jjbrand@nsa.gov jksilk@nsa.gov jllusby@nsa.gov jmcusic@nsa.gov jmjohns@nsa.gov jrsmith@nsa.gov jswalsm@nsa.gov jtnader@nsa.gov kamille@nsa.gov kbalex2@nsa.gov labaer@nsa.gov landers@nsa.gov lfgiles@nsa.gov lkensor@nsa.gov lphall@nsa.gov lrstanl@nsa.gov ltdunno@nsa.gov mabeatt@nsa.gov mawirt@nsa.gov mgflemi@nsa.gov mjgood@nsa.gov mkmcnam@nsa.gov mrevans@nsa.gov mrredgr@nsa.gov mthorto@nsa.gov nasmith@nsa.gov pacabra@nsa.gov papitte@nsa.gov plihnat@nsa.gov plporte@nsa.gov rdjones@nsa.gov rdsiers@nsa.gov relewis@nsa.gov resunda@nsa.gov rhkrysi@nsa.gov rlcarte@nsa.gov rlmeyer@nsa.gov rmmeyer@nsa.gov rpkelly@nsa.gov sfdishe@nsa.gov sfdonne@nsa.gov sgmille@nsa.gov sjmille@nsa.gov sstanar@nsa.gov swramsa@nsa.gov taedwar@nsa.gov tdsoule@nsa.gov tjpeter@nsa.gov twsager@nsa.gov vacurti@nsa.gov vnhalli@nsa.gov wjmarsh@nsa.gov wmmurph@nsa.gov wmthomp@nsa.gov wjseman@nsa.gov Mr. John Allison Chief Human Capital Officer DIA Building 6000 Washington , DC 20340-5100 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: John.Allison@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Brady Alsaker 10357 Windstream Dr. Columbia , MD 21044 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bradyalsaker@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Charles Alsup B.S., M.S. VP of Policy INSA 901 North Stuart Steet Suite 205 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (703) 509-6405 Fax: (703) 224-4681 Email: calsup@insaonline.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Laurence M Altenburg II 4501 N Fairfax Dr, 8th Floor Arlington , VA 22301 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: larry.altenburg@gartner.com _____________________________________________________ Matthew Altomare 521 Abbotts Landing Circle #K Fayetteville , NC 28314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mma32@cornell.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joseph Amato 100 Severn Avenue #508 Annapolis , MD 21403 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Eric J Amberge Managing Director APG Technologies, LLC 116 Chimney Ridge Pl Sterling , VA 20165 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: eric.amberge@apgtech.com _____________________________________________________ Richard F Ambrose Vice President IS&GS Security Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: richard.f.ambrose@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Stephanie Ambrose VP Global Services Unit Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Mr. Rob Amos Account Manager Cisco Systems, Inc. 13635 Dulles Technology Drive Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: roamos@cisco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Amshey COO The Podmilsak Group One Fountain Square, 11911 Freed Suite 710 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wamsheyjr@cox.net _____________________________________________________ Ms. Cecilia Anastos 5 River Ridge Lane Fredericksburg , VA 22406 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Chris E Anderson Deputy SID NSA 9800 Savage Road Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ceander@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Derrick Anderson 29 North Concord Gilbert , AZ 85234 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: derrick.anderson@asu.edu _____________________________________________________ Jeffrey Anderson TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Lari Anderson VP, Strategic Development BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Lonny Anderson Technology Directorate, CTO, CIO NSA 9800 Savage Road Suite 6473 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: landers@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ dr rhonda l anderson phd senior advisor, s&t odni 1033 30th st nw washington , DC 20007 Phone: (850) 303-1912 Fax: (none) Email: rhonda.anderson@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Roger Anderson VP Network Intelligence Division Applied Signal Technology 460 West California Avenue Sunnyvale , CA 94086 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: roger_anderson@appsig.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Wes Anderson General Manager Microsoft Corporation 5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wesand@microsoft.com _____________________________________________________ Mark Andersson COO Applied Signal Technology 460 West California Avenue Sunnyvale , CA 94086 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: MARK_ANDERSSON@appsig.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Louis Andre Sr. Vice President, Intelligence CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: landre@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Erica Andren 41 Caerleon Ct Pikesville , MD 21208 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: erica_andren@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Erica Andren Senior Manager BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: erica_andren@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Erica Andren Senior Manager BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: erica_andren@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Hugh K Bolton President & CEO The Advanced Technical Intelligence Center 2685 Hibiscus Way Suite 110 Beavercreek , OH 45431 Phone: (none) Fax: (937) 429-7602 Email: hbolton@atichcd.org _____________________________________________________ Ms. Deborah Bonanni Chief of Staff NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dabonan@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Kit Bond Sen. Vice Chairman Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: courtney_ellis@bond.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Steve Bond Strategic Planner Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 230 Mall blvd King of Prussia , PA 19406 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: steve.p.bond@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Gus Bontzos Vice President ITT Corporation Lisa McGee 141 National Business parkway Suite 200 annapolis junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gus.bontzos@itt.com _____________________________________________________ Randy Bookout TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: r_bookout@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Boone 4905 Oakcrest Drive Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jvboone@cox.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joseph Booth 43427 Circle Oaks Street Gonzales , LA 70737 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jbooth@dps.state.la.us _____________________________________________________ David Boren President, University of Oklahom EOP No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: davidlboren@ou.edu _____________________________________________________ Stanley Borgia Associate Director of Counterint Energy Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Rafael Borras Under Secretary for Management DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lupe.morales@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Rafael Borras Undersecretary for Management DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rafael.borras@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Elizabeth Bosnak 2300 Clarendon Blvd, Suite 800 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Eric J Boswell Diplomatic Security State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: boswellej@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Bottom TITLE TBD NGA 1206 Weatherstone Court Reston , VA 20194 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bottomd@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Bouchard 2345 Crystal Drive suite 525 Crystal City , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Michael.Bouchard@eodt.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Linda Bouland TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jllusby@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Joe Bowab Minority Staff Director Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joe_bowab@armed-services.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sheryl Bowanko 13401 Trey Lane Clifton , VA 20124 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ SHERYL BOWANKO VP SAIC 11251 ROGER BACON DRIVE RESTON , VA 20190 Phone: (unlisted) Fax: (703) 318-4612 Email: sheryl.bowanko@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Raymond C Bowen III Chairman/Co-Founder Exceptional Software Strategies Inc 849 International Drive Suite 310 Linthicum , MD 21090 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: raymond.bowen@exceptionalsoftware.com _____________________________________________________ William Bowman 7930 Jones Branch Road 5th Floor McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wbowman@adobe.com _____________________________________________________ John Boyarski 208 Wakefield Drive Locust Grove , VA 22508 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.boyarski@us.army.mil _____________________________________________________ John Boyarski Major DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.boyarski@us.army.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. James T Boyd BS, MS Senior Program Manager KMS Solutions, LLC 205 S. Whiting Street Suite 400 Alexandria , VA 22304 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 370-6946 Email: jtboyd@kmssol.com _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Jane A Boyd Lockheed Martin SSC Mailstop: 1102 P O Box 179 Denver , CO 80201 Phone: (540) 710-5837 Fax: (303) 971-3666 Email: jane.boyd@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Judith Boyd Dep. AGC for Intelligence DHS Office of the General Counsel 66 15th St. NE Washington , DC 20002 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jkboyd08@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Phillip L Boyd Fellow, Special Programs Cubic Defense Applications, Inc. 9333 Balboa Ave San Diego , CA 92123 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: phil.boyd@cubic.com _____________________________________________________ Brooke Boyer TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brooke.boyer@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Daniel Boyle Business Development Representat SAS Institute 1530 Wilson Blvd Suite 800 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Col. Ed Boyle USAF (Ret. TITLE TBD Kforce Government Solutions 2750 Prosperity Ave. Suite 300 Fairfax , VA 22031 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: eboyle@dnovus.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joseph Bozzay 18876 Loudoun Orchard Road Leesburg , VA 20175 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Dyann R Bradbury Associate Director of Compliance Digital River 5300 Leighton Avenue Lincoln , NE 68504 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dbradbury@digitalriver.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Gail Bradley Account Executive Dell Inc. One Dell Way One Dell Way Round Rock , TX 78682 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gail_bradley@dell.com _____________________________________________________ Patricia Bradshaw 11925 Parkland Court Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pbradshaw1@cox.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Tom Brady TITLE TBD Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tom.brady@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Tom Brady Business Development Executive Hewlett Packard Company 616 Silverstone Court Silver Spring , MD 20905 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lizette.a.grady@hp.com _____________________________________________________ John Bramer Director of Program Development Software Engineering Institute, CMU NRECA Building Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Adrienne Brand Senior Consultant Booz Allen Hamilton 13200 Woodland Park Road Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brand_adrienne@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joseph J Brand TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road S02, Suite 6425 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jjbrand@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Robert Brandon Program Area Manager Boeing 7700 Boston Blvd Springfield , VA 22153 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Robert.w.Brandon@Boeing.com _____________________________________________________ Scott Brasfield Business Development Parsons 100 M Street SE Washington , DC 20003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: scott.brasfield@parsons.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Sherri N Braxton-Lieber Director, NCR Programs Cubic Applications, Inc. Sherri Braxton-Lieber 12224 Summer Sky Path Clarksville , MD 21029 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sherri.braxton-lieber@cubic.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Bredimus Engineering Fellow, Special Prog Cubic Defense Applications, Inc. 9333 Balboa Ave San Diego , CA 92123 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mike.bredimus@cubic.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard Breeden Executive Director ManTech International Corporation 2500 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: richard.breeden@mantech.com _____________________________________________________ Chad Breese 21412 Alum Creek Ct Ashburn , VA 20147 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chad.breese@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Chris J Brehany 13020 Feldspar Court Clifton , VA 20124-0951 Phone: (703) 818-7272 Fax: (none) Email: brehany@geointsolutions.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Peter Breier Vice President CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pbreier@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert B Bremmer Practice Manager EMC Corporation Bob Bremmer 653 MacBeth Drive Pittsburgh , PA 15235 Phone: (none) Fax: (412) 798-3774 Email: robert.bremmer@emc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Brender 21700 Atlantic Boulevard Dulles , VA 20166 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brender.mark@geoeye.com _____________________________________________________ Donald Thomas Executive Director Ernst & Young 8484 Westpark Drive McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: donald.thomas@ey.com _____________________________________________________ Donna Thomas Principal Astrachan, Gunst & Thomas, P.C. 217 East Redwood Street 21st Floor Baltimore , MD 21202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dthomas@agtlawyers.com _____________________________________________________ Donna Thomas TITLE TBD Astrachan, Gunst & Thomas, P.C. 217 East Redwood Street 21st Floor Baltimore , MD 21202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dthomas@agtlawyers.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jason Thomas Senior Analyst TRSS, LLC 1410 Spring Hill Rd Suite 140 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jason.thomas@trssllc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Thomas Vice President Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Thomas_John@bah.com _____________________________________________________ John Thomas SVP, General Manager SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.d.thomas@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Marcus C Thomas Operational Technology Division FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: marcus.thomas@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Mike Thomas TITLE TBD Booz Allen Hamilton 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Thomas_Mike@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Paul Thomas VP - Defense Operations Wyle Information Systems 1600 Intenational Dr Suite 800 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: paul.thomas@wyle.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Ria Thomas 6903 K Victoria Dr. Alexandria , VA 22310 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rthomas@fabiani-co.com _____________________________________________________ Ria Thomas Defense/Security Fabiani & Company 1101 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Washington , DC 20004 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rthomas@fabiani-co.com _____________________________________________________ Kevin Thompkins Vice President of Bus. Ops. Engineering Systems Consultants, Inc. 8201 Corporate Drive Suite 1105 Landover , MD 20785-2230 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Bennie G Thompson Chair, Committee on Homeland Sec Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: andrea.lee@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Gregory Thompson 950 25th St. NW Washington , DC 20037 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thompson.g@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Jennifer Thompson Sr. Marketing Communications Spe L-3 Communications, Inc. 11955 Freedom Drive Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Kimberly A Thompson Director, Office of Corporate Co NGA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kimberly.thompson@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Leigh Thompson TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Leigh.Thompson@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Monica Thompson 3011 Colonial Springs Court Alexandria , VA 22306 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: monica@prointelservices.net _____________________________________________________ Robert D Thompson Jr. State / Division of Levee Distri 505 District Dr. Monroe , LA 71202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ldpolice1@bellsouth.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Thompson 8329 North Mopac Expressway Austin , TX 78759 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wmthompson@signaturescience.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William M Thompson TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wmthomp@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Thomson 460 Spring Park Place Suite 1000 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rthomson@terremark.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Tierney Vice President, Business Develop L-3 Communications/Com.Sys.East 1 Federal Street A&E-2C Camden , NJ 8103 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: John.Tierney@L-3Com.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Chris Tillery TITLE TBD USIS 7799 Leesburg Pike Suite 400 S Falls Church , VA 22043 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chris.tillery@usis.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Tillison Security Director Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.tillison@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Edward A Timmes SVP, Deputy General Manager SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: edward.a.timmes.jr@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Nils G Tolling TITLE TBD CTSS - Corporate and Transport Security Solutions 9007 West Shorewood Suite 529 Mercer Island , WA 98040 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nils@ctssgroup.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. David Tolliver 4648 Star Flower Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: DETolliver@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Judy Tolliver 4648 Star Flower Dr Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jetolliver@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jack Tomarchio RETIRED DHS 4103 Meadow Lane Newtown Square , PA 19073 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.Tomarchio@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Jack T Tomarchio Agoge Group, LLC 200 Eagle Road, Suite 308 Wayne , PA 19087 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jtt@agogegroup.com _____________________________________________________ Adm. Chris Tomney USCG Intelligence Coordinating Center DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chris.tomney@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Kurt Tong Asst Sec Asia-Pacific State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tongk@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Deputy Asst. Se John Torres Deputy Assistant Secretary, US I DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.torres@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Fran Townsend INSA Chairwoman of the Board MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 35 E. 62nd St. New York , NY 10065 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Stacy Trammell 11400 Glen Dale Ridge Road Glenn Dale , MD 20769 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stacy.trammell@zavda.com _____________________________________________________ Stacy Trammell President Zavda Technologies, LLC 9250 Bendix Road Suite 540 Columbia , MD 21045 Phone: (none) Fax: (240) 266-0597 Email: stacy.trammell@zavda.com _____________________________________________________ Stacy D Trammell Stacy D. Trammell 11400 Glen Dale Ridge Road Glenn Dale , MD 20769 Phone: (unlisted) Fax: (240) 266-0597 Email: stacy.trammell@zavda.com _____________________________________________________ Christopher T Trapp TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jeffrey Trauberman Vice President The Boeing Company-Network & Space Systems 1200 Wilson Blvd. Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeff.trauberman@boeing.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jeffrey Trauberman VP, Space, Intel & MDS The Boeing Company Jeffrey Trauberman The Boeing Company 1200 Wilson Blvd. Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeff.trauberman@boeing.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jeffrey Trauberman Vice President The Boeing Company 1200 Wilson Blvd. Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeff.traubeman@boeing.com _____________________________________________________ Jeffrey Trauberman Vice President The Boeing Company 1200 Wilson Blvd. Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeff.trauberman@boeing.com _____________________________________________________ Stephen Traver 1007 Longworth House Office Buil Washington , DC 20515 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Paul Tremont Executive Vice President, Operat SRC, Inc 7502 Round Pond Road North Syracuse , NY 13212 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tremont@srcinc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ronald J Trerotola Director RF Systems Engineering Cubic Defense Applications, Inc. 9333 Balboa Ave San Diego , CA 92123 Phone: (unlisted) Fax: (none) Email: ron.trerotola@cubic.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Steven A Trevino 19192 Greystone Square Leesburg , VA 20176 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Steven.Trevino@Keane.com _____________________________________________________ Joseph Trindal Managing Director KeyPoint Government Solutions, Inc. 1750 Foxtrail Drive Loveland , CO 80538 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joseph.trindal@keypoint.us.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bruce Triner 6112 Nightshade Court Rockville , MD 20852 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Kate Troendle Vice President BlueStone Capital Partners 1600 Tysons Boulevard 8th Floor McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 852-4496 _____________________________________________________ John Brennan Assistant to the President for H NSC No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john_o._brennan@who.eop.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Brennan Director, Policy and Analysis NRO 14675 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.brennan@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Nicholas Brethauer 655 Emerson St. NE Washington , DC 20017 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: npbrethauer@uwalumni.com _____________________________________________________ Larry Brewer SVP, Government Relations DRS Technologies, Inc. 5 Sylvan Way Parsippany , NJ 7054 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lbrewer@drs-ds.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Vincent Bridgeman 3834 Windom Pl NW Washington , DC 20016 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Diane Briggs TITLE TBD Harris Corporation P.O. Box 37 MS: 2-21D Melbourne , FL 32902 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dbriggs@harris.com _____________________________________________________ Ambassador Kenneth Brill TITLE TBD State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: BrillKC@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Esther Brimmer International Organization Affai State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brimmere@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Rex Brinker TITLE TBD Software Engineering Institute, CMU No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rbrinker@sei.cmu.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Denny Brisley 1421 Jefferson Davis Highway Suite 600 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: denny.brisley@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Denny Brisley President and CEO The Brisley Group, LLC 3406 Gilden Drive Alexandria , VA 22305 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: debrisley@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Ms. Denny E Brisley Market Development Executive SAIC 11251 Roger Bacon Drive Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brisleyd@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Bill Britton Vice President General Manager Cobham Analytic Solutions 5875 Trinity Parkway Suite 300 Centreville , VA 20120 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Sandra Broadnax Director, Small Business Program NGA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Sandra.L.Broadnax@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Sandra Broadnax 12310 Sunrise Valley Drive Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sandra.braodnax@waldenu.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joseph Broadwater Senior Vice President, NSG QinetiQ North America 7918 Jones Branch Drive Suite 350 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joe.broadwater@analex.com _____________________________________________________ Jon Brody VP of Marketing Tenable Network Security 7063 Columbia Gateway Drive Suite 100 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Elizabeth Brooks TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Daniel Brophy 1421 Jefferson Davis Highway Suite 600 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Daniel.Brophy@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Joseph Brosky 106 Shenkelview Drive Johnstown , PA 15905 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Joe.Brosky@usdoj.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joseph F Brosky National Drug Intelligence Cente 319 Washington Street Johnstown , PA 15905 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Joe.Brosky@usdoj.gov _____________________________________________________ Fred Brott TITLE TBD Intec Billing, Inc. 301 North Perimeter Center Suite 200 Atlanta , GA 30346 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: fred.brott@intecbilling.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Frederick Brott President, CEO & Chairman Intec Billing, Inc. 301 North Perimeter Center Suite 200 Atlanta , GA 30346 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: fred.brott@intecbilling.com _____________________________________________________ Brenda Brown Marketing Communications Operati TASC 4805 Stonecroft Blvd Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Charles G Brown Chair, Antennas and Propogation NSA 9800 Savage Road D, Suite 6242 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (301) 688-7741 Email: cgbrown@ieee.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Clay Brown TITLE TBD Northrop Grumman Geospatial Services 6910 Scenic Pointe Place Manassas , VA 20112 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cbrown@3001inc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Darrell Brown 45677 Paddington Station Terrace Sterling , VA 20166 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: darrellpbrown@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ David Brown 5155 Parkstone Drive Chantilly , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dave.brown@agilex.com _____________________________________________________ Frank H Brown TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Jason B Brown White House Cyber Security NSC No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jason_b._brown@who.eop.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jerome A Brown Jr. MPA Defense Analyst U.S. Government Accountability Office 5602 Hogenhill Terrace Rockville , MD 20853 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jerome.a.brown@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Kevin Brown Dr. Kevin L. Brown, CEO 7901 Jones Branch Drive Suite 610 Mclean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kbrown@lorenzresearch.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Kevin Brown TITLE TBD NRO 14675 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kevin.brown@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. La Tosca Brown BA Client Executive IBM 41342 Raspberry Drive Leesburg , VA 20176 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lbbrown@us.ibm.com _____________________________________________________ Lisa S Brown TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Admiral Michael Brown USN TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Michael A Brown Transport. Security Specialist Transportation Security Administration 601 S 12th Street TSA-13 Arlington , VA 205986013 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dadabrown@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ RADM Mike Brown Deputy Assistant Secretary for C DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Michael.Brown1@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Paul Brown Intelligence Analyst GTEC 20907 Sandstone Square Sterling , VA 20165 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: paulbrowntx@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Roger Brown 1517 N. Colonial Court Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brownrogera@mac.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William C Brown CI Staff Office CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 739-5504 Email: bbrown@caci.com _____________________________________________________ William E Brown Business Development Manager SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: william.e.brown@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Ric E Browne Manager, Business Development General Dynamics General Dynamics 2721 Technology Drive Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ric.browne@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Browning Director, Intelligence Systems General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Robert.Browning@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ William Brucato 11 Cresent Court Sterling , VA 20164 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: missionsupport1@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Bruce 9513 Woody Lane Great Falls , VA 22066 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james_bruce@rand.org _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kellene Bruce Research Fellow LMI 2000 Corporate Ridge McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kbruce@lmi.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ronald Bruce 10 South Beaumont Avenue Catonsville , MD 21228 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: crbruce@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Charles Brummund Vice President,General Manager, BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: charles.brummund@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael J Bruni Staffing Manager SAIC Michael Bruni 11251 Roger Bacon Drive Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 318-4595 Email: brunim@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Jill Bruning Chief Operating Officer NJVC, LLC 8614 Westwood Center Drive Suite 300 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jill.bruning@njvc.com _____________________________________________________ Bear Bryant Deputy Director of National Inte ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: robermb3@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Steve Bryen President Finmeccanica Angelica Falchi 1625 I Street, NW 12th Floor Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stephen.bryen@finmeccanica.com _____________________________________________________ Robert M Brzenchek Masters Emergency Planning Specialist Luzerne County EMA Robert Brzenchek Luzerne County EMA 185 Water Street Wilkes-Barre , PA 18702 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: robert.brzenchek@luzernecounty.org _____________________________________________________ Zbigniew Brzezinski Center for CSIS Counselor and Trustee CSIS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: aschwartz@csis.org _____________________________________________________ Donna Bucella Required unless Parent Required unless Parent , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Michael Buchwald TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: m_buchwald@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Brian Buck Chief Technology Officer River Glass Inc 6626 Stowe Ct Lisle , IL 60532 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bbuck@riverglassinc.com _____________________________________________________ Nick Buck President & CEO Buck Consulting Group, LLC 13111 Tingewood Ct Oak Hill , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 391-7821 Email: nick@buckgroup.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Buckley Senior Manager Deloitte 1001 G St. N.W. Ste 900 Washington , DC 20001 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: davidbuckley@deloitte.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Buckley Inspector General CIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: buckdavid@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Buie TITLE TBD NSA 106 Flanagan Drive Taneytown , MD 21787 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dbbuie@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Steve Bull Director Analytic Services (ANSER) 2900 South Quincy S Suite 800 Arlington , VA 22206 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: steve.bull@anser.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Bullett 11107 Sunset Hills Road Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rbullett@us.ibm.com _____________________________________________________ Brian B Bullock Capture Manager General Dynamics IT, NDIS 13857 McLearen Drive Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brian.bullock@gdit.com _____________________________________________________ Brian B Bullock Capture Manager General Dynamics IT, NDIS 13857 McLearen Drive Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 268-7886 Email: brian.bullock@gdit.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Stephen Buonato PO Box 10882 Marina del Rey , CA 90295 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sbuonato@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Laurence Burgess Deputy Undersecretary for Collec DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: laurence.burgess@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ LTG Ron Burgess USA Director of the DIA DIA 7400 Defense Pentagon Rm. 3E-258 Washington , DC 20301-7400 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Ronald.Burgess@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Burgoyne Vice President, ISR Sierra Nevada Corporation 444 Salomon Circle Sparks , NV 89434 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.burgoyne@sncorp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. A. Burks 950 Willow Valley Lakes Dr. #H311 Willow Street , PA 17584 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joanandroyburks@worldnet.att.net _____________________________________________________ Dr. James Burnett 7136 Avenida Altisima Rancho Palos Verdes , CA 90275 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rburnett@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Destiny Burns TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 10560 Arrowhead Drive Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Kerri Burns TITLE TBD i2 1430 Spring Hill Road McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ William J Burns Under Secretary Political Affair State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: burnswj@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Kyle C Burr B.A. Senior Consultant Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kyle.burr@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Tom Burrell 1400 Fountaingrove PKY MS: 3USW Santa Rosa , CA 95403 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tom_burrell@agilent.com _____________________________________________________ Lynda Burroughs TITLE TBD ManTech International Corporation 2500 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Lynda Burroughs Business Development Manager ManTech International Corporation 2250 Corporate Park Drive Suite 500 Herndon , VA 22304 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lynda.burroughs _____________________________________________________ Lynda Burroughs 12015 Lee Jackson Highway Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lynda.burroughs@mantech.com _____________________________________________________ Lynda Burroughs 2250 Corporate Park Drive Suite 500 Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Lynda.Burroughs@mantech.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Peter Burrow 1616 Anderson Road Suite 109 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: peter.burrow@xebecglobal.com _____________________________________________________ Captain Richard Burton USN TITLE TBD DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: j.burton@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Thomas J Burton Office of Inspector General NGA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thomas.burton@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Wes Bush Chief Executive Officer Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dan Butler Assistant Deputy Director of Nat ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: daniel.s.butler@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Daniel Butler 12020 Quorn Lane Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: d.butler@dni.osis.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gerry Butler General Manager Sierra Nevada Corporation 444 Salomon Circle Sparks , NV 89434 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gerry.butler@sncorp.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Karen Butler 12020 Quorn Lane Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: butlerkc@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Butler 2355 Dulles Corner Blvd. Suite 525 Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: robert.butler@sap.com _____________________________________________________ Robert Butler Deputy Assistant Secretary for C DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Robert.butler@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Garrett Butulis 2845 Calliness Way Wake Forest , NC 27587 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: garrett@butulis.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jim Byers Director, Security Services Ensco, Inc. 5400 Port Royal Road Springfield , VA 22151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: byers.james@ensco.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Mary Kay Byers Chief Human Capital Officer NRO 14675 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: marykay.byers@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Shala A Byers Analyst Department of Homeland Security 2715 Cortland Place Apt 32 Washington , DC 20008 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: shala.byers@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Nicole Byler BA 1201 Colombo Ave Apt 10206 Sierra Vista , AZ 85635 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nicole.byler@us.army.mil _____________________________________________________ Robert Campbell 10160 Technology Blvd East Dallas , TX 75220 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: robert.p.campbell@usdoj.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Tim Campen 8260 Willow Oaks Drive Rm 3024 Fairfax , VA 22031 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: campta3435@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Elizabeth Camphouse 2342 Ballard Way Ellicott City , MD 21042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: elizabeth.camphouse@entegrasystems.com _____________________________________________________ Roel Campos PIAB Member PIAB No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Wendy_A._Loehrs@pfiab.eop.gov _____________________________________________________ Peggy Canale Government Segment Manager Avocent 2805 Ridge Road Drive Alexandria , VA 22302 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: peggy.canale@emerson.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Frank Cantarelli TITLE TBD Ciena Corporation 1185 Sanctuary Parkway Suite 300 Alpharetta , GA 30004 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: fcantare@ciena.com _____________________________________________________ Eric Cantor Rep. House Minority Whip Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cantorschedule@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard Capitan Vice President - Business Dev Parsons 100 M St, SE Washington , DC 20003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: richard.capitan@parsons.com _____________________________________________________ Philip Caplan Consultant URS Federal Services, Inc. URS Federal Services, Inc. 9755 Patuxent Woods Dr. Suite 300 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (410) 423-2570 Email: philip.caplan@urs.com _____________________________________________________ Paul Capozzola 2300 Corporate Park Drive Suite 110 Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (703) 391-1944 Fax: (703) 674-0256 Email: pcapozzola@signaturegs.com _____________________________________________________ Paul Capozzola Director Cyber Security Signature Government Solutions Paul Capozzola 2300 Corporate Park Drive Suite 110 Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pcapozzola@signaturegs.com _____________________________________________________ Connie Cappadona Strategic Program Manager Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Connie Cappadona Strategic Program Manager Hewlett Packard Federal Strategic Programs Group 6600 Rockledge drive Bethesda , MD 20817 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: connie.cappadona@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Connie Cappadona Strategic Programs Manager Hewlett-Packard 11391 Fox Vale Glen CT Oakton , VA 22124 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: connie.cappadona@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Mike L Capps TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Valerie Caproni OGC FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: valerie.caproni@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Ann Caracristi Required unless Parent Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Ann Carbonell 5819 Appleford Drive Alexandria , VA 22315-5625 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: adoublen@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Ann M Carbonell PhD. NGA Source Technical Executive NGA 5819 Appleford Dr. Alexandria , VA 22315 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Ann.M.Carbonell@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Dr. Ann M Carbonella LIDAR Program Manager NGA 5819 Appleford Drive Alexandria , VA 22315-5625 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: carbonellaa@nima.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Cardillo Deputy Director of Analysis DIA 7711 Cashland Court Alexandria , VA 22315 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Robert.Cardillo@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Dr. David P Cargo TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road R1, Suite 6515 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dpcargo@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ John Carlin Chief of Staff and Senior Counse FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.carlin@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bruce Carlson Director NRO No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bruce.carlson@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Johan Carlson 7483 Argyll Court Warrenton , VA 20187 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: hans@stratspace.net _____________________________________________________ Don Carmichael Director, BD Wyle Information Systems 1600 Intenational Dr Suite 800 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Donald Carney TITLE TBD Perkins Coie 11703 Charen Lane Potomac , MD 20854 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dcarney@perkinscoie.com _____________________________________________________ Adelbert W Carpenter VP Business Development L-3 Communications 1215 S. Clark St Suite 1205 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 412-7198 Email: Buz.carpenter@L-3com.com _____________________________________________________ Mike Carpenter Senior Vice President McAfee, Inc. 12010 Sunset Hills Road 5th Floor Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael_carpenter@mcafee.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Carr TITLE TBD CISCO 12516 Nathaniel Oaks Drive Oak Hill , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dkcarr50@cisco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael D Carr NCE Director, Mission Systems Tr NGA 4600 Sangamore Road, MS D-085 Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (301) 227-6040 Email: carrmd@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Robert Carr TITLE TBD DIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: robert.carr@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Shawn Carrolo TITLE TBD Qwest Communications 4250 N. Fairfax Dr. 5th Floor Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Eric Carson 1431 Harvey Avenue Severn , MD 21144 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: eric.carson@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Johnnie Carson Asst Secretary African Affairs State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: carsonj@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Carta IC Account Manager., APG Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.carta@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mike Carta Account Executive Dell Inc. One Dell Way One Dell Way Round Rock , TX 78682 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael_carta@dell.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Ashton Carter Under Secretary Defense AT&L DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ashton.carter@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Denise Carter Competition Advocate DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Denise.Carter@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Gail Carter INSA OCI Task Force Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Roger Carter 7526 Cherry Tree Drive Fulton , MD 20759 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rlcarter@quantum-intl.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Roger L Carter TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road DC5, Suite 6217 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rlcarte@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Gen James Cartwright Vice Chairman DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: molly.denham@js.pentagon.mil _____________________________________________________ Alana Casanova Masters Public Affairs DISA Alana Casanova/SPI 6910 Cooper Ave Fort Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: alana.casanova@disa.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. John P Casciano P. O. Box 231552 Centreville, VA , VA 20120 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: garystar@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Susan Case Vice Presi Vice President National Security American Systems 13990 Parkeast Circle Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Susan.Case@AmericanSystems.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ed Casey Chief Executive Officer Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 Email: Ed.Casey@serco-na.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Angie Cash TITLE TBD Dell Inc. One Dell Way One Dell Way Round Rock , TX 78682 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mike Castelli Counsel ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: boz.cas@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Castro Public Sector Sales Representati Quest Software - Public Sector Group 700 King Farm Boulevard Suite 250 Rockville , MD 20850 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: davidacastro@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Lorraine Castro 11487 Sunset Hills Road Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lorraineCNJ@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Tonia Cates TITLE TBD DIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tonia.cates@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Greg Catherine TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Greg.Catherine@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Nelson Cathie 6923 Kettle Mar Dr. Houston , TX 77084 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nelson@fbnt-inc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Daniel Catlaw TITLE TBD Booz Allen Hamilton 1201 South Barton Street #159 Arlington , VA 22204 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: catlaw_daniel@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Cattler 5970 Lyceum Lane Manassas , VA 20112 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cattler@earthlink.net _____________________________________________________ David Cattler Deputy National Intelligence Off ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: davidmc2@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard Cauchon 85 Collamer Crossings E. Syracuse , NY 13057 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dickc@sensis.com _____________________________________________________ Marcella Cavallaro Federal Intelligence Sales Esri 380 New York St Redlands , CA 92373 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mcavallaro@esri.com _____________________________________________________ Marcella Cavallaro 8615 Westwood Center Dr Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mcavallaro@esri.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Cavanaugh 5643 Lightspun Lane Columbia , MD 21045 Phone: (410) 997-4709 Fax: (410) 740-1942 Email: jpcgolf1@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Cave 4001 Fairfax Drive Ste 300 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: william.l.cave@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Luis CdeBaca Ofc to Monitor & Combat Traffick State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cdebacal@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Matt Cegelske Cyber Federal Executive Fellow U.S. Navy 4720 Forbes Avenue, CIC Rm 2310 Pittsburgh , PA 15213 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mcegelsk@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Celentano 6564 Loisdale Court Springfield , VA 22150 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Michael Cerruti President & CEO Everest Technology Solutions Inc. 9990 Lee Highway Suite 501 Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mcerruti@everest.nu _____________________________________________________ Michael J Cerruti TITLE TBD Everest Technology Solutions Inc. 9990 Lee Highway Suite 501 Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mcerruti@everest.nu _____________________________________________________ Hector Cevallos Director CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Steve Chabinsky Dep Asst Director, FBI Cyber Div FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stevenrc@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Chadason TITLE TBD ManTech International Corporation 2500 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Patrick J Chagnon P.O. Box 152 Windsor , CT 6095 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pchagnon@bluelineinfo.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Mary Chahalis 503 Garden View Way Rockville , MD 20850 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mchahali@us.ibm.com _____________________________________________________ Mary Chahalis Account Manager, Intel Terrago Technologies 1380 Park Garden Lane Reston , VA 20194 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: marychahalis@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ stephanie chak FA Morgan Stanley 1850 k st nw suite 900 washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stephanie.chak@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dave Chamberlain Vice President, Integrated Custo Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dchamberlai2@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Chamberlin Director NJVC, LLC 8614 Westwood Center Drive Suite 300 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.chamberlin@njvc.com _____________________________________________________ Regan Chambers 67 South Scribewood Circle The Woodlands , TX 77382 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Diane Chandler Director CACI International Inc. 4831 Walden Lane Lanham , MD 20706 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dchandler@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Kelly Chandler Recruiting Manager Cobham Analytic Solutions 1911 N Fort Myer Drive Suite 1100 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kelly.chandler@cobham.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Yvonne L Chaplin 3110 Fairview Park Drive falls church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ychaplin@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David C Chapman VP, New Business Development Scientific Research Corporation 2300 Windy Ridge Parkway Suite 400 South Atlanta , GA 30339 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dchapman@scires.com _____________________________________________________ Eric Chapman TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: e_chapman@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Tara Chapman 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tdc@alumni.duke.edu _____________________________________________________ Jane P Chappell TITLE TBD Raytheon Company Jane P. Chappell 1200 S. Jupiter Road Garland , TX 75042 Phone: (972) 423-6129 Fax: (972) 205-6388 Email: jane_p_chappell@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Charles 8618 Westwood Center Drive #315 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tcharles@sgis.com _____________________________________________________ Joe Charron TITLE TBD Kforce Government Solutions 2750 Prosperity Ave. Suite 300 Fairfax , VA 22031 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jcharron@kforcegov.com _____________________________________________________ Timothy Chase 1919 N. Lynn Street Rosslyn , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tchase@deloitte.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Harris J Chasen BS CTO F4W Harris Chasen 39 Skyline Dr. Ste. A1001 Lake Mary , FL 32746 Phone: (none) Fax: (407) 804-1030 Email: hchasen@f4winc.com _____________________________________________________ Charles Chassot 5678 Roundtree Drive Woodbridge , VA 22193 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chuck.chassot@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Melissa Chaump 181 E. Reed Ave., #409 Alexandria , VA 22305 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: melrae0607@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Jim Chavez TITLE TBD Sandia National Laboratories P.O. Box 5800 Albuquerque , NM 87185 Phone: (505) 844-4485 Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. L. Monica Chavez Vice President, Communications & General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Monica.Chavez@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Ms Lucia M Chavez Director, Washington Operations General Dynamics 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: monica.chavez@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Carson T Checketts 1709 19th St. NW #23 Washington , DC 20009 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: c.checketts@mac.com _____________________________________________________ Gen. Peter W Chiarelli Vice Chief of Staff (4-star) DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Craig M Childress President Eagle Talon Solutions, Inc. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cmchildress@eagletsi.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Chiralo Manager, Program Development SRI International 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2800 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chiralo@wdc.sri.com _____________________________________________________ Amy Choi 555 Massachusetts Ave NW Unit 808 Washington , DC 20001 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: amy.choi@us.pwc.com _____________________________________________________ Min Chong 8381 Old Courthouse Rd Suite 330 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: min.chong@stopso.com _____________________________________________________ Aneesh Chopra Federal Chief Technology Officer EOP No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: aneesh_chopra@ostp.eop.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Duane Andrews CEO QinetiQ North America 7918 Jones Branch Drive Suite 350 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dandrews@qinetiq-na.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Edward Andron ACom ARM Property Manager BLDG Management Corp. 24 Perkiomen Avenue Staten Island , NY 10312 Phone: (718) 967-3617 Fax: (212) 557-6709 Email: eandron@bldg.com _____________________________________________________ Brad Antle CEO Salient Federal Solutions 4000 Legato Road Ste 510 Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brad.antle@salientfed.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bradford Antle 12012 Sunset Hills Road Suite 800 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 Email: brad.antle@salientfed.com _____________________________________________________ Kathleen Appenrodt 2331 Cathedral Avenue NW Apt. 50 Washington DC , DC 20008 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kathleen.Appenrodt@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Kathleen Appenrodt Federal Planner DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kathleen.Appenrodt@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Roy Apseloff 117 S. Buchanan Street Arlington , VA 22204 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rapseloff@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Roy Apseloff Director, National Media and Exp ODNI 117 S. Buchanan Street Arlington , VA 22204 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Roy.Apseloff@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Ellen Ardrey Deputy Director, Human Capital O DIA 7400 Defense Pentagon Rm. 3E-258 Washington , DC 20301-7400 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Ellen.Ardrey@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. James B Armor Jr. 7004 Veering Lane Burke , VA 22015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.armor@atk.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Patrick Arnold CTO Microsoft Corporation 5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: patar@microsoft.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard Arnold Director, Strategy & Business De General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Richard.Arnold@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Steve Arnold 11717 Exploration Lane Germantown , MD 20876 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: steven.arnold@hughes.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Myra Aronson 1000 Technology Drive Pittsburgh , PA 15219 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: myra.aronson@ansaldo-sts.us _____________________________________________________ Mr. Tony Arsene MBA, BAS, CEO Angelic Care Inc P.O. Box 253 Montclair , CA 91763 Phone: (909) 982-3866 Fax: (909) 982-3866 Email: guitaricon@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Dean D Artigue TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Kenneth Asbury 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ken.asbury@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Robert Ashe Strategic Planner SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGIES 185 STATE HIGHWAY 36 WEST LONG BRANCH , NJ 7764 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rashe@systek.com _____________________________________________________ Sapana Asher Title TBD i2 1430 Spring Hill Road McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Jeff Ashford Staff Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeff.ashford@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Lindley Ashline GovWin.com Web Editor Deltek 13880 Dulles Corner Ln # 400 Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lindleyashline@deltek.com _____________________________________________________ Elizabeth Ashwell TITLE TBD Treasury Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: julie.herr@do.treas.gov _____________________________________________________ Sid Ashworth Minority Staff Director Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sid_ashworth@appro.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Sid Ashworth VP, NGC Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Shay Assad Director of Defense Procurement DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: erin.porter@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Bill Chow VP, Engineering and Operations Core180, Inc. 2751 Prosperity Drive Suite 200 Vienna , VA 22031 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mahiyan Chowdhury Ex-MBA Substation Engineer Siemens Energy, Inc 900 E. Six Forks Rd 152 Raleigh , NC 27604 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mxc1700@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Dana Christiansen Federal Account Executive Gartner 4501 N. Fairfax Drive 8th Floor Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dana.christiansen@gartner.com _____________________________________________________ Ben Chu Strategic Planner Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ben.1.chu@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Ben Chu 1111 Lockheed Martin Way Sunnyvale , CA 94089 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ben.1.chu@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Steven Chu Secretary Energy Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: the.secretary@hq.doe.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Leonardo Ciano 15 Sampson Rd Rochester , NH 3867 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: leociano@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Kevin P Cichetti Associate Deput Director, Congre NGA 16424 Montecrest Lane Gaithersburg , MD 20878 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kevin.P.Cichetti@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Rick Cinquegrana Senior Manager Grant Thornton LLP 333 John Carlyle Street Suite 500 Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ James R Clapper Jr. Under Secretary of Defense for I DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: James.Clapper@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sharon Claridge 5353 Ashleigh Road Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sclaridge@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bill Clark TITLE TBD Computer Associates No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: william.clark@ca.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Clark Director of Collections DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david.clark@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Clark TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Mark.Clark@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Mary Clark TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ryan Clark Project Manager Computer Sciences Corporation 7231 Parkway Drive Hanover , MD 21076 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rclark52@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Timothy Clayton Director, Human Capital Manageme DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: timothy.clayton@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Peter Clement Deputy Director of Intelligence CIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 482-1739 Email: peterc@cia.ic.gov _____________________________________________________ Denis Clements INSA Innovative Tech Council QinetiQ North America 7918 Jones Branch Drive Suite 350 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ John Clements 7808 boyce street ft meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.e.clements@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Melcena (Gary) Clemmons VP for Business Development SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: melcena.g.clemmons@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Gail Clifford TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gclifford@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Howard Clifford Chief Technologist - US Intel Hewlett-Packard Co 107 Sandgate Ct. Millersville , MD 21108 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: howard.clifford@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Sean A Clifton 263 Clover Court Dublin , OH 43017 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sean.clifton@us.army.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. T E Clifton III 1700 N. Moore St. Suite 2100 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tip@eastportanalytics.com _____________________________________________________ Hillary Clinton Secretary State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ClintonHR@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Daniel L Cloyd National Secretary Brance, Direc FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: daniel.cloyd@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Aaron Coats 2808 McKinney Ave. #501 Dallas , TX 75204 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: acoats@smu.edu _____________________________________________________ Kyle Coble MSIT Cybersecurity Standards SPC DHS DHS - NCSD 245 Murray Lane Arlington , VA 20598 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kyle.coble@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Kevin Coby Vice President, Special Projects KeyW Corporation 1334 Ashton Road Hanover , MD 21076 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kcoby@keywcorp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Peter Coddington BA, MAS PO Box 128 Highland , MD 20777 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pcoddington@parabal.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Coe MA, BA Consultant Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: coe_michael_d@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Paul Cofoni Chief Executive Officer CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pcofoni@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Shaw Cohe TITLE TBD ASI Government 1655 North Fort Meyer Drive Suite 1000 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: scohe@acqsolinc.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Anita Cohen 6806 Wemberly Way McLean , VA 22101 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: anitairene@aol.com _____________________________________________________ David S Cohen Assistant Secretary (Terrorist F Treasury Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david.cohen@do.treas.gov _____________________________________________________ Dr. Jonathan Cohen TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road Suite 6513 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jdcohen@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Linda Cohen TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: linda.cohen@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Patricia A Cohen Research Staff Member Institute for Defense Analyses Intelligence Analyses Division 4850 Mark Center Drive Alexandria , VA 22312 Phone: (703) 642-2146 Fax: (none) Email: pcohen@ida.org _____________________________________________________ Harry Coker 9504 Silver Fox Turn Clinton , MD 20735-3045 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: HarryCokerJr@msn.com _____________________________________________________ Harry Coker TITLE TBD CIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 482-1739 Email: harrycokerjr@msn.com _____________________________________________________ Gene Colabatistto TITLE TBD SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gennaro.a.colabatistto@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gus P Coldebella 3809 Alton Pl NW Washington , DC 20016 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: coldebella@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. F. B Cole TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ltdunno@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jerry Cole 8105 Middle Ct Austin , TX 78759 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jgcassoc@aol.com _____________________________________________________ John C Cole Director Blackstone Technology Group 4601 N. fairfax Dr Suite 1010 Arlington , VA 20169 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ccole@bstonetech.com _____________________________________________________ Richard Coleman 6066 Shingle Creek Parkway #18 Brooklyn Center , MN 55430 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Richard Coleman MA Chairman Cyber, Space & Intelligence Association 4305 Underwood Street University Park , MD 20782 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: richcoleman1@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Coleman CEO Six3 Systems 1430 Spring Hill Road Suite 525 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rcoleman@six3systems.com _____________________________________________________ Marcus Collier Division Senior VP, Civilian and General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: marcus.collier@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Matthew R Collier 5984-201 Jake Sears Circle Virginia Beach , VA 23464 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mattmit@regent.edu _____________________________________________________ Kelly Collins 12210 Glen Mill Rd. Potomac , MD 20854 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kelly.collins@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Nancy Walbridge Collins Columbia University International Affairs, 420 West New York , NY 10027 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nwcollins@columbia.edu _____________________________________________________ Felipe Colon Jr. Chief, IC CIO Policy ODNI - IC CIO 7708 Tiverton Drive Springfield , VA 22152 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: felipe.colon@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Rebecca Colon Senior Assistant 2 General Dynamics AIS 2721 Technology Drive Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (240) 294-2170 Email: rebecca.colon@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Roy Combs TITLE TBD BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: roy.combs@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kathleen S Comiskey MBA Senior Consultant Invertix Corporation 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 800 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kcomiskey@invertix.com _____________________________________________________ BGen Joseph Composto USMC (Ret. Director, Security & Installatio NGA 4600 Sangamore Road, D-102 Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joseph.composto@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Melissa Cona 1651 Mount Eagle Pl Alexandria , VA 22302 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: m.cona18@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Erin Conaton Staff Director Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: erin.conaton@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Maggie Conde-Jimenez Executive Assistant ManTech International Corporation 2500 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Patrick Condo 1921 Gallows Road Ste 200 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pcondo@convera.com _____________________________________________________ Ronald Conn Acquisition Mgmt Supervisor Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ David Connor Director Federal Sales Sourcefire 12709 Oxon Rd Oak Hill , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dconnor@sourcefire.com _____________________________________________________ Dee Connors TITLE TBD TASC 4805 Stonecroft Blvd Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: deeann.connors@tasc.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. DeeAnn Connors Director of Marketing Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: deeann.connors@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Conrad Architect-DHS & Intel Comm Microsoft Corporation 5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dconrad@microsoft.com _____________________________________________________ Greg Conran Network Designs, Inc. 501 Church St. Suite 210 Vienna , VA 22180-4711 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Conroy Vice President, NSP Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thomas.conroy@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Kevin Considine Partner, Federal Consulting, CSC CSC (formerly Computer Sciences Corporation) 3110 Fairview Park Drive Fall Church , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kconsidine2@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Tom Conway Director of Federal Business Dev McAfee, Inc. 12010 Sunset Hills Road 5th Floor Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tom_conway@mcafee.com _____________________________________________________ RADM Cynthia Coogan Director, USCG Intelligence DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Cynthia.A.Coogan@uscg.mil _____________________________________________________ David Cook TITLE TBD i2 1430 Spring Hill Road McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Lt Col Jeffrey Cook USAF 1189 Waverton Lane Lincoln , CA 95648 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: angrypilot@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Michele Cook Vice President, Business Devlopm Six3 Systems 1430 Spring Hill Road Suite 525 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michele.cook@six3systems.com _____________________________________________________ Michele Cook Vice President Six3 Systems 1430 spring hill road Suite 525 Mclean , VA 22012 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Michele.cook@six3systems.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Owen Cook High Performance Technology Mana Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: owen.cook@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Owen Cook Jr Senior Account Executive Intelligent Decisions Inc 21445 Beaumeade Cir Ashburn , VA 20147 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ocook@intelligent.net _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Julie G Coonce Business Development SMSi 11720 Sunrise Valley Dr., St 320 Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jcoonce@sms-fed.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Frank Cooper TITLE TBD Concurrent Technologies Corporation 325 Graystone Lane Johnstown , PA 15905 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cooper@ctc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joe Cooper President & CEO Special Aerospace Security Services Inc 14325 Willard Road Suite 202 Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joe.cooper@sassi-va.com _____________________________________________________ Joe D Cooper TITLE TBD Special Aerospace Security Services Inc 14325 Willard Road Suite 202 Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joe.cooper@sassi-va.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Lawrence Cooper 2806 Erics Ct. Crofton , MD 21114 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Cooper@AstroGuy.net _____________________________________________________ Steven Cooper 3818 White Post Ct Suite A Alexandria , VA 22304 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: scooper@strativest.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Steve Coppinger Vice President CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: scoppinger@caci.com _____________________________________________________ John Copple 1029 Deer Spings Lane Golden , CO 80403 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jcopple@sanborn.com _____________________________________________________ Tom Corcoran TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: t_corcoran@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Lynne Corddry VP Business Development PS Red Hat, Inc 8260 Greensboro Dr Suite 300 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lcorddry@redhat.com _____________________________________________________ Jeffrey Cornelius 36227 80th St East Littlerock , CA 93543 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Oldsaltydog.cornelius@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Shannon Cornwell No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Christopher Corpora 5 Trellis Drive Stafford , VA 22554 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cacorpora@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kristin Corra Intelligence Officer OUSD(I) Kristin Corra 2450 VA Ave. Washington , DC 20037 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kmcorra@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mary Corrado TITLE TBD Deloitte Consulting, LLP No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mcorrado@deloitte.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Hank Corscadden Dir - Government Contract Compli Microsoft Corporation 5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Hank.Corscadden@microsoft.com _____________________________________________________ Vincent Corsi 8755 Diamond Hill Dr. Bristow , VA 20136 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: vcorsi@us.ibm.com _____________________________________________________ Gene Costa VP Finance Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Jim Costabile TITLE TBD SRA 4350 Fair Lakes Court Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jcostabile@raba.com _____________________________________________________ Vincent Costagliola TITLE TBD SR Technologies, Inc. 4101 SW 47 Ave Suite 102 Fort Lauderdale , FL 33314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jon-Josef Costandi 110 North French Street Alexandria , VA 22304 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jjcostandi@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Tony Cothron 1615 Dartmoor Dr. Huntingtown , MD 20639 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tony.cothron@gdit.com _____________________________________________________ Tony Cothron USN Chief of Staff NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (301) 688-4597 _____________________________________________________ Mr. George R Cotter TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road D5, Suite 6217 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (301) 688-4980 Email: grcotte@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Maria Cotto Specialist Department Of Homeland Security / NPPD / GCSM Maria Cotto 8181 Carnegie Hall Court, #304 Vienna , VA 22180 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: maria.cotto@hq.dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ John Cotton SVP, Maritime Strategic Plans DRS Technologies, Inc. 5 Sylvan Way Parsippany , NJ 7054 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jgcotton@drs.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Courtney Director, Business Development Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wcourtney@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Brian Covale OUSDI DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brian.covale@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Pamela Cowan TITLE TBD DIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pamela.cowan@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kathleen Cowles Senior Marketing Manager LGS Innovations Accounts Payable 5440 Millstream Road Suite E210 McLeansville , NC 27301 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ktcowles@lgsinnovations.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. J. M Cox 4513 Orangewood Lane Bowie , MD 20715-1134 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ James Cox 6048 Meadowglen Drive Ottawa , AC K1C5S3 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.cox2001@rogers.com _____________________________________________________ James Cox 6048 Meadowglen Drive Ottawa , ON K1C 5S3 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.cox2001@rogers.com _____________________________________________________ Larry Cox SVP, General Manager SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: larry.d.cox@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Joseph Coyne 13600 EDS Drive Herndon , VA 22101 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joe.coyne@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Lloyd Craighill 11720 Sunrise Valley Dr Ste 320 Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lcraighill@sms-fed.com _____________________________________________________ Frank D Crandall BSCJ Special Agent in Charge Law Enforcement and Public Safety Authority 3544 Bridgeway Lakes Drive West Sacramento , CA 95691 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: frankcrandall@sbcglobal.net _____________________________________________________ Ms. Nicole Crane 12329 Exbury Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nicole.c.crane@accenture.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Crawford 13454 Sunrise Valley Drive Ste 240 Herndon , VA 20171-3278 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: crawford@interf.com _____________________________________________________ Tom Crawford MBA Director, Operations Programs BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tom.crawford2@BAESystems.com _____________________________________________________ VADM Vivien Cray Retired DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: vivien.cray@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Madelyn Creedon Counsel/Strat Forces Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: madelyn_creedon@armed-services.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Beth Ann B Creekman Liaison Officer Office of the Director of National Intelligence 1500 Tysons McLean Blvd McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bacreekman@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Rita Creel Principal Engineer, Applied Assu Software Engineering Institute, CMU NRECA Building Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Patrick Cremins 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: patrick.j.cremins@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Lou Crenshaw Vice Admiral USN (Retired)/ Prin Grant Thornton LLP 333 John Carlyle Street Suite 500 Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Carol Cribbs Cyber Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: carol_cribbs@appro.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Rebecca Crocker Battelle Arlington Operations 1550 Crystal Drive Arlington , VA 22202-4138 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Rebecca Crocker Executive Assistant Battelle Rebecca Crocker 2111 Wilson Blvd Suite 1000 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (614) 458-0603 Email: crockerr@battelle.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Edward Croissant TITLE TBD USCG 740 W. Deer Lake Drive Lutz , FL 33548 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: edward.t.croissant@uscg.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. George Cronin Director Advanced Programs Harris Corporation P.O. Box 37 MS: 2-21D Melbourne , FL 32902 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gcroni01@harris.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jason Cronin Director LGS, Bell Lab Technologies 9305 Gerwig Lane Suite 200 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jcronin@lgsinnovations.com _____________________________________________________ Robert Crossgriff TITLE TBD Parsons 198 Van Buren Street Suite 250 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. James E Crowley Jr MA, BA Program Manager-National Securit IBM Corporation 12533 Ridgemoor Lake Ct St Louis , MO 63131 Phone: (314) 965-7373 Fax: (314) 252-4444 Email: crowleyj@us.ibm.com _____________________________________________________ Miss Jeannie A Crowley Sr. Associate PwC PwC 1800 Tysons Boulevard McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeannie.crowley@us.pwc.com _____________________________________________________ Philip J Crowley Public Affairs State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: crowleypj@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Bill Crumm SID Director NSA 9800 Savage Road Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bmcrumm@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Andy Culhane TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road S32, Suite 6532 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (301) 688-0683 _____________________________________________________ Arthur Cummings Director, National Security Bran FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: arthur.cummingsii@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Stephen Cundari 732 Timberbranch Drive Alexandria , VA 22302 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: scundari@harding-security.com _____________________________________________________ Stephen Cundari President & COO Six3 Systems 1430 Spring Hill Road Suite 525 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 997-5909 Email: steve@kinnearcundari.com _____________________________________________________ Lt Gen Charles Cunningham USAF ( TITLE TBD Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cunninghamc@jfsc.ndu.edu _____________________________________________________ ken cunningham Engineer ITT 141 National Business parkway annapolis junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ken.cunningham@itt.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Lisa Cunningham P.O. Box 197 Clifton , VA 20124 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kldckldc@netscape.net _____________________________________________________ Sally Cunningham SEI Counsel and Deputy Director Software Engineering Institute, CMU NRECA Building Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Francis Curley TITLE TBD Orbital Sciences Corporation 6 Locustwood Court Silver Spring , MD 20905 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: schilling.terry@orbital.com _____________________________________________________ Lawrence Curran 2100 2nd St SW Washington , DC 20530 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Lawrence.M.Curran@uscg.mil _____________________________________________________ John Currier Esquire 15391 Montresor Road Leesburg , VA 20176-5813 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.currier@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Vanessa Curtis 941 Ivy Trail Crownsville , MD 21032 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: vacurti@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Cusick Director, Office of Foreign Affa NSA 9800 Savage Road SI - Suite 6485 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jmcusic@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Melissa Cutter 11339 Wildmeadows St Waldorf , MD 20601 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mcutter@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Daniel Cuviello 5290 Shawnee Road Alexandria , VA 22312 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: daniel.j.cuviello@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ David Pekoske (aka Coster, John) Group President, Global Security A-T Solutions, Inc. 1934 Old Gallows Road Suite 360 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 288-3401 _____________________________________________________ Berico Technologies (aka Craig, Anne Meree) Directors at Berico Technologies Berico Technologies 1501 Lee Highway, Suite 303 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: directors@bericotechnologies.com _____________________________________________________ Christina Vanecek (aka Champ, Christina) Marketing PRTM Management Consultants, LLC 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Suite 1000 Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cvanecek@prtm.com _____________________________________________________ Gregg Davis TITLE TBD Verizon Business, Federal 22001 Loudoun County Parkway Ashburn , VA 20147 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gregg.davis@verizonbusiness.com _____________________________________________________ Gregg Davis TITLE TBD Verizon Business, Federal 22001 Loudoun County Parkway Ashburn , VA 20147 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gregg.davis@verizonbusiness.com _____________________________________________________ gregg davis Director Verizon 22001 Loudoun County Parkway Ashburn , VA 20147 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gregg.davis@verizonbusiness.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Harvey Davis Director, Installation and Logis NSA 9800 Savage Road L, Suite 6600 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: hadavis@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Lori Davis Dir, National Security Programs Marklogic 7950 Jones Branch Road Suite 200 McLean , VA 22107 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Lori.Davis@MarkLogic.com _____________________________________________________ Paul Davis Sr VP, Chief Technology Officer NJVC NJVC 8614 Westwood Center Drive Suite #300 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: paul.davis@njvc.com _____________________________________________________ Stevie Davis PM DHS 4428 Simpson Mill Way Woodbridge , VA 22192 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stevie.davis@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Stone Davis VP, ISS KGS 2750 Prosperity Ave Ste 300 Fairfax , VA 22031 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sdavis@kforcegov.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Stuart Davis CORP-Executive VP of Strategy ManTech International Corporation 2500 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stuart.davis@mantech.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Timur A Davis Sr MA, MS CEO TEAD Timur A. Davis 115 Schley Street Newark , NJ 07112 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: timur.davis@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Valerie E Davis PhD Adjunct Professor AMU 4202 Alovette San Antonio , TX 78251 Phone: (210) 725-5622 Fax: (none) Email: vedavis1@sbcglobal.net _____________________________________________________ Robert Day CIO, Director Cyber Command U.S. Coast Guard 3458 Mecartney Road Alameda , CA 94502 Phone: (202) 247-6854 Fax: (none) Email: robert.e.day@uscg.mil _____________________________________________________ Dr. Allen Dayton 10221 Raider Lane Fairfax , VA 22030-1908 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Manuel De Ponte Sr. VP, National Systems Group The Aerospace Corporation Attn: Linda Nicoll, M1-447 2310 E. El Segundo Blvd. El Segundo , CA 90245 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: manuel.deponte@aero.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dean A Deal Sr. Analyst DHS/USCIS Dean Deal 3211E Arrowhead Cir Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (571) 296-4976 Fax: (none) Email: dean.blkbry@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard Dean 6760 Alexander Bell Drive Ste 120 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: richard.dean@hengcon.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Deater 6131 Mountaindale Road Thurmont , MD 21788 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jdeater@mdsp.org _____________________________________________________ Dr. James DeBardelaben 2001 Jefferson Davis Hwy Suite 1109 Arlington , VA 20910 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jd@ivysys.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Maria deBerliner 500 Montgomery Street #400 Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mvelez@lat-intel.com _____________________________________________________ Rick DeBobes Staff Director Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rick_debobes@armed-services.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Terri DeBottis Executive Assistant SRC, Inc 7502 Round Pond Road North Syracuse , NY 13212 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: debottis@srcinc.com _____________________________________________________ Gerry Decker 6564 Loisdale Court Springfield , VA 22150 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael H Decker Assistant Secretary of Defense, DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.decker@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Raymond Decker 35 Fendall Avenue Alexandria , VA 22304 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Ray.Decker@opm.gov _____________________________________________________ Dr. William A Decker SVP for Engineering SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: william.a.decker@saic.com _____________________________________________________ William A Decker Chief Engineer SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive T1-12-5 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: deckerart@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Lynn DeCourcey Director, Cyber Security NJVC 8614 Westwood Center Drive Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lynn.decourcey@njvc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Martin Decre 11636 Dark Fire Way Columbia , MD 21044 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: martin.decre@sun.com _____________________________________________________ John DeFreitas VP/GM, Intelligence Solutions L-3 Communications, Inc. 11955 Freedom Drive Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Defreitas III 1274 Cobble Pond Way Vienna , VA 22812 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: movsalot@aol.com _____________________________________________________ MG John I DeFreitas USA Deputy S3 NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. William DeGenaro 1133 4th Street Ste 200 Sarasota , FL 34236 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Bob Degrasse Staff Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Bob.Degrasse@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Linda Dei Managing Director KeyPoint Government Solutions, Inc. 1750 Foxtrail Drive Loveland , CO 80538 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: linda.dei@keypoint.us.com _____________________________________________________ MS Debra S Del Vecchio Asst. for Program Development Penn State University/Applied Research Lab P. O. Box 30 North Atherton Street State College , PA 16804 Phone: (none) Fax: (814) 863-6239 Email: dsd13@psu.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Del Vecchio Deputy Director, Signals Intelli NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jenette.miller@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Leo Delaney TITLE TBD DIA 7400 Defense Pentagon Rm. 3E-258 Washington , DC 20301-7400 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Leo.Delaney@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Delaney 9113 Octavia Court Springfield , VA 22153 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kendrea Delauter TITLE TBD DIA 7400 Defense Pentagon Rm. 3E-258 Washington , DC 20301-7400 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kendrea.Delauter@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Anthony Deley VP, Advanced Capability Northrop Grumman One Space Park R2/2094 Redondo Beach , CA 90278 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: anthony.deley@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Antonio Delgado 10521 Mereworth Lane Oakton , VA 22124 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: adelgadojr@cox.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bill J DelGrego Vice President, Accenture & Col Accenture 15433 Woodgrove Road Purcellville , VA 20132 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: william.j.delgrego@accenture.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Dell 5916 Burnside Landing Drive Burke , VA 22015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tom.dell@spadac.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Matthew Dellon Cyber Intelligence Liaison US Department of Homeland Security 4650 N Washington Blvd Apt. 110 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: matthew.dellon@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Dr. R. P DeLong 1196 Third Avenue Anoka , MN 55303-2775 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: r_peter_delong@mathc2.com _____________________________________________________ Ben Delp delpbt@jmu.edu James Madison University 701 Carrier Drive, ISAT/CS 360 MSC 4111 Harrisonburg , VA 22807 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: delpbt@jmu.edu _____________________________________________________ Captain Fred Demech USN (Ret) TITLE TBD Northrop Grumman Corporation 36 Kipling Drive Moosic , PA 18507 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: fred.demech@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Helen D Demes Event Coordinator The SI Helen Demes 15052 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: helen.d.demes@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Jerry DeMoney Program Director SRI International 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2800 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jack Dempsey Director, Congressional Activiti DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jack.dempsey@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Joan Dempsey TITLE TBD Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jerry DeMuro TITLE TBD General Dynamics Corporation 2941 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jdemuro@gd.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Denk 12930 Worldgate Drive Suite 700 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wdenk@drs-ds.com _____________________________________________________ William Denk Vice President DRS Technical Services, Inc DRS TSI 12930 Worldgate Drive Suite 700 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wdenk@drs-ds.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Vincent Dennis TITLE TBD NRO 14675 Lee Road Room 15A00B Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: vincent.dennis@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Vincent Dennis TITLE TBD Deloitte Consulting, LLP No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ David A Deptula 25 Westover Ave SW Washington , DC 20032 Phone: (202) 562-5456 Fax: (none) Email: deptula.david@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Lt. General David A Deptula USAF Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: David.Deptula@pentagon.af.mil _____________________________________________________ Mitch Derman TITLE TBD i2 1430 Spring Hill Road McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Eleanor Desai Vice President National Security Dell Inc. One Dell Way One Dell Way Round Rock , TX 78682 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: eleanor_desai@federal.dell.com _____________________________________________________ Ms Eleanor Desai IC Sector Lead Dell Inc. One Dell Way One Dell Way Round Rock , TX 78682 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: eleanor_desai@federal.dell.com _____________________________________________________ Art Deslauriers CTO Lockheed Martin Advanced Programs 13539 Dulles Technology Drive Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: adeslauri@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Alison Deters TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: alison.deters@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Ambassador Joseph DeTrani Director National Counter Prolif ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: adam.jones@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Maj. Gen. Paul Dettmer Deputy AF Chief of Staff Intelli DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: paul.dettmer@pentagon.af.mil _____________________________________________________ Mark Devine Director, BD & Strategy Cobham Analytic Solutions 5875 Trinity Parkway Suite 300 Centreville , VA 20120 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Matthew Devost 22777 Zulla Chase Place Asburn , VA 20148 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: matt@devost.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Deweese Director, Aerospace System Div. Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: robert.deweese@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ CDR Pat DiBari MS, BS Deputy, Officer of C4ISR U.S. Coast Guard 2100 2nd Street SW Washington , DC 20593 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pat.dibari@uscg.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mike DiCaprio 231 Enterprise Road Johnstown , NY 12095 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mdicaprio@emihq.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ronald Dick Director, ES&I Division Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rdick3@csc.com _____________________________________________________ John Dickas ODNI Monitor Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: J_Dickas@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Alan Dietrich President, C3 & Aviation DRS Technologies, Inc. 5 Sylvan Way Parsippany , NJ 7054 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: adietrich@drs.com _____________________________________________________ Joyce Dietrich CG Liaison to FBI USCG 2109 N. Scott St. #49 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (860) 961-6301 Fax: (none) Email: jmdietrich@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Anthony Dignazio TITLE TBD ITT 4617 Morning Ride Court Ellicott City , MD 21043 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tony.dignazio@itt.com _____________________________________________________ Allan Assel Intel BD Juniper Networks Allan Assel Juniper Networks 2251 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: aassel@juniper.net _____________________________________________________ Stephen P Aubin TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dave Aucsmith Senior Director, Adv Tech in Gov Microsoft Corporation 5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: awk@microsoft.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mitchell Audritsh 4075 Wilson Boulevard Suite 900 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (unlisted) Fax: (none) Email: buckeye59@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Auer Major Account Manager Cisco Systems, Inc. 13635 Dulles Technology Drive Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dauer@cisco.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Wanda M Austin President & CEO The Aerospace Corporation Attn: Linda Nicoll, M1-447 2310 E. El Segundo Blvd. El Segundo , CA 90245 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wanda.m.austin@aero.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Harry Avig TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: havig@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Rodney Azama 203 Whitestone Road Ste 110 Silver Spring , MD 20901 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: razama@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Zalmai Azmi Senior Vice President CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: zazmi@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Colin Dillon TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cdillon@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Lawrence DiNapoli President/CEO Systems Technologies 185 Route 36 West Long Branch , NJ 07764 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sskodacek@systek.com _____________________________________________________ John R Dinger Deputy INR State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: shifletrv2@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Uyen Dinh Senior Director GeoEye 21700 Atlantic Boulevard Dulles , VA 20166 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dinh.uyen@geoeye.com _____________________________________________________ Nicole DiResta TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Nicole_Diresta@appro.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Susan F Disher NSA Representative to the Depart NSA 9800 Savage Road Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sfdishe@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jerry W Dixon Jr. 2328 Southfield Ct. Finksburg , MD 21048 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jerry@jdixon.com _____________________________________________________ Mary Dixon Director, Defense Manpower Data DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mary.dixon@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Stacey Dixon Budget Director Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Stacey.Dixon@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Julia Dizhevskaya Intern Delta Risk 2804 N. Seminary Chicago , IL 60657 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rschmidt911@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Julia Dizhevskaya Consultant Delta Risk LLC 2804 N. Seminary Chicago , IL 60657 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jdizhevskaya@delta-risk.net _____________________________________________________ Dr. Michaline Dobrezinski Deputy Director, Human Resources DIA 7400 Defense Pentagon Washington , DC 20301-7400 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Michaline.Dobrezinski@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Charles Dodd 414 2nd Street Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Joe Dodd VP, Business Development TASC 4805 Stonecroft Blvd Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joe.dodd@tasc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joseph Dodd SVP Business Development TASC 4805 Stonecroft Blvd Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joe.dodd@tasc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Glen Dodson VP and GM, National Security Gro Oracle Corporation 1910 Oracle Way Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: glen.dodson@oracle.com _____________________________________________________ Brett Dody 15052 Conference Center Dr Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ann.sullivan@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Brett Dody Director, Intelligence Systems G the SI 15052 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brett.dody@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Brett Dody MA Deputy Vice President The SI Organization, Inc. Chris Nolan 15052 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brett.dody@thesiorg.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Babs Doherty President and CEO Eagle Ray Inc. 4501 Singer Court Suite 260 Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bdoherty@eaglerayinc.com _____________________________________________________ Jeffrey Dolan 15 Mohegan Ave (ds) New London , CT 6320 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeffrey.t.dolan@uscg.mil _____________________________________________________ Karin M Dolan Assistant Director of Intelligen DoD HQMC Code I (IS) 2 Navy Annex Washington , DC 203801775 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: karin.dolan@usmc.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Tom Dolan Director, Law Enforcement Ops Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tdolan@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Lynn Domino 2111 Jefferson Davis Hwy #1018N Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pradaroxx@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Teresa Domzal Provost of the National Intellig ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: teresa.domzal@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sheri Donahue 4010 Hillsboro Road Louisville , KY 40207 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sdonahue@infragardmembers.org _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sheri Donahue 4010 Hillsboro Road Louisville , KY 40207 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sheri.donahue@insightbb.com _____________________________________________________ Bill Donellan TITLE TBD i2 1430 Spring Hill Road McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Chris Donesa Deputy Staff Director/Counsel Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chris.donesa@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sandra S Donnelly TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road E1, Suite 6809 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sfdonne@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Shaun Donovan Secretary Housing and Urban Development Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ioanna.t.kefalas@hud.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. John H Doody TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road A, Suite 6222 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jhdoody@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Matt Doring TITLE TBD NRO 14675 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: matt.doring@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Henry A Dorochovich S.B. Chief Mission Officer The SI Organization, Inc. 15052 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (703) 709-8783 Fax: (none) Email: henry.a.dorochovich@thesiorg.com _____________________________________________________ Andrey Dorokov 4545 Connecticut Avenue Apt 722 Washington , DC 20007 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: andorohov@yandex.ru _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jon Dorrick 6917 Trillium Lane Springfield , VA 22152 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jon.dorrick@itsfed.com _____________________________________________________ Jon Dorrick 6917 Trillium Lane Springfield , VA 22152 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jon.dorrick@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ VADM David J Dorsett Director of Naval Intelligence; DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david.dorsett@navy.mil _____________________________________________________ Jack Dorsett VP for Cyber and C4 Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dorsett.jack@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Jack Dorsett VP, Cyber & C4 Programs Northrop Grumman Corporation 2980 Fairview Park Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jack.dorsett@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Neal Dorsey PO Box B Lincoln , VA 20160 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dorseynet@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Christopher T Doss Special Training and Application FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: christopher.doss@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Dr. Rene Doublier P.O. Box 1851 Pittsboro , NC 27312 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: esres@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Ms Angel P Douglas M.H.R. Staff Officer National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency OGMC-S72361 7500 Geoint Drive Springfield , VA 22150 Phone: (703) 942-6321 Fax: (none) Email: angel.p.douglas@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Dr. Patrick Dowd TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jerry Dowless 13873 Park Center Road Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jdowless@dowless.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Downer TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david.downer@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Elizabeth T Doyle TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Frederick J Doyle VP, Defense & Intelligence Commu Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corp. 10 Longs Peak Drive Broomfield , CO 80020 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: fdoyle@ball.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Kevin Doyle Director, Cyber Programs SRC, Inc 7502 Round Pond Road North Syracuse , NY 13212 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: doyle@srcinc.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Doyle MBA, MA Graduate student Selwyn College, University of Cambridge 8623 Connemara Drive Fair Oak Ranch , TX 78015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mike@themekonggroup.com _____________________________________________________ Steve Doyle Senior Director of Intelligence Datameer P.O. Box 3576 Mooresville , NC 28117 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: odamachines@bellsouth.net _____________________________________________________ Tim Doyle Program Director Hughes 11717 Exploration Lane Germantown , MD 20876 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Doyle 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: william.a.doyle@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John M Doyon 3536 36th Road N. Arlington , VA 22207 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: doyon@erols.com _____________________________________________________ John M Doyon Director for Intelligence Progra NSC No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jdoyon@nsc.eop.gov _____________________________________________________ Michael Dozier MS Intel Analyst The IIAgroup Michael Dozier 483 4th Bethel , AK 99559 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.dozier@infragard.org _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Carrie Drake Event & Community Relations Mgr United States Geospatial Intelligence Foundation Carrie Drake 2325 Dulles Corner Blvd STE 450 Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 793-9069 Email: carrie.drake@usgif.org _____________________________________________________ Linda Drake 470 Spring Park Place Suite 700 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: linda_drake@appsig.com _____________________________________________________ Linda Drake Director of Business Development Raytheon Applied Signal Technology Linda Drake 470 Spring Park Place Suite 700 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: linda_drake@appsig.com _____________________________________________________ Linda Drake Director of Business Development Applied Signal Technology 460 West California Avenue Sunnyvale , CA 94086 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: linda_drake@appsig.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Gina Drawdy 15029 Rumson Place Manassas , VA 20111 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ginadrawdy@aim.com _____________________________________________________ Sidney D Drell Required unless Parent Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (650) 926-2664 Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Alex Drew Vice President, Intel Ops & Anal Sotera Defense Solutions, Inc 1501 Farm Credit Drive Suite 2300 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: adrew@theanalysiscorp.com _____________________________________________________ Ava Dreyer Administrative Staff Asst Draper Laboratory 1555 Wilson Blvd. Suite 501 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Doug Dreyer 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Melissa Drisko Deputy Director Naval Intelligen DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: melissa.drisko@navy.mil _____________________________________________________ Paul Druckman Vice President, DHS Business Dev Accenture 11951 Freedom Drive Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: paul.j.druckman@accenture.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Drury PE BSME President The Edge Group 4714 Louetta Rd. #703 Spring , TX 77388 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jdrury@theedgegroup.cc _____________________________________________________ Mr. Serge Duarte 185 West F. Street Rm 600 San Diego , CA 92101 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: serge.duarte@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Serge Duarte US Immigration and Customs DHS 185 West F. Street, Room 600 San Diego , CA 92101 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: serge.duarte@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Melvin Dubee VP Govt Relations Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: melvin.dubee@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Ian Dubin 4929 Arctic Terrace Rockville , MD 20853 Phone: (301) 933-1885 Fax: (none) Email: ianhdubin@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Daniel D Dubree Information Technology Operation FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: daniel.dubree@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Drenan Dudley Cyber Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: drenan_dudley@appro.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Charles Duecy President CPD Consultants 6049 Ramshorn Place McLean , VA 22101 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: patrick@cpdconsultants.com _____________________________________________________ Regina Dugan Director DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Regina.Dugan@darpa.mil _____________________________________________________ Lynn A Dugle President, IIS Raytheon M/S AA 1200 S Jupiter Road Garland , TX 75042 Phone: (none) Fax: (972) 205-6388 Email: lynn_dugle@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Lynn A Dugle President, IIS Raytheon M/S AA 1200 S Jupiter Road Garland , TX 75042 Phone: (none) Fax: (972) 205-6388 Email: lynn_dugle@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Duker TITLE TBD Oracle Corporation 1910 Oracle Way Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.duker@oracle.com _____________________________________________________ Kenneth Dumm Deputy Intelligence DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kenneth.dumm@usaf.mil _____________________________________________________ Arne Duncan Secretary Education Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: arne.duncan@ed.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Natalie Duncan 3806 Riverwood Road Alexandria , VA 22309 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cnlui@cox.net _____________________________________________________ Jen Dunham Sr. Account Executive SAS Institute 1530 Wilson Blvd Suite 800 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Dan Dunkel 4601 Green Oaks Drive Colleyville , TX 76034 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Daren Dunkel 4601 Green Oaks Drive Colleyville , TX 76034 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dunkel10@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Derek Dunkel 4601 Green Oaks Drive Colleyville , TX 76034 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Patrick Dunleavy 5846 pacific rim way #60 bellingham , WA 98226 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pdunleavy@msn.com _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Nina Dunn senior advisor to CEO Finmeccanica Angelica Falchi 1625 I Street, NW 12th Floor Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nina.dunn@finmeccanica.com _____________________________________________________ Thomas Dunn Senior Advisor ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thomajd4@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Terry Duran 14370 Newbrook Dr. Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tduran@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Terry Duran 14370 Newbrook Dr. Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tduran@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Bo Durickovic EVP Defense Personnel Services Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Darrell R Durst Vice President Program Managemen Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: darrell.r.durst@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Robert Dussault 10300 Eaton Place #500 Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dussault-rob@zai.com _____________________________________________________ Gilbert Dussek Program Manager Lockheed Martin Corporation 13560 Dulles Technology Drive Room 664 Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gilbert.dussek@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Carla Duy 3238 Duck Pond Court Oak Hill , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: carladuy@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joe Dvornicky TITLE TBD SafeNet, Inc. 4690 Millennium Drive Belcamp , MD 21017 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Joe.Dvornicky@safenet-inc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Dzergoski 1185 Dingus Drive Westminster , MD 21158 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dzergoski@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mohamed Elibiary P. O. Box 262366 Plano , TX 75026 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: melibiary@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Al Elkins TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: aelkins@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Elliott Vice President, Business Develop Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.elliott@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Zachary Elliott 20256 Grim Rd. Aurora , OR 97002 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: zach.elliott@nmarion.k12.or.us _____________________________________________________ Deborah Ellis TITLE TBD DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: deborah.ellis@js.pentagon.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Victor A Ellis 1165 University Dr NE Atlanta , GA 30306 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: victor.ellis@ang.af.mil _____________________________________________________ Harry M Elmendorf TITLE TBD Ball Corporation 2111 Wilson Blvd Suite 1120 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: helmendo@ball.com _____________________________________________________ Harry M Elmendorf Director, Defense and Intel Prog Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corp 2111 Wilson Blvd Suite 1120 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: helmendo@ball.com _____________________________________________________ Harry M Elmendorf Director, Def & Intel Ball Aerospace 2111 Wilson Blvd Suite 1120 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: helmendo@ball.com _____________________________________________________ Judith A Emmel Associate Director foráStrategic NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (301) 688-6198 Email: jaemmel@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dan Emory Principal and Co-founder Active Assurance Corporation 43769 Clemens Terrace Ashburn , VA 20147 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: demory@activeassurance.com _____________________________________________________ Erik Engebreth 21305 Arrowhead C Ashburn , VA 20147 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: eenge@triumfant.com _____________________________________________________ Peter Engel Vice President SafeNet, Inc. 1655 Fort Myer Drive Suite 1150 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: peter.engel@safenet-inc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Daniel Ennis Deputy Chief, S2 NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: drennis@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Michael Ennis 1710 SAIC Drive SAIC McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.e.ennis@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Harold Ennulat Manager Government Program Devel Software Engineering Institute, CMU NRECA Building Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Thomas Enright VP Intel Svcs Ctr Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joseph Ensor VP, NGES Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joseph.ensor@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. L. K Ensor Associate Director NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (410) 854-7685 Email: lkensor@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mieke Eoyang Chief of Staff, Rep. Anna Eshoo Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mieke.eoyang@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Dr. Mark Epstein 9209 Fox Meadow Lane Potomac , MD 20854 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mepstein@qualcomm.com _____________________________________________________ Ms Dorene Erickson 20905 Fowlers Mill Circle Ashburn , VA 21047 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dorene911@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Claudia Erland Arete Fellow, National & Homelan Arete Associates 1550 Crystal Drive Suite 703 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cerland@arete.com _____________________________________________________ Claudia A Erland TITLE TBD Arete Associates 1550 Crystal Drive Suite 703 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cerland@arete.com _____________________________________________________ Claudia A Erland 1550 Crystal Drive Suite 703 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cerland@arete.com _____________________________________________________ Robert Erland Senior Analyst, Information Domi NMIC No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rerland@nmic.navy.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jimmie R Erwin B.S., M.S Staff Officer National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency NGA Mail Stop D-071 4600 Sangamore Road Bethesda , MD 20816 Phone: (703) 471-7822 Fax: (none) Email: Jimmie.R.Erwin@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Karen Esaias 3105 S. Declaration Court Waldorf , MD 20603 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: esaiask@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Debra Esherman COO Sensa Solutions 11180 Sunrise Valley Drive Suite 100 Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: debbie@sensasolutions.com _____________________________________________________ Mark T Esper TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ LTC Paul Estavillo 2200 Wilson Blvd 102-551 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: paul.estavillo@us.army.mil _____________________________________________________ David Etue Manager PRTM Management Consultants, LLC 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Suite 1000 Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: detue@prtm.com _____________________________________________________ Al Evans Manager, Government Program Deve Software Engineering Institute, CMU NRECA Building Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark R Evans TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road S2J, Suite 6657 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mrevans@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Peggy Evans 211 Hart Senate Office Building Washington , DC 20510 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Peggy Evans Budget Director, SSCI Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: P_Evans@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Col. Gregory Evenstad USA(Ret.) TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road L, Suite 6600 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ghevens@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dan Everett Sales Manager Qwest Communications 4250 N. Fairfax Dr. 5th Floor Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: daniel.everett@qwest.com _____________________________________________________ Terri Everett BS,MA,MS Office of the DNI Washington , DC 20511 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: theresa.a.everett@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Doug Evers TITLE TBD Quest Software - Public Sector Group 700 King Farm Boulevard Suite 250 Rockville , MD 20850 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: douglas.evers@quest.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Stephen Ewell Managing Director InfraGard National Members Alliance 673 Potomac Station Dr #615 Leesburg , VA 20176 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sewell@infragardnational.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Ewing Senior Adviser ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mark.w.ewing@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ I.J Ezeonwuka 1204 S Washington St, Apt 411 ALEXANDRIA , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ijeomaez@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Barbara Fast INSA Cyber Security Council Boeing Required unless Parent Required unless Parent , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Stephen Faulkner 7683 Antigua Drive Memphis , TN 38119 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sfaulkner09@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Linc Faurer Required unless Parent Washington , DC 20005 Phone: 703 356-0178 Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Faust Asst Deputy Chief of Staff û G-2 DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.faust1@mi.army.mil _____________________________________________________ Vanessa Fauteux Field Marketing Manager Global Crossing 12010 Sunset Hills Road Suite 420 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Vanessa.Fauteux@GlobalCrossing.com _____________________________________________________ Chris Fedde TITLE TBD SafeNet, Inc. 4690 Millennium Drive Belcamp , MD 21017 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chris.fedde@safenet-inc.com _____________________________________________________ Chris Fedde TITLE TBD SafeNet, Inc. 4690 Millennium Drive Belcamp , MD 21017 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chris.fedde@safenet-inc.com _____________________________________________________ Andrew Feinsot President Moby Technologies 3203 19th St. N Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: afeinsot@mobytechnologies.com _____________________________________________________ Dianne Feinstein Sen. Chairman Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (202) 228-3954 Email: scheduling@feinstein.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Bradley H Feldman President, CDAI Cubic Defense Applications, Inc. 9333 Balboa Ave San Diego , CA 92123 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brad.feldman@cubic.com _____________________________________________________ John M Felker 2100 2nd Street SW Room 6613 Washington , DC 20593 Phone: (703) 736-0939 Fax: (none) Email: John.m.felker@uscg.mil _____________________________________________________ Kayla Feller 1600 South Joyce Street Apt 1526 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (571) 239-2170 Fax: (none) Email: kgfell@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Jeffrey Feltman Near Eastern Affairs State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: feltmanj@state.gov _____________________________________________________ James Felton TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 14150 Newbrook Drive Suite 300 Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Lorry Fenner Professional Staff Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Lorry.Fenner@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Dr Lorry M Fenner PhD Director, Conflict Records Resea Institute for National Strategic Studies, NDU 1241 4th St SW Washington , DC 20024 Phone: (202) 484-0411 Fax: (none) Email: lorryfenner@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Jessica Ferguson 601 South 12th Street Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jessica.ferguson@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Ferguson Vice President, Contracts & Fina The Podmilsak Group One Fountain Square, 11911 Freed Suite 710 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rlfxii@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Ferguson Principal Deputy Undersecretary DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thomas.ferguson@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Joseph W Fernandez Econ, Energy, & Business Affairs State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: fernandezjw@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Ralph Fernandez PO BOX 141727 Miami , FL 33114 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sis1975@bellsouth.net _____________________________________________________ Alejandro Fernandez-Cernuda Diaz Analyst La Caixa Av. Diagonal 621 Barcelona 08041 Spain Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: alejandro.j.fernandez@lacaixa.es _____________________________________________________ Kelly Ferrell Sr. Director, DNI Programs GDIT Kelly Ferrell 13857 McLearen Road Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kelly.ferrell@gdit.com _____________________________________________________ Frederick J Ferrer Director, Cybersapce ARINC 2551 Riva Road Annapolis , MD 21401 Phone: (717) 252-6355 Fax: (none) Email: FFerrer@arinc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Andrew Ferris Program Manager Interf 47256 Middle Bluff Pl. Potomac Falls , VA 20165 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ferris@interf.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Charles Fiala Senior Vice President, Governmen Corporate Office Properties Trust 6711 Columbia Gateway Drive Columbia , MD 21046-2104 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: charles.fiala@copt.com _____________________________________________________ Chuck Fiala Senior VP - Gov't Services Corporate Office Properties Trust 6711 Columbia Gateway Drive Suite 300 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: charles.fiala@copt.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sarah Fiebig 7103 Hundsford Lane Springfield , VA 22153 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: scfiebig@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sarah C Fiebig 4551 Strutfield Lane Apt 4431 Alexandria , VA 22311 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: scfiebig@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Richard Fieldhouse Strat Forces Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: richard_fieldhouse@armed-services.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bryan Fields 790 Village Top Canyon Lake , TX 78133 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wndwkr1@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Beth Finan Required unless Parent Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Patrick G Findlay Facilities and Logistics FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: patrick.findlay@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Michael Finn INSA OCI Task Force Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Rick Finn 1421 Jefferson Davis Highway Suite 600 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rick.finn@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Mr Pat Finnegan Manager Hirsch Electronics Pat Finnegan 11951 Freedom Drive Suite 1327 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (304) 876-2923 Fax: (703) 251-4440 Email: patwv24@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Mr Richard G Finnegan Richard G. Finnegan 2105 South Blosser Road Santa Maria , CA 93458 Phone: (none) Fax: (805) 928-9914 Email: rgfinnegan@quintron.com _____________________________________________________ Justin Firaben 5270 Navaho Dr Alexandria , VA 22312 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jfiraben@vt.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Fish 205 S. Whiting Street Suite 400 Alexandria , VA 22304 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thomas.fish@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas E Fish 198 Van Buren Street, Suite 250 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tfish@mcmunn-associates.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Scott D Fisher BS, MA Account Executive Capgemini Government Solutions 2250 Corporate Park Drive Suite 410 Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: scott.fisher@capgemini-gs.com _____________________________________________________ Rand H Fisher Sr. VP, Systems Planning & Engin The Aerospace Corporation Attn: Linda Nicoll, M1-447 2310 E. El Segundo Blvd. El Segundo , CA 90245 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rand.h.fisher@aero.org _____________________________________________________ Leslie Fishpaw Product Management the SI 15052 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: leslie.l.fishpaw@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bob Fitch SVice President, Government Rela BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bob.fitch@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dennis Fitzgerald 1358 Heritage Oak Way Reston , VA 20194 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Fitzpatrick Director, Special Security Cente ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kathlgz@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Kate Fitzpatrick TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kate_Fitzpatrick@appro.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kelly Fitzpatrick Deputy Director of Legislative A DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kelly.fitzpatrick2@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Bryan Flaherty MA; BA Receive grad University of Chicago 3351 Arnold Lane Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bryanflaherty.info@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Frances Fleisch TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: fjfleis@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Frederick Fleitz TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Frederick.Fleitz@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr Frederick Fleitz Global analyst Newsmax Media 9037 Allington Manor Circle Frederick , MD 21703 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: fredfleitz@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael G Fleming TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road I, Suite 6577 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (410) 854-7511 Email: mgflemi@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Kevin Flesher Chief Architect Lockheed Martin Space Systems 4882 Yates Circle Broomfield , CO 80020 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kevin.e.flesher@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mark Fletcher Federal Engagement Director Global Crossing 12010 Sunset Hills Road Suite 420 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Curtis Flood Professional Staff Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: CurtisFlood@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Bob Flores Founder & CEO Applicology 9812 Squaw Valley Dr Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bob.flores@applicology.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Michele Flournoy Under Secretary of Defense for P DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michele.flournoy@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Floyd TITLE TBD LGS Innovations Accounts Payable 5440 Millstream Road Suite E210 McLeansville , NC 27301 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dfloyd@lgsinnovations.com _____________________________________________________ David Flynn President/COO SR Technologies, Inc. 4101 SW 47 Avernue Davie , FL 33314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dflynn@srtrl.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Flynn Vice President, Contracts & Admi Sotera Defense Solutions, Inc 1501 Farm Credit Drive Suite 2300 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jflynn@theanalysiscorp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Flynn TITLE TBD ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jamespf0@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Louis Foiani Vice President Special Operations Technology, Inc. 12011 Guilford Road Suite 109 Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lfoiani@sotech.us _____________________________________________________ Michael J Folmar Security Division FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.folmar@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Marlin Forbes VP, Government Markets Core180, Inc. 2751 Prosperity Drive Suite 200 Vienna , VA 22031 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Carl Ford President Kanturk Partners, LLC. 17509 Charity Lane Germantown , MD 20874 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cford@kanturkpartners.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Celeste Ford President Stellar Solutions, Inc. 250 Cambridge Avenue Suite 204 Palo Alto , CA 94306 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cford@stellarsolutions.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Kevin Ford TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard Ford 3535 Military Trail, Suite 200 Jupiter , FL 33458 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rford@fedsys.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Joni Forman Assoc Dean, Def Sys Mgmt Coll DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joni.forman@dau.mil _____________________________________________________ Francine K Forney 1227 Michigan Court Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ciney1@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Sandra J Forney 7555 Colshire Drive Fairfax , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sandra.forney@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sharon H Forrest 12024 Waterside View Drive, #13 Reston , VA 20194 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sharfor@regent.edu _____________________________________________________ Randall Fort TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Mary Forte TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Chris Foster Staff Engineer Ensco, Inc. 5400 Port Royal Road Springfield , VA 22151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: foster.christopher@ensco.com _____________________________________________________ Christopher C Foster TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Tom Foust TITLE TBD Intelsat General Corporation 6550 Rock Spring Drive Suite 450 Bethesda , MD 20817 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tom.foust@intelsatgeneral.com _____________________________________________________ MR TOM FOUST FOUST VP - GLOBAL NETWORK SOLUTIONS INTELSAT GENERAL CORPORATION 6550 ROCK SPRING DR SUITE 450 BETHESDA , MD 20817 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tom.foust@intelsatgeneral.com _____________________________________________________ TOM L FOUST 6550 ROCK SPRING DR SUITE 450 BETHESDA , MD 20852 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tom.foust@intelsatgeneral.com _____________________________________________________ Alex J Fox 1000 Wilson Blvd Suite 1800 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: afox@digitalglobe.com _____________________________________________________ Dr George Fox SSCP L.T Dr George Fox / Leftenant 28 Marshall St Queensland Goondiwindi , AE 4390 Australia Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: georgef@dark-lite.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. James P Fox Jr. 1653 21st RD N APT 6 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: foxer51780@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Jay Fox Required unless Parent Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Joseph Fox Business Development Manager Cisco Systems, Inc. 7067 Balmoral Forest Road Clifton , VA 20124 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: JosFox@Cisco.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Fox Space & Intel Programs Raytheon 1100 Wilson Blvd Suite 2000 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.a.fox@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Fox Senior Vice President White Oak Technologiese, Inc. 1300 Spring Street Suite 320 Silver Spring , VA 20910 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Sheldon J Fox President, National Programs Bus Harris Corporation P.O. Box 37 MS: 2-21D Melbourne , FL 32902 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sheldon.fox@harris.com _____________________________________________________ Ken Foxton 5860 Trinity Parkway Suite 400 Centerville , VA 20120 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Kenneth Foxton VP Intel Programs Camber Corp. 6992 Columbia Gateway Dr. Suite 150 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kfoxton@camber.com _____________________________________________________ Kenneth Foxton VP National Intelligence Program Exceptional Software Strategies 849 International Drive, Ste 310 Linthicum , MD 21090 Phone: (none) Fax: (410) 694-0245 Email: kenneth.foxton@exceptionalsoftware.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Kenneth L Foxton 8615 Open Meadow Way Columbia , MD 21045 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kfoxton@yakabod.com _____________________________________________________ Miss Samantha J Foxton B.S. LT USN LT Samantha Foxton 6509 Sampson Rd. Suite 217 Dahlgren , VA 22448 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: samantha.j.foxton@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Thomas Francis Deputy J2 DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thomas.francis@js.pentagon.mil _____________________________________________________ Joshua Franke CMR 489 Box 1124 APO , AE 9751 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joshua.tyson.franke@us.army.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Franklin A.A.S. Alternate COMSEC Manager SAIC Mail Stop E-3G 4161 Campus Point Court San Diego , CA 92121 Phone: (951) 461-1951 Fax: (858) 826-5410 Email: tgfranklin59@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Ms. Lori Franko Systems Consultant Manager Dell Inc. One Dell Way One Dell Way Round Rock , TX 78682 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lori_franko@dell.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Lorin Frantzve 9743 E. Sharon Dr. Scottsdale , AZ 85260 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lfrantzve@imetlabs.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mike Fraser TITLE TBD USIS 7799 Leesburg Pike Suite 400 S Falls Church , VA 22043 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mike.fraser@usis.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard Fravel Chief Operating Officer NGA 4600 Sangamore Road, D-100 Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: richard.fravel@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Marshall Banker President, Customer Solutions BAE Systems Information Technology 1300 North 17th Street Suite 1400 Rosslyn , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Tristan A Bannon MS Director Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tristan.bannon@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Len Baptiste Director, Federal Security Solut Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lbaptiste@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Greg Barac Chief, NGA Support Team to DHS NGA 4600 Sangamore Road Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: greg.barac@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Edward J Baranoski ODNI, IARPA Director SMART Colle ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: edward.j.baranoski@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ James Barber IT Architect-EA IBM 15036 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jpbarber@us.ibm.com _____________________________________________________ Jeffrey Bardin 515 Oakham Road Barre , MA 1005 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jbardin@treadstone71.com _____________________________________________________ Anthony Barger DASDNII DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: anthony.barger@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Barry M Barlow Director, Acquisition Directorat NGA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: barry.barlow@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr Charles R Barlow BEE Corp. Vice President Communication Technologies, Inc (dba COMTek) Charles Barlow 3684 Centerview Dr. Suite 100 Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (703) 476-5244 Fax: (703) 961-1330 Email: barlowcr@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. George Barnes TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Barnes Vice President, Legislative Oper Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john_barnes@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Barnes 5504 Sir Douglas Dr Bryans Road , MD 20616 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: desrtrat6@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Max Barnett 4501 Connecticut Ave NW #906 Washington , DC 20008 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: max@maximusit.com _____________________________________________________ Steve Barney TITLE TBD SRA 4350 Fair Lakes Court Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sbarney@raba.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Barr Account Executive Microsoft Corporation 5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mbarr@microsoft.com _____________________________________________________ John Barrass BA, MBA COO RSSi 1303 Chamberlain Woods Way Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 997-8115 Email: jbarrass@rss-i.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Hugo Barrera 11410 NW 20th Street Rm 200 Miami , FL 33172 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Hugo.Barrera@atf.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Barrett TITLE TBD NRO 14675 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.barrett@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Sophie Barrett VP of Communications QinetiQ North America 7918 Jones Branch Drive Suite 350 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sophie.barrett@qinetiq-na.com _____________________________________________________ William Barroll Vice President Corporate Office Properties Trust 6711 Columbia Gateway Drive Columbia , MD 21046-2104 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bill.barroll@copt.com _____________________________________________________ Lisa Barrow TITLE TBD Deloitte Consulting, LLP No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lbarrow@deloitte.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Barth US Customs and Border Proection DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david.barth@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. G. D Bartko TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road S31, Suite 6456 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gdbartk@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Bart Bartlett Sr Director Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Frazier P.O. Box 50218 Baltimore , MD 21211 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tfrazier@attach.net _____________________________________________________ Tony Frazier Sr VP of Marketing GeoEye 2325 Dulles Corner Blvd. Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ H L Fredricks, Commissioner Intelligence Official Govt 1455 Coney Island Ave Rm : 10 B Bklyn, , NY 11230 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: 13152784989@tmomail.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Brett Freedman 1113 Fairview Court Silver Spring , MD 20910 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brettfreedman@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Brett Freedman 1113 Fairview Ct. Silver Spring , MD 20910 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brettfreedman@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Rob Freedman Director Ball Aerospace 2111 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1120 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Robert Freedman Ph.D. Director Strategic Initiatives Ball Aerospace and Technologies 9675 W. 108th Circle Westminster , CO 80021 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rfreedma@ball.com _____________________________________________________ James H Freis Director, FINCEN Treasury Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.freis@do.treas.gov _____________________________________________________ Steven Frenz VP, Business Development Directo SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: steven.h.frenz@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Robert A Friedenberg 11921 Freedom Drive Suite 730 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Dr.Bob@SecureMissionSolutions.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Friedlander 301 West 108 Street, 2nd New York , NY 10025 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jfriedlander@nyc.rr.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Frisbie TITLE TBD ManTech International Corporation 2500 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gary Frisvold TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road DF2, Suite 6229 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (301) 688-5204 Email: gafrisv@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Libby Fritsche TITLE TBD Computer Associates No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Elizabeth.fritsche@ca.com _____________________________________________________ Robert Frizzelle Vice President and General Manag Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rfrizzelle@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dave Frostman Vice President, Strategic Initia Stellar Solutions, Inc. 250 Cambridge Avenue Suite 204 Palo Alto , CA 94306 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dfrostman@stellarsolutions.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Frucella 1410 Spring Hill Road #600 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: offpiste@ix.netcom.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David A Frye President DFA, Inc. Atlanta HQ 5585 Mill Gate CT. Dunwoody , GA 30338 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dafrye@dfaco.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Deborah Frye 6809 Kenyon Dr Alexandria , VA 22307 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: debbie.frye@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Randy Fuerst Chief Operating Officer CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rfuerst@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Chad L Fulgham Chief Information Officer FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chad.fulgham@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Eric Fuller Vice President, Special Programs Berico Technologies 1501 Lee Highway Suite 303 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gary Fuller Principal Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Fuller_Gary@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Wayne Fullerton Ops Dir, National PGeneral Manag Cisco Systems, Inc. 13635 Dulles Technology Drive Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wfullert@cisco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mel Fulton 1301 Gatesmeadow Way Reston , VA 20194 Phone: (703) 471-0358 Fax: (none) Email: melfulton@msn.com _____________________________________________________ Mel Fulton TITLE TBD BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ George Funk TITLE TBD Dell Inc. One Dell Way One Dell Way Round Rock , TX 78682 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: george_funk@dell.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Nicholas Fuqua 1140 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Ste 1140 Washington , DC 20036 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nicholas.fuqua@defensegp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. W. Furr P.O. Box 16850 Salt Lake City , UT 84116 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: frank.furr@l-3com.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Gannon Vice President, General Manager BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.gannon@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Lenora Gant Director of the Intelligence Com ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lenora.p.gant@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Frank Garci TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: frank.garcia@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Frank Garcia Jr. 9621 Podium Dr. VIenna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: fwgjr@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Frank Garcia Jr. 9621 Podium Dr. Vienna , VA 22182-3339 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: garciafwg@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Garcia 5 Oak Run Road Laurel , MD 20724 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: j.garcia@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Garcia Account Executive Oracle Corporation 1910 Oracle Way Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mike.garcia@oracle.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Garcia Strategic Program Mgr HP Federal APG Strategic Programs Office 6600 Rockledge Drive Bethesda , MD 20817 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.garcia2@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael R Garcia 22010 Ayr Hill Court Ashburn , VA 20148 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: garcia2@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Rebecca Garcia Dir. Sales & Bus. Development SAS Institute 1530 Wilson Blvd Suite 800 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Rebecca Garcia 1530 Wilson Blvd. Ste.800 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rebecca.garcia@sas.com _____________________________________________________ Mark S Gardiner MA General Manager BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (703) 242-6358 Fax: (none) Email: mark.gardiner@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Greg Gardner 1921 Gallows Rd Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: greg.gardner@netapp.com _____________________________________________________ Janice Gardner Assistant Secretary (Intelligenc Treasury Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Janice.Gardner@do.treas.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Arthur Garner 2295 Otter Rock Avenue Henderson , NV 89044-0143 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: artgarner@mviewcc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joseph Garofalo 1906 Kings Forest Trail Mount Airy , MD 21771 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Joseph.Garofalo@hq.dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mike Garramone Director Ball Aerospace 2111 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1120 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rbturner@ball.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. W. Garrett 777 7th Street, N.W. Ste 326 Washington , DC 20001 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wsg45@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. William S Garrett Founder / MD SecurDigital 601 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suit Suite #900, South Building Washington , DC 200042642 Phone: (none) Fax: (301) 864-0291 Email: w.steven.garrett@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ricky Garris 10900 Scott Drive Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: RG4411@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Ricky Garris Senior Director Salient Federal Solutions 8618 Westwood Center Drive Suite 100 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 940-0084 Email: Ricky.Garris@salientfed.com _____________________________________________________ Alex Garza Assistant Chief of Health Affair DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: alex.garza@hq.dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Wayne Gaskill IT Program Manager CACI 26104 Flintonbridge Drive Chantilly , VA 20152 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: waynegaskill@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Matthew E Gaston Co-Director Software Engineering Institute, CMU NRECA Building Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (412) 268-3918 Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Harry D Gatanas Sr VP Defense and Intelligence Serco 1622 Wyatts Ridge Crownsville , MD 21032 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: harry.gatanas@serco-na.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Janelle Gatchalian TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jgatchalian@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kathleen L Harger 888 N. Quincy Street #1912 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: harger.kathleen@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Drew Harker TITLE TBD Arnold & Porter 555 Twelfth Street, NW Washington , DC 20004 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Drew_Harker@aporter.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bill Harp MA Defense Intel Esri Bill Harp - Industry Solutions 380 New York St Redlands , CA 92373 Phone: (none) Fax: (909) 307-3039 Email: bharp@esri.com _____________________________________________________ Preston Harrelle TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Thomas J Harrington EAD Criminal Cyber Response FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thomas.harrington@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Adam Harris Staff Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Adam.Harris@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Basil " Harris Jr Executive for Federal ISE Progra Office of the PM-ISE, ODNI Mr. Nick Harris 2100 K ST NW Suite 300 Washington , DC 20511 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nbasilh@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Basil N Harris TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: b.harris@radium.ncsc.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Gail Harris 555 Rivergate Lane B1-113 Durango , CO 81301 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Harrisg44@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Maggie M Harris President and CEO Engineering Systems Consultants, Inc. 8201 Corporate Drive Suite 1105 Landover , MD 20785-2230 Phone: (202) 554-1009 Fax: (301) 577-0136 _____________________________________________________ Ronald Harris Business Development Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ronald.r.harris.lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William J Harris Director Raytheon Company 22270 Pacific Blvd Dulles , VA 20166 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: william_J_Harris@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Duane Harrison TITLE TBD DIA 342 12th Street SE Washington , DC 20003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: duane.harrison@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. George Harrison 109 Middleton Drive Peachtree City , GA 30269 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: george.harrison@gtri.gatech.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jerry C Harrison Vice President SRI International 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2800 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jerry.harrison@sri.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Steven D Harrison 12004 Governors Court Woodbridge , VA 22192 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: imer71@netscape.net _____________________________________________________ Col. Stuart Harrison 5605 Doolittle Street Burke , VA 22015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sharrison2@cox.net _____________________________________________________ Mr Stuart Harrison Vice President Parsons 100 M Street SE Washington , DC 20003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sharrison2@cox.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bruce Hart COO Terremark 460 Spring Park Place Ste 1000 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bhart@terremark.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Hart 9736 Riverside Circle Ellicott City , MD 21042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: whart13407@aol.com _____________________________________________________ P.O. Brendan E Hartford Police Officer Chicago Police Department-SWAT Team 3510 S. Michigan Chicago , IL 60653 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brendan.hartford@chicagopolice.org _____________________________________________________ Tim Hartman General Manager Government Executive ADDRESS TBD Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Hartney TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Deborah Harvey Director SRC 941 Glenwood Station Lane Suite 301 Charlottesville , VA 22901 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: harvey@srcinc.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Lawrence Gershwin Excellence ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lawrekg@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Kenneth Gertz 2133 Lee Building College Park , MD 20742-5125 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kgertz@umd.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joseph Ghannam Sr. Intel Recruitment Consultant BAE Systems Inc. 2525 Network Place Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joseph_nad@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Matthew J Ghormley Pgm Mgr, DAU School of Pgm Mgmt DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: matthew.ghormley@dau.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Stanley Giannet 5929 Lafayette Street New Port Richey , FL 34652 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: drgiannet@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ben Gianni Vice President, DHS Programs Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bgianni@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Timothy Gibson Liason to DARPA NSA 4109 John Trammell Court Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 516-8784 Email: timothy.gibson@darpa.mil _____________________________________________________ Robert Giesler VP, Cyber Security Director SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: robert.j.giesler@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Anthony Gigioli Vice President, Systems Engineer Camber Corporation 5860 Trinity Parkway Suite 400 Centerville , VA 20120 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tgigioli@i2spros.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Gigrich 1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 1000 Washington , DC 20036 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james_gigrich@agilent.com _____________________________________________________ RADM. Ann D Gilbride Director (Retired), National Mar DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ann.gilbride@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard Gildea Vice President, US Business Deve Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rfgildea@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Louis F Giles Director of Policy NSA 9800 Savage Road DC3, Suite 6248 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lfgiles@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Charles Gill Principal Systems Engineer The SI Organization 15050 Conference Center Drive Chanitlly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: charles.w.gill@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Peter Gill SVP, Deputy Group President SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: peter.gill@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David W Gillard Systems Director The Aerospace Corporation 15049 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (703) 437-8353 Fax: (571) 307-1234 Email: david.w.gillard@aero.org _____________________________________________________ Dan Gillespie Director, Corporate Business Dev LMI 2000 Corporate Ridge McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (703) 464-9765 Fax: (none) Email: dgillespie@lmi.org _____________________________________________________ Dan Gilliam Required unless Parent Required unless Parent , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jim Gillie Director CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jgillie@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. James Giordano TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jgiordano@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Thomas Giroir Principal, Business Development Tresys Technology Tom Giroir 8840 Stanford Blvd. Suite 2100 Columbia , MD 21045 Phone: (none) Fax: (410) 953-0494 Email: tgiroir@tresys.com _____________________________________________________ Richard Girven Rep. TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: r_girven@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Natalie Givans Vice President Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Givans_Natalie@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Edmund Glabus Corporate Senior Vice President ManTech International Corporation 2500 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ed.glabus@mantech.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Glasby TITLE TBD Intelsat General Corporation 6550 Rock Spring Drive Suite 450 Bethesda , MD 20817 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Brendan Glasgow Federal Account Manager SafeNet, Inc. 1655 Fort Myer Drive, Suite 1150 Arlington , VA 20832 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Brendan.Glasgow@safenet-inc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Glass Crystal Square 5 Ste 300 Washington , DC 20511 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michaeljg@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Matthew Glaudemans 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: matthew.glaudemans@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gene Glazar Vice President, Business Develop BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gene.glazar@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Amy Glazier BA Intern ICTS 629 Q St. NW Washington , DC 20001 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: amyglazier@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Stephen Glennan 332 Red Magnolia Court Millersville , MD 21108 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stephenglennan@netscape.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Glogow CIO Office DHS 9620 W. Russell Road, #2098 Las Vegas , NV 89148 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.glogow@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Pat Gnazzo TITLE TBD Computer Associates No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: patrick.gnazzo@ca.com _____________________________________________________ Lorenzo Goco Budget Director Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: L_Goco@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Jeff Godbold Director of Federal Solutions Basis Technology 2553 Dulles View Drive Suite 450 Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dale Goddeke Director, Advanced Solutions Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dale_h_goddeke@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Richard Godfrey TITLE TBD MorganFranklin 1753 Pinnacle Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rick.godfrey@morganfranklin.com _____________________________________________________ Donald Goff TITLE TBD Criterion Systems 6613 Rosecroft Place Falls Church , VA 22043 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dgoff@criterion-sys.com _____________________________________________________ Robert Goffner 4208 Hunt Club Circle Apt. 702 Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: galaxypheonix@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Geoff Goldberg Required unless Parent Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Philip S Goldberg Intelligence and Research State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: goldbergps@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Richard Goldberg Senior VP of Public Affairs DRS Technologies, Inc. 5 Sylvan Way Parsippany , NJ 7054 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: goldberg@drs.com _____________________________________________________ Richard Goldberg TITLE TBD DRS Technologies, Inc. 5 Sylvan Way Parsippany , NJ 7054 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: goldberg@drs.com _____________________________________________________ Brad Goldman TITLE TBD SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bradford.l.goldman@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Bradford L Goldman VP- Intelligence Sector Parsons Corporation 100 M Street, SE Washington , DC 20003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Bradford.Goldman@Parsons.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Benjamin Goldsmith 1619 R St NW Apt 206 Washington , DC 20009 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bwgoldsmith@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jon Goldsmith Director, Business Development Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jgoldsmith@csc.com _____________________________________________________ David Goldstein Senior Systems Engineer Draper Laboratory 555 Technology Square Cambridge , MA 02139 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dgoldstein@draper.com _____________________________________________________ Seth Goldstein 2032 Derby Hall 154 N. Oval Mall Columbus , OH 43210 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: goldstein.95@polisci.osu.edu _____________________________________________________ Peter Goldstone President Government Executive ADDRESS TBD Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ David L Goldwyn International Energy Affairs State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: goldwyndl@state.gov _____________________________________________________ David C Gombert Principal Dep Dir of Nat Intel ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sandra.s.jimenez@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ cathy a gombrsTest programmer gombrs line sterling , VA 20164 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ck@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Gary M Gomez M.A. Director, Business Development Delex Systems Inc. 1953 Gallows Rd. Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: GGomez@delex.com _____________________________________________________ Magda J Gomez CNCM Board Agent National Labor Relations Board 1201 W. Mt. Royal Avenue 457 Baltimore , MD 21217 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: magdajohannagomez@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Jose Gomez-Canaan Vice President AQUANIL Av. 27 de Febrero No.266 Edificio INACIF Santo Domingo 22195 Dominican Republic Phone: (none) Fax: (unlisted) Email: jose@aqua.com.do _____________________________________________________ Tanis Gonsalves TITLE TBD Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Mr. Peter Goobic TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Peter.Goobic@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Good Commander's Action Group, JFCC-N NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mjgood@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Randall Good Director ENSCO, Inc. 5400 Port Royal Road Springfield , VA 22151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: good.randall@ensco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Goodall Assistant for Program Developmen Pennsylvania State University - App. Research Labo P.O. Box 30 State College , PA 16804 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tdg10@arl.psu.edu _____________________________________________________ Thomas D Goodall TITLE TBD Pennsylvania State University - App. Research Labo P.O. Box 30 State College , PA 16804 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tdg10@only.arl.psu.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Linda Gooden Executive Vice President Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: linda.gooden@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Jason P Goodfriend BA Director BAE Systems 8201 Greensboro Drive McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 847-5880 Email: jason.goodfriend@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Tom Goodman TITLE TBD Computer Associates No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thomas.goodman@ca.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Goodson Business Development Analysis Vi Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.goodson@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Cristin Goodwin Policy Counsel Microsoft Corporation 5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cgoodwin@microsoft.com _____________________________________________________ Eric Goosby US Global AIDS Coordinator State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: goosbye@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mike Gorbell 4660 Paint Horse Trail Santa Maria , CA 93455 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gorbell@msn.com _____________________________________________________ Philip H Gordon European & Eurasian Affairs State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gordonph@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Samuel Gordy SVP, Deputy General Manager SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: samuel.j.gordy@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jason Gorey 19 Centre Street Wakefield , MA 1880 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jasongorey@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Allen L Gorin TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road R6, Suite 6513 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: algorin@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Michael Goss Vice President BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.goss@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Rose Gottemoeller Verification, Compliance, and Im State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gottemoellerr@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Evan R Gottesman TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: e_gottesman@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Gourley 15017 Rumson Place Manassas , VA 20111 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bob@crucialpointllc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Gouveia 7809 Mistic View Court Rockville , MD 20855 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gouveia_william@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Elizabeth Govan M.A. B.A. 135A Riverview Ave Annapolis , MD 21401 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: elizabethgovan@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Dana Goward Director, Office of Assessment DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dana.goward@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Diana Gowen Senior Vice President Qwest Communications 4250 N. Fairfax Dr. 5th Floor Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: diana.gowen@qwest.com _____________________________________________________ Dr Walt Grabowski VP Business Development Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Ms. Judith Grabski Director, Operations TRSS, LLC 1410 Spring Hill Rd Suite 140 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: judith.grabski@trssllc.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Rae Grad 1101 Main Administration College Park , MD 20742 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rgrad@umd.edu _____________________________________________________ Liz A Grady Executive Assistant Hewlett Packard Federal APG Sales 1 Flint Pond Drive No. Grafton , MA 01536 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lizette.a.grady@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Liz A Grady 6600 Rockledge Drive Bethesda , MD 20817 Phone: (508) 839-7257 Fax: (none) Email: lizette.a.grady@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Lizette A Grady Administrative Assistant Hewlett Packard Federal APG Sales Robert Siebert 6600 Rockledge Drive Bethesda , MD 20817 Phone: (443) 852-1842 Fax: (none) Email: lizette.a.grady@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Hampton D Graham Vice President Owl Computing Technology Inc. 38A Grove Street Suite 101 Ridgefield , CT 06877 Phone: (none) Fax: (203) 894-1297 Email: dgraham@owlcti.com _____________________________________________________ Mr James S Graham Finance BS Financial Analyst NetStar-1 110 S Wise St Apt 2 Arlington , VA 22204 Phone: (571) 830-4563 Fax: (none) Email: grahamjs70@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Tim Graham Acct Exec IBM Federal Software 2300 Dulles Station Blvd Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 943-1952 Email: tim_graham@us.ibm.com _____________________________________________________ David Grannis Staff Director Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: D_Grannis@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Arthur Grant TITLE TBD Raytheon 10866 Burr Oak Way Burke , VA 22015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: arthur_v_grant@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jeff Grant VP, NGAS Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeff.d.grant@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jeffrey Grant One Space Park E2/11092 Redondo Beach , CA 90278 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeff.d.grant@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jeremy Grant 1655 North Fort Meyer Drive Suite 1000 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jgrant@acqsolinc.com _____________________________________________________ John Grant Cyber Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john_grant@hsgac.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Vernon Grapes TITLE TBD Stellar Solutions, Inc. 250 Cambridge Avenue Suite 204 Palo Alto , CA 94306 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Donald Grass 15459 Championship Drive Haymarket , VA 20169 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dakiers@vacoxmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Donald Grass TITLE TBD NRO 15459 Championship Drive Haymarket , VA 20169 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: donald.grass@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Grasso Vice President, Government Relat Lockheed Martin, Washington Operations 2121 Crystal Dr Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Michael.a.grasso@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Bill Gravell Required unless Parent Required unless Parent , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Julie Gravellese INSA Innovative Tech Council MITRE Required unless Parent Required unless Parent , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Tracy Graves Stevens President MSM Security Services, LLC. 8401 Connecticut Ave Suite 700 Chevy Chase , MD 20815 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Benjamin Gray 11417 Encore Drive Silver Spring , MD 20901 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bgray@alumni.nd.edu _____________________________________________________ Donald A Gray 13 Country Manor Road Eagle Lake , MN 56024 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: donald.gray83@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ mark gray Staff Officer ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: a78548@me.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Timothy P Grayson 9704 Glenway Ct Burke , VA 22015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tgrayson@ktech.com _____________________________________________________ Libby Greco Director, Field Marketing Computer Associates No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Gavin Green Business Development, Senior Man CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Jason Green 14825 Adriatic Court Haymarket , VA 20169 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jgreen@us.ibm.com _____________________________________________________ Katherine Green Vice President Abraxas Corp 12801 Worldgate Dr Suite # 800 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Katherine M Green Vice President Abraxas Corporation, a Cubic Company 205 Van Buren Street Suite 210 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 821-8511 Email: katherine.green@abraxascorp.com _____________________________________________________ Matt Green Chief of Staff Finmeccanica Angelica Falchi 1625 I Street, NW 12th Floor Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: matthew.green@finmeccanica.com _____________________________________________________ Owen Greenblatt 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: owen.greenblatt@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Creighton Greene Strat Forces/Intel Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: creighton_greene@armed-services.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Amanda Greenland Intel/Admin Coordinator OUSD(I) Amanda Greenland 5000 Defense Pentagon Room 3C915 Washington , DC 20301 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Amanda.Greenland@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Aaron Greenwald 3000 N. Washington Blvd Apt. 528 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Aaron.Greenwald@jhu.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Aaron Greenwald TITLE TBD Central Technology 3000 N. Washington Blvd, No. 229 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: greenwalda@centratechnology.com _____________________________________________________ Eric Greenwald 5446 Broad Branch Rd NW Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Eric Greenwald Counsel Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: eric.greenwald@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Michael Greenwood Manager Government Program Devel Software Engineering Institute, CMU NRECA Building Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Greer 6564 Loisdale Ct Ste 900 Springfield , VA 22150 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Bradford Gregg Senior Consultant Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr Mclean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gregg_bradford@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Donna Gregg 11100 John Hopkins Road Room 17-S334 Laurel , MD 20723 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Daniel Gressang P.O. Box 793 Bowie , MD 20718 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Gressang@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Louis E Grever EAD Science and Technology FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: louis.grever@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sabra Horne MPA Director, Office of Communicatio Office of Justice Programs, Dept of Justice 810 7th Street Arlington , DC 20531 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sabra.horne@usdoj.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Edward Horner PSC 41 Box 918 APO , AE 9464 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tornado.isr@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark T Horton TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road AT, Suite 6222 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mthorto@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Doug Hoskins Mgr. NGIS Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Jim Hoskins Required unless Parent Required unless Parent , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Dr. Najoua Hotard PhD President Inst. of Crit LangCult Exch ( ICLCE) Dr. Najoua Hotard 4424 East catalina Ave Baton Rouge , LA 70814 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: najouak@cox.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dewey Houck Director - IS Mission Systems The Boeing Company 7700 Boston Boulevard Springfield , VA 22153 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dewey.houck@boeing.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Jody Houck TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Jeffrey Houle 1221 Merchant Lane Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22101 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeffrey.houle@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Art House Director of Communications ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: arthur.house@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Charlie Houy Staff Director Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: charlie_houy@appro.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sharon Houy Associate Deputy Director DIA 7400 Defense Pentagon Rm. 3E-258 Washington , DC 20301-7400 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Sharon.Houy@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Wayne Howard Director, Business Development SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGIES 6225 Brandon Avenue Suite 220 Springfield , VA 22150 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: whoward@systek.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Lance Howden 11260 Roger Bacon Dr. Suite 406 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Lance@parabon.com _____________________________________________________ Cassandra Howell PMP Program Manager/FSO LexisNexis 1100 Alderman Drive Suite 1A Alpharetta , GA 30005 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cassandra.howell@lnssi.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Gail Howell 3514 N. Ohio Street Arlington , VA 22207 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jhowell1012@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Ms. Gail S Howell 3514 North Ohio Street Arlington , VA 22207 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jhowell1012@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Ms. Theresa Howell TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Howell Chairman & CEO TECH USA, Inc 8334 Veterans Highway 2nd Floor Millersville , MD 21108 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tbh@techusa.net _____________________________________________________ Steny Hoyer Rep. House Majority Leader Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: hoyer.scheduling@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Beth Hruz 7901 Jones Branch Dr ste 310 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: beth.hruz@tvarsolutions.com _____________________________________________________ Francis Hsu US Citizenship & Immigration DHS 1 NoMA Station 131 M St., NE 2nd Floor Washington , DC 20529 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Garfield Hubbard TITLE TBD Hub Consulting Group, Inc. 11002 Swansfield Road Columbia , MD 21045 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ghubbard@hubcon.com _____________________________________________________ Gene Hubbard President & CEO Hub Consulting Group, Inc. (HUBCO) 11002 Swansfield Road Columbia , MD 21044 Phone: (301) 596-3147 Fax: (301) 596-8600 Email: ghubbard@hubcon.com _____________________________________________________ Jeremy Bash Director's Chief of Staff CIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: christyt@ucia.gov _____________________________________________________ Dr. Umit Basoglu Vice President NJVC, LLC 8614 Westwood Center Drive Suite 300 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: umit.basoglu@njvc.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Diane Batchik TITLE TBD White Cliffs Consulting 6445 Sundown Trail Columbia , MD 21044 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: diane.batchik@whitecliffsconsulting.com _____________________________________________________ James Batt Director, Business Development & The Boeing Company 7700 Boston Blvd Springfield , VA 22153 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.e.batt@boeing.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Charles Battle Consultant System Planning Corporation 4000 Cathedral Ave., N.W. #121B Washington , DC 20016 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tbattle@sysplan.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ethan L Bauman Congressional Affairs NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (443) 479-0276 Email: elbauma@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jeffrey Baxter 400 South Beverly Drive #214 Beverly Hills , CA 90212 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jbaxter@skunkhollow.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jon Bayless Sr. Bus. Development Manager Sypris Electronics 10901 N. McKinley Drive Tampa , FL 33612 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jon.bayless@sypris.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Beachell 2374 Whitestone Hill Court Falls Church , VA 22043 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.beachell.wg96@wharton.upenn.edu _____________________________________________________ Rebecca Bean 1513 Independence Avenue SE Washington , DC 20003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rebecab2@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Sarah Beane Required unless Parent Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Beard 3810 North Randolph Court Arlington , VA 22207 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Joel Beaton Client Executive HP Enterprise Services 13600 EDS Drive Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joel.beaton@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Marjorie Beatty 901 Ravelston Terrace Arnold , MD 21012 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: marjorib@ptf.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Marjorie A Beatty TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mabeatt@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Christopher Beck TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chris.beck@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Tom Beck 43912 Felicity Place Ashburn , VA 20147 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tbeck@splunk.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Lora Becker 3210 Wessynton Way Alexandria , VA 22309 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lora_becker@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Christian Beckner Counsel Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: christian_beckner@hsgac.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mike Becraft SVP Federal Civilian Services Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Dr. Fernand D Bedard TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road R3, Suite 6513 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: fdbedar@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. George Beebe Deputy Director, Center for Inte Defense Group, Inc. 1140 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 1140 Washington , DC 20036 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: george.beebe@defensegp.com _____________________________________________________ Joseph Beerman Senior Manager Raytheon 7600 Leesburg Pike West Building, Suite 400 Falls Church , VA 22043 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joseph.beerman@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Rand Beers Under Secretary DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Robert.Beers@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr Grant A Begley Jr. MS Corp Senior Vice President Alion 1750 Tysons Boulevard Suite 1300 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 714-6509 Email: gbegley@alionscience.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bernie Guerry Vice President, National Intelli General Dynamics IT, NDIS 15000 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20121 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bernie.guerry@gdit.com _____________________________________________________ John W Hudson 605 Stillwood Drive Woodstock , GA 30189 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jwhudson@thechartwellconsultancy.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Tracey Huff TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Jack Huffard Co-founder, President and COO Tenable Network Security 7063 Columbia Gateway Drive Suite 100 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Hufnagel 15238 Cedar Knoll Court Montclair , VA 22025 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Celes Hughes TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: celes.hughes@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Chris Hughes Senior Manager CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jahughes@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Christian A Hughes Int' Bus Sr. Policy Advisor DHS-Office of International Affairs/Policy Christian A. Hughes/CBP/INA 1300 Pennsylvania Ave, NW RRB 8th Floor Washington , DC 20220 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: christian.hughes@hq.dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Jeffrey Hughes Strategic Programs Manager Hewlett Packard Jeffrey Hughes 7230 Woodville Road Mount Airy , MD 21771 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeffrey.l.hughes@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jeffrey L Hughes MSEE Strategic Program Executive Hewlett Packard 7230 Woodville Road Mount Airy , MD 21771 Phone: (301) 363-8456 Fax: (none) Email: jeffrey.l.hughes@hp.com _____________________________________________________ LTG Patrick Hughes USA (Ret) 2013 South Lynn Street Arlington , VA 22202-2128 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pmh116207@aol.com _____________________________________________________ LTG Patrick Hughes USA (Ret.) Vice President-Intelligence & Co L-3 Communications, Inc. 11955 Freedom Drive Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: patrick.hughes@l-3com.com _____________________________________________________ Patrick M Hughes TITLE TBD L-3 Communications, Inc. 11955 Freedom Drive Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: patrick.hughes@l-3com.com _____________________________________________________ Special Agent Gary Hughey Jr Special Agent Air Force Office of Special Investigations 1413 Arkansas Rd Joint Base Andrews , MD 20762 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ghugheyjr@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Jay Hulings TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jay.hulings@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Dave Hull Program Director SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGIES 185 STATE HIGHWAY 36 WEST LONG BRANCH , NJ 7764 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dhull@systek.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Regina Hambleton TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gregg Hamelin 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gregory.hamelin@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Tawfik Hamid TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thamid@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Bonnie Hamilton 3383 Dondis Creek Dr Triangle , VA 22172 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pheelyne@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Hamilton 7746 New Providence Drive #93 Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: travel1Mark@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jeffrey Hamlin 13861 Sunrise Valley Drive Ste 400 Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeff.hamlin@dlt.com _____________________________________________________ Teresa Hamlin Manager Corporate Strategy Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Mr. Frederick Hammerson Senior Language Authority DIA 7400 Defense Pentagon Washington , DC 20301-7400 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Frederick.Hammerson@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Rob Hamrick Vice President, Advanced Project Ensco, Inc. 5400 Port Royal Road Springfield , VA 22151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: hamrick.rob@ensco.com _____________________________________________________ Larry Hanauer TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: larry.hanauer@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Larry Hanauer Senior Intl. Policy Analyst RAND 1200 South Hayes Street Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lhanauer@rand.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jeffrey Handy 7403 Gateway Court Manassas , VA 20109-7313 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jhandy@gmri.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Lee Hanna TITLE TBD The Intelligence & Security Academy, LLC 1890 Preston White Drive Suite 250 Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lehanna@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Jeanette Hanna-Ruiz Staff Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeanette_hanna-ruiz@nsgac.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Paul Hannah Jr. 7045 Berry rd Suite A1 Accokeek , MD 20607 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: phannah@takt-gs.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Morten Hansen #B01 SOD 8th Villa, 657-7 Hannam Seoul , AP 140-887 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mortenhansenbxl@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Lars Hanson 2160 Westglen Court Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: parkersan@sprynet.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William G Hanson Bachelors Sr. Vice President Agilex Technologies Jerry Hanson 5155 Parkstone Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (703) 754-2327 Fax: (703) 483-4928 Email: jerry.hanson@agilex.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Hantke 306 Sentinel Drive Ste 100 Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael_hantke@appsig.com _____________________________________________________ Bob Harding Required unless Parent Required unless Parent , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard Harding USCG Intelligence, Director of S DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: richard.harding@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Beth Hardison TITLE TBD USIS 7799 Leesburg Pike Suite 400 S Falls Church , VA 22043 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: beth.hardison@usis.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jeffrey T Hardy BA, MBA 1603 Riverside Drive Annapolis , MD 21409 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeffreythardy@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jeffrey T Hardy 1603 RIVERSIDE DRIVE ANNAPOLIS , MD 21409 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeffrey.t.hardy@live.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. George Hargenrader 13233 Ladybank Lane Oak Hill , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: grh092864@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Kathleen Harger Chief Advocate Adaptive Initiati DARPA 3701 N. Fairfax Dr. Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kathleen.harger@darpa.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kathleen L Harger 888 N. Quincy Street #1912 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: harger.kathleen@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Drew Harker TITLE TBD Arnold & Porter 555 Twelfth Street, NW Washington , DC 20004 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Drew_Harker@aporter.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bill Harp MA Defense Intel Esri Bill Harp - Industry Solutions 380 New York St Redlands , CA 92373 Phone: (none) Fax: (909) 307-3039 Email: bharp@esri.com _____________________________________________________ Preston Harrelle TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Thomas J Harrington EAD Criminal Cyber Response FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thomas.harrington@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Adam Harris Staff Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Adam.Harris@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Basil " Harris Jr Executive for Federal ISE Progra Office of the PM-ISE, ODNI Mr. Nick Harris 2100 K ST NW Suite 300 Washington , DC 20511 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nbasilh@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Basil N Harris TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: b.harris@radium.ncsc.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Gail Harris 555 Rivergate Lane B1-113 Durango , CO 81301 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Harrisg44@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Maggie M Harris President and CEO Engineering Systems Consultants, Inc. 8201 Corporate Drive Suite 1105 Landover , MD 20785-2230 Phone: (202) 554-1009 Fax: (301) 577-0136 _____________________________________________________ Ronald Harris Business Development Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ronald.r.harris.lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William J Harris Director Raytheon Company 22270 Pacific Blvd Dulles , VA 20166 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: william_J_Harris@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Duane Harrison TITLE TBD DIA 342 12th Street SE Washington , DC 20003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: duane.harrison@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. George Harrison 109 Middleton Drive Peachtree City , GA 30269 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: george.harrison@gtri.gatech.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jerry C Harrison Vice President SRI International 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2800 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jerry.harrison@sri.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Steven D Harrison 12004 Governors Court Woodbridge , VA 22192 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: imer71@netscape.net _____________________________________________________ Col. Stuart Harrison 5605 Doolittle Street Burke , VA 22015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sharrison2@cox.net _____________________________________________________ Mr Stuart Harrison Vice President Parsons 100 M Street SE Washington , DC 20003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sharrison2@cox.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bruce Hart COO Terremark 460 Spring Park Place Ste 1000 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bhart@terremark.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Hart 9736 Riverside Circle Ellicott City , MD 21042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: whart13407@aol.com _____________________________________________________ P.O. Brendan E Hartford Police Officer Chicago Police Department-SWAT Team 3510 S. Michigan Chicago , IL 60653 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brendan.hartford@chicagopolice.org _____________________________________________________ Tim Hartman General Manager Government Executive ADDRESS TBD Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Hartney TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Deborah Harvey Director SRC 941 Glenwood Station Lane Suite 301 Charlottesville , VA 22901 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: harvey@srcinc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Quentin Harvey 12204 Columbia Springs Way Bristow , VA 20136 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: qharvey12@aol.com _____________________________________________________ James M Hass Director, IT Governance, Policy ODNI Liberty Crossing 2, 6B331 Washington , DC 20511 Phone: (301) 782-7972 Fax: (none) Email: james.m.hass@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Dr. David C Hassell Laboratory Division FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david.hassell@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Christopher Hassler President & CEO Syndetics, Inc. 10395 Democracy Lane Suite B Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cchassler@syndetics-inc.com _____________________________________________________ Christopher C Hassler TITLE TBD Syndetics, Inc. 10395 Democracy Lane Suite B Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cchassler@syndetics-inc.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. David Hatch TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road EC, Suite 6886 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dahatch@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Pete Hatfield Director AECOM 6564 Loisdale Ct Springfield , VA 22150 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pete.hatfield@aecom.com _____________________________________________________ Melissa Hathaway Required unless Parent Required unless Parent , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Justin Hattan 1332 Belmont St NW #101 Washington , DC 20009 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Jeff Haugh 913 Malvern Hill Drive Davidsonville , MD 21035-1242 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jhaugh@nss.us.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Steven Hauptman 116K Edwards Ferry Road Leesburg , VA 20176 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: steven.hauptman@fasi.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Jan Hauser 18475 Circle Drive Los Gatos , CA 95033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Nathan Hauser TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nathan.hauser@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Rita Hauser PIAB Member PIAB No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Wendy_A._Loehrs@pfiab.eop.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Arthur Hausman 55 Flood Circle Atherton , CA 94027 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ahhausman@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard Haver Consultant Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rich.haver@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Richard Haver TITLE TBD Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rich.haver@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Stephen C Hawald 4123 N 27 STREET ARLINGTON , VA 22207 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: SCH500MD@GMAIL.COM _____________________________________________________ Mr. Steven Hawkins Vice President Raytheon Company 1200 S. Jupiter Road MS AA-75000 Garland , TX 75042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: steve_k_hawkins@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Erin Hawley Director, Federal Sales Composite Software Inc. 11921 Freedom Drive Suite 550 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Hawley 929 Brick Manor Circle Silver Spring , MD 20905 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jhawley@tibco.com _____________________________________________________ AJ Hawrylak Private Wealth Associate The Pagnato-Karp Group AJ Hawrylak 1152 15th Street Washington DC , DC 20005 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ahawrylak@hightoweradvisors.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Kastriot Haxhiaj 330 Independence Ave, S.W. Rm 3720 Washington , DC 20237 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: khaxhiaj@voa.gov _____________________________________________________ Joyce Hayes TITLE TBD PRTM Management Consultants, LLC 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Suite 1000 Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jhayes@prtm.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Karyn Hayes-Ryan Director, Commercial Remote Sens NGA 4600 Sangamore Road Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: karyn.hayesryan@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Juanita Haynesworth 11244 Chestnut Grove Square #156 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jehay143@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Anthony Hayter Director of Business Development Ivysys Technology, LLC 2001 Jefferson Davis Hwy Suite 1109 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ahayter@ivysys.com _____________________________________________________ Leo Hazlewood Required unless Parent Required unless Parent , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Heagy TITLE TBD Imagery X 2235 Gerken Avenue Vienna , VA 22181-3151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: heagy@imageryx.com _____________________________________________________ Christine Healey TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: c_healey@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Jason Healey 1200 N. Herndon St #265 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jason@jasonhealey.com _____________________________________________________ Jay Healey TITLE TBD Delta Risk LLC 2804 N. Seminary Chicago , IL 60657 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Timothy J Healy Director DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: timothy.healy@tsc.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Heath TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Dr. James Heath Directors Science Advisor NSA 9800 Savage Road Suite 6242 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. James D Heathcote Deputy Associate Director, Offic NSA 9800 Savage Road Q, Suite 6772 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (410) 854-7685 Email: jdheath@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Kenneth Heaton 9800 Savage Rd Ste 6759 Ft George G Meade , 0 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: k.heaton@radium.ncsc.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Vonna W Heaton Director, InnoVision Directorate NGA 4600 Sanagmore Road Bethesda , MD 20816 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Vonna.W.Heaton@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Heck Director, Enterprise Programs Harris Corporation P.O. Box 37 MS: 2-21D Melbourne , FL 32902 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mheck@harris.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Heck Director, Bus. Development-ISS Sypris Electronics 10901 N. McKinley Drive Tampa , FL 33612 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mark.heck@sypris.com _____________________________________________________ Ken Heffernan VP, Business Development Directo SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kenneth.g.heffernan@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Rob Hegstrom Director, Battlespace Awareness DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rob.hegstrom@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Ray Heider TITLE TBD TASC 4805 Stonecroft Blvd Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: raymond.heider@tasc.com _____________________________________________________ kris Heim Chief Technology Officer White Oak Technologiese, Inc. 1300 Spring Street Suite 320 Silver Spring , VA 20910 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dennis V Heinbuch TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road I2, Suite 6575 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dvheinb@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Maj. Gen. Bradley Heithold TITLE TBD Air Force Intelligence No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Edward B Held Director of Office of Intelligen Energy Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: edward.held@in.doe.gov _____________________________________________________ Dr. Joseph Helman 4532 34 St S Arlington , VA 22206 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joehelman@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dale Helmer TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dhelmer@casl.umd.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Hemschoot Director, Information Processing L-3 Communications/Com.Sys.East 1 Federal Street A&E-2C Camden , NJ 8103 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jim.hemschoot@l-3com.com _____________________________________________________ James G Hemschoot TITLE TBD L-3 Communications/Com.Sys.East 1 Federal Street A&E-2C Camden , NJ 8103 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jim.hemschoot@l-3com.com _____________________________________________________ Jim Hemschoot TITLE TBD Level 3 Communications, LLC No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jim.hemschoot@l-3com.com _____________________________________________________ Melanie Hendrick Required unless Parent Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Melanie Hendrick 905 Columbia Rd. NW Washington , DC 20001 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 602-5457 Email: hendrick.melanie@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Hendricks APG Account Manager Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mark.hendricks@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kris Henley Vice President, Intelligence Pro Stellar Solutions, Inc. 250 Cambridge Avenue Suite 204 Palo Alto , CA 94306 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: khenley@stellarsolutions.com _____________________________________________________ Betsey Hennigan TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: betsey.hennigan@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Shawn Henry EAD Washington Field Officer FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Shawn.Henry@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Henson PSC #41, P.O. Box 3667 APO , AE 9464 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: robert.henson@lakenheath.af.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. John C Hepler 3478 South River Terrace Edgewater , MD 21037 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.hepler@datadomain.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Herd Principal Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Herd_Robert@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mel Heritage Assistant Deputy Director and Se ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ James Herlong 712 Oser Drive Crownsville , MD 21032 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: herlongjj@mac.com _____________________________________________________ Scott Herman Sr Dir of Product Development GeoEye 2325 Dulles Corner Blvd. Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Dr. Robert Hermann Required unless Parent Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Christie Hernandez Marketing Coordinator Carahsoft 12369 Sunrise Valley Drive STE D2 Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: christie.hernandez@carahsoft.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Enrique Hernandez 6415 Emerald Green CT Centreville , VA 20121-3824 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: hank.hernandez@vyndicar.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Don Herndon V.P. Business Development Sypris Electronics 10901 N. McKinley Drive Tampa , FL 33612 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: don.herndon@sypris.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Don Herring President AT&T Government Solutions-NIS 7125 Columbia Gateway Drive Suite 100 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dherring@att.com _____________________________________________________ Rebecca Hersman Deputy Assistant Secretary for C DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rebecca.hersman@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Brandon Hess BD Specialist Parsons 100 M St. SE Ste. 1200 Washington , DC 20003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brandon.hess@missionep.com _____________________________________________________ John J Hess Senior Director, Intelligence So Sotera Defense Solutions, Inc 1501 Farm Credit Drive Suite 2300 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Stephen Hetrick 2111 Blackmore Ct. San Diego , CA 92109 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: shetrick@srccomp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Heurtevent 1201 S. Eads St. #103 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david@heurtevent.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Brian Hibbeln 3815 Watkins Mill Drive Alexandria , VA 22304 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Brass@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Brian Hibbeln ADUSD for Special Capabilitiesáá DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Brian.Hibbeln@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Allison A Hickey TITLE TBD Accenture 43254 Watershed Ct Ashburn , VA 20147 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: allison.a.hickey@accenture.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Hicks 826 Walker Road Great Falls , VA 22066 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: hicksjw@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Hicks TITLE TBD NRO 826 Walker Road Falls Church , VA 22066 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.hicks@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Parker Hicks No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Russ Hierl Senior Director, Security Ops & Sotera Defense Solutions, Inc 1501 Farm Credit Drive Suite 2300 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rhierl@theanalysiscorp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Peter L Higgins 1600 Tysons Boulevard - 8th Fl. 1SecureAudit McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: HigginsP@1SecureAudit.com _____________________________________________________ Kevin Highfield 1600 S. Eads St. APT 907N Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: highfieldk@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Karim Hijazi 9858 Clint Moore Road C-111, #261 Boca Raton , FL 33496 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: khijazi@demiurgeconsulting.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Karim Hijazi CEO Unveillance Karim Hijazi 3475 Oak Valley Road NE STE. 2740 Atlanta , GA 30326 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: khijazi@unveillance.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jack Hild DD, Source Operations & Manageme NGA 4600 Sangamore Road Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jack.hild@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Alice Hill Senior Counselor to the Secretar DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Alice.Hill@hq.dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Chris Hill TITLE TBD Adobe 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1000 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chill@adobe.com _____________________________________________________ Larry Hill SVP, Deputy General Manager SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: larry.hill@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Martin Hill Vice President Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Hill_Marty@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Zachary Hill TITLE TBD DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Zachary.Hill@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Doug Himes TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road S33, Suite 6505 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Hindle Executive Vice President Westway Development 14325 Willard Road Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jhindle@westwaydevelopment.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jason Hines 1503E N. Colonial Terrace Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jason@viadesigns.com _____________________________________________________ Jason Hines BS, MS Head of Federal Sales Recorded Future 1503E N. Colonial Ter Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jason@recordedfuture.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Elizabeth Hoag DCIPS Program Manager DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: elizabeth.hoag@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Dr. Andrew Hock Arete Associates 9301 Corbin Avenue, Suite 2000 Northridge , CA 91324 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ahock@arete.com _____________________________________________________ Peter Hoekstra Rep. Minority Chair Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (202) 226-0779 Email: leah.scott@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. James W hoffman 4231 Monument Wall Way Apt 151 Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jim.hoffman@Objectfx.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Christopher Hoffmeister Intelligence Research Specialist Department of Homeland Security 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, 7.4 C Washington , DC 20229 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chris.hoffmeister@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ William Holcomb TITLE TBD The MITRE Corporation 7515 Colshire Drive McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wholcomb@mitre.org _____________________________________________________ Eric H Holder Jr. Attorney General Justice Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: linda.a.jenkins@usdoj.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. George L Holdridge Sr. BIE CEO Global Downlink Corporation Mr. George Holdridge 13290 Solana beach Cv. Delray Beach , FL 33446 Phone: (561) 495-9801 Fax: (none) Email: usmetro@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ John Holland Graduate Student Norwich University 425 Thames Street Hagerstown , MD 21740 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: hollandjf@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Guy Holliday VP for Programs Adapx 821 Second Avenue Ste 1150 Seattle , WA 98104 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: guy.holliday@adapx.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Nancy Holliday Director, Strategic Business Dev Microsoft Corporation 5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nancyhol@microsoft.com _____________________________________________________ Christopher Hollingshead Commander U.S Coast Guard 711 Diamond Vista Dr Port Angeles , WA 98363 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: christopher.hollingshead@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Hans Hollister SVP, Business Development L-3 Communications, Inc. 11955 Freedom Drive Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Jim Holm Staff Assistant Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Jim.Holm@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Georgia Holmer TITLE TBD Pherson Associates, LLC 9902 Deerfield Pond Drive Great Falls , VA 22066 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Christopher Holmes TITLE TBD Goodrich 88 Wildwood Drive Avon , CT 6001 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chris.holmes@goodrich.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sarah Holmes Senior Consultant Sensa Solutions 11180 Sunrise Valley Drive Suite 100 Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sarah@sensasolutions.com _____________________________________________________ Stewart Holmes TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Stewart_Holmes@appro.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Tonya M Holmes 2504 Buckingham Green Lane Upper Marlboro , MD 20774 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tholmes@poseidon2020.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Jayne Homeyer Director of Competencies and Sta ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jane.m.homeyer@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Vanessa Hood Embedded Analyst Palantir Technologies 1660 International Drive 8th Floor McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ William L Hooton Records Management Division FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: william.hooton@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ John M Hope Office of IT Program Management FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.hope@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Stephen J Hopkins 2703 E Towers Dr # 409 Cincinnati , OH 45238 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bkwtr22@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Carmen D Hopper MS, BA Head of Intelligence & Analytics Barclays Capital Carmen Hopper 745 Seventh Avenue 12th floor New York , NY 10019 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: carmen.hopper@barcap.com _____________________________________________________ Jason Hopper 1313 Hampshire Drive Frederick , MD 21702 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jhopper86@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Ms Jill Hopper 901 N. Stuart Street Suite 1110 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jhopper@cray.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert R Horback Vice President TASC 15036 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 961-0944 Email: ROBERT.HORBACK@tasc.com _____________________________________________________ Robert D Hormats Under Secretary Econ, Energy & A State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: HormatsRD@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sabra Horne 3131 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Apt 2908 Washington , DC 20008-5030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sabra Horne Senior Advisor for Outreach ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sabra.e.horne@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sabra Horne MPA Director, Office of Communicatio Office of Justice Programs, Dept of Justice 810 7th Street Arlington , DC 20531 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sabra.horne@usdoj.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Edward Horner PSC 41 Box 918 APO , AE 9464 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tornado.isr@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark T Horton TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road AT, Suite 6222 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mthorto@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Doug Hoskins Mgr. NGIS Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Jim Hoskins Required unless Parent Required unless Parent , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Dr. Najoua Hotard PhD President Inst. of Crit LangCult Exch ( ICLCE) Dr. Najoua Hotard 4424 East catalina Ave Baton Rouge , LA 70814 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: najouak@cox.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dewey Houck Director - IS Mission Systems The Boeing Company 7700 Boston Boulevard Springfield , VA 22153 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dewey.houck@boeing.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Jody Houck TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Jeffrey Houle 1221 Merchant Lane Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22101 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeffrey.houle@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Art House Director of Communications ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: arthur.house@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Charlie Houy Staff Director Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: charlie_houy@appro.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sharon Houy Associate Deputy Director DIA 7400 Defense Pentagon Rm. 3E-258 Washington , DC 20301-7400 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Sharon.Houy@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Wayne Howard Director, Business Development SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGIES 6225 Brandon Avenue Suite 220 Springfield , VA 22150 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: whoward@systek.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Lance Howden 11260 Roger Bacon Dr. Suite 406 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Lance@parabon.com _____________________________________________________ Cassandra Howell PMP Program Manager/FSO LexisNexis 1100 Alderman Drive Suite 1A Alpharetta , GA 30005 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cassandra.howell@lnssi.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Gail Howell 3514 N. Ohio Street Arlington , VA 22207 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jhowell1012@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Ms. Gail S Howell 3514 North Ohio Street Arlington , VA 22207 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jhowell1012@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Ms. Theresa Howell TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Howell Chairman & CEO TECH USA, Inc 8334 Veterans Highway 2nd Floor Millersville , MD 21108 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tbh@techusa.net _____________________________________________________ Steny Hoyer Rep. House Majority Leader Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: hoyer.scheduling@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Beth Hruz 7901 Jones Branch Dr ste 310 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: beth.hruz@tvarsolutions.com _____________________________________________________ Francis Hsu US Citizenship & Immigration DHS 1 NoMA Station 131 M St., NE 2nd Floor Washington , DC 20529 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Garfield Hubbard TITLE TBD Hub Consulting Group, Inc. 11002 Swansfield Road Columbia , MD 21045 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ghubbard@hubcon.com _____________________________________________________ Gene Hubbard President & CEO Hub Consulting Group, Inc. (HUBCO) 11002 Swansfield Road Columbia , MD 21044 Phone: (301) 596-3147 Fax: (301) 596-8600 Email: ghubbard@hubcon.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert A Hubbard Principal KPMG LLP Tony Hubbard, Principal 1676 International Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (202) 315-2573 Email: thubbard@kpmg.com _____________________________________________________ John W Hudson 605 Stillwood Drive Woodstock , GA 30189 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jwhudson@thechartwellconsultancy.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Tracey Huff TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Jack Huffard Co-founder, President and COO Tenable Network Security 7063 Columbia Gateway Drive Suite 100 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Hufnagel 15238 Cedar Knoll Court Montclair , VA 22025 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Celes Hughes TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: celes.hughes@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Chris Hughes Senior Manager CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jahughes@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Christian A Hughes Int' Bus Sr. Policy Advisor DHS-Office of International Affairs/Policy Christian A. Hughes/CBP/INA 1300 Pennsylvania Ave, NW RRB 8th Floor Washington , DC 20220 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: christian.hughes@hq.dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Jeffrey Hughes Strategic Programs Manager Hewlett Packard Jeffrey Hughes 7230 Woodville Road Mount Airy , MD 21771 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeffrey.l.hughes@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jeffrey L Hughes MSEE Strategic Program Executive Hewlett Packard 7230 Woodville Road Mount Airy , MD 21771 Phone: (301) 363-8456 Fax: (none) Email: jeffrey.l.hughes@hp.com _____________________________________________________ LTG Patrick Hughes USA (Ret) 2013 South Lynn Street Arlington , VA 22202-2128 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pmh116207@aol.com _____________________________________________________ LTG Patrick Hughes USA (Ret.) Vice President-Intelligence & Co L-3 Communications, Inc. 11955 Freedom Drive Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: patrick.hughes@l-3com.com _____________________________________________________ Patrick M Hughes TITLE TBD L-3 Communications, Inc. 11955 Freedom Drive Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: patrick.hughes@l-3com.com _____________________________________________________ Special Agent Gary Hughey Jr Special Agent Air Force Office of Special Investigations 1413 Arkansas Rd Joint Base Andrews , MD 20762 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ghugheyjr@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Jay Hulings TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jay.hulings@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Dave Hull Program Director SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGIES 185 STATE HIGHWAY 36 WEST LONG BRANCH , NJ 7764 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dhull@systek.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Patty Hullinger 500 Grove Street Suite 300 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: patricia.hullinger@netwitness.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Humenansky Vice President Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Humenansky_David@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Hummel TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rhummel@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ John Humphrey Senior VP Salient Federal Solutions 8618 Westwood Center Drive Suite 100 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 940-0084 Email: John.Humphrey@salientfed.com _____________________________________________________ John Humphrey TITLE TBD Salient Federal Solutions 8618 Westwood Center Drive Suite 100 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jhumphrey@sgis.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Humphrey P.O. Box 13326 Fairlawn , OH 44334-8726 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mhumphrey@kpmg.com _____________________________________________________ Tamara Hunt TITLE TBD DIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tamara.hunt@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Andrew Hunter TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: andrew.hunter@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Elizabeth Hunter Government Business Development AT&T Government Solutions 3033 Chain Bridge RD Oakton , VA 22185 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: eh9924@att.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert F Behler 7502 Round Pond Road North Syracuse , NY 13212 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rfb@srcinc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Behling 6517 Deidre Terrace McLean , VA 22101 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Behling Former Deputy Under Secretary of DoD 6517 Deidre Terrace McLean , VA 22101 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thomas.behling@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Beida Deputy Director, CTO NSA 9800 Savage Road Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ James Beirne 11328 Nancyann Way Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: beirnejd@mac.com _____________________________________________________ Karen Beirne-Flint 8300 Grainfield Road Severn , MD 21144 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: karen.beirne-flint@ogn.af.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Per Beith 3370 Miraloma Anaheim , CA 92803 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: per.beith@boeing.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gregory Bell 1401 Old Sage Ct Glen Allen , VA 23059 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gbell@bluecanary.us _____________________________________________________ Thomas Bell Deputy Director of National Inte CIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 482-1739 Email: lakecia.s.graham@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Chris Bellios Vice President BAE Systems 8201 Greensboro Dr McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chris.bellios@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Chris G Bellios MBA Vice President BAE Systems 8201 Greensboro Dr Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chris.bellios@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Stephanie Bellistri TBD Title Palantir Technologies 1660 International Drive 8th Floor McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms Leslee Belluchie 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 Email: leslee.belluchie@si-intl.com _____________________________________________________ Leslee Belluchie Managing Member FedCap Partners, LLC 11951 Freedom Drive 13th Floor Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Scott Belodeau Vice President TECH USA, Inc 8334 Veterans Highway 2nd Floor Millersville , MD 21108 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sbelodeau@techusa.net _____________________________________________________ Simone Bemporad CEO Finmeccanica Angelica Falchi 1625 I Street, NW 12th Floor Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: simone.bemporad@finmeccanica.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Charles Bender Director, Special R&D Intel PGen SRI International 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2800 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bender@wdc.sri.com _____________________________________________________ Andrea Benham 4204 Columbia Pike Apt. #2 Arlington , VA 22204 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: andreabenham@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Stephanie Benham Content Manager NGA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stephasb@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Daniel Benjamin Counterterrorism State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: benjamind@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Jeff Benjamin 7223 Willow Oak Place Springfield , VA 22153 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: benjaminja@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Thomas J Benjamin Senior Vice President and COO Analytic Services Inc. 2900 South Quincy Street Suite 800 Arlington , VA 22206 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thomas.benjamin@anser.org _____________________________________________________ Brian Bennett Reporter Tribune Washington Bureau 1090 Vermont Ave. NW Suite 1000 Washington , DC 20005 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bbennett@tribune.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Elizabeth Bennett Senior Staff Scientist Ensco, Inc. 5400 Port Royal Road Springfield , VA 22151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bennett.elizabeth@ensco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Corey A Bent BS ChE Chief, Media Services Department of Homeland Security 3009 S Hill St Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: coreybent@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Lesia Hunter TITLE TBD The Potomac Advocates 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lesia.hunter@serco-na.com _____________________________________________________ DSS Randy T Hunter Mr NC/BA AP/M Dir Systems Security CSSI Randy Hunter 284 Cranes Cir West Altamonte Springs , FL 32701 Phone: (407) 339-9467 Fax: 1-800-439-2216 Email: rhunter42@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Huntington Deputy Director for Human Intell DIA 7400 Defense Pentagon Rm. 3E-258 Washington , DC 20301-7400 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: William.Huntington@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ John A Hurley 9001 Cherrytree Drive Alexandria , VA 22309-2902 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jhurley@republiccapitalaccess.com _____________________________________________________ Mel Hurley Director - IT Professional Servi Wyle Information Systems 1600 Intenational Dr Suite 800 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Hurry TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mark Hutnan Senior Manager General Dynamics AIS 10560 Arrowhead Drive Fiarfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Doug Huttar Senior Manager Grant Thornton LLP 333 John Carlyle Street Suite 500 Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Church Hutton Cyber Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: church_hutton@armed-services.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Steve Hyde TITLE TBD TASC 4805 Stonecroft Blvd Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stephen.hyde@tasc.com _____________________________________________________ John Hynes Jr. SVP, General Manager SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.p.hynes.jr@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Karl Jensen TITLE TBD Raytheon Company 1200 S. Jupiter Road MS AA-75000 Garland , TX 75042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Karl_Jensen@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Karl Jensen VP, BD-Intelligence Solutions L-3 Communications, Inc. 11955 Freedom Drive Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Rick Jensen Director Business Finance Serco 1050 North Newport Rd Colorado Springs , CO 80916 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Kristin Jepson Director of Security Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kristin.Jepson@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Donald Jewell 9368 Duff Court Ellicott City , MD 21042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: donjewell15@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Rod Smith Jim Balentine President Abraxas/Cubic Mission Support Services Rod Smith 12801 Worldgate Drive Suite 800 Herndon , DC 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 563-9541 Email: rod.smith@abraxascorp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Jimenez 7122 Rock Ridge Lane Apartment I Alexandria , VA 22315 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: swnmia@juno.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jose Jimenez Chief Diversity Offiver Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jjimene4@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Jose Jiminez Acting Assistant to Special Agen DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jose.j.jiminez1@dhs.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Alexander Joel Civil Liberties Protection Offic ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: alexander.w.joel@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Alexander Joel Civil Liberties Officer ODNI ODNI Washington DC , DC 20511 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: alexawj@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Annie John TITLE TBD i2 1430 Spring Hill Road McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Johns Business Development Senior Mana CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jjohns@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Johns VP, BD Six3 Systems 1430 Spring Hill Road Suite 525 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 852-1218 Email: john.johns@six3systems.com _____________________________________________________ Barbara A Johnson TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Bart Johnson Principal Deputy Under Secretary DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bart.johnson@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Bobby Johnson Smartline Project Manager DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brjohnson@nmic.navy.mil _____________________________________________________ Clete Johnson TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: c_johnson@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Craig Johnson P.O. Box 748 MZ 1246 Fort Worth , TX 76101 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: craig.r.johnson@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ David T Johnson International Narcotics & Law En State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ambdavidjohnson@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dean Johnson President Entegra Systems 2342 Ballard Way Ellicott City , MD 21042 Phone: (none) Fax: (410) 418-4785 Email: dean.johnson@entegrasystems.com _____________________________________________________ Ivy Johnson TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ivy_johnson@hsgac.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. J. M Johnson TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road V4, Suite 6566 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jmjohns@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Jeffrey Johnson CTO FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeffery.johnson@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kathleen D Johnson 555 Herndon Parkway Parkway One Office Buildi , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kathleen.Johnson@cdsinc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Karl Jensen TITLE TBD Raytheon Company 1200 S. Jupiter Road MS AA-75000 Garland , TX 75042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Karl_Jensen@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Karl Jensen VP, BD-Intelligence Solutions L-3 Communications, Inc. 11955 Freedom Drive Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Rick Jensen Director Business Finance Serco 1050 North Newport Rd Colorado Springs , CO 80916 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Kristin Jepson Director of Security Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kristin.Jepson@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Donald Jewell 9368 Duff Court Ellicott City , MD 21042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: donjewell15@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Rod Smith Jim Balentine President Abraxas/Cubic Mission Support Services Rod Smith 12801 Worldgate Drive Suite 800 Herndon , DC 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 563-9541 Email: rod.smith@abraxascorp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Jimenez 7122 Rock Ridge Lane Apartment I Alexandria , VA 22315 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: swnmia@juno.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jose Jimenez Chief Diversity Offiver Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jjimene4@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Jose Jiminez Acting Assistant to Special Agen DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jose.j.jiminez1@dhs.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Alexander Joel Civil Liberties Protection Offic ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: alexander.w.joel@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Alexander Joel Civil Liberties Officer ODNI ODNI Washington DC , DC 20511 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: alexawj@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Annie John TITLE TBD i2 1430 Spring Hill Road McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Johns Business Development Senior Mana CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jjohns@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Johns VP, BD Six3 Systems 1430 Spring Hill Road Suite 525 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 852-1218 Email: john.johns@six3systems.com _____________________________________________________ Barbara A Johnson TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Bart Johnson Principal Deputy Under Secretary DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bart.johnson@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Bobby Johnson Smartline Project Manager DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brjohnson@nmic.navy.mil _____________________________________________________ Clete Johnson TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: c_johnson@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Craig Johnson P.O. Box 748 MZ 1246 Fort Worth , TX 76101 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: craig.r.johnson@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ David T Johnson International Narcotics & Law En State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ambdavidjohnson@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dean Johnson President Entegra Systems 2342 Ballard Way Ellicott City , MD 21042 Phone: (none) Fax: (410) 418-4785 Email: dean.johnson@entegrasystems.com _____________________________________________________ Ivy Johnson TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ivy_johnson@hsgac.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. J. M Johnson TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road V4, Suite 6566 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jmjohns@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Jeffrey Johnson CTO FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeffery.johnson@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kathleen D Johnson 555 Herndon Parkway Parkway One Office Buildi , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kathleen.Johnson@cdsinc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Keith Johnson 411 Tudor Ct Leesburg , VA 20176 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: keith.e.johnson@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Ken Johnson Minority Deputy Staff Director Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: K_Johnson@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Laura M Johnson 510 Alalea Drive Rockville , MD 20850-2001 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: laura.m.johnson@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Laura M Johnson Ph.D. Dep Chief Deliberate Plans DHS 3801 Nebraska Ave. NW Bldg 81, Rm 103 Washington , DC 20528 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: laura.manning.johnson@hq.dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Laura M Johnson PhD Acting Branch Chief, Deliberate DHS 3801 Nebraska Ave NAC bldg 81, rm 103 Washington , DC 20528 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lauramanning@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Ms. Mary Alice Johnson 1110 Herndon Parkway Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: maryalice@connellyworks.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael M Johnson Senior Scientist Sandia National Laboratories 7011 East Avenue MS 9152 Livermore , CA 94550 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mmjohns@sandia.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Johnson Federal Market Account Director SRC, Inc 7502 Round Pond Road North Syracuse , NY 13212 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: johnson@srcinc.com _____________________________________________________ Terry Johnson Acquisition Mgmt Supervisor Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ty Johnson Ty Johnson 1550 Crystal Drive Suite 502B Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ty.johnson@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bayne Johnston 310 W. 80th St. APT 2E New York , NY 10024 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: baynejohnston@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mikeal Johnston Dir JFO-PMO DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mikeal.johnston@hq.dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ John Jolly VP and General Manager General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Pierre Joly 8432 Ambrose Court Springfield , VA 22153 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pjoly@intellpros.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Adam Jones Staff ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: adam.jones@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Ashley Jones Communications Specialist Wyle Information Systems 1600 Intenational Dr Suite 800 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Charles Jones Vice President Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Jones_Chuck@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dalton Jones Senior Biometrics Executive ODNI 4251 Suitland Road Washington , D.C. 20593-5765 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dalton.jones@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Dan Jones TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: d_jones@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dennis Jones VP, Services & DoD Sales GeoEye 21700 Atlantic Boulevard Dulles , VA 20166 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jones.dennis@geoeye.com _____________________________________________________ Jaime Jones Director, Corporate Operations Delta Risk LLC 2213 N Street NW #302 Washington DC , DC 20037 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jjones@delta-risk.net _____________________________________________________ James L Jones National Security Advisor NSC No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james_l._jones@nsc.eop.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jesse Jones CEO Special Operations Technology, Inc. 12011 Guilford Road Suite 109 Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jjones@sotech.us _____________________________________________________ Jesse S Jones TITLE TBD Special Operations Technology, Inc. 12011 Guilford Road Suite 109 Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jjones@sotech.us _____________________________________________________ Kerri-Ann Jones Ocean, Environment, & Science State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jonesk@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Kimberly Q Jones Policy Officer DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kimberly.quirk@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Kyle Jones 4002 West Crowly Court Visalia , CA 93291 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kjones100m@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert D Jones Ch, Infra Dev & Opns, Suite 6575 NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rdjones@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. S. Jones 815 Ritchie Hwy. #214 Severna Park , MD 21146 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ William P Jones TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Joost Vice President, Tactical Systems General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Thomas.joost@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Cazzy J Jordan JD, PMP Sr. Developer Instructional General Dynamics IT 5875 BARCLAY DRIVE SUITE 5 ALEXANDRIA , VA 22315 Phone: (703) 992-4578 Fax: (none) Email: cazzy.jordan@gdit.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Everette E Jordan TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road NVTC, Suite 6486 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: eejorda@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Shunil Joseph 2451 Atrium Way 3rd Floor Nashville , TN 37214 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sjoseph@thinkingahead.com _____________________________________________________ paul m joyal BA, MA managing director National Strategies 1400 I Street NW suite 900 Washington , DC 20005 Phone: (301) 439-5066 Fax: (none) Email: pjoyal@nationalstrategies.com _____________________________________________________ Patrick Joyce TITLE TBD Deloitte Consulting, LLP No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Joyce TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Sean Joyce International Operations Divisio FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sean.joyce@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Steven Judd Account Sales Rep/INTEL Oracle Corporation 1910 Oracle Way Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: steven.judd@oracle.com _____________________________________________________ Rich Julien 1700 N. Moore St. Suite 1705 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rjulien@eastportanalytics.com _____________________________________________________ Paul Juola Staff Director Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: paul.juola@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Keith G Kauffman Asst Admin for Intelligence & An DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: keith.g.kauffman@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Michael Kauffman Vice President of Contracts Proteus Technologies 133 National Business Parkway Suite 150 Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Richard Kauzlarich 7019 Ted Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (703) 536-3486 Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Wendy Kay 7507 Brad St Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wendy.kay1@navy.mil _____________________________________________________ Wendy Kay Senior Director for Intelligence DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wendy.kay@navy.mil _____________________________________________________ Juliette Kayyem Assistant Secretary of Intergove DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: juliette.kayyem@hq.dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Suzanne Kecmer Manager, Strategy Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: suzanne_kecmer@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Steve Kee VP Hughes 11717 Exploration Lane Germantown , MD 20876 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: steven.kee@hughes.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Keebaugh President, IIS Raytheon Company 1200 S. Jupiter Road MS AA-75000 Garland , TX 75042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mike_keebaugh@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Keefe Assistant Deputy Director of Nat ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.p.keefe@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ James Keenan TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Terry Kees 2945 Gray Street Oakton , VA 22124 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: terrykees@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Ioanna T Kefalas Executive Assistant to Secretary Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Ioanna.T.Kefalas@hud.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr Marshall Keith Vice President The SI Organization, Inc. Chris Nolan 15052 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: marshall.keith@theSIorg.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Hans Keithly 10008 Park Royal Drive Great Falls , VA 22066 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: hjkeithley@cox.net _____________________________________________________ BG(R) Brian Keller 14688 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 22039 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brian.keller@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Patrick W Kelley Office of Integrity and Complian FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: patrick.kelley@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Jason Kello TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Declan Kelly Econ Envoy to Northern Ireland State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kellyd@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Ian C Kelly Dept Spokesman State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kellyic@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Kevin Kelly Vice President, Corporate Strate LGS Innovations Accounts Payable 5440 Millstream Road Suite E210 McLeansville , NC 27301 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: klkelly@lgsinnovations.com _____________________________________________________ Kevin L Kelly VP Corporate Strategy LGS Innovations Kevin Kelly 13665 Dulles Technology Drive Suite 301 Herndon , VA 20169 Phone: (703) 753-5115 Fax: (703) 394-1420 Email: klkelly@lgsinnovations.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Laurie Kelly TITLE TBD DIA DIOCC/DJA Defense Intelligence Agency 200 MacDill Blvd Bldg 6000 Washington , DC 20340 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: laurie.kelly@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Rodney P Kelly TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road DC4, Suite 6249 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rpkelly@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Stephen Kelly Office of Congressional Affairs FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stephen.kelly@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ronald Kemper 5213 SW 10th Avenue Cape Coral , FL 33914-7019 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ronkemper@att.net _____________________________________________________ Karyn Kendall TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: karyn.kendall@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Colonel Laura Kennedy USAF TITLE TBD NRO 3500 Pecan Place Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: laura.kennedy@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Patrick F Kennedy Under Secretary Management State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: KennedyPF@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Tracy S Kennedy Technical Director General Dynamics AIS 8800 Queen Ave South Bloomington , MN 55431 Phone: (none) Fax: (952) 921-6552 _____________________________________________________ Paul Kennett Vice President, ISS KGS 2750 Prosperity Ave Ste 300 Fairfax , VA 22031 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pkennett@kforcegov.com _____________________________________________________ Andrew Kerr TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: a_kerr@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Charles Kerschner 7904 Curtis Street Chevy Chase , MD 20815 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Paul Kerstanski 2231 Crystal Drive Suite 1114 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pkerstanski@greenlinesystems.com _____________________________________________________ David Kervin Chief Strategy Officer KeyPoint Government Solutions, Inc. 1750 Foxtrail Drive Loveland , CO 80538 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david.kervin@keypoint.us.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Frank Kesterman 4 Winterberry Court Bethesdsa , MD 20817 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kestermans@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Jamie Kettren 2000 S Eads St Apt 615 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jket85@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ryan Kezar 3753 Gekeler Lane V202 Boise , ID 83706 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rpkezar@cableone.net _____________________________________________________ David Khol 3904 Sulgrave Dr Alexandria , VA 22309 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david.khol@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Charles Kieffer Staff Director Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: charles_kieffer@appro.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Stephanie L Kiel M.A. Cyber Analyst USD(I) 1425 S. Eads APT. 505 ARLINGTON , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stephkiel@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ David Kier CEO Arete Associates 1550 Crystal Drive Suite 703 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dkier@arete.com _____________________________________________________ Mr David A Kier BS, MS CEO Arete Associates 1550 Crystal Dr Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Dkier@arete.com _____________________________________________________ Kathleen Kiernan No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kiernan@kiernangroupholdings.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gregory T Kiley 313 4th Street NE Washington , DC 20002 Phone: (202) 544-6897 Fax: (none) Email: gregory.kiley@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Lance Killoran 11573 Hemingway Drive Reston , VA 20194 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Frida Kim TITLE TBD FTS International 200 Spring Street, Suite 360 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Frida.Kim@fts-intl.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Hyeon C Kim MS Senior Scientist CACI Hyeon Kim 8530 Corridor Road Savage , MD 20763 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: hyeon.kim560@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Ryan Kim 3900 Watson Place #B-636 Washington , DC 20016 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: RK2085a@american.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Kimberling P.O. Box 1055 Leesburg , VA 20177 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ LTG John Kimmons Director, Intelligence Staff ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: shari.a.mcmahan@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ LTG John Kimmons USA Director of the Intelligence Sta ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: linnea.b.thompson@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Bonnie Kind TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road Comptroller, Suite 6200 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bkind@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Larry Kindsvater 6901 McLean Province Circle Falls Church , VA 22043-1666 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kindsvater.Consulting@Verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Bob King BSE, MBA 1721 Candlewood Drive Leavenworth , KS 66048 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: subbob@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dennis M King BA Manager, Business Development ABSI Corporation 9210 Corporate Drive Suite 150 Rockville , MD 20850 Phone: (410) 224-6508 Fax: (301) 997-0260 Email: kingdm4@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jay G King 7360 Guilford Drive, Suite 201 Frederick , MD 21704 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gking@integrity.us.com _____________________________________________________ Jeremy King Managing Partner, Federal Practi Benchmark Executive Search 1984 Isaac Newton Square, suite Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeremy@benchmarkes.com _____________________________________________________ Peter T King Rep. Ranking Member Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michele.ingwerson@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Steven King 245 Murray Ln, SW Mail Code 0602 Arlington , VA 20598 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Donna Kinnal Marketing Director ASI Government 1655 North Fort Meyer Drive Suite 1000 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Laurie Kinney TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lkinney@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Thomas Kirchamier TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Thomas.Kirchamier@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Kirchmaier 13857 McLearen Road Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 268-7568 Email: thomas.kirchmaier@gdit.com _____________________________________________________ Mike Kirkland 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ John A Kirschner TITLE TBD ABSi Corporation 9210 Corporate Drive Suite 150 Rockville , MD 20850 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.kirschner@absicorp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Sam Kirton TITLE TBD USIS 7799 Leesburg Pike Suite 400 S Falls Church , VA 22043 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sam.kirton@usis.com _____________________________________________________ Sam Kirton TITLE TBD USIS 7799 Leesburg Pike Suite 400 S Falls Church , VA 22043 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sam.kirton@usis.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. K Kitchen PO Box 4703 Oak Brook , IL 60521 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cyberskip@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard Kitchen Senior Vice President CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rkitchen@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Kevin Klein TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kevin.klein@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Laine Klein TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12950 Worldgate Drive Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Eric Kleppinger TITLE TBD FBI 8104 Overlake Court Fairfax Station , VA 22039 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: eric.kleppinger@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard Klingler 1501 K Street, NW Washington , DC 20005 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rklingler@sidley.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Elaine Knauf TITLE TBD Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: elaine.knauf@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Jean Knighten 2111 Wilson Blvd. Ste 1000 Arlington , VA 22032 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Knightenj@battelle.org _____________________________________________________ Ms. Katie Knipper TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: KKnipper@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Clark Knop Principal FedCap Partners, LLC 11951 Freedom Drive 13th Floor Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Rick Knop Managing Member FedCap Partners, LLC Judy St. George 11951 Freedom Drive 13th Floor Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 251-4440 Email: RKnop@FedCapPartners.com _____________________________________________________ Karen Knowles TITLE TBD SAS Institute 1530 Wilson Blvd Suite 800 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: karen.knowles@sas.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Brian Knutsen 7700 Boston Boulevard Springfield , VA 22153 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brian.knutsen@boeing.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ryan Kociolek Director, Business Development Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rkociolek@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Rebekah Koffler 1933 Hull Road Vienna , VA 22182-3716 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rebekahkoffler@aol.com _____________________________________________________ David Koger TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: d_koger@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Kohlhaas 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.j.kohlhaas@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Chris Kojm Deputy Director of National Inte ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 482-1739 Email: deborahn@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Kim Kok National Security Programs Marklogic Michael Reynolds 1600 Tysons Blvd Suite 800 Mclean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kim.kok@marklogic.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ron Kolb 1421 Jefferson Davis Highway Suite 600 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Ron.Kolb@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Paul Kolbe 9910 Chase Hill Ct Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: paul.kolbe@bp.com _____________________________________________________ Josh Kolchins TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joshua.kolchins@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Josh Kolchins 10560 Arrowhead Drive Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joshua.kolchins@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Curt Kolcun Vice President, Federal Microsoft Corporation 5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: curtk@microsoft.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Elizabeth Kolmstetter Deputy to Ronald Sanders, Intell ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: elizabeth.b.kolmstetter@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Cindy Komanowski TITLE TBD AT&T Government Solutions-NIS 7125 Columbia Gateway Drive Suite 100 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ckomanowski@att.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Jennifer Kondal 7789 Royal Sydney Dr. Gainesville , VA 20155 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jkondal@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Matthijs R. Koot Science Park 904 Amsterdam 1098 XH Netherlands Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: koot@uva.nl _____________________________________________________ Michael P Kortan Office of Public Affairs FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.kortan@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kristine Korva 1211 C ST NE Washington , DC 20002 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kkorva@deloitte.com _____________________________________________________ Kristen Kosinski TITLE TBD Applied Signal Technology 460 West California Avenue Sunnyvale , CA 94086 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kristen_kosinski@appsig.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Kostiw Staff Director Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Mike_Kostiw@armed-services.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Paul Kozemchak DARPA 3701 N. Fairfax Drive Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pkozemchak@darpa.mil _____________________________________________________ Paul Kozemchak Special Assistant to Director DARPA 3701 N. Fairfax Drive Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pkozemchak@darpa.mil _____________________________________________________ LT. GEN. Craig Koziol TITLE TBD DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: craig.koziol@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ron Krakower 317 Meadowbrook Lane South Orange , NJ 7079 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rkrakower@sarnoff.com _____________________________________________________ Eric Krebs Director of Strategy Blue Glacier Management Group Inc 8315 Lee Highway Suite 230 Fairfax , VA 22031 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: eric.krebs@blueglacier.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kelly Krechmer 1855 Saint Francis Street Apt 1604 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kelly_krechmer@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Kelly Krechmer 1350 Beverly Road, Apt. 818 McLean , VA 22101 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kkny10021@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Kelly Krechmer TITLE TBD ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kellyk@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Dean Kremer TITLE TBD Intelsat General Corporation 6550 Rock Spring Drive Suite 450 Bethesda , MD 20817 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Alexander L Kronick BS, MS Graduate Assistant NJCU 68 Blackford Road Newton , NJ 07860 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: alk555@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Allen Krum NRO & Special Projects Senior Ex Harris Corporation P.O. Box 37 MS: 2-21D Melbourne , FL 32902 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: akrum@harris.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Krysick Senior Acquisition Executive NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rhkrysi@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Nancy Kudla Chairman & CEO Kforce Government Solutions 2750 Prosperity Ave. Suite 300 Fairfax , VA 22031 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nkudla@dnovus.com _____________________________________________________ Alex Kugajevsky TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: alex.kugajevsky@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Mitch Kugler TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Christina Kuhn 2721 Technology Drive Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: christina.kuhn@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Karen Kuhn Program Support Camber Corporation 5860 Trinity Parkway Suite 400 Centerville , VA 20120 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kkuhn@i2spros.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Kuhn TITLE TBD DIA 7400 Defense Pentagon Rm. 3E-258 Washington , DC 20301-7400 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Michael.Kuhn@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Tina Kuhn TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Christina.Kuhn@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Martin Kurdys 10330 Old Columbia Rd Suite 102 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mkurdys@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Alexandra Kuscher TITLE TBD NetApp 1921 Gallows Road Suite 600 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kuscher@netapp.com _____________________________________________________ Cory Kutcher 2300 24th Road South #1130 Arlington , VA 22206 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cory.kutcher@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Carolyn Kwieraga Dir, NGIS Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr Howard W Kympton III 909 N. Washington Street Suite 300B Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 299-0799 Email: hkympton@chglobalsecurity.com _____________________________________________________ Matthew I Bentley B.A. 1124 Beechwood Ave Farrell , PA 16121 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mianbentley@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Jessica E Berardinucci 4200 Cathedral Avenue, NW Washington , DC 20016 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: j.berardinucci@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Bergen TITLE TBD Deloitte Consulting, LLP No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Russ Berkoff Services Manager Dell Inc. One Dell Way One Dell Way Round Rock , TX 78682 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: russ_berkoff@federal.dell.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Donald Berlin President Investigative Consultants 2020 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Ste 813 Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dberlin@icioffshore.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jon-Paul D Bernard BA Jobs/Internship Coordinator Georgetown University 37th and O Streets, N.W. Washington DC , DC 20057 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: isrpoet00@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard Bernard 3104 Evergreen Ridge Drive Cincinnati , OH 45215-5716 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bernard@erols.com _____________________________________________________ Kent Berner Group President, Intel Solutions A-T Solutions, Inc. 1934 Old Gallows Road Suite 360 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 288-3401 Email: kentberner@a-tsolutions.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. I. Bernstein 2133 Lee Building College Park , MD 20742-5125 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mbern@umd.edu _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kristin H Berry 6917 Bonheim Court McLean , VA 22101 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kberry@r3consulting.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Berry Jr., Principal Deputy General Co DIA Building 6000 Washington , DC 20340-5100 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Robert.Berry@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Alan Bersin Commissioner DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: alan.bersin@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Bessette 1226 W. Argyle St. #3E Chicago , IL 60640 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.bessette@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ John Betar 7 Woodland Drive Newville , PA 17241 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jebbetar@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ RADM Thomas Betterton USN (Ret) 7977 Wellington Drive Warrenton , VA 20186 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tom.bett03@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Rear Admiral Thomas Betterton US Former Director Program C (senio DoD 7977 Wellington Drive Warrington , VA 20186 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thomas.betterton@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Tom Bevan TITLE TBD Kforce Government Solutions 2750 Prosperity Ave. Suite 300 Fairfax , VA 22031 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tbevan@dnovus.com _____________________________________________________ Brig Gen Richard Beyea USAF(Ret) 7832 Lee Avenue Alexandria , VA 22308 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dickbeyea@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Bhavesh C Bhagat Founding Chairman Cloud Security Alliance DC / EnCrisp 12020 Sunrise Valley Drive Suite 100 Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bb@encrisp.com _____________________________________________________ Sameer Bhalotra Professional Staff Member Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: s_bhalotra@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Brian Biesecker TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gary R Biggs Director, Office of Protocol NGA 4600 Sangamore Road, D-105 Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gary.r.biggs@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Bigham Director Raytheon Company 1200 S. Jupiter Road MS AA-75000 Garland , TX 75042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mark_a_bigham@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Robert W Bilbo B.A. Office of Intel Plans & Policy U.S. Coast Guard LT Robert W. Bilbo, USCG USCG Headquarters (Room 3402) 2100 2nd Street S.W., STOP 7360 Washington , DC 20593 Phone: (540) 720-7969 Fax: (none) Email: robert.w.bilbo@uscg.mil _____________________________________________________ Kari Bingen TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kari.bingen@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Alexander Major Attorney Sheppard Mullin RIchter & Hampton LLP 1300 I Street NW 11th Floor East Washignton , DC 20005 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: amajor@sheppardmullin.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Makfinsky MBA President AM/PM 217 Bonifant Rd. Silver Spring , MD 20905 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael@makfinsky.com _____________________________________________________ Peter Makowsky Strategy Consultant, Senior Expe CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: 703-460-1232 Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ellen Maldonado TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ellen_maldonado@appro.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Kris Mallard TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kris.Mallard@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Brittain Mallow Principal Mitre 806 Lee Street Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bmallow@mitre.org _____________________________________________________ Kristopher M Malloy 52 Brandon Road Newport News , VA 23601 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kristopher.malloy@langley.af.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Brian Malone TITLE TBD NRO 14675 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brian.malone@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Jack Malone Consultant Network Designs, Inc. 501 Church St. Suite 210 Vienna , VA 22180-4711 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Dr. Michele L Malvesti TITLE TBD SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michele.l.malvesti@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Ed Mangiero Sales Director Intelsat General Corporation 6550 Rock Spring Drive Suite 450 Bethesda , MD 20817 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: edward.mangiero@intelsatgeneral.com _____________________________________________________ EDWARD MANGIERO MANGIERO 6550 ROCK SPRING DR SUITE 450 BETHESDA , MD 20817 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ED.MANGIERO@INTELSATGENERAL.COM _____________________________________________________ Richard Mangogna Chief Information Officer DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: richard.mangogna@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Cliff Mangum VP Business Capture Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Katy Mann TITLE TBD Composite Software Inc. 11921 Freedom Drive Suite 550 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Dr. Laura Manning Johnson Deputy Director of Fusion, Ops C DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lauramanning@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Claudio Manno Director of Intelligence FAA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: claudio.manno@faa.gov _____________________________________________________ Tiffini Manson 15513 Tuxedo Lane Gainesville , VA 20155 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tiffini.manson@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jim Manzelmann Deputy Director of Mission Servi DIA Building 6000 Washington , DC 20340-5100 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: James.Manzelmann@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mike Manzo Director General Dynamics AIS 12950 Worldgate Drive Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ RADM, USN Ret Dan March 3608 Launcelot Way Annandale , VA 22003 Phone: (703) 207-0482 Fax: (703) 207-9351 Email: tomcat61@earthlink.net _____________________________________________________ RADM USN Ret Dan March Independent Consultant EXCOM INSA, INSA/NCWG Natl Sec Studioes Council 3608 Launcelot Way Annandale , VA 22003 Phone: (703) 207-9351 Fax: (703) 207-0482 Email: tomcat61@earthlink.net _____________________________________________________ RADM USN Ret Dan March 3608 Launcelot Way Annandale , VA 22003 Phone: (703) 207-0482 Fax: (703) 207-9351 Email: tomcat61@earthlink.net _____________________________________________________ RADM Daniel March USN (Ret) 3608 Launcelot Way Annandale , VA 22003-1360 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tomcat61@earthlink.net _____________________________________________________ Daniel P March 3608 Launcelot Way Annandale , VA 22003-1360 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tomcat61@earthlink.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Philip Marcum General Manager, Global Analysis BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: philip.marcum@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Lisa Marcus 12817 Glen Mill Potomac , MD 20854 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lmarcus@msn.com _____________________________________________________ Catherine Marinis-Yaqub Manager PricewaterhouseCoopers 1800 Tysons Blvd McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: catherine.v.marinis-yaqub@us.pwc.com _____________________________________________________ Shant Markarian 8010 Towers Crescent Dr. 5th Floor Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: shantmarkarian@targusinfo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ronald Marks 7004 Dunningham Place McLean , VA 22101 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rmarksster@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Andrew Marshall 107 S. West Street #759 Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: andrew.marshall@osd.pentagon.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Andrew Marshall Director, Office of Net Assessme DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: andrew.marshall@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Keith Marshall 15052 Conference Center Dr Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ann.sullivan@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Richard H Marshall Director of Global Cyber Securit DHS 1110 Glebe Road Arlington , VA 21044 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: richard.marshall1@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. William J Marshall Chief of Staff, IA Directorate NSA 9800 Savage Road Info Assurance CofS, Suite 6468 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (410) 854-7511 Email: wjmarsh@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. B. Martin 9530 Morning Walk Drive Hagerstown , MD 21740 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: inrebuttal2u@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Brian Martin 966 Wayne Drive Winchester , VA 22601-6395 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brian.martin@atf.gov _____________________________________________________ Brian T Martin 966 Wayne Dr Winchester , VA 22601 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Inrebuttal2u@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bryan Martin Chief Technology Officer Man Tech ManTech Mission, Cyber & Technol 2250 Corporate Drive Suite 500 Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bryan.martin@mantech.com _____________________________________________________ Charles Martin Director DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Charles.Martin.ctr@darpa.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Martin Director of Intelligence, Survei DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.martin@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Paul Martin TITLE TBD Sierra Nevada Corporation 444 Salomon Circle Sparks , NV 89434 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: paul.martin@sncorp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Stephen Martin 10010 Junction Drive Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: srmartin@nciinc.com _____________________________________________________ Stephen R Martin MS, EMBA SVP, Deputy GM NCI Information Systems, Inc. Stephen Martin 10010 Junction Drive Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (410) 952-1778 Fax: (301) 483-6928 Email: srmartin07@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Wendy Martin Business Development Director, C Harris Corporation P.O. Box 37 MS: 2-21D Melbourne , FL 32902 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wmarti01@harris.com _____________________________________________________ Wendy Martin TITLE TBD Accenture No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wendy.a.martin@accenture.com _____________________________________________________ Wendy Martin Program Manager Harris Corporation Crucial Security Programs Ann Boyter 14900 Conference Center Dr Suite 225 Chanitlly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wmarti01@harris.com _____________________________________________________ Chris Martins TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 2721 Technology Drive Suite 400 Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Charlotte K Martinsson PIAB Member PIAB 9902 Deerfield Pond Drive Great Falls , VA 22066 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Charlotte_K._Martinsson@pfiab.eop.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Donald Maruca TITLE TBD Computer Associates No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: donald.maruca@ca.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Leonard 75 Coromar Drive Goleta , CA 93117 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rlleonard@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Joe Leonelli Vice President, Strategic Initia Applied Signal Technology 470 Spring Park Place, Ste. 700 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joe_leonelli@appsig.com _____________________________________________________ Michele Leonhart Administrator Justice Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Vickki.f.mcalpine@usdoj.gov _____________________________________________________ David Lerner Strat Forces Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david_lerner@armed-services.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Jeff Lessner Business Development, National S General Dynamics AIS 10560 Arrowhead Drive Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeffrey.lessner@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Gordon Letterman TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gordon_letterman@hsgac.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Glenn Leuschner TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road D, Suite 6242 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Brian Levay 504 Dill Pointe Drive Severna Park , MD 21146 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brian.levay@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Emma Levert MM/HRM 3137 Kevington Ave Eugene , OR 97405 Phone: (541) 685-1340 Fax: (none) Email: EmmLvrt@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Stuart A Levey Under Secretary of the Treasury Treasury Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stuart.levey@do.treas.gov _____________________________________________________ Carl Levin Sen. Chairman Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sharon Levin Consultant Booz Allen Hamilton 1506 Wakefield Rd Edgewater , MD 21037 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: levin_sharon@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Ken Levinrad Director Special Programs Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops Lockheed Martin Corp Wash OPS 2121 Crystal Drive Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ken.d.levinrad@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Curtis Levinson TITLE TBD Qwest Communications 4250 N. Fairfax Dr. 5th Floor Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms Rosanne M LeVitre Masters ODNI ADNI/PE-MP Wsshington , DC 20511 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rlevitre@sprynet.com _____________________________________________________ Rosanne M LeVitre Director Office of the Director of National Intelligence Tysons Corner Plaza Washington , DC 20511 Phone: (703) 760-5076 Fax: (none) Email: rosannml@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Rose Levitre TITLE TBD LMI 2000 Corporate Ridge McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rlevitre@sprynet.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Barry Levy TITLE TBD USIS 7799 Leesburg Pike Suite 400 S Falls Church , VA 22043 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: barry.levy@usis.com _____________________________________________________ David Levy M.S., Ph.D Director of Technology General Dynamics AIS 2721 Technology Drive Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Jacob J Lew Deputy Secretary for Management State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: LewJJ@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ed Lewandoski Vice President General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Ed.lewandoski@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Allen Lewis TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 14700 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Roslyn Mazer Inspector General ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rosyln.a.mazer@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joseph Mazzafro 10313 Congressional Court Ellicott City , MD 21042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mazzafro_joe@emc.com _____________________________________________________ Carrie Mazzaro TITLE TBD DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Carrie.Mazzaro@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Lewis TITLE TBD Quest Software - Public Sector Group 700 King Farm Boulevard Suite 250 Rockville , MD 20850 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: geoff.brown@quest.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Lewis 9861 Brokenland Parkway Suite 300 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mlewis@LingualISTek.com _____________________________________________________ Mark Lewis President L&M Management Services Mark Lewis 212 Blackhaw Ct Millersville , MD 21108 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: melewis56@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert E Lewis TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road IT IS, Suite 6222 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: relewis@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Ron Lewis SVP Chief Technology Officer Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: 703-939-6670 Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ryan Lewis 6907 Wake Forest Drive College Park , MD 20740 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rstephen.lewis@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Sam Lewis Dir of Operations Def and Intel Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Tom Lexington 78 Shuttle Meadow Avenue New Britain , CT 06051 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tlex@gwu.edu _____________________________________________________ Richard LHeureux 12975 Worldgate Drive Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: richard.lheureux@itt.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Alan Lieberman 18425 Long Lake Drive Boca Raton , FL 33496 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: anl335@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Joseph I Lieberman Sen. Chair Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joseph_lieberman@hsgac.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. John E Liebsch Director, Office of Future Warfa NGA 4600 Sangamore Road, P-037 Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.e.liebsch@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Michael Liggett Mr. Director, Adv. Tech. Programs Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ MR JAMES G LIGHTBURN CEO InfoAssure, Inc. 1997 Annapolis Exchange Parkway suite 210 Annapolis , MD 21401 Phone: (none) Fax: (410) 224-4022 Email: j.lightburn@infoassure.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Samuel Liles MSCS Associate Professor Purdue University Calumet 2200 169th Street Hammond , IN 46323 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sam@selil.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Liles 2513 Foxcroft Way Reston , VA 20191-3707 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: aerie10@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Patrick Linardi Criminal Research Specialist U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement/HSI/TTU 500 12th Street SW MS 5107 Washington , DC 20536 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Patrick.Linardi@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bryon Line 10401 Grosvenor Place #123 Rockville , MD 20852-4628 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bline1@starpower.net _____________________________________________________ James R Lint MBA Director, G2, Intell and Sec US Army Communication and Electronic Command 4803 Atlas Cedar Way Aberdeen , MD 21001 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.lint@us.army.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Linthicum 1903 Sawyer Place McLean , VA 22101 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: linthicum@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Evonne Lipscomb 7500 GEOINT Dr Springfield , VA 22150 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Evonne.Lipscomb@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Glenn Lipscomb TITLE TBD Level 3 Communications, LLC No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: glenn.lipscomb@level3.com _____________________________________________________ Mason McDaniel Program Dir Intelligence Ctr Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Michael McDaniel Deputy Assistant Secretary for H DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.mcdaniel@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Tom L McDivitt Intelligence Analyst Booz Allen Hamilton Tom McDivitt (544757) 8283 Greensboro Drive Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mcdivitt_thomas@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Paul Littmann TITLE TBD Deloitte Consulting, LLP No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: plittmann@deloitte.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Alexis Livanos Chief Technology Officer Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: alexis.livanos@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Vince Lively TITLE TBD ManTech International Corporation 2500 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Jack Livingston TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: j_livingston@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ John Llaneza Required unless Parent Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Luis Llorens TITLE TBD SR Technologies, Inc. 4101 SW 47 Ave Suite 102 Fort Lauderdale , FL 33314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ RADM Daniel Lloyd Senior Military Advisor DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: daniel.lloyd@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Andrew Lluberes Director of Communications for I DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Andrew.Lluberes@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Andrew L Lluberes 8613 Eagle Glen Terrace Fairfax Station , VA 22039 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: andrew.lluberes@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Rick Lober General Manager Hughes 11717 Exploration Lane Germantown , MD 20876 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rick.lober@hughes.com _____________________________________________________ Cynthia Loboski TITLE TBD DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: clobosky@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Cynthia Lobosky BA, MPA Prefer not to give out Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cynthia.m.lobosky@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Gary F. Locke Secretary Commerce Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thesec@doc.gov (address to Secretary Locke) _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Locke 97 Ruddy Duck Road Heathsville , VA 22473 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jwljrcpa@netscape.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Donald Logar Vice President, Division Group M CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dlogar@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jaan Loger 10090 McCarty Crest Court Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jloger@cox.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. William C Lohnes MEA 2333 Bollinger Mill Road Finksburg , MD 21048-2727 Phone: (none) Fax: (410) 552-6482 Email: wclohnes@earthlink.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gary Lombardo 11990 Market Street #415 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Dr. J. P. London Executive Chairman, CACI Board o CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jlondon@caci.com _____________________________________________________ mr gregory s mcinnis aircraft parts sales none 4635 mclemoresville rd huntingdon , TN 38344 Phone: (731) 986-5800 Fax: (none) Email: woodrot1@att.net _____________________________________________________ James W McJunkin National Security Branch, Direct FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.mcjunkin@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Ashley McKannon 16659 Malory Ct Dumfries , VA 22025 Phone: (703) 730-2379 Fax: (none) Email: aem2189@columbia.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas McKannon Manager, Space & Airborne System Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mckannon@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Thomas McKannon BS/MS/AeE Strategy & Business Capture Raytheon 1100 Wilson Blvd Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (703) 730-2379 Fax: (none) Email: t.mckannon@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Dean McKendrick TITLE TBD ManTech International Corporation 2500 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Lonsdale 1750 Tyson\\\'s Blvd., 4th Floor McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mvlonsdale@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Esteban A Lopez PO Box 605 Lisbon , MD 21765 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stephen.lopez@urs.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Marco A Lopez Jr. Chief of Staff, US Customs DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: marco.lopez@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Steve Lopez Required unless Parent Required unless Parent , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Donald Loren Rear Admiral, USN (ret) The Tauri Group 6504 John Thomas Drive Alexandria , VA 22315 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: don.loren@taurigroup.com _____________________________________________________ David Louis Account Director AT&T Government Solutions-NIS 7125 Columbia Gateway Drive Suite 100 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dlouis@att.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John J Lovegrove Director, Business Development TASC 4805 Stonecroft Blvd Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.lovegrove@tasc.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Mark Lowenthal TITLE TBD The Intelligence & Security Academy, LLC 1890 Preston White Drive Suite 250 Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mml@intellacademy.com _____________________________________________________ Dennis Lowrey TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 1200 Joe Hall Drive Ypsilanti , MI 48197 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ashley Lowry TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Ashley.Lowry@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Admiral James M Loy Senior Counselor The Cohen Group 500 8th Street, NW Suite 200 Washington , DC 20004 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Patrick Lucas Assistant to the President Berico Technologies 1501 Lee Highway Suite 303 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Carlo L Lucchesi Office of IT Policy and Planning FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: carlo.lucchesi@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ David Luckey 5000 Defense Pentagon Room 3C1063A Washington , DC 20301 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david.luckey@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Lueders Vice President Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Lueders_John@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Chet Lunner TITLE TBD Department of Homeland Security NAC Rm 19148 Washington , DC 20528 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chet.lunner@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Adam Lurie Program Director USIS 7799 Leesburg Pike Suite 400 S Falls Church , VA 22043 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: adam.lurie@usis.com _____________________________________________________ Adam Lurie TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: adam.lurie@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Nicholas Lusas 77 Corbin Ridge Bristol , CT 6010 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Edward McNamee TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael McNamee TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road SP, Suite 6468 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mkmcnam@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Tim McNeil TITLE TBD DIA 7400 Defense Pentagon Rm. 3E-258 Washington , DC 20301-7400 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Timothy.McNeil@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Frank B Meade 425 West 23 Street 11-B New York , NY 10011 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gothamite2@juno.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. C. Meador Chairman mgiss 85 Speen Street Suite 201 Framingham , MA 01701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: meador@mgiss.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Meadows Affiliant AT&T Government Solutions-NIS 7125 Columbia Gateway Drive Suite 100 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: demeadows@att.com _____________________________________________________ Amy Lyons Inspection Division FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: amy.lyons@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dwight Lyons TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dlyons@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jack Lyons 3420 Churchill Court Owings , MD 20736-9146 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: SandyNeckSandDunes@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ John Lyons VP of North American Sale Tenable Network Security 7063 Columbia Gateway Drive Suite 100 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Alexander Major Attorney Sheppard Mullin RIchter & Hampton LLP 1300 I Street NW 11th Floor East Washignton , DC 20005 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: amajor@sheppardmullin.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Makfinsky MBA President AM/PM 217 Bonifant Rd. Silver Spring , MD 20905 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael@makfinsky.com _____________________________________________________ Peter Makowsky Strategy Consultant, Senior Expe CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: 703-460-1232 Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ellen Maldonado TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ellen_maldonado@appro.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Kris Mallard TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kris.Mallard@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Brittain Mallow Principal Mitre 806 Lee Street Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bmallow@mitre.org _____________________________________________________ Kristopher M Malloy 52 Brandon Road Newport News , VA 23601 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kristopher.malloy@langley.af.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Brian Malone TITLE TBD NRO 14675 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brian.malone@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Jack Malone Consultant Network Designs, Inc. 501 Church St. Suite 210 Vienna , VA 22180-4711 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Dr. Michele L Malvesti TITLE TBD SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michele.l.malvesti@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Ed Mangiero Sales Director Intelsat General Corporation 6550 Rock Spring Drive Suite 450 Bethesda , MD 20817 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: edward.mangiero@intelsatgeneral.com _____________________________________________________ EDWARD MANGIERO MANGIERO 6550 ROCK SPRING DR SUITE 450 BETHESDA , MD 20817 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ED.MANGIERO@INTELSATGENERAL.COM _____________________________________________________ Richard Mangogna Chief Information Officer DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: richard.mangogna@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Cliff Mangum VP Business Capture Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Katy Mann TITLE TBD Composite Software Inc. 11921 Freedom Drive Suite 550 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Dr. Laura Manning Johnson Deputy Director of Fusion, Ops C DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lauramanning@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Claudio Manno Director of Intelligence FAA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: claudio.manno@faa.gov _____________________________________________________ Tiffini Manson 15513 Tuxedo Lane Gainesville , VA 20155 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tiffini.manson@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jim Manzelmann Deputy Director of Mission Servi DIA Building 6000 Washington , DC 20340-5100 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: James.Manzelmann@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mike Manzo Director General Dynamics AIS 12950 Worldgate Drive Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ RADM, USN Ret Dan March 3608 Launcelot Way Annandale , VA 22003 Phone: (703) 207-0482 Fax: (703) 207-9351 Email: tomcat61@earthlink.net _____________________________________________________ RADM USN Ret Dan March Independent Consultant EXCOM INSA, INSA/NCWG Natl Sec Studioes Council 3608 Launcelot Way Annandale , VA 22003 Phone: (703) 207-9351 Fax: (703) 207-0482 Email: tomcat61@earthlink.net _____________________________________________________ RADM USN Ret Dan March 3608 Launcelot Way Annandale , VA 22003 Phone: (703) 207-0482 Fax: (703) 207-9351 Email: tomcat61@earthlink.net _____________________________________________________ RADM Daniel March USN (Ret) 3608 Launcelot Way Annandale , VA 22003-1360 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tomcat61@earthlink.net _____________________________________________________ Daniel P March 3608 Launcelot Way Annandale , VA 22003-1360 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tomcat61@earthlink.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Philip Marcum General Manager, Global Analysis BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: philip.marcum@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Lisa Marcus 12817 Glen Mill Potomac , MD 20854 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lmarcus@msn.com _____________________________________________________ Catherine Marinis-Yaqub Manager PricewaterhouseCoopers 1800 Tysons Blvd McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: catherine.v.marinis-yaqub@us.pwc.com _____________________________________________________ Shant Markarian 8010 Towers Crescent Dr. 5th Floor Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: shantmarkarian@targusinfo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ronald Marks 7004 Dunningham Place McLean , VA 22101 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rmarksster@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Andrew Marshall 107 S. West Street #759 Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: andrew.marshall@osd.pentagon.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Andrew Marshall Director, Office of Net Assessme DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: andrew.marshall@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Keith Marshall 15052 Conference Center Dr Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ann.sullivan@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Richard H Marshall Director of Global Cyber Securit DHS 1110 Glebe Road Arlington , VA 21044 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: richard.marshall1@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. William J Marshall Chief of Staff, IA Directorate NSA 9800 Savage Road Info Assurance CofS, Suite 6468 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (410) 854-7511 Email: wjmarsh@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. B. Martin 9530 Morning Walk Drive Hagerstown , MD 21740 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: inrebuttal2u@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Brian Martin 966 Wayne Drive Winchester , VA 22601-6395 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brian.martin@atf.gov _____________________________________________________ Brian T Martin 966 Wayne Dr Winchester , VA 22601 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Inrebuttal2u@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bryan Martin Chief Technology Officer Man Tech ManTech Mission, Cyber & Technol 2250 Corporate Drive Suite 500 Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bryan.martin@mantech.com _____________________________________________________ Charles Martin Director DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Charles.Martin.ctr@darpa.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Martin Director of Intelligence, Survei DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.martin@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Paul Martin TITLE TBD Sierra Nevada Corporation 444 Salomon Circle Sparks , NV 89434 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: paul.martin@sncorp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Stephen Martin 10010 Junction Drive Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: srmartin@nciinc.com _____________________________________________________ Stephen R Martin MS, EMBA SVP, Deputy GM NCI Information Systems, Inc. Stephen Martin 10010 Junction Drive Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (410) 952-1778 Fax: (301) 483-6928 Email: srmartin07@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Wendy Martin Business Development Director, C Harris Corporation P.O. Box 37 MS: 2-21D Melbourne , FL 32902 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wmarti01@harris.com _____________________________________________________ Wendy Martin TITLE TBD Accenture No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wendy.a.martin@accenture.com _____________________________________________________ Wendy Martin Program Manager Harris Corporation Crucial Security Programs Ann Boyter 14900 Conference Center Dr Suite 225 Chanitlly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wmarti01@harris.com _____________________________________________________ Chris Martins TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 2721 Technology Drive Suite 400 Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Charlotte K Martinsson PIAB Member PIAB 9902 Deerfield Pond Drive Great Falls , VA 22066 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Charlotte_K._Martinsson@pfiab.eop.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Donald Maruca TITLE TBD Computer Associates No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: donald.maruca@ca.com _____________________________________________________ Scott Marvin Special Agent/Liaison Officer Department of Homeland Security POB 221403 Chantilly , VA 20153 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: scott.marvin@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Marvin 25711 DonerailsChase Drive Chantilly , VA 20152 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: whmarvin@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Keith Masback 2325 Dulles Corner Blvd Suite 450 Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: keith.masback@usgif.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. L. Mason Ph.D. 3150 Fairview Park Drive, South Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: roger.mason@noblis.org _____________________________________________________ L. R Mason ADNI for Systems and Resource An ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: roger.mason@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Mason CEO United Placements P.O. Box 810211 Boca Raton , FL 33481 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: info@unitedplacements.com _____________________________________________________ Mark Massop TITLE TBD i2 1430 Spring Hill Road McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Benjamin Matherne Business Development Lead Salient Federal Solutions Ben Matherne 8618 Westwood Center Drive Suite 100 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: benjamin.matherne@sgis.com _____________________________________________________ Asha Mathew Staff Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Asha_Mathew@hsgac.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. John I Mathews Ch, Client Engage & Comm Outreac NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jimathe@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Kent Matlick 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Gordon Matlock TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: g_matlock@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Daniel Matthews TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road I3, Suite 6703 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dpmatth@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Matthews Director, Warfighter Requirement DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thomas.matthews@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Project Leader, Michael Mattson 3805 9th Road South Arlington , VA 22204 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mattson@ebrinc.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Mattson Senior Consultant, National Inte Invertix Corporation 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 800 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Paul Matulic TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: p_matulic@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Philip Maxon 11720 Plaza America Drive Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pmaxon@input.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Peggy Maxson Dir, Natl Cybersecurity Educatio DHS 1110 N. glebe Road Arlington , VA 22243 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pegstelau@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gerald Mayefskie TITLE TBD QSS Group Inc. 4500 Forbes Blvd. Lanham , MD 20706 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gmayefsk@qssgroupinc.com _____________________________________________________ Gerry Mayer ISR Systems L-3 Communications 1 Federal St Camden , NJ 08103 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gerry.mayer@l-3com.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jason Mayer 1501 Farm Credit Dr. Ste 2300 McLean , VA 22101 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jmayer1@theanalysiscorp.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Roslyn Mazer Inspector General ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rosyln.a.mazer@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joseph Mazzafro 10313 Congressional Court Ellicott City , MD 21042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mazzafro_joe@emc.com _____________________________________________________ Carrie Mazzaro TITLE TBD DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Carrie.Mazzaro@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Christopher Biow Federal CTO MarkLogic 11980 Sentinel Point Ct Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Chris.Biow@marklogic.com _____________________________________________________ Terry Birck TITLE TBD Reed Illinois Corporation 600 W. Jackson Boulevard Suite 500 Chicago , IL 60661-5625 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wbirck@reedcorp.com _____________________________________________________ Terry Birck TITLE TBD Reed Illinois Corporation 600 W. Jackson Boulevard Suite 500 Chicago , IL 60661-5625 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wbirck@reedcorp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Terry L Birck Chairman Reed Illinois Corporation Terry Birck 600 W. Jackson Blvd. Chicago , IL 60661 Phone: (none) Fax: (312) 943-8141 Email: tbirck@reedcorp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael D Bisacre Senior Vice President Six3 Systems 1430 Spring Hill Road Suite 525 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mbisacre@harding-security.com _____________________________________________________ Mike Bisacre SVP Six3 Systems 1430 Spring Hill Road Suite 525 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mbisacre@six3systems.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Frank Biscardi 500 La Costa Court Melbourne , FL 32940 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: FrankBiscardi@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Cynthia Bishop TITLE TBD SAIC 9926 Wooden Hawk Court Burke , VA 22015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cynthia.a.bishop@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. David Bishop CTO LGS Innovations Accounts Payable 5440 Millstream Road Suite E210 McLeansville , NC 27301 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: djb@lgsinnovations.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Ebone Bishop 73 Eastern Parkway apt. 4B Brooklyn , NY 11238 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ebone.bishop@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Robert Bishop 4251 Suitland Road Suitland , MD 20746 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rebishop1717@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Bill Bistany Account Manager Computer Associates No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Bill Bistrican AA Busines Account Executive Vermillion Group- MRI Network Bill Bistrican 1801 25th Street West Des Moines , IA 50266 Phone: (515) 221-1208 Fax: (515) 224-7187 Email: wpb@vermilliongroup.com _____________________________________________________ Paul Bize INSA OCI Task Force Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Richard Bizzell 8201 Greensboro Dr Ste 300 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rick@usintelgroup.com _____________________________________________________ Lars Bjorn 219 N. Evergreen St. Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lars.bjorn@centauri-solutions.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Andrew Black TITLE TBD Black Watch Global 5235 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ablack@blackwatchglobal.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Fred Blackburn TITLE TBD Northrop Grumman Corporation 15036 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: fred.blackburn@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Anthony M Bladen Human Resources Division FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: anthony.bladen@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Allan Blades Manager, Business Development, D BAE Systems 124 Gaither Drive Ste 100 Mt. Laurel , NJ 8054 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: allan.blades@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ The Honorable Dennis C Blair Director of National Intelligenc ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dni-pao-outreach@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Mike Blair DHS S&T DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Thomas.Blair@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Thomas M Blair P.O. Box 240 White Hall , MD 21161-0240 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tmblairbvi@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Robert O Blake South & Central Asian Affairs State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: blakero@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Clarence Blakley TITLE TBD Law Enforcement Online 5840 Cameron Run Terrace #1628 Alexandria , VA 22303 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cblakley@leo.gov _____________________________________________________ Dr. Dennis McBride TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dmcbride@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Kimberly McCabe President ASI Government 1655 North Fort Meyer Drive Suite 1000 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Mary R McCaffrey Director, Office of Security NRO 14675 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mary.mccaffrey@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ John McCain Sen. Ranking Minority Member Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john_mccain@armed-services.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mickey McCarter Correspondent Homeland Security Today PO Box 5843 Washington , DC 20016 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mickey@hstoday.us _____________________________________________________ Mr. Steve McCaslin Director, Business Development Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: smccaslin@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Kel McClanahan 1200 South Courthouse Road Apartment #124 Arlington , VA 22204 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kellybmcc@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Tim McClees TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tim.mcclees@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Lauren McCollum Director Legislative Affairs Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lauren.mccollum@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Lauren M McCollum TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bruce W McConnell NPP Counselor to Phil Reitinger DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Bruce.McConnell@hq.dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Kirk McConnell Strat Forces/Intel Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kirk_mcconnell@armed-services.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Lester McConville PO Box 312 260 Rose Airy Lane Millwood , VA 22646 Phone: (none) Fax: (540) 837-1628 Email: chip.mcconville@jb-a-inc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas J McCormick Dir, Enterprise Ops Directorate NGA 4600 Sangamore Road, D-199 Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thomas.j.mccormick@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr Mark McCourt President Dalani Media Mark McCourt PO Box 457 Newtown Square , PA 19073 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mmccourt@dlnmedia.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Diann McCoy TITLE TBD ASI Government 1655 North Fort Meyer Drive Suite 1000 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dmccoy@acqsolinc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John McCreary Director, National Intelligence Kforce Government Solutions 2750 Prosperity Ave. Suite 300 Fairfax , VA 22031 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lcm@tidalwave.net _____________________________________________________ John McCreary Chief Analysis Officer KGS 2750 Prosperity Ave Ste 300 Fairfax , VA 22031 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jmccreary@kforcegov.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas McCreary Director IBM Corporation 12533 Ridgemoor Lake Court St. Louis , MO 63131 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mccreary@us.ibm.com _____________________________________________________ John McCreight 40 Richards Avenue Suite 7 Norwalk , CT 06854-2320 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jmc@implementstrategy.com _____________________________________________________ John McCreight 803 Silvermine Avenue New Canaan , CT 6840 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jmc@implementstrategy.com _____________________________________________________ John McCreight Chairman & Founder McCreight & Company 803 Silvermin Road New Canaan , CT 06840 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jmc@implementstrategy.com _____________________________________________________ Mason McDaniel Program Dir Intelligence Ctr Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Michael McDaniel Deputy Assistant Secretary for H DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.mcdaniel@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Tom L McDivitt Intelligence Analyst Booz Allen Hamilton Tom McDivitt (544757) 8283 Greensboro Drive Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mcdivitt_thomas@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Cecil McDonald 7781 S. Lakeview Street Littleton , CO 80120 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ceelinmac2@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Jonathan McDonald VP Agilex Technologies 5155 Parkstone Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jonathan.mcdonald@agilex.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard McDonald Director General Dynamics AIS 10560 Arrowhead Drive Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rich.mcdonald@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard McDonald Jr. TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Rich.McDonald@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard McDonald Jr. 10560 Arrowhead Drive Fairfax , VA 22192 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rich.mcdonald@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Jerry McDowell TITLE TBD Sandia National Laboratories P.O. Box 5800 Albuquerque , NM 87185 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mike McDuffie Vice President, Public Sector Sv Microsoft Corporation 5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mikemcdu@microsoft.com _____________________________________________________ Michael McElmurry 15811 Foxgate Rd Houston , TX 77079 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mcelmmp@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Deron McElroy 503 South Henry Street Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gordon McElroy 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gordon.mcelroy@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard McFarland Director, Congressional Relation Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rich_mcfarland@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ronald C McGarvey Threat Assessment officer USMC, MCNCRC G3 Mission Assurance Branch R. McGarvey 2350 Catlin Ave. Room 016 Quantico , VA 22134 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil _____________________________________________________ Kathleen McGhee Staff Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: K_Mcghee@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Maureen McGovern MBA, BS President KSB Solutions 2302 Birch Court Warrington , PA 18976 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: maureen.a.mcgovern@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Brad McGowan Senior Managing Director The SPECTRUM Group 11 Canal Center Plaza Suite 103 Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bmcgowan@spectrumgrp.com _____________________________________________________ Bradley W McGowan Senior Managing Director The SPECTRUm Group 11 Canal Center Plaza Suite # 103 Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bmcgowan@spectrumgrp.com _____________________________________________________ Kevin McGreevy CEO Network Designs, Inc. 501 Church St. Suite 210 Vienna , VA 22180-4711 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Judith McHale Under Sec Public Diplomacy & Pol State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mchalej@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Maj Gen James McInerney USAF (Re 2111 Wilson Blvd. Suite 400 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jmcinerney@ndia.org _____________________________________________________ mr gregory s mcinnis aircraft parts sales none 4635 mclemoresville rd huntingdon , TN 38344 Phone: (731) 986-5800 Fax: (none) Email: woodrot1@att.net _____________________________________________________ James W McJunkin National Security Branch, Direct FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.mcjunkin@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Ashley McKannon 16659 Malory Ct Dumfries , VA 22025 Phone: (703) 730-2379 Fax: (none) Email: aem2189@columbia.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas McKannon Manager, Space & Airborne System Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mckannon@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Thomas McKannon BS/MS/AeE Strategy & Business Capture Raytheon 1100 Wilson Blvd Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (703) 730-2379 Fax: (none) Email: t.mckannon@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Dean McKendrick TITLE TBD ManTech International Corporation 2500 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Dean McKendrick Vice President Intelligence Prog ManTech INTL 2250 Corporate Park Drive Suite 500 Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dean.mckendrick@mantech.com _____________________________________________________ Howard McKeon Rep. Ranking Minority Member Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: howard.mckeon@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ David McKeough Director of Sales McAfee, Inc. 12010 Sunset Hills Road 5th Floor Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david_mckeough@mcafee.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Chris McKeowen Assistant Deputy Under Secretary DIA 7400 Defense Pentagon Rm. 3E-258 Washington , DC 20301-7400 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Christine.McKeowen@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Todd McKinley 733 15th Street, NW Apartment# 916 Washington , DC 20005 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Toddmac78@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Glenn McKnab TITLE TBD HP 921 Burnett Avenue Arnold , MD 21012 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Glenn.mcknab@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Tom McLemore Staff Director Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tom.mclemore@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Joseph McLeod Manager Government Program Devel Software Engineering Institute, CMU NRECA Building Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Dr. Edward McMahon 8719 Burdette Road Bethesda , MD 20817 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: epmcm1@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. James McMahon TITLE TBD NRO 14675 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.mcmahon@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ John McMahon Required unless Parent Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Darcy McMillan Executive Assistant Sotera Defense Solutions, Inc 1501 Farm Credit Drive Suite 2300 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dmcmillan@the-analysis-corp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jason McMillan 107 S. West St #525 Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jmcmillan@ockim.com _____________________________________________________ Jason McMillan President Ockim, Inc. 107 S. West St #525 Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jmcmillan@ockim.com _____________________________________________________ Tim McMillan Business Analyssts Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tim.mcmillan@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John McMullen 2340 Dulles Corner Blvd MS: 6S02 Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.mcmullen@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ David McMunn Intel Sector Manager Parsons Corporation 198 Van Buren Street Suite 250 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 481-6013 Email: dmcmunn@mcmunn-associates.com _____________________________________________________ Miss Barbara McNamara 3003 Van Ness Street, N.W. #828W Washington , DC 20008 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: b.mcnamara@starpower.net _____________________________________________________ Timothy C McNamara TITLE TBD Boyden 217 E Redwood St Suite 1500 Baltimore , MD 21202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tmcnamara@boyden.com _____________________________________________________ Edward McNamee TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael McNamee TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road SP, Suite 6468 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mkmcnam@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Tim McNeil TITLE TBD DIA 7400 Defense Pentagon Rm. 3E-258 Washington , DC 20301-7400 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Timothy.McNeil@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Frank B Meade 425 West 23 Street 11-B New York , NY 10011 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gothamite2@juno.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. C. Meador Chairman mgiss 85 Speen Street Suite 201 Framingham , MA 01701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: meador@mgiss.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Meadows Affiliant AT&T Government Solutions-NIS 7125 Columbia Gateway Drive Suite 100 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: demeadows@att.com _____________________________________________________ Carmen Medina 901 N Stuart St suite 205 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: camedina@concentric.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. CB Mee Liason Officer to DHS NSA Perception I&A 628 Chapelgate Dr Odenton , MD 21113 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cb_mee@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ ADM, Tom Meek Director, National Maritime Inte DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tmeek@nmic.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mike Meermans VP, Strategic Planning Sierra Nevada Corporation 12706 Westport Lane Woodbridge , VA 22192 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mike.meermans@sncorp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jim Meginley COO Intec Billing, Inc. 301 North Perimeter Center Suite 200 Atlanta , GA 30346 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.meginley@intecbilling.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Kevin Meiners 1708 N. Utah Street Arlington , VA 22207-2329 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kevin.meiners@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Kevin Meiners Acting Deputy, Undersecretary of DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kevin.Meiners@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Brendan Melley Associate Vice President Cohen Group 103 Harvard Street Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bmelley@cohengroup.net _____________________________________________________ Ms. Lindsey A Mellon B.A. Intelligence Analyst BAE Systems 8201 Greensboro Drive Mclean , VA 22102 Phone: (831) 917-6376 Fax: (none) Email: lindseymellon@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. A. Melnick TITLE TBD Portable Export P.O. Box 5501 Falmouth , VA 22403 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: info@portableexpert.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Raymond Melnyk TITLE TBD L-3 Communications - Government Services, Inc. 15049 Conference Center Drive Suite 200 Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: raymond.melnyk@l-3com-spg.com _____________________________________________________ Mary Ann Melosh 11251 Roger Bacon Drive Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: meloshm@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Caylin Mendelowitz Staff Scientist ENSCO, Inc. 5400 Port Royal Rd. Springfield , VA 22151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mendelowitz.caylin@ensco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Justin Mentzer 205 Van Buren Suite 450 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: justin.mentzer@etginc.com _____________________________________________________ Justin Mentzer TITLE TBD ManTech International Corporation 2500 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Justin.mentzer@mantech.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Courtney Merriman TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cmerriman@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Merritt CISSP, CIS 201 Vanderpool Lane Suite 97 Houston , TX 77024 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david.d.merritt@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Beirut Mesfin TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bmesfin@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ James Mesick Director Human Capital The SI 15052 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: helen.d.demes@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ David Messina Director, Program Management Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david.e.messina@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Christina Mestre 7553 Alaska Ave NW Washington , DC 20012 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: christinawmestre@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Sheldon Meth 3601 Wilson Boulevard Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: smeth@sysplan.com _____________________________________________________ James Metsala 10328 Sager Avenue Unit 402 Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 877-2144 Email: james@metsala.com _____________________________________________________ Karen Metzler TITLE TBD Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Rachel Meyer TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rachel_meyer@appro.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Renee Meyer TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rmmeyer@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard J Meyer Deputy Director, TD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rlmeyer@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Dawn Meyerriecks DDNI for Acquisition & Technolog ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dawn.c.meyerriecks@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Randall Meyers Vice President Camber Corporation 5860 Trinity Parkway Suite 400 Centerville , VA 20120 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rmeyers@i2spros.com _____________________________________________________ Randall Meyers Vice President National Security Camber 6992 Columbia Gateway Dr Suite 150 Columbia , MD 21042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rmeyers@camber.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Andrew Michels TITLE TBD Interlocutor 1701 Kalorama Road, N.W. Washington , DC 20009 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: amichels@interlocutor.net _____________________________________________________ Tom Middleton VP Strategic Planning & Ops General Dynamics Information Technology 13857 McLearen Rd Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tom.middleton@gdit.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Vincent Mihalik Cyber Security Solutions Archite Wyle Information Systems 1600 Intenational Dr Suite 800 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Wanda Mikovch TITLE TBD DIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wanda.mikovch@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ milan milenkovic 131 s. west street alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: milanzm1963@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jack Milewski General Manager, Defense Intelli BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.milewski@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Russ Milheim Deputy Targeting DIA 7400 Defense Pentagon Washington , DC 20301-7400 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Russell.Milheim@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Brandon Milhorn TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brandon.milhorn@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Brandon Milhorn Director, Integrated Defense Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Alex Miller SVP and Senior Account Executive L-3 Communications, Inc. 11955 Freedom Drive Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Britney Miller Communications Specialist U.S. Department of Homeland Security 7005 Fawn Trail Ct. Bethesda , MD 20817 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: britneyamiller@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Connie Miller TITLE TBD Department of Justice 5344 Admiral Peary Highway Eldersburg , PA 15931 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Connie.M.Miller@usdoj.gov _____________________________________________________ James Miller Principal Deputy Under Secretary DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kelly.McKnight@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Jennifer Miller TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jennifer.miller@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ John Miller TITLE TBD ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.j.miller@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Jonathan Miller Director Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jonathan.e.miller@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Kelly A Miller Deputy Director, CIO NSA 9800 Savage Road Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kamille@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Laila Miller N/A N/A 1250 4 St SW Apt W411 Washington , DC 20024 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lmi4142@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Linda Miller TITLE TBD TASC 4805 Stonecroft Blvd Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: linda.miller@tasc.com _____________________________________________________ Michael J Miller 225 Kenneth Drive Rochester , NY 14623 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.j.miller@globalcrossing.com _____________________________________________________ Michael J Miller VP Federal Sector Global Crossing 12010 Sunset Hills Road Suite 420 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Michael.J.Miller@GlobalCrossing.com _____________________________________________________ Michael J Miller 225 Kenneth Drive 134 Rochester , NY 14623 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.j.miller@globalcrossing.com _____________________________________________________ Michael J Miller 225 Kenneth Drive Rochester , NY 14623 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.j.miller@globalcrossing.com _____________________________________________________ Michael J Miller 225 Kenneth Drive Rochester , NY 14623 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.j.miller@globalcrossing.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Scotty Miller 13901 E. Laurel Lane Scottsdale , AZ 85259 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: scotty.miller@gdds.com _____________________________________________________ Brig Gen Stephen J Miller USAF TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road D7, Suite 6242 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sjmille@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Steve Miller Senior Director, Federal Progams GeoEye GeoEye 21700 Atlantic Blvd, 5th Floor Dulles , VA 20166 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: miller.steve@geoeye.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Steven G Miller TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sgmille@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Dr. Susanne Miller Director Ensco, Inc. 5400 Port Royal Road Springfield , VA 22151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: miller.susanne@ensco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Brad Millick Director of Collections DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brad.millick@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Karl Milligan 348 Thompson Creek Mall #237 Stevensville , MD 21666 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kmilligan@patriotsecuritygroup.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Linda Millis 610 N. Pitt Street Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lmillis@markle.org _____________________________________________________ Ms. Linda Millis Director of Pirvate Sector Partn ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: linda.millis@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Linda Millis Director, Private Sector Partner Office of the Director of National Intelligence Room 4B-171 Washington , DC 20511 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: linda.millis@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Cheryl Mills Counselor and Chief of Staff State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: millsc@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Linda Mills President, NGIS Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Robert F Minehart TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Robert.Minehart@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Ken Minihan Required unless Parent Required unless Parent , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ John E MINITER PO Box 630 Ipswich , MA 1938 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Jennifer A Minton Program Director Raytheon 1311 N Abingdon Street Arlington , VA 22207 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jenminton@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Daniel Mintz Chief Technology Officer, Civil Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Jami Miscik PIAB Member PIAB No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Wendy_A._Loehrs@pfiab.eop.gov _____________________________________________________ Dave Missal Practice Manager Oracle 8812 Stony Creek Drive Colorado Springs , CO 80924 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dave.missal@oracle.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jamison Mitchell FSI State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jrmitchell@me.com _____________________________________________________ Lawrence A Mitchell Senior Vice President Sierra Nevada Corporation 444 Salomon Circle Sparks , NV 89434 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: larry.mitchell@sncorp.com _____________________________________________________ Lawrence A Mitchell TITLE TBD Sierra Nevada Corporation 444 Salomon Circle Sparks , NV 89434 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: larry.mitchell@sncorp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bill Mixon TITLE TBD USIS 7799 Leesburg Pike Suite 400 S Falls Church , VA 22043 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bill.mixon@usis.com _____________________________________________________ eric mock 2805 Clearmeadow street Bedford , TX 76021 Phone: (none) Fax: (631) 410-1160 Email: emock@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Bill Moeller 1421 Jefferson Davis Highway Suite 600 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: William.Moeller@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Edward Moffett TITLE TBD NRO 14675 Lee Road Room 15B20L Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: edward.moffett@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ MS DIANA M MOHLER MBA DIANA MOHLER 7930 JONES BRANCH DRIVE SUITE 800 MCLEAN , VA 22102 Phone: (301) 820-5235 Fax: (703) 854-1680 Email: dmohler@itllc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Mohr Director, Defense & Intel. PGene SRI International 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2800 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: william.mohr@sri.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Molino Vice President SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Mrm35@Cornell.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jon A Monett BS, MA Chairman The Quality of Life Program 6748 Old McLean Village Drive, S Suite 200 Mclean , VA 22101 Phone: (703) 893-7757 Fax: (none) Email: jon@monetts.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Arthur Money 3803 Riverwood Road Alexandria , VA 22309-2726 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: moneyarthurl@cs.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jonathan Moneymaker Director - Missions Systems CT The Boeing Company 7700 Boston Boulevard Springfield , VA 22153 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Jonathan.p.moneymaker@boeing.com _____________________________________________________ Audrey Monish VP Govt Relations DRS Defense Solutions 2011 Crystal Drive Suite 433 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: amonish@drs-ds.com _____________________________________________________ Gary Monroe Solution Strategist Computer Associates No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Lucian Montagnino 37 Far View Commons Southbury , CT 6488 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: loutmg@earthlink.net _____________________________________________________ Matt Monte 2100 Reston Parkway Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mattmm17@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Edward Montes Business Development Mgr, NSG Oracle Corporation 1910 Oracle Way Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: edward.montes@oracle.com _____________________________________________________ Oscar Montes Project Mgr Logistics Ctr Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Jennifer Montesano Director, Marketing & Public Rel General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Susan Moody APG Account Manager, NSA Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: susan.moody@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Beth Moore 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Catherine Moore TITLE TBD i2 1430 Spring Hill Road McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Felicia Moore Bachelors Research Analyst Deltek 8400 westpark drive mclean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: fepsteinmoore@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Heather Moore 12440 Casbeer Drive Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: hmoor1@newhaven.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Moore 14840 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jmoore@omniplex.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Jeannette Moore Director Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeannette_a_moore@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Jim Moore TITLE TBD Omniplex World Services Corporation 14840 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jmoore@omniplex.com _____________________________________________________ Jim Moore TITLE TBD Omniplex World Services Corporation 14840 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jmoore@omniplex.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Moore 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.ja.moore@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Keith Moore Business Development Analysis Vi Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: keith.w.moore@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Moore Executive Vice President LMI 2000 Corporate Ridge McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wmoore@lmi.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Moorman Vice President Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Moorman_Thomas@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Anthony Moraco SVP, General Manager SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: anthony.j.moraco@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Pamela Moraga Strategic Programs Manaager Hewlett-Packard Company 13600 EDS Drive Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gamechanger@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Pamela Moraga Business Development Executive Hewlett-Packard 6600 Rockledge Dr #150 Bethesda , MD 20817 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pamela.j.moraga@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Pam Morage 6600 Rockledge Drive Bethesda , MD 20817 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pamela.moraga@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Isidoro Moran Masters Chief Strategy Advisor Dell Services Federal Government Isidoro Moran 6800 Fleetwood Road Apt 1117 Mclean , VA 22101 Phone: (703) 761-4372 Fax: (none) Email: isidoro_moran@federal.dell.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Frank A Moret 906 La Grande Road Silver Spring , MD 20903 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Erol Morey Senior Director, NGA GeoEye GeoEye 12076 Grant Street Thornton , CO 80241 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: morey.erol@geoeye.com _____________________________________________________ John Morgan 3415 Meridian Way Highland Park Winston-Salem , NC 27104 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jj7282@mac.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Jessica Morgenstern TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Jessica.Morgenstern@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Wendy Morigi Director of Public Affairs ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wendy.morigi@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Jay Mork TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 8800 Queen Ave South Bloomington , MN 55431 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ed Mornston Director, JITF-Counterintelligen DIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Edward.Mornston@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Karen Morr 2023 Willow Branch Court Vienna , VA 22181 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Karen.T.Morr@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Brian Morra VP, NGES Northrop Grumman Corporation Brian Morra 1580A West Nursery Road MS A550 Linthicum , MD 21090 Phone: (none) Fax: (410) 993-2425 Email: brian.morra@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Michael J Morrell Deputy Director for Analysis CIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 482-1739 Email: christyt@ucia.gov _____________________________________________________ C. Morris 5392 Brunswick Lane Broad Run , VA 20137 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ccmorris@hughes.net _____________________________________________________ Ms. Carleda Morris Deputy Equality Executive NGA 4600 Sangamore Road Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: carleda.morris@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Caroline R Morris communications coordinator Finmeccanica Angelica Falchi 1625 I Street, NW 12th Floor Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (202) 223-6584 Email: caroline.morris@finmeccanica.com _____________________________________________________ Clementina Morris 2562 Glenridge Circle Merritt Island , FL 32953-2933 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Michael Morris Sr. Spec. Govt. Bus Dev AT&T Government Solutions-NIS 7125 Columbia Gateway Drive Suite 100 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mmorris@att.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael G Morris BS Senior Specialist, Bus. Dev. AT&T Corporation Michael G. Morris 3033 Chain Bridge Road Oakton , VA 22185 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 885-0046 Email: mm3125@att.com _____________________________________________________ Sean Morris Principal Deloitte 1001 G. St, NW Suite 900W Washington , DC 20001 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: semorris@deloitte.com _____________________________________________________ Brian Morrison Deputy Staff Director Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brian.morrison@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Gregg Morrison TITLE TBD Solers 950 N. Glebe Road Suite 1100 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gregg.morrison@solers.com _____________________________________________________ Gregg Morrison TITLE TBD Solers 950 N. Glebe Road Suite 1100 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gregg.morrison@solers.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gregg Morrison BBA, MS VP Solers, Inc 950 North Glebe Road Suite 1100 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gregg.morrison@solers.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Morrow 15059 Conference Center Drive Suite 110 Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mmorrow@rri-usa.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Amos Morse VP Proprietary Program Harris Corporation P.O. Box 37 MS: 2-21D Melbourne , FL 32902 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: amorse@harris.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jack C Mortick TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road S3, Suite 6305 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jcmorti@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Assistant Secre John Morton TITLE TBD DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.morton@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Moskal BS, MBA Vice President CUBRC 4455 Genesee St. Buffalo , NY 14225 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: moskal@cubrc.org _____________________________________________________ Mosheh Moskowitz Chief Technology Officer Flexispine 9700 Great Seneca Hwy Rockville , MD 20850 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mosheh.moskowitz@flexispine.com _____________________________________________________ Chafiq Moummi 6803 Morning Brook Terrace Alexandria , AL 22315 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: moummi@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Moya Director, Program Management Pro Sypris Electronics 10901 N. McKinley Drive Tampa , FL 33612 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dave.moya@sypris.com _____________________________________________________ Charles Mrozek Manager, Classified Projects URS 9755 Patuxent Woods Drive Suite 300 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Chuck.mrozek@urs.com _____________________________________________________ Robert Mueller Director FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Robert.muelleriii@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Paul E Muench Deputy CIO NGA 4600 Sangamore Road, D-199 Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: paul.e.muench@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bryan K Mulholland Senior Account Executive Microsoft Corporation 5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bryanmulholland@live.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Mullaney 10 Keith\'s Lane Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mmullaney@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Brian Mullen TITLE TBD BEA 2477 Chelmsford Drive Crofton , MD 21114 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bmullen@bea.com _____________________________________________________ John Mullen Associate EAD National Security FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.mullen@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Admiral Mike Mullen Chairman DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.mullen@js.pentagon.mil or mike.mullen@js.pentagon.mil _____________________________________________________ Rob Mullen TITLE TBD i2 1430 Spring Hill Road McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Mullen Manager, Special Programs L-3 Communications/Com.Sys.East 1 Federal Street A&E-2C Camden , NJ 8103 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: robert.mullen@l-3com.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Carl Muller Senior Vice President CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cmuller@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Mulvenon 1140 Connecticut Ave NW Ste 1140 Washington , DC 20036 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.mulvenon@defensegp.com _____________________________________________________ Amy Mummert Strategic Marketing Manager SafeNet, Inc. 4690 Millennium Drive Belcamp , MD 21017 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Al Munson TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: amunson@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Al Munson consultant Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Alden Munson 215 Wolfe St. Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: amunson857@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Margaret Munson Partner The Intelligence & Security Academy, LLC 1890 Preston White Drive Suite 250 Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mmunson@ec.rr.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Murdock TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: william.murdock@harris.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Leon Murphey TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Leon.Murphey@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Charles Murphy Professor Liberty University 202 Capital Lane Forest , VA 24551 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cmurphy@liberty.edu _____________________________________________________ John Murphy Director of Staff DARPA P.O.Box 2861 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.murphy@darpa.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Katharine Murphy TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: katharine.murphy@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Kyle Murphy No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kmurphy557@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Murphy 225 Dover Road Westwood , MA 2090 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mike@millcp.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Murphy 225 Dover Road Westwood , MA 2090 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mike@millcp.com _____________________________________________________ Richard Murphy CEO Core180, Inc. 2751 Prosperity Drive Suite 200 Vienna , VA 22031 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Timothy P Murphy Associate Deputy Director FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: timothy.murphy@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Wayne M Murphy Chief S2 NSA 9800 Savage Road S21, Suite 6228 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wmmurph@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Allen Murray Sr. Program Director Hughes 11717 Exploration Lane Germantown , MD 20876 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bruce Murray APG Account Manager Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bruce.murray@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Ms Mickey Murray Security Manager Intelligent Decisions Inc 21445 Beaumeade Cir Ashburn , VA 20147 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mmurray@intelligent.net _____________________________________________________ Mickey V Murray TITLE TBD Intelligent Decisions Inc 21445 Beaumeade Cir Ashburn , VA 20147 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mmurray@intelligent.net _____________________________________________________ VADM Robert B Murrett USN Director NGA 4600 Sangamore Road, D-100 Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (301) 227-3696 Email: Robert.b.murrett@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Katherine Muse Duma 9079 Golden Sunset Ln. Springfield , VA 22153 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: k.muse.duma@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Clyde Musgrave 3620 Fairfield Place Suite 820 Frisco , TX 75035 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: DrClyde@me.com _____________________________________________________ Frank F Blanco President/CED The Pola Group 1915 Towne Centre Blvd Ste 309 Annapolis , MD 21401 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: fblanco@thepolagroup.com _____________________________________________________ Rick Blankenship Account Manager, Federal Intel MicroStrategy 1850 Towers Crescent Plaza Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rblankenship@microstrategy _____________________________________________________ Ms. Rhonda Blatman 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rhonda.j.blatman@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Blauch NSA Account Manager, APG Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david.blauch@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Robert A Blecksmith Director, Critical Incident Resp FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: robert.blecksmith@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Donald Blersch 14807 Windrift Court Centreville , VA 20120 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: don@blersch.net _____________________________________________________ Donald Blersch Director, capability requirement ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: donald.j.blersch@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Donald J Blersch 14807 Windrift Court Centreville , VA 20120 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: donald.j.blersch@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Mike Blinde Staff Director Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Michael.Blinde@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Kristen Blough Account Manager Cisco Systems, Inc. 13635 Dulles Technology Drive Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: krblough@cisco.com _____________________________________________________ James Blue Vice President, Finance BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.blue@basesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Jennie Blumenthal Principal PRTM Management Consultants, LLC 1730 Pennsylvania Ave NW Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jblumenthal@prtm.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Randall Blystone TITLE TBD NRO 14675 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: randall.blystone@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Zdzislaw Bochynski 111 W. 67th Street Apt 26F New York , NY 10023 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sandi Bock Ex. Administrataive Assistant Sypris Electronics 10901 N. McKinley Drive Tampa , FL 33612 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sandi.bock@sypris.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Kenneth Bodzioch Vice President, Engineering L-3 Communications/Com.Sys.East 1 Federal Street A&E-2C Camden , NJ 8103 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kenneth.Bodzioch@L-3Com.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Paul Boedges TITLE TBD NRO 14675 Lee Road Suite 32D07 Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: paul.boedges@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ John Boehner Rep. House Republican Leader Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: boehnerscheduler@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Bogart Acquisition Executive DIA Building 6000 Washington , DC 20340-5100 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Mark.Bogart@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ brandi bohannon 4415 harrison st nw washington , DC 20016 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brandibohannon@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Jane Bohlin Project Manager Ensco, Inc. 5400 Port Royal Road Springfield , VA 22151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bohlin.jane@ensco.com _____________________________________________________ Tina Bohse Sr. Account Manager Qwest Communications 4250 N. Fairfax Dr. 5th Floor Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Daniel R Bolchoz 4019 Windsor Ridge Williamsburg , VA 23188 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dbolchoz@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Randy Boldosser Director AT&T Government Solutions-NIS 7125 Columbia Gateway Drive Suite 100 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: boldosser@att.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Steve Bolen TITLE TBD NRO 122 Goldswatch Terrace, S.W. Leesburg , VA 20175 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: steve.bolen@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Marc Mussoline 8618 Westwood Center Drive #315 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mmussoline@sgis.com _____________________________________________________ Bob Mutchler SVP Corporate Development Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Muzzy TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Try dfmuzzy@nsa.gov or dbmuzzy@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mike Myers Director of New Business Eagle Alliance 2711 Technology Drive Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dstrong2@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Todd G Myers B.F.A. Chief Technology Advisor NGA 2618 Culpeper Road Alexandria , VA 22308 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: todd.g.myers@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Angela Smigel (aka Maroz, Dea) Sr. Staff Administrator Ensco, Inc. 5400 Port Royal Road Springfield , VA 22151 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 321-4609 Email: smigel.angela@ensco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jayme Newell TITLE TBD Computer Associates No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jayme.newell@ca.com _____________________________________________________ Jeannette Newlen 1001 Research Park Blvd., Suite Charlottesville , VA 22911 Phone: (703) 580-7844 Fax: (none) Email: jeannette.newlen@us.army.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Aaron Newman Senior Principal Analyst Innovative Decisions 6464 Manhasset Lane Alexandria , VA 22312 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: anewman@innovativedecisions.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Patricia Newman 657 Quail Run Court Arnold , MD 21012 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pmnewma657@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Long Nguyen BSC System Analyst Senior CACI, INC. 14370 Newbrook Dr Commonwealth Building A Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lnguyen@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Steve Nguyen Vice President, LNSSI & Federal LexisNexis Mr. Steve Nguyen 1150 18th Street, NW suite 250 Washington , DC 20036 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: steve.nguyen@lnssi.com _____________________________________________________ Vinh Nguyen 1220 East West Hwy 1601 Silver Spring , MD 20910 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dc.vinh@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sherrill Nicely Deputy Associate Director of Nat ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sherrill.l.nicely@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Paul Nicholas Security Strategist Microsoft Corporation 5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pnichol@microsoft.com _____________________________________________________ BGEN. Theodore Nicholas Defense Counterintelligence and DIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: theodore.nicholas@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Douglas Nichols 325 Cool Ridge Court Millersville , MD 21108 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nichols.dm@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Nichols Partner The Potomac Advocates 7360 Bloomington Court Springfield , VA 22150 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john@potadv.com _____________________________________________________ Rhonda Nichols TITLE TBD Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rnichols2@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Wilma Nichols Director of Finance The Potomac Advocates 7360 Bloomington Court Springfield , VA 22150 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wil@potadv.com _____________________________________________________ Wilma D Nichols TITLE TBD The Potomac Advocates 7360 Bloomington Court Springfield , VA 22150 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wil@potadv.com _____________________________________________________ Ben Nicholson Minority Staff Director, Cyber Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ben.nicholson@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Nicholson 409 Walnut Avenue Gloucester , NJ 08030-2246 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Janet Nickloy Dir, Space Comm Sys BD Harris Corporation PO Box 37 Melbourne , FL 329020037 Phone: (none) Fax: (321) 674-2828 Email: jnickloy@harris.com _____________________________________________________ Linda Nicoll TITLE TBD The Aerospace Corporation Attn: Linda Nicoll, M1-447 2310 E. El Segundo Blvd. El Segundo , CA 90245 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: linda.a.nicoll@aero.org _____________________________________________________ Daniel Nielsen Senior Procurement Executive ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Daniel.nielsen@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Alex Nieves SVice President, Computer Forens ManTech International Corporation 2500 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: alex.nieves@mantech.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Steve Niezgoda Vice President, Terrorist Screen Sotera Defense Solutions, Inc 1501 Farm Credit Drive Suite 2300 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sniezgoda@theanalysiscorp.com _____________________________________________________ Joseph L Nimmich Senior Advisor Penn State Applied Research Lab 3535 Loyola Ct Dunkirk , MD 20754 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jlnuscg@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Donald P Nixon III Analyst SRA 4350 Fair Lakes Court Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dpn4@georgetown.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Tripop Noiwan 1107 N. Vernon Street Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tnoiwan@sysplan.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Chris Nolan Director, Washington Operations The SI Organization, Inc. Chris Nolan 15052 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chris.s.nolan@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Chris S Nolan Director, Government Relations The SI 15052 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: helen.d.demes@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Christopher S Nolan Director, Govenment Relations Lockheed Martin Corporation 15052 Conference Center Drive SG2 4D430H Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chris.s.nolan@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Matthew Nolan Nebraska Ave Washington , DC 20016 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: matthewwnolan@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Matthew Nolan 8924 Maurice Lane Annandale , VA 22003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: matthew.nolan@hq.dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gilbert C Nolte TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gcnolte@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Dr. William Nolte 2758 Gracefield Road Silver Spring , MD 20904 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wnolte@umd.edu _____________________________________________________ Robert Noonan INSA Board of Advisors Booz Allen Hamilton Required unless Parent Required unless Parent , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Glen Nordin Senior Language Authority DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: glen.nordin@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Glenn Nordin 500 Canterbury Lane Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 604-1226 Email: glenn.nordin@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ GM2 JASON N NORDIN GUNNERS MATE SECOND CLASS US NAVY 809-B CUESTA DRIVE #2187 MOUNTAIN VIEW , CA 94040 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: JASON.NORDIN@NAVY.MIL _____________________________________________________ Mr. Nels Nordquist TITLE TBD ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nels.p.nordquist@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ John Norjen Jr. managing Director Investments Corporate Office Properties Trust 6711 Columbia Gateway Drive Columbia , MD 21046-2104 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.norjen@copt.com _____________________________________________________ Colonel Ron Norman USAF TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road F1J, Suite 6672 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ronald.norman@jiddo.dod.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Douglas Norton TITLE TBD Siemens Government Services 619 Kings Cloister Circle Alexandria , VA 22302-4025 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: douglas.norton@siemensgovt.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Norton TITLE TBD General Dynamics C4 Systems 2231 Crystal Drive Suite 600 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: susan.hernandez-francis@gdc4s.com _____________________________________________________ James Norton Director General Dynamics C4 Systems 2231 crystal drive suite 600 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Susan.Hernandez-Francis@gdc4s.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Paul Norton 1101 30th Street, N.W. Suite 100B Washington , DC 20007 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: norton@eurasiagroup.net _____________________________________________________ Christina Norwich Embedded Analyst Palantir Technologies 1660 International Drive 8th Floor McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. E. Novak TITLE TBD Novak Biddle 1313 Aintree Road Baltimore , MD 21286 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: roger@novakbiddle.com _____________________________________________________ Jay Nussbaum COO Agilex Jay Nussbaum 5155 Parkstone Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 483-4900 Email: jay.nussbaum@agilex.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. M-J OBOROCEANU MSLS, MA INFORMATION RESEARCH SPECIALIST CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 5112 MACARTHUR BLVD NW #309 WASHINGTON , DC 20016 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: MOBOROCEANU@CRS.LOC.GOV _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Odegaard 17788 Brookwood Way Purcellville , VA 20132-9027 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jodegaard_1@radiantblue.com _____________________________________________________ David Odgers 4430 Po Valley Rd Ft Drum , NY 13602 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ OGHENETEJIRI ODIETE 118 akpakpava street, benin city EDO STATE NIGERIA BENIN CITY P.O. BOX 6654 Nigeria Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: odietetejiri@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Anthony Oettinger 33 Oxford St.,125 Maxwell Dworki Cambridge , MA 2138 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: anthony.oettinger@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Andy Ogielski President Renesys 1750 Elm Street Suite 101 Manchester , NH 3104 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ato@renesys.com _____________________________________________________ Andy T Ogielski President Renesys 1750 Elm Street Suite 101 Manchester , NH 3104 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ato@renesys.com _____________________________________________________ Jacob S Olcott Subcommittee Director and Counse Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jacob.olcott@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr Stephen Olechnowicz Ops Researcher IDA ITSD 8450 Mark Center Drive Alexandria , VA 22311 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stevessurf@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Alexander Olesker Research Associate Crucial Point LLC 3525 S St. NW Washington , DC 20007 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: aolesker@crucialpointllc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Peter Oleson 4846 Riverside Drive Galesville , MD 20765 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: psa@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Mr Peter Oleson P.O. Box 383 Galesville , MD 20765 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: peter.c.oleson@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Deborah Oliver 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: deborah.g.oliver@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Ryan E Olivett 5325 Westbard Ave #620 Bethesda , MD 20816 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ro9730a@student.american.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Olsen Manager, Ground Operations East The Boeing Company 7700 Boston Boulevard Springfield , VA 22153 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david.m.olsen@boeing.com _____________________________________________________ Sparky Olsen Boeing IS Director Mission Operations 7700 Boston Blvd. Springfield, VA , VA 22153 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 270-6893 Email: sparky.olsen@boeing.com _____________________________________________________ James M Olson George Bus TITLE TBD Texas A&M TX 77843-4220 , -979 jolson@bushsc Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jolson@bushschool.tamu.edu _____________________________________________________ Paul Oostberg Sanz Counsel Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: paul.oostbergsanz@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Falken Robert Ord CEO Falken Industries, LLC 9510 technology drive Manassas , VA 20110 Phone: (none) Fax: (571) 292-1860 Email: rord@falken.us _____________________________________________________ Dr. Henry Orejuela CEO Space and Defense Systems, Inc. 10700 Parkridge Boulevard Suite 410 Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: horejuela@sdsi.net _____________________________________________________ Henry Orejuela TITLE TBD Space and Defense Systems, Inc. 10700 Parkridge Boulevard Suite 410 Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: horejuela@sdsi.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Fran J Orlosky TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road B, Suite 6533 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: fjorlos@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Aurora E Ortega 6597 Quiet Hours Apt 201 Columbia , MD 21045 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: aeortega@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Neil Orth Sp.Cmd. & DoDIIS Com. Western Re Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: neil.orth@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Ryan Orth TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 2305 Mission College Boulevard Santa Clara , CA 95054 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Francisco Ortiz Urb. Bonneville Gardens, Calle # Caguas , 0 725 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: FVPR@PRTC.net _____________________________________________________ Ms. Stefanie R Osburn Chief of Staff PIAB No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Stefanie_R._Osburn@pfiab.eop.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr John L Osterholz BA, MS VP BAE Systems 11487 Sunset Hills Rd Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.osterholz@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John A Oswald Director, Analysis and Productio NGA MS: L-05, 3838 Vogel Road Arnold , MO 63010-6238 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: John.A.Oswald@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Stephen S Oswald Vice President/General Manager The Boeing Company Stephen Oswald 1215 South Clark Street Suite 500 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 414-6442 Email: stephen.s.oswald@boeing.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Stephen S Oswald Chief Operating Officer The Boeing Company Steve Oswald 1215 South Clark Street Suite 500 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 414-6442 Email: stephen.s.oswald@boeing.com _____________________________________________________ Maria Otero Under Secretary Democracy & Glob State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: OteroM@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Roger Oussoren Director GDIT 13857 McLearen Rd Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: roger.oussoren@gdit.com _____________________________________________________ Roger Oussoren Director GDIT 13857 McLearen Rd Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: roger.oussoren@gdit.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Grover Outland Senior VP and General Counsel TECH USA, Inc 8334 Veterans Highway 2nd Floor Millersville , MD 21108 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: outland@techusa.net _____________________________________________________ Grover C Outland TITLE TBD TECH USA, Inc 8334 Veterans Highway 2nd Floor Millersville , MD 21108 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: outland@techusa.net _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Doris Over Chief of Protocol NSA 9800 Savage Road DC6P, Suite 6258 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dcover@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ray Owen Vice President, Strategy & Busin General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Ray.owen@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Owens Director, Military Services Ops BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.d.owens@bluelink.net _____________________________________________________ Judith Oxman Vice Acquisition Executive DIA Judith Oxman DIA-AE 200 MacDill Boulevard Washington , DC 20340 Phone: (410) 956-3080 Fax: (703) 907-2807 Email: judith.oxman@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Judith R Oxman Vice Acquisition Executive DIA DIA-AE 200 MacDill Boulevard Washington , DC 20340 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 907-2807 Email: judith.oxman@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mike Ozatalar BS, MS VP - Program Manager Parsons 100 M Street SE Washington , DC 20003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.ozatalar@parsons.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Fatih Ozman President & CEO Sierra Nevada Corporation 444 Salomon Circle Sparks , NV 89434 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: vickie.breunig@sncorp.com _____________________________________________________ Bill Parker COO Salient Federal Solutions 4000 Legato Road Suite 600 Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bill.parker@salientfed.com _____________________________________________________ Bill Parker COO Salient Federal Solutions 4000 Legato Road Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bill.parker@salientfed.com _____________________________________________________ John Parker TITLE TBD i2 1430 Spring Hill Road McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ John P Parker 3365 Lakeside View Dr Falls Church , VA 22041 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: johnpaulparker@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ John Paul Parker Chief of Acquisition, ONDI CIO B ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: johnpaulparker@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Kevin Parker President and CEO Deltek 13880 Dulles Corner Lane Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Lauren Parker B.A. HR Specialist (Intern) Department of Navy HRSC East Norfolk Naval Shipyard Portsmouth , VA 23709 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lauren.parker@navy.mil _____________________________________________________ Richard Parker LLNL, 700 eEast Avenue mail stop L 449 Livermore , CA 94550 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: parker27@llnl.gov _____________________________________________________ Tawanda Parker TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: t_parker@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr Tim Parker Sr Manager Strategic Development Lockheed Martin IS&GS 700 N Frederick Avenue Gaithersburg , MD 20879 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tim.parker@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Tim Parker Strategic Planning Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tim.parker@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Deborah Parkinson Cyber Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: deborah_parkinson@hsgac.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jacob Parness 1001 Lamberton Drive Silver Spring , MD 20902 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jayparness@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Joe Parsley VP Strategy and BD QinetiQ North America 315 Bob heath Dr Huntsville , AL 35808 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Norman Parsons 6403 N 15th st Tampa , FL 33610 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: norman.parsons41@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr Oliver Parsons President Opti-Tech, LLC 614 Knollwood Road Severna Park , MD 21146 Phone: (none) Fax: (410) 982-6817 Email: oparsons@optitechis.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joseph Paska 1595 Spring Hill Road Suite 250 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: paska@ebrinc.com _____________________________________________________ Neelam D Patel TITLE TBD QinetiQ North America 7918 Jones Branch Drive Suite 350 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Neelam.patel@Qinetiq-NA.com _____________________________________________________ Sangita Patel TITLE TBD Composite Software Inc. 11921 Freedom Drive Suite 550 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Jennifer Paterson 8201 Greensboro Dr Ste 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jennifer.paterson@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Rachel Patricca 1910 Oracle Way Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rachel.patricca@oracle.com _____________________________________________________ Rachel Patricca 1910 Oracle Way Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rachel.patricca@oracle.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Patrick APG Account Manager Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.patrick@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Leonard Patterson 12504 Plantation Drive Brandywine , MD 20613 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lepatt@hughes.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Tom Patterson 1710 Apollo Ct. Seal Beach , CA 90740 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Pattishall Sector Vice President and Genera Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bob.pattishall@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Christopher Paul Strat Forces Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: christopher_paul@armed-services.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ John R Pearce Director, BD- Intel Solutions L-3 STRATIS 11955 Freedom Drive Suite 15049 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 234-1078 Email: john.pearce@l-3com.com _____________________________________________________ Adam R Pearlman J.D. Associate Deputy General Counsel United States Department of Defense 1600 Defense Pentagon Room 3B688 Washington , DC 20301 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: adam.r.pearlman@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Curtis Pearson Director, Information Dominance Northrop Grumman 895 Oceanic Dr Annapolis , MD 21404 Phone: (none) Fax: (410) 981-4918 Email: curtis.pearson@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Kendell Pease TITLE TBD General Dynamics Corporation 2941 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kpease@gd.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bob Pecha Vice President CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rpecha@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Pecha TITLE TBD DIA 7400 Defense Pentagon Rm. 3E-258 Washington , DC 20301-7400 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Robert.Pecha@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gardner G Peckham Managing Director Prime Policy Group 1110 Vermont Avenue, NW Suite 1000 Washington , DC 20005 Phone: (none) Fax: (202) 530-4600 Email: gardner.peckham@prime-policy.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. George Pedersen CEO ManTech International Corporation 2500 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: george.pedersen@mantech.com _____________________________________________________ Mr Daniel H Pedowitz Business Unit Executive IBM 6710 Rockledge Drive Bethesda , MD 20878 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pedowitz@us.ibm.com _____________________________________________________ James Peery TITLE TBD Sandia National Laboratories P.O. Box 5800 Albuquerque , NM 87185 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ammon Peffley Account Manager Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. George Peirce General Council DIA Building 6000 Washington , DC 20340-5100 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: George.Peirce@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ David Pekoske Group President, Global Security A-T Solutions, Inc. 1934 Old Gallows Road Suite 360 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 288-3401 _____________________________________________________ David Pekoske MPA, MBA 1934 Old Gallows Road Suite 360 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 288-3401 Email: davidpekoske@a-tsolutions.com _____________________________________________________ David Pekoske Group President, Global Security A-T Solutions 1934 Old Gallows Road Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: davidpekoske@alum.mit.edu _____________________________________________________ Nancy Pelosi Speaker of the House Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (202) 225-4188 Email: scheduler.pelosi@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr Mark D Pendleton MSEE, BSEE Director Northrop Grumman Corporation 1-Space Park Redondo Beach , CA 90278 Phone: (310) 214-2628 Fax: (none) Email: mark.pendleton@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Kirsten Penn Director Strategic Development NJVC, LLC 8614 Westwood Center Drive Suite 300 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Catherine Pennington Director, NGA Program The MITRE Corporation 7515 Colshire Dr, MS H135 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cpenning@mitre.org _____________________________________________________ Greg Pennington Academic Programs Intern United States Geospatial Intelligence Foundation 2325 Dulles Corner Boulevard Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: greg.pennington@usgif.org _____________________________________________________ Jonathan Peppard TITLE TBD ASI Government 1655 North Fort Meyer Drive Suite 1000 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jpeppard@acqsolinc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard Pera 200 MacDrill Blvd 5C355 Bolling AFB Washington , DC 20340-5100 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Richard.Pera@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard J Pera 3114 Rittenhouse St. NW Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pera@mindspring.com _____________________________________________________ David Percelay MBA Executive Director AIRescue David Percelay PO Box 8067 Van Nuys , CA 91409 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dpercelay@post.harvard.edu _____________________________________________________ John Pereira Director for Support CIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: christyt@ucia.gov _____________________________________________________ Michael Perelman P.O. Box 56555 Philadelphia , PA 19111 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Perkins 14660 Rothgeb Dr. Ste 102 Rockville , MD 21014 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Kevin L Perkins Criminal Investigative Division FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kevin.perkins@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Eric Perlstein Director - IT Services Applied Integrated Technologies, Inc. 6305 Ivy Lane Suite 520 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: eric.perlstein@ait-i.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Douglas Perritt 103 Stonestep Court Millersville , MD 21108 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dougperritt@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joe Perry Senior Financial Manager NGA 4600 Sangamore Road Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joseph.perry@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ William Perry Required unless Parent Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Dr. Lenora Peters Gant Deputy ADNI CHCO ODNI 1000 Colonial Farm Rd. Gate 5 McLean , VA 22101 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 275-1297 Email: Kyles2@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Peters PO Box 100581 Arlington , VA 22210 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dp1811us@cox.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jack Peters Director CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jpeters@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Peters TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tjpeter@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Martin Petersen 7102 Westmoreland Drive Warrenton , VA 20187 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: martin.c.petersen@saic.com _____________________________________________________ J. M. Peterson 5251-18 John Tyler Highway #323 Williamsburg , VA 23185 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jmpeterson@policeone.com _____________________________________________________ John M Peterson III Consultant CTSERF 5251-18 John Tyler Highway #323 Williamsburg , VA 23185 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jmpeterson@iacsp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr John M Peterson III Consultant CTSERF 1490 Quarterpath Road Suite 5A, #323 Williamsburg , VA 23185 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jmpeterson@iacsp.com _____________________________________________________ Max Peterson Area Vice President - Federal Dell Inc. One Dell Way One Dell Way Round Rock , TX 78682 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: max_peterson@dell.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Doris E Petitti 1804 Greer Court Gambrills , MD 21054 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: petittid@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Suzanne Petrie-Liscouski TITLE TBD TASC 4805 Stonecroft Blvd Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: suzanne.petrie@tasc.com _____________________________________________________ Pete Petrihos Vice President The Cohen Group 500 8th Street, NW Suite 200 Washington , DC 20004 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Benjamin V Petrone 5650 Assateague Place Manassas , VA 20112 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: BenPetrone@Gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Linda Petrone 9015 Admiral Vernon Terrace Alexandria , VA 22309 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: linda.petrone@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Walter Petruska 1510 Eddy Street PH 1A San Francisco , CA 94115 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wpetruska@usfca.edu _____________________________________________________ Michael Pevzner TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: m_pevzner@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ MG Cloyd Pfister USA (Ret) 4653 Kirkpatrick Lane Alexandria , VA 22311 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chpfister@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Ms. Katherine H Pherson CEO Pherson Associates, LLC 9902 Deerfield Pond Drive Great Falls , VA 22066 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kpherson@pherson.org _____________________________________________________ Katherinr H Pherson TITLE TBD Pherson Associates, LLC 9902 Deerfield Pond Drive Great Falls , VA 22066 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kpherson@pherson.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Randolph H Pherson TITLE TBD Pherson Associates, LLC 9902 Deerfield Pond Drive Great Falls , VA 22066 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rpherson@pherson.org _____________________________________________________ John Philbin 10455 White Granite Drive Suite 400 Oakton , VA 22124 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.philbin@gdit.com _____________________________________________________ Betsy Philips S&I Professional Staff Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: betsy.philips@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Elizabeth Phillips Executive Vice President McBee Strategic Consulting, LLC 455 Massachusetts Ave., NW 12th Floor Washington , DC 20001 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bphillips@mcbeestrategic.com _____________________________________________________ Elizabeth Phillips Executive Vice President McBee Strategic Consulting, LLC 455 Massachusetts Ave., NW 12th Floor Washington , DC 20001 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bphillips@mcbeestrategic.com _____________________________________________________ Elizabeth Phillips Executive Vice President McBee Strategic Consulting, LLC 455 Massachusetts Ave., NW Suite 1200 Washington , DC 20001 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bphillips@mcbeestrategic.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Elizabeth A Phillips Executive Vice President McBee Strategic Consulting E. Phillips 601 Pennyslvania Ave., NW Suite 800 - North Building Washington , DC 20004 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bphillips@mcbeestrategic.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Elizabeth A Phillips 6312 Seven Corners Center, #203 Falls Church , VA 22044 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bphillips@mcbeestrategic.com _____________________________________________________ Jeanette Phillips Planning Manager Texas Office of Homeland Security-SAA 5805 N Lamar Blvd Austin , TX 78759 Phone: (512) 334-9259 Fax: (none) Email: jeanette.phillips@txdps.state.tx.us _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jack Picard Director CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jpicard@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. James C Picard BA History VP Operations CACI Jim Picard 4224 Avon Drive Dumfries , VA 22025 Phone: (703) 400-8342 Fax: (none) Email: jpicard@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Pick Chief, Deputy Enterprise Managem DIA 7400 Defense Pentagon Rm. 3E-258 Washington , DC 20301-7400 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Michael.Pick@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Matt Pickett 8618 Westwood Center Drive #315 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mpickett@sgis.com _____________________________________________________ Jessica Pierce 12000 Market Street Unit 484 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nieman_jessica@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. michael pillsbury 3017 O St NW washington , DC 20007 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Betsy Pimentel Vice President, Defense Programs Stellar Solutions, Inc. 250 Cambridge Avenue Suite 204 Palo Alto , CA 94306 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bpimentel@stellarsolutions.com _____________________________________________________ William Pinard 11108 Cavalier Ct Apt 5F Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wpinard@gmu.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Natalio C Pincever TITLE TBD McAfee, Inc. 12010 Sunset Hills Road 5th Floor Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Natalio_Pincever@McAfee.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Pineda 7906 Hadley Court Severn , MD 21144 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pineda_john@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Jason Pinegar Intelligence Analyst FBI 935 Pennsylvania Ave. Washington , DC 20535 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jason.pinegar@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Anthony D Pinson 119 Wolfe Street Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pinsonad@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Victor Piotrowski National Science Foundation 4201 Wilson Blvd Suite 835 Arlington , VA 22230 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: vpiotrow@nsf.gov _____________________________________________________ Al Pisani VP, Intelligence Operations TASC 4805 Stonecroft Blvd Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: albert.pisani@tasc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Scott Pischinger Sales Manager Dell Inc. One Dell Way One Dell Way Round Rock , TX 78682 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: scott_pischinger@dell.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard A Piske lll vp & managing director Manpower Public Sector 143 Spa Drive Annapolis , MD 21403 Phone: (410) 267-9067 Fax: (703) 516-9269 Email: richard.piske@na.manpower.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard Piske 6305 Ivy Lane Suite 100 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: richard_piske@kellyservices.com _____________________________________________________ John Pistole Deputy Director FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.pistole@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Paul Pittelli TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road R2, Suite 6529 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (301) 688-0255 Email: papitte@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Hannah Pitts Consultant Delta Risk LLC 2804 N. Seminary Chicago , IL 60657 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: hpitts@delta-risk.net _____________________________________________________ Jim Pitts President, NGES Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Anthony P Placido Director of Intelligence Justice Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: anthony.p.placido@usdoj.gov _____________________________________________________ Michele Platt Senior Vice President, Division CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mplatt@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Stephanie Platz-Vieno TITLE TBD NRO 14675 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stephanie.platzvieno@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ RADM James Plehal USN(Ret.) Senior Advisor, NPPD DHS Nebraska Avenue Center Washington , D.C. 20528 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.plehal@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mark Plozay TITLE TBD i2 1430 Spring Hill Road McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ John Plummer Business Development Kelly Government Solutions 8403 Colesville Road Silver Spring , MD 20910 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: plummjc@kellyservices.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Debora A Plunkett Deputy Director, Information Ass NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: daplunk@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mike Plymack SVP Strategic Programs Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ronald Podmilsak President & CEO The Podmilsak Group One Fountain Square, 11911 Freed Suite 710 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: podmilsakgroup@cox.net _____________________________________________________ Ronald Podmilsak TITLE TBD The Podmilsak Group One Fountain Square, 11911 Freed Suite 710 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: podmilsakgroup@cox.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Larry Poe 11325 Ethan Court Issue , MD 20645 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Christopher Poirier Emergency Management Deputy Prog Department of the Treasury 6517 Coachleigh Way Alexandria , VA 22315 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: christopher.poirier@do.treas.gov _____________________________________________________ Mark Polansky CI Special Agent DIA Box 323 West River , MD 20778 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: paladinhill@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Dr Len Polizzotto PhD Vice President Draper Laboratory 555 Technology Sq Cambridge , MA 02139 Phone: (none) Fax: (617) 258-2626 Email: lpolizzotto@draper.com _____________________________________________________ Dr Len Polizzotto 555 Tech Sq Cambridge , MA 02139 Phone: (none) Fax: (617) 258-2626 Email: lpolizzotto@draper.com _____________________________________________________ Matt Pollard TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: m_pollard@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Michael Polmar TSG-Snr. VP ManTech International Corporation 2500 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mariam Al-Botani Intern Mission Concepts 902A Prince St Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (703) 822-0191 Fax: (571) 970-4593 Email: malbotani@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr Ali D Alami 2007 Nordlie Pl Falls Church , VA 22043 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: there4u06@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Steven Albers 19904 Collingdale Place Gaithersburg , MD 20886 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: steven.albers@unisys.com _____________________________________________________ Chris Albert Federal Intelligence Sales Esri Bill Harp - Industry Solutions 380 New York St Redlands , CA 92373 Phone: (none) Fax: (909) 307-3039 _____________________________________________________ Rebecca Albert Program Manager BAE Systems 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rebecca.albert@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Catherine Albright Sales Director TRSS, LLC 1410 Spring Hill Rd Suite 140 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: catherine.albright@trssllc.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Lisa Albuquerque TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: onrdogpm@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Barbara Alexander Dir. Cyber, Infrastructure & Sci DHS 4801 Nebraska Ave, NW Washington , DC 20528 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ LTG Keith B Alexander USA Director NSA 9800 Savage Road Suite 6242 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755-6242 Phone: (none) Fax: (301) 688-7741 Email: kbalex2@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mike Alexander Staff Director Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael_alexander@HSGAC.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Sarita Alexander Administration Deloitte Consulting, LLP 1919 N. Lynn Street Rosslyn , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: saalexander@deloitte.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Yonah Alexander TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: YAlexander@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Ms. Karen Alexandre 47248 Middle Bluff Place Sterling , VA 20165 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: karen.alexandre@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Sondra D Alexis Chemistry Chief, Customer Assurance Department of Homeland Security S. Alexis 245 Murray Lane Bldg 19, G-001-22 Washington, DC , DC 20578 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sondra.alexis@hq.dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Jeffrey Allan Political Affairs Officer United Nations 32950 Amicus Pl. Apt 314 Abbotsford , British Columbia V2S6G9 Canada Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jfausa@live.com _____________________________________________________ Charlie Allen INSA Senior Intelligence Advisor Chertoff Group 1110 Vermont Avenue NW Suite 1200 Washington , DC 20005 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Dan Allen Chief Operating Officer CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Edward Allen 12125 Club Commons Drive Glen Allen , VA 23059-7029 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: EdwardLAllen@earthlink.net _____________________________________________________ Jim Allen TITLE TBD Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ John Allen CEO/Founder BlueStone Capital Partners 1600 Tysons Boulevard 8th Floor McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 852-4496 _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mike Allen Vice President, Intel Analysis Camber Corporation 5860 Trinity Parkway Suite 400 Centerville , VA 20120 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mallen@i2spros.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Phoebe Allen 1120C Benfield Blvd Millersville , MD 21108 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pallen@camber.com _____________________________________________________ VADM Thad Allen USCG Commandant DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thad.allen@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Victoria Allen 501 E. 38th Street HP 539 Erie , PA 16546 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: vallen05@mercyhurst.edu _____________________________________________________ Christopher Alligood MBA Program Director LMI 2000 Corporate Ridge McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: calligood@lmi.org _____________________________________________________ Michael Abadie Vice President Info Systems ITT 141 National Business Pky Suite 200 Annapolis Junction , MD 21032 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.abadie@itt.com _____________________________________________________ Mike Abadie TITLE TBD ITT 12975 Worldgate Dr. Building M1 Herdon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Abel 1651 Old Meadow Road McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Mark.Abel@wyle.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Abel VP of Business Development Wyle Information Systems 1600 Intenational Dr Suite 800 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mark.abel@wyle.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Abe M Abraham 3832 Longmeadow way Fort Worth , TX SW13 OJP Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: abecaptn@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Abramson 13038 Maple View Lane Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: abramsonj@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Daniel Abreu Analyst SRA International 13508 Fallen Oak Court Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: daniel_abreu@sra.com _____________________________________________________ Nikolas Acheson IC Business Development Manager SAIC Nikolas Acheson 6841 Benjamin Franklin Dr. Mail Stop F1-3-N3 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (443) 367-7921 Email: nikolas.s.acheson@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Veronica Acker Program Manager BAE Systems 5808 Atteentee Rd McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: veronica.acker@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Russell Adamchak 1421 Jefferson Davis Highway Suite 600 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Russell.Adamchak@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Colin Adams Federal Planner DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Colin.Adams@hq.dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dennis Adams TITLE TBD NRO 14675 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dennis.adams@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Michael Adams Account Manager Carahsoft Technology Corp 12369 Sunrise Valley Dr Suite D2 Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: andrea.terrazas@carahsoft.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Lou Addeo TITLE TBD ManTech International Corporation 2500 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gary Adkins VP, National & Federal Security GeoEye 21700 Atlantic Boulevard Dulles , VA 20166 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: adkins.gary@geoeye.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Harvey Adler 6633 Thurlton Drive Alexandria , VA 22315 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: eagle724@cox.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jorge Aguila Diagonal 621 barcelona , AL 8028 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. jorge aguila Av. Diagonal, 621-629 Barcelona 08028 Spain Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jorge.aguila@lacaixa.es _____________________________________________________ David Aguilar Acting Deputy Commissioner DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david.aguilar@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Peter Ahearn 806 Polo Place Great Falls , VA 22066 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: peterja0@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Commissioner Jayson P Ahern Retired DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jayson.ahern@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Brandon Ahrens Senior Manager Accenture 11951 Freedom Drive Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brandon.k.ahrens@accenture.com _____________________________________________________ Nick Aievoli 7900 Westpark drive Mclean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: naievoli@gcsinfo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Aitken communications manager Finmeccanica Angelica Falchi 1625 I Street, NW 12th Floor Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mark.aitken@finmeccanica.com _____________________________________________________ Scott Aken VP, Cyber Operations Manager SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: scott.aken@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Carol Ann Babcock TITLE TBD IEEE 12459 Wendell Holmes Road Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cabeta@ieee.org _____________________________________________________ Dr. James Babcock 12459 Wendell Holmes Road Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jhbeta@ieee.org _____________________________________________________ Matthew Babin TITLE TBD Palantir Technologies 1660 International Drive 8th Floor McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Carrie L Bachner President, CEO Mission Concepts 220 20th Street South Suite 209 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: carrie_bachner@missionconcepts.com _____________________________________________________ David Baciocco VP Corporate Business Developmen Applied Signal Technology 460 West California Avenue Sunnyvale , CA 94086 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dave_baciocco@appsig.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Badoud 15520 Horseshoe Lane Woodbridge , VA 22191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tbadoud@theanalysiscorp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Craig Baer Director of Intelligence Program TECH USA, Inc 8334 Veterans Highway 2nd Floor Millersville , MD 21108 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cbaer@techusa.net _____________________________________________________ Dr. Louis Baer Director, Office of Policy NSA 9800 Savage Road S02L, Suite 6425 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: labaer@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Maureen Baginski VP Intelligence Service Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 Email: Maureen.Baginski@serco-na.com _____________________________________________________ Bart Bailey CEO Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bbailey@3001inc.com _____________________________________________________ Marianne Bailey Director ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Marianne.bailey@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Brittany Baird TITLE TBD Proteus Technologies 133 National Business Parkway Suite 150 Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Magdalena Bajll 524 Redland Blvd. Rockville , MD 20850 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: magdalena.a.bajll@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Beverley Baker DEA Atlanta Division/Atlanta HID 763 Juniper St, NE Atlanta , GA 30308 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Beverly.F.Baker@usdoj.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dean Bakeris 2200 Defense Highway Ste 405 Crofton , MD 21114 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dbakeris@sfa.com _____________________________________________________ Dean Bakeris VP Program Development Custom Engineering and Designs, Inc. 78 Boonton Avenue Montville , NJ 07045 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dbakeris@marotta.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Balch Director of Sales, NSG Oracle Corporation 1910 Oracle Way Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dave.balch@oracle.com _____________________________________________________ Sherry Baldwin Director, Office of Small Busine DIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Sherry.Baldwin@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Jim Balentine Abraxas Corp 12801 Worldgate Dr Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Christina Balis 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: christina.balis@serco-na.com _____________________________________________________ Phil Balisle EVP, Washington Operations DRS Technologies, Inc. 5 Sylvan Way Parsippany , NJ 7054 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pbalisle@drs.com _____________________________________________________ Katherine Ballard 1744 N Rhodes St #310 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: katherineballard1982@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Joel Balzer INSA OCI Task Force TASC 4805 Stonecroft Blvd Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Gail Bamford TITLE TBD SAS Institute 1530 Wilson Blvd Suite 800 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gail.bamford@sas.com _____________________________________________________ George Bamford Chief, Cyber Thrat Branch DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis 3801 Nebraska Ave NW Washington , DC 20528 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gbamford2@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Paul A Cabral TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road DF, Suite 6229 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pacabra@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joseph Cabrera 42701 Rolling Rock Square South Riding , VA 20152 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jcabrera@harris.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Paul Cadaret 20622 Shadow Rock Lane Trabulo Canyon , CA 92679 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: psc@usd.com _____________________________________________________ R S Cadogan Vice President, Intelligence and Newberry Group 2510 Old Highway 94 South St. Charles , MO 63303 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: RCadogan@thenewberrygroup.com _____________________________________________________ Gerald Cady Intelligence Analyst DIA 6211 Swords Way Bethesda , MD 20817 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gerald.cady@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr Less Calahan Master's Director, National Capitol Regio Specrtum Comm Inc. 1401 Wilson Blvd Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (301) 534-9588 Fax: (571) 312-8156 Email: Lester.Calahan@SPTRM.Com _____________________________________________________ Mr Less Calahan Master's Director, Nat'l Capitol Region Spectrum Comm Inc. 1401 Wilson Blvd Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (703) 232-1584 Fax: (571) 312-8156 Email: Lester.Calahan@SPTRM.Com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Lester Calahan Director, National Capitol Regio Spectrum 1401 Wilson Blvd Suite 1007 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (757) 224-7501 Email: lester.calahan@Sptrm.com _____________________________________________________ Lester Calahan Masters Director,National Capitol Region Spectrum Comm Inc. 1601 North Kent Street Rosslyn , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (571) 312-8156 Email: Lester.Calaha@SPTRM.Com _____________________________________________________ Theresa Calbi Sr. Spec. Government Bus. Dev. AT&T Government Solutions 3033 Chain Bridge RD Oakton , VA 22185 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tc4591@att.com _____________________________________________________ Theresa Calbi Business Manager AT&T Government Solutions-NIS 3033 Chain Bridge Rd. Oakton , VA 22124 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tcalbi@att.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joe Call Senior Advisor to the Assistant DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Joe.Call@uscg.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dan Callahan Principal Consultant Venona Consulting, LLC 8300 Boone Boulevard Vienna , VA 22151 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 848-4586 Email: lindsay@venonaconsulting.com _____________________________________________________ Lindsay K Callahan Executive Administrator Venona Consulting, LLC Lindsay Callahan 7633 Dunston Street Springfield , VA 22151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lindsay@venonaconsulting.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Albert Calland Executive Vice President CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bcalland@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Steve Cambone EVP Strategic Development QinetiQ North America 7918 Jones Branch Drive Suite 350 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: steve.cambone@qinetiq-na.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jack Camm Vice President, Foreign Affairs Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jcamm@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Danielle Camner Lindholm Vice President for Policy Business Executives for National Security 1717 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 350 Washington , DC 20037 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ann Campbell TITLE TBD Sandia National Laboratories P.O. Box 5800 Albuquerque , NM 87185 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Chelsey Campbell TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chelsey.campbell@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Don Campbell TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Don.Campbell@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Lt Gen (Ret) John Campbell EVP Government Programs Iridium Communications Inc John Campbell 1750 Tyson's Blvd Suite 1400 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.campbell@iridium.com _____________________________________________________ Kurt M Campbell East Asian & Pacific Affairs State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: campbellkm@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr Rob Campbell MBA 9756 Sinclair Keller , TX 76244 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rob.campbell@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Robert Campbell 2335 Audrey Manor Ct Waldorf , MD 20603 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: robert.e.campbell@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joe D'Andrea 76 Wendt Ave #3H Larchmont , NY 10538 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jadandrea@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Michael D'Andrea Vice President SRA International 4300 Fair Lakes Court Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mike_dandrea@sra.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William D'Arcangelo 21261 Thatcher Terrace #103 Ashburn , VA 20147 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: william.darcangelo@stanleyassociates.com _____________________________________________________ SHASHI DABIR 5200 Leesburg Pk #1232 Falls Church , VA 22041 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dabirs@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dana Dalton TBD CVG Inc. 709 Canyon Greens Drive Las Vegas , NV 89144-0834 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: danahdalton@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Marc Damasha TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road Suite 6513 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bmcrumm@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Chad DAmore 12466 Ansin Circle Drive POtomac , MD 20854 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chaddamore@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Richard Danforth President, DRS Defense Solutions DRS Technologies, Inc. 5 Sylvan Way Parsippany , NJ 7054 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rdanforth@drs-ds.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Daniel Director for Intelligence Progra OMB No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: J._Michael_Daniel@omb.eop.gov _____________________________________________________ Mark Daniels TITLE TBD Intelsat General Corporation 6550 Rock Spring Drive Suite 450 Bethesda , MD 20817 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Lisa Danzig Special assistant to Secretary D Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Miss Kelly Darmer Academic Researcher University of Dallas Kelly Darmer 1705 East West Highwat Apt 201 Silver Spring , MD 20910 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: KellyDarmer@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Miss Kelly N Darmer BA, MA Student/Natl Sec & Intel Researc Institute of World Politics Kelly Darmer 1705 E West Hwy #201 Silver Spring , MD 20910 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: KellyDarmer@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Brian Darmody 2133 Lee Building College Park , MD 20742-5125 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bdarmody@umd.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Daubenspeck 12100 Sunset Hills Road #4073 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: daubenspeckr@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Kenneth Daugherty 3712 Woodland Circle Falls Church , VA 22041 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bill Daumer Director AT&T Government Solutions-NIS 7125 Columbia Gateway Drive Suite 100 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: daumer@att.com _____________________________________________________ Joanna Davenport Gavel NGA Account Manager Science Applications International Corporation 14668 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 676-1902 Email: davenportgav@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Jennifer David Human Development Directorate NGA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jennifer.david@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ mr john b david associate fraud examiner zeb nigeria limited john bassey david p o box 1112, eket, akwa ibom state, nigeria Eket 2341 Nigeria Phone: +2348035847710 Fax: (none) Email: johnbassey108@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Davidson Counsel Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: M_Davidson@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Heather Davies Lead Associate Booz Allen Hamilton 1615 Murray Canyon Road Suite 140 San Diego , CA 92108 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: davies_heather@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Rebecca Davies Minority Staff Director Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rebecca_davies@appro.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Arthur Davis President SAVA Solutions 6616 Rock Lawn Drive Clifton , VA 20124 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: adavis@savasolutions.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Brett Davis Account Executive Microsoft Corporation 5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brettd@microsoft.com _____________________________________________________ Kimberly Easterling BBA Senior Associate PricewaterhouseCoopers 1800 Tysons Blvd McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kimberly.easterling@us.pwc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert E Eastman Program Management Vice Presiden Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: robert.e.eastman@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Ms.. Widad Echahly 24 Stoke Street Sumner Christchurch 8081 New Zealand Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wechahly@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Reinaldo Echevarria 487 Spring St Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: echevarria_reinaldo@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Philip Eckman 104 Old Glory Court Williamsburg , VA 23185 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: philipeckman@earthlink.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. George Economou Major Account Executive Akamai 11111 Sunset Hills Road Ste 250 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: economou@akamai.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Regan Edens 1732 Remington Crofton , MD 21114 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: edensr6@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Scott Eder Mgr, NGES Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Charles Edge TITLE TBD Harding Security 19286 Spotswood Glade Dr. Gordonsville , VA 22942 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: eedge@harding-security.com _____________________________________________________ Mary Edington Senior Consultant Deloitte Consulting 10310 Deer Trail Drive Dunkirk , MD 20754 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: maryedington@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ David Edmonds Vice President, Govt Opns & Stra Syndetics, Inc. 10395 Democracy Lane Suite B Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bedmonds@syndetics-inc.com _____________________________________________________ Kristen Edmondson Wolfe VP Marketing Deltek 13880 Dulles Corner Lane Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Lauren B Edris Research Analyst The Potomac Advocates Potomac Advocates 122 C Street, NW, Suite 280 Washington , DC 20001 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lbe8721@esu.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Albert Edwards Director AT&T Government Solutions-NIS 7125 Columbia Gateway Drive Suite 100 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: burt@att.com _____________________________________________________ John Edwards President, Intel/Defense Sector Agilex Technologies, Inc 5155 Parkstone Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.edwards@agilex.com _____________________________________________________ John Edwards President, Intel Agilex John Edwards 5155 Parkstone Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 483-4928 Email: john.edwards@agilex.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas A Edwards TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road DP3, Suite 6203 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: taedwar@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Michael Edwins Director, BD-Intel Solutions L-3 Communications, Inc. 11955 Freedom Drive Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr Sal Egea MS/BS Mgmt 6626 Hunter Creek Lane Alexandria , VA 22315 Phone: (703) 863-8107 Fax: (none) Email: salvadoe@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Todd Egeland 3002 Cedar Hill Rd. Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: egeland@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Eiden TITLE TBD Westway Development 14325 Willard Road Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jjeiden@westwaydevelopment.com _____________________________________________________ John J Eiden TITLE TBD Westway Development 14325 Willard Road Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jjeiden@westwaydevelopment.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Eric Eifert TITLE TBD ManTech International Corporation 2500 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Dawn R Eilenberger Director, Office of Internationa NGA 4600 Sangamore Road Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dawn.r.eilenberger@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Rosalinda Elias 10115 Duportail Road Bldg 363 Ft Belvoir , VA 22060 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rosalinda.elias@us.army.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Craig Fabina 5531 Stephen Reid Rd. Huntingtown , MD 20639 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bob68@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Martin Faga 21700 Atlantic Blvd Sterling , VA 20166 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mfaga@mitre.org _____________________________________________________ Matt Fahle Senior Executive Accenture No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: matthew.r.fahle@accenture.com _____________________________________________________ Matthew Fahle VP, Intelligence Programs Accenture Cara Knox 211 North Broadway Suite 2950 St. Louis , MO 63102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: matthew.r.fahle@accenture.com _____________________________________________________ Matthew Fahle VP, Intelligence Programs Accenture 11951 Freedom Drive Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: matthew.r.fahle@accenture.com _____________________________________________________ Matthew Fahle Senior Executive Accenture Cara Knox 211 North Broadway Suite 2950 St. Louis , MO 63102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: matthew.r.fahle@accenture.com _____________________________________________________ Rick Faint CEO Exceptional Software Strategies Inc 849 International Drive Suite 310 Linthicum , MD 21090 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Larry Fairchild VP & Sr. Account Executive L-3 Communications 11955 Freedom Dr. Suite 10048 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: larry.fairchild@l-3com.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Fred Faithful Equality Executive NGA 4600 Sangamore Road, D-100 Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: fred.faithful@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Judy Falanga TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road Suite 6435 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Alexander Falatovich 32 Chrissy Lane Sugarloaf , PA 18249 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: afalat55@mercyhurst.edu _____________________________________________________ Angelica Falchi Dir.- Corporate Communications Finmeccanica Angelica Falchi 1625 I Street, NW 12th Floor Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: angelica.falchi@finmeccanica.com _____________________________________________________ Mary Kay Falise BS Director, IC Red Hat, Inc. 503 Broadwater Road Arnold , MD 21012 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mkfalise@redhat.com _____________________________________________________ Paul Falkler VP, Strategic Development Direct SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: paul.t.falkler@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Pack Fancher Vice President KippsDeSanto & Co. 1600 Tysons Boulevard Suite 375 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (202) 997-6169 Fax: (703) 442-1498 Email: pfancher@kippsdesanto.com _____________________________________________________ Aaron Fansler 100604 Hillview Dr Kennewick , WA 99338 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: aaron.fansler@pnl.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Gail Faraon Senior Research Manager PhaseOne 6080 Center Drive Ste 4050 Los Angeles , CA 90045 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gailchunfaraon@phaseone.net _____________________________________________________ Ms. Cindy M Farkus Economics Managing Director DHS Intelligence and Analysis 1704 Culpepper Ct Severn , MD 21144 Phone: (410) 551-3717 Fax: (none) Email: cmfarku@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Farley 42798 Pilgrim Square Chantilly , VA 20152 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mfarley@nova.org _____________________________________________________ Sandra M Farr Senior Consultant LMI 2000 Corporate Ridge McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: farr.michelle@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Alycia Farrell TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: alycia_farrell@appro.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jeffrey Farrell 11303 Seneca Circle Great Falls , VA 22066 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeff.farrell@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ john m farrell Director HP Fortify 12573 Cricket Lane Woodbridge , VA 22192 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jmfarrell@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Robert Farrell P.O. Box 3705 Reston , VA 20195 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bob.farrell@senecatechnologygroup.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joe Fasching Chief Financial Executive DIA Building 6000 Washington , DC 20340-5100 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Joseph.Fasching@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ David Etue (aka Gray, Benjamin) Manager PRTM Management Consultants, LLC 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Suite 1000 Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: detue@prtm.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William H Gaal BS 1419 Woodhurst Blvd. McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wgaal@us.ibm.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. C. Gabbard Executive Vice President Defense Group Inc 429 Santa Monica Blvd. Ste 460 Santa Monica , CA 90401 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gabbard@defgrp.com _____________________________________________________ Derek Gabbard CEO Lookingglass Cyber Solutions 1001 S. Kenwood St Suite 200 Baltimore , MD 21224 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dgabbard@lgscout.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Gabbay 200 W. Mercer St #410 Seattle , WA 98119 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mgabbay@islinc.com _____________________________________________________ Bill Gaches Dir. of Intelligence Analysis Arete Associates 1550 Crystal Drive Suite 703 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: William.Gaches@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Lynn Gaches Intel Analyst Camber Corporation 5860 Trinity Parkway Suite 400 Centerville , VA 20120 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lgaches@camber.com _____________________________________________________ Willard Gaefcke, Jr. 4417 McNab Avenue Lakewood , CA 90713 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gaefcke@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Glenn Gaffney Deputy Director for Science and CIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 482-1739 Email: barbarbt@ucia.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mike Gaffney President,Business Development, Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mgaffney@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gary Gagnan Executive Director MITRE 46731 Manchester Ter Potomac Falls , VA 20165 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gjg_@mitre.org _____________________________________________________ Gary Gagnon TITLE TBD The MITRE Corporation 7515 Colshire Drive McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gjg@mitre.org _____________________________________________________ Mr Bob Gajda Consultant Bob Gajda 5819 Appleford Drive Alexandria , VA 22315 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bobgajda@aol.com _____________________________________________________ bob gajda IC Consultant 5819 appleford drive alexandria , VA 22315 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bobgajda@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Gajda 5819 Appleford Drive Alexandria , VA 22315 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bobgajda@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Joe M Galindo Supervisory IT Specialist Federal Government 935 Pennsylvania Ave NW Washington , DC 20024 Phone: (202) 554-8115 Fax: (none) Email: galindojoe@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Sean Gallagher Senior Director, National Intell Invertix Corporation 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 800 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Laurene Gallo Vice President Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Gallo_Laurene@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Laurene Gallo 8283 Greensboro Drive McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gallo_laurene@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Oliver Galloway TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: o_galloway@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Ryan Galluzzo Ryan Galluzzo 49 Claudette Cir Framingham , MA 01701 Phone: (508) 877-0093 Fax: (none) Email: ryanjglluzzo@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Timothy Galpin Assistant Director for Programs Johns Hopkins University, APL 11100 Johns Hopkins Road Room 17-S344 Laurel , MD 20723 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: timothy.galpin@jhuapl.edu _____________________________________________________ Timothy J Galpin TITLE TBD Johns Hopkins University, APL 11100 Johns Hopkins Road Room 17-S344 Laurel , MD 20723 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: timothy.galpin@jhuapl.edu _____________________________________________________ Dr. Gulu Gambhir SVP, Chief Technology Officer SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gambhirs@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Tom Gann Vice President of Public Affairs McAfee, Inc. 12010 Sunset Hills Road 5th Floor Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thomas_gann@mcafee.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Christopher Haakon 8012 Apollo Street Mason Neck , VA 22079 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cphaakon@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Richard N Haass President of the Council on Fore Council on Foreign Relations 58 East 68th Street New York , NY 10065 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: president@cfr.org _____________________________________________________ Biff Hadden 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joel Haenlein Senior Scientist Ensco, Inc. 5400 Port Royal Road Springfield , VA 22151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: haenlein.joel@ensco.com _____________________________________________________ Katy Hagan TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Katy_Hagan@appro.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ SEN Chuck Hagel PIAB Member PIAB No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Wendy_A._Loehrs@pfiab.eop.gov _____________________________________________________ Chris Hagner Project Manager White Oak Technologiese, Inc. 1300 Spring Street Suite 320 Silver Spring , VA 20910 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Annette Hagood Director Deloitte Consulting, LLP 1001 G St Washington , DC 20001 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ahagood@deloitte.com _____________________________________________________ Cassee Haines Executive Assistant Camber Corporation 5860 Trinity Parkway Suite 400 Centerville , VA 20120 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Kevin Hair Vice President, Corporate Busine SRC, Inc 7502 Round Pond Road North Syracuse , NY 13212 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: hair@srcinc.com _____________________________________________________ Katie Hairfield Summer Intern the SI 15052 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kathleen.s.hairfield@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Lance Haldeman Alliances Director Computer Associates No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Lance Haldeman 2291 Wood Oak Dr Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lance.haldeman@ca.com _____________________________________________________ Lance Haldeman Alliances Director Computer Associates 2291 Wood Oak Dr Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lance.haldeman@ca.com _____________________________________________________ Michael M Hale Deputy Director, SIGINT Director NRO No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: halemi@nro.mil; tohailhale@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Richard L Haley Finance Division FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: richard.haleyii@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Dean E Hall Deputy Chief Information Officer FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dean.hall@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Katherine Hall 6924 Fairfax Drive # 304 Arlington , VA 22213 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: katherine.hall@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Keith Hall Vice President Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Hall_Keith@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Larry P Hall TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road S33, Suite 6549 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lphall@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Leslie Hall 12900 Federal Systems Park Drive MS FP1-5166 Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: leslie.hall@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Susan Hall SVP, Business Development NJVC, LLC 8614 Westwood Center Drive Suite 300 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: susan.hall@njvc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ralph Haller Deputy Director (DDNRO) NRO 14675 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ralph.haller@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Vanessa Hallihan Chief, Custom Solutions, Suite 6 NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: vnhalli@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Brigadier Gener Irving Halter US Vice Director, Operations, Joint NRO 14675 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: irving.halter@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Kevin Iaquinto CMO Deltek 13880 Dulles Corner Lane Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Gretchen Idsinga Business Development, Senior Man CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gidsinga@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Patricia L Ihnat Deputy NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: plihnat@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Chris Incardona Director, Government Programs GeoEye GeoEye 21700 Atlantic Blvd Suite 500 Dulles , VA 20166 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: incardona.chris@geoeye.com _____________________________________________________ Paul R Ingholt BA., JD Principal Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Drive McLean , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ingholt_paul@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. J. C Inglis Deputy Director NSA 9800 Savage Road Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jcingli@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Bobby R Inman Required unless Parent Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (512) 328-0444 Fax: (512) 471-8408 _____________________________________________________ Nancy Inman 3200 Riva Ridge Road Austin , TX 78746 Phone: (512) 328-0444 Fax: (none) Email: elcaro2@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Jennifer Internicola Manager General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Jennifer.Internicola@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ S. L Ireland Assistant Secretary for Intellig Treasury Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Mary M Irvin Director, Source Operations and NGA 4600 Sangamore Road, D-165 Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mary.m.irvin@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Irvine 14900 Conference Center Dr. #225 Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jirvine@crucialsecurity.com _____________________________________________________ Matthew S Irvine 3718 Appleton St., NW Washington , DC 20016 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mattirvine@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Rob Irvine Counterintelligence DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: robert.irvine@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Jeff Isaacson TITLE TBD Sandia National Laboratories P.O. Box 5800 Albuquerque , NM 87185 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Isacoff TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Stephen Isacoff P.O. Box 465 Hudson , MA 01749 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stephen@networkconsultantsgroup.com _____________________________________________________ Joanne Isham Required unless Parent Washington , DC 20005 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Tanvirul Islam CEO TerminusNet 2/4 Outer Circuler Road. OreantPoint. Flat B-3, Moghbazar Dhaka 1217 Bangladesh Phone: +88-02-9362262 Fax: (none) Email: Travis@TerminusNet.com _____________________________________________________ Roderick Isler 1421 Jefferson Davis Highway Suite 600 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Rod.isler@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ MG Roderick Isler USA 1703 Mansion Ridge Rd. Annapolis , MD 21401 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: goaisler@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Adam Isles TITLE TBD Raytheon Company 1200 S. Jupiter Road MS AA-75000 Garland , TX 75042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Steven Isola 10993 S. Camino Escorpion Vail , AZ 85641-6429 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stevenisola@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Isom J.D. President/CEO IsomCorp 1655 N. Fort Myer Drive Suite 700 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (877) 770-4766 Email: michael.isom@isomcorp.com _____________________________________________________ Robert Ivery Research Fellow LMI 2000 Corporate Ridge McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Ives 1619 Hartsville Trail The Villages , FL 32162 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: johnives@eagle32.com _____________________________________________________ Raymond Ivie TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12950 Worldgate Drive Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Chuck Izzo TITLE TBD i2 1430 Spring Hill Road McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bill Jack Consultant Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bill.jack@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Galen B Jackman TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Alan W Jackson Managing Member Jade Enterprises, LLC 15859 Berlin Turnpike Purcellville , VA 20132 Phone: (540) 882-4534 Fax: (540) 882-4535 Email: alanwjack@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Kevin G Jackson B.S AVP Business Development SAIC 6909 Metro Park Drive Alexandria , VA 22310 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kevin.g.jackson@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Miriam Jackson TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mjackson@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Janice L Jacobs Consular Affairs State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jacobsjl@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Mike Jacobs Required unless Parent Required unless Parent , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jake Jacoby Executive Vice President, Nation CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jjacoby@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Jake Jacoby TITLE TBD CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jjacoby@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard Jacques Ph.D. DHS Operations Directorate DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Steve Jacques 1511 22nd St. N. Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Jadik Vice President, C4ISR Networked Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.jadik@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Jim Jaeger TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (210) 468-3433 Fax: (none) Email: Jim.Jaeger@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Adrienne Janetti 4850 Mark Center Drive JAWD/IDA Alexandria , VA 22311 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: adriennejanetti@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Adrienne Janetti TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ajanetti@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael D Janeway 116 Chimney Ridge Place Potomac Falls , VA 20165 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mike.janeway@apgtech.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Tammy Janorske TITLE TBD Computer Associates No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tammy.janorske@ca.com _____________________________________________________ Brian Janosko Engineering Program Manager Lockheed Martin IS&GS Brian Janosko DEPI 415C 13530 Dulles Technology Dr Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brian.j.janosko@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ William Janssen TITLE TBD The Boeing Company 7700 Boston Boulevard Springfield , VA 22153 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Peter Jantzen Vice President, Sales Intec Billing, Inc. 301 North Perimeter Center Suite 200 Atlanta , GA 30346 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: peter.jantzen@intecbilling.com _____________________________________________________ Elise M Jarvis Associate Director, Law Enforcem Anti-Defamation League 1100 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 1020 Washington , DC 20036 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ejarvis@adl.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Larry Jaski Jr. MBA, BS Director DHS-I&A Production Mangement Division No Address Available No City Available , MD 21220 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: LARRY.JASKI@HQ.DHS.GOV _____________________________________________________ Frank Jaworski TITLE TBD SRA 4350 Fair Lakes Court Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: fjaworski@raba.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. K. Jenkins 105 Kingswood Road Annapolis , MD 21401 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brucejenkins@windsorvisions.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Karl Jensen Director, Strategy Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: karl_jensen@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Lynda Burroughs (aka Kaur, Harjeet) 12015 Lee Jackson Highway Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lynda.burroughs@mantech.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Kacena 6650 Rock Island Rd. Apt 304 Springfield , VA 22150 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tkacena@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. James Kadtke PhD Senior Scientist & Policy Analys National Nanotechnology Coordinating Office 1701 16th Street, NW Apt. 824 Washington , DC 20009 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jkadtke@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Hans Kaeser 3623 S Street, NW Washington , DC 20008 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: huk3@georgetown.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Kagan 5432 Connecticut Ave., NW Apt. 706 Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mhkagan@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr Robert I Kahane 13530 Dulles Executive Park Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 466-2692 Email: bob.kahane@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Ralph Kahn Director of Sales McAfee, Inc. 12010 Sunset Hills Road 5th Floor Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ralph_kahn@mcafee.com _____________________________________________________ James Kahrs TITLE TBD DATRA 2020 Pennsylvania Ave NW Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Dr. Eugene Kaiser TITLE TBD Defense Information Systems Agency 2508 Goldcup Lane Reston , VA 22091 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: eugene.kaiser@disa.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Kalkbrenner VP Communication Systems ITT Mr. Jim Kalkbrenner 141 National Business Parkway Suite 200 Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jim.kalkbrenner@itt.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Kalogeropoulos 2783 Mansway Dr. Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Robert Kames PO Box 3342 Annapolis , MD 21403 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Robert@Kames.com _____________________________________________________ Paul Kaminski PIAB Member PIAB No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Wendy_A._Loehrs@pfiab.eop.gov _____________________________________________________ Jordan Kanter Senior Consultant Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kanter_jordan@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Jeff Kaplan TITLE TBD PRTM Management Consultants, LLC 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Suite 1000 Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jkaplan@prtm.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Leonard Kaplan 7403 Gateway Court Manassas , VA 20109 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lkaplan@gmri.com _____________________________________________________ Stephen R Kappes Deputy Director CIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 482-1111 Email: brendjh@ucia.gov _____________________________________________________ Jan Karcz Director, Analytic Development ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jansk@dni.gov _____________________________________________________ Jan Karcz Col. (Ret) 10827 Cross School Road Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jansk@odci.gov _____________________________________________________ Mike Karpovich Former INSA Intern FBI Required unless Parent Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: 518-588-7098 Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Rajendra Karwasra 9/6J, Medical Campus, PGIMS, Rohtak , IN India Phone: (126) 221-3331 Fax: (none) Email: karwasra@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Joy Kasaaian PM IBG IBG 2001 Jefferson Highway Ste 310 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jkasaaian@biometricgroup.com _____________________________________________________ Colonel Beth M Kaspar USAF TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road DA1, Suite 6540 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bmkaspa@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ John Kastanowski systems engineer TASC, Inc. 5358 blue aster circle centreville , VA 20120 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jkastanowski@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Kate Kaufer TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kate_Kaufer@appro.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joseph J La Pilusa Director, Business Development Dynamics Reseach Corporation 11440 Commerce Park Drive Suite 400 Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jlapilusa@drc.com _____________________________________________________ Diane La Voy TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: diane.lavoy@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ David Lacey Sr. Director Hughes 11717 Exploration Lane Germantown , MD 20876 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david.lacey@hughes.com _____________________________________________________ Phillip Lacombe 8700 Cathedral Forest Drive Fairfax Station , VA 22039 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: phil.lacombe@securemissionsolutions.com _____________________________________________________ DAVID B LACQUEMENT DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS CYBERCOM 9800 SAVAGE ROAD FORT GEORGE G. MEADE , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: RFTYGAR@NSA.GOV _____________________________________________________ Rudy A Laczkovich President Nexidia Federal Solutions, Inc 19984 Augusta Village Pl Ashburn , VA 20147 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rlaczkovich@nexidia.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Steve Lafata Senior Vice President of Busines Spectrum 1 Compass Way Suite 300 Newport News , VA 23606 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Steve.lafata@sptrm.com _____________________________________________________ Ray LaHood Secretary Transportation No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: secretaryscheduler@dot.gov _____________________________________________________ Ellen Laipson PIAB Member PIAB No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Wendy_A._Loehrs@pfiab.eop.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Karen Lamb 4801 Stonecroft Boulevard Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: karen.lamb@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Karen Lamb TITLE TBD BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Peter Lamb APG Account Manager Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: peter.lamb@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Dennis Lambell Vice President/General Manager BAE Systems 10920 Technology Place San diego , CA 92127 Phone: (none) Fax: (858) 592-1086 Email: dennis.lambell@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Brett Lambert TITLE TBD Densmore Group 2711 Jenifer Street Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: blambert@densmoregroup.com _____________________________________________________ Brett Lambert Deputy Assist. Sec. of Defense OSD (AT&L) 3330 Defense Pentagon Rm 3B854 Washington , VA 20301 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brett.lambert@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Captain Mike Lambert 7930 Jones Branch Dr Suite 350 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mike.lambert@centurum.com _____________________________________________________ Brian D Lamkin Training and Education FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brian.lamkin@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Joseph E Lampert IV Si Account Executive Verizon Business 22001 Loudoun County Parkway Asburn , VA 20147 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joseph.lampert@one.verizon.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Landgraf Client Principal - DoD Agencies Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bob.landgraf@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Stephen Landman 2812 9th Street S. Apt. 201 Arlington , VA 22204 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Landman_Stephen@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ John Landon VP, NGC Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Kevin Landy Chief Counsel Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kevin_landy@hsgac.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Carol Lane Vice President Ball Aerospace Ball Aerospace & Technologies Co 2111 Wilson Blvd, Suite 1120 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rbturner@ball.com _____________________________________________________ MS CAROL LANE VICE PRESIDENT BALL AEROSPACE 2111 WILSON BLVD #1120 ARLINGTONV , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: clane@ball.com _____________________________________________________ MS CAROL LANE VICE PRESIDENT BALL AEROSPACE RONDI TURNER 2111 WILSON BLVD #1120 ARLINGTON , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rbturner@ball.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Alan MacDougall Chief, Counter Proliferation Sup DIA 7400 Defense Pentagon Rm. 3E-258 Washington , DC 20301-7400 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Alan.MacDougall@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Dr. Michael Macedonia Director NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kcremona@casl.umd.edu(Kelly Cremona-office mgr-DTO/ODNI)301-226-9124 _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Macfarlane TITLE TBD Innovative Information Solutions 43647 Warbler Square Leesburg , VA 20176 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dmacfarlane@iis-us.com _____________________________________________________ John MacGaffin Advisor CSIS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: macgaffinj@centratechnology.com _____________________________________________________ Stacy Macik Administrative Executive, Acquis Software Engineering Institute, CMU NRECA Building Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Cynthia Mack Vice President General Dynamics AIS 10560 Arrowhead Drive Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ John Mackay Sales Director Endeca 12369 Sunrise Valley Dr Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: andrea.terrazas@carahsoft.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard MacKnight 105 Summers Drive Alexandria , VA 22301 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ramackjr@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Jo MacMichael HCMO Chief of Staff DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jo.macmichael@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Jo MacMichael 1550 Crystal Drive Suite 502a Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (703) 566-0835 Fax: (none) Email: jo.macmichael@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Schira Madan TITLE TBD ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: schira.t.madan@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Reese Madsen Director of Training and Educati DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: reese.madsen@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Tom Madson TITLE TBD General Dynamics Corporation 2941 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tmadson@gd.com _____________________________________________________ Mark Magee TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mark.magee@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ John Maguire TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: j_maguire@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Larry Maguire Deputy ITTF DIA 7400 Defense Pentagon Washington , DC 20301-7400 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Laurence.Maguire@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Edward Mahen TITLE TBD NRO 14675 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: edward.mahen@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Gina Mahin TITLE TBD ExecuTech Strategic Consulting 712 Northwood Avenue Cherry Hill , NJ 8002 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gina.mahin@esc-techsolutions.com _____________________________________________________ Thomas Mahlik 180 Cameron Station Blvd Alexandria , VA 22304 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tmahlik@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bruno Mahlmann VP Business Development Salient Federal Solutions 8618 Westwood Center Drive Suite 100 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 940-0084 Email: Bruno.Mahlmann@salientfed.com _____________________________________________________ Mr Bruno Mahlmann III MS Vice President Salient Federal Solutions 4000 Legato Rd, Suite 510 Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bmahlmann2@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Sabahat Mahmood 2030 N. Adams St. Apartment 1412 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: smahmoo3@gmu.edu _____________________________________________________ Cody Majerus Cody Majerus 4615 Rose Creek Parkway Fargo , ND 58104 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: codymajerus@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Vahid Majidi National Security Branch, WMD FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: vahid.majidi@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Alexander Major Attorney Sheppard Mullin RIchter & Hampton LLP 1300 I Street NW 11th Floor East Washinton , DC 20005 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: amajor@sheppardmullin.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Nacht Assistant Secretary of Defense f DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.nacht@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. J. T Nader TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jtnader@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Kevin Nagel Senior Executive Accenture No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kevin.s.nagel@accenture.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Nagengast Director AT&T Government Solutions-NIS 7125 Columbia Gateway Drive Suite 100 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nagengast@att.com _____________________________________________________ Garo Nalabandian Sr. Associate Advisory KPMG LLP Garo Nalabandian 1676 International Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (202) 330-5417 Email: gnalabandian@kpmg.com _____________________________________________________ Adam E Namm Overseas Buildings and Operation State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nammae@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Samir H Nanavati 1 Battery Park Plaza 29th Floor New York , NY 10004 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: snanavati@ibgweb.com _____________________________________________________ Scott Nance Professional Staff Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Scott_Nance@appro.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Nannen Vice President Raytheon Company 1200 S. Jupiter Road MS AA-75000 Garland , TX 75042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jnannen@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ The Honorable Janet Napolitano Secretary, Department of Homelan DHS Nebraska Avenue Center Washington , D.C. 20528 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: janet.napolitano@hq.dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Len Napolitano TITLE TBD Sandia National Laboratories P.O. Box 5800 Albuquerque , NM 87185 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ James Navarro Director, Military Intelligence CSC 8613 Lee Highway Fairfax , VA 22031 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jnavarro3@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Aradhana Nayak-Rhodes DIA DIA 3223 Walbridge Place, NW Washington , DC 20010 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: anayakrhodes@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Neal TITLE TBD General Dynamics C4 Systems 2231 Crystal Drive Suite 600 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Patrick Neary TITLE TBD ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: patrick.c.neary@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Patrick C Neary 5126 Knapp Pl Alexandria , VA 22304 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: patrick.neary@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jack Neigel 1449 Colleen Lane McLean , VA 22101 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jack@neigelcorp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gail Nelson Ph.D. 645 Poplar Avenue Boulder , CO 80304 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: NelsonSD_83@msn.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Nelson 10302 Eaton Place Suite 500 Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nelson-john@zai.com _____________________________________________________ Robert Nesbit TITLE TBD The MITRE Corporation 7515 Colshire Drive McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rfnesbit@mitre.org _____________________________________________________ Julia Nesheiwat Senior Advisor State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nesheiwatj@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Tamara Nestuk Deputy S1 NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joel Neubert 3160 Challenger Point Dr. Loveland , CO 80538 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jneube@acxiom.com _____________________________________________________ Tim Neun Manager, Corporate Communication Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Jeff Neurauter Attorney Advisor DHS Office of General Counsel 1616 Ft. Myer Dr Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeff.neurauter@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Devin O'Brien Staff Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Devin_Obrien@hsgac.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Geoff O'Connell Deputy Director, NCTC CIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 482-1739 Email: brendalo1@nctc.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Matthew O'Connell 21700 Atlantic Boulevard Dulles , VA 20166 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: oconnell@geoeye.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Matthew O'Connell CEO/President GeoEye 2325 Dulles Corner Blvd. 10th Floor Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 480-8175 Email: o'connell.matthew@geoeye.com _____________________________________________________ 2LT Daniel O'Connor USA 4905 172nd Avenue Bristol , WI 53104 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: daniel.oconnor30@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Michael P O'Donnell MS, BS 4201 Wilson Blvd. Room 455-I Arlington , VA 22230 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 292-9145 Email: modonnel@nsf.gov _____________________________________________________ Darcey O'Halloran TITLE TBD Deloitte Consulting, LLP No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (401) 862-9025 Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Dr. John O'Hara 3038 Traymore Lane Bowie , MD 20715-2024 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jhohara@aol.com _____________________________________________________ John O'Hara NSA government employee (GGD-15) NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jhohara@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Rob O'Keefe Chief Technology Officer Arc Aspicio LLC 3318 Lorcom Lane Arlington , VA 22207 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rfo@arcaspicio.com _____________________________________________________ Richard O'Lear 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: richard.j.olear@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Cassian O'Rourke 302 Emilies Lane Severna Park , MD 21146-1513 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cashorourke@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Maj Gen Gary O'Shaughnessy USAF Vice President, NSG Oracle Corporation 1910 Oracle Way Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gary.oshaughnessy@oracle.com _____________________________________________________ Grace O'Sullivan 950 N. Glebe Rd. Suite 1100 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gosullivan@solers.com _____________________________________________________ Grace O'Sullivan Business Development Solers Inc. 950 N. Glebe Rd. Suite 1100 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gosullivan@solers.com _____________________________________________________ Grace O'Sullivan Marketing and Communications Solers 950 N. Glebe Road Suite 1100 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gosullivan@solers.com _____________________________________________________ Stephanie O'Sullivan Associate Deputy Director CIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 482-1739 Email: bettycd@ucia.gov _____________________________________________________ Brian O'Toole Chief Technology Officer GeoEye 2325 Dulles Corner Blvd. Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Dr. Tara O'Toole Undersecretary for Science & Tec DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: loretta.young@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Dr. William S Oakes TITLE TBD Raytheon Company 1200 S. Jupiter Road MS AA-75000 Garland , TX 75042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: oakes@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Oakley 2124 Fox Meadows Manhattan , KS 66503 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: oakley_david@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Douglas Oakley VP Agency Consulting Group 5457 Twin Knolls Road Columbia , MD 21045 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: doakley@acg-hq.com _____________________________________________________ Mr Armando J Obdola President Advanced Security and Intelligence Management Solu 8072 11th ave Burnaby , British Columbia V3N 2N7 Canada Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: johan.obdola@asims.ca _____________________________________________________ Mr. Edward Obloy TITLE TBD Booz Allen Hamilton 13200 Woodland Park Drive Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: obloy_edward@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard Oborn TITLE TBD NRO 14675 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: richard.oborn@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Kevin Doyle (aka Pushkin, Matthew) Director, Cyber Programs SRC, Inc 7502 Round Pond Road North Syracuse , NY 13212 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: doyle@srcinc.com _____________________________________________________ Alex P Computer Consultant Northrop Grumman 1000 Wilson Boulevard Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: swardheld@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Lon P 1000 Wilson Boulevard Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (703) 834-7980 Fax: (none) Email: puzzleboks@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Donald E Packham EAD Human Resources FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: donald.packham@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Michael Pafford Project Manager The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab 11100 Johns Hopkins Road MS: MP6 N-629 Laurel , MD 20723 Phone: (none) Fax: (240) 228-6864 Email: mike.pafford@jhuapl.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joe Page TITLE TBD Computer Associates No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joseph.page@ca.com _____________________________________________________ Thomas Page Advanced Technology Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thomas.j.page@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Linda Pagelson TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: linda.pagelson@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Christopher Painter Deputy Director, Cyber NSC No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: christopher_m_painter@nsc.eop.gov _____________________________________________________ Will Painter TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: will.painter@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Chris Pallotta APG Account Manager, NIMA Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chris.pallotta@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Douglas Palmer TITLE TBD Deloitte Consulting, LLP No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dpalmer@deloitte.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Andrew Palowitch 1800 Old Meadow Drive #1119 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: awp82@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Leon E Panetta Director CIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 482-1739 Email: christyt@ucia.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Steve Panzer ObjectFX 10440 Little Patuxent Parkway Columbia , MD 21044 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: steve.panzer@objectfx.com _____________________________________________________ Mike Papay TITLE TBD Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ COL Leesa Papier Director of Analytics Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) 8125 Sea Water Path Columbia , MD 21045 Phone: (410) 814-1037 Fax: (none) Email: leesa.papier@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Robert J Papp Potential USCG Commandant DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: robert.j.papp@uscg.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Aris Pappas Senior Director, Inst. For Adv. Microsoft Corporation 5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Aris.Pappas@microsoft.com _____________________________________________________ Aris Pappas TITLE TBD Microsoft Corporation 5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: aris.pappas@microsoft.com _____________________________________________________ George Pappas TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: george.pappas@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Christina Pappas-Moir TITLE TBD Geospatial Concepts 6212 Squires Hill Drive Falls Church , VA 22044 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chris.moir@geospatialconcepts.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Alexander J Paranicas Business Development Analyst Lockheed Martin IS&GS 13560 Dulles Technology Drive Dep 2 - 4th Floor Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: alexander.j.paranicas@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Craig Parisot Chief Operating Officer Invertix Corporation 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 800 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Bill Parker COO Salient Federal Solutions 4000 Legato Road Ste 510 Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bill.parker@salientfed.com _____________________________________________________ John Quattrocki Director CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Frank Quick TITLE TBD The MITRE Corporation 7515 Colshire Drive McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: fquick@mitre.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. J. Quinn Vice President, Missile & Space Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Kate Quinn 900 North Washington Street #302E Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: marykatequinn@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Mary E Quinn Director, TCA OUSDI 5000 Defense Pentagon Washington , DC 203015000 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mary.quinn@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert F Behler (aka Roberts, Robert) 7502 Round Pond Road North Syracuse , NY 13212 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rfb@srcinc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert T Rabito Jr. 46 saunders st lawrence , MA 1841 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rrabito@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Keny Rader Project Leader III Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Rado 1376 Apple Hollow Arnold , MO 63010 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.rado@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Dr. Daniel J Ragsdale Ph.D. Program Manager DARPA Dr Ragsdale 3701 Fairfax Drive Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (703) 241-2850 Fax: (none) Email: daniel.ragsdale@darpa.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Donald J Raines BS, MBA Director, Business Development ManTech International Corporation 7799 Leesburg Pike Suite 700 South Falls Church , VA 22043 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: donald.raines@mantech.com _____________________________________________________ Danny E Rains BA Special Agent DHS/FEMA DHS/FEMA 1201 Maryland Ave, SW Office of Security room 205 Washington , DC 20024 Phone: (none) Fax: (202) 646-4646 Email: danny.rains@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Daniel Ramey 2195 Greenkeepers Court Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dbr1211@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Johann Ramos Homeland S 1102 Ronstan dr # 6 killeen , TX 76543 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: hsuyang55@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kendra Ramos 2901 Graham Rd. Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kendra.ramos@sri.com _____________________________________________________ Clark Rampton 11251 Roger Bacon Dr Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ramptonc@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Adrienne Ramsay TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: adrienne.ramsay@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sherri Ramsay Chief, NTOC NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: swramsa@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Dafna Rand TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: d_rand@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Rick Randall 12012 Sunset Hills Road Suite 800 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 Email: rick.randall@cobham.com _____________________________________________________ Rick Randall 1911 N. Fort Myer Dr. Suite 1100 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rick.randall@cobham.com _____________________________________________________ Rick Randall Vice President, Business Develop Cobham Analytic Solutions 2303 Dulles Station Blvd. Suite 200 Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Rick Randall VP, Business Development Cobham Analytic Solutions Cobham Analytic Solutions 2303 Dulles Station Blvd Suite 200 Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rick.randall@cobham.com _____________________________________________________ Chris Randolph No Title - gratis as of Charlie DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: christopher.b.randolph@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Christopher Randolph TITLE TBD Department of Homeland Security 802 S. Lee St. Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chrisrandolph11@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dick Rankin 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dick.rankin@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ John Ransom 1427 C St NE Washington , DC 20002 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jransom1984@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jeffrey Rapp Director, Joint Intelligence Tas DIA Building 6000 Washington , DC 20340-5100 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Jeffrey.Rapp@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Martijn Rasser 8319 Midwood Street Alexandria , VA 22308 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mrasser@alumni.bates.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Martijn Rasser 8319 Midwood Street Alexandria , VA 22308 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: martijn.rasser@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Rod Smith Jim Balentine (aka Smith Balentine, Rod Jimmy) President Abraxas/Cubic Mission Support Services Rod Smith 12801 Worldgate Drive Suite 800 Herndon , DC 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 563-9541 Email: rod.smith@abraxascorp.com _____________________________________________________ Michael J Miller (aka Sutton, John) VP Federal Sector Global Crossing 12010 Sunset Hills Road Suite 420 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Michael.J.Miller@GlobalCrossing.com _____________________________________________________ Jennifer Sabbagh 34605 West Twelve Mile Road Farmington Hills , MI 48331 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sabbaghj@trinity-health.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Patrick Sack Vice President, Technical/INTEL Oracle Corporation 1910 Oracle Way Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: patrick.sack@oracle.com _____________________________________________________ John Saddler TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 2673 Commons Boulevard Beavercreek , OH 45431 Phone: (937) 488-1079 Fax: (937) 427-6416 _____________________________________________________ Roland Saenz TITLE TBD Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: saenz_ron@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Roland Saenz USN Retire Senior Associate Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: saenz_ron@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Tony W Sager TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road Chief, Vul Analysis & Ops, Suite Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: twsager@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Kenneth L. Salazar Secretary Interior Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: scheduling@ios.doi.gov (Attn: Secretary Salazar) _____________________________________________________ Keith Salette TITLE TBD FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Keith.Salette@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ John Saling Director, Special Programs MetaCarta, a Division of Qbase 1943 Isaac Newton Square East Suite 200 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jsaling@metacarta.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gary Salisbury Vice President, Business Develop Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gary.salisbury@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Charles Salvaggio TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Salvatori Deputy Undersecretary for Analys DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.salvatori@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ James Sample 1101 Market St Chattanooga , TN 37402 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: j31k@pge.com _____________________________________________________ Timothy R Sample VP, Special Programs Organizatio Battelle Colonial Place Operations 2111 Wilson Blvd Suite 1000 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: crockerr@battelle.org _____________________________________________________ Timothy R Sample VP, Special Programs Organizatio Battelle Colonial Place Operations Tim Sample 2111 Wilson Blvd Suite 1000 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: crockerr@battelle.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Zachary K Sams Technical Recruiter SRC 14685 Avion Parkway Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: zsams@srcinc.com _____________________________________________________ Justin Samuel 888 N. Quincy Street 603 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: samuel_justin@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jeffrey Sanders 1551 N. Glenville Drive Richardson , TX 75081 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ MRS Barbara S Sanderson BSEE Dir, NGC Northrop Grumman 1000 Wilson Blvd Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (703) 532-2444 Fax: (703) 741-7790 Email: barbara.sanderson@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Neil Sandhoff Director of Business Development Sotera Defense Solutions, Inc 1501 Farm Credit Drive Suite 2300 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Lara Sanford TITLE TBD DIA 7400 Defense Pentagon Rm. 3E-258 Washington , DC 20301-7400 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Lara.Sanford@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Terry Santavicca TITLE TBD TASC 4805 Stonecroft Blvd Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: terry.santavicca@tasc.com _____________________________________________________ Anthony Santino 11717 Exploration Lane Germantown , MD 20876 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: anthony.santino@hughes.com _____________________________________________________ Matt Stern TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Matthew.Stern@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Tracy G Stevens President Innoviss 8401 Connecticut Avenue Chevy Chase , MD 20815 Phone: (301) 879-9433 Fax: (301) 656-0625 Email: tgraves@innoviss.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bruce Stewart SVP CACI 40 Wyoming Dr. Jackson , NJ 8527 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Bstewart@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bruce Stewart Senior Vice President CACI 40 Wyoming Dr Jackson , NJ 8527 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: BStewart@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Stewart 8301 Greensboro Drive McLean , VA 22079 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stewartmj@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Michael J Stewart VP, Business Development Directo SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.j.stewart@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Vincent Stewart Director of Intelligenceáááááááá DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Vincent.stewart@usmc.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Stan Stimms Director, Security DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stan.stimms@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Brian Stites CAG for the Consolidated Staff ( NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bmstite@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kathryn N Stockhausen 1220 East West Highway Apt 218 Silver Spring , MD 20910 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: knicolestockhausen@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Paul Stockton Assistant Secretary for Homeland DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Don Stokes Director, Strategic Tech, Joint CIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 482-1739 Email: donaljo@ucia.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Stolarik President,COO QinetiQ North America 7918 Jones Branch Drive Suite 350 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mike.stolarik@analex.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Corin Stone Deputy General Counsel and Actin ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: corin.stone@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Don Stone TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: d_stone@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Garnett Stowe Vice President, National Intelli Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gstowe@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Sam Stowers 412 East 21st Street Sioux Falls , SD 57105 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stowers.sam@spectrumresolutions.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Timothy A Strait 25050 Riding Plaza #130-150 South Riding , VA 20152 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tstrait@msshq.com _____________________________________________________ Andy Strampach Vice President Business Developm Cobham Analytic Solutions 5875 Trinity Parkway Suite 300 Centreville , VA 20120 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Richard Strathearn Sr. Mgr Business Development Lockheed Martin 1111 Lockheed Martin Way O/P7AS, B/156E Sunnyvale , CA 94089 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: richard.a.strathearn@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Linda Strating 1521 16th St. NW Washington , DC 20036 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: strating@iwp.edu _____________________________________________________ Steve Stratton SVP Business Development QinetiQ North America 7918 Jones Branch Drive Suite 350 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Herbert Strauss 6230 Jean Louise Way Alexandria , VA 22310 Phone: (703) 313-9664 Fax: (none) Email: herb.strauss@gartner.com _____________________________________________________ Rob Strayer TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rob_strayer@hsgac.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Cara J Streb VP/Division Manager CACI 14046 Eagle Chase Circle Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cstreb@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Jennifer E Sims 3600 N St. NW, Georgetown Univ. Mortara Ctr. Washington , DC 20057 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Sims.jennifer@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Stan Sims Dir Of Security DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ssims@cox.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joshua Sinai 1501 Farm Credit Dr. Ste 2300 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joshua.sinai@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Mr Justin M Sinclair MS Intelligence Analyst Dept of Defense 4603 Holborn Ave Annandale , VA 22003 Phone: (571) 282-5802 Fax: (none) Email: jmsinclair@gmx.com _____________________________________________________ RADM Andrew M Singer Chair for Intelligence US Navy 6 Deer Forest Dr Monterey , CA 93940 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: singer.andy@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Hilery Sirpis Vice President Government Executive ADDRESS TBD Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ike Skelton Rep. Chair Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ike.skelton@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ John Skordas TITLE TBD SRA 4350 Fair Lakes Court Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jskordas@raba.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard Skulte Program Manager LMI 2000 Corporate Ridge McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rskulte@lmi.org _____________________________________________________ R. D Slack Department speaker of the faculty senate at Texas A&M TX 77843-2258 , -979 D-slack@tamu. Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: D-slack@tamu.edu _____________________________________________________ Jason Slackney 1746 Gilson St. Falls Church , VA 22043 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: j_slackney@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Bob Slapnik MBA & BS 7212 Chestnut Street Chevy Chase , MD 20815 Phone: (none) Fax: (301) 654-8745 Email: bob@hbgary.com _____________________________________________________ Anne-Marie Slaughter Policy Planning State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: slaughtera@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Dr. J. C Smart TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road NSOC, Suite 6433 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jcsmart@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Teresa Smetzer Strategic Account Executive LMI 2000 Corporate Ridge McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tsmetzer@lmi.org _____________________________________________________ Angela Smigel Sr. Staff Administrator Ensco, Inc. 5400 Port Royal Road Springfield , VA 22151 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 321-4609 Email: smigel.angela@ensco.com _____________________________________________________ Lynn Smiroldo Director of Business Managment QinetiQ North America 7918 Jones Branch Drive Suite 350 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lynn.smiroldo@qinetiq-na.com _____________________________________________________ Melissa Smislova Director DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Melissa.Smislova@hq.dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Brandon Smith TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brandon.smith@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Bryan Smith TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: B_Smith@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Clifton L Smith TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Conrad Smith TITLE TBD SR Technologies, Inc. 4101 SW 47 Ave Suite 102 Fort Lauderdale , FL 33314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Courtney Smith GeoEye 21700 Atlantic Blvd. Suite 500 Dulles , VA 20166 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: smith.courtney@geoeye.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Smith TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dsmith@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. H. G Smith Chief Scientist NGA 4600 Sangamore Rd., M/D D-82 Bethesda , MD 20816 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Harold.G.Smith@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Kay Sears President Intelsat General Corporation 6550 Rock Spring Drive Suite 450 Bethesda , MD 20817 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kay.sears@intelsatgeneral.com _____________________________________________________ Kim Seastrom Admin The MITRE Corporation 7515 Colshire Dr McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: seastrom@mitre.org _____________________________________________________ Kathleen Sebelius Secretary Health and Human Services Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Shelly.watson@hhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Sebra Director, Recruiting BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.sebra@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Adam Sedgewick Cyber Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: adam_sedgewick@hsgac.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Segal Director, Westfield Ops L-3 Communications - Government Services, Inc. 15049 Conference Center Drive Suite 200 Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mark.segal@l-3com.com _____________________________________________________ Mark Segal TITLE TBD L-3 Communications - Government Services, Inc. 15049 Conference Center Drive Suite 200 Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mark.segal@l-3com.com _____________________________________________________ CHARLES SEGARS 2850 OCEAN PARK BLVD STE 225 SANTA MONICA , CA 90405 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: CDSEGARS@LASD.ORG _____________________________________________________ Heather Seidl Business Analyst SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: heather.seidl@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Seidl 1490 Garden of the Gods Road Suite B Colorado Springs , CO 80907 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mike.seidl@rpssol.com _____________________________________________________ John Sekula 2111 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1120 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sharon Sellars TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kathleen Sellers Program Manager Sensa Solutions 2000 Corporate Ridge McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kathleen.Sellers@sensasolutions.com _____________________________________________________ Amber Sells Unknown Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Semancik TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wsemancik54@comcast.net; or wsemancik@ieee.net; or wjseman@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ralph Semmel Director Johns Hopkins University, APL 11100 Johns Hopkins Road Room 17-S344 Laurel , MD 20723 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ralph.semmel@jhuapl.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Peter Senholzi Director, Business Development Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: psenholzi@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Senich 7220 Old Dominion Drive McLean , VA 22101 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wmsenich@us.ibm.com _____________________________________________________ Arthur Sepeta Assistant General Counsel FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: arthur.sepeta@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Arun Seraphin Cyber Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: arun_seraphin@armed-services.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Allan Servi Senior Vice President Terremark 460 Spring Park Place Suite 1000 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: aservi@terremark.com _____________________________________________________ Stephanie Sever Operations Manager The Intelligence & Security Academy, LLC 1890 Preston White Drive Suite 250 Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stephanie@intellacademy.com _____________________________________________________ Kristin Seward TITLE TBD DIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kristin.seward@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Matthew A Shabat 7541 Heatherton Lane Potomac , MD 20854 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Shackelford 47317 Ox Bow Potomac Falls , VA 20165 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mikeshackelford@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Michelle Shader Director of Marketing Qwest Communications 4250 N. Fairfax Dr. 5th Floor Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michelle.shader@qwest.com _____________________________________________________ Michelle Shader TITLE TBD Qwest Communications 4250 N. Fairfax Dr. 5th Floor Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michelle.shader@qwest.com _____________________________________________________ Michelle Shader Marketing Director Qwest Government Services, Inc. 4250 N. Fairfax Dr 5th Fl Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michelle.shader@qwest.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Curt Shaffer Executive Director Global Tech Ops 2 Davenport Drive Downingtown , PA 19335 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cshaffer@globaltechops.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Glen Shaffer President & COO Kforce Government Solutions 2750 Prosperity Ave. Suite 300 Fairfax , VA 22031 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gshaffer@dnovus.com _____________________________________________________ Glen Shaffer Executive Vice President KGS 1355 Central Parkway S. Ste 100 San Antonio , TX 78232 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gshaffer@kgsgov.com _____________________________________________________ Glen Shaffer Executive Vice President KGS 1355 Central Parkway S Ste 100 San Antonio , TX 78232 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gshaffer@kforcegov.com _____________________________________________________ Tiffany Shaffery Intelligence Analyst CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tshaffery@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Paul Shahady 4390 Powder Horn Drive Beavercreek , OH 45432 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pashahady@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Shaheen 8509 Hempstead Avenue Bethesda , MD 20817 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mshaheen@civitasgroup.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John A Shakespeare 9417 Goldfield Lane Burke , VA 22015-4213 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Zani Drizan Shala YES Coordinator off AKC Association of Kosovo Criminallist -Justice Prishtina Prishtina 11000 Yugoslavia Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: drizan.shala@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Stanley Shanfield PhD Technical Program Director Draper Laboratory 555 Technology Square Cambridge , MA 02465 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sshanfield@draper.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Shank TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 2727 Technology Drive Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Susan Shapero Director, Advd Tech PGeneral Man Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: susan.shapero@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Andrew J Shapiro Political-Military Affairs State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: shapiroaj@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Tammi Shapiro Public Sector Operations Manager Quest Software - Public Sector Group 700 King Farm Boulevard Suite 250 Rockville , MD 20850 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tammi.shapiro@quest.com _____________________________________________________ Mark B Shappee 674 County Square Drive, Suite 1 Ventura , CA 93003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mark@venturemanagement.com _____________________________________________________ Theodore Sharp Business Manager SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sharptd@saic.com _____________________________________________________ mr nigel l sharpe Nigel Sharpe 410X, Ridgeway, Lusaka 100100 Zambia Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nigelsharpe07@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Pleaman F Shaver 4048 Higley Rd Bldg 1452 Dahlgren , VA 22448 Phone: (540) 775-0477 Fax: (none) Email: pshaver@jwac.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. K. Shea 14668 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: k.stuart.shea@saic.com _____________________________________________________ K. S Shea President, Intelligence, Securit SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: k.stuart.shea@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Philip Shea Director, Intelligence, DHS QinetiQ North America 7918 Jones Branch Drive Suite 350 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: phil.shea@qinetiq-na.com _____________________________________________________ Stu Shea Group President SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sheaks@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Daniel Shostak 2445 Lyttonsville Road #1505 Silver Spring , MD 20910 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: danielshos@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Justin Shum INSA OCI Task Force Raytheon Required unless Parent Required unless Parent , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Stephen Sibold 12 Pennsbury Ct. Fredericksburg , VA 22406 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lecsas0930@earthlink.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Vincent Sica Program Management Vice Presiden Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: vincent.n.sica@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Siebert Director, Defense Agencies Group Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: robert.siebert@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Robert A Siebert Director, HP APG Fed Sales Hewlett Packard Robert Siebert 1582 Rossback Road Davidsonville , MD 21035 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: robert.siebert@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Siebs Vice President, Deputy Business CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dsiebs@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Steve Sieke SVP IT and Professional Svcs Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Renee Siemiet 4504 West Juniper Drive, Apt B USAF Academy , CO 80840 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: renee.siemiet@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Rhea Siers TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road DC3, Suite 6248 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rdsiers@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Jenn Silk TITLE TBD DoD 13646 Forest Pond Court Centreville , VA 20121 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jksilk@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Jennifer Silk 13646 Forest Pond Ct Centreville , VA 20121 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jennifer.silk@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Captain Joel Silk 702 E. Capitol St NE Washington , DC 20003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joel.silk@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Joel Silk TITLE TBD NSA 13646 Forest Pond Court Centreville , VA 20121 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joel.silk@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Mark Silver Acting Deputy DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mark.silver@usmc.mil _____________________________________________________ Robert Silver MSC 3BF New Mexico State University Las Crusez , NM 88003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rsilver@msu.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ariel Silverstone 3530 Berkeley Park Ct Duluth , GA 30096 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: arielsilverstone@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Bob Simmons Minority Staff Director Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bob.simmons@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Janet A Simmons Masters EVP and COO Global Resource Solutions, Incorporated Janet Simmons 1001 N. Fairfax Street Suite 420 Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (301) 274-0741 Fax: (703) 535-7866 Email: jsimmons@grsco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Paul Simmons Account Executive Dell Inc. One Dell Way One Dell Way Round Rock , TX 78682 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: paul_e_simmons@dell.com _____________________________________________________ Denis Simon School of International Affairs 245 Katz Building University Park , PA 16802 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jim Simon General Manager, Inst. For Adv. Microsoft Corporation 5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jisimon@microsoft.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Alan Simpson 1520 Spruce Street #101 Philadelphia , PA 19102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: intel@comlinks.com _____________________________________________________ Renee Simpson S&I Staff Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Renee_Simpson@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Dr. Jennifer Sims School of Foreign Service Washington , DC 20057 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jes67@georgetown.edu _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Sheaffer President, N.American Public Sec Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jsheaffer@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Hal Shear TITLE TBD GrayDome, Inc. P.O. Box 5902 Annapolis , MD 21403 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: hshear@graydome.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jacob Shebel 5574 Burnside Drive #4 Rockville , MD 20853 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jacob.shebel@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Jacob Shebel TITLE TBD FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jacob.shebel@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Earl Sheck Vice President, Defense Intellig Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: earl.sheck@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Shedd Deputy Director of National Inte DIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david.shedd@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Steve Sheldon TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road K8, Suite 6672 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Andrea Shemel Principal Consultant Oracle 1910 Oracle Way Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: andrea.shemel@oracle.com _____________________________________________________ Lori Shepard TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: l_shepard@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Sheppard Vice President, Geo-Intel Group BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: robert.sheppard@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Veronica C Sherard Divison Manager, Strategic BD ENSCO, Inc. Veronica Sherard 3110 Fairview Park Drive Suite 300 Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (321) 724-6487 Fax: (321) 783-9511 Email: sherard.veronica@ensco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Brian E Sheridan 8 Woodmere Circle Middletown , MD 21769 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: briansheridan9@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Brian E Sheridan BAE Systems 4075 Wilson Blvd Suite 900 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 387-7607 Email: brian.sheridan@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ William Shernit Required unless Parent Required unless Parent , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Marc Shichman Project Manager White Oak Technologiese, Inc. 1300 Spring Street Suite 320 Silver Spring , VA 20910 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Patrick Shields TITLE TBD ASI Government 1655 North Fort Meyer Drive Suite 1000 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jorge Shimabukuro Chief of Staff, Security DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jorge.shimabukuro@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Eric Shinseki Secretary, General Veterans Affairs No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: secva@va.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Masahiro Shiomi 1800 K st NW Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: msiomijp@gmai.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Jean M Shipley Communication Marketing Manager Ciena Corporation 1185 Sanctuary Parkway Suite 300 Alpharetta , GA 30004 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jshipley@ciena.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Shissler P.O. Box 2153 Ellicott City , MD 21041 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: John.Shissler@jhuapl.edu _____________________________________________________ Bryan Shonka Security Technology MPI Research 54943 N Main Street Mattawan , MI 49071 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bryan.shonka@mpiresearch.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Marvin Shoop TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Craig Short TITLE TBD Aligent 1615 7th Street S.W. MS: 130 Everett , WA 98203-6261 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: craig_short@agilent.com _____________________________________________________ Nadia Short TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Nadia.Short@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Cara Jo Streb Director, Line CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cstreb@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Travis Stright Student American University 6490 River Run Columbia , MD 21044 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: travis.stright@american.edu _____________________________________________________ COL Donald Strimbeck USA(Ret) 109 Broad St. P.O Box 519 Granville , WV 26534 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dcsoinks@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Dayna Strong Executive Assistant to the VP Eagle Alliance 2711 Technology Drive Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dstrong2@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Angela Stubblefield TSA Intelligence DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Angela.H.Stubblefield@faa.gov _____________________________________________________ Richard Stubblefield 1000 Independence Ave. Washington , DC 20585 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: richard.stubblefield@nnsa.doe.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bruce Stubbs EA for Maritime Domain Awareness DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bruce.stubbs@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Stuckey 3867 Chain Bridge Road Fairfax , VA 22030-3903 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Bookbear1@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Bill Studeman Consultant Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Carl Stuekerjuergen 102 Norwood Place Sterling , VA 20164 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: carlrita.stuekerjuergen@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Alicia Stump Marketing Communications Coordin Cobham Analytic Solutions 5875 Trinity Parkway Suite 300 Centreville , VA 20120 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jerry Stump 3734 Thomas Point Road Annapolis , MD 21403 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jerry.stump@centurum.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Mary Sturtevant Vice President, Intelligence Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mary.k.sturtevant@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Sarita Subbarao Former INSA Intern Chertoff Group, LLC 1110 Vermont Ave. NW Suite 1200 Washington , DC 20005 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Dr. Minda Suchan Director ITT Geospatial Minda Suchan 12930 Worldgate Dr, Suite 150 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (310) 919-7687 Fax: (571) 703-7471 Email: minda.suchan@itt.com _____________________________________________________ Laura Sucre Program Manager IBM - Federal Public Sector 2902 Beau Lane Fairfax , VA 22031 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lsucre@us.ibm.com _____________________________________________________ Daniel Suh 110 s.wise st arlington , VA 22204 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: donchicus@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Sulick Chief, National Clandestine Serv CIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 482-1973 Email: christyt@ucia.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Linda Sullivan TITLE TBD NRO 6319 Rockwell Road Burke , VA 22015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: linda.sullivan@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sally Sullivan TITLE TBD ManTech International Corporation 2500 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Tim Sullivan Tim Sullivan 305 Rockrimmon S Colorado Springs , CO 80919 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tsullivan@pcscm.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Troy Sullivan Director, Counterintelligence DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: troy.sullivan@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Yvette Sullivan Program Director The SI 15052 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: helen.d.demes@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Yvette Sullivan Program Management the SI 15052 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: yvette.f.sullivan@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ George Sumrall 15036 Conference Center Dr. Suite 500 East Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard E Sunday TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road F6, Suite 6905 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: resunda@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Laura Sunden Marketing Manager SR Technologies, Inc. 4101 SW 47 Ave Suite 102 Fort Lauderdale , FL 33314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Lsunden _____________________________________________________ Mr Thomas D Sundling CEO Secure Mission Solutions 11921 Freedom Drive Suite 730 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tsundling@securemissionsolutions.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Surrette 1919 Storm Drive Falls Church , VA 22043 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: RJSurrette@aol.com _____________________________________________________ John Sutton SVP Business Development QinetiQ North America 7918 Jones Branch Drive Suite 350 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Swain TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jswain@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Darin Swan Masters 6517 Livingston Rd Apt 103 Oxon Hill , MD 20745 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: digdug113@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. James K Swanson MBA, MIPP Senior Vice Presidneet Finmeccanica 1625 Eye Street, NW 12th Floor WASHINGTON , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (202) 225-6584 Email: james.swanson@finmeccanica.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Scott Swanson 1431 Hunter Suite A. Naperville , IL 60540 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chief@delphiresearch.us _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Swanson Chairman & CEO Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: william_h_swanson@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Susan Swart Asst Sec Chief Info Officer State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: swarts@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joseph Swartz 6454 Woodmere Place Centreville , VA 20120 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joseph.h.swartz@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Swetnam TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mikeswet@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Mike Swetnam TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mswetnam@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Khizer Syed TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: khizer.syed@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Sherill Sylvertooth 1855 Saint Francis Street #2105 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ssylvertooth@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Syphrit 2324 Fairview Terrace Alexandria , VA 22303 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.syphrit@pentagon.af.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Syphrit Targeting Action Officer DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.syphrit@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Laszlo Szente 2455 Rolling Plains Drive Herndon , VA 20171-2275 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: SzenteLS@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Sheaffer President, N.American Public Sec Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jsheaffer@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Hal Shear TITLE TBD GrayDome, Inc. P.O. Box 5902 Annapolis , MD 21403 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: hshear@graydome.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jacob Shebel 5574 Burnside Drive #4 Rockville , MD 20853 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jacob.shebel@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Jacob Shebel TITLE TBD FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jacob.shebel@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Earl Sheck Vice President, Defense Intellig Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: earl.sheck@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Shedd Deputy Director of National Inte DIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david.shedd@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Steve Sheldon TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road K8, Suite 6672 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Andrea Shemel Principal Consultant Oracle 1910 Oracle Way Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: andrea.shemel@oracle.com _____________________________________________________ Lori Shepard TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: l_shepard@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Sheppard Vice President, Geo-Intel Group BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: robert.sheppard@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Veronica C Sherard Divison Manager, Strategic BD ENSCO, Inc. Veronica Sherard 3110 Fairview Park Drive Suite 300 Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (321) 724-6487 Fax: (321) 783-9511 Email: sherard.veronica@ensco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Brian E Sheridan 8 Woodmere Circle Middletown , MD 21769 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: briansheridan9@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Brian E Sheridan BAE Systems 4075 Wilson Blvd Suite 900 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 387-7607 Email: brian.sheridan@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ William Shernit Required unless Parent Required unless Parent , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Marc Shichman Project Manager White Oak Technologiese, Inc. 1300 Spring Street Suite 320 Silver Spring , VA 20910 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Patrick Shields TITLE TBD ASI Government 1655 North Fort Meyer Drive Suite 1000 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jorge Shimabukuro Chief of Staff, Security DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jorge.shimabukuro@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Eric Shinseki Secretary, General Veterans Affairs No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: secva@va.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Masahiro Shiomi 1800 K st NW Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: msiomijp@gmai.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Jean M Shipley Communication Marketing Manager Ciena Corporation 1185 Sanctuary Parkway Suite 300 Alpharetta , GA 30004 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jshipley@ciena.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Shissler P.O. Box 2153 Ellicott City , MD 21041 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: John.Shissler@jhuapl.edu _____________________________________________________ Bryan Shonka Security Technology MPI Research 54943 N Main Street Mattawan , MI 49071 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bryan.shonka@mpiresearch.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Marvin Shoop TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Craig Short TITLE TBD Aligent 1615 7th Street S.W. MS: 130 Everett , WA 98203-6261 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: craig_short@agilent.com _____________________________________________________ Nadia Short TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Nadia.Short@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jamileh Soudah 1000 Indendence Ave SW NA-116, FOR 4B-044 Washington , DC 20585 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jamileh.soudah@nnsa.doe.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Trumbull D Soule TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tdsoule@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Peter Sowa Program Dir Intel Svcs Ctr Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Mr. Anthony Spadaro President Spadaro & Associates 4634 North 38th Street Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22207 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: spadaro@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kathryn Spear Kathryn Spear 1000 Technology Dr. Pittsburgh , PA 15219 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kathryn.Spear@ansaldo-sts.us _____________________________________________________ Elyssa J Speier Kipps DeSanto & Company 1600 Tysons Blvd Suite 375 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Elizabeth Spiegle Program Manager BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: elizabeth.spiegle@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Larry Spilman 13542 Travilah Road North Potomac , MD 20878-3800 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: l.spilman@att.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Karl Spinnenweber Director, Business Development Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kspinnen@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Noah Spivak Principal Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: spivak_noah@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. George Spix Architect, Inst. For Adv. Tech i Microsoft Corporation 5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gspix@microsoft.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Daniel Spohn TITLE TBD The Intelligence & Security Academy, LLC 1890 Preston White Drive Suite 250 Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: danspohn@msn.com _____________________________________________________ William Springer 25208 Larks Terrace South Riding , VA 20152 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bllspringer@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ DJ Spry 2454 Chelmsford Dr Crofton , MD 21114 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: djspry@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Jeffrey Spugnardi 5849 North 26th St Arlington , VA 22207 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jspug@vt.edu _____________________________________________________ Ms. Lisa Spuria Deputy Director, Analysis and Pr NGA 4600 Sangamore Road Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (301) 227-7451 Email: lisa.j.spuria@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Squier Police Dept, 100 Bureau Dr. Bldg 101,Rm A-16 Gaithersburg , MD 20899-1911 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.squier@nist.gov _____________________________________________________ Judy St. George Executive Assistant FedCap Partners, LLC 11951 Freedom Drive 13th Floor Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Craig A Stafford II II 13510 Oaklands Manor Drive Laurel , MD 20708 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: StaffordC88@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Carl Stahlman 10241 Bristol Channel Ellicott City , MD 21042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: carl.stahlman@mac.com _____________________________________________________ Sandra Stanar-Johnson NSA Liaison to DHS NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sstanar@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Eric Stange Senior Executive Accenture No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: eric.s.stange@accenture.com _____________________________________________________ Joe Stanisha 4501 N. Fairfax Dr Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Leon R Stanley TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road SSG, Suite 6441 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lrstanl@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Stanton 619 S Garfield St Arlington , VA 22204 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: camus666ster@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Dave Stapley SVP, International Business Deve DRS Technologies, Inc. 5 Sylvan Way Parsippany , NJ 7054 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dstapley@drs.ca.com _____________________________________________________ Wayne Starrs Sr Director, Apps Dev General Dynamics IT, NDIS 13857 McLearen Road Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wayne.starrs@gdit.com _____________________________________________________ Alissa Starzak TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: a_starzak@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ CJ Staton INSA OCI Task Force CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Carol Staubach 11659 Gilman Lane Herndon , VA 20170-2420 Phone: (703) 430-0924 Fax: (none) Email: carols2002@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Carol Staubach Vice President Booz Allen Hamilton 11659 Gilman Lane Herndon , VA 20170-2420 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: staubach_carol@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Staubach 11659 Gilman Ln Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tstaubach@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Rodolfo Steckerl U.S. EMBASSY BOGOTA DOJ RODOLFO STECKERL 70452 HWY 21 SUITE 200-125 COVINGTON , LA 70433 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. George Steeg Consultant ProposalCrafter 20550 Falcons Landing Circle #5005 Potomac Falls , VA 20165-3586 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gfsteeg@proposalcrafter.com _____________________________________________________ Catherine J Steele VP, Strategic Space Ops The Aerospace Corporation Attn: Linda Nicoll, M1-447 2310 E. El Segundo Blvd. El Segundo , CA 90245 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: catherine.j.steele@aero.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Delvicciho Steele 814 Sero Pine Lane Fort Washington , MD 20744 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dsteele128@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Delvicciho Steele TITLE TBD DIA 814 Sero Pine Lane Fort Washington , MD 20744 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Delvicciho.Steele@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Kent Steen 121 North Cove Drive Ponte Vedra Beach , FL 32082 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kent.steen@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Stefan 5485 Ashleigh Road Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wfstefan@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Stefan 5485 Ashleigh Road Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Victoria Steffes 42 Dixon Street Madison , WI 53704 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: vsteffes@wisc.edu _____________________________________________________ Mark Steidler Marketing Coordinator NeoSystems Corp. 8000 Towers Crescent Drive Suite 710 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: msteidler@neosystemscorp.com _____________________________________________________ Christopher Steinbach TITLE TBD Newberry Group 2510 Old Highway 94 South St. Charles , MO 63303 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Christopher J Steinbach President & CEO Newberry Group 2510 Old Highway 94 South St. Charles , MO 63303 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: csteinbach@thenewberrygroup.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. craig Steinberg Sr Partner Meridian Group International 219 S.E. 25th Ave. Boynton Beach , FL 33435 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: csteinberg@meridiangroupintl.com _____________________________________________________ James B Steinberg Deputy Secretary State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: SteinbergJB@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Steinke 6034 Richmond Hwy. Apt 505 Alexandria , VA 22303-2109 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.steinke@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Kristen Stephen Legislative Assistant/Legis Fell DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kristen.Stephen@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Trae Stephens Forward Deployed Engineer Palantir Technologies 1660 International Drive 8th Floor McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. George Stephenson Dir, NGES Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: george.stephenson@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Jim Smythers TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: j_smythers@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Albert Snell TITLE TBD Computer Associates No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: albert.snell@ca.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Fredd Snell TITLE TBD USIS 7799 Leesburg Pike Suite 400 S Falls Church , VA 22043 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: fredd.snell@usis.com _____________________________________________________ Gordon Snow Acting Director, Cyber Division FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gordon.snow@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Asst. Sec. James Snyder Deputy Assistant Secretary, NPPD DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.snyder@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Jeffrey C Snyder TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Michael A Snyder Associate Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (410) 858-7706 Fax: (none) Email: snyder_michael@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Rodney Snyder 20704 Parkside Circle Potomac Falls , VA 20165 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: RodneyASnyder@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Scott Snyder TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Vince Snyder 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Vince Snyder Vice President, Defense Systems The SI 15052 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: helen.d.demes@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gary Sojka Partner The Potomac Advocates 7360 Bloomington Court Springfield , VA 22150 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gary@potadv.com _____________________________________________________ Dan Soliman TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 2305 Mission College Boulevard Santa Clara , CA 95054 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Sarah Soliman 1115 Old Cedar Road McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sklovell@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Hilda L. Solis Secretary Labor Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ExecutiveSecretariat@dol.gov _____________________________________________________ Carl Solomon Vice President Entegra Systems 2342 Ballard Way Ellicott City , MD 21042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: carl@entegrasystems.com _____________________________________________________ Linda K Solomon Principal Deloitte Consulting Earlease Jackson 1001 G Street, NW Suite 900W Washington , DC 20001 Phone: (none) Fax: (202) 661-1670 Email: lsolomon@deloitte.com _____________________________________________________ LCDR Timothy C Sommella Program Reviewer U.S. Coast Guard COMDT (CG-82) U.S. Coast Guard 2100 2nd Street SW STOP 7245 Washington , DC 20593 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: timothy.c.sommella@uscg.mil _____________________________________________________ Mark Sommer 1266 Teaneck Road #10A Teaneck , NJ 7666 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brocean@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Stephen Songy 716 Earl of Chesterfield Lane Virginia Beach , VA 23454 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stevesongy@mjww.net _____________________________________________________ Dr. Allan Sonsteby Assoicate Director, Communicatio Pennsylvania State University - App. Research Labo P.O. Box 30 State College , PA 16804 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ags108@only.arl.psu.edu _____________________________________________________ Marcus Soriano B.A. Psy. Contract Assistant Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Mclean , VA 22204 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: marcus.l.soriano@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Eric Sosnitsky Director, Government Sales Core180, Inc. 2751 Prosperity Drive Suite 200 Vienna , VA 22031 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Pamela Sotnick TITLE TBD Composite Software Inc. 11921 Freedom Drive Suite 550 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Pamela Sotnick Account Manager Composite Software Inc. 11921 Freedom Drive Suite 550 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pam@compositesw.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Hal Smith Vice President, Intelligence & L Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: hsmith30@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jeffrey Smith none Arnold & Porter 555 Twelfth Street, NW Washington , DC 20004 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Jeffrey_Smith@aporter.com _____________________________________________________ Jeffrey E Smith VP BD DoD Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jeffrey E Smith VP Serco Jeffrey Smith 1818 Library St Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: JESmith@serco-na.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joel Smith TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jrsmith@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Smith TITLE TBD ManTech International Corporation 2500 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. John T Smith 12508 Ridgegate Drive Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jsmith611@cox.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joseph Smith 4822 Union Cypress Place West Melbourne , FL 32904 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jcsmithjr@cfl.rr.com _____________________________________________________ Judy Smith TITLE TBD ITT 12975 Worldgate Dr. Building M1 Herdon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: judy.smith@itt.com _____________________________________________________ Kevin Smith 2122 Massachusetts Ave NW Apt 209 Washington , DC 20008 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kws.international@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Smith 3782 Plum Meadow Drive Ellicott City , MD 21042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michaelmasmth@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Smith 3620 Beacon Point St Las Vegas , NV 89133 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: msi@co.clark.nv.us _____________________________________________________ Michael Smith 3620 Beacon Point Street Las Vegas , NV 89129 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: msi@co.clark.nv.us _____________________________________________________ Mr. Neal A Smith TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road I, Suite 6577 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nasmith@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Paul Smith Assistant Vice President, Specia Intec Billing, Inc. 301 North Perimeter Center Suite 200 Atlanta , GA 30346 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: paul.smith@intecbilling.com _____________________________________________________ Ray Smith Program Manager National Counterterrorism Center 8531 Welsh Pony Ct Gainesville , VA 20155 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ray.smith@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Ray Smith Project Manager NCTC 8531 Welsh Pony Ct Gainesville , VA 20155 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ray.c.smith@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Raymond Smith 8531 Welsh Pony Ct. Gainsville , VA 20155 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ray.smith@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Richard Smith (aka Smith Balentine, Rod Jimmy) PO Box 1650 Soquel , CA 95073 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: california.globalist@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Rod Smith Abraxas Corp 12801 Worldgate Dr Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Rodney Smith Abraxas Corporation 12801 Worldgate Drive, Suite 800 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rsmith@abraxascorp.com _____________________________________________________ Rodney Smith President Abraxas Corporation 12801 Worldgate Dr Suite 800 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (301) 881-0126 Fax: (703) 821-8511 Email: rsmith@abraxascorp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ronald Smith 236 West Sixth St. Suite 206 Reno , NV 89503 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ron.smith@chw.edu _____________________________________________________ Zannie Smith TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Zannie.smith@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gregory Smithberg TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Max Poma 3801 Nebraska Avenue Washington , DC 20016 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: max.poma@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ David Pomerantz Staff Director Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david.pomerantz@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sabrina Porcelli 4 University Road #409 Cambridge , MA 2138 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sabrinaporcelli@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Elizabeth M Porter Director, Energy Initiatives Lockheed Martin, Corporate Engineering & Technolog 6801 Rockledge Drive #352 Bethesda , MD 20817 Phone: (none) Fax: (301) 897-6822 Email: liz.porter@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Pamela L Porter Director, NSA Office of Small Bu NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: plporte@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Scott Porter VP, NGES Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Terry Porter Director, Intelligence Programs Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: terrybev@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Terry Porter Director, Intelligence Programs Harris Corporation P.O. Box 37 MS: 2-21D Melbourne , FL 32902 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: terry_porter@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Terry Porter Director Intelligence Programs Raytheon Company 6225 Brandon Avenue Suite 320 Springfield , VA 22150 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tporte03@harris.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Norman Portner 18221 Cypress Point Terrace Leesburg , VA 20176 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nportner@npci.com _____________________________________________________ Michael H Posner Asst Sec Democracy, Human rights State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: posnermh@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Gregg Potter Vice J2 DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gregg.potter@js.pentagon.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jack Potter General Manager, Ops & Sustainme BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jack.potter@esi.baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Brian Potts TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Brian_Potts@appro.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard E Pound 205 Van Buren Street, Suite 300 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Richard.E.Pound@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Carl Powe 5614 Alta Dena St. Huntsville , AL 35802 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cpowe@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Benjamin Powell Partner Wilmer Hale 803 Beverley Drive Alexandria , VA 22302 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ben.powell@wilmerhale.com _____________________________________________________ Hannah Powell Special Assistant, Undersecretar DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Hannah.Powell@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Hannah R Powell 1255 New Hampshire Ave, NW Apt 214 Washington , DC 20036 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Nancy J Powell HR State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: powellnj@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Henry Power TITLE TBD Lockheed Martin Corporation 6029 Hortons Mill Court Haymarket , VA 20169 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: henry.power@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Mary Predenkoski TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Keith M Preising BA & MS Specialist Master Deloitte Consulting Keith M. Preising 1919 North Lynn Street Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (703) 793-9811 Fax: (none) Email: kpreising@deloitte.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ray Prescott Regional Vice President, INTEL Oracle Corporation 1910 Oracle Way Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: raymond.prescott@oracle.com _____________________________________________________ Mary C Presnell Cathy Presnell 1676 International Drive McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (202) 318-2274 Email: mpresnell@kpmg.com _____________________________________________________ Salvatore Presti Vice President Eti Engineering Inc. 4219 Lafayette Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sal.presti@eti-eng.com _____________________________________________________ Salvatore Presti Vice President ETI Engineering, Inc. 4219 Lafayette Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 318-7102 Email: sal.presti@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Bernadette Preston TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road R3, Suite 6883 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Stephen Preston General Counsel CIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: christyt@ucia.gov _____________________________________________________ Doug Price Operations Manager Cobham Analytic Solutions 5875 Trinity Parkway Suite 300 Centreville , VA 20120 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Laura Price 1676 International Drive McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lprice@kpmg.com _____________________________________________________ Laura Price Partner KPMG LLP Laura Price 1676 International Drive McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lprice@kpmg.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Price 1934 Old Gallows Road #350 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mprice@jamitek.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Dana Priest Staff Writer The Washington Post 1150 15th St. NW Washington , DC 20071 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: priestd@washpost.com _____________________________________________________ Jayne P Prin Dir of Leadership NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jayne.p.prin@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Tim Prince TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Tim.Prince@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Larry Prior TITLE TBD ManTech International Corporation 2500 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lawrence.prior@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Todd Probert TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Prohaska 7403 Gateway Court Manassas , VA 20109 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jprohaska@fulcrumco.com _____________________________________________________ William Prosser Client Business Manager AT&T Government Solutions-NIS 7125 Columbia Gateway Drive Suite 100 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wp5243@att.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gary Pulliam Vice President, Civil & Commerci The Aerospace Corporation Attn: Linda Nicoll, M1-447 2310 E. El Segundo Blvd. El Segundo , CA 90245 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gary.p.pulliam@aero.org _____________________________________________________ Andy Purdy Required unless Parent Required unless Parent , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ SPC Roman Pyatetsky Specialist Army - State Guard of the State of New York 2520 Batchelder St. Suite 8J Brooklyn , NY 11235 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Roman.pyatetsky@newyorkguard.us _____________________________________________________ Martijn Rasser TITLE TBD CIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 482-1739 Email: MARTIJR@ucia.gov _____________________________________________________ Martijn Rasser Military Analyst CIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: MARTIJR@ucia.gov _____________________________________________________ Mina Rath TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Greg Rattray Principal Delta Risk LLC 2804 N. Seminary Chicago , IL 60657 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: grattray@delta-risk.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Justin A Rauschuber Intelligence Analyst USN 5312 Mt. Olive Rd Adkins , TX 78101 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: justinrauschuber06@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Erik Raven TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Erik_Raven@appro.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Abbas Ravjani Professional Staff Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: abbas.ravjani@aya.yale.edu _____________________________________________________ Rodger Rawls TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Rodger.Rawls@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Bill Ray VP-Sales/Business Development Basis Technology One Alewife Center Cambridge , MA 02140-2323 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Katie Ray Foundation Coordinator & Sales S GeoEye 2325 Dulles Corner Blvd. Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Paul Reagan Chief of Staff, Sen. Webb Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: paul_reagan@webb.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Suzanne Reardon Research Fellow LMI 2000 Corporate Ridge McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sreardon@lmi.org _____________________________________________________ Timothy Reardon INSA OCI Task Force Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. J R Reddig Senior Director, Technical CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jreddig@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Reddig 4502 Arlington Boulevard #405 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jayare303@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Alissa Redding Systems Engineering Mgr the SI 15052 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: helen.d.demes@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Redgraves IA Senior IA Architect, Suite 64 NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mrredgr@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Gloria Redman 22548 Glenn Drive Suite 105 Sterling , VA 20164-4447 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gredman@triumph-tech.com _____________________________________________________ Melinda Redman 5887 Kara Place Burke , VA 22015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mredman@totalintel.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Melinda Redman 901 N. Glebe Road, Suite 901 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mredman@totalintel.com _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Annette Redmond 1906 Ames Ct Woodbridge , VA 22191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ffrenchie15@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Frank Redner Manager Government Program Devel Software Engineering Institute, CMU NRECA Building Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Jack Reed Sen. Committee Member Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rosanne_haroian@reed.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jon Reed Director Special Programs Harris Corporation P.O. Box 37 MS: 2-21D Melbourne , FL 32902 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jreed@harris.com _____________________________________________________ Ann Reese TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Ann.Reese@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Gary Reese Professional Staff Member Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Gary_Reese@appro.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Garry Reid Deputy Assistant Secretary, Spec DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: garry.reid@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kim S Reid 4853 Tobacco Way Woodbridge , VA 22193 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kim.reid@fas.usda.gov _____________________________________________________ Peter R Reif 42920 Nashua Street Ashburn , VA 20147 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: prreif@msn.com _____________________________________________________ Laurinda Reifsteck BS, MS Special Agent Air Force Office of Special Investigations 1535 Command Drive Andrews AFB , MD 20762 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: laurinda.reifsteck@us.af.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Reinhardt N.American Public Sector, Sr Bus Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: treinhardt@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Tracy A Reinhold National Security Branch, Direct FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tracy.reinhold@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Reist TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dreist@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ernest Reith Deputy Director, InnoVision Dire NGA 4600 Sangamore Road Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ernest.reith@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ernest Reith Dep Dir - S&T Branch FBI Ernest Reith/A-EAD STB 935 Pennsylvania Ave, NW Room 7270 Washington , DC 20535 Phone: (none) Fax: (202) 324-0705 Email: ernest.reith@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Reith 9800 Rod Road Alpharetta , GA 30022 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: intelrisk@earthlink.net _____________________________________________________ Phil Reitinger Deputy Undersecretary, NPPD DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Philip.Reitinger@Dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Scott Renda Policy Analyst, Platform Manager U.S. Office of Management and Budget 1511 Park Rd NW #33 Washington , DC 20010 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: renda@runbox.com _____________________________________________________ Mark Resnik Manager Deloitte Consulting, LLP 39659 Rosebay Court Indian Land , SC 29707 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mresnik@deloitte.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. John Retelle TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jretelle@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Thomas Revay 9105 Murdock Road Fairfax , VA 22032 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thom0573@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Reybold TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Silvestre Reyes Rep. Chair Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (202) 225-2016 Email: liza.lynch@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael K Reynolds 21101 Carthagena Ct Ashburn , VA 20147 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Michael.Reynolds@Marklogic.com _____________________________________________________ Michael K Reynolds Sr. Director Business Developmen Marklogic Michael Reynolds 1600 Tysons Blvd Suite 800 Mclean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Michael.Reynolds@Marklogic.COM _____________________________________________________ Michael K Reynolds Sr. Director Business Developmen Marklogic Michael Reynolds 1600 Tysons Blvd Suite 800 Mclean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Michael.Reynolds@Marklogic.COM _____________________________________________________ Mr. Barry Rhine Sector Vice President and Genera Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: barry.rhine@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Rob Rhode Required unless Parent Required unless Parent , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Charles Rhodes BS/MBA ODNI ODNI Charles Rhodes 3223 Walbridge Place NW Washington , DC 20010 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Rhodesiii3@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. George Rhodes Vice President/General Manager S General Dynamics - Information Technology 7902 Oak Hollow Lane Fairfax Station , VA 22039 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: george.rhodes@gdit.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Rhodes 2823 Hitchcock Mill Run Marietta , GA 30068 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jrrhodes@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. James R Rhodes III Lead Architect TRSS, LLC 1410 Spring Hill Rd Suite 140 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bob.rhodes@trssllc.com _____________________________________________________ Jill D Rhodes TITLE TBD ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jill.d.rhodes@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Matthew Rhodes 18862 Bent Willow Circle #1032 Germantown , MD 20874 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mrhodes3@umd.edu _____________________________________________________ Stephen Riccitelli 2955 Madison Avenue Unit 40 Bridgeport , CT 06606-2071 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sasd127@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Dan Rice VP, IS&GS-Security, Spatial Solu Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gregory Rice Director of BD Boeing 3370 E. Miraloma Avenue Anaheim , CA 92806 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sean.rice@boeing.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Richard Director, Business Development Sypris Electronics 10901 N. McKinley Drive Tampa , FL 33612 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mark.richard@sypris.com _____________________________________________________ John Richardson 1912 N. 13th St. #102 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jlr94@georgetown.edu _____________________________________________________ Melissa M Richardson TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Aaron Richman PO Box 56555 Phila , PA 19111 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ARICHMAN3@GMAIL.COM _____________________________________________________ Michelle Richman Application Design Manager SRA 1252 Harbor Island Walk Baltimore , MD 21230 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mrichman411@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Kathleen Rick TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: K_rick@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Scott Rickard SVP Business Development Telesecret Inc. 545 Lanternback Island Dr Satellite Beach , FL 32937 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: scott@telesecret.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Wayne Riegel TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Robert Riegle Senior Executive Service DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: robert.riegle@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert C Riegle JD COO Mission Concepts, Inc. 902A Prince St. Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: robert_riegle@missionconcepts.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. H. L Riley TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road M, Suite 6665 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: hlriley@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Edward Rinkavage TITLE TBD CentralPoint 901 N. Stuart Street Ste 810 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: erinkavage@i-centralpoint.com _____________________________________________________ Mr Albert J Rio Jr consultant IBM Corporation 12533 Ridgemoor Lake Court St. Louis , MO 63131 Phone: +34-670-02-8556 Fax: (none) Email: albert.rio@es.ibm.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Steven Ritchey 4400 Fair Lakes Court Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sritchey@afcea.org _____________________________________________________ Debbie L Rivera Manager, Marketing and Communica General Dynamics IT Debbie Rivera 13857 McLearen Road Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 268-7885 Email: debbie.rivera@gdit.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Debra Rivera Marketing Coordinator General Dynamics IT, NDIS 15000 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20121 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: debbie.rivera@gdit.com _____________________________________________________ Debra L Rivera TITLE TBD General Dynamics IT, NDIS 15000 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20121 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: debbie.rivera@gdit.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Rixse 750 N. Tamiami Trail #619 Sarasota , FL 34236 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jrixse@earthlink.net _____________________________________________________ Doug Roach TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: doug.roach@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Andrew Robbert Practice Director, Consulting NS Oracle Corporation 1910 Oracle Way Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: drew.robbert@oracle.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. David W Robbins BSEE, MEEE VP for Operations SAIC, Applied CBRNE & DE Operation David W Robbins SAIC 10260 Campus Point Drive San Diego , CA 92121 Phone: (none) Fax: (858) 826-2225 Email: robbinsd@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Donna M Roberson Roberson Group 101 Constitutution Avenue NW Suite L110 Washington , DC 20001 Phone: (none) Fax: (202) 204-5606 Email: donnaroberson@robersongroup.com _____________________________________________________ Charles Robert Member of Technical Staff Sandia National Laboratories P.O. Box 5800 Albuquerque , NM 87185 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cjrober@sandia.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bruce Roberts TITLE TBD Cubic Defense Applications, Inc. 9333 Balboa Ave San Diego , CA 92123 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bruce.roberts@cubic.com _____________________________________________________ Bruce Roberts TITLE TBD Cubic Defense Applications, Inc. 9333 Balboa Ave San Diego , CA 92123 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bruce.roberts@cubic.com _____________________________________________________ Daniel D Roberts Criminal Justice Information Ser FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: daniel.roberts@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gregory Roberts President, Communications System L-3 Communications/Com.Sys.East 1 Federal Street A&E-2C Camden , NJ 8103 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: greg.roberts@l-3com.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Phil Roberts Chief of Staff DIA 7400 Defense Pentagon Rm. 3E-258 Washington , DC 20301-7400 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Phillip.Roberts@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Terry Roberts TITLE TBD Software Engineering Institute, CMU No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: twroberts@sei.cmu.edu _____________________________________________________ Terry Roberts Executive Director Software Engineering Institute 4301 Wilson Blvd Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 908-9235 Email: twroberts@sei.cmu.edu _____________________________________________________ Richard Robey BSME, MBA Director Business Development Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Deborah Robinson Director, National Programs SAIC 14668 Lee road Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: deborah.a.robinson@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Deborah Robinson Business Development Raytheon Company 22260 Pacific Blvd Sterling , VA 20166 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: deborah.a.robinson@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Deborah Robinson Business Development Raytheon 22270 Pacific Blvd Sterling , VA 20166 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: deborah.a.robinson@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Dwayne Robinson President/CEO of VSTI, A SAS Com SAS Institute 1530 Wilson Blvd Suite 800 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr Ross R Robinson BBA President Icentric Marketing, Inc 25671 Tremaine Terrace South Riding , VA 20152 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 327-7440 Email: rrobinson@icentric-marketing.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Cheryl Roby DoD Chief Information Officer, O DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cheryl.roby@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Dr. Richard Roca Director Emeritus Johns Hopkins University, APL 11100 Johns Hopkins Road Room 17-S344 Laurel , MD 20723 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: richard.roca@jhuapl.edu _____________________________________________________ Edward M Roche, Ph.D.,J.D. Director of Scientific Intellige Barraclough Ltd. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: eroche@barracloughltd.com _____________________________________________________ Chris Rocheleau Deputy Director of Intelligence FAA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Chris.Rocheleau@faa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Christopher Rocheleau TITLE TBD Federal Aviation Administration 2903 Valley Dr Alexandria , VA 22302 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chris.rocheleau@faa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael T Rochford Sr. Counterintelligence Officer Oak Ridge National Lab Michael T. Rochford P O Box 2008 Building 5300, MS 6076 Oak Ridge , TN 37831 Phone: (none) Fax: (865) 241-0240 Email: rochfordmt@ornl.gov _____________________________________________________ Michael A Rodrigue Director, New Campus East PMO NGA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.rodrigue@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Carrie Rodriguez 1919 N. Lynn St. Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cwrodriguez@deloitte.com _____________________________________________________ Michelle Shader TITLE TBD Qwest Communications 4250 N. Fairfax Dr. 5th Floor Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michelle.shader@qwest.com _____________________________________________________ Michelle Shader Marketing Director Qwest Government Services, Inc. 4250 N. Fairfax Dr 5th Fl Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michelle.shader@qwest.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Curt Shaffer Executive Director Global Tech Ops 2 Davenport Drive Downingtown , PA 19335 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cshaffer@globaltechops.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Glen Shaffer President & COO Kforce Government Solutions 2750 Prosperity Ave. Suite 300 Fairfax , VA 22031 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gshaffer@dnovus.com _____________________________________________________ Glen Shaffer Executive Vice President KGS 1355 Central Parkway S. Ste 100 San Antonio , TX 78232 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gshaffer@kgsgov.com _____________________________________________________ Glen Shaffer Executive Vice President KGS 1355 Central Parkway S Ste 100 San Antonio , TX 78232 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gshaffer@kforcegov.com _____________________________________________________ Tiffany Shaffery Intelligence Analyst CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tshaffery@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Paul Shahady 4390 Powder Horn Drive Beavercreek , OH 45432 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pashahady@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Shaheen 8509 Hempstead Avenue Bethesda , MD 20817 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mshaheen@civitasgroup.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John A Shakespeare 9417 Goldfield Lane Burke , VA 22015-4213 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Zani Drizan Shala YES Coordinator off AKC Association of Kosovo Criminallist -Justice Prishtina Prishtina 11000 Yugoslavia Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: drizan.shala@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Stanley Shanfield PhD Technical Program Director Draper Laboratory 555 Technology Square Cambridge , MA 02465 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sshanfield@draper.com _____________________________________________________ Michael Shank TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 2727 Technology Drive Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Susan Shapero Director, Advd Tech PGeneral Man Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: susan.shapero@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Andrew J Shapiro Political-Military Affairs State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: shapiroaj@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Tammi Shapiro Public Sector Operations Manager Quest Software - Public Sector Group 700 King Farm Boulevard Suite 250 Rockville , MD 20850 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tammi.shapiro@quest.com _____________________________________________________ Mark B Shappee 674 County Square Drive, Suite 1 Ventura , CA 93003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mark@venturemanagement.com _____________________________________________________ Theodore Sharp Business Manager SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sharptd@saic.com _____________________________________________________ mr nigel l sharpe Nigel Sharpe 410X, Ridgeway, Lusaka 100100 Zambia Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nigelsharpe07@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Pleaman F Shaver 4048 Higley Rd Bldg 1452 Dahlgren , VA 22448 Phone: (540) 775-0477 Fax: (none) Email: pshaver@jwac.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. K. Shea 14668 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: k.stuart.shea@saic.com _____________________________________________________ K. S Shea President, Intelligence, Securit SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: k.stuart.shea@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Philip Shea Director, Intelligence, DHS QinetiQ North America 7918 Jones Branch Drive Suite 350 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: phil.shea@qinetiq-na.com _____________________________________________________ Stu Shea Group President SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sheaks@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Jon Ross Executive Director CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: 703-679-6465 Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mary Stone Ross TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mary.ross@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Deb Rossi Global Enterprise Manager NetApp 1921 Gallows Road Suite 600 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Deb.Rossi@netapp.com _____________________________________________________ Administrator Gale Rossides TSA Acting Administrator DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gale.rossides@tsa.dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard Rossmark 10173 Goodin Circle Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rrossmark@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Susan Roth TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Jenni Rothenberg TITLE TBD Deloitte Consulting, LLP No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Andrew Rothman Intelligence Resources Int. 111 Hillcrest Road Watchung , NJ 07069 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Arothman _____________________________________________________ Andrew Rothman Intelligence Resources Internati 111 Hillcrest Road Watchung , NJ 07069 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: arothman@me.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bradley Rotter 850 Corbett Ave suite 6 San Francisco , CA 94131 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brad@rotter.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John P Rowan McGuireWoods LLP 1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington , DC 20036 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: prowan@mcguirewoods.com _____________________________________________________ MR. Christopher R Rowe Director of Special Projects DHS 9956 worman Drive King George , VA 22485 Phone: (540) 775-6756 Fax: (none) Email: Christopher.rowe@HQ.dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Lloyd B Rowland Deputy Director NGA 4600 Sangamore Road, D-100 Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lloyd.b.rowland@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joe Rozek Executive Director-Homeland Secu Microsoft Corporation 5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jrozek@microsoft.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Timothy Ruane 1612 Kenwood Avenue Alexandria , VA 22302 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ta_ruane@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Michelle A Rubie-Smith Vice President GRS 1001 North Fairfax Street Suite 420 Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. David S Rubin Vice President Booz Allen Hamilton Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Drive McLean, , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rubin_d-Asst@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Stephen Rubley President/CEO TRSS, LLC 1410 Spring Hill Rd Suite 140 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stephen.rubley@trssllc.com _____________________________________________________ Ronald C Ruecker Office of Law Enforcement Coordi FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ronald.ruecker@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Ashley Rush Project Engineer Lockheed Martin 13530 Dulles Technology Dr Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ashley.rush@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Nate Rushfinn Enterprise Architect Computer Associates No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Melvern R Rushing TITLE TBD Eti Engineering Inc. 4219 Lafayette Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Melvern.Rushing@eti-eng.com _____________________________________________________ MR Rushing TITLE TBD Eti Engineering Inc. 4219 Lafayette Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Melvern.Rushing@eti-eng.com _____________________________________________________ John Russack Dir, NGIS Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. E.G. Russell 1399 Olde Towne Rd Alexandria , VA 22307 Phone: (703) 765-1183 Fax: (none) Email: polecat28@cox.net _____________________________________________________ Jacqueline Russell TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: j_russell@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ John Russell TITLE TBD SR Technologies, Inc. 4101 SW 47 Ave Suite 102 Fort Lauderdale , FL 33314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. John G Russell TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road DA3, Suite 6623 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jgrusse@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Maureen K Russell MA-IR, BA Associate Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (419) 308-1916 Fax: (none) Email: russell_maureen@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Trish Russell 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Dr. Pete Rustan TITLE TBD NRO 14675 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: peter.rustan@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Scott Rutz 2978 Millbridge Drive San Ramon , CA 94583 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: scott.rutz@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Amy E Ryan Liberty Crossing 1 Washington , DC 20505 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: aeryan09@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Cynthia R Ryan General Counsel NGA 4600 Sangamore Road, D-107 Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cynthia.r.ryan@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Daniel J Ryan Professor National Defense University Marshall Hall Ft. Lesley J. McNair Washington , DC 20319 Phone: (443) 994-3612 Fax: (202) 685-2986 Email: danryan@danjryan.com _____________________________________________________ David L Ryan VP, NGIS Northrop Grumman Information Systems 12900 Federal Systems Park Drive Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: David.L.Ryan@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Lucy Ryan 1421 Jefferson Davis Highway Suite 600 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lucy.ryan@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Stephen J Ryan 1391 Pennsylvania Ave SE Unit 416 Washington , DC 20003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stephen.jm.ryan@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Patricia Taylor Chief of the Intelligence Commun ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: patricia.t.taylor@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Teresa Taylor CEO Proteus Technologies 133 National Business Parkway Suite 150 Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (443) 539-3370 Email: tmtaylor@proteuseng.com _____________________________________________________ Teresa Taylor President Proteus Technologies 133 National Business Parkway Suite 150 Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Tina Taylor TITLE TBD QinetiQ North America 7918 Jones Branch Drive Suite 350 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Tina.Taylor@QinetiQ-NA.com _____________________________________________________ Robert Teague TITLE TBD Applied Signal Technology 460 West California Avenue Sunnyvale , CA 94086 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ROBERT_TEAGUE@appsig.com _____________________________________________________ Berico Technologies Directors at Berico Technologies Berico Technologies 1501 Lee Highway, Suite 303 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: directors@bericotechnologies.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jody Tedesco President & General Manager NJVC, LLC 8614 Westwood Center Drive Suite 300 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jody.tedesco@njvc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jody J Tedesco President NJVC, LLC 8614 Westwood Center Drive Suite 300 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 288-3068 Email: jody.tedesco@njvc.com _____________________________________________________ Stephen S Teel TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Theodore Tempel 1324 Grant Street Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ted.tempel@itt.com _____________________________________________________ Steven J Temple TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Pamela Tennyson TITLE TBD NRO 14675 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pamela.tennyson@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Kevin Tepley 22777 Portico Place Ashburn , VA 20148 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kdtepley@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Jack Terrell Sr Purchasing Mgr. Abraxas Corp 12801 Worldgate Dr Suite # 800 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: JACK.TERRELL@cubic.com _____________________________________________________ Paul Terry TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Paul.Terry@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Stacey Terry Manager PRTM Management Consultants, LLC 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Suite 1000 Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sterry@prtm.com _____________________________________________________ Caroline Tess TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: c_tess@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ rachel test test test , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rphillips@insaonline.org _____________________________________________________ Gary M Testut Director of Defense & Intelligen Ball Corporation Ball Aerospace & Technologies 2111 Wilson Blvd, Suite 1120 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cbarber@ball.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Anthony Tether 6400 Lyric Lane Falls Church , VA 22044 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ttether@darpa.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Kris Teutsch Director Microsoft Corporation 5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kteutsch@microsoft.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Scott Thayer TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: swt1@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Theby 3015 Shoreline Blvd Laurel , MD 20724 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mtheby@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William R Theuer 4321 Gannett Circle Anchorage , AK 99504 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wrtheuer@gci.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Will Thierbach Director, Special Projects Camber Corporation 5860 Trinity Parkway Suite 400 Centerville , VA 20120 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wthierbach@i2spros.com _____________________________________________________ Mr Craig Tait 10b Clinton Way Kingston Wellington 6020 New Zealand Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: craig.tait@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mike Talbott VP Intel Plans and Concepts NEK 110 S. Sierra Madre St Colorado Springs , CO 80903 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: airtalbo@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joseph P Talieri TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road S2J2, Suite 6130 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Stacey Porter-slport3@missi.ncsc.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ronnie Tallent TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Bascom D TALLEY Faculty Coordinator, Intel Prog. JHU/SOE/Div. Public Safety Leadership Bascom D. Talley 6740 Alexander Bell Drive Suite 350 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (410) 290-1061 Email: dittalley@jhu.edu _____________________________________________________ Bascom D TALLEY Faculty Coordinator, Intel Prog. JHU/SOE/Div. Public Safety Leadership Bascom D. Talley 6740 Alexander Bell Drive Suite 350 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (202) 363-4243 Fax: (410) 290-1061 Email: dittalley@jhu.edu _____________________________________________________ Jacqueline S Tame MPAff Intelligence Officer DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DIAC/JITF-CT, 200 MacDill Blvd Washington , DC 20340 Phone: (703) 829-7370 Fax: (none) Email: jacqueline.s.tame@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Jim Taneyhill President-CEO BT Federal Inc. 11440 Commerce Park Dr Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joseph Taraba 7 Creek Parkway Boothwyn , PA 19061 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joseph.taraba@ttemi.com _____________________________________________________ Barbara Tarad TITLE TBD ManTech International Corporation 2500 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: barbara.tarad@mantech.com _____________________________________________________ Barbara Tarad TITLE TBD ManTech International Corporation 2500 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: barbara.tarad@mantech.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Vicki Tarallo CEO & President Sensa Solutions 11180 Sunrise Valley Drive Suite 100 Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: vicki@sensasolutions.com _____________________________________________________ Vicki M Tarallo TITLE TBD Sensa Solutions 11180 Sunrise Valley Drive Suite 100 Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: vicki@sensasolutions.com _____________________________________________________ Leah F Tarbell Vice President, Intel Group STG Inc 11710 Plaza America Drive Suite 1200 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Sue Tardif Program Director, Organizational LMI 2000 Corporate Ridge McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stardif@lmi.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Don Tarkenton Manager, DoD Sales Quest Software - Public Sector Group 700 King Farm Boulevard Suite 250 Rockville , MD 20850 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: don.tarkenton@quest.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Tarry 2100 2nd St, SW Washington , DC 20593 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: william.e.tarry@uscg.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Tatum VP Business Development INTEL Oracle Corporation 1910 Oracle Way Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mark.tatum@oracle.com _____________________________________________________ Ellen Tauscher Under Secretary Arms Control & I State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: TauscherE@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Christopher Taylor Executive Vice President BlueStone Capital Partners 1600 Tysons Boulevard 8th Floor McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 852-4496 _____________________________________________________ Chuck Taylor Executive Vice President Proteus Technologies 133 National Business Parkway Suite 150 Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Damian R Taylor Cyber Federal Executive Fellow Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 904 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dtaylor@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Dr. David W Taylor Director, Technology Development Ensco, Inc. 5400 Port Royal Road Springfield , VA 22151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: taylor.david@ensco.com _____________________________________________________ James D Taylor TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Dr. Patricia Taylor 5602 Phelps Luck Drive Columbia , MD 21045 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pttaylor@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Dr. Patricia Taylor Chief of the Intelligence Commun ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: patricia.t.taylor@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Mrs. Teresa Taylor CEO Proteus Technologies 133 National Business Parkway Suite 150 Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (443) 539-3370 Email: tmtaylor@proteuseng.com _____________________________________________________ Teresa Taylor President Proteus Technologies 133 National Business Parkway Suite 150 Annapolis Junction , MD 20701 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Tina Taylor TITLE TBD QinetiQ North America 7918 Jones Branch Drive Suite 350 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Tina.Taylor@QinetiQ-NA.com _____________________________________________________ Robert Teague TITLE TBD Applied Signal Technology 460 West California Avenue Sunnyvale , CA 94086 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ROBERT_TEAGUE@appsig.com _____________________________________________________ Berico Technologies Directors at Berico Technologies Berico Technologies 1501 Lee Highway, Suite 303 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: directors@bericotechnologies.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jody Tedesco President & General Manager NJVC, LLC 8614 Westwood Center Drive Suite 300 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jody.tedesco@njvc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jody J Tedesco President NJVC, LLC 8614 Westwood Center Drive Suite 300 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 288-3068 Email: jody.tedesco@njvc.com _____________________________________________________ Stephen S Teel TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Theodore Tempel 1324 Grant Street Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ted.tempel@itt.com _____________________________________________________ Steven J Temple TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Pamela Tennyson TITLE TBD NRO 14675 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pamela.tennyson@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Kevin Tepley 22777 Portico Place Ashburn , VA 20148 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kdtepley@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Jack Terrell Sr Purchasing Mgr. Abraxas Corp 12801 Worldgate Dr Suite # 800 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: JACK.TERRELL@cubic.com _____________________________________________________ Paul Terry TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Paul.Terry@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Stacey Terry Manager PRTM Management Consultants, LLC 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Suite 1000 Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sterry@prtm.com _____________________________________________________ Caroline Tess TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: c_tess@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ rachel test test test , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rphillips@insaonline.org _____________________________________________________ Gary M Testut Director of Defense & Intelligen Ball Corporation Ball Aerospace & Technologies 2111 Wilson Blvd, Suite 1120 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cbarber@ball.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Anthony Tether 6400 Lyric Lane Falls Church , VA 22044 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ttether@darpa.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Kris Teutsch Director Microsoft Corporation 5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington , DC 20015 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kteutsch@microsoft.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Scott Thayer TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: swt1@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Theby 3015 Shoreline Blvd Laurel , MD 20724 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mtheby@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William R Theuer 4321 Gannett Circle Anchorage , AK 99504 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wrtheuer@gci.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Will Thierbach Director, Special Projects Camber Corporation 5860 Trinity Parkway Suite 400 Centerville , VA 20120 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wthierbach@i2spros.com _____________________________________________________ Donald Thomas Executive Director Ernst & Young 8484 Westpark Drive McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: donald.thomas@ey.com _____________________________________________________ Donna Thomas Principal Astrachan, Gunst & Thomas, P.C. 217 East Redwood Street 21st Floor Baltimore , MD 21202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dthomas@agtlawyers.com _____________________________________________________ Donna Thomas TITLE TBD Astrachan, Gunst & Thomas, P.C. 217 East Redwood Street 21st Floor Baltimore , MD 21202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dthomas@agtlawyers.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jason Thomas Senior Analyst TRSS, LLC 1410 Spring Hill Rd Suite 140 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jason.thomas@trssllc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Thomas Vice President Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Thomas_John@bah.com _____________________________________________________ John Thomas SVP, General Manager SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.d.thomas@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Marcus C Thomas Operational Technology Division FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: marcus.thomas@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Mike Thomas TITLE TBD Booz Allen Hamilton 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Thomas_Mike@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Paul Thomas VP - Defense Operations Wyle Information Systems 1600 Intenational Dr Suite 800 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: paul.thomas@wyle.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Ria Thomas 6903 K Victoria Dr. Alexandria , VA 22310 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rthomas@fabiani-co.com _____________________________________________________ Ria Thomas Defense/Security Fabiani & Company 1101 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Washington , DC 20004 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rthomas@fabiani-co.com _____________________________________________________ Kevin Thompkins Vice President of Bus. Ops. Engineering Systems Consultants, Inc. 8201 Corporate Drive Suite 1105 Landover , MD 20785-2230 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Bennie G Thompson Chair, Committee on Homeland Sec Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: andrea.lee@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Gregory Thompson 950 25th St. NW Washington , DC 20037 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thompson.g@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Jennifer Thompson Sr. Marketing Communications Spe L-3 Communications, Inc. 11955 Freedom Drive Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Kimberly A Thompson Director, Office of Corporate Co NGA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kimberly.thompson@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Leigh Thompson TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Leigh.Thompson@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Monica Thompson 3011 Colonial Springs Court Alexandria , VA 22306 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: monica@prointelservices.net _____________________________________________________ Robert D Thompson Jr. State / Division of Levee Distri 505 District Dr. Monroe , LA 71202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ldpolice1@bellsouth.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Thompson 8329 North Mopac Expressway Austin , TX 78759 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wmthompson@signaturescience.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William M Thompson TITLE TBD NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wmthomp@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Robert Thomson 460 Spring Park Place Suite 1000 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rthomson@terremark.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Tierney Vice President, Business Develop L-3 Communications/Com.Sys.East 1 Federal Street A&E-2C Camden , NJ 8103 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: John.Tierney@L-3Com.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Chris Tillery TITLE TBD USIS 7799 Leesburg Pike Suite 400 S Falls Church , VA 22043 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chris.tillery@usis.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Tillison Security Director Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.tillison@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Edward A Timmes SVP, Deputy General Manager SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: edward.a.timmes.jr@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Nils G Tolling TITLE TBD CTSS - Corporate and Transport Security Solutions 9007 West Shorewood Suite 529 Mercer Island , WA 98040 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: nils@ctssgroup.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. David Tolliver 4648 Star Flower Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: DETolliver@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Judy Tolliver 4648 Star Flower Dr Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jetolliver@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jack Tomarchio RETIRED DHS 4103 Meadow Lane Newtown Square , PA 19073 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.Tomarchio@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Jack T Tomarchio Agoge Group, LLC 200 Eagle Road, Suite 308 Wayne , PA 19087 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jtt@agogegroup.com _____________________________________________________ Adm. Chris Tomney USCG Intelligence Coordinating Center DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chris.tomney@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Kurt Tong Asst Sec Asia-Pacific State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tongk@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Deputy Asst. Se John Torres Deputy Assistant Secretary, US I DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.torres@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Fran Townsend INSA Chairwoman of the Board MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 35 E. 62nd St. New York , NY 10065 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Stacy Trammell 11400 Glen Dale Ridge Road Glenn Dale , MD 20769 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stacy.trammell@zavda.com _____________________________________________________ Stacy Trammell President Zavda Technologies, LLC 9250 Bendix Road Suite 540 Columbia , MD 21045 Phone: (none) Fax: (240) 266-0597 Email: stacy.trammell@zavda.com _____________________________________________________ Stacy D Trammell Stacy D. Trammell 11400 Glen Dale Ridge Road Glenn Dale , MD 20769 Phone: (unlisted) Fax: (240) 266-0597 Email: stacy.trammell@zavda.com _____________________________________________________ Christopher T Trapp TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jeffrey Trauberman Vice President The Boeing Company-Network & Space Systems 1200 Wilson Blvd. Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeff.trauberman@boeing.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jeffrey Trauberman VP, Space, Intel & MDS The Boeing Company Jeffrey Trauberman The Boeing Company 1200 Wilson Blvd. Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeff.trauberman@boeing.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jeffrey Trauberman Vice President The Boeing Company 1200 Wilson Blvd. Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeff.traubeman@boeing.com _____________________________________________________ Jeffrey Trauberman Vice President The Boeing Company 1200 Wilson Blvd. Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jeff.trauberman@boeing.com _____________________________________________________ Stephen Traver 1007 Longworth House Office Buil Washington , DC 20515 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Paul Tremont Executive Vice President, Operat SRC, Inc 7502 Round Pond Road North Syracuse , NY 13212 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tremont@srcinc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ronald J Trerotola Director RF Systems Engineering Cubic Defense Applications, Inc. 9333 Balboa Ave San Diego , CA 92123 Phone: (unlisted) Fax: (none) Email: ron.trerotola@cubic.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Steven A Trevino 19192 Greystone Square Leesburg , VA 20176 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Steven.Trevino@Keane.com _____________________________________________________ Joseph Trindal Managing Director KeyPoint Government Solutions, Inc. 1750 Foxtrail Drive Loveland , CO 80538 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joseph.trindal@keypoint.us.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bruce Triner 6112 Nightshade Court Rockville , MD 20852 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Kate Troendle Vice President BlueStone Capital Partners 1600 Tysons Boulevard 8th Floor McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 852-4496 _____________________________________________________ Ms. Lisa Trombley Program Management Senior Manage Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lisa.m.trombley@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Jesse Trout Account Manager TechUSA Government Solutions, LLC 8334 Veterans Highway Millersville , MD 21108 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jtrout@techusa.net _____________________________________________________ David Trulio Director, Federal/Civil Programs Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david.trulio@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Sandy Trumbull Account Manager Computer Associates No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Louis Tucker Minority Staff Director Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: L_Tucker@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Louis Tucker CEO Mission Sync LLC 1835 Tilden Place McLean , VA 22101 Phone: (703) 760-0643 Fax: (none) Email: louis.tucker@missionsyncllc.com _____________________________________________________ mr Mel Tuckfield Deputy Director, Hewlett Packard Federal APG Strategic Program Mel Tuckfield 6600 Rockledge Drive Bethesda , MD 20817 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mel.tuckfield _____________________________________________________ Mr. Melvyn Tuckfield Deputy Director, Advanced Progra Hewlett-Packard Company 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mel.tuckfield@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Chris Tully Sr. VP of Sales GeoEye 2325 Dulles Corner Blvd. Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Damian Turchan TITLE TBD PhotoTelesis 47181 Timberland Place Sterling , VA 20165 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dturchan@photot.com _____________________________________________________ J Stephen (Steve) Turett Director, Strategy and Business Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jturett@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Viv Turnbull Vice Deputy Director for Informa DIA 7400 Defense Pentagon Rm. 3E-258 Washington , DC 20301-7400 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Vivian.Turnbull@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kathleen Turner 6448 Spring Terrace Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kathleen.Turner@misc.pentagon.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kathleen Turner TITLE TBD ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kathleen.turner@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Lamar Turner PO Box 3565 Hobbs , NM 88241 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: LamarTurner2@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mike Turner TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: fturner@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ MS RONDI TURNER SR. EXECUTIVE ASST BALL AEROSPACE 2111 WILSON BLVD #1120 ARLINGTON , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rbturner@ball.com _____________________________________________________ Scott Turner Federal Engagement Director Global Crossing 12010 Sunset Hills Road Suite 420 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Stansfield Turner Former CIA Director CIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sturner@umd.edu _____________________________________________________ John Turnicky No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.turnicky@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Lauren Twenhafel Unknown Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ James Tyson JR. BSIT, MSIS Telecommunications Tech Advisor HQ INSCOM / G6 Networks 8825 Beulah Street Fort Belvoir , VA 22060 Phone: (703) 580-6350 Fax: (none) Email: jtyson.3@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Clinton Ung TITLE TBD Northrop Grumman 2288 Ballard Way Ellicott City , MD 21042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: clinton.ung@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ William Usher 11410 Hollow Timber Court Reston , VA 20194-1980 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: billusher77@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Ms. Marilyn Vacca Acting Chief Financial Officer ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: marilyn.a.vacca@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ Mike Vahle TITLE TBD Sandia National Laboratories P.O. Box 5800 Albuquerque , NM 87185 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Andrew Vail Executive Assistant to the ODNI/ ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ George Valdez TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 2305 Mission College Boulevard Santa Clara , CA 95054 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Michelle Valdez Senior Advisor, Cyber Security S Software Engineering Institute, CMU NRECA Building Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mavaldez@cert.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Victor Valdez 1117 17th Street South Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: vjv6504@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Victor Valdez 1117 17th Street South Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: vjv6504@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Arturo Valenzuela Western Hemisphere Affairs State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: valenzuelaa@state.gov _____________________________________________________ John Valle TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 1200 Joe Hall Drive Ypsilanti , MI 48197 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ John Van Dyke TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 8800 Queen Ave South Bloomington , MN 55431 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ William Van Vleet President and CEO Applied Signal Technology 460 West California Avenue Sunnyvale , CA 94086 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: BILL_VANVLEET@appsig.com _____________________________________________________ Daniel VanBelleghem Jr. VP, Information Assurance NCI Information Systems 11730 Plaza America Dr Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dvanbelleghem@nciinc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Tony Vanchieri TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Tony.Vanchieri@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Lesa Vandagriff TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 14700 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (703) 251-7484 Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Matthew Vandermast Vice President Sotera Assured IT 2300 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: matthew.vandermast@soteradefense.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dirk Vandervaart TITLE TBD American Systems 13990 Parkeast Circle Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dirk.vandervaart@americansystems.com _____________________________________________________ Christina Vanecek Marketing PRTM Management Consultants, LLC 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Suite 1000 Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cvanecek@prtm.com _____________________________________________________ Ms Donna J VanHoose Director, Business Development The Boeing Company 7700 Boston Boulevard Springfield , VA 22153 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: donna.vanhoose@boeing.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jhan Vannatta 200 Regency Forest Drive Suite 150 Cary , NC 27518-8695 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jhanv@signalscape.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Varchetta BA 2608 Elderdale Dr Hampton Cove , AL 35763 Phone: (256) 509-6676 Fax: (none) Email: mvarchetta@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Neftali Vargas SIGINT Analyst USN 21533 Willis Wharf CT Lexington Park , MD 20653 Phone: (unlisted) Fax: (none) Email: vargas.nef@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Wray Varley Sales Director Qwest Communications 4250 N. Fairfax Dr. 5th Floor Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wray.varley@qwest.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bill Varner INSA Board of Directors ManTech International Corporation 2500 Corporate Park Drive Herndon , VA Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Bill.Varner@ManTech.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Bill Varner President & COO ManTech Mission Cyber & Technology Solutions 2250 Corporate Park Dr. #500 Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bill.varner@mantech.com _____________________________________________________ L. William Varner 2250 Corporate Park Drive Suite 500 Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Bill.Varner@mantech.com _____________________________________________________ Miron Varouhakis School of Journalism & Mass Comm University of South Carolina Columbia , SC 29208 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: varouhakis@sc.edu _____________________________________________________ Ms. Debra Vecchio Assistant Director for Program D Pennsylvania State University - App. Research Labo P.O. Box 30 State College , PA 16804 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dsd13@only.arl.psu.edu _____________________________________________________ Veronica Venture Office of EEO FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: veronica.venture@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Kendra Verbanic Government Relations the SI 15052 Conference Center Drive Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kendra.verbanic@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Kenneth Verbrugge Program Area Manager Johns Hopkins University, APL 11100 Johns Hopkins Road Room 17-S344 Laurel , MD 20723 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ken.verbrugge@jhuapl.edu _____________________________________________________ Alexander S Verhulst Staffing/Sourcing Specialist SAIC 11251 Roger Bacon Drive Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (703) 585-4371 Fax: (703) 318-4595 Email: alexander.s.verhulst@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Richard R Verma Legislative Affairs State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: vermarr@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Stephen Vermillion 11600 Sunrise Valley Drive Suite 290 Reston , VA 20191 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: svermillion@objectvideo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Veronis 6867 Elm Street Suite 207 McLean , VA 22101 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mveronis@socratiq.com _____________________________________________________ Laura M Verouden TITLE TBD The Aerospace Corporation Attn: Linda Nicoll, M1-447 2310 E. El Segundo Blvd. El Segundo , CA 90245 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Melanne Verveer Global Women's Issues State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: verveerm@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Michael Via BA, MS Cyber Intelligence Analyst Home 10049 Cairn Mountain Way 10049 Cairn Mountain Way Bristow , VA 20136 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: viacissp@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Sean Vieira VP, Government Markets Core180, Inc. 2751 Prosperity Drive Suite 200 Vienna , VA 22031 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Phyllis Villani Director, Talent Acquisition Northrop Grumman Corporation 12900 Federal Systems Park Drive FP1/7121 Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 968-2565 Email: phyllis.c.villani@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ Thomas J Vilsack Secretary Agriculture Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Scheduling@osec.usda.gov (Attn: Sally Cluthe) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Adam Vincent BS, MS CEO Cyber Squared Inc. http://www.cybersquared.com 1100 N. Glebe Rd. Suite 1010 Arlington , VA 22204 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: avincent@cybersquared.com _____________________________________________________ David Vincent TITLE TBD FBI PO Box 230343 Centreville , VA 20120 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david.vincent@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Richard G Violette BA, MBA Business Development Exceptional Software Strategies Inc 849 International Drive Suite 310 Linthicum , MD 21090 Phone: (none) Fax: (410) 694-0245 Email: richard.violette@exceptionalsoftware.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Laura Virella 9159 Ciri Lake Lane Fort Belvoir , VA 22060 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: lvirellal@netscape.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Vince Virga 100 Corporate Drive Suite 280 Fort Lauderdale , FL 33334 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: vince@sgis.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Virgil Virga 8618 Westwood Center Drive #315 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: virgil@sgis.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Faye Virostek Director, Government Relations General Dynamics Corporation 2941 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: fvirostek@gd.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Samuel S Visner Vice President for Strategy and Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: svisner@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Laura Voelker Director, HUMINT DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: laura.voelker@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kathleen Voelkner 6226 West Haleh Avenue Las Vegas , NV 89141 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kvoelkner@securityconsultants.us _____________________________________________________ Mr. Tom Vollmer Executive Director CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tvollmer@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Lisa von dem Hagen 1655 North Fort Meyer Drive Suite 1000 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: insightstrategyresults@acqsolinc.com _____________________________________________________ Lou Von Thaer President General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Christopher Voorhees Federal Programs CA Technologies 2317 N. Monroe Street Arlington , VA 22207 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: voorhees2317@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Laura Voyatzis Legislative Liaison SAF/LL (AFOSI) Laura Voyatzis 1160 AF Pengaton 4B852 Washington , DC 20330 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: laura.voyatzis@pentagon.af.mil _____________________________________________________ Michael D Vozzo J.D., M.A. Associate Deputy General Counsel United States Department of Defense 2521 S. Clark Street Suite 2000 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michael.vozzo@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Steve Wallach Sr. VP of Product Integration GeoEye 2325 Dulles Corner Blvd. Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Steven P Wallach Technical Executive NGA 4600 Sangamore Road, D-100 Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (301) 227-3696 Email: steven.p.wallach@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Dave Wallen General Manager, Mission Program BAE Systems Information Technology 8201 Greensboro Drive Suite 1200 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david.wallen@baesystems.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Tommy Walls 8618 Westwood Center Drive Ste 100 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: twalls@sgis.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Walsh President Sypris Electronics 10901 N. McKinley Drive Tampa , FL 33612 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.walsh@sypris.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael J Walsh Sr. Director Intelligent Decisions 21445 Beaumeade Circle Ashburn , VA 20147 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mwalsh@intelligent.com _____________________________________________________ Thomas Walsh V.P. Falken Industries 9510 technology drive manassas , VA 20110 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: trwalsh@falken.us _____________________________________________________ Ms. Jennifer Walsmith TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road Suite 6148 -Senior Acquisition E Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (443) 479-0367 Email: jswalsm@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Drew Walter Policy/Oversight Investigations Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Drew.Walter@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Jack Walters VP Verizon Business, Federal 22001 Loudoun County Parkway Ashburn , VA 20147 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jack.walters@verizon.com _____________________________________________________ John J Walters VP Verizon Business, Federal 22001 Loudoun County Parkway Ashburn , VA 20147 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jack.walters@one.verizon.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Chris Walton President and CEO Visual Intelligence Group LLC 17979 Sands Road Hamilton , VA 20158 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chris.walton@visualintelgroup.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Scott Walton 6935 Bugledrum Way Columbia , MD 21045 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: swalton@google.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Timothy Walton 13800 Coppermine Rd. 2nd Floor Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: twalton@fundintel.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joshua Wander 5719 Hobart Street Pittsburgh , PA 15217 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jwander@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Tyler Z Wang BA Contract Specialist GSA APT# 715 1300 S Arlington Ridge Rd Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: tribaljumbal@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ James Wangler Senior Executive Accenture No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.wangler@accenture.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Wansley Vice President Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wansley_bill@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Ann Ward 8865 Stanford Blvd. Columbia , MD 21666 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: annward@cisco.com _____________________________________________________ Ann Ward TITLE TBD Cisco Systems, Inc. 13635 Dulles Technology Drive Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: annward@cisco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Anthony Ward President & CEO Ward Solutions 6760 Alexander Bell Drive Suite 180 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: award@ward-solutions.com _____________________________________________________ Colonel James Ward USAF TITLE TBD NRO 14675 Lee Road Chantilly , VA 20151-1715 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: james.ward@nro.mil _____________________________________________________ Mark Ward 3138 Creswell Drive Falls Church , VA 22044 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mark.k.ward@saic.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Peter Ward Managing Partner SAGE 1344 Ashton Road Suite 105 Hanover , MD 21076 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pete.ward@sage-mgt.net _____________________________________________________ Peter Ward TITLE TBD SAGE 1344 Ashton Road Suite 105 Hanover , MD 21076 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pete.ward@sage-mgt.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Rick Ward Director Raytheon Company 1200 S. Jupiter Road MS AA-75000 Garland , TX 75042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rdward1@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Charles E Warden Senior Executive Accenture 11951 Freedom Drive Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: charles.e.warden@accenture.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Charles E Warden TITLE TBD Accenture 11951 Freedom Drive Reston , VA 20882 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: charles.e.warden@accenture.com _____________________________________________________ Eric Warden 25116 Vista Ridge Road Laytonsville , MD 20882 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: charles.e.warden@accenture.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kathy Warden TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kathy.warden@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Kathy Warden VP, NGIS Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Bryan Ware BS Science CEO Digital Sandbox 8260 Greensboro Drive Suite 450 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bware@dsbox.com _____________________________________________________ Jamal Ware Minority Public Affairs POC Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jamal.ware@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Cheryl Warner Director, Business Development Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cheryl.warner@ngc.com _____________________________________________________ John Warner Required unless Parent Washington , DC 20005 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Susan Warner Vice President TECH USA, Inc 8334 Veterans Highway 2nd Floor Millersville , MD 21108 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: swarner@techusa.net _____________________________________________________ Pearl Warren TITLE TBD Quest Software - Public Sector Group 700 King Farm Boulevard Suite 250 Rockville , MD 20850 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: pearl.warren@quest.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kristen Waschull Director of Human Resources DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kristi.Waschull@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jonathan Washburn 831 Carroll Street Brooklyn , NY 11215 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Thomas Washburne Partner Venable LLP 750 East Pratt Street Baltimore , MD 21202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: twashburne@venable.com _____________________________________________________ Doug Waters Director, Special Programs LGS Innovations Accounts Payable 5440 Millstream Road Suite E210 McLeansville , NC 27301 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Jason Wathen 646 Steamboat Rd Greenwich , CT 6830 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jwathen@bhgrp.com _____________________________________________________ Charles Watson SVP Marketing i2 1430 Spring Hill Road McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Charles.Watson@i2group.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kathleen Watson J.D. Director AECOM Kathleen Watson 6564 Loisdale Court Suite 500 Springfield , VA 22150 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kathleen.Watson@aecom.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Kathleen M Watson VP, Global Missions Center Aecom 6564 Loisdale Court Suite 500 Springfield , VA 22315 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Kathleen.Watson@aecom.com _____________________________________________________ Robert B Watts Chief, Contingency Exercises U.S. Coast Guard 5209 Claridge Ct Fairfax , VA 22032 Phone: (703) 272-8974 Fax: (none) Email: rbwatts27@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mary Webb Executive Assistant Analytic Services Inc. 2900 South Quincy Street Suite 800 Arlington , VA 22206 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 416-3270 Email: mary.webb@anser.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Matthew Webb Attorney-Advisor (Intelligence) Transportation Security Administration 601 South 12th Street Arlington , VA 20598 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: matthew.webb@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Webber Managing Member Westway Development 14325 Willard Road Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mwebber@westwaydevelopment.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Pamela Weber 8281 Greensboro Drive McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: weber_pam@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Jason Webster INSA OCI Task Force Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ William Webster Required unless Parent Washington , DC 20005 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ David Wehrly 1007 8th St. Anacortes , WA 98221 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ John Weiler 904 Clifton Drive Alexandria , VA 22308 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john@ICHnet.org _____________________________________________________ mr John A Weiler 98.6 Executive Director IT Acquisition Advisory Council, a division of ICH 904 Clifton Drive Alexandria , VA 22397 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: John.Weiler@Ichnet.org _____________________________________________________ LtCol Anne Weinberg TITLE TBD USD(I) Required unless Parent Washington , DC 20005 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Paul R Weise Director, Office of Geospatial I NGA 4600 Sangamore Road, D-111 Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: paul.r.weise@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Dr. Nancy K Welker TITLE TBD NSA 9800 Savage Road DE, Suite 6274 Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mawirt@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jack Welsh 13200 Woodland Park Road Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: welsh_j-admin@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Gen Mark Welsh III Associate Director for Military CIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: christyt@ucia.gov _____________________________________________________ Ms. Rosemary Wenchel Director, Information Assurance DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rosemary.wenchel@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Former Baker Preston Werntz Senior Strategist, Office of Cyb DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: preston.werntz@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Dr. Michael Wertheimer Technical Director, SID NSA 9800 Savage Road , DC 20511 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wertheimer@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Ms. Michele Weslander Quaid 4175 Lower Park Drive Fairfax , VA 22030-8543 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: weslandm@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Michele Weslander Quaid DNI Senior Representative to ISR DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: michele.weslanderquaid@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Michele R Weslander Quaid Chief Technology Officer (Fed) Google, Inc. 1101 New York Avenue, N.W Second Floor Washington , DC 20005 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr John Westcott BA BD Director The Boeing Company 7700 Boston Blvd Springfiled , VA 22153 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 270-6608 Email: john.g.westcott@boeing.com _____________________________________________________ Vince Westmark 16800 E. CentreTech Parkway Aurora , CO 80011 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: vcwestmark@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Vincent C Westmark TITLE TBD Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Vanessa Weyland Prog Mgr, Career Developm AF ISR Agency 12906 Green Cedar Helotes , TX 78023 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: vanessa.weyland@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Kris Wheaton 501 East 38th Street Erie , PA 16546 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kwheaton@mercyhurst.edu _____________________________________________________ Ms. Judith Whitaker TITLE TBD Boyden 217 E Redwood St Suite 1500 Baltimore , MD 21202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jwhitaker@boyden.com _____________________________________________________ Chris White TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chris.white@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Dana White Strat Forces Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dana_white@armed-services.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. David B White Deputy Chief Operating Officer NGA 4600 Sangamore Road, D-100 Bethesda , MD 20816-5003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: david.b.white@nga.mil _____________________________________________________ Colonel John D White BA, MSC Deputy Director OUSD(I)/PP&R/ISRP Pentagon, 3C915 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: john.white@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Patricia White 901 N. Nelson St Apt 1514 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: plwhite@paragondynamics.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard White VP, Washington Operations Harris Corporation P.O. Box 37 MS: 2-21D Melbourne , FL 32902 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rwhite01@harris.com _____________________________________________________ Scott White VP, NGC Northrop Grumman Corporation 1000 Wilson Boulevard Suite 2300 MS 141/NGWO Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. Sean White 343 E 74th St Apartment 8E New York , NY 10021 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: seanjwhite@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Suzanne White Chief Financial Officer DIA 7400 Defense Pentagon Rm. 3E-258 Washington , DC 20301-7400 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Suzanne.White@dia.mil _____________________________________________________ Mr. John Whiteford Director for Intel Pgms NSA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jewhite@nsa.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Damian Whitham Director Terremark Worldwide 460 Spring Park Place Suite 1000 Herndon , VA 20170 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dwhitham@terremark.com _____________________________________________________ Alphonse Whitmore TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Alphonse.Whitmore@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Scott C Whitney 14901 Bogle Dr. Suite 302 Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: scott.whitney@missionep.com _____________________________________________________ RADM H. Whiton USN (Ret) 12337 Galesville Drive Gaithersburg , MD 20878 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: hwwhiton@msn.com _____________________________________________________ Windsor Whitton Required unless Parent Required unless Parent , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Maria Whitworth Senior Vice President CACI International Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mwhitworth@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Maria F Whitworth 4114 Legato Road Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mwhitworth@caci.com _____________________________________________________ Jonathan Wick TITLE TBD General Dynamics AIS 12450 Fair Lakes Circle Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ McDaniel Wicker TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mcdaniel.wicker@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Jerome Wieber Sr. Staff Acquisitions Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jerome.wieber@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joshua S Wiener MA 2662 Ocean Avenue Apt E2 Brooklyn , NY 11229 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Jwiener31@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Jerome Wiever 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jerome.wieber@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Miss Molly Wike Analyst Department of the Navy 4251 Suitland Road Washington DC , DC 20395 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mollywike@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Molly Wike 4251 Suitland Road Washington DC , DC 20395 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mollywike@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Daniel C Wilbricht Director, IC Federal Programs Red Hat 8260 Greensboro Drive ste. 300 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dwilbric@redhat.com _____________________________________________________ Steven A Wilburn Sr. Principal SRA International Inc. 13873 Park Center Road Suite 150 Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: steven_wilburn@sra.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard Wilhelm Vice President Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Wilhelm_Richard@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Wayne Wilkinson President White Oak Technologies 1300 Spring Street Suite 320 Silver Spring , MD 20910 Phone: (703) 759-9296 Fax: (none) Email: wwilkinson@woti.com _____________________________________________________ Candice M Will Office of Professional Responsib FBI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: candice.will@ic.fbi.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Butch Willard Deputy Director, Legislative Aff DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: butch.willard@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Ms. Amanda Williams TITLE TBD Ciena Corporation 1185 Sanctuary Parkway Suite 300 Alpharetta , GA 30004 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: amwillia@ciena.com _____________________________________________________ Amanda Williams TITLE TBD Ciena Corporation 1185 Sanctuary Parkway Suite 300 Alpharetta , GA 30004 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: amwillia@ciena.com _____________________________________________________ Anthony Williams CEO GRS 260 Lee Street, SW Tumwater , WA 98501 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. David Williams Senior Associate Booz Allen Hamilton 13200 Woodland Park Road Suite 5066 Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: williams_david@bah.com _____________________________________________________ LTG James Williams USA (Ret) 8928 Maurice Lane Annandale , VA 22003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: diac1@earthlink.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Jud Williams SVP, Asset Management/Leasing COPT 6711 Columbia Gateway Dr Suite 300 Columbia , MD 21046 Phone: (none) Fax: (443) 285-7650 Email: jud.williams@copt.com _____________________________________________________ Senior Vice Pre Judd Williams Senior Vice President Corporate Office Properties Trust 6711 Columbia Gateway Drive Columbia , MD 21046-2104 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jud.williams@copt.com _____________________________________________________ Laura Williams 1501 Farm Credit Dr Suite 2300 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: laura.williams@soteradefense.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Markeith Williams 102 Bermuda Green Drive Durham , NC 27703 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: markeith_williams@hotmail.com _____________________________________________________ Clint Williamson War Crimes Issues (Ambassador at State Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: williamsonc@state.gov _____________________________________________________ Thomas Willoughby 5229 42nd Place Hyattsville , MD 20781-1902 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: thomas.willoughby@hq.dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Brian Wilson TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brian_wilson@appro.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr Brian Wilson Asst Transit Mngmt Analyst MTA/New York City Transit 130 Livingston Street Brooklyn , NY 11201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Brian.Wilson@nyct.com _____________________________________________________ Heather Wilson 9220 Guadalupe Trail NW Albuquerque , NM 87114 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: hawilson@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Sam Wilson Required unless Parent Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Tina Wilson VP Business Development GRS 1001 North Fairfax Street Suite 420 Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Ms. Suzanne Wilson-Houck bogus bogus , VA 22302 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sthouck@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ suzanne wilson-houck Whatever Ripple 604 Fort Williams Parkway alexandria , VA 22304 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: sthouck@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Suzanne Wilson-Houck Membership Ripple Communications 1110 Vermont Ave, NW Suite 1000 Washington , DC 20005 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: swhouck@insaonline.org _____________________________________________________ Bill Wilt VP of North American Sales GeoEye 2325 Dulles Corner Blvd. Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ LCDR Terry Wilton USN (Ret) 1120-C Heritage Place Waldorf , MD 20602-1821 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: marathont@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joseph Wiltshire 500 Thompson Dairy Way Rockville , MD 20850 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: joewiltshire@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Roland Wiltz 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: roland.j.wiltz@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Andreas Wimmer MSc., CTS Director Integritas LLC 96 Robinson Road SIF Building #13-04 Singapore 068899 Indonesia Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: andrew.wimmer@pacific.net.sg _____________________________________________________ Mr. Joseph Windham IV 3307 Wyndham Circle Unit 2170 Alexandria , VA 22302 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jcwindham4@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ JC Windham Financial Manager, Navy DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jcwindham4@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Steven Winebrenner 6406 Ivy Lane COP 4/4 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: steven.jos.winebrenner@hp.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Maureen Wingfield Senior Manager Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: maureen_v_wingfield@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Scott Winn 8840 Stanford Boulevard Suite 2100 Columbia , MD 21045 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: swinn@tresys.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Scott Winn 960 Western Run Rd Hunt Valley , MD 21030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: swinn@scottwinn.com _____________________________________________________ Craig Winter 19842 Leadwell St. Winnetka , CA 91306 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Dr. Prescott Winter RETIRED Associate Deputy Director of Nat ODNI No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: prescott.b.winter@ugov.gov _____________________________________________________ DuWayne L Wirta President Wirta Consulting LLC DuWayne Wirta 13602 Hampstead Ct. Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (703) 904-7949 Fax: (none) Email: dlwirta@cox.net _____________________________________________________ Kate Wisniewski TITLE TBD PRTM Management Consultants, LLC 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Suite 1000 Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: kwisniewski@prtm.com _____________________________________________________ Ayonnda Witcher 1610 Tulip Avenue District Heights , MD 20747 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ayonndawitcher@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Witt 2000 E. El Segundo Blvd. B-E07,MS S102 El Segundo , CA 90245 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mhwitt@raytheon.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Jennifer Wohlander 2200 Wilson Blvd Suite 102-139 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jennifer.wohlander@cust-matters.com _____________________________________________________ Scott Wohlander 2200 Wilson Blvd. Suite 102-139 Arlington , VA 22201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: scott.wohlander@cust-matters.com _____________________________________________________ Bradford F Wolf Senior Advanced Systems Manager Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corp. 10 Longs Peak Drive Broomfield , CO 80021 Phone: (none) Fax: (303) 533-5179 Email: bfwolf@ball.com _____________________________________________________ Bradford F Wolf Sr. Advanced Systems Manager Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corp. 10 Longs Peak Drive Broomfield , CO 80021 Phone: (none) Fax: (303) 533-5179 Email: bfwolf@ball.com _____________________________________________________ Jim Wolfe TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: j_wolfe@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr. Steven Wolter Sr. Special Programs Manager LGS Innovations Accounts Payable 5440 Millstream Road Suite E210 McLeansville , NC 27301 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: swolter@lgsinnovations.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Steven Wolter Sr. Special Programs Manager LGS Innovations 13665 Dulles Technology Drive Suite 301 Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: swolter@lgsinnovations.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Wesley Wong 350 Greensboro Dr. McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wwong@htgcorp.com _____________________________________________________ Brian R Wood Director, Business Development Lockheed Martin Corporation-Washington Ops 2121 Crystal Drive Suite 100 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brian.wood@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Margaret Wood 7474 Greenway Center Drive Suite 800 Greenbelt , MD 20770 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mwwood@woodcons.com _____________________________________________________ Dr. Roy L Wood Dean, Def Sys Mgmt College DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: roy.woods@dau.mil _____________________________________________________ Sheryl Wood TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: s_wood@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Asst. Admin. Stephen N Wood TSA Federal Security Director DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: stephen.wood@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Meredith Woodruff 1441 McLean Mews Court McLean , VA 22101 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: meredith_woodruff@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ Glen Woods 10395 Democracy Lane Suite B Fairfax , VA 22030 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Mr. James Woolsey Vice President Booz Allen Hamilton 8283 Greensboro Dr. Booz Building McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Woolsey_Jim@bah.com _____________________________________________________ Megan Woolsey Required unless Parent Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Megan Woolsey Consultant Deloitte 1919 N. Lynn Street Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mwoolsey3@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Megan Woolsey Consultant Deloitte 1919 N. Lynn Street Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mwoolsey3@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Steve Woolwine Vice President, Intelligence Ope Berico Technologies 1501 Lee Highway Suite 303 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Michael H Wooster 211 N. Union Street Alexandria , VA 22314 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mwooster@sanborn.com _____________________________________________________ Jeff Wootton Forward Deployed Engineer Palantir Technologies 1660 International Drive 8th Floor McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jwootton@palantir.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Patrick Worcester TITLE TBD Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: PWorcester@potomacinstitute.org _____________________________________________________ Ms. Christine Wormuth PDASD, Homeland Defense and Amer DoD No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: christine.wormuth@osd.mil _____________________________________________________ Saskia Wrausmann 14 Seaton Place NW Washington , DC 20007 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ B.G. Wright TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: bg.wright@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Gary Wright BS EE President/CEO Futures, Inc. 1225 Crows Foot Road Marriottsville , MD 21104 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gwright1@futures-inc.com _____________________________________________________ Lynn Wright Director, JTTF DIA No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wrightonmaple@comcast.net _____________________________________________________ Mr. Wayne A Wright 42725 Ridgeway Dr. Ashburn , VA 20148 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: wayne.wright@msn.com _____________________________________________________ Mark Wrigley SVP Business Development Serco 1818 Library Street Suite 1000 Reston , VA 20190 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 939-6001 _____________________________________________________ Don Wurzel VP for National Security Studies Arete Associates 1550 Crystal Drive Suite 703 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: dwurzel@arete.com _____________________________________________________ Robert J Wysocki MA MS Senior Fellow LMI 2000 Corporate Ridge McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: rwysocki@lmi.org _____________________________________________________ Robert J Wysocki MA, MS 3210 Wessynton Way Alexandria , VA 223092227 Phone: (703) 619-1456 Fax: (none) Email: rj.wysocki@live.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Alan Wade 8601 Ordinary Way Annandale , VA 22003 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: awade2@cox.net _____________________________________________________ Ralph Wade 1421 Jefferson Davis Highway Suite 600 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Ralph.Wade@gd-ais.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ralph Wade Vice President, National Capital Spectrum 1401 Wilson Blvd Suite 1007 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (757) 224-7501 Email: ralph.wade@sptrm.com _____________________________________________________ Roger Waesche Executive Vice President & Chief Corporate Office Properties Trust 6711 Columbia Gateway Drive Columbia , MD 21046-2104 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: roger.waesche@copt.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ryan Wagener Executive Vice President, Busine Six3 Systems 1430 Spring Hill Road Suite 525 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ryan.wagener@six3systems.com _____________________________________________________ Caryn Wagner Under Secretary for Intelligence DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: carynanne@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Ms. Caryn A Wagner No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: carynanne@verizon.net _____________________________________________________ Jennifer Wagner TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: j_wagner@ssci.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Jennifer Wagner Senior Manager Gov't Relations Raytheon Company - IIS 1100 Wilson Boulevard Suite 1900 Arlington , VA 22209 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Rick Wagner TITLE TBD TASC 4805 Stonecroft Blvd Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: richard.wagner@tasc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Mark Walch Dep Dir, US CERT for Ops Tech DHS No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mark.walch@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Pete Waldorf No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (703) 981-1683 Fax: (703) 621-1133 Email: pete.waldorf@fts-intl.com _____________________________________________________ Chip Walgren TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: chip_walgren@appro.senate.gov _____________________________________________________ Ash Walker 1902 Forsyth Street Suite C Macon , GA 31201 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ashwalker10@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Bruce Walker TITLE TBD Sandia National Laboratories P.O. Box 5800 Albuquerque , NM 87185 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ Cindy Walker CDO KGS 2750 Prosperity Ave Ste 300 Fairfax , VA 22031 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: cwalker@kforcegov.com _____________________________________________________ Torian Walker VP, Business Development Directo SAIC 1710 SAIC Drive M/S 1-4-1 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: torian.c.walker@saic.com _____________________________________________________ William J Walker PO Box 25022 Arlington , VA 22202 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: williamj.walker@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ William J Walker Deputy Director DEA Intelligence Justice Dept. No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: william.j.walker@usdoj.gov _____________________________________________________ James Walkinshaw Chief of Staff, Congressman Conn Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: James.Walkinshaw@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Bill Wall Director of Strategic Program Pu EMC Intel 653 MacBeth Drive Pittsburgh , PA 15235 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) _____________________________________________________ William Wall Business development EMC Corporation 8444 Westpark Drive McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: William.wall@emc.com _____________________________________________________ William T Wall Director of BD, IC EMC Corporation 8444 Westpark Drive Suite 700 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: william.wall@emc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Brett A Wallace 532 20th Street NW #604 Washington , DC 20006 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: brettawallace@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael Wallace District Manager NetApp 1921 Gallows Road Suite 600 Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Michael.Wallace@netapp.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ramy Yaacoub 1425 Euclide st nw #5 Washingtn , DC 20009 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ramy.yaacoub@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Ron Yaggi Director, Defense Intelligence O Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ryaggi@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Austin K Yamada ME Vice President QinetiQ North America 7918 Jones Branch Drive Suite 350 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: austin.yamada@vt-arc.org _____________________________________________________ Mr. Austin K Yamada BS, ME Vice President Virginia Tech Applied Research Corporation 900 North Glebe Road Arlington , VA 22203 Phone: (301) 564-0685 Fax: (none) Email: austin.yamada@vt-arc.org _____________________________________________________ Lauren M Yamada Program Analyst Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 601 S. 12th St Mail Drop 6104 Arlington , VA 20598 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Lauren.Yamada@dhs.gov _____________________________________________________ Charles R Yanjanin Region Manager Cisco Systems, Inc 13635 Dulles Technology Drive Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 738-7914 Email: cyanjani@cisco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Homayun Yaqub 9435 Lorton Market Street Suite 749 Lorton , VA 22079 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: hy@masygroup.com _____________________________________________________ Ms. Christina N Yarnold Project Engineering Staff Lockheed Martin - IS&GS Security 2245 Monroe Street Floor 4, 442C Herndon , VA 20171 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: christina.n.yarnold@lmco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. William Yates 1600 S. Bayshore Lane Miami , FL 33133 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: byates5043@aol.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Michael S Yeagley GM, Global Public Secotr NovoDynamics, Inc 9819 Fosbak dr Vienna , VA 22182 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 242-0019 Email: m_yeagley2002@yahoo.com _____________________________________________________ John Yim VP Operations BCMC 2745 Hartland Rd. Falls Church , VA 22043 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: jyim@bcmcgroup.com _____________________________________________________ Ed Yost Director, Business Development Computer Sciences Corporation 3170 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: eyost@csc.com _____________________________________________________ Ed Yost Vice President Apptis 4800 Westfields Blvd Chantilly , VA 20151 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: ed.yost@apptis.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Greg Young President-CEO Ensco, Inc. 3110 Fairview Park Dr Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: young.greg@ensco.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Greg Young President and CEO ENSCO Inc. Gregory B. Young 3110 Fairview Park Dr. Suite 300 Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: gbyoung@mac.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Gregory B Young President and CEO ENSCO, Inc. 3110 Fairview Park Drive Suite 300 Falls Church , VA 22042 Phone: (none) Fax: (703) 321-4687 Email: young.greg@ensco.com _____________________________________________________ Mark Young TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: mark.young@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Sarah Young TITLE TBD Congress No Address Available No Address Available No City , VA 22203 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: Sarah.Young@mail.house.gov _____________________________________________________ Mr Keith M Younger BS Director EMC Global Alliances 8444 Westpark Dr suite 900 McLean , VA 22102 Phone: (703) 560-6636 Fax: (703) 893-2562 Email: keith.younger@emc.com _____________________________________________________ Mr. Richard Youngs 12156 Wedgeway Ct Fairfax , VA 22033 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: richard.youngs@gmail.com _____________________________________________________ Shahin Yousefi 1004 Walters Mill Road Forest Hill , MD 21050 Phone: (none) Fax: (none) Email: syousefi@netstarconsulting.com _____________________________________________________ Thomas W Yun Medical Services State Dept. 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TOP-SECRET- Presidential Documents – Strategic Counterterrorism Commuications Initiative

Federal Register Volume 76, Number 179 (Thursday, September 15, 2011)]
[Presidential Documents]
[Pages 56945-56947]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-23891]

Presidential Documents

Federal Register / Vol. 76 , No. 179 / Thursday, September 15, 2011 /
Presidential Documents

___________________________________________________________________

Title 3–
The President

[[Page 56945]]

Executive Order 13584 of September 9, 2011

Developing an Integrated Strategic
Counterterrorism Communications Initiative and
Establishing a Temporary Organization to Support
Certain Government-wide Communications Activities
Directed Abroad

By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America, including section 2656 of title 22, United
States Code, and section 3161 of title 5, United States
Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Policy. The United States is committed to
actively countering the actions and ideologies of al-
Qa’ida, its affiliates and adherents, other terrorist
organizations, and violent extremists overseas that
threaten the interests and national security of the
United States. These efforts take many forms, but all
contain a communications element and some use of
communications strategies directed to audiences outside
the United States to counter the ideology and
activities of such organizations. These communications
strategies focus not only on the violent actions and
human costs of terrorism, but also on narratives that
can positively influence those who may be susceptible
to radicalization and recruitment by terrorist
organizations.

The purpose of this Executive Order is to reinforce,
integrate, and complement public communications efforts
across the executive branch that are (1) focused on
countering the actions and ideology of al-Qa’ida, its
affiliates and adherents, and other international
terrorist organizations and violent extremists
overseas, and (2) directed to audiences outside the
United States. This collaborative work among executive
departments and agencies (agencies) brings together
expertise, capabilities, and resources to realize
efficiencies and better coordination of U.S. Government
communications investments to combat terrorism and
extremism.

Sec. 2. Assigned Responsibilities to the Center for
Strategic Counterterrorism Communications.

(a) Under the direction of the Secretary of State
(Secretary), the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications (Center) that has been established in
the Department of State by the Secretary shall
coordinate, orient, and inform Government-wide public
communications activities directed at audiences abroad
and targeted against violent extremists and terrorist
organizations, especially al-Qa’ida and its affiliates
and adherents, with the goal of using communication
tools to reduce radicalization by terrorists and
extremist violence and terrorism that threaten the
interests and national security of the United States.
Consistent with section 404o of title 50, United States
Code, the Center shall coordinate its analysis,
evaluation, and planning functions with the National
Counterterrorism Center. The Center shall also
coordinate these functions with other agencies, as
appropriate.

Executive branch efforts undertaken through the Center
shall draw on all agencies with relevant information or
capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct these
communications efforts.

(b) To achieve these objectives, the Center’s
functions shall include:

(i) monitoring and evaluating narratives (overarching communication themes
that reflect a community’s identity, experiences, aspirations, and
concerns) and events abroad that are relevant to the development of a

[[Page 56946]]

U.S. strategic counterterrorism narrative designed to counter violent
extremism and terrorism that threaten the interests and national security
of the United States;

(ii) developing and promulgating for use throughout the executive branch
the U.S. strategic counterterrorism narratives and public communications
strategies to counter the messaging of violent extremists and terrorist
organizations, especially al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents;

(iii) identifying current and emerging trends in extremist communications
and communications by al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents in order
to coordinate and provide thematic guidance to U.S. Government
communicators on how best to proactively promote the U.S. strategic
counterterrorism narrative and policies and to respond to and rebut
extremist messaging and narratives when communicating to audiences outside
the United States, as informed by a wide variety of Government and non-
government sources, including nongovernmental organizations, academic
sources, and finished intelligence created by the intelligence community;

(iv) facilitating the use of a wide range of communications technologies,
including digital tools, by sharing expertise among agencies, seeking
expertise from external sources, and extending best practices;

(v) identifying and requesting relevant information from agencies,
including intelligence reporting, data, and analysis; and

(vi) identifying shortfalls in U.S. capabilities in any areas relevant to
the Center’s mission and recommending necessary enhancements or changes.

(c) The Secretary shall establish a Steering
Committee composed of senior representatives of
agencies relevant to the Center’s mission to provide
advice to the Secretary on the operations and strategic
orientation of the Center and to ensure adequate
support for the Center. The Steering Committee shall
meet not less than every 6 months. The Steering
Committee shall be chaired by the Under Secretary of
State for Public Diplomacy. The Coordinator for
Counterterrorism of the Department of State shall serve
as Vice Chair. The Coordinator of the Center shall
serve as Executive Secretary. The Steering Committee
shall include one senior representative designated by
the head of each of the following agencies: the
Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of the
Treasury, the National Counterterrorism Center, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Counterterrorism Center of
the Central Intelligence Agency, the Broadcast Board of
Governors, and the Agency for International
Development. Other agencies may be invited to
participate in the Steering Committee at the discretion
of the Chair.

Sec. 3. Establishment of a Temporary Organization.

(a) There is established within the Department of
State, in accordance with section 3161 of title 5,
United States Code, a temporary organization to be
known as the Counterterrorism Communications Support
Office (CCSO).
(b) The purpose of the CCSO shall be to perform the
specific project of supporting agencies in Government-
wide public communications activities targeted against
violent extremism and terrorist organizations,
especially al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents,
to audiences abroad by using communication tools
designed to counter violent extremism and terrorism
that threaten the interests and national security of
the United States.
(c) In carrying out its purpose set forth in
subsection (b) of this section, the CCSO shall:

(i) support agencies in their implementation of whole-of-government public
communications activities directed at audiences abroad, including by
providing baseline research on characteristics of these audiences, by
developing expertise and studies on aspirations, narratives, information
strategies and tactics of violent extremists and terrorist organizations
overseas, by designing and developing sustained campaigns on specific areas
of

[[Page 56947]]

interest to audiences abroad, and by developing expertise on implementing
highly focused social media campaigns; and

(ii) perform such other functions related to the specific project set forth
in subsection (b) of this section as the Secretary may assign.

(d) The CCSO shall be headed by a Director selected
by the Secretary, with the advice of the Steering
Committee. Its staff may include, as determined by the
Secretary: (1) personnel with relevant expertise
detailed on a non-reimbursable basis from other
agencies; (2) senior and other technical advisers; and
(3) such other personnel as the Secretary may direct to
support the CCSO. To accomplish this mission, the heads
of agencies participating on the Steering Committee
shall provide to the CCSO, on a non-reimbursable basis,
assistance, services, and other support including but
not limited to logistical and administrative support
and details of personnel. Non-reimbursable details
shall be based on reasonable requests from the
Secretary in light of the need for specific expertise,
and after consultation with the relevant agency, to the
extent permitted by law.
(e) The CCSO shall terminate at the end of the
maximum period permitted by section 3161(a)(1) of title
5, United States Code, unless sooner terminated by the
Secretary consistent with section 3161(a)(2) of such
title.

Sec. 4. General Provisions.

(a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to
impair or otherwise affect:

(i) authority granted by law to an agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii) functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with
applicable law and subject to the availability of
appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not,
create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law or in equity by any party against
the United States, its departments, agencies, or
entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any
other person.

(Presidential Sig.)

THE WHITE HOUSE,

September 9, 2011.

[FR Doc. 2011-23891
Filed 9-14-11; 8:45 am]
Billing code 3195-W1-P

TOP-SECRET-Secret U.S. Message to Mullah Omar: “Every Pillar of the Taliban Regime Will Be Destroyed”

U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (center) and U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Robert Finn are given a tour of the U.S. Embassy compound in Kabul, Afghanistan on April 27, 2002. OSD Package No. A07D-00238 (DOD Photo by Robert D. Ward)

Washington, DC, September 14, 2011 – In October 2001 the U.S. sent a private message to Taliban leader Mullah Omar warning that “every pillar of the Taliban regime will be destroyed,” [Document 16] according to previously secret U.S. documents posted today by the National Security Archive at www.nsarchive.org. The document collection includes high-level strategic planning memos that shed light on the U.S. response to the attacks and the Bush administration’s reluctance to become involved in post-Taliban reconstruction in Afghanistan. As an October 2001 National Security Council strategy paper noted, “The U.S. should not commit to any post-Taliban military involvement since the U.S. will be heavily engaged in the anti-terrorism effort worldwide.” [Document 18]

Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and President George W. Bush.  (Source: Department of Defense)

Materials posted today also include memos from officials lamenting the American strategy of destroying al-Qaeda and the Taliban without substantially investing in Afghan infrastructure and economic well-being. In 2006, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald R. Neumann asserted that recommendations to “minimize economic assistance and leave out infrastructure plays into the Taliban strategy, not to ours.” [Document 25] The Ambassador was concerned that U.S. inattention to Afghan reconstruction was causing the U.S. and its Afghan allies to lose support. The Taliban believed they were winning, he said, a perception that “scares the hell out of Afghans.” [Document 26] Taliban leaders were capitalizing on America’s commitment, he said, and had sent a concise, but ominous, message to U.S. forces: “You have all the clocks but we have all the time.” [Document 25]

The documents published here describe multiple important post-9/11 strategic decisions. One relates to the dominant operational role played by the CIA in U.S. activities in Afghanistan. [Document 19] Another is the Bush administration’s expansive post-9/11 strategic focus, as expressed in Donald Rumsfeld’s remark to the president: “If the war does not significantly change the world’s political map, the U.S. will not achieve its aim/ There is value in being clear on the order of magnitude of the necessary change.” [Document 13] Yet another takes the form of U.S. communications with Pakistani intelligence officials insisting that Islamabad choose between the United States or the Taliban: “this was a black-and-white choice, with no grey.” [Document 3 (Version 1)]

Highlights include:

  • A memo from Secretary Rumsfeld to General Franks expressing the Secretary’s frustration that the CIA had become the lead government agency for U.S. operations in Afghanistan, “Given the nature of our world, isn’t it conceivable that the Department [of Defense] ought not to be in a position of near total dependence on CIA in situations such as this?” [Document 19]
  • A detailed timeline of the activities of Vice President Richard Cheney and his family from September 11-27, 2001 [Document 22]
  • The National Security Council’s October 16, 2001 strategic outline of White House objectives to destroy the Taliban and al-Qaeda while avoiding excessive nation-building or reconstruction efforts. “The U.S. should not commit to any post-Taliban military involvement since the U.S. will be heavily engaged in the anti-terrorism effort worldwide.” The document also notes the importance of “CIA teams and special forces in country operational detachments (A teams)” for anti-Taliban operations. [Document 18]
  • U.S. Ambassador Neumann expresses concern in 2006 that the American failure to fully embrace reconstruction activities has harmed the American mission. “The supplemental decision recommendation to minimize economic assistance and leave out infrastructure plays into the Taliban strategy, not to ours.” A resurgent Taliban leadership summarized the emerging strategic match-up by saying, “You have all the clocks but we have all the time.” [Document 25]
  • A memo on U.S. strategy from Donald Rumsfeld to President Bush dated September 30, 2001, saying, “If the war does not significantly change the world’s political map, the U.S. will not achieve its aim/ There is value in being clear on the order of magnitude of the necessary change. The USG [U.S. Government] should envision a goal along these lines: New regimes in Afghanistan and another key State (or two) that supports terrorism.” [Document 13]
  • A transcript of Washington’s October 7, 2001 direct message to the Taliban: “Every pillar of the Taliban regime will be destroyed.” [Document 16]
  • The day after 9/11, Deputy Secretary Armitage presents a “stark choice” to Pakistani Intelligence (ISI) Chief Mahmoud Ahmed, “Pakistan must either stand with the United States in its fight against terrorism or stand against us. There was no maneuvering room.” [Document 3 (Version 1)]
  • In talking points prepared for a September 14, 2001 National Security Council meeting. Secretary of State Colin Powell notes, “My sense is that moderate Arabs are starting to see terrorism in a whole new light. This is the key to the coalition, we are working them hard.” [Document 7]

Read the Documents

Document 1 – Action Plan
U.S. Department of State, Memorandum,” Action Plan as of 9/13/2001 7:55:51am,” September 13, 2001, Secret, 3 pp. [Excised]

Two days after the 9/11 attacks, the Department of State creates an action plan to document U.S. government activities taken so far and to create an immediate list of things to do. Included in the list are high-level meetings with Pakistani officials, including ISI intelligence Director Mahmoud Ahmed. [Note that Ahmed’s September 13 meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage is detailed in Document 3 and Document 5.] The action plan details efforts to get international support, including specific U.S. diplomatic approaches to Russia, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Sudan, China and Indonesia.

Document 2 – Islamabad 05087
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Musharraf: We Are With You in Your Action Plan in Afghanistan” September 13, 2001, Secret – Noforn, 7 pp. [Excised]

Newly appointed U.S. Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin “bluntly” tells Pakistani President Musharraf “that the September 11 attacks had changed the fundamentals of the [Afghanistan – Pakistan] debate. There was absolutely no inclination in Washington to enter into a dialogue with the Taliban. The time for dialog was finished as of September 11.” Effectively declaring the Taliban a U.S. enemy (along with al-Qaeda), Ambassador Chamberlin informs President Musharraf “that the Taliban are harboring the terrorists responsible for the September 11 attacks. President Bush was, in fact, referring to the Taliban in his speech promising to go after those who harbored terrorists.”  [Note: A less complete version of this document was previously released and posted on September 13, 2010. This copy has less information withheld.]  

Document 3 – State 157813 [Version 1]
Document 3 – State 157813 [Version 2]

U.S. Department of State, Cable, “Deputy Secretary Armitage’s Meeting with Pakistan Intel Chief Mahmud: You’re Either With Us or You’re Not,” September 13, 2001, Secret, 9 pp. [Excised]

The day after the 9/11 attacks, Deputy Secretary Armitage meets with Pakistani Intelligence (ISI) Chief Mahmoud Ahmed (which can also be spelled Mehmood Ahmad, Mahmud or Mahmoud). Armitage presents a “stark choice” in the 15-minute meeting. “Pakistan must either stand with the United States in its fight against terrorism or stand against us. There was no maneuvering room.” Mahmud assures Armitage that the U.S. “could count on Pakistan’s ‘unqualified support,’ that Islamabad would do whatever was required of it by the U.S.” Deputy Secretary Armitage adamantly denies Pakistan has the option of a middle road between supporting the Taliban and the U.S., “this was a black-and-white choice, with no grey.” Mahmoud responds by commenting “that Pakistan has always seen such matters in black-and-white. It has in the past been accused of ‘being-in-bed’ with those threatening U.S. interests. He wanted to dispel that misconception.” Mahmoud’s denial of longstanding historical Pakistani support for extremists in Afghanistan directly conflicts with U.S. intelligence on the issue, which has documented extensive Pakistani support for the Taliban and multiple other militant organizations.

Two versions of this document have been reviewed with different sections released. Version 1 in general contains more information; however Version 2 contains a few small sections not available in Version 1. These sections include paragraph 10, “Mr. Armitage indicated it was still not clear what might be asked of Pakistan by the U.S. but he suspected it would cause ‘deep introspection.’ Mahmud’s colleagues in the CIA would likely be talking more with him in the near future on this. Mahmud confirmed that he had been in touch with Langley after yesterday’s attacks and expected to continue these contacts.” It is unclear why this was withheld in Version 1. It is not surprising that Mahmoud, Chief of Pakistani intelligence, would be in regular contact with equally high-level intelligence officials from the CIA.

It is interesting to read this document ten years after it was initially written, as it is largely assumed that Islamabad over the past decade has taken the “grey” approach Armitage steadfastly denies as a potential position. Pakistan has served as a safe haven for the Taliban insurgency, while Islamabad simultaneously assists the U.S. in its war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

Document 4 – Talking Points
U.S. Department of State, “Talking Points,” September 13, 2001, Secret, 4 pp. [Excised]

Talking points for Secretary Colin Powell drafted two days after the 9/11 attacks. Objectives of the U.S. response to the attack include, “eliminating Usama bin-Laden’s al-Qaida.” The Secretary focuses on regional support from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, as well as cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Interestingly the Secretary notes that the U.S. “will also probe Iranian ability to work with us against the Taliban and Usama bin-Laden, and we’ll look for Arafat’s support.”

Document 5 – State 159711
U.S. Department of State, Cable, “Deputy Secretary Armitage’s Meeting with General Mahmud: Actions and Support Expected of Pakistan in Fight Against Terrorism,” September 14, 2001, Secret, 5 pp. [Excised]

On September 13, 2001 Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage again meets with Pakistani Intelligence (ISI) Chief Mahmoud Ahmed in one of a series of well-known communications between Armitage and the ISI Chief in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Secretary Armitage tells General Mahmoud the U.S. is looking for full cooperation and partnership from Pakistan, understanding that the decision whether or not to fully comply with U.S. demands would be “a difficult choice for Pakistan.” Armitage carefully presents General Mahmoud with the following specific requests for immediate action and asks that he present them to President Musharraf for approval:

  • “Stop al-Qaida operatives at your border, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan and end all logistical support for bin Ladin;”
  • “Provide the U.S. with blanket overflight and landing rights to conduct all necessary military and intelligence operations;”
  • “Provide as needed territorial access to U.S. and allied military intelligence, and other personnel to conduct all necessary operations against the perpetrators of terrorism or those that harbor them, including use of Pakistan’s naval ports, airbases and strategic locations on borders;”
  • “Provide the U.S. immediately with intelligence, [EXCISED] information, to help prevent and respond to terrorist acts perpetuated against the U.S., its friends and allies;”
  • “Continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts of September11 and any other terrorist acts against the U.S. or its friends and allies [EXCISED]”
  • “Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and any other items and recruits, including volunteers en route to Afghanistan that can be used in a military offensive capacity or to abet the terrorist threat;”
  • “Should the evidence strongly implicate Usama bin Ladin and the al-Qaida network in Afghanistan and should Afghanistan and the Taliban continue to harbor him and this network, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban government, end support for the Taliban and assist us in the formentioned ways to destroy Usama bin Ladin.”

[Note: A less complete version of this document was previously released and posted on September 13, 2010. This copy has less information withheld. ]

Document 6 – Memo
U.S. Department of State, Gameplan for Polmil Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan,” September 14, 2001, Secret/NODIS, 4 pp. [Excised]

Since “Tuesday’s attacks clearly demonstrate that UBL [Usama bin Ladin] is capable of conducting terrorism while under Taliban control,” U.S. officials are faced with the question of what to do with the Taliban. The Department of State issues a set of demands to the Taliban including: surrendering all known al-Qaeda associates in Afghanistan, providing intelligence on bin Laden and affiliates, and expelling all terrorists from Afghanistan. Reflecting U.S. policies in the years to come, the memo notes that the U.S. “should also find subtle ways to encourage splits within the [Taliban] leadership if that could facilitate changes in their policy toward terrorism.” The memo concludes that if “the Taliban fail to meet our deadline, within three days we begin planning for Option three, the use of force. The Department of State notes the importance of coordination with Pakistan, the Central Asian states, Russia, and “possibly Iran.” “Pakistan is unwilling to send its troops into Afghanistan, but will provide all other operational and logistical support we ask of her.”

Document 7 – Talking Points
U.S. Department of State, “Talking Points for PC 0930 on 14 September 2001,” September 14, 2001, [Unspecified Classification], 3 pp. [Excised]

Secretary of State Colin Powell’s September 14, 2001 talking points for a National Security Council Principal’s Committee meeting discuss the administration’s immediate response to the 9/11 attacks and future plans for retaliation. Objectives include, “setting the stage for a forceful response,” “eradicating Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaida” and “eliminating safehaven and support for terrorisms whether from states or other actors.” Secretary Powell notes, “My sense is that moderate Arabs are starting to see terrorism in a whole new light. This is the key to the coalition, we are working them hard.”

Document 8 –  Islamabad 05123

U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Musharraf Accepts The Seven Points” September 14, 2001, Secret, 4 pp. [Excised]

After extensive meetings with ranking Pakistani military commanders, on September 14, 2001 President Pervez Musharraf accepts the seven actions requested by the U.S. for immediate action in response to 9/11.  President Musharraf “said he accepted the points without conditions and that his military leadership concurred,” but there would be “a variety of security and technical issues that need to be addressed.” He emphasized that “these were not conditions … but points that required clarification.” Musharraf also asks the U.S. to clarify if its mission is to “strike UBL and his supporters or the Taliban as well,” and advises that the U.S. should be prepared for what comes next. “Following any military action, there should be a prompt economic recovery effort. “You are there to kill terrorists, not make enemies” he said. “Islamabad wants a friendly government in Kabul.”

[Note: A copy of this document was previously released and posted on September 13, 2010.]

Document 9 – State 161279

U.S. Department of State, Cable, “Deputy Secretary Armitage-Mamoud Phone Call – September 18, 2001,” September 18, 2001, Confidential, 2 pp.

Traveling aboard a U.S. government aircraft, Pakistani Intelligence ISI Director Mahmoud Ahmed arrives in Afghanistan on September 17, 2001 to meet Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar and discuss 9/11, U.S. demands and the future of al-Qaeda. Mahmoud informs Mullah Omar and other Taliban officials that the U.S. has three conditions:

  • “They must hand over UBL [Usama bin Ladin] to the International Court of Justice, or extradite him,”
  • “They must hand over or extradite the 13 top lieutenants/associates of UBL…”
  • “They must close all terrorist training camps.”

According to Mahmoud, the Taliban’s response “was not negative on all these points.” “The Islamic leaders of Afghanistan are now engaged in ‘deep Introspection’ about their decisions.”

[Note: A copy of this document was previously released and posted on September 13, 2010.]

Document 10 – State 161371
U.S. Department of State, Cable, “Secretary’s 13 September 2001 Conversation with Pakistani President Musharraf,” September 19, 2001, Secret, 3 pp.

Secretary of State Colin Powell and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf have a telephone conversation on September 13, to discuss U.S.-Pakistan relations and U.S. retaliation for the events of 9/11. The Secretary informs President Musharraf that “because Pakistan has a unique relationship with the Taliban, Pakistan has a vital role to play.” The Secretary tells Musharraf, “‘as one general to another, we need someone on our flank fighting with us. And speaking candidly, the American people would not understand if Pakistan was not in the fight with the U.S.'”

Document 11 – Islamabad 05337
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Mahmud Plans 2nd Mission to Afghanistan” September 24, 2001, Secret, 3 pp.

ISI Director Mahmoud Ahmed returns to Afghanistan to make a last-minute plea to the Taliban. General Mahmoud tells U.S. Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin “his mission was taking place in parallel with U.S. Pakistani military planning” and that in his estimation, “a negotiated solution would be preferable to military action.” “‘I implore you,’ Mahmud told the Ambassador, ‘not to act in anger. Real victory will come in negotiations.’ ‘Omar himself,’ he said, ‘is frightened. That much was clear in his last meeting.'”  The ISI Director tells the Ambassador America’s strategic objectives of getting Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda would best be accomplished by coercing the Taliban to do it themselves. “It is better for the Afghans to do it. We could avoid the fallout. If the Taliban are eliminated … Afghanistan will revert to warlordism.” Nevertheless General Mahmoud promises full Pakistani support for U.S. activities, including military action. “We will not flinch from a military effort.” “Pakistan,” he said, “stands behind you.” Ambassador Chamberlin insists that while Washington “appreciated his objectives,” to negotiate to get bin Laden, Mullah Omar “had so far refused to meet even one U.S. demand.”  She tells Mahmoud his trip “could not delay military planning.”

[Note: A copy of this document was previously released and posted on September 13, 2010.]

Document 12 – Islamabad 05452
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Mahmud on Failed Kandahar Trip” September 29, 2001, Confidential, 3 pp.

An additional trip by ISI Director Mahmoud Ahmed to Afghanistan to negotiate with the Taliban is unsuccessful. Mahmoud’s September 28, 2001 “two-hour meeting with Taliban Deputy Foreign Minister Jalil concluded with no progress.” Mahmoud is ostensibly seeking to get the Taliban to cooperate “so that ‘the barrel of the gun would shift away from Afghanistan,’ only in this way would Pakistan avoid ‘the fall out’ from a military attack on its neighbor.”Yet despite Mahmoud’s efforts the Taliban remained uncooperative. “The mission failed as Mullah Omar agreed only to ‘think about’ proposals.” U.S. officials are similarly unenthusiastic about the idea of compromise. “Ambassador confirmed that the United States would not negotiate with the Taliban and that we were on a ‘fast track to bringing terrorists to justice.'” Mahmoud acknowledged that “President [Bush] had been quite clear in asserting there would be no negotiations.”

Document 13 – Memorandum for the President
The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the President, “Strategic Thoughts,” September 30, 2001, Top Secret/Close Hold, 2 pp. [Excised]

Instead of focusing exclusively on al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld advises President Bush that the U.S. should think more broadly. “It would instead be surprising and impressive if we built our forces up patiently, took some early action outside of Afghanistan, perhaps in multiple locations, and began not exclusively or primarily with military strikes but with equip-and-train activities with local opposition forces coupled with humanitarian aid and intense information operations.”

With a strategic vision emphasizing support for local opposition groups rather than direct U.S. strikes, the Secretary is wary of excessive or imprecise U.S. aerial attacks which risk “creating images of Americans killing Moslems.” The memo argues that the U.S. should “capitalize on our strong suit, which is not finding a few hundred terrorists in the caves of Afghanistan,” and instead using “the vastness of our military and humanitarian resources, which can strengthen enormously the opposition forces in terrorist-supporting states.” The approach to the war should not focus “too heavily on direct, aerial attacks on things and people.”

“If the war does not significantly change the world’s political map, the U.S. will not achieve its aim/ There is value in being clear on the order of magnitude of the necessary change. The USG [U.S. Government] should envision a goal along these lines: New regimes in Afghanistan and another key State (or two) that supports terrorism (To strengthen political and military efforts to change policies elsewhere).”

Document 14 – Working Paper
The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Working Paper, “Thoughts on the ‘Campaign’ Against Terrorism” October 2, 2001, Secret, 1 p.

Arguing that Afghanistan is “part of the much broader problem of terrorist networks and nations that harbor terrorists across the globe,” this paper discusses multiple aspects of emerging U.S. operations in the war on terror, including developing greater intelligence capabilities, the use of direct action, military capabilities, humanitarian aid and “working with Muslims worldwide to demonstrate the truth that the problem is terrorism – not a religion or group of people.”

Document 15 – Memorandum
The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, “Strategic Guidance for the Campaign Against Terrorism, October 3, 2001, Top Secret, 16 pp.

A expansive document designed to “provide strategic guidance to the Department of Defense for the development of campaign plans,” this memo specifies the perceived threats, objectives, means, strategic concepts and campaign elements guiding the nascent war on terror. Threats identified include terrorist organizations, states harboring such organizations (including the “Taliban [and] Iraq Baathist Party”), non-state actors that support terrorist organizations and the capacity of “terrorist organizations or their state supporters to acquire, manufacture or use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons or the means to deliver them.”

Strategic objectives include preventing further attacks against the U.S. and deterring aggression, as well as the somewhat contradictory goals of “encouraging populations dominated by terrorist organizations or their supporters to overthrow that domination,” and “prevent[ing] or control[ing] the spreading or escalation of conflict.” 

Document 16 – State 175415
U.S. Department of State, Cable, “Message to Taliban,” October 7, 2001, Secret/Nodis/Eyes Only, 2 pp.

The U.S. requests that either Pakistani Intelligence ISI Chief Mahmoud Ahmed or Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf deliver a message to Taliban leaders directly from Washington informing the Taliban that “if any person or group connected in any way to Afghanistan conducts a terrorist attack against our country, our forces or those of our friends or allies, our response will be devastating. It is in your interest and in the interest of your survival to hand over all al-Qaida leaders.” The U.S. warns that it will hold leaders of the Taliban “personally responsible” for terrorist activities directed against U.S. interests, and that American intelligence has “information that al-Qaida is planning additional attacks.” The short message concludes by informing Mullah Omar that “every pillar of the Taliban regime will be destroyed.”

Document 17 – Information Paper
Defense Intelligence Agency, Information Paper, “Prospects for Northern Alliance Forces to Seize Kabul,” October 15, 2001, Secret/Norforn/X1, 2 pp. [Excised]

Comparing the current military strength of the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, this paper concludes that a difficult battle for Kabul may lay ahead for the Northern Alliance. “Taliban strength in the Kabul Central Corps is approximately 130 tanks, 85 armored personnel carriers, 85 pieces of artillery and approximately 7,000 soldiers. Northern Alliance forces, under the command of General Fahim Khan, number about 10,000 troops, with approximately 40 tanks and a roughly equal number of APCs [armored personnel carriers], and a few artillery pieces.” “If the Northern Alliance’s present combat power relative to defending Taliban forces in and around Kabul remains unchanged, the Northern Alliance will not be in a position to successfully conduct a large scale offensive to seize and hold Kabul. The Northern Alliance is more likely to occupy key terrain around the city and use allied air strikes/artillery to strengthen its position and encourage defections of Taliban leaders in the city. Only under these favorable circumstances would Northern Alliance forces then be able to take control of Kabul.”

However the document asserts that this military balance may change rapidly due to the provision of assistance to the Northern Alliance and the isolation of the Taliban. “Russia is reportedly delivering approximately forty to fifty T-55 tanks, sixty APCs, plus additional artillery, rocket systems, attack helicopters and a large quantity of ammunition to the Northern Alliance via the Parkhar supply base in southern Tajikistan.”

On November 13, 2001 the Northern Alliance took control of Kabul as the Taliban rapidly retreated to Kandahar.

Document 18 – Memorandum and Attached Paper
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld to Douglas Feith, “Strategy,” Attachment, “U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan,” National Security Council, October 16, 2001, 7:42am, Secret/Close Hold/ Draft for Discussion, 7 pp. [Excised]

Five weeks after the 9/11 attacks, the National Security Council outlines the U.S. retaliatory strategy. Emphasizing the destruction of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, it is careful not to commit the U.S. to extensive rebuilding activities in post-Taliban Afghanistan. “The USG [U.S. Government] should not agonize over post-Taliban arrangements to the point that it delays success over Al Qaida and the Taliban.” “The U.S. should not commit to any post-Taliban military involvement since the U.S. will be heavily engaged in the anti-terrorism effort worldwide.” There is a handwritten note from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld adding “The U.S. needs to be involved in this effort to assure that our coalition partners are not disaffected.”

Operationally the U.S. will “use any and all Afghan tribes and factions to eliminate Al-Qaida and Taliban personnel,” while inserting “CIA teams and special forces in country operational detachments (A teams) by any means, both in the North and the South.” Secretary Rumsfeld further notes: “Third country special forces UK [excised] Australia, New Zealand, etc) should be inserted as soon as possible.”

Diplomacy is important “bilaterally, particularly with Pakistan, but also with Iran and Russia,” however “engaging UN diplomacy… beyond intent and general outline could interfere with U.S. military operations and inhibit coalition freedom of action.”

Document 19 – Working Paper
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld to General Myers, Working Paper, “Afghanistan,” October 17, 2001, 11:25am, Secret, 1 p.

A memo from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Myers reflects the critical role played by the Central Intelligence Agency in initial U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Secretary Rumsfeld expresses his frustration that U.S. intelligence officials, instead of military personnel, are the dominant actors on the ground in Afghanistan. “Given the nature of our world, isn’t it conceivable that the Department ought not to be in a position of near total dependence on CIA in situations such as this?” “Does the fact that the Defense Department can’t do anything on the ground in Afghanistan until CIA people go in first to prepare the way suggest that the Defense Department is lacking a capability we need?”

Document 20 – Working Paper
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Working Paper, “Discussions w/CENTCOM re: Sy Hersh Article,” October 22, 2001, 1:19pm, Secret, 2 pp.

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld is concerned about information reported by Seymour Hersh in The New Yorker that U.S. Central Command failed to fire on a convoy thought to contain Taliban personnel including Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar. Rumsfeld informs Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Central Command Thomas “Tommy” Franks that he had been instructed “immediately to hit [this target] if anyone wiggled and that [the Secretary] was going to call the President. But in the meantime, he had [the Secretary’s] authority to hit it.” Secretary Rumsfeld discussed the failure to fire with General Myers, writing that he has “the feeling he [Franks] may not have given me the full story.”

The paper also contradicts previous instructions that aerial attacks should be precise and limited in Afghanistan. Instead, Secretary Rumsfeld states, “I have a high tolerance level for possible error. That is to say, if he [Franks] thinks he has a valid target and he can’t get me or he can’t get Wolfowitz in time, he should hit it. I added that there will not be any time where he cannot reach me or, if not me, Wolfowitz. I expect him to be leaning far forward on this.”

Document 21 – Memorandum for the President
U.S. Department of State, Memorandum, From Secretary of State Colin Powell to U.S. President George W. Bush, “Your Meeting with Pakistani President Musharraf,” November 5, 2001, Secret, 2 pp. [Excised]

Signed by Secretary of State Colin Powell to President Bush, this memo highlights critical changes in U.S.-Pakistan relations since 9/11, including higher levels of cooperation not only on counterterrorism policy, but also on nuclear non-proliferation, the protection of Pakistani nuclear assets, and economic development. Powell notes that President Musharraf’s decision to ally with the U.S. comes “at considerable political risk,” as he has “abandoned the Taliban, frozen terrorist assets [and] quelled anti-Western protests without unwarranted force, [Excised].” Regarding Afghanistan, the Secretary tells the President that Pakistan will want to protect its interests and maintain influence in Kabul. “Musharraf is pressing for a future government supportive of its interests and is concerned that the Northern Alliance will occupy Kabul.”

[Note: A copy of this document was previously released and posted on September 13, 2010.]

Document 22 – Timeline
U.S. Secret Service, Paper, “9/11/01 Timeline,” November 17, 2001, Secret, 32 pp. [Excised]

A detailed timeline of the activities of Vice President Richard Cheney and his family from September 11-27, 2001, this document was compiled at the request of the Vice President, whose well-known Secret Service codename is “Angler.” The document extensively uses other Secret Service code words, such as “Crown” (White House), “Author” (Lynne Cheney, the Vice President’s wife), “Advocate” (Elizabeth Cheney, the Vice President’s daughter) and “Ace” (Philip J. Perry, the Vice President’s son-in-law).

Document 23 – Snowflake
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Snowflake Memorandum, From Donald Rumsfeld to Doug Feith, “Afghanistan,” April 17, 2002, 9:15AM, Secret, 1 p. [Excised]

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is concerned the U.S. does not yet have comprehensive plans for U.S. activities in Afghanistan. “I may be impatient. In fact I know I’m a bit impatient. But the fact that Iran and Russia have plans for Afghanistan and we don’t concerns me.” The Secretary laments the state of interagency coordination and is alarmed that bureaucratic delay may harm the war effort. “We are never going to get the U.S. military out of Afghanistan unless we take care to see that there is something going on that will provide the stability that will be necessary for us to leave.”

Document 24 – Memorandum
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, From Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “Al Qaeda Ops Sec,” July 19, 2002, Secret, 1 p. [Excised]

U.S. officials are unsure whether or not Osama bin Laden is alive, with the intelligence community assessing that he must be because “his death would be too important a fact for [members of al-Qaeda] to be able to keep it a secret.” Paul Wolfowitz rejects this assertion, arguing that bin Laden’s survival is equally important news for al-Qaeda to communicate, leading him to conclude that the terrorists are “able to communicate quite effectively on important subjects without our detecting anything.” Although specifics remain classified, the memo expresses concern over America’s overreliance on a specific capability allowing the U.S. to track terrorist organizations. Wolfowitz questions whether or not this technique is providing a false sense of security to intelligence officials and that the U.S. may even be being manipulated by terrorists who may know about U.S. capabilities. “We are a bit like the drunk looking for our keys under the lamppost because that is the only place where there is light.” Critical information may be in places the U.S. is not looking.

Document 25 – Kabul 000509
U.S. Embassy (Kabul), Cable, “Afghan Supplemental” February 6, 2006, Secret, 3 pp. [Excised]

In a message to the Secretary of State, U.S. Ambassador Ronald R. Neumann expresses his concern that the American failure to fully fund and support activities designed to bolster the Afghan economy, infrastructure and reconstruction effort is harming the American mission. His letter is a plea for additional money and a shift in priorities. “We have dared so greatly, and spent so much in blood and money that to try to skimp on what is needed for victory seems to me too risky.”

The Ambassador notes, “the supplemental decision recommendation to minimize economic assistance and leave out infrastructure plays into the Taliban strategy, not to ours.” Taliban leaders were issuing statements that the U.S. would grow increasingly weary, while they gained momentum. A resurgent Taliban leadership ominously summarizes the emerging strategic match-up with the United States by saying, “You have all the clocks but we have all the time.”

Document 26 – Kabul 003863
U.S. Embassy (Kabul), Cable, “Afghanistan: Where We Stand and What We Need” August 29, 2006, Secret, 8 pp. [Excised]

According to U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald R. Neumann “we are not winning in Afghanistan; although we are far from losing.” The primary problem is a lack of political will to provide additional resources to bolster current strategy and to match increasing Taliban offensives. “At the present level of resources we can make incremental progress in some parts of the country, cannot be certain of victory, and could face serious slippage if the desperate popular quest for security continues to generate Afghan support for the Taliban…. Our margin for victory in a complex environment is shrinking, and we need to act now.” The Taliban believe they are winning. That perception “scares the hell out of Afghans.” “We are too slow.”

Rapidly increasing certain strategic initiatives such as equipping Afghan forces, taking out the Taliban leadership in Pakistan and investing heavily in infrastructure can help the Americans regain the upper hand, Neumann declares. “We can still win. We are pursuing the right general policies on governance, security and development. But because we have not adjusted resources to the pace of the increased Taliban offensive and loss of internal Afghan support we face escalating risks today.”

SCHEI**HAUS-FLIEGEN “GoMOPA”-Peter Ehlers und Gerd Bennewirtz- SCHEI**-HAUS-Nomen est STASI-Omen !

Der Beweis: Organisierte Verbrecher der GoMoPa:”Lug, Trug; Betrug, Cybermord, Rufmord, Mord”

Liebe Leser,

trotz serienmässiger Vorstrafen wegen Betruges und der zahlreicher anderer Kripo-,FBI-Ermiottlungen werden die organisierten GoMoPa-STASI-Gangster Ihre unwahren Lügen gegen mich nicht löschen und stellen diese immer wieder neu ins Netz: Kein Wunder, denn ich habe die Verbrechen dieser organisierten Kriminellen aufgedeckt und werde dies weiter tun – im Interesse aller anständigen Mitglieder der menschlichen Gesellschaft !

Wie dumm diese STASI-Verbrecher zeigt sich in deren eigenen  Texten: “Wie kann ein Magister eine Diplomarbeit schreiben” ? – wie in deren “Shithouse Fly Blog auf mich falsch dargelegt und natürlich haben die STASI-Kriminellen nicht den Hauch eines Beweises für irgendeine Behauptung – wir dagegen jede Menge und auch jede Menge Aktenzeichen gegen sie:

Zum Beispiel:

Klaus Maurischat ( Aktenzeichen Krefeld vom 24. April 2006; AZ: 28 Ls 85/05 – Am 24. April 2006 war die Verhandlung am Amtsgericht Krefeld in der Betrugssache: Mark Vornkahl / Klaus Maurischat ./. Dehnfeld. Aktenzeichen: 28 Ls 85/05, Klaus Maurischat, Lange Straße 38, 27313 Dörverden)

FAKT IST: Klaus Maurischat ist vorbestraft

Aktenzeichen Krefeld vom 24. April 2006; AZ: 28 Ls 85/05 – Am 24. April 2006 war die Verhandlung am Amtsgericht Krefeld in der Betrugssache: Mark Vornkahl / Klaus Maurischat ./. Dehnfeld. Aktenzeichen: 28 Ls 85/05, Klaus Maurischat, Lange Straße 38, 27313 Dörverden)

Sie wollen mich zwingen, mit ihren Lügen meine Berichterstattung gegen sie einzustellen – wie hier ersichtlich:

So wollte der Serienbetrüger Klaus Maurischat uns zwingen, die Berichterstattung über “GoMoPa” zu stoppen

Unser Bildtext: Klaus Maurischat: There is no Place like home

So wollte der Serienbetrüger Klaus Maurischat uns zwingen die Berichterstattung über den “NACHRICHTENDIENST” “GoMoPa” einzustellen

Meine Anmerkung:  Sie lesen

den Original-Text mit den Original-Rechtschreibfehlern von Maurischat  in chronologischer Reihenfolge von unten nach oben. “Unter den Linden” ist die Regus-Tarnadresse für den untergetauchten Serienbetrüger und Stasi-Ganoven. “SUMA” steht im Sprach-Jargon des “GoMoPa”-”NACHRICHTENDIENSTLERS” für Suchmaschine.

Zitat:

HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA (MEINE ANTWORT)

> Was anderes fällt einem Hilfsschüler auch nicht ein! Wenn ich dich
> schnappe, dann haue ich dir die Fresse ein – mein Lieber! Merk dir
> das gut, du Kinderficker!
>
> Was sagt denn dein Freund Dr. XXX  zu deinem handeln, Schwuchtel?
>
> > HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA (MEINE ANTWORT)
> >
> > > Geiles Google Suchergebniss hast du mittlerweile. Das ist sowas von
> > > geil. Am besten ist dieser Beitrag zu Deiner Magisterarbeit, du
> > > Spinner:
> > >
> > > http://scheisshausfliege.wordpress.com/2011/01/29/die-diplomarbeit-des-magisters-bernd-pulch-ein-haufen-scheisse/
> > >
> > > Wenn du nicht aufhörst, wird niemand mehr ein Stück Brot von dir
> > > nehmen. Dein Name ist dan absolut durch. Glaub mir, wir verstehen da
> > > mehr von als du Schwachkopf!
> > >
> > > Im Übrigen kannst du mich stets gern persönlich treffen. Unter den
> > > Linden 21, Berlin –  habe immer für dich Feigling Zeit! (TARN-ADRESSE)
> > >
> > > So – und nun überle wann du die Artikel über uns löschen willst,
> > > sonst mache ich die erste Seite der SUMA Ergebnisse mit deinen
> > > Einträgen voll.

Weitere Info zu den Verbrechen der organisierten Kriminellen der STASI  “GoMoPa” auf http://www.victims-opfer.com

TOP-SECRET-NEW KISSINGER ‘TELCONS’ REVEAL CHILE PLOTTING AT HIGHEST LEVELS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT

NEW KISSINGER ‘TELCONS’ REVEAL CHILE PLOTTING
AT HIGHEST LEVELS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT

Nixon Vetoed Proposed Coexistence with an Allende Government
Kissinger to the CIA: “We will not let Chile go down the drain.”

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 255

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Washington D.C., September 13, 2001- On the eve of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the military coup in Chile, the National Security Archive today published for the first time formerly secret transcripts of Henry Kissinger’s telephone conversations that set in motion a massive U.S. effort to overthrow the newly-elected socialist government of Salvador Allende. “We will not let Chile go down the drain,” Kissinger told CIA director Richard Helms in one phone call. “I am with you,” the September 12, 1970 transcript records Helms responding.

The telephone call transcripts—known as ‘telcons’—include previously-unreported conversations between Kissinger and President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers.  Just eight days after Allende’s election, Kissinger informed the president that the State Department had recommended an approach to “see what we can work out [with Allende].”   Nixon responded by instructing Kissinger: “Don’t let them do it.

After Nixon spoke directly to Rogers, Kissinger recorded a conversation in which the Secretary of State agreed that “we ought, as you say, to cold-bloodedly decide what to do and then do it,” but warned it should be done “discreetly so that it doesn’t backfire.” Secretary Rogers predicted that “after all we have said about elections, if the first time a Communist wins the U.S. tries to prevent the constitutional process from coming into play we will look very bad.”

The telcons also reveal that just nine weeks before the Chilean military, led by Gen. Augusto Pinochet and supported by the CIA, overthrew the Allende government on September 11, 1973, Nixon called Kissinger on July 4 to say “I think that Chilean guy might have some problems.” “Yes, I think he’s definitely in difficulties,” Kissinger responded. Nixon then blamed CIA director Helms and former U.S. Ambassador Edward Korry for failing to block Allende’s inauguration three years earlier. “They screwed it up,” the President declared.

Although Kissinger never intended the public to know about these conversations, observed Peter Kornbluh, who directs the National Security Archive’s Chile Documentation Project, he “bestowed on history a gift that keeps on giving by secretly taping and transcribing his phone calls.”  The transcripts, Kornbluh noted, provide historians with the ability to “eavesdrop on the most candid conversations of the highest and most powerful U.S. officials as they plotted covert intervention against a democratically-elected government.”

Kissinger began secretly taping all his incoming and outgoing phone conversations when he became national security advisor in 1969; his secretaries transcribed the calls from audio tapes that were later destroyed.  When Kissinger left office in January 1977, he took more than 30,000 pages of the transcripts, claiming they were “personal papers,” and used them, selectively, to write his memoirs.  In 1999, the National Security Archive initiated legal proceedings to force Kissinger to return these records to the U.S. government so they could be subject to the freedom of information act and declassification.  At the request of Archive senior analyst William Burr, telcons on foreign policy crises from the early 1970s, including these four previously-unknown conversations on Chile, were recently declassified by the Nixon Presidential library.

On November 30, 2008 the National Security Archive will publish a comprehensive collection of Kissinger telcons in the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA). Comprising 15,502 telcons, this collection documents Kissinger’s conversations with top officials in the Nixon and Ford administrations, including President Richard Nixon; Defense Secretaries Melvin Laird, Elliot Richardson, and James Schlesinger; Secretary of State William P. Rogers; Ambassador to the U.N. George H.W. Bush; and White House Counselor Donald Rumsfeld; along with noted journalists, ambassadors, and business leaders with close White House ties.  Wide-ranging topics discussed in the telcons include détente with Moscow, military actions during the Vietnam War and the negotiations that led to its end, Middle East peace talks, the 1970 crisis in Jordan, U.S. relations with Europe, Japan, and Chile, rapprochement with China, the Cyprus crisis (1974- ), and the unfolding Watergate affair.  When combined with the Archive’s previous electronic publication of Kissinger’s memoranda of conversation — The Kissinger Transcripts: A Verbatim Record of U.S. Diplomacy, 1969-1977 — users of the DNSA will have access to comprehensive records of Kissinger’s talks with myriad U.S. officials and world leaders.  Like the Archive’s earlier publication, the Kissinger telcons will be comprehensively and expertly indexed, providing users with have easy access to the information they seek.  The collection also includes 158 White House tapes, some of which dovetail with transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations with Nixon and others.  Users of the set will thus be able to read the “telcon” and listen to the tape simultaneously.

READ THE DOCUMENTS

l. Helms/Kissinger, September 12, 1970, 12:00 noon.

Eight days after Salvador Allende’s narrow election, Kissinger tells CIA director Richard Helms that he is calling a meeting of the 40 committee—the committee that determines covert operations abroad.  “We will not let Chile go down the drain,” Kissinger declares.  Helms reports he has sent a CIA emissary to Chile to obtain a first-hand assessment of the situation.

2. President/Kissinger, September 12, 1970, 12:32 p.m.

In the middle of a Kissinger report to Nixon on the status of a terrorist hostage crisis in Amman, Jordan, he tells the president that “the big problem today is Chile.”  Former CIA director and ITT board member John McCone has called to press for action against Allende; Nixon’s friend Pepsi CEO Donald Kendall has brought Chilean media mogul Augustine Edwards to Washington.  Nixon blasts a State Department proposal to “see what we can work out [with Allende], and orders Kissinger “don’t let them do that.” The president demands to see all State Department cable traffic on Chile and to get an appraisal of “what the options are.”

3. Secretary Rogers, September 14, 1970, 12:15pm (page 2)

After Nixon speaks to Secretary of State William Rogers about Chile, Kissinger speaks to him on September 14. Rogers reluctantly agrees that the CIA should “encourage a different result” in Chile, but warns it should be done discreetly lest U.S. intervention against a democratically-elected government be exposed.  Kissinger firmly tells Secretary Rogers that “the president’s view is to do the maximum possible to prevent an Allende takeover, but through Chilean sources and with a low posture.”

4) President/Kissinger, July 4, 1973, 11:00 a.m.

Vacationing in San Clemente, Nixon calls Kissinger and discusses the deteriorating situation in Chile.  Two weeks earlier, a coup attempt against Allende failed, but Nixon and Kissinger predict further turmoil.  “I think that Chilean guy may have some problems,” Nixon states.  “Oh, he has massive problems.  He has massive problems…he’s definitely in difficulties,” Kissinger responds.  The two share recollections of three years earlier when they had covertly attempted to block Allende’s inauguration.  Nixon blames CIA director Richard Helms and former U.S. ambassador Edward Korry for failing to stop Allende; “they screwed it up,” he states.  The conversation then turns to Kissinger’s evaluation of the Los Angeles premiere of the play “Gigi.”

5) President/Kissinger, September 16, 1973, 11:50 a.m. (previously posted May 26, 2004)

In their first substantive conversation following the military coup in Chile, Kissinger and Nixon discuss the U.S. role in the overthrow of Allende, and the adverse reaction in the new media. When Nixon asks if the U.S. “hand” will show in the coup, Kissinger admits “we helped them” and that “[deleted reference] created conditions as great as possible.”  The two commiserate over what Kissinger calls the “bleating” liberal press. In the Eisenhower period, he states, “we would be heroes.” Nixon assures him that the people will appreciate what they did: “let me say they aren’t going to buy this crap from the liberals on this one.”

TOP-SECRET – Meyer Lansky – THE FBI FILES PART 1

Meyer Lansky (1902-1983) was involved in a wide-range of organized criminal activity and was associated with many other well known criminal figures from the 1920s to the 1970s. Lansky was especially active in gambling ventures, including the rise of Las Vegas and efforts to build casinos in Cuba before the communist revolution there. In 1972, he was indicted on charges that he and others had skimmed millions of dollars from a Vegas casino that they owned; the indictment on Lansky was later dismissed since he was considered too ill to face trial. The files in this release range from 1950 to 1978.

By clicking on the links below you can download the files a pdf documents

62-97928 -83

71-4082 -9

92-2831 section 1 -97

92-2831 section 2 -68

92-2831 section 3 -133

92-2831 section 4 -266- pages 1-249

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Meyer Lansky

Meyer Lansky in 1958
Born Meyer Suchowljansky
July 4, 1902(1902-07-04)
Grodno, Russian Empire
Died January 15, 1983(1983-01-15) (aged 80)
Miami Beach, Florida
Cause of death lung cancer
Nationality United States
Known for Mob activity

Meyer Lansky (born Meyer Suchowljansky[1]; July 4, 1902 – January 15, 1983), known as the “Mob’s Accountant”, was a Russian Empire-born American organized crime figure who, along with his associate Charles “Lucky” Luciano, was instrumental in the development of the “National Crime Syndicate” in the United States. For decades he was thought to be one of the most powerful people in the country.

Lansky developed a gambling empire which stretched from Saratoga, New York to Miami to Council Bluffs and Las Vegas; it is also said that he oversaw gambling concessions in Cuba. Although a member of the Jewish Mafia, Lansky undoubtedly had strong influence with the Italian Mafia and played a large role in the consolidation of the criminal underworld (although the full extent of this role has been the subject of some debate).

Lansky was born Meyer Suchowljansky in Grodno (then in the Russian Empire, now in Belarus), to a Jewish family who experienced pogroms at the hands of the local Christian Polish and Russian population.[2] In 1911, he emigrated to the United States through the port of Odessa[3] with his mother and brother and joined his father, who had previously emigrated to the United States in 1909, and settled on the Lower East Side of Manhattan, New York.[4]

Lansky met Bugsy Siegel when he was a teenager. They became lifelong friends, as well as partners in the bootlegging trade, and together with Lucky Luciano, formed a lasting partnership. Lansky was instrumental in Luciano’s rise to power by organizing the 1931 murder of Mafia powerhouse Salvatore Maranzano. As a youngster, Siegel saved Lansky’s life several times, a fact which Lansky always appreciated. The two adroitly managed the Bug and Meyer Mob despite its reputation as one of the most violent Prohibition gangs.

Lansky was the brother of Jacob “Jake” Lansky, who in 1959 was the manager of the Nacional Hotel in Havana, Cuba.

 Gambling operations

By 1936, Lansky had established gambling operations in Florida, New Orleans, and Cuba. These gambling operations were very successful as they were founded upon two innovations. First, in Lansky and his connections there existed the technical expertise to effectively manage them based upon Lansky’s knowledge of the true mathematical odds of most popular wagering games. Second, mob connections were used to ensure legal and physical security of their establishments from other crime figures, and law enforcement (through payoffs).

But there was also an absolute rule of integrity concerning the games and wagers made within their establishments. Lansky’s “carpet joints” in Florida and elsewhere were never “clip-joints”; where gamblers were unsure of whether or not the games were rigged against them. Lansky ensured that the staff (the croupiers and their management) actually consisted of men of high integrity. And it was widely known what would happen to a croupier or a table manager who attempted to cheat or steal from a customer or the house.[clarification needed]

In 1936, Lansky’s partner Luciano was sent to prison. As Alfred McCoy records:

“During the 1930s, Meyer Lansky ‘discovered’ the Caribbean for Northeastern United States syndicate bosses and invested their illegal profits in an assortment of lucrative gambling ventures…. He was also reportedly responsible for organized crime’s decision to declare Miami a ‘free city’ (i.e., not subject to the usual rules of territorial monopoly).”

[citation needed]

Lansky later convinced the Mafia to place Bugsy Siegel in charge of Las Vegas, and became a major investor in Siegel’s Flamingo Hotel.

After Al Capone‘s 1931 conviction for tax evasion and prostitution, Lansky saw that he too was vulnerable to a similar prosecution. To protect himself, he transferred the illegal earnings from his growing casino empire to a Swiss numbered bank account, whose anonymity was assured by the 1934 Swiss Banking Act. Lansky eventually even bought an offshore bank in Switzerland, which he used to launder money through a network of shell and holding companies.[5]

War work

In the 1930s, Meyer Lansky and his gang claimed to have stepped outside their usual criminal activities to break up rallies held by Nazi sympathizers. Lansky recalled a particular rally in Yorkville, a German neighborhood in Manhattan, that he claimed he and 14 other associates disrupted:

The stage was decorated with a swastika and a picture of Adolf Hitler. The speakers started ranting. There were only fifteen of us, but we went into action. We threw some of them out the windows. Most of the Nazis panicked and ran out. We chased them and beat them up. We wanted to show them that Jews would not always sit back and accept insults.[6]

During World War II, Lansky was also instrumental in helping the Office of Naval Intelligence‘s Operation Underworld, in which the US government recruited criminals to watch out for German infiltrators and submarine-borne saboteurs.

According to Lucky Luciano’s authorized biography, during this time, Lansky helped arrange a deal with the US Government via a high-ranking U.S. Navy official. This deal would secure the release of Lucky Luciano from prison; in exchange the Italian Mafia would provide security for the war ships that were being built along the docks in New York Harbor. German submarines were sinking allied shipping outside the coast on a daily basis and there was great fear of attack or sabotage by Nazi sympathizers.

The Flamingo

During the 1940s, Lansky’s associate Benjamin “Bugsy” Siegel persuaded the crime bosses to invest in a lavish new casino hotel project in Las Vegas, the Flamingo. After long delays and large cost overruns, the Flamingo Hotel was still not open for business. To discuss the Flamingo problem, the Mafia investors attended a secret meeting in Havana, Cuba in 1946. While the other bosses wanted to kill Siegel, Lansky begged them to give his friend a second chance. Despite this reprieve, Siegel continued to lose Mafia money on the Flamingo Hotel. A second family meeting was then called. However, by the time this meeting took place, the casino turned a small profit. Lansky again, with Luciano’s support, convinced the family to give Siegel some more time.

The Flamingo was soon losing money again. At a third meeting, the family decided that Siegel was finished. He had humiliated the organized crime bosses and never had a chance. It is widely believed that Lansky himself was compelled to give the final okay on eliminating Siegel due to his long relationship with Siegel and his stature in the family.

On June 20, 1947, Siegel was shot and killed in Beverly Hills, California. Twenty minutes after the Siegel hit, Lansky’s associates, including Gus Greenbaum and Moe Sedway, walked into the Flamingo Hotel and took control of the property. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Lansky retained a substantial financial interest in the Flamingo for the next twenty years. Lansky said in several interviews later in his life that if it had been up to him, Ben Siegel would be alive today.

This also marked a power transfer in Vegas from the New York crime families to the Chicago Outfit. Although his role was considerably more restrained than in previous years, Lansky is believed to have both advised and aided Chicago boss Tony Accardo in initially establishing his hold.

Lansky in Cuba

After World War II, Lansky associate Lucky Luciano was paroled from prison on the condition that he permanently return to Sicily. However, Luciano secretly moved to Cuba, where he worked to resume control over American Mafia operations. Luciano also ran a number of casinos in Cuba with the sanction of Cuban president General Fulgencio Batista, though the American government succeeded in pressuring the Batista regime to deport Luciano.

Batista’s closest friend in the Mafia was Lansky. They formed a renowned friendship and business relationship that lasted for three decades. During a stay at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York in the late 1940s, it was mutually agreed upon that, in exchange for kickbacks, Batista would offer Lansky and the Mafia control of Havana’s racetracks and casinos. Batista would open Havana to large scale gambling, and his government would match, dollar for dollar, any hotel investment over $1 million, which would include a casino license. Lansky, of course, would place himself at the center of Cuba’s gambling operations. He immediately called on his “associates” to hold a summit in Havana.

The Havana Conference was held on December 22, 1946 at the Hotel Nacional. This was the first full-scale meeting of American underworld leaders since the Chicago meeting in 1932. Present were such notable figures as Joe Adonis and Albert “The Mad Hatter” Anastasia, Frank Costello, Joseph “Joe Bananas” Bonanno, Vito Genovese, Moe Dalitz, Thomas Luchese, from New York, Santo Trafficante Jr. from Tampa, Carlos “The Little Man” Marcello from New Orleans, and Stefano Magaddino, Joe Bonanno’s cousin from Buffalo. From Chicago there was Anthony Accardo and the Fischetti brothers, “Trigger-Happy” Charlie and his brother Rocco, and, representing the Jewish interest, Lansky and “Dandy” Phil Kastel from Florida. The first to arrive was Salvatore Charles Lucky Luciano, who had been deported to Italy, and had to travel to Havana with a false passport. Lansky shared with them his vision of a new Havana, profitable for those willing to invest the right sum of money. A city that could be their “Latin Las Vegas,” where they would feel right at home since it was a place where drugs, prostitution, labor racketeering, and extortion were already commonplace. According to Luciano’s evidence, and he is the only one who ever recounted details of the events in any detail, he confirmed that he was appointed as kingpin for the mob, to rule from Cuba until such time as he could find a legitimate way back into the U.S. Entertainment at the conference was provided by, among others, Frank Sinatra who flew down to Cuba with their friends, the Fischetti brothers.

In 1952, Lansky even offered then President Carlos Prío Socarrás a bribe of U.S. $250,000 to step down so Batista could return to power. Once Batista retook control of the government he quickly put gambling back on track. The dictator contacted Lansky and offered him an annual salary of U.S. $25,000 to serve as an unofficial gambling minister. By 1955, Batista had changed the gambling laws once again, granting a gaming license to anyone who invested $1 million in a hotel or U.S. $200,000 in a new nightclub. Unlike the procedure for acquiring gaming licenses in Vegas, this provision exempted venture capitalists from background checks. As long as they made the required investment, they were provided with public matching funds for construction, a 10-year tax exemption and duty-free importation of equipment and furnishings. The government would get U.S. $250,000 for the license plus a percentage of the profits from each casino. Cuba’s 10,000 slot machines, even the ones which dispensed small prizes for children at country fairs, were to be the province of Batista’s brother-in-law, Roberto Fernandez y Miranda. An Army general and government sports director, Fernandez was also given the parking meters in Havana as a little something extra. Import duties were waived on materials for hotel construction and Cuban contractors with the right “in” made windfalls by importing much more than was needed and selling the surplus to others for hefty profits. It was rumored that besides the U.S. $250,000 to get a license, sometimes more was required under the table. Periodic payoffs were requested and received by corrupt politicians.

Lansky set about reforming the Montmartre Club, which soon became the in place in Havana. He also long expressed an interest in putting a casino in the elegant Hotel Nacional, which overlooked El Morro, the ancient fortress guarding Havana harbor. Lansky planned to take a wing of the 10-storey hotel and create luxury suites for high stakes players. Batista endorsed Lansky’s idea over the objections of American expatriates such as Ernest Hemingway and the elegant hotel opened for business in 1955 with a show by Eartha Kitt. The casino was an immediate success.[7]

Once all the new hotels, nightclubs and casinos had been built Batista wasted no time collecting his share of the profits. Nightly, the “bagman” for his wife collected 10 percent of the profits at Trafficante’s interests; the Sans Souci cabaret, and the casinos in the hotels Sevilla-Biltmore, Commodoro, Deauville and Capri (part-owned by the actor George Raft). His take from the Lansky casinos, his prized Habana Riviera, the Nacional, the Montmartre Club and others, was said to be 30 percent. What exactly Batista and his cronies actually received in total in the way of bribes, payoffs and profiteering has never been certified. The slot machines alone contributed approximately U.S. $1 million to the regime’s bank account.

Revolution

The fast times soon rolled to a stop. The 1959 Cuban revolution and the rise of Fidel Castro changed the climate for mob investment in Cuba. On that New Year’s Eve of 1958, while Batista was preparing to flee to the Dominican Republic and then on to Spain (where he died in exile in 1973), Lansky was celebrating the $3 million he made in the first year of operations at his 440-room, $18 million palace, the Habana Riviera. Many of the casinos, including several of Lansky’s, were looted and destroyed that night.

On January 8, 1959, Castro marched into Havana and took over, setting up shop in the Hilton. Lansky had fled the day before for the Bahamas and other Caribbean destinations. The new Cuban president, Manuel Urrutia Lleó, took steps to close the casinos.

In October 1960, Castro nationalized the island’s hotel-casinos and outlawed gambling. This action essentially wiped out Lansky’s asset base and revenue streams. He lost an estimated $7 million. With the additional crackdown on casinos in Miami, Lansky was forced to depend on his Las Vegas revenues.

Later years

In his later years, Lansky lived a low-profile, routine existence in Miami Beach, making life difficult for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). He dressed like the average grandfather, walked his dog every morning, and portrayed himself as a harmless retiree. Lansky’s associates usually met him in malls and other crowded locations. Lansky would change drivers, who chauffeured him around town to look for new pay phones almost every day. Lansky was so elusive that the FBI essentially gave up monitoring him by the mid-1970s.

Attempted escape to Israel and trial

In 1970, Lansky fled to Herzliya Pituah, Israel, to escape federal tax evasion charges. Although the Israeli Law of Return allows any Jew to settle in the State of Israel, it excludes those with criminal pasts. Two years after Lansky fled to Israel, Israeli authorities deported him back to the U.S. However, the government’s best shot at convicting Lansky was with the testimony of loan shark Vincent “Fat Vinnie” Teresa, an informant with little or no credibility. The jury was unreceptive and Lansky was acquitted in 1974.

Death

Lansky’s last years were spent quietly at his home in Miami Beach. He died of lung cancer on January 15, 1983, age 80, leaving behind a widow and three children.[8] On paper, Lansky was worth almost nothing. At the time, the FBI believed he left behind over $300 million in hidden bank accounts, but they never found any money.

However, his biographer Robert Lacey describes Lansky’s financially strained circumstances in the last two decades of his life and his inability to pay for health care for his relatives. For Lacey, there was no evidence “to sustain the notion of Lansky as king of all evil, the brains, the secret mover, the inspirer and controller of American organized crime.”[9] He concludes from evidence including interviews with the surviving members of the family that Lansky’s wealth and influence had been grossly exaggerated, and that it would be more accurate to think of him as an accountant for gangsters rather than a gangster himself. His granddaughter told author T.J. English that at his death in 1983, Lansky left only $37,000 in cash.[10] When asked in his later years what went wrong in Cuba, the gangster offered no excuses. “I crapped out,” he said. He would also tell people he had lost every single penny in Cuba. In all likelihood, it was only an excuse to keep the IRS off his back. According to Lansky’s daughter Sandra, he had transferred at least $15 million to his brother Jake due to his problems with the IRS. Lansky was known to keep money in other people’s names, but how much will likely never be known. Meyer Lansky was and continues to be a mystery.

In September 1982, Forbes listed him as one of the 400 wealthiest people in America. His net worth was estimated at $100 million.

 In popular culture

 In film

  • The character Hyman Roth, portrayed by Lee Strasberg, and certain aspects of the main character Michael Corleone from the film The Godfather Part II (1974), are based on Lansky. In fact, shortly after the premiere in 1974, Lansky phoned Strasberg and congratulated him on a good performance (Strasberg was nominated for an Oscar for his role), but added “You could’ve made me more sympathetic.” Roth’s statement to Michael Corleone that “We’re bigger than U.S. Steel” was actually a direct quote from Lansky, who said the same thing to his wife while watching a news story on the Cosa Nostra. The character Johnny Ola is similar to Lansky’s associate Vincent Alo. Additionally, the character Moe Greene, who was a friend of Roth’s, is modeled upon Bugsy Siegel.[11][12] The film reflects real life in that Lansky was denied the Right of Return to Israel and returned to the U.S. to face criminal charges, but fabricated details regarding Roth’s attempts to bribe Latin American dictators for entry to their countries, as well as Roth’s ultimate fate.
  • Maximilian “Max” Bercovicz, the gangster played by James Woods in Sergio Leone‘s opus Once Upon A Time In America was inspired by Meyer Lansky.[13]
  • Mark Rydell plays Lansky in the 1990 Sydney Pollack film Havana, starring Robert Redford.
  • The film Bugsy (1991), a biography of Bugsy Siegel, included Lansky as a major character, played by Ben Kingsley.
  • In the 1991 film Mobsters, he is played by the actor Patrick Dempsey.
  • In a 1999 movie biopic entitled Lansky, the dramatized role of Lansky is portrayed by Richard Dreyfuss.
  • Meyer Lansky is portrayed by Dustin Hoffman in the 2005 film The Lost City.

 In television

  • In the current (2010) series on HBO, Boardwalk Empire, Meyer Lansky is played by Anatol Yusef.
  • The 1981 NBC mini series, The Gangster Chronicles, the character of Michael Lasker, played by Brian Benben, was based on Lansky. Because Lansky was still living at the time, the producers derived the “Michael Lasker” name for the character to avoid legal complications.
  • A 1999 made-for-TV movie called Lansky was released starring Richard Dreyfuss as Lansky, Eric Roberts as Bugsy Siegel, and Anthony LaPaglia as Lucky Luciano.
  • Manny Wiesbord, the mob chieftain played by Joseph Wiseman on Crime Story, was based on Lansky.
  • Lansky’s grandson, Meyer Lansky II, appeared in the “Jesse James vs. Al Capone” episode of Spike‘s Deadliest Warrior as a Capone expert, credited as “Mafioso Descendant.” The senior Lansky was briefly referenced during the episode.

 In literature

  • In the 2010 book of photographs “New York City Gangland”,[14] Meyer Lansky is seen “loitering” on Little Italy’s famed “Whiskey Curb” with partners Benjamin “Bugsy” Siegel, Vincent “Jimmy Blue Eyes” Alo, and waterfront racketeer Eddie McGrath.
  • In the 1996 novel The Plan, by Stephen J. Cannell, Lansky and fellow mobster Joseph Alo are involved in putting an anti-Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act presidential candidate into office.
  • In the 2009 theatrical adaption by Joseph Bologna “Lansky” is portrayed by Mike Burstyn in a one act play.
  • In the book Havana by Stephen Hunter, Lansky and Fidel Castro are both included as main characters.
  • In the 2009 novel If The Dead Rise Not by Philip Kerr the hero, Bernie Gunther, meets Lansky in Havana.
  • In the 2009 novel Ride of the Valkyries by Stuart Slade, Meyer Lansky is the President of Mafia run Cuba.
  • In the 2011 historical novel, “The Devil Himself” by Eric Dezenhall, Meyer Lansky coordinates counterespionage operations with the U.S. Navy to prevent Nazi sabotage in New York and help plan the invasion of Sicily.
  • He portrays himself in Harold Robbins 1995 follow-up to The Carpetbaggers, The Raiders.

In music

  • In his 2007 song “Party Life,” Jay-Z raps, “So tall and Lanky / My suit, it should thank me / I make it look good to be this hood Meyer Lansky.”
  • Raekwon, a member of the Wu-tang Clan referred to himself as “rap’s Meyer Lansky” in his song “Glaciers of Ice,” a single on his classic 1995 release “Only Built 4 Cuban Linx…
  • A member of the rap group Wu-Syndicate uses Myalansky as his stage name, referring to Meyer Lansky.
  • In the 2010 mixtape “Albert Anastasia” by Rick Ross refers to Meyer Lansky in his song White Sand Pt.II: “I put the team together like I’m Meyer Lansky.”
  • On Obie Trice’s “Outro” off the Cheers album Proof raps, ” Know much about Meyer Lansky? / Don’t tustle with my hand speed / Clutch your burner, bust it and watch your man bleed.”
  • In 2011 50 Cent’s Run Up On Me Freestyle raps, “Got a fetish for the guns Calico drums / Rap Meyer Lansky steady counting my ones”

TOP-SECRET-CUBA and the U.S ROAD MAP

Washington, D.C., September, 2011– In March 1975, a top aide to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger drafted a secret/nodis report titled “Normalizing Relations with Cuba” that recommended moving quickly to restore diplomatic ties with Havana. “Our interest is in getting the Cuba issue behind us, not in prolonging it indefinitely,” states the memorandum, which was written as the Ford administration engaged in secret diplomacy with Castro officials to lessen hostilities. “If there is a benefit to us in an end to the state of ‘perpetual antagonism,'” the report to Kissinger noted, “it lies in getting Cuba off the domestic and inter-American agendas—in extracting the symbolism from an intrinsically trivial issue.”The Kissinger document is one of several declassified records posted today and cited in a new article, “Talking to Fidel,” published in the February issue of Cigar Aficionado now available in newsstands. Written by Archive Cuba analyst Peter Kornbluh and William LeoGrande, Dean of the School of Public Affairs at American University, the article traces the secret, back-channel efforts by Kennedy, Kissinger, Carter and Clinton to improve and even attempt to normalize relations with the Castro regime. “The historical record,” the authors write, “contains important lessons [for President Obama] on how an effective effort at direct diplomacy might end, once and for all, the perpetual hostility in U.S.-Cuban relations.”

The article also quotes former President Jimmy Carter as stating that he should have followed through on his initial efforts to normalize relations with Cuba. “I think in retrospect, knowing what I know since I left the White House,” Carter told the authors in an interview, “I should have gone ahead and been more flexible in dealing with Cuba and establishing full diplomatic relations.”

The Kissinger documents, posted for the first time on the Web, along with other documentation from the Kennedy and Carter administrations, were obtained by the Archive’s Cuba documentation project as part of a major research project on secret dialogue and negotiations between Havana and Washington over the past fifty years.  The article in Cigar Aficionado is adapted from a forthcoming book by Kornbluh and LeoGrande, Talking with Fidel: The Untold History of Dialogue between the United States and Cuba.

“History shows that presidents from Kennedy to Clinton considered dialogue both possible and preferable to continued hostility and aggression in U.S. policy toward Cuba,” Kornbluh noted. “This rich declassified record of the past provides a road map for the new administration to follow in the future.”


Read the Dialogue Documents

Document l: White House memorandum, Secret, “Conversation with Commandante Ernesto Guevara of Cuba”, August 22, 1961.

In a secret memo to President Kennedy, Richard Goodwin recounts his impromptu meeting with Ernesto “Che” Guevara that took place on August 17, 1961 in Montevideo, Uruguay. Their conversation covered several key points: First, Guevara expressed Cuba’s hope to establish a “modus vivendi” with the United States. Second, although Castro was willing\ to make a number of concessions toward that goal, the nature of Cuba’s political system was nonnegotiable. “He said they could discuss no formula that would mean giving up the type of society to which they were dedicated,” Goodwin reported. Finally Guevara raised the issue of how the two countries would find “a practical formula” to advance toward accommodation. He made a pragmatic suggestion, according to Goodwin: “He knew it was difficult to negotiate these things but we could open up some of these issues by beginning to discuss secondary issues … as a cover for more serious conversation.” The meeting marked the first high-level talks between officials from the United States and Cuba since the break in diplomatic relations on January 3, 1961.

Document 2: White House memorandum, Top Secret, “Mr. Donovan’s Trip to Cuba,” March 4, 1963.

This document records President Kennedy’s interest in negotiations with Castro and his instructions to his staff to “start thinking along more flexible lines” about negotiations with Cuba toward better relations.  At issue were talks between James Donovan, who had negotiated the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners, and Fidel Castro, who had expressed an interest in using the prisoner negotiations as a springboard to discuss more normal relations.  The memo recording Kennedy’s views makes clear he expressed a concrete interest in exploring and pursuing an effective dialogue with Castro.

Document 3: Central Intelligence Agency memorandum, Secret, “Interview of the U.S. Newswoman with Fidel Castro Indicating Possible Interest in Rapprochement with the United States”, May 1, 1963.

After ABC News correspondent Lisa Howard returned from interviewing Castro in April 1963, she provided a debriefing to CIA deputy director Richard Helms. Helms’s memorandum of conversation notes her opinion that Castro is “ready to discuss rapprochement.” Howard also offered to become an intermediary between Havana and Washington. The document contains a notation, “Psaw,” meaning President Kennedy read the report on Howard and Castro. 

Document 4: Oval Office audio tape, Kennedy and Bundy, November 5, 1963. (.mp3 audio clip – 6 MB)

This audio document, recorded by a secret taping system in President Kennedy’s office, records a discussion between the President and his National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, regarding Castro’s invitation to William Attwood, a deputy to U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, to come to Cuba for secret talks. “How can Attwood get in and out of there very privately,” Kennedy is heard to ask. The President suggests that Attwood should be taken off the U.S. payroll prior to such a meeting so that the White House could plausibly deny that any official talks had taken place if the meeting leaks to the press.

Document 5: National Security Council, memorandum for Secretary Kissinger, Confidential, “Cuba Policy,” August 30, 1974.

This memorandum for Kissinger lays out the growing multinational pressures on the U.S. to change its sanctions policy toward Cuba.  A number of Latin countries are pushing for licenses for U.S. subsidiaries to export goods to Cuba, and the OAS nations are threatening to lift the ban on trade and diplomatic ties with Havana that the U.S. imposed in 1964.  Stephen Low, an NSC staffer on Latin America, recommends an options paper for changing U.S. policy and negotiating with the Cubans that “should be held very closely.” Kissinger authorizes the project. Unbeknownst to all but his two top aides, he also initiates contact with the Cubans through intermediaries to begin exploring talks. (Newly posted)

Document 6: Kissinger Aide-Memoire to Cuba, January 11, 1975

In an effort to renew a dialogue between Cuba and the United States, Kissinger’s aides and Cuban representatives meet for the first time in a public cafeteria in La Guardia airport in New York on January 11, 1975. During this secret meeting, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, William Rogers, provides an aide-mémoire, approved by Kissinger, to Castro’s representative, Ramon Sanchez-Parodi.   “We are meeting here to explore the possibilities for a more normal relationship between our two countries,” the untitled and unsigned U.S. document reads.  The message takes a very positive tone in suggesting that the “U.S. is able and willing to make progress on such issues even with socialist nations with whom we are in fundamental ideological disagreement.” (Newly posted) 

Document 7: Department of State, Secret, “Normalizing relations with Cuba”, March 27, 1975.

As the OAS prepared to lift multilateral sanctions against Cuba, and the U.S. Congress pushed for lifting the embargo, deputy assistant secretary for Latin America Harry Shlaudeman drafted a secret/nodis memo for Kissinger on “Normalizing Relations with Cuba.” His report suggests that the U.S. should move quickly to negotiate with Cuba through a scenario that will result in normal diplomatic relations. “Our interest is in getting the Cuba issue behind us, not in prolonging it indefinitely,” the memo states. Shlaudeman warns that the conventional scenario of talks will become mired in disagreements over compensation for expropriated property and suggests setting that issue aside. The document lays out a series of steps that would be taken to normalize relations and finally get the “intrinsically trivial issue” of Cuba “off the domestic and inter-American agendas.” (Newly posted)

Document 8: Presidential Directive / NSC-6, Secret, “Cuba”, March 15, 1977.

This directive, issued shortly after Carter took office, represents the only time a President has ordered normalization of U.S. relations with Castro’s Cuba. “I have concluded that we should attempt to achieve normalization of our relations with Cuba,” the directive states. Carter instructed his foreign policy team to “set in motion a process which will lead to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba.” Although negotiations led quickly to re-opening diplomatic ties through the establishment of interest sections in Havana and Washington, secret talks, including with Fidel Castro, broke down over the U.S. insistence that Cuba withdraw its troops from Africa before the Carter Administration would consider lifting the embargo.

CUBA and the U.S

ROAD MAP ON EFFORTS TO IMPROVE
RELATIONS REVEALED IN DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS

Archive Posts Documents used in new Cigar Aficionado Article: “Talking To Fidel”

Secret Kissinger Era reports on Ending “Perpetual Antagonism” may hold Lessons for Obama Administration

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 269

TOP-SECRET-Historical Archives Lead to Arrest of Police Officers in Guatemalan Disappearance

Demonstration by the GAM on April 13, 1985 following the deaths of GAM leaders, Héctor Gómez and Rosario Godoy de Cuevas. Photo from; “Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyrany.” [Courtesy of Jean-Marie Simon]

Historical Archives Lead to Arrest of Police
Officers in Guatemalan Disappearance

Declassified documents show U.S. Embassy knew
that Guatemalan security forces were behind
wave of abductions of students and labor leaders

National Security Archive calls for release of military files
and investigation into intellectual authors of the 1984
abduction of Fernando García and other disappearances

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 273

By Kate Doyle and Jesse Franzblau

Washington, DC, September 14, – Following a stunning breakthrough in a 25-year-old case of political terror in Guatemala, the National Security Archive today is posting declassified U.S. documents about the disappearance of Edgar Fernando García, a student leader and trade union activist captured by Guatemalan security forces in 1984.The documents show that García’s capture was an organized political abduction orchestrated at the highest levels of the Guatemalan government.

Guatemalan authorities made the first arrest ever in the long-dormant kidnapping case when they detained Héctor Roderico Ramírez Ríos, a senior police officer in Quezaltenango, on March 5th and retired policeman Abraham Lancerio Gómez on March 6th as a result of an investigation into García’s abduction by Guatemala’s Human Rights Prosecutor (Procurador de Derechos Humanos—PDH). Arrest warrants have been issued for two more suspects, Hugo Rolando Gómez Osorio and Alfonso Guillermo de León Marroquín. The two are former officers with the notorious Special Operations Brigade (BROE) of the National Police, a unit linked to death squad activities during the 1980s by human rights groups.

According to the prosecutor Sergio Morales, the suspects were identified using evidence found in the vast archives of the former National Police. The massive, moldering cache of documents was discovered accidentally by the PDH in 2005, and has since been cleaned, organized and reviewed by dozens of investigators. The National Security Archive provided expert advice in the rescue of the archive and posted photographs and analysis on its Web site. Last week, Morales turned over hundreds of additional records to the Public Ministry containing evidence of state security force involvement in the disappearance of other student leaders between 1978 and 1980. As the Historical Archive of the National Police prepares to issue its first major report on March 24, more evidence of human rights crimes can be expected to be made public.

Government Campaign of Terror

The abduction of Fernando García was part of a government campaign of terror designed to destroy Guatemala’s urban and rural social movements during the 1980s. On February 18, 1984, the young student leader was captured on the outskirts of a market near his home in Guatemala City. He was never seen again. Although witnesses pointed to police involvement, the government under then-Chief of State Gen. Oscar Humberto Mejía Víctores always denied any role in his kidnapping. According to the Historical Clarification Commission’s report released in 1999, García was one of an estimated 40,000 civilians disappeared by state agents during Guatemala’s 36-year civil conflict.

In the wake of García’s capture, his wife, Nineth Montenegro – now a member of Congress – launched the Mutual Support Group (Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo—GAM), a new human rights organization that pressed the government for information about missing relatives. Co-founded with other families of the disappeared , GAM took shape in June of 1984, holding demonstrations, meeting with government officials and leading a domestic and international advocacy campaign over the years to find the truth behind the thousands of Guatemala’s disappeared. The organization was quickly joined by hundreds more family members of victims of government-sponsored violence, including Mayan Indians affected by a brutal army counterinsurgency campaign that decimated indigenous communities in the country’s rural highlands during the early 1980s.

Declassified U.S. records obtained by the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act indicate that the United States was well-aware of the government campaign to kidnap, torture and kill Guatemalan labor leaders at the time of García’s abduction. “Government security services have employed assassination to eliminate persons suspected of involvement with the guerrillas or who are otherwise left-wing in orientation,” wrote the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research four days after García disappeared, pointing in particular to the Army’s “notorious presidential intelligence service (archivos)” and the National Police, “who have traditionally considered labor activists to be communists.”

The U.S. Embassy in Guatemala considered the wave of state-sponsored kidnappings part of an effort to gather information on “Marxist-Leninist” trade unions. “The government is obviously rounding up people connected with the extreme left-wing labor movement for interrogation,” wrote U.S. Ambassador Frederic Chapin in a cable naming six labor leaders recently captured by security forces, including García. Despite reports that García was already dead, the ambassador was “optimistic” that he and other detainees would be released after questioning.

Many of the kidnapping victims noted in U.S. records included in this briefing book also appear in the “Death Squad Dossier,” an army intelligence logbook listing 183 people disappeared by security forces in the mid-1980s. In 1999, the National Security Archive obtained the original logbook and released a public copy. The logbook indicates that García was among dozens of students, professors, doctors, journalists, labor leaders and others subjected to intensive army and police surveillance in the weeks leading up to their capture, disappearance and – in about half of the cases – execution. The logbook entry listing Fernando García includes his alleged subversive alias names and affiliation to the Guatemalan Communist Party, as well as detailed personal information taken from official documents such as his national identification card and his passport. Other victims listed in the Death Squad Dossier who are named in the U.S. documents posted today include Amancio Samuel Villatoro, Alfonso Alvarado Palencia, José Luis Villagrán Díaz and Santiago López Aguilar. U.S. records describe their disappearances in the context of the government campaign to systematically dismantle Guatemala’s labor movement.

The U.S. records posted today contain illuminating information on how the use of illegal kidnapping as a counterinsurgency strategy reached a peak during the government of Oscar Mejía Víctores. U.S. figures estimated that there was an average of 137 abductions a month under the Mejía Víctores regime during 1984. According to one extensive State Department report written in 1986, part of the modus operandi of government kidnapping involved interrogating victims at military bases, police stations, or government safe houses, where information about alleged connections with insurgents was “extracted through torture.” The security forces used the information to conduct joint military/police raids on houses throughout the city, secretly capturing hundreds of individuals who were never seen again, or whose discarded bodies were later discovered showing signs of torture. The National Police, subservient to the Army hierarchy, created special units to assist the military in the urban counter-guerrilla operations.

The records also demonstrate military efforts to cover up their role in the extra-legal activities. In 1985, for example, as Guatemala prepared to transition to a civilian government for the first time in a quarter of a century, the Army ordered the Archivos – which the State Department called “a secret group in the President’s office that collected information on insurgents and operated against them” – to move its files out of presidential control and into the Intelligence Directorate (D-2) section of the military.

U.S. documents also chronicled developments as members of GAM became targets of government violence themselves. GAM members suffered the worst period of violence during Easter “holy week” in 1985, beginning with the kidnapping of senior member Héctor Gómez Calito, whose tortured and mutilated body was found on March 30, 1985. According to one U.S. Embassy source, agents from the Detectives Corps of the National Police had been gathering information on Gómez in the days leading to his abduction. Two weeks before his disappearance, Chief of State Oscar Mejía Víctores publicly charged that GAM members were being manipulated by guerrillas and questioned the sources of their funding. Following his murder, GAM co-founder and widow of missing student leader Carlos Ernesto Cuevas Molina, Rosario Godoy de Cuevas, who had delivered the eulogy at Gómez Calito’s funeral, was found dead at the bottom of a ditch two miles outside Guatemala City, along with her 2-year-old son and 21-year-old brother. While the government claimed their deaths was an accident, Embassy sources discounted the official version of the events, and claimed that Godoy was targeted and her death a premeditated homicide. Human rights monitors who had seen the bodies reported that the infant’s fingernails had been torn out.

Future Investigations

The arrest of the police officers in Guatemala is an unprecedented step in the struggle against impunity, and a testament to the investigative efforts being carried out in the historical National Police archive. The declassified records, however, demonstrate that Fernando García’s disappearance was not an ordinary police arrest, but rather an organized political abduction orchestrated by the highest-levels of government. In addition to the police files that have already proven so crucial to breaking new ground in this case, the release of the relevant military files is critical to unraveling what role the Army High Command and Chief of State played in this crime. In addition to the material authors of the crime, those who planned and ordered García’s kidnapping must also be investigated. At the time of his disappearance, the key military and police personnel overseeing Guatemala’s urban counter-terror campaign were:

Head of the Army Intelligence Directorate (D-2): Byron Disrael Lima Estrada
Director of the Presidential General Staff (EMP): Juan José Marroquín Siliezar
Directors of the Archivos: Marco Antonio González Taracena and Pablo Nuila Hub
Chief of the National Police: Héctor Rafael Bol de la Cruz

Oscar Mejía Víctores, Guatemala’s former chief of state, is currently named as one of eight defendants charged with genocide and other crimes in an international criminal case that is being investigated by Judge Santiago Pedraz in the Audiencia Nacional (National Court) of Spain.

The García case is also important in the context of Guatemala’s current struggle against organized crime. The same week authorities arrested the police officers involved in Fernando García’s kidnapping 25 years ago, the PDH announced that retired and active duty police are involved in today’s organized kidnapping gangs. Government prosecutors have announced they are currently investigating at least 10 members of the police’s elite anti-kidnapping unit for involvement in contemporary abductions. The struggle for justice and accountability for Guatemala’s past crimes has a direct relationship to the current efforts to dismantle illegal armed networks. Last week’s arrests marked an important initial step in the right direction towards ending blanket impunity in Guatemala.


U.S. documents on government death squad operations, the disappearance of Edgar Fernando García, and attacks on Guatemala’s Mutual Support Group – GAM

Document 1
February 23, 1984
Trade-Union Leaders Abducted
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, Classified Cable

The U.S. Embassy in Guatemala informs Washington about the abduction of Fernando García and other trade-union officials in the recent weeks. According to press accounts on his disappearance, armed men kidnapped him while he was walking in Guatemala City on February 18, 1984. The cable provides information on related incidents of abductions of labor activists in the weeks leading up to Fernando García’s capture, describing the disappearances in the context of the widespread government targeting of Guatemala’s labor leaders. The document provides information on the political and organizational affiliation of the recently disappeared labor activists. According to the cable, Fernando García was part of CAVISA, the industrial glass union, which is an “affiliate of the communist trade-union confederation FASGUA,” Guatemala’s autonomous federal trade-union.

It also mentions that the disappeared victims were associated with the CNT (Confederacion Nacional de Trabajadores), and makes reference to the case of the 28 CNT labor leaders, who “disappeared in 1980 in one fell swoop. It is believed that GOG security forces murdered all of them.” The other group mentioned is the National Council for Trade Union Unity – CNUS, which asserted that Fernando García was already dead. Despite those claims, the U.S. Embassy remained “optimistic that Fernando García of CAVISA will be released.” Edgar Fernando García was never seen or heard from again.

Document 2
February 23, 1984

Guatemala: Political Violence Up
U.S. Department of State, secret intelligence analysis

The same day that Embassy officials inform Washington of Fernando García’s disappearance, the State Department produces an intelligence report on the recent spike in political assassinations and disappearances. The intelligence report describes several notable cases of victims in the “new wave of violence,” over the past several weeks, and provides key information on police coordination with military intelligence in government kidnappings. It mentions the recent abduction and release of a labor leader and confirms that “he had been kidnapped by the National Police, who have traditionally considered labor activists to be communists.” It states that the detective corps (the DIT) of the National Police has traditionally been involved in “extra-legal” activities, working alongside the Army’s presidential intelligence unit, the Archivos. 

(Document previously posted: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB15/index.html)

Document 3
March 19, 1984
Guatemala: Democratic Trade Union Confederation CUSG Protests Abductions of Trade-Union Leaders
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, confidential cable

Less than a month after Fernando García’s disappearance, the U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission in Guatemala, Paul D. Taylor reports on the growing protests from the Confederation of Syndicalist Unity (CUSG) over the recent disappearance of trade-union leaders, “especially the disappearance of STICAVISA trade-union official Edgar Fernando García.” The CUSG blames the disappearances on the “government attempts to destabilize the Guatemalan labor movement,” a charge which the government denies. The cable goes on to describe the individual cases of the disappeared, including the case of the escaped prisoner Álvaro René Sosa Ramos, who “fled to asylum in the Belgian Ambassador’s residence after being shot in an attempt to escape his captors. Once recovered from gunshot wounds, he will be going into exile.” Sosa Ramos is mentioned in the Death Squad Dossier as entry number 87.

The document offers further background as to why the labor leaders are disappearing. According to the U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission Paul D. Taylor, “By picking up leftist trade-union leaders connected with the CNT and the FASGUA, the government of Guatemala – advertently or inadvertently – is destabilizing the Marxist-Leninist wing of the Guatemalan labor movement.” His analysis concludes that the individuals were most likely targeted due to government suspicion that they were connected to armed insurgent groups, and that “security forces are after them for that reason.”

Document 4
April 3, 1984

Guatemala: March 25-29 Visit of U.S. Trade-Union Delegation
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, classified cable

International pressure continues to mount for investigations into the disappearances of Fernando García and other labor leaders. The cable reports on a trade-union delegation visit to Guatemala, led by former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Pat Derian. The delegation presses Embassy officials for information on the missing trade-union leaders. The Embassy continues to make the point that “all of these abducted union leaders are from the leftist CNT,” emphasizing the political orientation of the disappeared victims.

The delegation maintains that Fernando García was being held by the army, and asked the Embassy to look into his disappearance, as well as that of Jose Luis Villagrán, “disappeared February 11, 1984 in zone 11.” U.S. officials promise they will “make inquiries to the government about all these people.” Ms. Derian presses further, asking them to make “representations,” not just “inquiries” into the disappearances. Deputy Chief of Mission Paul D. Taylor still maintains, however, that it has yet to be demonstrated “whether government forces seized all these trade-unionists” and further comments “If the GOG has picked them up, it is almost certainly for matters other than their trade-union activities.”

Document 5
April 1, 1985

Murder of Member of Mutual Support Group (GAM)
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, limited officials use cable

The cable reports on the death of Héctor Orlando Gómez Galito, a member of the activist Mutual Support Group (GAM). The Embassy reports that he was “abducted and assassinated the weekend of March 30-31.” Gómez was kidnapped by unidentified men after leaving a weekly GAM meeting in Zone 11 of Guatemala City, and his body was discovered near the Pacific highway 15 miles from the city. “His assassination follows in the wake of reports that members of the groups had been the subject of unspecified threats.”

The cable lists the co-directors of GAM as Beatriz Velasquez de Estrada, Aura Farfán, Maria Rosario Godoy de Cuevas, Maria Choxom de Castañón, Nineth Montenegro de García, and another Mrs. García, the mother of Edgar Fernando. The cable examines Héctor Gómez Calito’s involvement in the organization, concluding that he may have acted as a spokesperson unofficially because of security concerns. Gómez was one of the group’s planner for a march to be held on April 12 or 13, and, “According to reports, the GAM claims that Gómez was killed because of his involvement with the organization.”

Document 6
April 3, 1985

Background on Case of Héctor Orlando Gómez Calito, Murdered “Mutual Support Group” (GAM) Member: Embassy Discussions with Two Sources
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, confidential cable

GAM director, Nineth Montonegro de García, and Father Alain Richard, member of Peace Brigades International (PBI), meet with U.S. officials to provide the Embassy with background information on the death of Héctor Gómez. They explain that Gómez had joined GAM following the disappearance of his brother, and had acted as a publicist for the group. Richard tells officials that the police detective corps (DIT) had asked the mayor of the town of Amatitlan, where Gómez was from, for information about his activities, and that his house was reportedly under surveillance by “men in automobiles.”

The Embassy also states “Richard had no doubts that the GOG [the Government of Guatemala] was directly responsible for Gomez’s murder.” Richard added that regardless of the belief that the entire group was being watched, GAM would continue their advocacy efforts. The cable ends by noting “Embassy officers will meet GAM directors on Monday, April 8.”

Document 7
April 4, 1985

Background and Recent Developments of the Mutual Support Group (GAM)
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, Confidential Cable

The Embassy provides a summary of GAM organizing in March, “with some emphasis on its activist activities (blocking traffic, occupation of government offices, etc.) and the GOG reaction to those activities.” It gives background on the creation of the group, dating its first public appearance in early July 1984, when GAM members began publicly campaigning for an investigation into the disappearances of their relatives and calling upon others to join. They approached the Embassy shortly thereafter, “asking for our assistance on behalf of 67 missing persons.”

A few days after a GAM event in November 1984, they were received by Chief of State General Mejía, where “they repeated their demands” to investigate the disappeared. They met with Mejía a second time, which led to the formation of a government commission ostensibly to look into the GAM charges. In March 1985, they occupied the offices of the Guatemalan Attorney General, “protesting the lack of action by the GOG Tripartite Commission.” Beginning in mid March, the government began to express disapproval of the tactics chosen by GAM to pursue their objectives. Press reports carried warnings issued by Mejía Víctores in which he “charged that the GAM was being manipulated by the insurgents and questioned the source of the group’s funds.”

According to the cable, the Embassy had informed Washington on March 25 that four members of GAM had allegedly received various threats. One of the names on their list was Héctor Gómez, even though he was “not then known to the Embassy in any capacity related to GAM. Additional information regarding the specifics of Gómez’s murder have been provided.”

Document 8
April 6, 1985

Death of Maria Rosario Godoy de Cuevas, a Director of the “Mutual Support Group” (GAM)
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, Confidential Cable

Before Embassy officials had the chance to meet with GAM members again, another one of their members was killed. “At about 8:00 pm April 4, Maria del Rosario Godoy Aldana de Cuevas, a founder and member of the board of directors of GAM was found dead in her automobile.” Three days after Rosario Godoy de Cuevas delivered the eulogy at Héctor Gómez’ funeral, she was found dead along with her 2-year-old son and 21-year-old brother. U.S. Embassy provides the official story given by the Guatemalan government, that she was “the victim of an apparent vehicular accident.” Embassy sources, however, believe the death was premeditated, and note several contradictory facts in the official version of events. Rosario de Cuevas helped found GAM following the disappearance of her husband, Carlos Ernesto Cuevas Molina, another labor leader who was kidnapped on May 15, 1984.

Document 9
April 9, 1985
Mutual Support Group (GAM) Update
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, Confidential Cable

Provides further information on the death of Maria Godoy de Cuevas, and describes the “sense of threats felt by GAM members.” In press broadcasts Archbishop Prospero Penados referred to the recent events, including the Cuevas deaths, as the “holy week of shame and fear” in Guatemala, and called the deaths a “bloody act.”

Embassy comments on the matter of the autopsy, noting that it is unclear what examination was completed by “police forensic specialists.” An Embassy source also said “he had heard that the victims had died of asphyxiation and that a ‘bogus autopsy’ had been performed … another rumor circulating said that the victims had died from gunfire. But again, no details or proof have been offered.” The Guatemalan Interior Minister said he had the “official report that showed the Cuevas case to have been an accident.”

The cable reiterates that “GAM members had recently began to receive anonymous threats by letter and telephone,” and that other press reports spoke of anonymous threats against the organization. Threats notwithstanding, the group announced plans for another public protest later that month.

Document 10
April 9, 1985

Conversation with the Chief of State on Human Rights
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, Confidential Cable

Five days after the death of Rosario Godoy de Cuevas, U.S. Ambassador-at-large for Central America Harry Shlaudeman visits Guatemala and meets with Mejía Víctores and Foreign Minister Fernando Andrade. During the meeting, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala Alberto M. Piedra takes Mejía Víctores aside to express U.S. concern over the recent events, “especially the death of Maria Rosario Godoy de Cuevas.” He indicates that “even if the government had nothing to do with the matter, public opinion abroad would definitely blame the military.” The Ambassador explains that the high profile violence was making it difficult to defend Guatemala’s position, especially in Congress, and this could endanger their efforts to increase aid to the government.

Piedra also takes aside the Foreign Minister, who tells the Ambassador that he was against the “continuance of these types of crime.” He added that the U.S. Embassy should continue opposing such violations to all sectors of Guatemalan society, “and in a very special way to the military.”

Document 11
March 28, 1986

Guatemala’s Disappeared: 1977-86
Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, secret report

This Department of State report from 1986 provides details on the evolution of the use of forced disappearance by security forces over the decade prior, and how this tactic became institutionalized under the Mejía Víctores regime. “In the cities, out of frustration from the judiciary’s unwillingness to convict and sentence insurgents, and convinced that the kidnapping of suspected insurgents and their relatives would lead to a quick destruction of the guerilla urban networks, the security forces began to systematically kidnap anyone suspected of insurgent connections.” The documents estimates there were 183 reported cases of government kidnapping the first month of the Mejía government, and an average of 137 abductions a month through the end of 1984. Part of the modus operandi of government kidnapping involved interrogating victims at military bases, police stations, or government safe houses, where information about alleged connections with insurgents was “extracted through torture.”

The document concludes that the U.S. embassy and the State Department have failed in the past to adequately grasp the magnitude of Guatemala’s problem of government kidnapping.

(Document previously posted: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB15/index.html)

Former police official Héctor Roderico Ramírez Ríos, accused of participating in the abduction of Fernando García, taken in to custody for charges of illegal detention and forced disappearance. [Courtesy of Prensa Libre]
Family snapshot of Nineth de García, daughter Alejandra and husband Fernando before his abduction on February 18, 1984. Photo from “Guatemala, The Group for Mutual Support,” An Americas Watch Report. [Courtesy of Jean-Marie Simon]
Nineth Montenegro removed by police officials after occupying a government building with other GAM members during the administration of Vinicio Cerezo. [Courtesy of Prensa Libre]
Plainclothes National Police agent standing with a U.S.-made carbine outside the judicial headquarters in Zone 1 of Guatemala City. [Courtesy of Jean-Marie Simon]
Fernando García’s entry in the military intelligence document, the diario militar
Rosario Godoy de Cuevas addressing a GAM rally two months before she was assassinated. [Photo Courtesy of Jean-Marie Simon]
Caption: Óscar Humberto Mejía Víctores, Head of State at the time of Fernando García’s abduction. Mejía Víctores is wanted in international courts for crimes against humanity, such as forced disappearances, carried out under his command. [Photo Courtesy of Prensa L

TOP-SECRET – MCI Lawful Spying Guide

mci-spy

TOP-SECRET – INSA Nest of Official and Corporate Spies

insa-spies

TOP-SECRET – FUJIMORI FOUND GUILTY OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES

UJIMORI FOUND GUILTY OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES

National Security Archive Posts Declassified Evidence Used in Trial
U.S. Documents Implicated Fujimori in Repression, Cover-up

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 274

Washington, DC, September 13 – As a special tribunal in Peru pronounced former president Alberto Fujimori guilty of human rights atrocities, the National Security Archive today posted key declassified U.S. documents that were submitted as evidence in the court proceedings. The declassified records contain intelligence gathered by U.S. officials from Peruvian sources on the secret creation of “assassination teams” as part of Fujimori’s counterterrorism operations, the role of the Peruvian security forces in human rights atrocities and Fujimori’s participation in protecting the military from investigation.

Fujimori was tried for two major massacres: the execution of fourteen adults and an eight-year old boy in the Barrios Altos neighborhood of Lima on November 3, 1991; and the kidnapping, disappearance and assassination of nine students and a professor from La Cantuta University on July 18, 1992. Both atrocities were committed by a military death squad known as La Colina, believed to be supervised by Fujimori’s closest advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos. Fujimori, who was Peru’s president from 1990 to 2000 when he was forced to resign in a major corruption scandal, was also convicted for the abduction of a well known journalist, Gustavo Gorriti, in April 1992, and a prominent businessman, Samuel Dyer on July 27, 1992.

The trial began on December 10, 2007. Since then dozens of witnesses have testified on Fujimori’s responsibility as commander-in-chief for the operations of his security forces.

In September 2008, Archive Senior Analyst Kate Doyle gave expert testimony in the trial on the nature of the 21 U.S. documents that were submitted to the court as evidence by the prosecution team. During her testimony she noted that the documents reflected the conclusions of the U.S. Embassy that Fujimori had engaged in a “covert strategy to aggressively fight against subversion through terror operations, disregarding human rights, and legal norms.”

Among the key documents used during the trial is a U.S. embassy report, classified secret, from August 1990, just after Fujimori’s election. Based on a debriefing of a former intelligence agent in Peru, the Embassy reported that Fujimori planned a “two tiered anti-subversion plan”—a public policy that adhered to human rights, and a covert set of operations that would “include army special operations units trained in extra-judicial assassinations.”

The prosecution of Fujimori comes ten years after the ground-breaking arrest of Gen. Augusto Pinochet, and is part of an accelerated movement in Latin America to hold human rights violators accountable. “The exercise of justice in the Fujimori case,” noted Peter Kornbluh, a senior analyst at the Archive who attended the trial last fall, “sends a signal through Latin America, and onto the United States, that those who authorize human rights abuses in the name of fighting terrorism are not immune from prosecution.”

Fujimori faces up to 30 years in prison.


Read the Documents

Note: These documents were among 21 declassified U.S. records provided by the National Security Archive to the special tribunal conducting the Fujimori trial. They were originally obtained through the Freedom of Information Act by Peru analyst Tamara Feinstein, and FOIA specialist Jeremy Bigwood.

Document 1: U.S. Embassy, Cable, Secret, Reported Secret Annex to National Pacification/Human Rights Plan, Aug. 23, 1990, 5 pp.

Only weeks after Fujimori’s election, an intelligence officer working with the SIN (the National Intelligence Service) reported to U.S. embassy officials on a covert plan, purportedly “the brainchild of presidential advisor Vladimiro Montesinos,” to conduct extra-judicial assassinations of suspected terrorists. “The training of these new ‘assassination teams’ is already underway,” the source reported. He also stated that the plan had “the tacit approval of President Fujimori.”

Document 2: U.S. Embassy Cable, Secret, Barrios Altos Massacre: One Month Later, December 4, 1991, Secret, 2 pp.

The Fujimori government has showed little “political will” to investigate the Barrios Altos massacre and find the perpetrators of the crime, the embassy reported. At this early stage, the Embassy has concluded that the security forces were involved in the killing. “There is no high level political pressure to root out the culprits in this case,” according to the cable. “President Fujimori has not made a public issue of it.”

Document 3: U.S. Embassy, Cable, Secret, Barrios Altos Massacre, December 13, 1991, 2 pp.

Ambassador Quainton reports on meeting with Fujimori, and other government officials, at graduation ceremonies at the Peruvian Military Academy.  Quainton makes it clear that the U.S. embassy is concerned about military involvement in the Barrios Altos massacre and the lack of any investigation. “”I told him,” as Quainton cabled, that “the very institution—the Army—which he had been praising at the graduation ceremonies was being discredited by allegations of paramilitary involvement in the Barrios Altos killing.” According to Gloria Cano, the lead lawyer for the Peruvian human rights group, APRODEH, this document provided critical evidence that Fujimori was cognizant of the involvement of his security forces almost a year before he admitted it publicly.

Document 4: U.S. Embassy Cable, [Excised] Comments on Fujimori, Montesinos, but not on Barrios Altos, January 22, 1993, Secret, 10 pp.

An undisclosed source describes the close and complicated relationship between President Fujimori and his top intelligence aide, Vladimiro Montesinos. The source notes that while Fujimori understands the importance of human rights, in practice he “is prepared to sacrifice principles to achieve a quick victory over terrorism.” He is “absolutely committed to destroying Sendero Luminoso and the MRTA within his five year term and is prepared to countenance any methods that achieve that goal.”

Document 5: U.S. Embassy, Cable, Secret, Army Officers on ‘Show of Force;’ Barrios Altos and Death Squads, April 27, 1993, 4 pp.

The Embassy reports on how the military is justifying its public show of force—tanks in the street—to repel any type of Congressional investigation into official complicity in the Barrios Altos massacre. The Embassy source, described as an “Army field grade officer,” admits that the military was responsible for both the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta atrocities, which he describes as “stupidly planned and executed.”

Document 6: U.S. State Department, Cable, Secret, La Cantuta Demarche, June 8, 1993, 3 pp.

Peter Tarnoff, a high-ranking State Department official, instructs the embassy to issue a demarche to Fujimori on the La Cantuta atrocity and to demand that the allegations of Peruvian government involvement be “thoroughly and impartially investigated.” Among the talking points sent by Washington are: “recent allegations suggest that a unit organized within the armed forces carried out a series of disappearances at La Cantuta and was responsible for the Barrios Altos incident.” The embassy is ordered to tell Fujimori: “If it is indeed true that the armed forces have organized such units, this is a very serious affair.”

TOP-SECRET – ROBERT F. KENNEDY URGED LIFTING TRAVEL BAN TO CUBA IN ’63

Source: Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

ROBERT F. KENNEDY URGED LIFTING
TRAVEL BAN TO CUBA IN ’63

Attorney General cited inconsistency with “our views as a free society”
State Department overruled RFK proposal to withdraw prohibitions on travel

Documents Record First Internal Debate to Lift Ban

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 158

Washington D.C. September 13, 2011 – Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy sought to lift the ban on U.S. citizens traveling to Cuba in December 1963, according to declassified records re-posted today by the National Security Archive. In a December 12, 1963, memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Kennedy urged a quick decision “to withdraw the existing regulation prohibiting such trips.”

Kennedy’s memo, written less than a month after his brother’s assassination in Dallas, argues that the travel ban imposed at the end of the Eisenhower administration was a violation of American freedoms and impractical in terms of law enforcement. Among his “principal arguments” for removing the restrictions on travel to Cuba was that freedom to travel “is more consistent with our views as a free society and would contrast with such things as the Berlin Wall and Communist controls on such travel.”

This document, and others relating to the first internal debate over lifting the Cuba travel ban, are quoted in an opinion piece in the Washington Post today, written by Robert Kennedy’s daughter, Kathleen Kennedy Townsend. Her article argued that President Obama should consider her father’s position and support the Free Travel To Cuba Act that has been introduced in the U.S. Congress.

Robert Kennedy’s memo prompted what senior National Security Council officials described as “an in-house fight to permit non-subversive Americans to travel to Cuba.” Several State Department officials supported Kennedy’s position that “the present travel restrictions are inconsistent with traditional American liberties,” and that “it would be extremely difficult to enforce the present prohibitions on travel to Cuba without resorting to mass indictments.” But in a December 13, 1963 meeting at the State Department, with no representatives present from the Attorney General’s office, Undersecretary of State George Ball ruled out any relaxation of regulations on travel to Cuba.

A principal argument, as national security advisor McGeorge Bundy informed President Johnson in a subsequent memorandum on “Student Travel to Cuba” was that “a relaxation of U.S. restrictions would make it very difficult for us to urge Latin American governments to prevent their nationals from going to Cuba-where many would receive subversive training.”

The ban on travel was maintained until President Jimmy Carter lifted it in 1977; but restrictions were re-imposed during the Reagan administration and were tightened further by the Bush administration in 2004. President Obama recently announced he was lifting all restrictions on Cuban-Americans who want to travel to the island. The vast majority of U.S. citizens, however, still face stiff penalties if they travel to Cuba.

According to Peter Kornbluh, who directs the Archive’s Cuba Documentation Project, the documents “shed significant light on the genesis of the travel ban to Cuba, and the first internal debate over ending it.” The original rationale for the ban “is no longer applicable,” he noted, “but RFK’s arguments remain relevant to the current debate over the wisdom of restricting the freedom to travel.”

The documents were found among the papers of State Department advisor Averill Harriman at the Library of Congress and in declassified NSC files at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston. The Archive first posted them in April 2005.


Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view. Document 1: Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, “Travel to Cuba,” December 12, 1963

In a comprehensive memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Robert Kennedy presented the arguments for legalizing travel to Cuba before a number of student groups traveled there at Christmas time. There were two courses of action, he wrote: new efforts to block increased travel to Cuba, or “to withdraw the existing regulation prohibiting such trips. The first is unlikely to meet the problem and I favor the second,” Kennedy informed Rusk. In his memo he presented several arguments for lifting the travel ban: that it was a violation of American liberties to restrict free travel; that it was impractical to arrest, indict and engage in “distasteful prosecutions” of scores of U.S. citizens who sought to go to Cuba; and that lifting the travel ban was likely to diminish the attraction of leftists who were organizing protest trips to Havana. “For all these reasons I believe that it would be wise to remove restrictions on travel to Cuba before we are faced with problems which are likely to be created in the immediate future.”

Document 2: State Department, “Travel Regulations,” December 13, 1963

Two State Department officers, legal advisor Abram Chayes and Abba Schwartz summarize Kennedy’s arguments that “the ban on travel to Cuba be removed immediately,” including that “the present travel restrictions are inconsistent with traditional American liberties.” They note that lifting restrictions to Cuba is likely to be undertaken in the context of lifting most travel restrictions to other nations. They support Kennedy’s proposal but favor passport validation which would require those who travel to apply for permission from the Secretary of State to go to Cuba.

Document 3: NSC, “Travel Controls-Cuba,” December 18, 1963

This memo, written by the NSC’s Latin American specialist Gordon Chase to national security advisor McGeorge Bundy, reveals that the Attorney General’s proposal has been overruled at the State Department. At a meeting on December 13, to which Justice department officials were not invited, State Department officials from the Latin American division successfully argued that lifting the ban would compromise U.S. pressures on other nations in the hemisphere to isolate Cuba and block students from traveling there. In addition, according to Chase, Abba Schwartz believed that Lyndon Johnson could not politically afford to lift the ban because it would “make him look unacceptably soft.” The State Department’s attention turns to steps the government can take to prevent U.S. students from violating the ban and traveling to Cuba.

Document 4: NSC, “Student Travel to Cuba,” May 21, 1964

In an options memorandum for President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy informs him of the continuing debate over lifting restrictions on travel to Cuba. As summer begins, the administration expects about 100 students to try and travel to Cuba. Bundy lays out the “two distinct schools of thought” on the travel issue: Robert Kennedy’s effort to end controls on the basis of “our libertarian tradition and the difficulty of controlling travel” and current U.S. policy which is built on a tough line toward Cuba and efforts to enlist other Latin American nations to isolate Cuba politically and culturally, and to “prevent their nationals from going to Cuba.” Bundy correctly assumes that President Johnson does not want to relax controls on travel to Cuba and informs him that an interagency group is studying ways to further “reduce the interest in and to control student travel to Cuba this summer.”

TOP-SECRET: Fukushima Daiichi NPP 12 September 2011

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Dust Sampling at the Opening of Reactor Building of Unit 3, September 12, 2011. Released by Tokyo Electric Power Company 13 September 2011.[Image]

	

TOP-SECRET – Khodorkovsky ‘will not be free while Putin is in power’

Wednesday, 18 April 2007, 07:48
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001770
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DOJ OF OPDAT/ALEXANDRE, LEHMANN AND NEWCOMBE, OCRS/OHR AND
SHASKY, OIA/BURKE AND DITTOE
STATE FOR EUR/RUS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/17/2017
TAGS ECON, KCRM, KJUS, PGOV, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: MEETING WITH XXXXXXXXXXXX
REF: A. MOSCOW 774 B. MOSCOW 697
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reasons 1.5 (b, d)

1. (C) Summary: Emboffs met with XXXXXXXXXXXX. He described the new embezzlement and money laundering charges — that Khodorkovskiy engaged in transfer pricing that harmed unwitting minority shareholders in Yukos’ three production subsidiaries — as a re-packaging of the charges in the first case. He claimed the defense has substantial evidence these shareholders were fully informed of these activities. Further, XXXXXXXXXXXX maintained that the charges are without legal or factual support and questioned the prosecution’s claim that the loss to the subsidiaries was USD 30 billion, a figure he said was about equal to the value of the oil produced by the three units during the period in question. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he was surprised that a Moscow court had agreed to change the venue of the trial from Chita to Moscow. He described two cases pending before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The first case claims that Khodorkovskiy was arrested and held in pre-trial detention in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention), while the second alleges violations of Khodorkovskiy’s right to a fair trial. XXXXXXXXXXXX maintained that the case against XXXXXXXXXXXX is politically motivated and being run out of the Kremlin, and does not foresee any change of status for Khodorkovskiy while the Putin Administration remains in office. End Summary.

The New Charges

—————

2. (C) On February 16, the General Procuracy charged Khodorkovskiy and Platon Lebedev with embezzlement and money laundering (Ref B). According to the indictment, Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev acquired controlling interests in three oil companies (Samaraneftegaz, Yuganskneftegaz, and Tomskneftegaz) and then caused these companies to sell oil at below-market prices to other companies that they controlled without disclosing to other shareholders their role in these transactions. They then allegedly re-sold the oil at market prices, which were approximately 3-4 times greater than the original purchase price. The alleged victims were the other shareholders of Samaraneftegaz, Yuganskneftegaz, and Tomskneftegaz, who were entitled to the benefit of an arms-length sale at market prices, but instead received only the artificially deflated prices allegedly set by Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev (Ref B).

3. (C) As an initial matter, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the new charges are simply a re-packaging of the charges in the first case. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX in the first case, prosecutors relied on the very same transactions to charge Khodorkovskiy with tax evasion. However, he said, they were unsatisfied with Khodorkovskiy’s eight-year sentence and decided to bring new charges carrying potentially heavier sentences. The money laundering charges carry a maximum sentence of 15 years and the embezzlement charges carry a maximum sentence of 10 years. He said the defense will challenge them on the grounds that they violate Russian and international norms prohibiting double jeopardy. XXXXXXXXXXXX also suggested that the new charges may have been brought to prevent Khodorkovskiy from being released on parole before upcoming Duma and Presidential elections. (Note: Russian law provides that a prisoner is eligible for early release after he has served half of his sentence. Because Khodorkovskiy was arrested in October 2003 and was sentenced to eight years, he might have been eligible for early release in October 2007. However, his prison violations, which XXXXXXXXXXXX claims were provoked by authorities, would likely have prevented his early release in any event. End Note.)

4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that the new charges are without merit since this transfer pricing technique was not only legal but engaged in by “thousands of firms.” He noted that the business groups and industrial firms emerging from privatization during the 1990s were generally organized to take maximum advantage of benefits the GOR provided via “internal offshore” zones. The headquarters and some operating units of a group or firm were typically located in identified havens and conducted most of the transactions, thus allowing for tax optimization. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX this structure facilitated and encouraged the widespread practice of transfer pricing, whereby one part of a company

MOSCOW 00001770 002 OF 003

purchased the output made by another part of the company at below-market prices before selling the same output at a market price.

5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX defense would present substantial documentary evidence, including records of corporate meetings, proving that the minority shareholders of Samaraneftegaz, Yuganskneftegaz, and Tomskneftegaz were fully informed of all relevant aspects of the subject transactions. XXXXXXXXXXXX also claimed that if the minority shareholders had actually been defrauded, as prosecutors claim, they would have filed civil suits, which they did not do. Finally, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the prosecution’s claim of a USD 30 billion loss to the shareholders is &absurd8 because the sum would represent the total value of all the oil produced by the subject companies during the relevant time period rather than the difference between what the minority shareholders actually received and what they would have received in arms-length transactions, which, he said, would have been much a more sensible way to measure the alleged loss.

The Trial: Where and When?

————————–

6. (C) The Procuracy filed the new charges in Chita, where Khodorkovskiy is presently incarcerated, and sought to conduct the preliminary investigation and trial there (Ref B). Shortly after the new charges were filed, the defense filed a motion seeking a change of venue to Moscow, claiming that the majority of witnesses and evidence are located there. On March 20, the Basmanny Court in Moscow granted the defense motion. The Procuracy appealed this decision and the appeal was heard on April 16 in the Moscow City Court. This Court upheld the Basmanny Court’s decision transferring the case to Moscow. XXXXXXXXXXXX Russian law provides that the preliminary investigation should be conducted in the place where the crime was allegedly committed, but may be conducted in the place where the defendant is located to ensure &completeness, objectivity and compliance with procedural norms.”

7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that the Procuracy chose Chita to make it difficult for the defense team to meet with their clients and prepare their defense. Specifically, he said, Chita is difficult to reach and lacks the copying machines and other office equipment the defense needs to prepare its case. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that although the Procuracy’s decision was clearly wrong as a matter of law, he was surprised by the Basmanny Court’s decision because the same court had consistently ruled against Khodorkovskiy in the first case. He claimed that the ruling was an indication of a general recognition that the Procuracy had “gone too far.”

8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that he did not know when the trial on the new charges would take place. He said that the prosecution had sought to start the trial in June so that it would be completed before the elections, but noted that the case materials consist of 127 volumes and said that the XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the prosecutors will likely move to cut off the defense’s review of the case file in May, but said that the defense would challenge such a motion. Under Russian law, the prosecution can seek to limit the time that the defense has to review the case file if there are grounds to believe that the defense is engaging in unreasonable delay. XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that a trial date could not be set until the location of the trial had been determined. Therefore, because of ongoing litigation regarding the venue of the trial and the voluminous nature of the case file, it is not clear when the case will proceed to trial.

The European Court of Human Rights

———————————-

9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that Khodorkovskiy has filed two complaints to the ECHR in Strasbourg alleging violations of his rights under the Convention in the first case. The ECHR in Strasbourg adjudicates claims brought under the Convention. As a result of Russia’s ratification of the Convention in 1998, Russia is bound by the Convention and any ECHR decisions interpreting it. The first complaint, he said,

MOSCOW 00001770 003 OF 003

alleges that Khodorkovskiy was arrested and held in pre-trial detention in violation of the Convention. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the ECHR had agreed to hear this case on an accelerated timetable, but had not yet set a date.

10. (C) The second complaint, he said, alleges violations of Khodorkovskiy’s right to a fair trial. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that before adjudicating a case, the ECHR typically sends a list of specific questions about the movant’s claims to the respondent government. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX the Russian government has not yet responded to the ECHR’s questions regarding the second complaint and it is therefore not clear when this case will be considered. XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that the second complaint is “more interesting” than the first because, if successful, it could result in a reversal of Khodorkovskiy’s conviction. By contrast, the first claim could only result in an award of monetary damages. XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted that the French Embassy in Moscow and German Bundestag have shown interest in this case.

No Changes Expected

——————-

11. (C) In his final remarks, XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that the new charges against Khodorkovskiy are politically motivated and said that the case is being orchestrated entirely by the Kremlin. Although he stated confidently that the charges are without legal or evidentiary support, he concluded by saying that Khodorkovskiy would likely remain in prison as long as the Putin Administration is in power. BURNS

TOP-SECRET – China ‘would accept’ Korean reunification

Monday, 22 February 2010, 09:32
S E C R E T SEOUL 000272
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2034
TAGS PREL, PGOV, KNNP, ECON, SOCI, KS, KN, <abbr title=”JA“><abbr title=”JA“>JA, CH
SUBJECT: VFM CHUN YOUNG-WOO ON SINO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS
Classified By: AMB D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
  1. South Korea’s vice Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo tells the Americans that senior Chinese officials have told him that China is fed up with the North Korean regime’s behaviour and would not oppose Korean reunification. Chun says North Korea has already collapsed economically and will collapse politically when Kim Jong-il dies. Key passage highlighted in yellow.
  2. Read related article

Summary

——-

1. (S) Vice Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo told the Ambassador February 17th that China would not be able to stop North Korea‘s collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically and would collapse politically two to three years after the death of Kim Jong-il. Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North’s economy. Beijing had “no will” to use its modest economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang’s policies — and the DPRK characterized as “the most incompetent official in China” — had retained his position as chief of the PRC’s 6PT delegation. Describing a generational difference in Chinese attitudes toward North Korea, Chun claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX believed Korea should be unified under ROK control. Chun acknowledged the Ambassador’s point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula. End summary.

VFM Chun on Sino-North Korean Relations…

——————————————

2. (S) During a February 17 lunch hosted by Ambassador Stephens that covered other topics (septel), ROK Vice Foreign Minister and former ROK Six-Party Talks (6PT) Head of Delegation Chun Yung-woo predicted that China would not be able to stop North Korea’s collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically; following the death of KJI, North Korea would collapse politically in “two to three years.” Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North’s economy; there was “no substance” to the reports, he said. The VFM also ridiculed the Chinese foreign ministry’s “briefing” to the ROK embassy in Beijing on Wang Jiarui’s visit to North Korea; the unidentified briefer had “basically read a Xinhua press release,” Chun groused, adding that the PRC interlocutor had been unwilling to answer simple questions like whether Wang had flown to Hamhung or taken a train there to meet KJI.

3. (S) The VFM commented that China had far less influence on North Korea “than most people believe.” Beijing had “no will” to use its economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang’s policies and the DPRK leadership “knows it.” Chun acknowledged that the Chinese genuinely wanted a denuclearized North Korea, but the PRC was also content with the status quo. Unless China pushed North Korea to the “brink of collapse,” the DPRK would likely continue to refuse to take meaningful steps on denuclearization.

XXXXXXXXXXXX

—————————————–

4. (S) Turning to the Six Party Talks, Chun said it was “a very bad thing” that Wu Dawei had retained his position as chief of the PRC’s delegation. XXXXXXXXXXXX said it appeared that the DPRK “must have lobbied extremely hard” for the now-retired Wu to stay on as China’s 6PT chief. [NAME REMOVED] complained that Wu is the PRC’s XXXXXXXXXXXX an arrogant, Marx-spouting former Red Guard who “knows nothing about North Korea, nothing about nonproliferation and is hard to communicate with because he doesn’t speak English.” Wu was also a hardline nationalist, loudly proclaiming — to anyone willing to listen — that the PRC’s economic rise represented a “return to normalcy” with China as a great world power.

…China’s “New Generation” of Korea-Hands…

———————————————

5. (S) Sophisticated Chinese officials XXXXXXXXXXXX stood in sharp contrast to Wu, according to VFM Chun.XXXXXXXXXXXX Chun claimed XXXXXXXXXX believed Korea should be unified under ROK control.XXXXXXXXXXXX, Chun said, were ready to “face the new reality” that the DPRK now had little value to China as a buffer state — a view that since North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test had reportedly gained traction among senior PRC leaders.

…PRC Actions In A DPRK Collapse Scenario…

———————————————

6. (S) Chun argued that, in the event of a North Korean collapse, China would clearly “not welcome” any U.S. military presence north of the DMZ. XXXXXXXXXXXX Chun XXXXXXXXXXXX said the PRC would be comfortable with a reunified Korea controlled by Seoul and anchored to the United States in a “benign alliance” — as long as Korea was not hostile towards China. Tremendous trade and labor-export opportunities for Chinese companies, Chun said, would also help salve PRC concerns about living with a reunified Korea. Chundismissed the prospect of a possible PRC military intervention in the event of a DPRK collapse, noting that China’s strategic economic interests now lie with the United States, Japan, and South Korea — not North Korea. Moreover, Chun argued, bare-knuckle PRC military intervention in a DPRK internal crisis could “strengthen the centrifugal forces in China’s minority areas.”

…and Japan

————

7. (S) Chun acknowledged the Ambassador’s point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula under Seoul’s control. Chun asserted that, even though “Japan’s preference” was to keep Korea divided, Tokyo lacked the leverage to stop reunification in the event the DPRK collapses. STEPHENS

TOP-SECRET – Sixteen Individuals Arrested in the United States for Alleged Roles in Cyber Attacks

WASHINGTON—Fourteen individuals were arrested today by FBI agents on charges related to their alleged involvement in a cyber attack on PayPal’s website as part of an action claimed by the group “Anonymous,” announced the Department of Justice and the FBI. Two additional defendants were arrested today on cyber-related charges.

The 14 individuals were arrested in Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Florida, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Mexico, and Ohio on charges contained in an indictment unsealed today in the Northern District of California in San Jose. In addition, two individuals were arrested on similar charges in two separate complaints filed in the Middle District of Florida and the District of New Jersey. Also today, FBI agents executed more than 35 search warrants throughout the United States as part of an ongoing investigation into coordinated cyber attacks against major companies and organizations. Finally, the United Kingdom’s Metropolitan Police Service arrested one person and the Dutch National Police Agency arrested four individuals today for alleged related cyber crimes.

According to the San Jose indictment, in late November 2010, WikiLeaks released a large amount of classified U.S. State Department cables on its website. Citing violations of the PayPal terms of service, and in response to WikiLeaks’ release of the classified cables, PayPal suspended WikiLeaks’ accounts so that WikiLeaks could no longer receive donations via PayPal. WikiLeaks’ website declared that PayPal’s action “tried to economically strangle WikiLeaks.”

The San Jose indictment alleges that in retribution for PayPal’s termination of WikiLeaks’ donation account, a group calling itself Anonymous coordinated and executed distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks against PayPal’s computer servers using an open source computer program the group makes available for free download on the Internet. DDoS attacks are attempts to render computers unavailable to users through a variety of means, including saturating the target computers or networks with external communications requests, thereby denying service to legitimate users. According to the indictment, Anonymous referred to the DDoS attacks on PayPal as “Operation Avenge Assange.”

The defendants charged in the San Jose indictment allegedly conspired with others to intentionally damage protected computers at PayPal from Dec. 6, 2010, to Dec. 10, 2010.

The individuals named in the San Jose indictment are: Christopher Wayne Cooper, 23, aka “Anthrophobic;” Joshua John Covelli, 26, aka “Absolem” and “Toxic;” Keith Wilson Downey, 26; Mercedes Renee Haefer, 20, aka “No” and “MMMM;” Donald Husband, 29, aka “Ananon;” Vincent Charles Kershaw, 27, aka “Trivette,” “Triv” and “Reaper;” Ethan Miles, 33; James C. Murphy, 36; Drew Alan Phillips, 26, aka “Drew010;” Jeffrey Puglisi, 28, aka “Jeffer,” “Jefferp” and “Ji;” Daniel Sullivan, 22; Tracy Ann Valenzuela, 42; and Christopher Quang Vo, 22. One individual’s name has been withheld by the court.

The defendants are charged with various counts of conspiracy and intentional damage to a protected computer. They will make initial appearances throughout the day in the districts in which they were arrested.

In addition to the activities in San Jose, Scott Matthew Arciszewski, 21, was arrested today by FBI agents on charges of intentional damage to a protected computer. Arciszewski is charged in a complaint filed in the Middle District of Florida and made his initial appearance this afternoon in federal court in Orlando, Fla.

According to the complaint, on June 21, 2011, Arciszewski allegedly accessed without authorization the Tampa Bay InfraGard website and uploaded three files. The complaint alleges that Arciszewski then tweeted about the intrusion and directed visitors to a separate website containing links with instructions on how to exploit the Tampa InfraGard website. InfraGard is a public-private partnership for critical infrastructure protection sponsored by the FBI with chapters in all 50 states.

Also today, a related complaint unsealed in the District of New Jersey charges Lance Moore, 21, of Las Cruces, N.M., with allegedly stealing confidential business information stored on AT&T’s servers and posting it on a public file sharing site. Moore was arrested this morning at his residence by FBI agents and is expected to make an initial appearance this afternoon in Las Cruces federal court. Moore is charged in with one count of accessing a protected computer without authorization.

According to the New Jersey complaint, Moore, a customer support contractor, exceeded his authorized access to AT&T’s servers and downloaded thousands of documents, applications and other files that, on the same day, he allegedly posted on a public file-hosting site that promises user anonymity. According to the complaint, on June 25, 2011, the computer hacking group LulzSec publicized that they had obtained confidential AT&T documents and made them publicly available on the Internet. The documents were the ones Moore had previously uploaded.

The charge of intentional damage to a protected computer carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine. Each count of conspiracy carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine.

An indictment and a complaint merely contain allegations. Defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

To date, more than 75 searches have taken place in the United States as part of the ongoing investigations into these attacks.

These cases are being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys in the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for the Northern District of California, Middle District of Florida, and the District of New Jersey. The Criminal Division’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section also has provided assistance.

Today’s operational activities were done in coordination with the Metropolitan Police Service in the United Kingdom and the Dutch National Police Agency. The FBI thanks the multiple international, federal, and domestic law enforcement agencies who continue to support these operations.

TOP-SECRET- How The FBI fights Cybercrime – Statement before the House Judiciary Subcommittee

  • Gordon M. Snow
  • Assistant Director
  • Federal Bureau of Investigation
  • Statement before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
  • Washington, D.C.

Good morning, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gohmert, and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today regarding the FBI’s efforts to combat cyber crime as it relates to social networking sites.

Let me begin by acknowledging that the rapid expansion of the Internet has allowed us to learn, to communicate, and to conduct business in ways that were unimaginable 20 years ago. Still, the same technology, to include the surge in the use of social networking sites over the past two years, has given cyber thieves and child predators new, highly effective avenues to take advantage of unsuspecting users. These cyber criminals are using a variety of schemes to defraud or victimize innocent social networking site users, some of which I would like to highlight today.

Social Engineering

Regardless of the social networking site, users continue to be fooled online by persons claiming to be somebody else. Unlike the physical world, individuals can misrepresent everything about themselves while they communicate online, ranging not only from their names and business affiliations (something that is fairly easy to do in-person as well), but extending as well to their gender, age, and location (identifiers that are far more difficult to fake in-person). Years ago, we called these types of people confidence or “con” men. Perhaps as a result of today’s high-tech times, con artists are now referred to as being engaged in social engineering. It should come as no surprise to learn that the FBI is investigating classic investment fraud schemes, such as Ponzi schemes, that are now being carried out in virtual worlds. Other con artists are able to conduct identity theft crimes by misidentifying themselves on social networking sites and then tricking their victims into giving them their account names and passwords as well as other personally identifiable information.

In addition to identity theft crimes, child predators routinely use social networking sites to locate and communicate with future victims and other pedophiles. In at least one publicized case from last year, an individual attempted to extort nude photos of teenage girls after he gained control of their e-mail and social networking accounts. That particular FBI investigation led to an 18-year federal sentence for the offender, reflecting that these crimes are serious and will not be tolerated.

Fraud Schemes

There are a variety of Internet fraud schemes being used by cyber criminals at any given time. By way of example, a recent fraud scheme involves a cyber criminal gaining access to an unsuspecting user’s e-mail account or social networking site. The fraudster, who claims to be the account holder, then sends messages to the user’s friends. In the message, the fraudster states that he is on travel and has been robbed of his credit cards, passport, money, and cell phone; and is in need of money immediately. Without realizing that the message is from a criminal, the friends wire money to an overseas account without validating the claim.

Phishing Scams

Phishing schemes attempt to make Internet users believe that they are receiving e-mail from a trusted source when that is not the case. Phishing attacks on social networking site users come in various formats, including: messages within the social networking site either from strangers or compromised friend accounts; links or videos within a social networking site profile claiming to lead to something harmless that turns out to be harmful; or e-mails sent to users claiming to be from the social networking site itself. Social networking site users fall victim to the schemes due to the higher level of trust typically displayed while using social networking sites. Users often accept into their private sites people that they do not actually know, or sometimes fail altogether to pproperly set privacy settings on their profile. This gives cyber thieves an advantage when trying to trick their victims through various phishing schemes.

Social networking sites, as well as corporate websites in general, provide criminals with enormous amounts of information to send official looking documents and send them to individual targets who have shown interest in specific subjects. The personal and detailed nature of the information erodes the victim’s sense of caution, leading them to open the malicious e-mail. Such e-mail contains an attachment that contains malicious software designed to provide the e-mail’s sender with control over the victim’s entire computer. Once the malware infection is discovered, it is often too late to protect the data from compromise.

Cyber criminals design advanced malware to act with precision to infect, conceal access, steal or modify data without detection. Coders of advanced malware are patient and have been known to test a network and its users to evaluate defensive responses. Advanced malware may use a “layered” approach to infect and gain elevated privileges on a system. Usually, these types of attacks are bundled with an additional cyber crime tactic, such as social engineering or zero day exploits. In the first phase of a malware infection, a user might receive a spear phishing e-mail that obtains access to the user’s information or gains entry into the system under the user’s credentials. Once the cyber criminal initiates a connection to the user or system, they can further exploit it using other vectors that may give them deeper access to system resources. In the second phase, the hacker might install a backdoor to establish a persistent presence on the network that can no longer be discovered through the use of anti-virus software or firewalls.

Data Mining

Cyber thieves use data mining on social networking sites as a way to extract sensitive information about their victims. This can be done by criminal actors on either a large or small scale. For example, in a large-scale data mining scheme, a cyber criminal may send out a “getting to know you quiz” to a large list of social networking site users. While the answers to these questions do not appear to be malicious on the surface, they often mimic the same questions that are asked by financial institutions or e-mail account providers when an individual has forgotten their password. Thus, an e-mail address and the answers to the quiz questions can provide the cyber criminal with the tools to enter your bank account, e-mail account, or credit card in order to transfer money or siphon your account. Small-scale data mining may also be easy for cyber criminals if social networking site users have not properly guarded their profile or access to sensitive information. Indeed, some networking applications encourage users to post whether or not they are on vacation, simultaneously letting burglars know when nobody is home.

The Cyber Underground

The impact of cyber crime on individuals and commerce can be substantial, with the consequences ranging from a mere inconvenience to financial ruin. The potential for considerable profits is enticing to young criminals, and has resulted in the creation of a large underground economy known as the cyber underground. The cyber underground is a pervasive market governed by rules and logic that closely mimic those of the legitimate business world, including a unique language, a set of expectations about its members’ conduct, and a system of stratification based on knowledge and skill, activities, and reputation.
One of the ways that cyber criminals communicate within the cyber underground is on website forums. It is on these forums that cyber criminals buy and sell login credentials (such as those for e-mail, social networking sites, or financial accounts); where they buy and sell phishing kits, malicious software, access to botnets; and victim social security numbers, credit cards, and other sensitive information. These criminals are increasingly professionalized, organized, and have unique or specialized skills.

In addition, cyber crime is increasingly transnational in nature, with individuals living in different countries around the world working together on the same schemes. In late 2008, an international hacking ring carried out one of the most complicated and organized computer fraud attacks ever conducted. The crime group used sophisticated hacking techniques to compromise the encryption used to protect data on 44 payroll debit cards, and then provided a network of “cashers” to withdraw more than $9 million from over 2,100 ATMs in at least 280 cities worldwide, including cities in the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Estonia, Italy, Hong Kong, Japan and Canada. The $9 million loss occurred within a span of less than 12 hours. The cyber underground facilitates the exchange of cyber crime services, tools, expertise, and resources, which enables this sort of transnational criminal operation to take place across multiple countries.

Beyond Cyber Crime

Apart from the cyber crime consequences associated with social networking sites, valuable information can be inadvertently exposed by military or government personnel via their social networking site profile. In a recently publicized case, an individual created a fake profile on multiple social networking sites posing as an attractive female intelligence analyst and extended friend requests to government contractors, military, and other government personnel. Many of the friend requests were accepted, even though the profile was of a fictitious person. According to press accounts, the deception provided its creator with access to a fair amount of sensitive data, including a picture from a soldier taken on patrol in Afghanistan that contained embedded data identifying his exact location. The person who created the fake social networking sites, when asked what he was trying to prove, responded: “The first thing was the issue of trust and how easily it is given. The second thing was to show how much different information gets leaked out through various networks.” He also noted that although some individuals recognized the sites as fake, they had no central place to warn others about the perceived fraud, helping to ensure 300 connections in a month.

This last point is worth expanding upon. Some social networking sites have taken it upon themselves to be model corporate citizens by voluntarily providing functions for users to report acts of abuse. A number of sites have easy to use buttons or links that, with a single click, will send a message to the system administrator alerting them of potentially illegal or abusive content. Unfortunately though, many sites have not followed the lead. Some sites provide users with no ability to report abuse, while others either intentionally or unintentionally discourage reporting by requiring users to complete a series of onerous steps every time they want to report abuse.

FBI Cyber Mission and Strategic Partnerships

The Department of Justice leads the national effort to prosecute cyber crime, and the FBI, in collaboration with other federal law enforcement agencies, investigates cyber crime. The FBI’s cyber crime mission is four-fold: first and foremost, to stop those behind the most serious computer intrusions and the spread of malicious code; second, to identify and thwart online sexual predators who use the Internet to meet and exploit children and to produce, possess, or share child pornography; third, to counteract operations that target U.S. intellectual property, endangering our national security and competitiveness; and fourth, to dismantle national and transnational organized criminal enterprises engaging in Internet fraud. To this end, we have established cyber squads in each of our 56 field offices around the country, with more than 1,000 specially trained agents, analysts, and digital forensic examiners. Still, we can not combat this threat alone.

Some of the best tools in the FBI’s arsenal for combating any crime problem are its long-standing partnerships with federal, state, local, and international law enforcement agencies, as well as with the private sector and academia. At the federal level, and by presidential mandate, the FBI leads the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) as a multi-agency national focal point for coordinating, integrating, and sharing pertinent information related to cyber threat investigations in order to determine the identity, location, intent, motivation, capabilities, alliances, funding, and methodologies of cyber threat groups and individuals. In doing so, the partners of the NCIJTF support the U.S. government’s full range of options across all elements of national power.

The FBI also partners closely with not-for-profit organizations, including extensive partnerships with the National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C), in establishing the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), the National Cyber-Forensic and Training Alliance (NCFTA), the InfraGard National Members Alliance in establishing InfraGard, the Financial Services Information Sharing & Analysis Center (FS-ISAC), and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC).

Just one recent example of coordination highlights how effective we are when working within these closely established partnerships. Earlier this year, Romanian police and prosecutors conducted one of Romania’s largest police actions ever—an investigation of an organized crime group engaged in Internet fraud. The investigation deployed over 700 law enforcement officers who conducted searches at 103 locations, which led to the arrest of 34 people. Over 600 victims of this Romanian crime ring were U.S. citizens. The success in bringing down this group was based in large part on the strength of our partnership with Romanian law enforcement and our domestic federal, state and local partners. Through extensive coordination by the FBI’s legal attaché (legat) in Bucharest, the Internet Crime Complaint Center provided the Romanians with over 600 complaints it had compiled from submissions to the http://www.IC3.gov reporting portal. In addition, and again in close coordination with the FBI’s legat, over 45 FBI field offices assisted in the investigation by conducting interviews to obtain victim statements on Romanian complaint forms, and by obtaining police reports and covering other investigative leads within their divisions.

Working closely with others, sharing information, and leveraging all available resources and expertise, the FBI and its partners have made significant strides in combating cyber crime. Clearly, there is more work to be done, but through a coordinated approach we have become more nimble and responsive in our efforts to bring justice to the most egregious offenders.

Conclusion

Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gohmert, and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to come before you today and share the work that the FBI is doing to address the threat posed by cyber criminals in this country and around the globe. I am happy to answer any questions.

TOP-SECRET – Biological Weapons Export Controls Revised

Biological Weapons Export Controls Revised


[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 176 (Monday, September 12, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 56099-56103]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-22677]

=======================================================================
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security

15 CFR Parts 740, 742 and 774

[Docket No. 110222155-1110-01]
RIN 0694-AF14

Implementation of a Decision Adopted Under the Australia Group
(AG) Intersessional Silent Approval Procedures in 2010 and Related
Editorial Amendments

AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) publishes this final
rule to amend the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement
a decision based on a proposal that was discussed at the 2010 Australia
Group (AG) Plenary and adopted under the AG intersessional silent
approval procedures in November 2010. Specifically, this rule amends
the Commerce Control List (CCL) entry in the EAR that controls human
and zoonotic pathogens and ``toxins,'' consistent with the
intersessional changes to the AG's ``List of Biological Agents for
Export Control.'' First, this rule clarifies the scope of the AG-
related controls in the EAR that apply to ``South American haemorrhagic
fever (Sabia, Flexal, Guanarito)'' and ``Pulmonary and renal syndrome-
haemorrhagic fever viruses (Seoul, Dobrava, Puumala, Sin Nombre)'' by
revising the list of viruses in this CCL entry to remove these two
fevers and replace them with ten viral causative agents for the fevers.
These changes are intended to more clearly identify the causative
agents that are of concern for purposes of the controls maintained by
the AG. Second, this rule alphabetizes and renumbers the list of
viruses in this CCL entry, consistent with the 2010 intersessional
changes to the AG control list. Finally, this rule makes an editorial
change to the CCL entry that controls human and zoonotic pathogens and
``toxins.'' To assist exporters to more easily identify the bacteria
and ``toxins'' that are controlled under this CCL entry, this rule
alphabetizes and renumbers the lists of bacteria and ``toxins'' in the
entry.

DATES: This rule is effective September 12, 2011.

ADDRESSES: Send comments regarding this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Jasmeet Seehra,
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), by e-mail to Jasmeet_K._ Seehra@omb.eop.gov, or by fax to (202) 395-7285; and to the Regulatory
Policy Division, Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of
Commerce, 14th Street & Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Room 2705,
Washington, DC 20230.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Elizabeth Sangine, Director, Chemical
and Biological Controls Division, Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty
Compliance, Bureau of Industry and Security, Telephone: (202) 482-3343.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is amending the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement a decision that was
adopted under the Australia Group (AG) intersessional silent approval
procedures in November 2010. The AG is a multilateral forum consisting
of 40 participating countries that maintain

[[Page 56100]]

export controls on a list of chemicals, biological agents, and related
equipment and technology that could be used in a chemical or biological
weapons program. The AG periodically reviews items on its control list
to enhance the effectiveness of participating governments' national
controls and to achieve greater harmonization among these controls.
    The November 2010 intersessional decision revised the AG ``List of
Biological Agents for Export Control'' to clarify the scope of the AG
controls that apply to certain viruses connected with the phenotypes or
medical conditions known as ``South American haemorrhagic fever'' and
``Pulmonary and renal syndrome-haemorrhagic fever viruses.'' The
purpose of these changes was to address a concern by the AG that the
listings for ``South American haemorrhagic fever (Sabia, Flexal,
Guanarito)'' and ``Pulmonary and renal syndrome-haemorrhagic fever
viruses (Seoul, Dobrova, Puumala, Sin Nombre)'' could be misinterpreted
(e.g., by assuming that the causative agents identified in the
parentheses represented an exhaustive listing of such viruses). In
addition, both of these AG listings referred to phenotypes or medical
conditions known to be caused by several distinct species of viruses,
some (but not all) of which were identified in parentheses for each
listing.
    To address this concern, the November 2010 AG intersessional
decision removed ``South American haemorrhagic fever'' and ``Pulmonary
and renal syndrome-haemorrhagic fever viruses'' from the List of
Biological Agents and replaced them with ten viral causative agents for
the fevers. Five of these causative agents (i.e., ``Dobrava-Belgrade
virus,'' ``Guanarito virus,'' ``Sabia virus,'' ``Seoul virus,'' and
``Sin nombre virus'') were previously identified in parentheses under
the listings for the two fevers, while the other five causative agents
(i.e., ``Andes virus,'' ``Chapare virus,'' ``Choclo virus,'' ``Laguna
Negra virus,'' and ``Lujo virus'') were not previously identified on
the AG List. Two other causative agents (i.e., ``Flexal virus'' and
``Puumala virus'') that were previously identified in parentheses under
the listings for the two fevers were removed from the AG List. This
rule amends Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 1C351 on the
Commerce Control List (CCL) (Supplement No. 1 to part 774 of the EAR)
by revising the list of viruses contained in 1C351.a to reflect these
changes to the AG List of Biological Agents.
    Consistent with the changes to ECCN 1C351 described above, this
rule alphabetizes and renumbers the list of viruses in ECCN 1C351.a to
conform with the format in the AG List of Biological Agents. In
addition, for the convenience of exporters attempting to determine the
control status of certain pathogens and toxins, this rule alphabetizes
and renumbers the lists of bacteria and toxins contained in ECCN
1C351.c and .d, respectively. Consistent with this reordering, this
rule revises references to certain agents identified in the ``CW
Controls'' paragraph of this ECCN, in the ``License Requirements
Notes'' under the License Requirements section of this ECCN, and/or in
the ``Related Controls'' paragraph under the List of Items Controlled
section of this ECCN.
    Although this rule removes ``Flexal virus'' from ECCN 1C351,
consistent with the AG intersessional changes to the AG List of
Biological Agents as described above, this virus continues to be listed
on the CCL. Specifically, this rule adds ``Flexal virus'' to ECCN 1C360
(Select agents not controlled under ECCN 1C351, 1C352, or 1C354),
because the virus is included in the list of select agents and toxins
maintained by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, in 42 CFR 73.3(b).
    This rule also amends ECCNs 1C351 and 1C352 by revising the
``Related Controls'' paragraph under the List of Items Controlled for
each ECCN to correct the references to the regulations maintained by
CDC and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), U.S.
Department of Agriculture, that apply to certain select agents and
toxins.
    Finally, this rule amends Section 740.20 (License Exception STA),
Section 742.18 (license requirements and policies related to the
Chemical Weapons Convention), and the List of Items Controlled section
in ECCN 1C991 (Vaccines, immunotoxins, medical products, and diagnostic
and food testing kits) to update the references to certain items
controlled under ECCN 1C351 that were alphabetized and renumbered, as
described above. Section 740.20 also is amended to include in paragraph
(b)(2)(vi) certain toxins controlled by ECCN 1C351.d that were
inadvertently omitted by the License Exception STA rule that BIS
published on June 16, 2011 (76 FR 35276). The toxins identified in
Section 740.20(b)(2)(vi) may be exported under License Exception STA to
countries listed in Section 740.20(c)(1), provided that such exports
conform with the limits specified in Section 740.20(b)(2)(vi)(A) and
(b)(2)(vi)(B).
    None of the changes made by this rule increase the scope of the
controls in ECCNs 1C351 and 1C991 (i.e., the items that are controlled
under these ECCNs remain the same, although certain items are now
specifically identified under separate listings in 1C351.a). As noted
above, ``Flexal virus,'' which was previously controlled under ECCN
1C351.a, is now controlled as a ``select agent'' under ECCN 1C360.a;
however, the license requirements for this virus remain unchanged.
    Although the Export Administration Act expired on August 20, 2001,
the President, through Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001, 3 CFR,
2001 Comp., p. 783 (2002), as extended by the Notice of August 12,
2010, 75 FR 50681 (August 16, 2010), has continued the EAR in effect
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

Saving Clause

    Shipments of items removed from eligibility for export or reexport
under a license exception or without a license (i.e., under the
designator ``NLR'') as a result of this regulatory action that were on
dock for loading, on lighter, laden aboard an exporting carrier, or en
route aboard a carrier to a port of export, on October 12, 2011,
pursuant to actual orders for export or reexport to a foreign
destination, may proceed to that destination under the previously
applicable license exception or without a license (NLR) so long as they
are exported or reexported before October 27, 2011. Any such items not
actually exported or reexported before midnight, on October 27, 2011,
require a license in accordance with this regulation.
    ``Deemed'' exports of ``technology'' and ``source code'' removed
from eligibility for export under a license exception or without a
license (under the designator ``NLR'') as a result of this regulatory
action may continue to be made under the previously available license
exception or without a license (NLR) before October 27, 2011. Beginning
at midnight on October 27, 2011, such ``technology'' and ``source
code'' may no longer be released, without a license, to a foreign
national subject to the ``deemed'' export controls in the EAR when a
license would be required to the home country of the foreign national
in accordance with this regulation.

Rulemaking Requirements

    1. Executive Orders 13563 and 12866 direct agencies to assess all
costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if
regulation is

[[Page 56101]]

necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits
(including potential economic, environmental, public health and safety
effects, distributive impacts, and equity). Executive Order 13563
emphasizes the importance of quantifying both costs and benefits, of
reducing costs, of harmonizing rules, and of promoting flexibility.
This rule has been determined to be not significant for purposes of
Executive Order 12866.
    2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person is
required to respond to, nor shall any person be subject to a penalty
for failure to comply with, a collection of information subject to the
requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et
seq.) (PRA), unless that collection of information displays a currently
valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Control Number. This rule
contains a collection of information subject to the requirements of the
PRA. This collection has been approved by OMB under Control Number
0694-0088 (Multi-Purpose Application), which carries a burden hour
estimate of 58 minutes to prepare and submit form BIS-748. Send
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this
collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the
burden, to Jasmeet Seehra, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and
to the Regulatory Policy Division, Bureau of Industry and Security,
Department of Commerce, as indicated in the ADDRESSES section of this
rule.
    3. This rule does not contain policies with Federalism implications
as that term is defined in Executive Order 13132.
    4. The provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.
553) requiring notice of proposed rulemaking, the opportunity for
public participation, and a delay in effective date, are inapplicable
because this regulation involves a military and foreign affairs
function of the United States (See 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1)). Immediate
implementation of these amendments is non-discretionary and fulfills
the United States' international obligation to the Australia Group
(AG). The AG contributes to international security and regional
stability through the harmonization of export controls and seeks to
ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical
and biological weapons. The AG consists of 40 member countries that act
on a consensus basis and the amendments set forth in this rule
implement a decision adopted under the AG intersessional silent
approval procedures in November 2010 and other changes that are
necessary to ensure consistency with the controls maintained by the AG.
Since the United States is a significant exporter of the items in this
rule, immediate implementation of this provision is necessary for the
AG to achieve its purpose. Any delay in implementation will create a
disruption in the movement of affected items globally because of
disharmony between export control measures implemented by AG members,
resulting in tension between member countries. Export controls work
best when all countries implement the same export controls in a timely
and coordinated manner.
    Further, no other law requires that a notice of proposed rulemaking
and an opportunity for public comment be given for this final rule.
Because a notice of proposed rulemaking and an opportunity for public
comment are not required to be given for this rule under the
Administrative Procedure Act or by any other law, the analytical
requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.)
are not applicable. Therefore, this regulation is issued in final form.

List of Subjects

15 CFR Part 740

    Administrative practice and procedure, Exports, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.

15 CFR Part 742

    Exports, Foreign trade.

15 CFR Part 774

    Exports, Foreign trade, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

    Accordingly, parts 740, 742 and 774 of the Export Administration
Regulations (15 CFR parts 730-774) are amended as follows:

PART 740--[AMENDED]

0
1. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 740 continues to read as
follows:

    Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.;
22 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp.,
p. 228; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; Notice
of August 12, 2010, 75 FR 50681 (August 16, 2010).

0
2. Section 740.20 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(2)(v) and
paragraph (b)(2)(vi) introductory text, as follows:

Sec.  740.20  License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (STA).

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (v) License Exception STA may not be used for any item controlled
by ECCN 1C351.a, .b, .c, d.11, .d.12 or .e, ECCNs 1C352, 1C353, 1C354,
1C360, 1E001 (i.e., for technology, as specified in ECCN 1E001, for
items controlled by ECCN 1C351.a, .b, .c, .d.11, .d.12 or .e or ECCNs
1C352, 1C353, 1C354 or 1C360) or ECCN 1E351.
    (vi) Toxins controlled by ECCN 1C351.d.1 through 1C351.d.10 and
1C351.d.13 through 1C351.d.19 are authorized under License Exception
STA to destinations indicated in paragraph (c)(1) of this section,
subject to the following limits. For purposes of this paragraph, all
such toxins that are sent from one exporter, reexporter or transferor
to a single end-user, on the same day, constitute one shipment.
* * * * *

PART 742--[AMENDED]

0
3. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 742 continues to read as
follows:

    Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.;
22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 2139a; 22 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.; 22
U.S.C. 7210; Sec 1503, Pub. L. 108-11, 117 Stat. 559; E.O. 12058, 43
FR 20947, 3 CFR, 1978 Comp., p. 179; E.O. 12851, 58 FR 33181, 3 CFR,
1993 Comp., p. 608; E.O. 12938, 59 FR 59099, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p.
950; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; E.O. 13222,
66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; Presidential Determination
2003-23 of May 7, 2003, 68 FR 26459, May 16, 2003; Notice of August
12, 2010, 75 FR 50681 (August 16, 2010); Notice of November 4, 2010,
75 FR 68673 (November 8, 2010).

0
4. Section 742.18 is amended by revising paragraph (a)(1), paragraph
(b)(1)(i) introductory text, and paragraphs (b)(1)(ii) and (b)(1)(iii),
as follows:

Sec.  742.18  Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or Convention).

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (1) Schedule 1 chemicals and mixtures controlled under ECCN 1C351.
A license is required for CW reasons to export or reexport Schedule 1
chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C351.d.11 or d.12 to all destinations
including Canada. CW applies to 1C351.d.11 for ricin in the form of
Ricinus Communis AgglutininII (RCAII), which is
also known as ricin D or Ricinus Communis LectinIII
(RCLIII), and Ricinus Communis LectinIV
(RCLIV), which is also known as ricin E. CW applies to
1C351.d.12 for saxitoxin identified by C.A.S. 35523-89-8.
(Note that the advance notification procedures and annual reporting
requirements described in

[[Page 56102]]

Sec.  745.1 of the EAR also apply to exports of Schedule 1 chemicals.)
* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (i) Exports to States Parties to the CWC. Applications to export
Schedule 1 Chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C351.d.11 or .d.12 to
States Parties to the CWC (destinations listed in Supplement No. 2 to
part 745 of the EAR) generally will be denied, unless all of the
following conditions are met:
* * * * *
    (ii) Exports to States not party to the CWC. Applications to export
Schedule 1 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1C351.d.11 or .d.12 to
States not Party to the CWC (destinations not listed in Supplement No.
2 to part 745 of the EAR) generally will be denied, consistent with
U.S. obligations under the CWC to prohibit exports of these chemicals
to States not Party to the CWC.
    (iii) Reexports. Applications to reexport Schedule 1 chemicals
controlled under ECCN 1C351.d.11 or .d.12 generally will be denied to
all destinations (including both States Parties to the CWC and States
not Party to the CWC).
* * * * *

PART 774--[AMENDED]

0
5. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 774 continues to read as
follows:

    Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.;
10 U.S.C. 7420; 10 U.S.C. 7430(e); 22 U.S.C. 287c, 22 U.S.C. 3201 et
seq., 22 U.S.C. 6004; 30 U.S.C. 185(s), 185(u); 42 U.S.C. 2139a; 42
U.S.C. 6212; 43 U.S.C. 1354; 15 U.S.C. 1824a; 50 U.S.C. app. 5; 22
U.S.C. 7201 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 7210; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR,
1996 Comp., p. 228; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p.
783; Notice of August 12, 2010, 75 FR 50681 (August 16, 2010).

0
6. In Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 (the Commerce Control List),
Category 1--Special Materials and Related Equipment, Chemicals,
``Microorganisms'' and ``Toxins,'' ECCN 1C351 is amended by revising
the License Requirements section and the ``Related Controls'' and
``Items'' paragraphs in the List of Items Controlled section, to read
as follows:

Supplement No. 1 to Part 774--The Commerce Control List

* * * * *
1C351 Human and zoonotic pathogens and ``toxins'', as follows (see
List of Items Controlled).

License Requirements

Reason for Control: CB, CW, AT

               Control(s)                         Country chart

CB applies to entire entry.............  CB Column 1.

CW applies to 1C351.d.11 and d.12 and a license is required for CW
reasons for all destinations, including Canada, as follows: CW
applies to 1C351.d.11 for ricin in the form of (1) Ricinus Communis
AgglutininII (RCAII), also known as ricin D or
Ricinus Communis LectinIII (RCLIII) and (2)
Ricinus Communis LectinIV (RCLIV), also known
as ricin E. CW applies to 1C351.d.12 for saxitoxin identified by
C.A.S. 35523-89-8. See Sec.  742.18 of the EAR for
licensing information pertaining to chemicals subject to restriction
pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The Commerce
Country Chart is not designed to determine licensing requirements
for items controlled for CW reasons.

               Control(s)                         Country chart

AT applies to entire entry.............  AT Column 1.

License Requirement Notes

    1. All vaccines and ``immunotoxins'' are excluded from the scope
of this entry. Certain medical products and diagnostic and food
testing kits that contain biological toxins controlled under
paragraph (d) of this entry, with the exception of toxins controlled
for CW reasons under d.11 and d.12, are excluded from the scope of
this entry. Vaccines, ``immunotoxins'', certain medical products,
and diagnostic and food testing kits excluded from the scope of this
entry are controlled under ECCN 1C991.
    2. For the purposes of this entry, only saxitoxin is controlled
under paragraph d.12; other members of the paralytic shellfish
poison family (e.g. neosaxitoxin) are designated EAR99.
    3. Clostridium perfringens strains, other than the epsilon
toxin-producing strains of Clostridium perfringens described in c.9,
are excluded from the scope of this entry, since they may be used as
positive control cultures for food testing and quality control.

License Exceptions

* * * * *

List of Items Controlled

Unit: * * *
Related Controls: (1) Certain forms of ricin and saxitoxin in
1C351.d.11. and d.12 are CWC Schedule 1 chemicals (see Sec.  742.18
of the EAR). The U.S. Government must provide advance notification
and annual reports to the OPCW of all exports of Schedule 1
chemicals. See Sec.  745.1 of the EAR for notification procedures.
See 22 CFR part 121, Category XIV and Sec.  121.7 for additional CWC
Schedule 1 chemicals controlled by the Department of State. (2) The
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), U.S. Department
of Agriculture, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, maintain
controls on the possession, use, and transfer within the United
States of certain items controlled by this ECCN (for APHIS, see 7
CFR 331.3(b), 9 CFR 121.3(b), and 9 CFR 121.4(b); for CDC, see 42
CFR 73.3(b) and 42 CFR 73.4(b)).
Related Definitions: * * *
Items:
    a. Viruses, as follows:
    a.1. Andes virus;
    a.2. Chapare virus;
    a.3. Chikungunya virus;
    a.4. Choclo virus;
    a.5. Congo-Crimean haemorrhagic fever virus (a.k.a. Crimean-
Congo haemorrhagic fever virus);
    a.6. Dengue fever virus;
    a.7. Dobrava-Belgrade virus;
    a.8. Eastern equine encephalitis virus;
    a.9. Ebola virus;
    a.10. Guanarito virus;
    a.11. Hantaan virus;
    a.12. Hendra virus (Equine morbillivirus);
    a.13. Japanese encephalitis virus;
    a.14. Junin virus;
    a.15. Kyasanur Forest virus;
    a.16. Laguna Negra virus;
    a.17. Lassa fever virus;
    a.18. Louping ill virus;
    a.19. Lujo virus;
    a.20. Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus;
    a.21. Machupo virus;
    a.22. Marburg virus;
    a.23. Monkey pox virus;
    a.24. Murray Valley encephalitis virus;
    a.25. Nipah virus;
    a.26. Omsk haemorrhagic fever virus;
    a.27. Oropouche virus;
    a.28. Powassan virus;
    a.29. Rift Valley fever virus;
    a.30. Rocio virus;
    a.31. Sabia virus;
    a.32. Seoul virus;
    a.33. Sin nombre virus;
    a.34. St. Louis encephalitis virus;
    a.35. Tick-borne encephalitis virus (Russian Spring-Summer
encephalitis virus);
    a.36. Variola virus;
    a.37. Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus;
    a.38. Western equine encephalitis virus; or
    a.39. Yellow fever virus.
    b. Rickettsiae, as follows:
    b.1. Bartonella quintana (Rochalimea quintana, Rickettsia
quintana);
    b.2. Coxiella burnetii;
    b.3. Rickettsia prowasecki (a.k.a. Rickettsia prowazekii); or
    b.4. Rickettsia rickettsii.
    c. Bacteria, as follows:
    c.1. Bacillus anthracis;
    c.2. Brucella abortus;
    c.3. Brucella melitensis;
    c.4. Brucella suis;
    c.5. Burkholderia mallei (Pseudomonas mallei);
    c.6. Burkholderia pseudomallei (Pseudomonas pseudomallei);
    c.7. Chlamydophila psittaci (formerly known as Chlamydia
psittaci);
    c.8. Clostridium botulinum;
    c.9. Clostridium perfringens, epsilon toxin producing types;
    c.10. Enterohaemorrhagic Escherichia coli, serotype O157 and
other verotoxin producing serotypes;
    c.11. Francisella tularensis;
    c.12. Salmonella typhi;
    c.13. Shigella dysenteriae;
    c.14. Vibrio cholerae; or
    c.15. Yersinia pestis.
    d. ``Toxins'', as follows, and ``subunits'' thereof:

[[Page 56103]]

    d.1. Abrin;
    d.2. Aflatoxins;
    d.3. Botulinum toxins;
    d.4. Cholera toxin;
    d.5. Clostridium perfringens toxins;
    d.6. Conotoxin;
    d.7. Diacetoxyscirpenol toxin;
    d.8. HT-2 toxin;
    d.9. Microcystin (Cyanginosin);
    d.10. Modeccin toxin;
    d.11. Ricin;
    d.12. Saxitoxin;
    d.13. Shiga toxin;
    d.14. Staphylococcus aureus toxins;
    d.15. T-2 toxin;
    d.16. Tetrodotoxin;
    d.17. Verotoxin and other Shiga-like ribosome inactivating
proteins;
    d.18. Viscum Album Lectin 1 (Viscumin); or
    d.19. Volkensin toxin.
    e. ``Fungi'', as follows:
    e.1. Coccidioides immitis; or
    e.2. Coccidioides posadasii.

0
7. In Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 (the Commerce Control List),
Category 1-- Special Materials and Related Equipment, Chemicals,
``Microorganisms'' and ``Toxins,'' ECCN 1C352 is amended by revising
the ``Related Controls'' paragraph in the List of Items Controlled
section, to read as follows:

1C352 Animal pathogens, as follows (see List of Items Controlled).
* * * * *

List of Items Controlled

Unit: * * *
Related Controls: The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS), U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, maintain controls on the possession, use, and transfer
within the United States of certain items controlled by this ECCN
(for APHIS, see 7 CFR 331.3(b), 9 CFR 121.3(b), and 9 CFR 121.4(b);
for CDC, see 42 CFR 73.3(b) and 42 CFR 73.4(b)).
Related Definitions: * * *
Items:
* * * * *

0
8. In Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 (the Commerce Control List),
Category 1--Special Materials and Related Equipment, Chemicals,
``Microorganisms'' and ``Toxins,'' ECCN 1C360 is amended by revising
paragraph (a) in the ``Items'' paragraph in the List of Items
Controlled to read as follows:

1C360 Select agents not controlled under ECCN 1C351, 1C352, or
1C354.
* * * * *

List of Items Controlled

Unit: * * *
Related Controls: * * *
Related Definitions: * * *
Items:
Note: * * *
    a. Human and zoonotic pathogens, as follows:
    a.1. Viruses, as follows:
    a.1.a. Central European tick-borne encephalitis viruses, as
follows:
    a.1.a.1. Absettarov;
    a.1.a.2. Hanzalova;
    a.1.a.3. Hypr;
    a.1.a.4. Kumlinge;
    a.1.b. Cercopithecine herpesvirus 1 (Herpes B virus);
    a.1.c. Flexal virus;
    a.1.d. Reconstructed replication competent forms of the 1918
pandemic influenza virus containing any portion of the coding
regions of all eight gene segments;
a.2. [RESERVED];
* * * * *

0
9. In Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 (the Commerce Control List),
Category 1--Special Materials and Related Equipment, Chemicals,
``Microorganisms'' and ``Toxins,'' ECCN 1C991 is amended by revising
the ``Items'' paragraph in the List of Items Controlled to read as
follows:

1C991 Vaccines, immunotoxins, medical products, diagnostic and food
testing kits, as follows (see List of Items controlled).
* * * * *

List of Items Controlled

Unit: * * *
Related Controls: * * *
Related Definitions: * * *
Items:
    a. Vaccines against items controlled by ECCN 1C351, 1C352,
1C353, 1C354, or 1C360;
    b. Immunotoxins containing items controlled by 1C351.d;
    c. Medical products containing botulinum toxins controlled by
ECCN 1C351.d.3 or conotoxins controlled by ECCN 1C351.d.6;
    d. Medical products containing items controlled by ECCN 1C351.d
(except botulinum toxins controlled by ECCN 1C351.d.3, conotoxins
controlled by ECCN 1C351.d.6, and items controlled for CW reasons
under 1C351.d.11 or .d.12);
    e. Diagnostic and food testing kits containing items controlled
by ECCN 1C351.d (except items controlled for CW reasons under ECCN
1C351.d.11 or .d.12).

    Dated: August 26, 2011.
Kevin J. Wolf,
Assistant Secretary for Export Administration.
[FR Doc. 2011-22677 Filed 9-9-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-33-P

TOP-SECRET – FBI Notice of Potential al-Qa’ida NYC DC Threat

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U//FOUO) Potential Al-Qa’ida Threat to New York City and Washington, DC During 9/11 Anniversary Period

8 September 2011

(U) Scope

(U//FOUO) This Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) is intended to provide warning and perspective regarding potential attack plotting by al-Qa?ida against US interests. This product is intended to support the activities of FBI and DHS and to assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government counterterrorism and law enforcement officials and the private sector in effectively deterring, preventing, preempting, or responding to terrorist attacks against the United States.

IA-0???-11

(U) Warning: This joint FBI/DHS document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO). It is subject to release restrictions as detailed in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 482) and the Freedom of Information Acts (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS and FBI policy for FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, media, or other personnel who do not have an authorized need-to-know without appropriate prior authorization.

(U) Warning: This product may contain US person information that has been deemed necessary for the intended recipient to understand, assess, or act on the information provided. US person information is highlighted with the label USPER and should be protected in accordance with constitutional requirements and all federal and state privacy and civil liberties laws.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U) Key Findings

(U//FOUO) According to recently obtained information, al-Qa’ida may be planning attacks inside the United States, targeting either New York City or Washington, DC around the time of the 9/11 anniversary.

(U//FOUO) We remain concerned that terrorists and violent extremists may view the symbolism of the 10th anniversary of 9/11 as a potentially attractive date to conduct an attack—particularly in major US cities.

(U//FOUO) Al-Qa’ida Possibly Planning Homeland Attack around 9/11 Anniversary Timeframe

(U//FOUO) As of early September 2011, al-Qa’ida possibly planned to carry out attacks in either New York City or Washington, DC—including a possible car bomb attack— around the timeframe of the 9/11 anniversary; such attacks may involve operatives carrying US documentation.

  • (U//FOUO) The attacks would be intended to cause panic within the public and disarray among first responders.
  • (U//FOUO) We have no further information on the specific timing, targets, locations, or methods of any of the potential attacks.

(U//FOUO) We assess that al-Qa’ida has likely maintained an interest since at least February 2010 in conducting large attacks in the Homeland timed to coincide with symbolic dates, to include the 10-year anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. We also remain concerned that the May 2011 death of Usama bin Ladin (UBL), coupled with the subsequent removal of several key al-Qa’ida figures, could further contribute to al-Qa’ida’s desire to stage an attack on a symbolic date—such as the 10-year anniversary of 9/11—as a way to avenge UBL’s death and reassert the group’s relevance, although operational readiness likely remains the primary driving factor behind the timing of al-Qa’ida attacks.

(U) Possible Attack Methods and Targets

(U//FOUO) While this specific threat reporting indicates al-Qa’ida may be considering an attack using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs)—likely similar to the tactic used by Faisal Shahzad USPER in his attempted attack on Times Square on 1 May 2010—we assess that al-Qa’ida and its affiliates have also considered attacks with small-arms, homemade explosive devices, and poisons, and probably provide their operatives with enough autonomy to select the particular target and method of attack.

(U//FOUO) Although we have no specific information on targets other than these two cities for this particular threat stream, we assess that al-Qa’ida in general has traditionally viewed aviation, mass transit systems, and US Government and military sites as particularly attractive. We further assess that targets with large gatherings of people and that are of economic, symbolic, or political significance offer the opportunity for al-Qa’ida and its adherents to inflict mass casualties, with the added objectives of causing economic and psychological damage on the United States.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Page 2 of 5

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U) Indicators of Pre-Operational Surveillance and Preparations for an Attack

(U//FOUO) We strongly encourage federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial counterterrorism officials and the private sector to remain alert and immediately report potential indicators of preoperational surveillance and planning activities at any commercial retail establishment, transportation venue, national monument or icon, or other public gathering place. Although a single indicator may constitute constitutionally protected activity, one or more might indicate pre-operational surveillance or preparation for an attack. Possible indicators include:

  • (U//FOUO) Unusual or prolonged interest in or attempts to gain sensitive information about security measures of personnel, entry points, peak days and hours of operation, and access controls such as alarms or locks;
  • (U//FOUO) Observation of security reaction drills or procedures; multiple false alarms or fictitious emergency calls to the same locations or similar venues;
  • (U//FOUO) Use of cameras or video recorders, sketching, or note-taking in a manner that would arouse suspicion;
  • (U//FOUO) Unusual interest in speaking with building maintenance personnel;
  • (U//FOUO) Observation of or questions about facility security measures, to include barriers, restricted areas, cameras, and intrusion detection systems;
  • (U//FOUO) Observations of or questions about facility air conditioning, heating, and ventilation systems;
  • (U//FOUO) Suspicious purchases of items that could be used to construct an explosive device, including hydrogen peroxide, acetone, gasoline, propane, or fertilizer;
  • (U//FOUO) Suspicious activities in storage facilities or other areas that could be used to construct an explosive device;
  • (U//FOUO) Attempted or unauthorized access to rooftops or other potentially sensitive areas.

(U) Recommended Protective Measures for VBIED Attacks

  • (U//FOUO) Update personnel on escalating threat;
  • (U//FOUO) Review and verify IED and VBIED tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and reporting procedures;
  • (U//FOUO) Frequently test communications and notification procedures;
  • (U//FOUO) Be aware of and report unattended vehicles;
  • (U//FOUO) Identify security zones and establish standoff distances;

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Page 3 of 5

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

  • (U//FOUO) Conduct refresher training for employees to understand basic procedures and associated hazards from blast and fragmentation;
  • (U//FOUO) Educate facility personnel on indicators of a VBIED attack TTPs and to be on the lookout for suspicious behavior;
  • (U//FOUO) Review and identify local use-of-force policies to challenge a potential vehicle suicide attack should it be encountered;
  • (U//FOUO) Review evacuation protocols for VBIED threats, and conduct evacuation drills establishing primary and secondary evacuation routes and assembly areas;
  • (U//FOUO) Establish security presence at strategic locations within at-risk venues, specifically at all entrances or vehicular choke points;
  • (U//FOUO) Establish vehicle search protocols and identify vehicle screening points or marshalling areas to check identification and manifests of approaching service vehicles;
  • (U//FOUO) Prohibit unauthorized vehicle access;
  • (U//FOUO) Record tag numbers for all vehicles entering site;
  • (U//FOUO) Establish protocols for executing serpentine vehicle access and choke points to impede approach of a VBIED toward a possible target. Conduct random vehicle explosive detection and canine searches;
  • (U//FOUO) Stagger search times and patterns to impede potential surveillance.

(U) Outlook

(U//FOUO) The FBI and DHS continue to work with our federal and non-federal partners to investigate this threat stream and will provide updates as appropriate. We continue to operate under the assumption that terrorists not yet identified by the Intelligence Community and law enforcement could seek to advance or execute attacks with little or no warning and urge federal, state, and local law enforcement and the private sector to maintain increased vigilance for indications of pre-operational and suspicious activity.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Page 4 of 5

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U) Reporting Notice

(U) The FBI and DHS encourage recipients of this document to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to the local FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force and the State and Major Urban Area Fusion Center. The FBI’s 24/7 Strategic Information and Operations Center can be reached by telephone number 202-323-3300 or by email at SIOC[at]ic.fbi.gov. The DHS National Operations Center (NOC) can be reached by telephone at (202) 282-9685 or by email at NOC.Fusion[at]dhs.gov. FBI regional phone numbers can be found online at http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm and Fusion Center information may be obtained at http://www.dhs.gov/files/resources/editorial_0306.shtm. For information affecting the private sector and critical infrastructure, contact the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC), a sub-element of the NOC. The NICC can be reached by telephone at (202) 282-9201 or by email at NICC[at]dhs.gov. When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact.

(U) Administrative Note: Law Enforcement Response

(U//FOUO) Information contained in this intelligence bulletin is for official use only. No portion of this bulletin should be released to the media, the general public, or over nonsecure Internet servers. Release of this material could adversely affect or jeopardize investigative activities.

(U) For comments or questions related to the content or dissemination of this document, please contact the FBI Counterterrorism Analysis Section at (202) 324-3000 or FBI_CTAS[at]ic.fbi.gov, or DHS/I&A Production Branch staff at IA.PM[at]hq.dhs.gov.

(U) I&A would like to invite you to participate in a brief customer feedback survey regarding this product. Your feedback is extremely important to our efforts to improve the quality and impact of our products on your mission. Please click below to access the form and then follow a few simple steps to complete and submit your response. Thank you.

(U) Tracked by: HSEC-8.1, HSEC-8.2, HSEC-8.3.4

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Page 5 of 5

TOP-SECRET -“FBI agents, fire fighters, rescue workers and engineers work at the Pentagon crash site,” 9/11/2001

“FBI agents, fire fighters, rescue workers and engineers work at the Pentagon crash site,” 9/11/2001; Photo number: 010914-F8006R-002; Photo Courtesy of the Department of Defense

On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four passenger airliners, crashing them into the World Trade Center in New York City, and into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, while the fourth plane crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. Shown here is the crash scene at the Pentagon following the attack.

TOP-SECRET – Nazi & Japanese War Crimes Final Report to the United States Congress

final-report-2007

TOP-SECRET – Brazil Conspired with U.S. to Overthrow Allende

Declassified U.S. Documents Show Richard Nixon and Brazilian President Emilio Médici Discussed Coordinated Intervention in Chile, Cuba, and other Latin American nations “to prevent new Allendes and Castros”

Washington, D.C., September 12, 2011 – In December 1971, President Richard Nixon and Brazilian President Emilio Garrastazú Médici discussed Brazil’s role in efforts to overthrow the elected government of Salvador Allende in Chile, formerly Top Secret records posted by the National Security Archive today reveal. According to a declassified memorandum of conversation, Nixon asked Médici whether the Chilean military was capable of overthrowing Allende. “He felt that they were…,” Médici replied, “and made clear that Brazil was working toward this end.”

The Top Secret “memcon” of the December 9, 1971, Oval Office meeting indicates that Nixon offered his approval and support for Brazil’s intervention in Chile. “The President said that it was very important that Brazil and the United States work closely in this field. We could not take direction but if the Brazilians felt that there was something we could do to be helpful in this area, he would like President Médici to let him know. If money were required or other discreet aid, we might be able to make it available.  This should be held in the greatest confidence.”

The U.S. and Brazil, Nixon told Médici, “must try and prevent new Allendes and Castros and try where possible to reverse these trends.”

During the same meeting, President Médici asked Nixon if “we” should be supporting Cuban exiles who “had forces and could overthrow Castro’s regime.” Nixon responded that “we should, as long as we did not push them into doing something that we could not support, and as long as our hand did not appear.”  The two also participated in a discussion of the potential to undermine the populist Peruvian President General Velasco Alvarado by publicizing the allegation that he had a lovechild with a mistress—she was a former “Miss Peru”—in Paris, according to General Vernon Walters who also attended the Médici/Nixon meeting.

The documents were declassified in July as part of the State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series.

The memcon records Nixon telling Médici that he “hoped we could cooperate closely, as there were many things that Brazil as a South American country could do that the U.S. could not.” Indeed, the documentation reveals that Nixon believed that a special relationship with Brazil was so important that he proposed a secret back-channel between the two presidents “as a means of communicating directly outside of normal diplomatic channels.” Médici named his private advisor and foreign minister Gibson Barbosa as his backchannel representative, but told Nixon that for “extremely private and delicate matters” Brazil would use Col. Manso Netto. Nixon named Kissinger as his representative for the special back channel.

Communications between Nixon and Medici using the special back-channel remain secret.

Peter Kornbluh, who directs the National Security Archive’s Chile and Brazil projects, noted that “a hidden chapter of collaborative intervention to overthrow the government of Chile” was now emmerging from the declassified documentation. “Brazil’s archives are the missing link,” he said, calling on President Ignacio Lula da Silva to open Brazil’s military archives on the past. “The full history of intervention in South America in the 1970s cannot be told without access to Brazilian documents.”

Drawing on Brazilian sources, a CIA intelligence memorandum noted that Médici had proposed that Brazil and the U.S. cooperate in countering the “trend of Marxist/leftist expansion” in Latin America and that Nixon promised to “assist Brazil when and wherever possible.”  The report noted that the substance of the secret talks had created concern among some officers in Brazil who believed that responsibility for these operations would fall to the Brazilian Armed forces. The memo quoted General Vicente Dale Coutinho as stating that “the United States obviously wants Brazil to ‘do the dirty work’” in South America.

A CIA National Intelligence Estimate done in 1972 predicted that Brazil would play an increasingly bigger role in hemispheric affairs, “seeking to fill whatever vacuum the US leaves behind. It is unlikely that Brazil will intervene openly in its neighbors internal affairs,” the intelligence assessment predicted, “but the regime will not be above using the threat of intervention or tools of diplomacy and covert action to oppose leftist regimes, or keep friendly governments in office, or to help place them there in countries such as Bolivia and Uruguay.”

In 2002, National Security Archive analyst Carlos Osorio posted a declassified Top Secret memorandum of conversation of Nixon’s meeting with British Prime Minister Edward Heath dated December 20, 1971, during which the two discussed Brazil’s role in South America. “Our position is supported by Brazil, which is after all the key to the future,” states Nixon, “The Brazilians helped rig the Uruguayan election… There are forces at work which we are not discouraging.”


Read the Documents

Document 1: White House Memorandum, Top Secret, “Meeting with President Emílio Garratazú Médici of Brazil on Thursday, December 9, 1971, at 10:00 a.m., in the President’s Office, the White House”, December 9, 1971.

During this meeting between President Nixon and President Médici, the two discuss the political and economic situations in several nations of mutual concern, among them Chile, Cuba, Peru, and Bolivia. Nixon asks Médici whether he feels the Chilean military could overthrow President Salvador Allende. Médici responds that he believes Allende will be overthrown “for very much the same reasons that Goulart had been overthrown in Brazil,” and “made it clear that Brazil was working towards this end.”  Nixon stressed “that it was very important that Brazil and the United States work closely in this field” and offered “discreet aid” and money for Brazilian operations against the Allende government. The two also discuss mutual operations against Castro supporting exile groups that had the forces to overthrow him, and how to block Peru’s efforts to bring Cuba back into the OAS.  During the meeting, Nixon raises an issue he clearly considers of major importance: establishing a highly secret back channel between the two presidents: because of the close relationship they have developed, he would like to have “a means of communicating directly outside of normal diplomatic channels when this might be necessary.” Médici agrees and names Brazilian Foreign Minister Gibson Barbosa as a representative for such communication while Nixon picks Kissinger. Médici also tells Nixon he will use Brazilian Colonel Manso Netto if the issue is particularly sensitive and discreet.  Nixon notes that the two countries “must try and prevent new Allendes and Castros and try where possible to reverse these trends.” At the end of the meeting, Nixon states that he “hoped that we could cooperate closely, as there were many things that Brazil as a South American country could do that the U.S. could not.”

Document 2: Memorandum from the Senior Department of Defense Attache in France (Gen. Walters) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Henry Kissinger), undated.

In a memo to National Security Advisory Henry Kissinger, General Vernon Walters reports on the meeting between Médici and Nixon, and on the follow-up instructions that Nixon has given. First, Nixon wants Kissinger and Secretary Connolly to ensure priority support for the Inter-American Development Bank. Nixon also wants Kissinger to know that Nixon’s special channel to Médici and the Brazilians will be through Foreign Minister Gibson Barbosa, that Col. Arthur S. Moura who presently was the Army and Defense Attache in Brazil should be promoted to Brigadier General. The President also expects Médici to tell Kissinger of the visit of Argentine president Lanusse to Brazil and then Kissinger will relay the information to Nixon. Gen. Walters is also instructed to convey to Kissinger how much Nixon enjoyed meeting Médici and establishing a close relationship with the Brazilian president.

Document 3: CIA Memorandum, from CIA Deputy Director Robert Cushman to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, “Alleged Commitments Made by President Richard Nixon to Brazilian President Emílio Garrastazú Médici”, December 29, 1971.

After word of the discussion between Nixon and Médici leaks to the Brazilian military, the CIA transmits intelligence on the reaction among several officers. A memo from CIA Deputy Director Robert Cushman to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, asserts that the talks between Brazilian President Medici and President Nixon resulted in the two countries forming a pact to combat Latin American communism. Cushman also reports that General Vicente Dale Coutinho, commander of the fourth army, and other field grade officers in the Northeast, “have learned from a “Cabinet leak” that secret talks between the two Presidents were of great importance in the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy.” According to CIA intelligence, the military officers believe that the focus of the talks centered on hemisphere security, and Nixon reportedly asked support from Medici “in safeguarding the internal security and status quo in the hemisphere, including the governments of Bolivia and Uruguay.”  Medici agreed to the request and “personally believes the Brazilian government must assume a greater role in defending neighboring, friendly governments.” According to the report, General Coutinho takes offense to this notion and feels that the U.S. wants Brazil “to do the dirty work” and he believes the Brazilian military will be significantly disadvantaged because of it.

Document 4: National Intelligence Estimate 93-73, Secret, “The New Course in Brazil”, January 13, 1972.

This National Intelligence Estimate on Brazil predicts that the Brazilian military intends to “dominate Brazilian politics for years to come.” The assessment of the intelligence community is that there is no opposition capable of overthrowing the government, but if political division grows within the ranks of the military it could throw the country into chaos. The NIE says Brazil’s economy has a positive outlook for the next five years, and although the government will have recurring problems with the balance of payments over that time, it will “probably be able to deal with them.” The NIE reports that the reputation of the Brazilian military will reflect on the strength of its economy, and the growing social problems within in the country will grow even if the economy does. The NIE says that more Brazilians are becoming educated and realizing what their country lacks, which could affect the control of the military government. The report reasons that Brazil will continue to see itself as an ally of the U.S., but further nationalistic opinion within the country and trade issues will make the relationship rockier. The NIE concludes stating that Brazil will not hesitate to intervene in its neighbors’ affairs, using covert action “to oppose leftist regimes, to keep friendly governments in office, or help place them there in countries such as Bolivia and Uruguay.”

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TOP-SECRET-Breaking the Silence The Mexican Army and the 1997 Acteal Massacre

Mexican troops training at a Military Camp in Chiapas.
(Photo courtesy of Adolfo Gutiérrez)

Breaking the Silence
The Mexican Army and the 1997 Acteal Massacre

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 283

Washington, D.C., September, 2011 – As Mexicans debate last week’s Supreme Court ruling vacating the conviction of 20 men for the Acteal massacre, newly declassified documents from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency describe the Army’s role in backing paramilitary groups in Chiapas at the time of the killings. The secret cables confirm reporting about military support for indigenous armed groups carrying out attacks on pro-Zapatista communities in the region and add important new details. They also revive a question that has lingered for almost 12 years: when will the Army come clean about its role in Acteal?

Since the brutal attack of December 22, 1997, the Mexican government has offered multiple versions of the military’s involvement in the conflictive Chiapas zone around Acteal. The problem is the accounts have been incomplete or untrue. The most important of the DIA documents directly contradicts the official story told about the massacre by the government of then-President Ernesto Zedillo.

In the report issued by the nation’s Attorney General Jorge Madrazo in 1998, Libro Blanco Sobre Acteal, the government asserted that “The Attorney General’s office has documented the existence of groups of armed civilians in the municipality of Chenalhó, neither organized, created, trained, nor financed by the Mexican Army nor by any other government entity, but whose management and organization respond to an internal logic determined by the confrontation, between and within the communities, with the Zapatista bases of support.” (p. 32, emphasis added)

But in a telegram sent to DIA headquarters in Washington on May 4, 1999, the U.S. Defense Attaché Office in Mexico points to “direct support” by the Army to armed groups in the highland areas of Chiapas, where the killings took place. The document describes a clandestine network of “human intelligence teams,” created in mid-1994 with approval from then-President Carlos Salinas, working inside Indian communities to gather intelligence information on Zapatista “sympathizers.” In order to promote anti-Zapatista armed groups, the teams provided “training and protection from arrests by law enforcement agencies and military units patrolling the region.”

Although the cable was written in 1999, the attaché took care to point out that Army intelligence officers were overseeing the armed groups in December 1997. The document provides details never mentioned in the many declarations of the Mexican Army following the attack. The human intelligence teams, explains the Defense Attaché Office, “were composed primarily of young officers in the rank of second and first captain, as well as select sergeants who spoke the regional dialects. The HUMINT teams were composed of three to four persons, who were assigned to cover select communities for a period of three to four months. After three months the teams’ officer members were rotated to a different community in Chiapas. Concern over the teams’ safety and security were paramount reasons for the rotations every three months.”

The Defense Intelligence Agency released the excised documents to the National Security Archive in 2008 in response to a Freedom Information Act request. (An appeal for additional records is pending.) The information was compiled by the agency’s representatives in Mexico, defense attaché officers whose primary task is to gather intelligence on the Mexican armed forces and send it to headquarters in Washington for analysis. The analysis is then used by the government to assist in crafting national security policy in Mexico. The agency is the eyes and ears of the U.S. Secretary of Defense abroad: think of it as the Pentagon’s CIA.

So the “internal logic” turns out to be the military’s, in the form of a carefully planned counterinsurgency strategy that combined civic action programs – frequently trumpeted by the Defense Secretariat in statements to the press – with secret intelligence operations designed to strengthen the paramilitaries and provoke conflict against EZLN supporters.

In the almost twelve years since the massacre human rights groups, journalists and investigators have been able to unearth a smattering of true facts about the slaughter at Acteal, but without the help of official transparency. Requests for government information made through the Mexican freedom of information law–such as the ones filed by the National Security Archive last year–meet a resounding silence. The Attorney General’s office helpfully steers the requester to the library to find its 1998 report. The Interior Ministry responds with a copy of a public communiqué the agency issued five days after the massacre summarizing “Actions Taken” in the Acteal case. The nation’s intelligence center replies that it has no control over what should be military files, and therefore no documents. And the Army? “After a meticulous search in the archives of this Secretariat,” writes the institution to the National Security Archive, emphasis added, “the requested information was not located.”

Perhaps even more unsettling than the supposed non-existence of documents in the Defense Secretariat is the response of the Office of the President to requests about Acteal. The staff of President Felipe Calderón told this requester to look in the Presidential Archives of the General Archive of the Nation for files relevant to the massacre. We did. We found many. They are all located in the section “Unprocessed Files,” where letters, telegrams and other forms of complaints from Mexican citizens have languished for years without reply. The communications that poured in after December 22, 1997, from every state in Mexico as well as from international human rights groups and academic institutions contain expressions of anger, despair, and condemnation for the attack. They also include specific charges made by residents of Chiapas about instances of violence, energy blackouts, and land seizures: potential leads for further investigation by the government into the conflict destroying the region.

The cries for attention sent to the highest mandate in the land went unanswered. They were routinely tagged as unprocessed files and can be perused today by any researcher who cares to look in the national archives.

Until the current administration decides to honor its obligations to inform its citizens about the truth of the 1997 massacre, the people’s call for facts will remain lost in the unprocessed files.

And we will be left to rely on the United States for information about the Mexican Army and Acteal.


Read the Documents

Document 1
December 31, 1997
Mexican Military Presence Increases Following the Massacre in Chiapas
Defense Intelligence Agency, secret intelligence information report

In this heavily redacted cable sent to DIA headquarters in Washington on December 31, 1997, the U.S. Defense Attaché Office in Mexico describes the deployment of troops by the Mexican military to the conflict zones of Chiapas. Citing secret and open source accounts, the document indicates that President Ernesto Zedillo committed thousands of new troops to the region following the December 22 massacre of 45 Tzotzil Indian men, women and children, with other units “placed on alert to assist in the event of an uprising.”

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act
FOIA Request No. 38,435, released February 2008
Under appeal

Document 2
May 4, 1999
Military Involvement with Chiapas Paramilitary Groups
Defense Intelligence Agency, secret intelligence information report

In a telegram sent to DIA headquarters in Washington on May 4, 1999, the U.S. Defense Attaché Office in Mexico points to “direct support” by the Army to armed groups in the highland areas of Chiapas, where the Acteal killings took place. The document describes a clandestine network of “human intelligence teams,” created in mid-1994 with approval from then-President Carlos Salinas, working inside Indian communities to gather intelligence information on Zapatista “sympathizers.”

Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act
FOIA Request No. 38,435, released February 2008
Under appeal

TOP-SECRET – May 02 – U-2 Cover Plan

Cover plan to be used for downed U-2 flight

Memo, cover plan to be used for downed U-2 flight; White House Office, Office of the Staff Seretary: Records, 1952-61 (Subject Series; Alphabetical Subseries), Box 15, Folder: Intelligence Matters (14); Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library; National Archives

On May 1, 1960, an American U-2 spy plane piloted by Francis Gary Powers was shot down over Soviet air space. Dated May 2, this document details a cover story to be released regarding the flight.

TOP-SECRET-The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States – 9/11 Commission

FBI Report Apr 2004

FBI Report Chronology Part 01 of 02

FBI Report Chronology Part 02 of 02

Click on te links above to get the Original Documents of the 9/11 Commisssion

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, was set up on November 27, 2002, “to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 attacks“, including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks.

The commission was also mandated to provide recommendations designed to guard against future attacks.

Chaired by former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean, the commission consisted of five Democrats and five Republicans. The commission was created by Congressional legislation, with the bill signed into law by President George W. Bush.

The commission’s final report was lengthy and based on extensive interviews and testimony. Its primary conclusion was that the failures of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation permitted the terrorist attacks to occur and that had these agencies acted more wisely and more aggressively, the attacks could potentially have been prevented.

After the publication of its final report, the commission closed on August 21, 2004.[1] The commission was the last investigation by the federal government into the events of 9/11, with the exception of the NIST report on the collapse of Building 7.

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States was established on November 27, 2002, by President George W. Bush and the United States Congress, with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger initially appointed to head the commission.[2] However, Kissinger resigned only weeks after being appointed, because he would have been obliged to disclose the clients of his private consulting business.[3] Former U.S. Senator George Mitchell was originally appointed as the vice-chairman, but he stepped down on December 10, 2002, not wanting to sever ties to his law firm.[4] On December 15, 2002, Bush appointed former New Jersey governor Tom Kean to head the commission.[5]

By the spring of 2003, the commission was off to a slow start, needing additional funding to help it meet its target day for the final report, of May 27, 2004.[6] In late March, the Bush administration agreed to provide an additional $9 million for the commission, though this was $2 million short of what the commission requested.[7] The first hearings were held from March 31 to April 1, 2003, in New York City.[8]

Members

The members of the commission’s staff included:

Then government officials who were called to testify before the commission included:

Past government officials who were called to testify before the commission included:

President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, former President Bill Clinton, and former Vice President Al Gore all gave private testimony. President Bush and Vice President Cheney insisted on testifying together and not under oath, while Clinton and Gore met with the panel separately. As National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice claimed that she was not required to testify under oath because the position of NSA is an advisory role, independent of authority over a bureaucracy and does not require confirmation by the Senate. Legal scholars disagree on the legitimacy of her claim. Eventually, Condoleezza Rice testified publicly and under oath.[12]

The commission issued its final report on July 22, 2004. After releasing the report, Commission Chair Thomas Kean declared that both Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush had been “not well served” by the FBI and CIA.[13] The commission interviewed over 1,200 people in 10 countries and reviewed over two and a half million pages of documents, including some closely-guarded classified national security documents. Before it was released by the commission, the final public report was screened for any potentially classified information and edited as necessary.

Additionally, the commission has released several supplemental reports on the terrorists’ financing, travel, and other matters.

Parenthetic numbers refer to page numbers in the Commission Report

  1. The U.S. government must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all elements of national power. (367)
  2. United States should support Pakistan’s government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for better education, so long as Pakistan’s leaders remain willing to make difficult choices of their own. (369)
  3. United States and the international community should make a long-term commitment to a secure and stable Afghanistan, in order to give the government a reasonable opportunity to improve the life of the Afghan people. Afghanistan must not again become a sanctuary for international crime and terrorism. The United States and the international community should help the Afghan government extend its authority over the country, with a strategy and nation-by-nation commitments to achieve their objectives. (370)
  4. The problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship must be confronted, openly. The United States and Saudi Arabia must determine if they can build a relationship that political leaders on both sides are prepared to publicly defend—a relationship about more than oil. It should include a shared commitment to political and economic reform, as Saudis make common cause with the outside world. It should include a shared interest in greater tolerance and cultural respect, translating into a commitment to fight the violent extremists who foment hatred. (374)
  5. The U.S. government must define what the message is, what it stands for. We should offer an example of moral leadership in the world, committed to treat people humanely, abide by the rule of law, and be generous and caring to our neighbors. America and Muslim friends can agree on respect for human dignity and opportunity. (376)
  6. Where Muslim governments, even those who are friends, do not respect these principles, the United States must stand for a better future. One of the lessons of the long Cold War was that short-term gains in cooperating with the most repressive and brutal governments were too often outweighed by long-term setbacks for America’s stature and interests. (376)
  7. We need to defend our ideals abroad vigorously. America does stand up for its values. The United States defended, and still defends, Muslims against tyrants and criminals in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
    • Recognizing that Arab and Muslim audiences rely on satellite television and radio, the government has begun some promising initiatives in television and radio broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran, and Afghanistan. These efforts are beginning to reach large audiences. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has asked for much larger resources. It should get them.
    • The United States should rebuild the scholarship, exchange, and library programs that reach out to young people and offer them knowledge and hope. Where such assistance is provided, it should be identified as coming from the citizens of the United States. (377)
  8. The U.S. government should offer to join with other nations in generously supporting a new International Youth Opportunity Fund. Funds will be spent directly for building and operating primary and secondary schools in those Muslim states that commit to sensibly investing their own money in public education. (378)
  9. A comprehensive U.S. strategy to counter terror-ism should include economic policies that encourage development, more open societies, and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their families and to enhance prospects for their children’s future. (379)
  10. The United States should engage other nations in developing a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terror-ism. (379)
  11. The United States should engage its friends to develop a common coalition approach toward the detention and humane treatment of captured terrorists. (380)
  12. Pre-venting the proliferation of [weapons of mass destruction] warrants a maximum effort—by strengthening counterproliferation efforts, expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative, and supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. (381)
  13. Vigorous efforts to track terrorist financing must remain front and center in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The government has recognized that information about terrorist money helps us to understand their networks, search them out, and disrupt their operations. Intelligence and law enforcement have targeted the relatively small number of financial facilitators—individuals al Qaeda relied on for their ability to raise and deliver money—at the core of al Qaeda’s revenue stream. (382)
  14. The United States should combine terrorist travel intelligence, operations, and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility. (385)
  15. The U.S. border security system should be integrated into a larger network of screening points that includes our transportation system and access to vital facilities, such as nuclear reactors. The President should direct the Department of Homeland Security to lead the effort to design a comprehensive screening system, addressing common problems and setting common standards with systemwide goals in mind. (387)
  16. The Department of Homeland Security, properly supported by the Congress, should complete, as quickly as possible, a biometric entry-exit screening system, including a single system for speeding qualified travelers. It should be integrated with the system that provides benefits to foreigners seeking to stay in the United States. (389)
  17. We should do more to exchange terrorist information with trusted allies, and raise U.S. and global border security standards for travel and border crossing over the medium and long term through extensive inter-national cooperation. (390)
  18. Secure identification should begin in the United States. The federal government should set standards for the issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification, such as drivers licenses. (390)
  19. The U.S. government should identify and evaluate the transportation assets that need to be protected, set risk-based priorities for defending them, select the most practical and cost-effective ways of doing so, and then develop a plan, budget, and funding to implement the effort. The plan should assign roles and missions to the relevant authorities (federal, state, regional, and local) and to private stakeholders. In measuring effectiveness, perfection is unattainable. But terrorists should perceive that potential targets are defended. They may be deterred by a significant chance of failure. (391)
  20. Improved use of “no-fly” and “automatic selectee” lists should not be delayed while the argument about a successor to CAPPS continues. (393)
  21. The TSA and the Congress must give priority attention to improving the ability of screening checkpoints to detect explosives on passengers. (393)
  22. As the President determines the guidelines for information sharing among government agencies and by those agencies with the private sector, he should safeguard the privacy of individuals about whom information is shared. (394)
  23. The burden of proof for retaining a particular governmental power should be on the executive, to explain (a) that the power actually materially enhances security and (b) that there is adequate supervision of the executive’s use of the powers to ensure protection of civil liberties. If the power is granted, there must be adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use. (394-5)
  24. There should be a board within the executive branch to oversee adherence to the guidelines we recommend and the commitment the government makes to defend our civil liberties. (395)
  25. Homeland security assistance should be based strictly on an assessment of risks and vulnerabilities. Now, in 2004, Washington, D.C.,and New York City are certainly at the top of any such list. We understand the contention that every state and city needs to have some minimum infrastructure for emergency response. But federal homeland security assistance should not remain a program for general revenue sharing. It should supplement state and local resources based on the risks or vulnerabilities that merit additional support. Congress should not use this money as a pork barrel. (396)
  26. Emergency response agencies nationwide should adopt the Incident Command System (ICS). When multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are involved, they should adopt a unified command. (397)
  27. Congress should support pending legislation which provides for the expedited and increased assignment of radio spectrum for public safety purposes. (397)
  28. We endorse the American National Standards Institute’s recommended standard for private preparedness…. We also encourage the insurance and credit-rating industries to look closely at a company’s compliance with the ANSI standard in assessing its insurability and creditworthiness. We believe that compliance with the standard should define the standard of care owed by a company to its employees and the public for legal purposes. (398)
  29. We recommend the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), built on the foundation of the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). Breaking the older mold of national government organization, this NCTC should be a center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence, staffed by personnel from the various agencies. (403)
  30. The current position of Director of Central Intelligence should be replaced by a National Intelligence Director with two main areas of responsibility: (1) to oversee national intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest across the U.S. government and (2) to manage the national intelligence program and oversee the agencies that contribute to it. (411)
  31. The CIA Director should emphasize (a) rebuilding the CIA’s analytic capabilities; (b) transforming the clandestine service by building its human intelligence capabilities; (c) developing a stronger language program, with high standards and sufficient financial incentives; (d) renewing emphasis on recruiting diversity among operations officers so they can blend more easily in foreign cities;(e) ensuring a seamless relationship between human source collection and signals collection at the operational level; and (f) stressing a better balance between unilateral and liaison operations. (415)
  32. Lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department. There it should be consolidated with the capabilities for training, direction, and execution of such operations already being developed in the Special Operations Command. (415)
  33. Overall amounts of money being appropriated for national intelligence and to its component agencies should no longer be kept secret. Congress should pass a separate appropriations act for intelligence, defending the broad allocation of how these tens of billions of dollars have been assigned among the varieties of intelligence work. (416)
  34. Information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge. (417)
  35. The president should lead the government-wide effort to bring the major national security institutions into the information revolution. (418)
  36. Congress should address [the dysfunction system of intelligence oversight].We have considered various alternatives: A joint committee on the old model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is one. A single committee in each house of Congress. (420)
  37. Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland security. Congressional leaders are best able to judge what committee should have jurisdiction over this department and its duties. But we believe that Congress does have the obligation to choose one in the House and one in the Senate, and that this committee should be a permanent standing committee with a nonpartisan staff. (421)
  38. We should minimize as much as possible the disruption of national security policymaking during the change of administrations by accelerating the process for national security appointments. (422)
  39. A specialized and integrated national security workforce should be established at the FBI consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the development of an institutional culture imbued with a deep expertise in intelligence and national security. (425-6)
  40. The Department of Defense and its oversight committees should regularly assess the adequacy of Northern Command’s strategies and planning to defend the United States against military threats to the homeland. (428)
  41. The Department of Homeland Security and its oversight committees should regularly assess the types of threats the country faces to determine (a) the adequacy of the government’s plans—and the progress against those plans—to protect America’s critical infrastructure and (b) the readiness of the government to respond to the threats that the United States might face. (428)

TOP-SECRET-Conspiracy of Silence? Colombia, the United States and the Massacre at El Salado

A Colombian girl in El Salado displays a copy of the Memoria Histórica report: La Masacre de El Salado: Esa Guerra No Era Nuestra (The El Salado Massacre: That Was Not Our War). [Photo: Michael Evans]

Conspiracy of Silence?

Colombia, the United States and the Massacre at El Salado

Declassified Documents Highlight U.S. Concerns Over Role of Colombian Security Forces in February 2000 Paramilitary Killings

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 287

Washington, D.C., September 24, 2009 – The United States harbored serious concerns about the potential involvement of Colombian security forces in the February 2000 massacre at El Salado, an attack that occurred while the two countries were hammering out the final details of the massive military aid package known as Plan Colombia, according to declassified documents posted today on the National Security Archive Web site.

Orchestrated and carried out by paramilitaries from the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), an illegal paramilitary army, there have long been allegations that Colombian security forces, including those from the Colombian Navy’s 1st Marine Infantry Brigade, facilitated the massacre by vacating the town before the carnage began and constructing roadblocks to delay the arrival of humanitarian aid. U.S. assistance under Plan Colombia required the Colombian military to demonstrate progress in breaking ties with paramilitary forces.

Images of victims on display during the presentation of the Memoria Histórica report. Victims for whom a photo was not available were represented by blank faces.
[Michael Evans]

The documents described in the article below—and in Spanish on the Web site of Semana (Colombia’s leading news magazine)—show that U.S. officials had significant doubts about the credibility of their Colombian military counterparts and were well aware, even before El Salado, of the propensity of the Colombian military to act in concert with illegal paramilitary forces, whether through omission or commission.

These findings also complement those of Memoria Histórica, an independent group charged by Colombia’s National Commission on Reparations and Reconciliation with investigating the history of the country’s armed conflict. Its report on El Salado, La Masacre de El Salado: Esa Guerra No Era Nuestra (The El Salado Massacre: That Was Not Our War), was released this week before audiences in El Salado and Bogotá.

Highlights from the documents include:

  • The U.S. Embassy’s record of a January 1999 meeting in which Colombia’s deputy army commander said that the Army “had no business pursuing paramilitaries” as they were “apolitical common criminals” that “did not threaten constitutional order through subversive activities.”
  • Another 1999 report from U.S. military sources found that the Colombian armed forces had “not actively persecuted paramilitary group members because they see them as allies in the fight against the guerrillas, their common enemy.”
  • A U.S. military source who opined that evidence indicating some of the paramilitary members were wearing Colombian Army uniforms suggested “that many of the paramilitaries are ex-military members, or that they obtain the uniforms from military or ex-military members.”
  • State Department talking points that pointed to the capture of a mere 11 of the 450 perpetrators of the massacre as evidence that the military had actively pursued the perpetrators and was improving its record against paramilitaries.
  • A U.S. Embassy cable based on a conversation with a source apparently close to the investigation who strongly suggested that the Colombian military knew about the massacre ahead of time, cleared out of the town before the killing began and “had been lucky in capturing the eleven paramilitary members.”
  • A document casting doubt on the military’s explanation of its role in El Salado, including the U.S. Embassy’s view that it was “difficult to believe that the town of El Salado had not been subject to threats of an attack prior to the massacre, considering the town is situated in a high conflict area.”
  • A U.S. Embassy report on Admiral Rodrigo Quiñones, one of the military members alleged to have facilitated the massacre, noting that “an unmistakable pattern of similar allegations has followed him almost everywhere he has held field command.”

Conspiracy of Silence?
Colombia, the United States and the Massacre at El Salado
By Michael Evans

The question of the exact role played by Colombian security forces in the February 2000 El Salado massacre occupies a small but crucial part of the new report issued this week by Memoria Histórica (Historical Memory), the independent group charged by Colombia’s National Commission on Reparation and Reconciliation with writing the history of Colombia’s internal conflict. A long overdue account of one of the most horrific and indiscriminate paramilitary atrocities in Colombian history, the report is also a stinging indictment of the culture of impunity that has long shielded members of the Colombian security forces from justice.

Hundreds waited in line to receive a copy of the Memoria Histórica report on El Salado.
[Michael Evans]

The killings unfolded over five fateful days during which time hundreds of paramilitaries, mostly from the Bloque Norte (Northern Bloc), descended upon El Salado and other towns in the region, leaving behind a trail of torture, mayhem and murder that left 60 people dead and forced thousands from their homes, most of whom have never returned.

But while the paramilitary authors of the El Salado massacre were identified long ago, the exact role of the Colombian military has never been definitively established. Nevertheless, and despite very limited access to military records on the case, the report is adamant about the responsibility of the Colombian state.

The El Salado massacre raises not only the question of omission but also the action of the [Colombian] State. Omission in the development of the acts because it is not understandable how the security forces were neither able to prevent nor neutralize the paramilitary action. A massacre that lasted five days and that involved 450 paramilitaries, of which only 15 were captured a week after the massacre ended.*

For the United States, the potential involvement of the Colombian security forces in paramilitary crimes was the crux of the matter. The killings came as the development of Plan Colombia was in its final stages—a package that called for massive increases in aid for the Colombian military, but would also require the Colombian government to show that the military was severing longstanding ties with paramilitary forces.

Declassified records from the era show just how low the bar had been set for the Colombian military. In the view of the U.S. Embassy, the fact that Colombian security forces had captured a mere 11 of the 450 paramilitaries involved in what it characterized “an indiscriminate orgy of drunken violence” was actually reassuring. In its first report on El Salado, sent to Washington just days after the killings, the Embassy, under Ambassador Curtis Kamman, said it was “the first time Post can recall that the military, in this case the Marines, pursued paramilitaries in the wake of atrocities in the region with some vigor.” El Salado, it seemed, was a military success story, and the Embassy had little else to say about El Salado for nearly five months.

The United States should not have been too surprised by the allegations that security forces were involved at El Salado. During the previous year, U.S. officials had frequently expressed doubts about the willingness of the military to combat paramilitary forces.

  • During a January 1999 meeting with NGO representatives organized by the Colombian armed forces and attended by U.S. Embassy staff, Deputy Army Commander General Nestor Ramirez said that the Army “had no business pursuing paramilitaries” as they were “apolitical common criminals” that “did not threaten constitutional order through subversive activities.”
  • Another 1999 report from U.S. military sources found that the Colombian armed forces had “not actively persecuted paramilitary group members because they see them as allies in the fight against the guerrillas, their common enemy.”
  • The United States was also well aware of the “body count syndrome” that fueled human rights abuses in the Colombian security forces. Intelligence reports from throughout the 1990s described “death squad activity” among the armed forces. A Colombian Army colonel told the U.S. that the emphasis on body counts “tends to fuel human rights abuses by well-meaning soldiers trying to get their quota to impress superiors” and that it led to a “cavalier, or at least passive, approach when it comes to allowing the paramilitaries to serve as proxies … for the [Colombian Army] in contributing to the guerrilla body count.”
  • Evidence of military participation in the 1999 La Gabarra massacres left little doubt that there were military officers who viewed paramilitary forces as allies in the fight against guerrillas. Army Col. Victor Hugo Matamoros, with responsibility for the region around La Gabarra, told Embassy staff that he did not pursue paramilitaries in his area of operations. Separately, the Vice President’s office told the Embassy that Colombian Army troops had “donned AUC armbands” and participated in one of the massacres.

Eerily similar patterns emerged just a few weeks after El Salado. In March, U.S. military sources reported on the movements of Colombian security forces in the days around the killings. Buried beneath the details in one Intelligence Information Report is a short paragraph, based on an unidentified source, indicating that “many of the captured paramilitaries were wearing Colombian military uniforms.” This, the source said, suggested “that many of the paramilitaries are ex-military members, or that they obtain the uniforms from military or ex-military members.”

Even so, it was apparently not until July, when the New York Times published a detailed investigation of the alleged military complicity in the massacre, that the Embassy began to take the allegations seriously. Among other things, the Times article found that Colombian police and marine forces had vacated the town before the killings began, set up roadblocks to prevent humanitarian aid to reach the town, and otherwise did nothing to stop the paramilitary carnage. Still, State Department talking points drawn up to respond to press inquiries about the case again pointed to the capture of 11 of the paramilitaries as evidence that security forces had actively pursued the perpetrators.

Days after the New York Times story, the Embassy sent a cable to Washington summarizing what it knew about El Salado and the status of the investigation. Repeated requests by the National Security Archive have now produced two very different versions of this cable, telling two very different stories. A copy of the cable declassified in 2002 omits several paragraphs that were later declassified in a version released in December 2008. These portions of the document, based on a conversation with a source apparently close to the investigation, strongly suggest that the Colombian Army knew about the massacre ahead of time and cleared out of the town before the killing began.

 [Source] believes that the Army likely knew from intelligence reports that the paramilitaries were in the area, but left prior to the massacre. The paramilitaries then entered in trucks from Magdalena, went to Ovejas first and then onto El Salado…

The source also believed that the military “had been lucky in capturing the eleven paramilitary members,” adding that “the military was attacked at La Esmerelda ranch and then proceeded to detain eleven paramilitary members after successfully overtaking them.” The new information seemed to change the conversation. For the Embassy, the question now was not whether the military had been involved, but rather, to what “degree.”

U.S. Embassy suspicions about the military’s role in El Salado are also evident in an August 2000 cable on a briefing given the Embassy by Colonel Carlos Sánchez García of the Navy’s 1st Marine Infantry Brigade. Sánchez defended the actions of his unit, saying, among other things, that military resources were stretched thin and that they “did not receive any prior knowledge of an attack in or around the area of El Salado.”

A version of this cable declassified in 2001 lets Col. Sánchez’s explanation stand on its own, omitting any further analysis. However, a more complete version of this same document, declassified in 2008, includes portions of the document not previously released that question the credibility of Col. Sánchez.

Comment: Colonel Sanchez stated that his purpose was to present the Embassy with the Brigade’s version of events surrounding El Salado and dispute allegations made in the July 14 New York Times article. Because Colonel Sanchez was dispatched for this purpose, his report should be taken with a grain of salt.

The Embassy also doubted Sánchez’s assertion that his unit had no prior knowledge of the paramilitary incursion.

It is difficult to believe that the town of El Salado had not been subject to threats of an attack prior to the massacre, considering the town is situated in a high conflict area.

Ultimately, the question of military culpability in El Salado came to revolve around Sánchez’s commander, Admiral Rodrigo Quiñones Cárdenas, an officer dogged throughout his career by allegations of human rights abuses, assassinations, drug trafficking and complicity with paramilitaries.

In 1994, Quiñones was investigated for the murders of more than 50 unionists, journalists, politicians, human rights workers and other individuals in Barrancabermeja, then considered a guerrilla stronghold. His ultimate exoneration by a military tribunal did little to quell suspicions about his links to death squads and paramilitaries. Despite a reprimanded issued in October 1998 by the Colombian Attorney General’s office for the Barrancabermeja killings, Quiñones was promoted to the rank of rear admiral that same year.

Quiñones was certainly no stranger to the United States. As Director of Naval Intelligence in the early 1990s, he was in frequent contact with his U.S. counterparts, including a meeting with the U.S. Director of Naval Intelligence in 1993. A U.S. military biographic sketch of Quiñones from 1992 listed numerous details about his personal habits (“Enjoys reading,” “Teeth – Yes/Natural”) and noted that he participated in “unknown training” at the U.S. Marine Corps base at Quantico, Virginia.

With respect to El Salado, Quiñones has long maintained that he was in Bogotá during the killings, and thus not responsible for the actions of the brigade at that time. A strong alibi in place, Quiñones was also sanctioned for El Salado, leading Memoria Histórica to lament that certain lines of investigation were not followed. Why, the report asks, did the Procuraduría not look at the information available to the Brigade in the months before the attack?

If it is indeed certain that [Quiñones] was in Bogotá when the paramilitary incursion began, beginning on February 15, and in this sense the operational decisions on the ground were the responsibility of Colonel Sánchez García, it is also certain that as Commander of the First Brigade of the Marine Infantry, Rear Admiral Quiñones Cárdenas should have known of information that, according to the Inspector General of Colombia, the First Brigade received in the preceding months about the Self-Defense Forces and about the risk to the population living in the Montes de María. Information that, in accordance with the evaluation of the Inspector General, should have served to prevent the paramilitary incursion, and not only to counteract it when it was already happening.

Why too did the Procuraduría’s inquiry not scrutinize the actions of Quiñones after his return from Bogotá on February 18?

Then-Colonel Quiñones Cárdenas returned from Bogotá to his base on February 18, and for this reason it would have been reasonable to investigate not only his actions before and during the paramilitary incursion, but also his actions after the incursion.

In any case, Quiñones was promoted to the rank of rear admiral in the wake of El Salado, and it was not until 2001, after allegations that he was involved in yet another paramilitary attack, that the Embassy finally turned up the pressure on Quiñones. U.S. documents on the August 2001 Chengue massacre are few and highly excised, but the existing record leaves little doubt that by 2002 the Embassy had had enough of Quiñones and was ready to cut him loose. In April 2002, the Embassy requested the revocation of his visa, but not for his involvement in assassinations or paramilitary massacres. Rather, the State Department used the only evidence it was willing to bring to bear: “information indicating that he had received payments from narcotraffickers”—adding yet another serious crime to the increasingly long list of allegations against Quiñones.

The cancellation of his visa effectively ended the Quiñones’s career, a fact confirmed by Defense Minister Marta Lucia Ramirez during the announcement of his “voluntary” resignation. And while he has never truly faced justice for the killings in Barrancabermeja, or his supposed role in El Salado and Chengue, it seems clear that the sheer number of denunciations leveled against him throughout his career finally forced his removal. Reporting his resignation to Washington, the Embassy noted that although “establishing Quiñones’s guilt in any particular case is problematic, an unmistakable pattern of similar allegations has followed him almost everywhere he has held field command.”

The real debate about El Salado is not about its authors or its magnitude, but about the culture of impunity that has prevented an honest investigation of security force members tied to the killings. As important as the new report is to the preservation of historical memory, the story will remain incomplete as long as the military continues to deny the group meaningful access to its records on the case. So too has the U.S. been unwilling to declassify many of its key records on the El Salado case. Repeated requests for reports specifically cited in the documents described above have been stonewalled by the Pentagon and other agencies.

Without access to these records, we may never know exactly what the United States knew about military complicity in El Salado or whether the massacre had any impact at all on the development of the aid package then being prepared for Colombian security forces, nor will we know whether the U.S. government’s tepid response to the case was due to simple negligence, poor analysis, or an active effort to assist in the cover-up of the military’s role in El Salado.


Michael Evans is director of the Colombia Documentation Project at the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C. The Colombia Project would like to thank the Fund for Constitutional Government for its generous support of this investigation and the John Merck Fund for its continuing support of the Colombia Project.

* All translations by Michael Evans

TOP-SECRET-POSADA CARRILES BUILT BOMBS FOR, AND INFORMED ON, JORGE MAS CANOSA, CIA RECORDS REVEAL

A 1965 CIA cable summarizes intelligence on a demolition project proposed by Jorge Mas Canosa, head of a violent Cuban exile group. A source cited on page three had informed the CIA of a payment that Mas Canosa had made to Luis Posada to finance a sabotage operation against Soviet and Cuban ships in Mexico.

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 288

Washington, D.C., September 11, 2011 – On the 33rd anniversary of the bombing of Cubana flight 455, the National Security Archive today posted recently obtained CIA records on Luis Posada Carriles, his ties to “the Company” and role as an informant on other violent exile groups. The documents provide extensive details on a collaboration between Cuban-American militant Jorge Mas Canosa, who rose to become the most powerful leader of the hardline exile community in Miami, and Posada—codenamed AMCLEVE 15—who volunteered to spy on violent exile operations for the CIA.

The documents include a July 1966 memo from Posada, using the name “Pete,” to his CIA handler Grover Lythcott requesting permission to join the coordinating junta for four violent exile groups, including RECE run by Mas Canosa. “I will give the Company all the intelligence that I can collect,” Posada wrote. “I will gain a more solid position between the exiles and, because of that, I will be in a better position in the future to perform a good job for the company.”

Posada, the documents show, had been reporting to the CIA on Mas Canosa’s activities since mid 1965. In July of that year, Posada reported that he had completed two ten-pound Limpet bombs for a Mas Canosa operation against Soviet and Cuban ships in the port of Veracruz, Mexico, using eight pounds of Pentolite explosives and a pencil detonator.

In a memo, Grover Lythcott described Posada as “not a typical ‘boom and bang’ type of individual” who was “acutely aware of the international implications of ill planned or over enthusiastic activities against Cuba.”  A CIA personnel record suggested that Posada would be “excellent for use in responsible civil position in PBRUMEN”—a codename for Cuba—”should the present government fall.”

Both CIA and FBI intelligence records identify Posada as a mastermind of the bombing of Cubana airline flight 455, also using a pencil detonator, that took the lives of all 73 passengers and crew on October 6, 1976. Posada has publicly admitted ties to a series of hotel bombings in Cuba in 1997; in November 2000 he was arrested in Panama City for plotting to blow up an auditorium where Fidel Castro would be speaking. He is currently living freely in Miami, awaiting trial in El Paso, Texas, early next year on charges of lying to immigration authorities about his role in the hotel bombings, and as to how he illegally entered the United States in the spring of 2005.

“The documents show Posada has a long history of trying to ingratiate himself with the CIA,” said Peter Kornbluh, who directs the Cuba documentation project at the National Security Archive, “perhaps attempting to buy himself a degree of protection as he engaged in a career of terrorism.” He called on the CIA “to release its entire operational file on Posada Carriles and his activities, to clarify the history of anti-Castro violence and advance the cause of justice for Posada’s many victims.”

The documents were obtained from the CIA pursuant to a FOIA request for records on Posada and his code-name, AMCLEVE 15. In recent years, the CIA has declassified the documents as part of the Kennedy Assassination Records Act.

 


Read the Documents

Document 1: CIA, July 21,1966, Memorandum, “AMCLEVE /15.”

This document includes two parts-a cover letter written by Grover T. Lythcott, Posada’s CIA handler, and an attached request written by Posada to accept a position on new coordinating Junta composed of several anti-Castro organizations. In the cover letter, Lythcbtt refers to Posada by his codename, AMCLEVE/I5, and discusses his previous involvement withthe Agency. He lionizes Posada, writing that his ”performance in all assigned tasks has been excellent,” and urges that he be permitted to work with the combined anti-Castro exile groups. According to the document, Lythcott suggests that Posada be taken off the CIA payroll to facilitate his joining the anti-Castro militant junta, which will be led by RECE. Lythcott insists that Posada will function as an effective moderating force considering he is “acutely aware of the international implications of ill planned or over enthusiastic activities against Cuba.” In an attached memo, Posada, using the name “Pete,” writes that if he is on the Junta, “they will never do anything to endanger the security of this Country (like blow up Russian ships)” and volunteers to “give the Company all the intelligence that I can collect.”

Document 2: CIA, August 29, 1966, “TYPIC/INTEL/AMCLEVE-15, Source Authentication for AMCLEVE-15.”

This document announces that Posada is officially “associated with the Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE) and the ‘Coordination of Forces’ which RECE is organizing.” Moreover, the document explains that Posada, codenamed AMCLEVE-15, “will be reporting on this alliance of activist organizations.”

Document 3: CIA, July 1, 1965, Cable, “Plan of the Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE) to Blow Up a Cuban or Soviet Vessel in Veracruz, Mexico.” (previously posted in May 2005)

This CIA cable summarizes intelligence on a demolition project proposed by Jorge Mas Canosa, then the head of RECE. On the third page, a source is quoted as having informed the CIA of a payment that Mas Canosa has made to Luis Posada in order to finance a sabotage operation against ships in Mexico. Posada reportedly has “100 pounds of C-4 explosives and some detonators” and limpet mines to use in the operation.

Document 4: CIA, July 24, 1965, Cable.

Based on reporting from Posada, referred to as AMCLEVE-15, the CIA learns details about the limpet-type bombs Posada is building for a demolition operation against ships in Mexico. “A-15 working directly with Jorge Mas Canosa,” the cable states. The CIA instructs Posada “to disengage from activities.”

Document 5: CIA, September 27, 1965, Memorandum, “AMCLEVEI15, 201300985.”

“PRQ Part II,” or the second part of Posada’s Personal Record Questionnaire, provides operational information. Within the text of the document, Posada is described as “strongly anti-Communist” as well as a sincere believer in democracy. The document describes Posada having a “good character,” not to mention the fact that he is “very reliable, and security conscious.” The CIA recommends that he be considered for a civil position in a post-Castro government in Cuba (codenamed PBRUMEN).

 

TOP-SECRET-Backgrounder: US Smart Power Counterterrorism

Background Briefing on Secretary Clinton’s Speech “A Smart Power Approach to Counterterrorism”

Special Briefing

Senior Administration Official

Conference Call

September 9, 2011

MR. TONER: Good morning, everyone, and thanks to all for joining us at such short notice. As you know, the Secretary is giving remarks this morning very shortly from now on smart power approach to counterterrorism. We thought it would be useful to have someone walk you through some of the highlights of that speech before she actually gives it. So without further ado, I d like to introduce [Senior Administration Official One], who will be known as Senior Administration Official Number One. And just a reminder, this is on background.

So without further ado, handing it over to [Senior Administration Official One].

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Good morning, everybody. Thank you for joining us. As you know, this speech was designed to be part of the commemoration of the 10-year anniversary since the September 11 attack. The Secretary thought it would be appropriate to stand back and talk about the Administration s approach to counterterrorism, but it obviously takes on new relevance given what we have heard about a heightened alert status.

Fundamentally, this speech, if you ve had a chance to look at it you should all have embargoed copies is designed to talk about using all the tools of American power, including our values and our strong democratic leadership around the world to fight counterterrorism and embedding the fight against terrorism in our larger approach to values-based global leadership.

So just walking you through it and you ll see that throughout this speech, she emphasizes that the fight against counter against terrorism has to be not just a fight about what we are against, but we have to fight for what we are for, namely our values of tolerance, equality, and opportunity for universal rights and the rule of law.

So, at the top of the speech, she makes clear that the military fight continues. We have unfinished business and we will do what we need to do to confront terrorists militarily where they live, but we will do so within international law standards and in keeping with our highest values. But we also have to work to cut the roots out from under terrorists, and that means attacking finances, attacking their ability to recruit, and attacking their ability to have safe havens.

So, in the section Taking the Fight to al-Qaida, she talks about the force piece here, but she also talks about the justice piece. Draw your attention to page five, where she makes clear that in doing we will we maintain the right to use force against groups such as al-Qaida that have attacked us and still threaten us with imminent violence, but in doing so we will stay true to our values and respect the rule of law, including international law principles. And then further down, she makes clear our intention to make full use of civilian courts and reformed military commissions, because this sends a message to the world about the importance of rule of law in confronting terrorism.

Further on, she talks about how the threat has changed. After the loss of [sic] the death of bin Ladin, the threat from the Afghan-Pakistan border remains, but the al-Qaida threat has become more diffuse.

On page six, you see that she talks about al-Qaida now as a syndicate of terror. It is not a monolith. It s becoming more geographically diverse and she specifically talks about al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, with bases in Yemen trying to do attacks beyond its bases, and about al-Shabaab in Somalia, as two examples there.

Further on, she talks about how our larger goals, globally, of supporting democratic change, supporting prosperity, fighting poverty, fighting repression, supporting rule of law are also counterterrorism objectives. And in this regard, the work that we do to try to resolve conflicts, reduce poverty, improve governance also drain the swamp that terrorists try to live in and exploit.

Some specific areas of innovation noted on page seven, I would call your attention to new biometric screening tools to improve border security and visa processes electronic fingerprinting, facial recognition, iris scans. And then also in the category of making it harder for terrorists to operate, our work to combat terror finance, working with countries around the world to put new tough legislation in place, to disrupt illicit financial networks, but as a result of it becoming harder for terrorists to use official networks, having now to confront their alternative strategies where they fund their operation through criminal activity and kidnapping. So we also have to work with governments to ensure that we have a no-concessions policy, no paying ransom to kidnappers, et cetera.

In the category of trying to drain the swamp of new recruits, trying to slow recruitment, you see starting on page eight and nine she talks about a number of initiatives. First of all, trying to counter the extremist narrative, this speaks to the establishment at the State Department of the special representative to Muslim communities, to step up in our engagement in the most crucial spaces, putting our own people, speaking Arabic, Urdu, and Dari, on key television stations to counteract misinformation, and the development and launching now of a new center for strategic counterterrorism communications, which is focused on undermining terrorist propaganda, dissuading potential recruits. This is housed in the State Department, but it s a whole-of-government approach that includes Urdu and Arabic speakers who make up a special digital outreach team and are getting up online, contesting the narrative in terror on terrorist websites and forums, and getting in it and arguing their points with young people.

She also talks, starting on page nine, about what we ve learned about key recruiting hotspots, that terrorists have been more successful in hotspots where economic opportunity is in short supply, where education is biased in favor of an extremist narrative, and the importance of using a scalpel, not a sledgehammer, working with local leaders in particular places where recruiting has been most successful to try to empower a more progressive, democratic narrative and to provide alternative opportunities for young people, to deny recruiters the opportunity to turn kids extreme and there are some examples here working with the Kenyan Muslim Youth Association, working with the Sisters Against Violence, particularly focusing our efforts in Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Yemen, and obviously Afghanistan.

And then the last piece here is the importance of strengthening the diplomatic offensive to build both to build partner capacity and to maintain a strong global community, a global coalition against terrorism. So here on page 10 and 11, talking about first elevating our own counterterrorism effort to the level of assistant secretary, then our efforts to expand our training programs to some 60 countries we ve now trained some 7,000 law enforcement and counterterrorism officials around the world strengthening capacity, building in frontline states Yemen and Pakistan.

Also, we discovered that in fact, there is no dedicated international venue to regularly convene counterterrorism policymakers and practitioners from around the world. So at the UNGA, working with Turkey, the United States will serve as a founding co-chair, along with 30 other nations, of a new global counterterrorism forum. This forum is designed to assist countries that are transitioning from authoritarian rule to democracy and rule of law. It s going to provide support, particularly in the civilian sector, best practices, writing of new legislation, training police, prosecutors, judges, but all within the context of upholding the strongest standards of universal human rights.

Finally, at the end of the speech, she talks about the essential element of defeating an extremist ideology with an ideology of hope, democracy, prosperity, universal values, tapping into the aspirations for change that we ve seen across North Africa and the broader Middle East, and rooted very much in American leadership, American confidence in our own values, in our own open democratic system which must not only be maintained, it has to be strengthened as a key element of serving as a beacon for others around the world and for defeating terror.

So with that, let me pause and take any questions.

MR. TONER: We can go ahead and take some questions now.

OPERATOR: Thank you. At this time, we re ready to begin the question-and-answer session. If you would like to ask a question, please press *1 and record your name and news organization clearly so I may introduce you into the call. Again, press *1 to ask a question. And one moment for our first question.

One moment, please. We do have a question from Kirit Radia with ABC News. You may ask your question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Hi, Kirit.

QUESTION: Hi, [Senior Administration Official One]. It s Kirit. Thanks for doing this. I do have a quick question about the terror plot that came out last night. I know it s not exactly about the speech, but there was some reporting that this was the result of a tip from a walk-in into a U.S. Embassy. I m curious if you could tell us anything about that, since we re on background.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: I cannot, Kirit. We are not prepared to talk at all about the intelligence surrounding this issue.

MR. TONER: Next question.

OPERATOR: At this time, I m showing no further questions. Again, if you d like to ask a question, please press *1. Again, press *1 to ask a question.

And one moment for our next question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Okay, good. Well, if we have no questions, we will look forward to the speech in about half an hour.

OPERATOR: We did have one question, if you d like to take it yet.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Sure.

OPERATOR: And that s from Chris Hawley with Associated Press. You may ask your question.

QUESTION: Hi, there. Last week, we had a very large story kind of looking at terrorism arrests around the world, and we found that something like 35,000 people have been convicted of terrorism in the last 10 years and a lot of this stems from sort of U.S. pressure and aid toward other countries. But at the same time, a lot of groups are saying that many countries are using this as an excuse to crack down on political dissidents. Are there any protections or guidelines you guys are adopting as you go into this quote/unquote smart approach to protect political dissent?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Thank you for that.

First and foremost, I think when you hear the speech, when you see the speech, you ll see that the Secretary makes clear that one of our strongest and most important U.S. weapons in the fight against terror is our own adherence to the highest standards of international law. So in the training programs that we are doing for other countries, in the best practices that we are trying to share, and in the example that we set and particularly, as I said, she cites the importance of being able to use both civilian courts and reformed military courts to try terrorists in a transparent manner which protects their rights we are trying to set an example for countries around the world in the way this has to be handled, and that this is about trying terrorists, this is not about using terrorism as an excuse to settle scores or handle other issues.

QUESTION: Got it. All right. Many thanks.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Thank you.

OPERATOR: Thank you. At this time, I m showing no further questions.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Thank you very much, everybody.

PRN: 2011/1450

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9/11-How can we survive ? – Black Humor for War Time Debt Profligacy and Panic

Black Humor for War Time Debt Profligacy and Panic

Images by Cryptome.


We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People, Peter Van Buren, 2011. Peter Van Buren was a State Department officer in Iraq working with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). He was based primarily at Forward Operating Base Hammer

Van Buren provides an informative, gorge-raising, black humorous, literal boots-on-the-ground, apology for “we have a war to fight, damn the cost, others will pay the bill” instigator of the current global panic about national debt ever bleaker humor. Rue with him being taken in by the natsec scam, laugh at each other and weep over your unpaid bills, service cutbacks, and tax duns for the cost of guiltless official malfeasance.

DoJ-celebrated task force prosecutions for terrorism, financial crime, health care fraud and child pornography are easy, small-time stuff compared to the great crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan forgiven by war-time exemptions, with very few cases for US official financial profligacy, negligence and wastage.

Excerpts:


Page 11:

My side of State was removed from the high-level Wikileaky things ambassadors did and changed very little between administrations.

[Van Buren was based primarily at FOB Hammer (as was Bradley Manning), a huge base 12 miles in circumference which was heavily compartmentalized to separate types of personnel: military, USG, OG (CIA), contractors, guards, servants.]

[Image]U.S. Army 210th Brigade Support Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division Soldiers compete in remote car derby in Forward Operating Base Hammer, Iraq, July 4, 2010. U.S. Soldiers celebrated Independence Day with a series of tournaments, a cookout, and an array of games.(U.S. Army photo by Spc. Frank Smith/Released)

Pages 46-49:

Money and Our Meth Habit

We lacked a lot of things in Iraq: flush toilets, fresh vegetables, the comfort of family members nearby, and of course adult supervision, strategic guidance, and common sense. Like Guns N’ Roses’ budget for meth after a new hit, the one thing we did not lack was money. There was money everywhere. A soldier recalled unloading pallets of new US hundred-dollar bills, millions of dollars flushing out of the belly of a C-130 cargo aircraft to be picked up off the runway by forklifts (operated by soldiers who would make less in their lifetimes than what was on their skids at that moment). You couldn’t walk around a corner without stumbling over bales of money; the place was lousy with it. In my twenty-three years working for the State Department, we never had enough money. We were always being told to “do more with less,” as if slogans were cash. Now there was literally more money than we could spend. It was weird.

We’d be watching the news from home about foreclosures, and I’d be reading e-mails from my sister about school cutbacks, while signing off on tens of thousands of dollars for stuff in Iraq. At one point we were tasked to give out microgrants, $5,000 in actual cash handed to an Iraqi to “open a business,” no strings attached. If he took the money and in front of us spent it on dope and pinball, it was no matter. We wondered among ourselves whether we shouldn’t be running a PRT in Detroit or New Orleans instead of Baghdad. In addition to the $63 billion Congress had handed us for Iraq’s reconstruction, we also had some $91 billion of captured Iraqi funds (that were mostly misplaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority), plus another $18 billion donated by countries such as Japan and South Korea. In 2009, we had another $387 million for aid to internal refugees that paid for many reconstruction-like projects. If that was not enough, over a billion additional US dollars were spent on operating costs for the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. By comparison, the reconstruction of Germany and Japan cost, in 2010 dollars, only $32 billion and $17 billion, respectively.

While a lot of the money was spent in big bites at high levels through the Embassy, or possibly just thrown into the river when no one could find a match to set it on fire, at the local level money was spent via two programs: CERP and QRF. CERP was Army money, the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. Though originally provided to address emergency humanitarian needs and short-term counterinsurgency costs, this nearly unlimited pool of cash came to be spent on reconstruction. The local US Army Commander could himself approve projects up to $200,000, with almost no technical or policy oversight. Accounting was fast and loose; a 2009 audit, for example, found the Army could not account for $8.7 billion in funds. It might have been stolen or just lost; no one will ever know. The Army shared its money with us at the ePRTs, partly out of generosity, partly out of pity, and partly because individual military units were graded on how much cash they spent — more money spent meant more reconstruction kudos in evaluation reports.


Pages 56-57:

Garbage

In our air-conditioned isolation, it took years to realize we needed to think about things like garbage and potable water. What had happened all around Iraq since the chaos of 2003 was a process of devolution, where populated areas lost their ability to sustain the facilities that had constituted civilization since the Romans — water, sewage, trash removal — things that made it possible for large numbers of people to live in close proximity to one another. Shock and awe had disrupted the networked infrastructure that allowed cities to function. What had been slow degradation through neglect under Saddam became irreversible decline by force under the United States.

The collapse of civil society left a void that the bad guys had rushed to fill. Stories circulated of neighborhood militiamen commandeering shuttered power plants and private generators for the public’s use, turning the militants into local heroes. In some poor areas, especially in the south, Iranian charities were a primary source of propane, food, and other services that people expected the government to provide, as Saddam had more or less done. It had finally dawned on us that providing reliable basic utilities was critical to a successful counterinsurgency. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were put on the case after earlier efforts by megacontractors like Bechtel and then the Army Corps of Engineers had failed.

Almost daily my team and I would go out into the field. We’d strap on body armor and helmets and load into armored vehicles for the soldiers to drive us out of the FOB. We rode in either armored Humvees or large monster trucks called MRAPs, mine-resistant, ambush-protected carriers. These sat high off the ground and were covered with antennas and crazy electronics designed to thwart the battery-powered triggers that set off IEDs and mines along our route. The best thing about the MRAPs was that they were hermetically sealed against nonexistent chemical weapons and thus possessed near-nuclear-powered air-conditioning. You could crank that stuff and form frost. The MRAPs were so high off the ground that the turret often tore down the spaghetti web of pirated electric lines strung over most streets, lessening our popularity every time we drove in. Our parade of four or five vehicles, armed with nasty-looking machine guns and tough-looking soldiers, would nonetheless roll through small towns and slums to arrive at whatever dilapidated building served as the center of US-appointed local government. (By common consent no one was allowed to comment on the paradox of creating a democracy by appointing local leaders. It just wasn’t done.) As we drove, trash was a fact anywhere we looked, like the sun and the dust. The MRAPs specifically equipped to look for roadside bombs even had giant blowers welded to their front bumpers to whip garbage aside and expose the IEDs. For a poor country, everybody seemed to have a lot of things to throw away. Even though the trash was rarely collected, there were huge dumps filled with acres of it. You couldn’t help but be reminded that for all the counterinsurgency ideals about living among the people, we still lived near Iraq but not in it; on the FOB you couldn’t drop a Snickers wrapper without two people telling you to pick that shit up.

[Image]

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles secure a local village while members of Provincial Reconstruction Team Zabul conduct a key leader engagement with village elders in Arghandab, Afghanistan, July 30, 2011. PRT Zabul’s mission is to conduct civil-military operations in Zabul Province to extend the reach and legitimacy of the Government of Afghanistan. (U.S. Air Force photo/Senior Airman Grovert Fuentes-Contreras)(Released)

TOP-SECRET-State Department Cable says Colombian Army Responsible for Palace of Justice Deaths, Disappearances

Colombian security forces lead survivors of the Palace of Justice across the street to the Casa del Florero. [Photo: Revista Semana]

Document Introduced as Evidence in Trial of Col. Alfonso Plazas Vega

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 289

Updated – September 2001
Secrets and Lies: The U.S. Embassy and Col. Plazas Vega

Col. Luis Alfonso Plazas Vega (ret.) [Photo: Revista Semana]

The recent appearance of a declassified U.S. Embassy report blaming the Colombian Army and Col. Luis Alfonso Plazas Vega for deaths and disappearances during operations to retake the Palace of Justice building in November 1985 has stirred up heated debate on both sides of the issue. As it happens, both sides have it wrong, at least in part. As the person who first uncovered the document, the result of a declassification request to the U.S. State Department, I submit the following points for the sake of clarification and in the hope that the real significance of the document is not lost in the confusion of the moment.

Initial reports on the matter dramatically mischaracterized the document and distorted its meaning. El Espectador, for example, attributed the information to supposed “intelligence agents at the service of the U.S. Embassy in Colombia” and reported that the document had been “brought to the attention of Colombian authorities in 1998”, details that the document simply does not support. Since El Espectador also failed to publish the document itself, many other Colombian news organizations simply followed its lead, repeating the same erroneous details.

Seizing the opportunity, defenders of Col. Plazas have sought to discredit the entire document, including what are by far the most important, verifiable and incriminating details. Pouncing on these inaccuracies in a letter to the editor, the colonel’s wife, Thania Vega de Plazas, said that the original report in El Espectador was “completely false” and went on to invent some facts of her own. Her assertion that the document is merely a summary of “the affirmations of some Colombian human rights NGOs” is 100 percent wrong and a gross mischaracterization of the document. (The colonel’s son, Miguel Plazas, made the same points, in the exact same words, in a letter to El Tiempo.)

She is correct that the document is not primarily about the Palace of Justice case or Col. Plazas. Rather, it is a report that mentions Col. Plazas in another context altogether: his participation in a January 1999 meeting between members of the Colombian Armed Forces and local human rights organizations—one of a series of gatherings meant to bridge the divide between the two groups. A U.S. Embassy representative (“Poloff” for Political Officer) also attended the meeting, hence this cable.

Declassified records are tricky things. It is not always easy to determine the provenance or meaning of a particular document, especially when parts have been redacted. Nevertheless, the meaning of the passage concerning Col. Plazas is unambiguous:

The presence among the “NGO representatives” of two military officers (one active duty, one retired), who killed time with lengthy, pro-military diatribes, also detracted from the military-NGO exchange. One of the two was retired Colonel Alfonso Plazas Vargas [sic], representing the “Office for Human Rights of Retired Military Officers.” Plazas commanded the November, 1985 raid on the Supreme Court building after it had been taken over by the M-19. That raid resulted in the deaths of more than 70 people, including eleven Supreme Court justices. Soldiers killed a number of M-19 members and suspected collaborators hors de combat, including the Palace’s cafeteria staff.

It is not entirely clear on the basis of what evidence the Embassy made these statements about the Palace of Justice case, or why the cable’s author chose to include them here. And it certainly is not possible to determine whether the information was ever brought to the attention of the Colombian authorities, as the report in El Espectador disingenuouslyclaimed. But to attribute these statements to Colombian human rights groups, and to deny that they represent the view of the U.S. Embassy, is simply wrong. Anyone with a working knowledge of the English language can clearly see the meaning of these words.

This brief description of Col. Plazas represents the clearest and most concise statement yet declassified about the Army’s responsibility for the deaths and disappearances in the Palace of Justice case. It is extremely unlikely that the Embassy would make such accusations, however tangential they may be to the central subject of the document, without carefully evaluating the available evidence.

While it is appropriate for the defenders of Col. Plazas to question the hyperbolic and in some cases fabricated information that has appeared in some of the reporting on this matter, such objections do not justify the fabrication of equally erroneous information and cannot refute what is plainly evident in the document: that the U.S. Embassy, in January 1999, under Ambassador Curtis Kamman, believed that the Colombian military, under the command of Col. Plazas, was responsible for the vast majority of the deaths and disappearances in the Palace of Justice case.

Any further questions about the meaning of the document or the information therein should be directed to the U.S. State Department. With the case against Col. Plazas moving through the Colombian courts, and with the Truth Commission on the Palace of Justice in its final months, now is the time for the U.S.  Government to do the right thing and declassify all human rights related information it has pertaining to the Palace of Justice tragedy.


Original Post – October 8, 2009

State Department Cable says Colombian Army Responsible for Palace of Justice Deaths, Disappearances

Document Introduced as Evidence in Trial of Col. Alfonso Plazas Vega

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 289

Washington, D.C., October 8, 2009 – A declassified U.S. State Department document filed in a Colombian court yesterday blames the Colombian Army, and Col. Alfonso Plazas Vega in particular, for the deaths of over 70 people during military operations to retake the Palace of Justice building from insurgents who had seized the building in November 1985. The document, a January 1999 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Colombia, was obtained by the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act.

The Palace of Justice burned to the ground during military efforts to retake the building from M-19 guerrillas. Eleven Supreme Court justices died in the blaze, along with dozens of others. [Photo: Revista Semana]

The cable states in paragraph four that Col. Plazas Vega (misspelled as “Plazas Vargas”) “commanded the November, 1985 Army raid on the Supreme Court building” and that the operation “resulted in the deaths of more than 70 people, including eleven Supreme Court justices.” The Embassy adds that soldiers under the command of Col. Plazas Vega “killed a number of M-19 members and suspected collaborators hors de combat, including the Palace’s cafeteria staff.”

Col. Plazas Vega is currently on trial for the disappearances of eleven civilians during the course of the operation, several of whom worked in the Palace cafeteria. The Palace of Justice tragedy began on November 6, 1985, after insurgents from the M-19 guerrilla group seized the building, taking a number of hostages. The building caught fire and burned to the ground during Colombian military and police force efforts to retake the Palace, killing most of the guerrillas and hostages still inside.

“The information included in this brief description of Col. Plazas Vega is the clearest, most concise statement we have seen in declassified records about the Army’s responsibility for the deaths and disappearances in the Palace of Justice case,” said Michael Evans, director of the Archive’s Colombia documentation project.

“The Palace of Justice tragedy is one of the most searing events in Colombian history,” Evans added, “and with both this case and the Truth Commission on the Palace of Justice in progress, now is the time for the U.S. government to come forward with all human rights related information it has pertaining to the Palace of Justice tragedy.”

Other documents published today provide new details on military operations to retake the building and on Colombia’s fruitless efforts to find a diplomatic post for Col. Plazas Vega in the mid-1990s.

  • In the midst of the crisis, the Embassy reported, “We understand that orders are to use all necessary force to retake building.” Another cable reported that, “FonMin [Foreign Minister] said that President, DefMin [Defense Minster], Chief of National Police, and he are all together, completely in accord and do not intend to let this matter drag out.”
  • A pair of contradictory Embassy cables: one reporting that “surviving guerrillas have all been taken prisoner,” followed by another, two days later, reporting that “None of the guerrillas survived.”
  • A February 1986 Embassy cable reporting that Colombian military influence on society and politics, “no doubt exercised at times of crisis such as the Palace of Justice takeover, is also sometimes overdrawn.”
  • A highly-redacted U.S. Embassy document from 1996 regarding an inquiry about “human rights and narcotics allegations” against Col. Plazas Vega. Discussing his rejection as Colombian Consul to Hamburg by the German government, the cable notes that “[the State] Department concurred that the [Colombian government] be informally asked to withdraw Plazas’ nomination…” The Embassy adds that, “None of the above allegations [against Plazas] were ever investigated by the authorities — a common problem during the 1980’s in Colombia.”

TOP-SECRET-Operation Sofia: Documenting Genocide in Guatemala

Army occupation of Río Azul model village, Nebaj, Quiché. Photograph courtesy of Jean-Marie Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyranny.

Operation Sofia: Documenting Genocide in Guatemala

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 297

September 10, 2011, Washington, DC – The Guatemalan army, under the direction of military ruler Efraín Ríos Montt, carried out a deliberate counterinsurgency campaign in the summer of 1982 aimed at massacring thousands of indigenous peasants, according to a comprehensive set of internal records presented as evidence to the Spanish National Court and posted today by the National Security Archive on its Web site. The files on “Operation Sofia” detail official responsibility for what the 1999 UN-sponsored Historical Clarification Commission determined were “acts of genocide against groups of Mayan people.”

The National Security Archive’s Kate Doyle presented the documentation as evidence in the international genocide case, which is under investigation by Judge Santiago Pedraz in Madrid. Ms. Doyle testified today before Judge Pedraz on the authenticity of the documents, which were obtained from military intelligence sources in Guatemala. Earlier this year, Defense Minister Gen. Abraham Valenzuela González claimed that the military could not locate the documents or turn them over to a judge in Guatemala, as ordered by the Guatemalan Constitutional Court in 2008.

After months of analysis, which included evaluations of letterheads and signatures on the documents and comparisons to other available military records, Doyle said, “we have determined that these records were created by military officials during the regime of Efraín Ríos Montt to plan and implement a ‘scorched earth’ policy on Mayan communities in El Quiché. The documents record the military’s genocidal assault against indigenous populations in Guatemala.”

The Archive’s Guatemala project has a long track record of obtaining and authenticating internal records on Guatemalan repression. In 1999, Ms. Doyle obtained a “death squad diary”—a logbook of kidnappings, secret detentions, torture, disappearances and executions between 1983 and 1985 kept by the feared “Archivo,” a secret intelligence unit controlled by President Oscar Humberto Mejía Víctores. Although the military claimed the document was a fabrication, a team of experts led by Doyle was able to establish its authenticity. The logbook has been accepted as official, authentic evidence by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission.

The appearance of the original “Operation Sofía” documents provides the first public glimpse into secret military files on the counterinsurgency campaign that resulted in massacres of tens of thousands of unarmed Mayan civilians during the early 1980s, and displaced hundreds of thousands more as they fled the Army’s attacks on their communities. The records contain explicit references to the killing of unarmed men, women and children, the burning of homes, destruction of crops, slaughter of animals and indiscriminate aerial bombing of refugees trying to escape the violence.

Among the 359 pages of original planning documents, directives, telegrams, maps, and hand-written patrol reports is the initial order to launch the operation issued on July 8, 1982, by Army Chief of Staff Héctor Mario López Fuentes. The records make clear that “Operation Sofía” was executed as part of the military strategy of Guatemala’s de facto president, Gen. Efraín Ríos Montt, under the command and control of the country’s senior military officers, including then Vice Minister of Defense Gen. Mejía Víctores. Both men are defendants in the international genocide case in front of the Spanish Court.

In 1999, the UN-sponsored Historical Clarification Commission concluded that the Guatemalan Army had committed “massacres, human rights violations, and other atrocities” against Mayan communities that “illustrated a government policy of genocide.” Due to military stonewalling, which included refusing to turn over internal records, the Commission based its findings almost exclusively on testimony from witnesses and perpetrators, human rights reports, and data from exhumations. The Commission also drew on declassified U.S. government documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and provided by the National Security Archive.

The posting today includes an analysis by Kate Doyle of the Operation Sofia documents, as well as photographs from the Ixil region taken in 1982 by photojournalist and human rights advocate, Jean-Marie Simon.


Documents

Document 1
July 8 – August 20, 1982
Operación Sofía
Guatemalan Armed Forces

Complete reportLow resolution – (18 MB) | High resolution – (70 MB)

Report in sectionsPart 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4

The Operation Sofía archive is a bound collection of 359 pages of documents sent to and from the Army General Staff (Estado Mayor General del Ejército – EMGE), the Commander of the Guatemalan Airborne Troops – who planned and ran the operation – the Commander of the special counterinsurgency Task Force “Gumarcaj,” the Commander of the Huehuetenango Military Zone, and the commanding officers of the Army battalions, companies and patrol units assigned to carry out the offensive.

Document 2Excerpt from an analysis of the Operation Sofía documents by Kate Doyle

Refugees being brought into town on trucks following army sweeps into mountainsides, Nebaj, Quiche. Photograph courtesy of Jean-Marie Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyranny.

Interrogation of woman and child, suspected subversives, at army garrison, Chajul, Quiché. Photograph courtesy of Jean-Marie Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyranny.

TOP-SECRET-FBI FILES ABOUT 9-11-NINE-ELEVEN

1097129INTERPOL Section 1 -19

Khalifa Part 1

Khalifa part 2

Khalifa Part 3 pages 1-249

Khalifa part 4

Khalifa part 5

Meridian Capital about GoMoPa STASI-FÄLSCHUNGEN DER “GoMoPa” Fingierter “Press Releaser”

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

die Betrüger und durch uns inhaftierten Erpresser der GoMoPa versuchen mit einer gefälschten Presse-Mitteilung von sich abzulenken und einen investigativen Journalisten, Bernd Pulch, zu belasten.

Die Presse-Mitteilung auf pressreleaser.org ist eine Fälschung und die gesamte Webseite ist der GoMoPa zu zuordnen.

Hier noch einmal die tatäschlichen Geschehnisse:

Hier der Artikel von “GoMoPa” über Meridian Capital.


Der Beweis: Erpressungsversuch des „NACHRICHTENDIENSTES“ GoMoPa“ an Meridian Capital „GoMopa“ schreibt:08.09.2008
Weltweite Finanzierungen mit WidersprüchenDie Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. gibt an, weltweite Finanzierungen anbieten zu können und präsentiert sich hierbei auf aufwendig kreierten Webseiten. GOMOPA hat die dort gemachten Angaben analysiert und Widersprüche entdeckt.Der FirmensitzDer Firmensitz befindet sich laut eigener Aussage in Dubai, Vereinigte Arabische Emirate. In einem GOMOPA vorliegenden Schreiben der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. heißt es jedoch, der Firmensitz sei in London. Auf der Homepage des Unternehmens taucht die Geschäftsadresse in der Londoner Old Broad Street nur als „Kundenabteilung für deutschsprachige Kunden“ auf. Eine weitere Adresse in der englischen Hauptstadt, diesmal in der Windsor Avenue, sei die „Abteilung der Zusammenarbeit mit Investoren“.Die Meridian Capital Enterprises ist tatsächlich als „Limited“ (Ltd.) mit Sitz in England und Wales eingetragen. Aber laut Firmenhomepage hat das Unternehmen seinen „rechtlichen Geschäftssitz“ in Dubai. Eine Abfrage beim Gewerbeamt Dubais (DED) zu dieser Firmierung bleibt ergebnislos.Bemerkenswert ist auch der vermeintliche Sitz in Israel. Auf der Webseite von Meridian Capital Enterprises heißt es: „Die Firma Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist im Register des israelischen Justizministeriums unter der Nummer 514108471, gemäß dem Gesellschaftsrecht von 1999, angemeldet.“ Hierzu Martin Kraeter, Gomopa-Partner und Prinzipal der KLP Group Emirates in Dubai: „Es würde keinem einzigen Emirati – geschweige denn einem Scheich auch nur im Traum einfallen, direkte Geschäfte mit Personen oder Firmen aus Israel zu tätigen. Und schon gar nicht würde er zustimmen, dass sein Konterfei auch noch mit vollem Namen auf der Webseite eines Israelischen Unternehmens prangt.“Auf der Internetseite sind diverse Fotos mit Scheichs an Konferenztischen zu sehen. Doch diese großen Tagungen und großen Kongresse der Meridian Capital Enterprises werden in den Pressearchiven der lokalen Presse Dubais mit keinem Wort erwähnt.
Martin Kraeter: „ Ein ‚britisch-arabisch-israelisches bankfremdes Finanzinstitut sein zu wollen, wie die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. es darstellt, ist mehr als zweifelhaft. So etwas gibt es schlicht und ergreifend nicht! Der Nahostkonflikt schwelt schon seit mehr als 50 Jahren. Hier in den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten (VAE) werden Israelis erst gar nicht ins Land gelassen. Israelische Produkte sind gebannt. Es gibt nicht einmal direkte Telefonverbindungen. Die VAE haben fast 70% der Wiederaufbaukosten des Libanon geschultert, nachdem Israel dort einmarschiert ist.“

Zwei angebliche Großinvestitionen der Meridian Capital Enterprises in Dubai sind Investmentruinen bzw. erst gar nicht realisierte Projekte. Das Unternehmen wirbt mit ihrer finanziellen Beteiligung an dem Dubai Hydropolis Hotel und dem Dubai Snowdome.

Der Aktivitätsstatus der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist laut englischen Handelsregister (UK Companies House) „dormant“ gemeldet. Auf der Grundlage des englischen Gesellschaftsrechts können sich eingetragene Unternehmen selbst „dormant“ (schlafend) melden, wenn sie keine oder nur unwesentliche buchhalterisch zu erfassende Transaktionen vorgenommen haben. Dies ist angesichts der angeblichen globalen Investitionstätigkeit der Meridian Capital Ltd. sehr erstaunlich.

Der Webauftritt

Die Internetseite der MCE ist sehr aufwendig gestaltet, die Investitionen angeblich in Millionen- und Milliardenhöhe. Bei näherer Betrachtung der Präsentationselemente fällt jedoch auf, dass es sich bei zahlreichen veröffentlichen Fotos, die Veranstaltungen der Meridian Capital Enterprises dokumentieren sollen, meist um Fotos von Online-Zeitungen oder frei zugänglichen Medienfotos einzelner Institutionen handelt wie z.B. der Börse Dubai.

Auf der Internetpräsenz befinden sich Videofilmchen, die eine frappierende Ähnlichkeit mit dem Werbematerial von NAKHEEL aufweisen, dem größten Bauträger der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate. Doch den schillernden Videos über die berühmten drei Dubai Palmen „Jumeirah, Jebel Ali und Deira“ oder das Archipel „The World“ wurden offensichtlich selbstproduzierte Trailersequenzen der Meridian Capital Enterprises vorangestellt. Doch könnte es sich bei den Werbevideos um Fremdmaterial handeln.

Auch die auf der Webseite wahllos platzierten Fotos von bekannten Sehenswürdigkeiten Dubais fungieren als Augenfang für den interessierten Surfer mit eigenem Finanzierungswunsch. Bei einem Volumen von 10 Millionen Euro oder höher präsentiert sich die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. als der passende Investitionspartner. Das Unternehmen verfügt weltweit über zahlreiche Standorte: Berlin, London, Barcelona, Warschau, Moskau, Dubai, Riad, Tel Aviv, Hong Kong und New York. Aber nahezu alle Standorte sind lediglich Virtual Offices eines global arbeitenden Büroservice-Anbieters. „Virtual Office“ heißt im Deutschen schlicht „Briefkastenfirma“. Unter solchen Büroadressen sollen laut Meridian Capital Enterprises ganze Kommissionen ansässig sein, alles zum Wohle des Kunden.“

Zitatende

Hier die Hintergründe der Erpressung:

http://www.immobilien-vertraulich.com/law/7154-opfer-nach-immovation-und-estavis-versucht-gomopa-nun-dkb-zu-erpressen-gomopa-hintermann-ra-resch.html

Hier unsere Original-Stellungnahme:

Anfang Oktober 2008 erhielt einer der Arbeiter der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. eine Meldung von einem anonymen Sender, dass in naher Zukunft – zuerst im Internet, dann im Fernsehen, im Radio und in der deutschen Presse – Informationen erscheinen, die die Funktionsweise und Tätigkeiten der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. in einem äußerst negativen Licht darstellen. Der Mitarbeiter der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. wurde also informiert, dass diese Meldungen/Nachrichten zweifelsohne deutlich das Aussehen und den guten Ruf der Firma Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. beeinträchtigen.
Der an dieser Stelle erwähnte „Gesprächspartner” hat den Arbeiter der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. informiert, dass die Möglichkeit besteht die peinliche Situation zu vermeiden, indem die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. auf das von der Person gezeigte Konto die Summe von 100.000,00 EUR überweist. Wie sich aber später zeigte, war der Herr Klaus Maurischat – dieser anonyme Gesprächspartner – „Gehirn“ und „Lider des GOMOPA“. Die Ermittlungen wurden angestellt durch die Bundeskriminalpolizei (Verfolgungs- und Ermittlungsorgan auf der Bundesebene) während des Ermittlungsverfahrens wegen einer finanziellen Erpressung, Betrügereien auch wegen der Bedrohungen, welche von Herrn Maurischat und seine Mitarbeiter praktiziert wurden sowie wegen Teilnahme anderer (Leiter der Internetservices und Moderatoren der Blogs) an diesem Prozedere. Diese Straftaten wurden begangen zu Schaden vieler Berufs- und Justizpersonen, darunter auch der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. Die Opfer dieses Verbrechens sind in Deutschland, Österreich, der Schweiz, Spanien, Portugal, Großbritannien, den USA und Kanada sichtbar.
In diesem Moment taucht folgende Frage auf: Wie war die Reaktion der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. auf die Forderungen seitens GOMOPA? Entsprach die Reaktion den Erwartungen von GOMOPA? Hat die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. die geforderte Summe 100.000,00 EUR überwiesen?
Seites der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. gab es überhaupt keine Reaktion auf den Erpressungsversuch von GOMOPA. Ende August 2008 auf dem Service http://www.gompa.net sind zahlreiche Artikel/Meldungen erscheinen, welche die Tätigkeit der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. in einem sehr negativen Licht dargestellt haben. Nachdem die auf http://www.gomopa.net enthaltenen Informationen ausführlich und vollständig analysiert worden waren, ergab es sich, dass sie der Wahrheit nicht einmal in einem Punkt entsprechen und potenzielle und bereits bestehende Kunden der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. in Bezug auf die von diesem Finanzinstitut geführten Geschäftstätigkeit irreführen. Infolge der kriminellen Handlugen von GOMOPA und der mit ihm kooperierenden Services und Blogs im Netz hat die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. beachtliche und messbare geschäftliche Verluste erlitten. Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. hat nämlich in erster Linie eine wichtige Gruppe von potenziellen Kund verloren. Was sich aber als wichtiger ergab, haben sich die bisherigen Kunden von der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. kaum abgewandt. Diejenigen Kunden haben unsere Dienstleitungen weiterhin genutzt und nutzen die immer noch. In Hinblick auf die bisherige Zusammenarbeit mit der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd., werden ihrerseits dem entsprechend keine Einwände erhoben .
GOMOPA hat so einen Verlauf der Ereignisse genau prognostiziert, dessen Ziel beachtliche und messbare geschäftliche durch die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. erlittene Verluste waren. Der Verlauf der Ereignisse hat das Service GOMOPA mit Sicherheit gefreut. GOMOPA hat nämlich darauf gerechnet, dass die Stellung der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. nachlässt und das Finanzinstitut die geforderte Summe (100.000,00 EUR) bereitstellt. Im Laufe der Zeit, als das ganze Prozedere im Netz immer populärer war, versuchte GOMOPA noch vier mal zu der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. Kontakte aufzunehmen, indem es jedes mal das Einstellen dieser kriminellen „Kompanie” versprochen hat, wobei es jedes mal seine finanziellen Forderungen heraufsetzte. Die letzte für das Einstellen der „Kompanie“ gegen die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. vorgesehene Quote betrug sogar 5.000.000,00 EUR (in Worten: fünfmilionen EURO). Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. konnte sich aber vor den ständig erhöhenden Forderungen seitens des Services GOMOPA behaupten.
Im Oktober 2008 traf die Leitung der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. Entscheidung über die Benachrichtigung der Internationalen Polizei INTERPOL sowie entsprechender Strafverfolgungsorgane der BRD (die Polizei und die Staatsanwaltschaft) über den bestehenden Sachverhalt. In der Zwischenzeit meldeten sich bei der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. zahlreiche Firmen und Korporationen, sogar Berufsperson wie Ärzte, Richter, Priester, Schauspieler und anderen Personen aus unterschiedlichen Ländern der Welt, die der Erpressung von GOMOPA nachgegeben und die geforderten Geldsummen überwiesen haben. Diese Personen gaben bereits Erklärungen ab, dass sie dies getan haben, damit man sie bloß endlich „in Ruhe lässt” und um unnötige Probleme, Schwierigkeiten und einen kaum begründbaren Ausklang vermeiden zu können. Die Opfer dieses kriminellen Vorgehens haben die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. über unterschiedliche Geldsummen, welche verlangt wurden, informiert.
In einem Fall gab es verhältnismäßig kleine (um ein paar tausend EURO), in einem anderen Fall handelte es schon um beachtliche Summen (rund um paar Millionen EURO).
Zusätzlich wendeten sich an die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. Firmen, welche dem GOMOPA noch keine „Gebühr” überweisen haben und bereits überlegen, ob sie dies tun sollen, oder nicht. Diese Firmen erwarteten von der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. eine klare Stellungnahme sowie eine professionelle praktische Beratung, wie man sich in solch einer Lage verhalten soll und wie man diese Geldforderungen umgehen kann. Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. hat ausnahmslos allen Verbrechensopfern, welche sich bei unserer Firma gemeldet haben, eine Zusammenarbeit vorgeschlagen. Als oberste Aufgabe stellt sich diese Kooperation, gemeinsam entschlossene und wirksame Maßnahmen gegen GOMOPA, gegen andere Services im Netz sowie gegen alle Bloggers zu treffen, die an dem hier beschriebenen internationalen kriminellen Vorgehen mit GOMOPA-Führung teilnehmen.Auf unsere Bitte benachrichtigten alle mitbeteiligten Firmen die Internationale Polizei INTERPOL sowie ihre heimischen Verfolgungsorgane, u. a. die zuständige Staatsanwaltschaft und die Polizeibehörden über den bestehenden Sachverhalt.
In Hinblick auf die Tatsache, dass das verbrecherische Handeln von GOMOPA sich über viele Staaten erstreckte und dass die Anzahl der in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland erstatteten Anzeigen wegen der durch GOMOPA, Internetservices und Bloggers begangenen Straftaten, rasant wuchs – was zweifelsohne von einer weit gehenden kriminellen Wirkungskraft des GOMOPA zeugt – schlug die Internationale Wirtschaftspolizei INTERPOL der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. vor, dass sich ihr Vertreter in Berlin mit dem Vertreter von GOMOPA trifft, um die „Zahlungsmodalitäten“ und Überweisung der Summe von 5.000.000,00 EUR zu besprechen. Dieser Schritt meinte, eine gut durchdachte und durch die Bundeskriminalpolizei organisierte Falle durchzuführen, deren Ziel die Festnahme der unter GOMOPA wirkenden internationalen Straftäter war.
Die koordinierten Schritte und Maßnahmen der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. und anderer Beschädigter, geleitet von der Internationalen Wirtschaftspolizei INTERPOL, dem Bundeskriminalamt und der Staatsanwaltschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland haben zur Aus-, Einarbeitung und Durchführung der oben beschriebenen Falle beigetragen. Im November 2008 führte die in Berlin vorbereitete Falle zur Festnahme und Verhaftung des Vertreters des GOMOPA, der nach der Festnahme auf Herrn Klaus Maurichat – als den Hauptverantwortlichen und Anführer der internationalen kriminellen Gruppe GOMOPA verwies. Der Festgenommene benannte und zeigte der Bundeskriminalpolizei zugleich den aktuellen Aufenthaltsort des Herrn Klaus Maurischat. „Gehirn“ und Gründer dieser internationalen kriminellen Gruppe GOMOPA, Herr Klaus Maurischat wurde am selben Tag auch festgenommen und auf Frist verhaftet, wird bald in Anklagezustand gestellt, wird die Verantwortung für eigene Straftaten und die des Forums GOMOPA vor einem zuständigen Bundesgericht tragen. Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. unternahm bereits alle möglichen Schritte, damit Herr Klaus Maurischat auch auf der Anklagebank des zuständigen Gerichts des Vereinigten Königsreiches Großbritannien erscheint. Unter den beschädigten Berufs- und Justizpersonen aus Großbritannien, neben der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. gibt es noch viele Opfer von GOMOPA…

Die dreisten Verbrecher wagen es unter http://www.pressreleaser.org, einer eigenen “GoMoPa”-Seite unsere Pressemitteilung oben zu verfälschen und unschuldige Personen zu belasten.

Dear Readers,

after a thorough research we are sure that the real “GoMoPa” boss is Jochen Resch, lawyer in Berlin, Germany. He is the brain behind “GoMoPa” and responsable for blackmailing, extortion, racketeering, cybermurder and murder – in the tradition of the East German “Inteeligence” STASI that is why he called “GoMoPa” – Financial “Intelligence” Service .

Webmaster

Meridian Capital about GoMoPa

Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. unveils new criminal phenomena in network. In recently appeared on the net more often at the same time a new a very worrying phenomenon of criminal nature. Professional criminals groups in the network are taking part, to extortion, fraud, Erschwindeln relating to certain specifically selected companies and businesses are capable of. These criminals developed new methods and means, simply and in a short time to bereichern.Strategien and manifestations, which underlie this process are fairly simple. A criminal is looking to “carefully” on the Internet specific companies and corporations (victims of crime) and informed them in the next step, that of the business activities of such companies and corporations in the near future – first on the Internet then in other available mass media – numerous and very unfavorable information appears. At the same time, the criminals beat their future victims an effective means of reducing unnecessary difficulties and problems to escape the loss of good name and image of the company and corporate sector. These offenders are aware of that reputation, name and appearance of each company is a value in itself. It was therefore a value of what each company is prepared to pay any price. But the reason for difficulties and problems arising from the loss of good name and reputation result. The criminals and their victims are already aware that this loss is devastating consequences might have been the closing down of a particular business can enforce. It takes both to No as well as at large companies regard. The company is concerned that in virtually every industry in each country and cross-border activities sind.Das criminal procedure in the form of a blackmail on money, a fraud is becoming rapidly and globally, ie led cross-border and internationally. Among the victims of extortion, fraud is now looking both at home (domestic) and international corporations, the major emphasis on conservation, keeping and maintaining their reputation in the business according to their credibility lay. The criminals in the network have understood that maintaining an unassailable reputation and name of a company the unique ability to provide fast and easy enrichment forms. The above-mentioned criminal procedure is difficult to track because it is international in nature, and by overlapping or even nonexistent (fictional) professional and judicial persons in various countries and operated company wird.Diese offenders in the network publish it and disseminate false information about your victims on remote servers, which are not uncommon in many exotic countries. There are those countries in which serious gaps in the legal system, investigative and prosecution procedures are visible. As an example, at this point mention India werden. Mit criminals working in the network grid portals known leader of blogs with your seat-consciously or unconsciously, even in highly developed countries. For example, at this point, countries such as Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the United States, Britain, Spain or Portugal are mentioned. The below listed criminals were able to act unpunished today. As a symptom of such action appears here the activity and “effectiveness” of the company GOMOPA, which is on countries such as Germany, Switzerland, Austria, the United States, Britain, Spain and India. A good example of such an action is Mr. Klaus Mauri Chat – the leader and “brain” of the company GOMOPA with many already in force and criminal judgments “on his account”, which in this way for years and funded its maintenance in the industry almost unlimited activity. This status will change dramatically, however, including far and wide thanks to discontinued operations of the firm Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. who would oppose such offenses addressed in the network. Other companies and corporations, in which the crime network and outside of this medium have fallen victim to contribute to combating such crimes bei.Die situation is changing, thanks to effective steps and the successful cooperation of the firm Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. with the international police Interpol, with the federal agency (FBI) in the U.S., the Federal Criminal Police in Germany, with Scotland Yard in Britain, as well as with the Russian secret service FSB.Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. – Together with other companies and cooperations, the victim of criminal activities of the network of crime have fallen – has undeniably already started to yield results. The fact that in recent weeks (November 2008) on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany of the above-mentioned leaders and “brain” of the company GOMOPA, Mr Klaus Maurishat was arrested should not be ignored. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. information available results clearly show that the next arrests of persons participating in this process in such countries as: Austria, Switzerland, Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Spain, Mexico, Portugal, Brazil, the USA, Canada, UK, Ireland , Australia, New Zealand and made in a.. The ultimate goal of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. and the other victims of crime in the network is to provide all participants in this criminal procedure before the competent court to lead. All professional and judicial persons, regardless of the seat and out of the business, which the above-described criminal action (fraud, extortion) to have fallen victim can of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. led company to join the goal set at all at this point the procedure described those associated in the public and the economic life out. II blacklist blackmail and with international fraudsters and their methods (opus operandi) in the following countries: 1 The Federal Republic Deutschland2. Dubai 3rd Russia 1st The Federal Republic of Germany GmbH GOMOPA, Goldman Morgenstern & Partners LLC., Goldman Morgenstern & Partners Consulting LLC, Wottle collection. In these firms are quite active following persons: – Klaus Mauri Chat ( “Father” and “brain” of the criminal organization responsible for countless final judgments have been achieved (arrested in Germany in November 2008) – Josef Rudolf Heckel ( “right hand “when Mr Klaus Mauri chat, denounced former banker who is excessive in many Bankschmuggeleien was involved.
The study of 900 pages named Toxdat by Ehrenfried Stelzer is the “Stasi Killer Bible”. It lists all kind of murder methods and concentrates on the most effective and untraceable.
“The toxdat study was ordered by Stasi Vice-President Gerhard Neiber, the second man in rank after boss Erich Mielke. The toxdat study was also the theoretical “story book” for the murder of the famous German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach by former Stasi member under the guidance of “GoMoPa”,” an informer stated. “Ehrenfried stelzer” was nicknamed “Professor Murder” by his victims. Even close co-worker now compare him with the German SS”doctor” Mengele, “Dr. Death” from Auschwitz.
Only two articles let the German audience believe that the famous journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach died on natural courses by blood pollution.

For more Information the victims have launched a new site: http://www.victims-opfer.com

The first one, published only hours after the death of Mr Heinz Gerlach by the notorious “GoMoPa” (see article below) and a second 3 days later by a small German local newspaper, Weserbergland Nachrichten.
Many people including the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” doubted that this man who had so many enemies and friends would die of natural causes without any previous warning. Rumours occured that Mr. Gerlach’s doctor doubted natural courses at all. After many critical voices discussed the issue a small website of a small German local newspaper – which never before had reported about Mr. Heinz Gerlach and which is not even in the region of Mr Gerlachs home – published that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution. Weserbergland-Nachrichten published a long article about the deadly consequences of blood pollution and did not even name the source of such an important statement. It claimed only that somebody of Gerlachs inner circle had said this. It is a proven fact that after the collpase of the Eastern German Communist Regime many former Communist propaganda agents went to regional newspapers – often in Western Germany like Günther Schabowski did the man who opened the “Mauer”.
The theatre stage was set: One day later the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” took the agenda publishing that Mr Gerlach had died for natural causes without any further research at all.
This was done by a website which for months and months and months reported everything about Mr. Gerlach.
Furthermore a research proves that the technical details regarding the website hosting of this hostile website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” proves that there are common details with the hosting of “GoMoPa” and their affiliates as proven by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims (see http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com)
Insiders believe that the murderers of Mr. Heinz Gerlach are former members of the Eastern German Terror Organisation “Stasi” with dioxins. They also believe that “GoMoPa” was part of the plot. At “GoMoPa”’ a person named Siegfried Siewers was officialy responsible for the press but never appeared in public. “GoMoPa”-victims say that this name was a cameo for “GoMoPa” frontrunner Klaus Maurischat who is controlled by the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzner, Berlin.
Siegfried Sievers, a former Stasi member is responsible for the pollution of millions Germanys for many years with dioxins. This was unveiled at 5th of January 2011 by German prosecutors.
The victims say that Maurischat (probably also a Stasi cameo) and Sievers were in contact as Sievers acted as Stasi Agent and was in fact already a specialist in dioxins under the Communist Terror Regime in Eastern Germany.
Furthermore the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzer disguised as Professor for Criminal studies during the Communist Regime at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University.
Background:
The man behind the Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch and his activities is Ehrenfried Stelzer, former Stasi Top officer in Berlin and “Professor for Criminal Studies” at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University during the Communist regime, the SJB-GoMoPa-victims say (www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com) is responsable for the killing of German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach.
These informations stem from various sources who were close to the criminal organization of GoMoPa in the last years. The SJB-GoMoPa say that the well-known German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach was killed by former Stasi members with dioxins. Polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (PCDDs), or simply dioxins, are a group of organic polyhalogenated compounds that are significant because they act as environmental pollutants. They are commonly referred to as dioxins for simplicity in scientific publications because every PCDD molecule contains a dioxin skeletal structure. Typically, the p-dioxin skeleton is at the core of a PCDD molecule, giving the molecule a dibenzo-p-dioxin ring system. Members of the PCDD family have been shown to bioaccumulate in humans and wildlife due to their lipophilic properties, and are known teratogens, mutagens, and confirmed (avered) human carcinogens. They are organic compounds.
Dioxins build up primarily in fatty tissues over time (bioaccumulate), so even small exposures may eventually reach dangerous levels. In 1994, the US EPA reported that dioxins are a probable carcinogen, but noted that non-cancer effects (reproduction and sexual development, immune system) may pose an even greater threat to human health. TCDD, the most toxic of the dibenzodioxins, is classified as a Group 1 carcinogen by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC).
In 2004, a notable individual case of dioxin poisoning, Ukrainian politician Viktor Yushchenko was exposed to the second-largest measured dose of dioxins, according to the reports of the physicians responsible for diagnosing him. This is the first known case of a single high dose of TCDD dioxin poisoning, and was diagnosed only after a toxicologist recognized the symptoms of chloracne while viewing television news coverage of his condition.
German dioxin scandal: In January 2011 about 4700 German farms were banned from making deliveries after tests at the Harles und Jentzsch plant in the state of Schleswig-Holstein showed high levels of dioxin. Again this incident appears to involve PCBs and not PCDDs at all. Dioxin were found in animal feed and eggs in many farms. The person who is responsible for this, Siegfried Sievert is also a former Stasi Agent. At “GoMoPa” the notorious Eastern-Berlin press agency (see article below) one of the henchmen acted under the name of “Siegfried Siewert”.
Further evidence for the killing of Mr.Heinz Gerlach is provided by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims by analyzing the dubious role of former Stasi-Top-agent Ehrenfried Stelzer, also a former “Professor for Crime Studies” under the Communist regime in Eastern Germany and the dubious role of “detective” Medard Fuchsgruber. Both are closely tied to the dubious “GoMoPa” and Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch.
According to the SJB-GoMoPa-victims is Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch the mastermind of the criminal organization “GoMoPa2. The victims state that they have a source inside “GoMoPa” who helped them discover  the shocking truth. The so-called “Deep Throat from Berlin” has information that Resch had the idea to found the criminal organization “GoMoPa” and use non-existing Jewish lawyers  named Goldman, Morgenstern & Partner as camouflage. Their “office” in Madison Avenue, New York, is a mailbox. This is witnessed by a German Ex-Patriot, a lawyer, whose father, Heinz Gerlach, died under strange circumstances.
Resch seems to use “GoMoPa” as an instrument to blackmail parts of the German Property and Investment.

German authorities are under growing pressure to reopen investigations into at least a dozen suspicious deaths after the arrest of an alleged East German assassin cast new light on the communist regime. Stasi victims quoted a source saying “isolated units” had conducted operations that were “extremely well organised” and had “100 per cent logistical support” from the East German state.
A statement from prosecutors read: “The accused [Jurgen G] is suspected, as a member of a commando of the former DDR, of killing a number of people between 1976 and 1987 who from the point of view of the DDR regime had committed treason or were threatening to do so.”
Details of his Jurgen G’s arrest have been described in suitably florid terms, with the mass circulation tabloid Bild saying he was working at the Wolfsbruch marina near Rheinsberg in north-eastern Germany when a woman approached him. “Excuse me, is that your yellow Trabant in the car park? I just ran into it with my car,” she is said to have asked.
When he followed her to the car park, masked officers jumped out of vans and bushes and overpowered him in an operation worthy of the Stasi itself.
An eyewitness told Bild: “They blindfolded him and raced off in an unmarked car.”
Police across Germany are reported to be sifting through files to see who the victims may have been, and some intelligence officers are greeting the arrest of Jurgen G as a breakthrough.
Thomas Auerbach, who works for the Stasi file authority in Berlin and has written a book based on the death squad files, said: “These people were trained to make such murders look like accidents or suicides, even as ‘ordinary’ crimes such as robberies. They were real terror experts.”
The cases said to be linked to Jurgen G or his unit include many people involved with the commercial arm of the East German ruling socialist party, the SED (Socialist Unity Party).
Uwe Harms, the head of a Hamburg-based haulage firm which was part of a network of companies secretly owned by the SED, disappeared in March 1987 after conversations with various DDR functionaries. Six weeks later, his body was found in a plastic bag.
Weeks before his death he told friends that he felt he was being followed. After reunification, one of the other SED company heads said Mr Harms had been liquidated for refusing to allow his firm to be used to transport arms into East Germany.
Dieter Vogel, a businessman who had been jailed for life for spying for the CIA, was found suffocated in his cell in the East German prison Bautzen on March 9, 1982. The fact that he was due to be taken to the West in a spy swap arrangement just a few weeks later cast doubt on the suicide theory.
He had passed the names of several Stasi moles to the BND, West Germany’s heavily penetrated counter-intelligence service.
The Christian Democrat Union politician Uwe Barschel, 43, was found dead by magazine reporters in his bathtub in a hotel room in Geneva in October, 1987. He died of poisoning, but rumours that he was involved somehow in arms deals and the Stasi have clung to the case.
One of the more high-profile and enduring mysteries is that of Lutz Eigendorf, an East German footballer from the Stasi-backed Dynamo Berlin.
He fled to the West in 1979 amid great publicity. Four years later, he died after crashing his car into a tree on a straight stretch of road with blood alcohol levels way over the limit. Witnesses who had seen him earlier in the evening said he had not been drinking.
Most controversial though is the suggestion that the assassination squad was linked to the murder of a Swedish television reporter and her friend in 1984.
Cats Falk and her friend Lena Graens went missing on Nov 19, 1984. Their bodies were fished out of a Stockholm canal six months later.
Reports suggested a three-man assassination squad killed them, spiking their drinks with drugs, putting them into their car and pushing it into the Hammarby canal.
Shortly before her death, Cats Falk had reportedly uncovered a deal between an arms dealer and an East German firm.
Germany has recently undergone a wave of nostalgia for all things East German, dubbed Ostalgie, with colourful television shows featuring former DDR stars such as the ice skater Katerina Witt talking wistfully about socialist pop music.
A reassessment may be coming in the wake of the revelations.

Victims: The DDR-STASI MURDER GANG “GoMOPa” in murderoplot against Joerg Berger

The Stasi Murder Gang of „GoMoPa“ was involved in many trials to kill the popular East German soccer trainer Joerg Berger, Stasi victims tell in postings on their hompage http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com. Berger stated before his early death in his biography that they tried to pollute him with arsenic.
Arsenic and many of its compounds are especially potent poisons. Many water supplies close to mines are contaminated by these poisons. Arsenic disrupts ATP production through several mechanisms. At the level of the citric acid cycle, arsenic inhibits lipoic acid which is a cofactor for pyruvate dehydrogenase; and by competing with phosphate it uncouples oxidative phosphorylation, thus inhibiting energy-linked reduction of NAD+, mitochondrial respiration and ATP synthesis. Hydrogen peroxide production is also increased, which might form reactive oxygen species and oxidative stress. These metabolic interferences lead to death from multi-system organ failure, probably from necrotic cell death, not apoptosis. A post mortem reveals brick red coloured mucosa, owing to severe haemorrhage. Although arsenic causes toxicity, it can also play a protective role.[
Elemental arsenic and arsenic compounds are classified as “toxic” and “dangerous for the environment” in the European Union under directive 67/548/EEC. The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) recognizes arsenic and arsenic compounds as group 1 carcinogens, and the EU lists arsenic trioxide, arsenic pentoxide and arsenate salts as category 1 carcinogens.
Arsenic is known to cause arsenicosis owing to its manifestation in drinking water, “the most common species being arsenate [HAsO42- ; As(V)] and arsenite [H3AsO3 ; As(III)]”. The ability of arsenic to undergo redox conversion between As(III) and As(V) makes its availability in the environment more abundant. According to Croal, Gralnick, Malasarn and Newman, “[the] understanding [of] what stimulates As(III) oxidation and/or limits As(V) reduction is relevant for bioremediation of contaminated sites (Croal). The study of chemolithoautotrophic As(III) oxidizers and the heterotrophic As(V) reducers can help the understanding of the oxidation and/or reduction of arsenic.
Treatment of chronic arsenic poisoning is easily accomplished. British anti-lewisite (dimercaprol) is prescribed in dosages of 5 mg/kg up to 300 mg each 4 hours for the first day. Then administer the same dosage each 6 hours for the second day. Then prescribe this dosage each 8 hours for eight additional days. However the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) states that the long term effects of arsenic exposure cannot be predicted. Blood, urine, hair and nails may be tested for arsenic, however these tests cannot foresee possible health outcomes due to the exposure. Excretion occurs in the urine and long term exposure to arsenic has been linked to bladder and kidney cancer in addition to cancer of the liver, prostate, skin, lungs and nasal cavity.[
Occupational exposure and arsenic poisoning may occur in persons working in industries involving the use of inorganic arsenic and its compounds, such as wood preservation, glass production, nonferrous metal alloys and electronic semiconductor manufacturing. Inorganic arsenic is also found in coke oven emissions associated with the smelter industry.

THE DDR GESTAPO-STASI MURDER GANG responsable for the murder of Lutz Eigendorf

The talented Eigendorf played for East German side Dynamo Berlin.
He made his debut for the GDR in an August 1978 match against Bulgaria, immediately scoring his first two goals in a 2–2 draw. He went on to collect six caps, scoring three goals.[1] His final international was a February 1979 friendly match against Iraq.
On 20 March 1979, after a friendship match between Dynamo and West German club 1. FC Kaiserslautern in Gießen he fled to the west hoping to play for that team. But because of his defection he was banned from play for one year by UEFA and instead spent that time as a youth coach with the club.
This was not the first time an East German athlete had fled to the west, but it was a particularly embarrassing defection. Eigendorf’s club Dynamo was under the patronage of the Stasi, East Germany’s secretive state police, and subject to the personal attentions of the organisation’s head, Erich Mielke. He ensured that the club’s roster was made up of the country’s best players, as well as arranging for the manipulation of matches in Dynamo’s favour. After his defection Eigendorf openly criticised the DDR in the western media.
His wife Gabriele remained behind in Berlin with their daughter and was placed under constant police surveillance. Lawyers working for the Stasi quickly arranged a divorce and the former Frau Eigendorf re-married. Her new husband was eventually revealed as a Lothario – an agent of the state police whose role it was to spy on a suspect while romancing them.
In 1983 Eigendorf moved from Kaiserslautern to join Eintracht Braunschweig, all the while under the scrutiny of the Stasi who employed a number of West Germans as informants. On 5 March that year he was badly injured in a suspicious traffic accident and died within two days. An autopsy indicated a high blood alcohol level despite the testimony of people he had met with that evening indicating that Eigendorf had only a small amount of beer to drink.
After German re-unification and the subsequent opening of the files of the former East Germany’s state security service it was revealed that the traffic accident had been an assassination attempt orchestrated by the Stasi, confirming the longtime suspicions held by many. A summary report of the events surrounding Eigendorf’s death was made on German television on 22 March 2000 which detailed an investigation by Heribert Schwan in the documentary “Tod dem Verräter” (“Death to the Traitor”).
On 10 February 2010, a former East German spy revealed the Stasi ordered him to kill Eigendorf, which he claimed not to have done

MfS has been accused of a number of assassinations against political dissidents and other people both inside and outside the country. Examples include the East German football player Lutz Eigendorf and the Swedish journalist Cats Falck.
The terrorists who killed Alfred Herrhausen were professionals. They dressed as construction workers to lay a wire under the pavement of the road along Mr. Herrhausen’s usual route to work. They planted a sack of armor-piercing explosives on a parked bicycle by the roadside. An infrared beam shining across the road triggered the explosion just when the limousine, one of three cars in a convoy, sped by.
The operation, from the terrorists’ point of view, was flawless: Mr. Herrhausen, the chairman of one of Europe’s most powerful companies, Deutsche Bank, was killed in the explosion along that suburban Frankfurt road on Nov. 30, 1989.
But was everything what it seemed?
Within days, the Red Army Faction — a leftist terrorist group that had traumatized West Germany since 1970 with a series of high-profile crimes and brazen killings of bankers and industrialists — claimed responsibility for the assassination. An intense manhunt followed. In June 1990, police arrested 10 Red Army Faction members who had fled to East Germany to avoid arrest for other crimes. To the police’s surprise, they were willing to talk. Equally confounding to authorities: All had solid alibis. None was charged in the Herrhausen attack.
Now, almost two decades later, German police, prosecutors and other security officials have focused on a new suspect: the East German secret police, known as the Stasi. Long fodder for spy novelists like John le Carré, the shadowy Stasi controlled every aspect of East German life through imprisonment, intimidation and the use of informants — even placing a spy at one point in the office of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt.
According to documents reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, the murders of Mr. Herrhausen and others attributed to the Red Army Faction bear striking resemblance to methods and tactics pioneered by a special unit of the Stasi. The unit reported to Stasi boss Erich Mielke and actively sought in the waning years of the communist regime to imitate the Red Army Faction to mask their own attacks against prominent people in Western Germany and destabilize the country.
“The investigation has intensified in recent months,” said Frank Wallenta, a spokesman for the Federal Prosecutor. “And we are investigating everything, including leads to the Stasi.”
If those leads turn out to be true, it would mean not only rewriting some of the most dramatic episodes of the Cold War, but would likely accelerate a broader soul-searching now under way in Germany about the communist past.
In building a reunified country, many Germans have ignored discussion of the brutal realities of its former communist half. When the former East Germany is discussed, it’s often with nostalgia or empathy for brothers hostage to Soviet influence.

Stasi boss Erich Mielke, middle, with unnamed associates
That taboo is slowly being broken. Last year’s Oscar-winning movie, “The Lives of Others,” chronicled in dark detail a Stasi agent’s efforts to subvert the lives of ordinary people. Material in the Stasi archives shows that senior leaders had a shoot-to-kill order against those fleeing from East to West — a controversial order that contradicts East German leaders’ claims that they never ordered any shootings.
This story is based on more than a dozen interviews with police, prosecutors and other security officials. Several policemen and prosecutors confirmed that the allegation of extensive Stasi involvement with the Red Army Faction is a key part of the current investigation.
Court cases in West Germany in the 1990s established that members of the Red Army Faction were granted free passage to other countries in the 1970s and refuge in East Germany in the 1980s. But the current investigation and documents from Stasi archives suggest far deeper involvement — that members of the Red Army Faction were not only harbored by the Stasi but methodically trained in sophisticated techniques of bombing and murder.
Traudl Herrhausen, Mr. Herrhausen’s widow, is one of those pushing for further investigation. She says she long suspected involvement by the Stasi or other intelligence service such as the KGB, but never spoke publicly because she didn’t have evidence and didn’t want to interfere in the investigation. She says she is now breaking an 18-year silence in her desire to see justice done. “Now I want to look my husband’s killers in the eye,” she said in an interview.
The Red Army Faction was founded about 1970 by a band of leftists who justified their terrorism based on opposition to West Germany’s ruling elite. Killing members of this elite would provoke the West German state to take repressive measures that would show its true fascist face, Red Army Faction leaders believed.
In its early years, the group, also known as the Baader-Meinhof band, made headlines with prison breaks, bank robberies, bomb attacks and deadly shootouts. Four gang members led by Ulrike Meinhof freed Red Army Faction leader Andreas Baader from a Berlin jail a month after his arrest.
Red Army Faction violence in West Germany intensified in 1977 when Jürgen Ponto, then head of Dresdner Bank, was shot and killed at his home. Five weeks later, the group killed four people and abducted the chairman of the German employer association, Hans-Martin Schleyer, one of West Germany’s most prominent businessmen. It was the start of a six-week ordeal in which neither government nor terrorists would compromise. To support the Red Army Faction cause, Palestinian terrorists hijacked a Lufthansa jet in Spain, forcing it to land in Mogadishu, Somalia. After the plane was rushed by West German commandos, top Red Army Faction leaders in West Germany committed suicide and Mr. Schleyer was executed by his captors.
Red Army Faction violence began to abate in the late 1970s after the Lufthansa incident. Many in Germany thought the group — whose attacks were often crude — lost its will to kill after the arrest of its senior leaders in 1982. So when the group appeared to renew its terror campaign with a series of high-profile attacks in 1985, police were stunned by the level of their sophistication and determination.
This time, the group dazzled police with its ability to hit targets and leave little substantial evidence behind. They used high-tech devices no one thought they possessed. Their marksmen killed with military precision.

Weapons used by terrorists during the 1977 kidnapping of German industrialist Hanns-Martin Schleyer.
Surprisingly, members of the Red Army Faction so-called third generation had a policeman’s understanding of forensic science. From 1985 onward, the Red Army Faction rarely left a fingerprint or other useful piece of evidence at a crime scene, according to court records. The murder cases from this era are still open. Some suspected Stasi involvement, but no one could ever prove it, according to a senior police official.
The 1989 car-bomb murder of Mr. Herrhausen particularly stunned police with its audacity and sophistication. Mr. Herrhausen was the head of Deutsche Bank, Germany’s largest bank. He was part of the political-business elite that helped turn West Germany from a war-ravaged rump state into an economic powerhouse — all while East Germany languished in frustration. Mr. Herrhausen was a vocal proponent of a united Germany.
In November 1989, Mr. Herrhausen was following the fall of the Berlin wall and events in the Soviet Union closely, conferring frequently with Mikhail Gorbachev, according to his wife and friends. Then on Nov. 27, Mr. Herrhausen announced a plan to acquire the investment banking firm Morgan Grenfell — at the time a record-breaking bank acquisition.
Also during November, a spot along Mr. Herrhausen’s usual route to work was closed because of construction. Terrorists, dressed as construction workers, laid an electric wire under the road’s pavement. On Nov. 29, the stretch reopened.
On the morning of Nov. 30, like every workday morning, Mr. Herrhausen stepped into his limousine at about 8:30. Mr. Herrhausen’s driver waited about one minute to allow the first of the three-car entourage to drive ahead and survey the road.
“It was the route they hadn’t used in weeks,” Mrs. Herrhausen said.
As Mr. Herrhausen sped down the road, a team of terrorists waited. Beside the road, a parked bicycle held a sack of armor-piercing explosives. The detonator was connected by the electric wire under the road to a trigger activated by an interruption in an infrared beam shining across the road.
A terrorist activated the detonator after the first car of bodyguards drove past the bomb. Mr. Herrhausen died at the scene.
As they had during previous attacks, police set up dragnets to round up Red Army Faction cadre. But the June 1990 arrests of 10 members of the group who had earlier been granted political asylum in East Germany produced no leads. All the seized Red Army Faction members had solid alibis.
In July 1991, prosecutors believed they had a breakthrough when an informant claimed he had allowed two members of the Red Army Faction to stay at his home near the Herrhausen residence. Prosecutors followed that trail 13 years before dropping charges in 2004.
Frustrated with the inability of prosecutors to solve the Herrhausen case and believing that prosecutors were ignoring other leads including possible Stasi involvement, German officials replaced the prosecutor overseeing the case.
Police acknowledge that part of the reason for their focus on possible Stasi involvement was that all other leads had dried up. But they say they also knew that over the years the Stasi had worked with and given explosives to other terrorists, including “Carlos the Jackal” and the Basque group ETA in Spain. And in 2001 to 2003, an undercover police officer met with a man who claimed he had been a killer for the Stasi operating in Western Germany, although police were never able to tie him to specific murders.
German investigators turned their attention to Wartin, a small eastern German village nestled in yellow-brown fields of grain near the Polish border. Today, sheep graze in a field spotted with wooden posts.
In the 1980s, however, Wartin was home to the Stasi’s AGM/S — “Minister Working Group/Special Operations.” It got its name because it reported to Mr. Mielke, the minister who headed the Stasi for almost all of East Germany’s 40-year history.
The Wartin unit’s peacetime duties included the kidnapping and murder of influential people in the West, according to Stasi records reviewed by The Wall Street Journal in the Stasi archives in Berlin.
The documents say the unit’s activities included “intimidating anti-communist opinion leaders” by “liquidation,” and “kidnapping or hostage taking, connected with the demand that political messages be read,” according to a description of the unit’s activities written by a senior Wartin official in 1982.
Based on these documents, German investigators increasingly believe that the Stasi played a more active role than previously believed in Red Army Faction terrorism. After years of not being able to draw parallels between the Stasi unit in Wartin and the Red Army Faction killings, police are now focusing closely on such a link. Joachim Lampe, who assisted the successful prosecution of the first wave of Red Army Faction terrorists up until 1982 and was then assigned to prosecute Stasi-related crimes in West Germany, says it’s time to compare the activities of Wartin with the activities of the Red Army Faction to see where they overlap. “It is an important line of investigation,” he said.
A year after the Red Army Faction’s first generation collapsed in 1972, an internal Wartin report said cooperation with terrorists is possible if the individuals could be trusted to maintain secrecy and obey orders. Initial contacts, however, may not have taken place until later in the decade. Disillusionment gripped many of the terrorists living on the lam, according to court records citing witness statements by accused terrorists. Beginning about 1980, the Stasi granted refuge to 10 members of the Red Army Faction in East Germany and gave them assumed identities.
The Stasi sympathized with the anti-capitalist ideals of the Red Army Faction, but Stasi leaders were concerned about placing their trust in a group of uncontrollable leftist militants, a review of Stasi records shows. Stasi officials did not want to tarnish East Germany’s international reputation, so they toyed with different concepts for cooperation with terrorist groups, according to a prosecutor who has investigated Stasi involvement with terrorism.
One suggestion, contained in a document prepared for new officers assigned to the unit, was to emulate Romanian intelligence, which successfully worked with the terrorist “Carlos” to bomb the Radio Free Europe office in Munich, Germany, in 1981. To assist in such operations, the Wartin unit developed highly specialized explosives, poisons and miniature firearms.
About 1980 the Stasi also proposed a second strategy: instead of using a terrorist group directly — such cooperation always contained risk of discovery — they could simply execute attacks so similar to those of known terrorists that police would never look for a second set of suspects, according to Wartin records. The Wartin leadership called this strategy the “perpetrator principle,” according to Stasi records. The unit’s progress in implementing the steps to imitate terrorist attacks is described in a series of progress reports by Wartin officials between 1980 and 1987.
In September 1981, Red Army Faction terrorists attempted to kill U.S. Gen. James Kroesen in Heidelberg, Germany, shooting a bazooka at his car. About the same time, members of the same Red Army Faction team visited East Germany, where they were asked by the Stasi to shoot a bazooka at a car containing a dog. The dog died, according to court records.
In Wartin, officials wrote up a detailed description of the Red Army Faction members’ re-enactment of the Kroesen attack. “It is important to collect all accessible information about the terrorist scene in imperialist countries, to study and analyze their equipment, methods and tactics, so we can do it ourselves,” a senior Wartin official wrote in February 1982, according to the report.
In 1982, West German police discovered two troves of Red Army Faction weapons and documents buried in German forests. Three terrorists, including Red Army Faction leader Christian Klar, were arrested when they approached the sites. The troves were buried in locations easy to find at night, a tactic used by Wartin’s own agents to store operational equipment in West Germany, according to an investigator who viewed the troves and Stasi records.
That same year, a Wartin official described the staged bombing of a moving vehicle. According to the report, several Stasi officers shed “tears of joy” when electronic sensors detected the approaching car and ignited the detonator.
A spokesman at Germany’s federal police investigative agency, the equivalent of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, declined to comment on the close similarity between the detonator used in the demonstration and the device that killed Mr. Herrhausen, saying this is part of their investigation.
Wartin officers continued their preparations for imitating terrorist attacks in West Germany, according to a 1985 internal Wartin report. They created a special archive profiling the characteristics of known terrorists and terrorist groups, and taught staff members to execute nearly identical attacks, according to Stasi records. Each year, the unit’s officers detailed the unit’s success in teaching these techniques in their annual reports, according to the reports.
Then, in 1987, the AGM/S stopped offensive operations. The unit was disbanded.
Werner Grossmann, a former three-star Stasi General and former head of foreign intelligence operations, says the AGM/S was responsible for planning attacks in West Germany, but was dissolved “because it didn’t produce results.” Mr. Grossmann assumed control of part of the AGM/S after most of the unit was dissolved.
Mr. Grossmann says he took control of part of the AGM/S because he wanted to run intelligence operations against West Germany’s civil defense infrastructure.
“I refused to have anything to do with terrorism and terrorists,” Mr. Grossmann said in an interview. He said he didn’t have any influence over the AGM/S activities before 1987 and wasn’t informed about the unit’s activities before it came under his control.
Olaf Barnickel, a career Stasi officer who served at Wartin, says his unit planned murders in West Germany, but never committed one. “It was all theory and no practice,” Mr. Barnickel said in an interview.
But some German police are unpersuaded. They believe the seeds may have been planted for future violent attacks.
In November 1989, as East Germany disintegrated, groups of citizens forced their way into Stasi installations, seizing control. In Wartin, a local church minister led a group of demonstrators to the main entrance of the Stasi base. The base closed.
Within the Stasi as a whole, the chain of command began to disintegrate. Links to organizations in West Germany, including the Red Army Faction, were broken.
Sixteen months after Mr. Herrhausen’s murder, the Red Army Faction claimed its last victim, killing Detlev Karsten Rohwedder, the head of the Treuhandanstalt, the powerful trust that controlled most state-owned assets in the former East Germany and was overseeing their privatization. Mr. Rohwedder was killed while he was standing by the window of his house in Düsseldorf.
The murder was performed by a trained sharpshooter, according to a police official familiar with the investigation. The Stasi trained members of the Red Army Faction in sharpshooting skills and had its own teams of sharpshooters, according to witness statements by Stasi officials to a Berlin prosecutor and Stasi records.
In 1998, the Red Army Faction issued the last of its communiques, announcing it was disbanding. German police attribute the group’s disappearance to changing times, which made the group seem a relic of the past. Indeed, the Red Army Faction today is largely seen by the German public as part of the social upheaval that plagued West Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. More than one in four Germans consider former Red Army Faction members to have been misguided idealists. More than half now think the investigations should be closed for good in the coming decade when the current group of Red Army Faction prisoners finish serving their prison sentences.
German prosecutors say their investigation of the Stasi’s role is continuing.
Since last month, Mrs. Herrhausen has been in contact with the next of kin of victims in the other unsolved Red Army Faction murder cases, looking for support to push the investigation. The bomb that killed her husband nearly 18 years ago exploded soon after he left for work, within earshot of their home in suburban Frankfurt.
“I still hear that bomb every day,” she says.

Only two articles let the German audience believe that the famous journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach died on natural courses by blood pollution.
The first one, published only hours after the death of Mr Heinz Gerlach by the notorious “GoMoPa” (see article below) and a second 3 days later by a small German local newspaper, Weserbergland Nachrichten.
Many people including the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” doubted that this man who had so many enemies and friends would die of natural causes without any previous warning. Rumours occured that Mr. Gerlach’s doctor doubted natural courses at all. After many critical voices discussed the issue a small website of a small German local newspaper – which never before had reported about Mr. Heinz Gerlach and which is not even in the region of Mr Gerlachs home – published that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution. Weserbergland-Nachrichten published a long article about the deadly consequences of blood pollution and did not even name the source of such an important statement. It claimed only that somebody of Gerlachs inner circle had said this. It is a proven fact that after the collpase of the Eastern German Communist Regime many former Communist propaganda agents went to regional newspapers – often in Western Germany like Günther Schabowski did the man who opened the “Mauer”.
The theatre stage was set: One day later the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” took the agenda publishing that Mr Gerlach had died for natural causes without any further research at all.
This was done by a website which for months and months and months reported everything about Mr. Gerlach.
Furthermore a research proves that the technical details regarding the website hosting of this hostile website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” proves that there are common details with the hosting of “GoMoPa” and their affiliates as proven by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims (see http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com)
Insiders believe that the murderers of Mr. Heinz Gerlach are former members of the Eastern German Terror Organisation “Stasi” with dioxins. They also believe that “GoMoPa” was part of the plot. At “GoMoPa”’ a person named Siegfried Siewers was officialy responsible for the press but never appeared in public. “GoMoPa”-victims say that this name was a cameo for “GoMoPa” frontrunner Klaus Maurischat who is controlled by the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzner, Berlin.
Siegfried Sievers, a former Stasi member is responsible for the pollution of millions Germanys for many years with dioxins. This was unveiled at 5th of January 2011 by German prosecutors.
The victims say that Maurischat (probably also a Stasi cameo) and Sievers were in contact as Sievers acted as Stasi Agent and was in fact already a specialist in dioxins under the Communist Terror Regime in Eastern Germany.
Furthermore the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzer disguised as Professor for Criminal studies during the Communist Regime at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University.
Background:
The man behind the Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch and his activities is Ehrenfried Stelzer, former Stasi Top officer in Berlin and “Professor for Criminal Studies” at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University during the Communist regime, the SJB-GoMoPa-victims say (www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com) is responsable for the killing of German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach.
These informations stem from various sources who were close to the criminal organization of GoMoPa in the last years. The SJB-GoMoPa say that the well-known German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach was killed by former Stasi members with dioxins. Polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (PCDDs), or simply dioxins, are a group of organic polyhalogenated compounds that are significant because they act as environmental pollutants. They are commonly referred to as dioxins for simplicity in scientific publications because every PCDD molecule contains a dioxin skeletal structure. Typically, the p-dioxin skeleton is at the core of a PCDD molecule, giving the molecule a dibenzo-p-dioxin ring system. Members of the PCDD family have been shown to bioaccumulate in humans and wildlife due to their lipophilic properties, and are known teratogens, mutagens, and confirmed (avered) human carcinogens. They are organic compounds.
Dioxins build up primarily in fatty tissues over time (bioaccumulate), so even small exposures may eventually reach dangerous levels. In 1994, the US EPA reported that dioxins are a probable carcinogen, but noted that non-cancer effects (reproduction and sexual development, immune system) may pose an even greater threat to human health. TCDD, the most toxic of the dibenzodioxins, is classified as a Group 1 carcinogen by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC).
In 2004, a notable individual case of dioxin poisoning, Ukrainian politician Viktor Yushchenko was exposed to the second-largest measured dose of dioxins, according to the reports of the physicians responsible for diagnosing him. This is the first known case of a single high dose of TCDD dioxin poisoning, and was diagnosed only after a toxicologist recognized the symptoms of chloracne while viewing television news coverage of his condition.
German dioxin scandal: In January 2011 about 4700 German farms were banned from making deliveries after tests at the Harles und Jentzsch plant in the state of Schleswig-Holstein showed high levels of dioxin. Again this incident appears to involve PCBs and not PCDDs at all. Dioxin were found in animal feed and eggs in many farms. The person who is responsible for this, Siegfried Sievert is also a former Stasi Agent. At “GoMoPa” the notorious Eastern-Berlin press agency (see article below) one of the henchmen acted under the name of “Siegfried Siewert”.
Further evidence for the killing of Mr.Heinz Gerlach is provided by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims by analyzing the dubious role of former Stasi-Top-agent Ehrenfried Stelzer, also a former “Professor for Crime Studies” under the Communist regime in Eastern Germany and the dubious role of “detective” Medard Fuchsgruber. Both are closely tied to the dubious “GoMoPa” and Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch.
According to the SJB-GoMoPa-victims is Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch the mastermind of the criminal organization “GoMoPa2. The victims state that they have a source inside “GoMoPa” who helped them discover  the shocking truth. The so-called “Deep Throat from Berlin” has information that Resch had the idea to found the criminal organization “GoMoPa” and use non-existing Jewish lawyers  named Goldman, Morgenstern & Partner as camouflage. Their “office” in Madison Avenue, New York, is a mailbox. This is witnessed by a German Ex-Patriot, a lawyer, whose father, Heinz Gerlach, died under strange circumstances.
Resch seems to use “GoMoPa” as an instrument to blackmail parts of the German Property and Investment.

The name of Benno Ohnesorg became a rallying cry for the West German left after he was shot dead by police in 1967. Newly discovered documents indicate that the cop who shot him may have been a spy for the East German secret police.
It was one of the most important events leading up to the wave of radical left-wing violence which washed over West Germany in the 1970s. On the evening of June 2, 1967, the literature student Benno Ohnesorg took part in a demonstration at West Berlin’s opera house. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the shah of Iran, was to attend and the gathered students wanted to call attention to his brutal regime.
The protests, though, got out of hand. Pro-shah demonstrators, some of them flown in from Iran for the occasion, battled with the student protestors. West Berlin police also did their part, brutally beating back the crowd. At 8:30 p.m., a shot was fired, and a short time later the 26-year-old Ohnesorg, having been hit in the back of the head, became the left wing’s first martyr.
Now, though, the history of the event may have to be re-written. New documents discovered in the Stasi archive — the vast collection of files left behind by the East German secret police — reveal that the policeman who shot Ohnesorg, Karl-Heinz Kurras, could in fact have been a spy for East Germany’s communist regime.
In an article that will appear in late May in Deutschlandarchiv, a periodical dedicated to the ongoing project of German reunification, Helmut Müller-Enbergs and Cornelia Jabs reveal that documents they found in the Stasi papers show that Kurras began working together with the Stasi in 1955. He had wanted to move to East Berlin to work for the East German police. Instead, he signed an agreement with the Stasi to remain with the West Berlin police force and spy for the communist state.
As a result of the new information, criminal charges have once again been filed against Kurras, who was acquitted twice, once in 1967 and again in 1970, of negligent homicide charges related to Ohnesorg’s death. Kurras told the Berlin paper Tagesspiegel on Friday that he had never worked together with the Stasi.
But in addition to finding the agreement between Kurras and the Stasi, the two researchers also discovered numerous documents indicating that the East Germans were pleased with the information Kurras passed along — particularly given that he was posted to a division responsible for rooting out moles within the West German police force.
Immediately after Ohnesorg’s death, Kurras received a Stasi communication ordering him to destroy his records and to “cease activities for the moment.” Kurras responded with his acquiescence and wrote “I need money for an attorney.”
The exact circumstances surrounding the death of Ohnesorg have never been completely clarified. Kurras himself, now 81, gave conflicting versions of the story during the investigation but the official version has long been that Kurras fired in self defense. Many others point to witness accounts whereby the police were beating Ohnesorg when the shot was fired.
It is still unclear how the new evidence might play into history’s understanding of the tragic event. The day was one full of violence, with demonstrators and police battling each other with pipes, wooden clubs and stones. Police were further incited by rumors that an officer had been stabbed earlier in the evening. Ohnesorg himself, however, was not directly involved in the violence.
West Berlin in the 1960s and 70s became a focal point of German left wing radicalism. The city had long been left-leaning, and the fact that Berliners were exempt from military service meant that it became a magnate for pacifists and anti-state activists.
Ohnesorg’s death gave them an immediate rallying cry. As the left-wing movement became more radical, many justified their violent activities by pointing to the police brutality that led to the student’s death. A letter written by Ulrike Meinhof announcing the founding of the Red Army Faction, which appeared in SPIEGEL in the fall of 1967, explicitly mentioned the Ohnesorg incident. The RAF went on to terrorize Germany for decades, ultimately killing over 30 people across the country. The radical “June 2 Movement” used the date of the incident in its name.
Kurras, for his part, seems to have been a highly valued Stasi agent. In his files, it is noted that “he is prepared to complete any task assigned to him.” It also mentions that he is notable for having the “courage and temerity necessary to accomplish difficult missions.”

Now it seems the STASI is back again in business after transforming it in to the CYBER-STASI of the 21st Century.

The serial betrayer and cyberstalker Klaus Maurischat is on the run again. The latest action against him (see below) cause him to react in a series of fake statements and “press releases” – one more absurd than the other. Insider analyze that his criminal organisation “GoMoPa” is about to fade away.

On our request the German criminal police (Kriminalpolizei) has opened new cases against the notorious “GoMoPa” organisation which already fled in the underground. Insiders say they have killed German journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach and their criminal record is bigger than the Encyclopedia – Britannica

The case is also directed against Google, Germany, whilst supporting criminal action of “GoMoPa” for years and therefore give them the chance to blackmail successfull businessman. This case is therefore an example and will be followed by many others as far as we can project. Furthermore we will bring the case to the attention of the German lawyers community which will not tolerate such misconduct by Googles German legal representative Dr. Arndt Haller and we will bring the case to the attention ofGoogle Inc in Mountain View, USA, and the American ministry of Justice to stop the Cyberstalkers once and for all.
Besides that many legal institutions, individuals and firms have already contacted us to help to clarify the death of Mr. Heinz Gerlach and to prosecute his murderers and their backers.
The case number is ST/0148943/2011

In a series of interviews beginning 11 months before the sudden death of German watchdog Heinz Gerlach Berlin lawyer Joschen Resch unveilved secrets of Gerlach, insiders say. Secret documents from Mr Gerlachs computer were published on two dubious hostile German websites. Both have a lot of similarities in their internet registration. One the notorious “GoMoPa” website belongs to a n Eastern German organization which calls itself “
Numerous attempts have been made to stop our research and the publication of the stories by “GoMoPa” members in camouflage thus confirming the truth and the substance of it in a superior way.
Only two articles let the German audience believe that the famous journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach died on natural courses by blood pollution. The first one, published only hours after the death of Mr Heinz Gerlach by the notorious “GoMoPa” (see article below) and a second 3 days later by a small German local newspaper, Weserbergland Nachrichten.

Many people including the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” doubted that this man who had so many enemies and friends would die of natural causes without any previous warning. Rumours occured that Mr. Gerlach’s doctor doubted natural courses at all. After many critical voices discussed the issue a small website of a small German local newspaper – which never before had reported about Mr. Heinz Gerlach and which is not even in the region of Mr Gerlachs home – published that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution. Weserbergland-Nachrichten published a long article about the deadly consequences of blood pollution and did not even name the source of such an important statement. It claimed only that somebody of Gerlachs inner circle had said this. It is a proven fact that after the collpase of the Eastern German Communist Regime many former Communist propaganda agents went to regional newspapers – often in Western Germany like Günther Schabowski did the man who opened the “Mauer”.

The theatre stage was set: One day later the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” took the agenda publishing that Mr Gerlach had died for natural causes without any further research at all.

This was done by a website which for months and months and months reported everything about Mr. Gerlach.
Furthermore a research proves that the technical details regarding the website hosting of this hostile website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” proves that there are common details with the hosting of “GoMoPa” and their affiliates as proven by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims (see http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com)

Insiders believe that the murderers of Mr. Heinz Gerlach are former members of the Eastern German Terror Organisation “Stasi” with dioxins. They also believe that “GoMoPa” was part of the plot. At “GoMoPa”’ a person named Siegfried Siewers was officialy responsible for the press but never appeared in public. “GoMoPa”-victims say that this name was a cameo for “GoMoPa” frontrunner Klaus Maurischat who is controlled by the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelznr, Berlin.

Siegfried Sievers, a former Stasi member is responsible for the pollution of millions Germanys for many years with dioxins. This was unveiled at 5th of January 2011 by German prosecutors.
The victims say that Maurischat (probably also a Stasi cameo) and Sievers were in contact as Sievers acted as Stasi Agent and was in fact already a specialist in dioxins under the Communist Terror

The Stasi murder:
„GoMoPa“ & Backers: Blackmailing, Extortion, Racketeering, Internet Murder and Murder. These are the weapons of the East-German “NACHRICHTENDIENST” “GoMoPa”, a renegate confesses.
Deep Throat, Berlin; confesses: „Since months the „GoMoPa“ keyfigures like Klaus-Dieter Maurischat< are in hide-aways because the German police is hunting them for the wirecard fraud and a lot of other criminal actions. I left the group when I noticed that. The found and former Stasi-Colonel Ehrenfried Stelzer died under strange circumstances in Berlin. This has been told to us. But it is also possible that his death was staged. In any case the criminal organization of “GoMoPa” is responsible for the murder of Heinz Gerlach by dioxin. Now my life is also in danger that is why I hide myself.”
According to Deep Throat, Hans J. the murder was done with the help of the old Stasi-connections of the “NACHRICHTENDIENST” “GoMoPa”.
The renegate says that computer hacker Thomas Promny and Sven Schmidt are responsible for the computer crimes and he states that the crime organization of “GoMoPa” has also helpers inside internet companies like Go-Daddy, Media-on and even in Google, Hamburg..

THE “NACHRICHTENDIENST”:New criminal police action against “GoMoPa”:

German criminal police (Kriminalpolizei) has opened new cases against the notorious “GoMoPa” organisation which already fled in the underground.

On our request the German criminal police (Kriminalpolizei) has opened new cases against the notorious “GoMoPa” organisation which already fled in the underground. Insiders say they have killed German journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach and their criminal record is bigger than the
Encyclopedia – Britannica

The case is also directed against Google, Germany, whilst supporting criminal action of “GoMoPa” for years and therefore give them the chance to blackmail successfull businessman. This case is therefore an example and will be followed by many others as far as we can project. Furthermore we will bring the case to the attention of the German lawyers community which will not tolerate such misconduct by Googles German legal representative Dr. Arndt Haller and we will bring the case to the attention of Google Inc in Mountain View, USA, and the American ministry of Justice to stop the Cyberstalkers once and for all.

Besides that many legal institutions, individuals and firms have already contacted us to help to clarify the death of Mr. Heinz Gerlach and to prosecute his murderers and their backers.

The case number is

ST/0148943/2011

Stasi-Dioxin: The “NACHRICHTENDIENST”  searching for the perfect murder:

Viktor Yushchenko was running against Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. Yanukovych was a political ally of outgoing president Leonid Kuchma. Kuchma’s administration depended upon corruption and dishonesty for its power. Government officials ruled with a sense of terror rather than justice. For the powerful and wealthy few, having Yanukovych elected president was important. Should Yushchenko win, Ukraine’s government was sure to topple. Yushchenko’s campaign promises included a better quality of life for Ukrainians through democracy. His wife, Katherine, told CBS in a 2005 interview, “He was a great threat to the old system, where there was a great deal of corruption, where people were making millions, if not billions.”
On September 6, 2004, Yushchenko became ill after dining with leaders of the Ukrainian secret police. Unlike other social or political engagements, this dinner did not include anyone else on Yushchenko’s team. No precautions were taken regarding the food. Within hours after the dinner, Yushchenko began vomiting violently. His face became paralyzed; he could not speak or read. He developed a severe stomachache and backache as well as gastrointestinal pain. Outwardly, Yushchenko developed what is known as chloracne, a serious skin condition that leaves the face scarred and disfigured.
By December 2004, doctors had determined that Yushchenko had been the victim of dioxin poisoning. Dioxin is a name given to a group of related toxins that can cause cancer and even death. Dioxin was used in the biochemical weapon called Agent Orange during the Vietnam War controversial war in which the United States aidedSouth Vietnam in its fight against a takeover by Communist North Vietnam). Yushchenko had a dioxin level six thousand times greater than that normally found in the bloodstream. His is the second-highest level ever recorded.
Yushchenko immediately suspected he had been poisoned, though Kuchma’s camp passionately denied such allegations. Instead, when Yushchenko showed up at a parliamentary meeting shortly after the poisoning incident, Kuchma’s men teased him, saying he must have had too much to drink or was out too late the night before.
Dioxin can stay in the body for up to thirty-five years. Experts predict that his swelling and scars will fade but never completely disappear. John Henry, a toxicologist at London’s Imperial Hospital, told RedNova.com, “It’ll be a couple of years, and he will always be a bit pockmarked. After damage as heavy as that, I think he will not return to his film star looks.” And Yushchenko will live with the constant threat of cancer.
At first it was believed the poison must have come from a Russian laboratory. Russia was a strong supporter of Kuchma and lobbied against Yushchenko in the 2004 election. But by July 2005, Yushchenko’s security forces were able to trace the poison to a lab in Ukraine. Though not entirely ruling out Russia’s involvement, Yushchenko is quoted on his Web site as saying “I’m sure that even though some people are running from the investigation, we will get them. I am not afraid of anything or anybody.”

Evidence shows that such a perfect murder plotted by former Stasi agents is the cause of the death of German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach.

The Ministry for State Security (German: Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), commonly known as the Stasi (IPA: [‘?tazi?]) (abbreviation German: Staatssicherheit, literally State Security), was the official state security service of East Germany. The MfS was headquartered in East Berlin, with an extensive complex in Berlin-Lichtenberg and several smaller facilities throughout the city. It was widely regarded as one of the most effective and repressive intelligence and secret police agencies in the world. The MfS motto was “Schild und Schwert der Partei” (Shield and Sword of the Party), that is the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED).

According to the confessions of an informer, Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch writes most of the “articles” of the communist “STASI” agency “GoMoPa” himself or it is done by lawyers of his firm. The whistleblower states that lawyer Resch is the mastermind behind the “CYBER-STASI” called “NACHRICHTENDIENST” “GoMoPa”. Bizarre enough they use Jewish names of non-existing Jewish lawyers by the name of “Goldman, Morgenstern and Partner” to stage their bogus “firm”.  Further involved in their complots are a “detective” Medard Fuchsgruber and “STASI”-Colonel Ehrenfried Stelzer, “the first crime expert” in the former communist East-Germany.
According to London based Meridian Capital hundreds and thousands of wealthy people and companies have paid to the “NACHRICHTENDIENST” to avoid their cyberstalking (see article below).
Finally the German criminal police started their investigations (case number ST/0148943/2011).
The “NACHRICHTENDIENST” is also involved in the death of the well-known German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach who died under strange circumstances in July 2010.
Only hours after his death the “NACHRICHTENDIENST” was spreading the news that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution and set the stage for a fairy tale. Months before his death the “NACHRICHTENDIENST” started a campaign to ruin his reputation and presumably was also responsable for cyberattacks to bring his website down. In fact they presumably used the same tactics also against our servers. Therefore we investigated all internet details of them and handed the facts to the FBI and international authorities.

Story background:
Now it seems the STASI is back again in business after transforming it in to the CYBER-STASI of the 21st Century.

The serial betrayer and  cyberstalker Klaus Maurischat is on the run again. The latest action against him (see below) cause him to react in a series of fake statements and “press releases” – one more absurd than the other. Insider analyze that his criminal organisation “GoMoPa” is about to fade away.
On our request the German criminal police (Kriminalpolizei) has opened new cases against the notorious “GoMoPa” organisation which already fled in the underground. Insiders  say they  have killed German journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach and their criminal record is bigger than the Encyclopedia – Britannica
The case is also directed against Google, Germany, whilst supporting criminal action of  “GoMoPa” for years and therefore give them the chance to blackmail successfull businessman. This case is therefore an example and will be followed by many others as far as we can project. Furthermore we will bring the case to the attention of the German lawyers community which will not tolerate such misconduct by Googles German legal representative Dr. Arndt Haller and we will bring the case to the attention of Google Inc in Mountain View, USA, and the American ministry of Justice to stop the Cyberstalkers once and for all.
Besides that many legal institutions,  individuals and firms have already contacted us to help to clarify the death of Mr. Heinz Gerlach and to prosecute his murderers and their backers.
The case number is ST/0148943/2011
In a series of interviews beginning 11 months before the sudden death of German watchdog Heinz Gerlach Berlin lawyer Joschen Resch unveilved secrets of Gerlach, insiders say. Secret documents from Mr Gerlachs computer were published on two dubious hostile German websites. Both have a lot of similarities in their internet registration. One the notorious “GoMoPa” website belongs to a n Eastern German organization which calls itself “
Numerous attempts have been made to stop our research and the publication of the stories by “GoMoPa” members in camouflage thus confirming the truth and the substance of it in a superior way.
Only two articles let the German audience believe that the famous journalist and watchdog Heinz Gerlach died on natural courses by blood pollution. The first one, published only hours after the death of Mr Heinz Gerlach by the notorious “GoMoPa” (see article below) and a second 3 days later by a small German local newspaper, Weserbergland Nachrichten.

Many people including the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” doubted that this man who had so many enemies and friends would die of natural causes without any previous warning. Rumours occured that Mr. Gerlach’s doctor doubted natural courses at all. After many critical voices discussed the issue a small website of a small German local newspaper – which never before had reported about Mr. Heinz Gerlach and which is not even in the region of Mr Gerlachs home – published that Mr Gerlach died of blood pollution. Weserbergland-Nachrichten published a long article about the deadly consequences of blood pollution and did not even name the source of such an important statement. It claimed only that somebody of Gerlachs inner circle had said this. It is a proven fact that after the collpase of the Eastern German Communist Regime many former Communist propaganda agents went to regional newspapers – often in Western Germany like Günther Schabowski did the man who opened the “Mauer”.

The theatre stage was set: One day later the hostile Gerlach website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” took the agenda publishing that Mr Gerlach had died for natural causes without any further research at all.

This was done by a website which for months and months and months reported everything about Mr. Gerlach.
Furthermore a research proves that the technical details regarding the website hosting of this hostile website “Akte Heinz Gerlach” proves that there are common details with the hosting of “GoMoPa” and their affiliates as proven by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims (see http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com)
Insiders believe that the murderers of Mr. Heinz Gerlach are former members of the Eastern German Terror Organisation “Stasi” with dioxins. They also believe that “GoMoPa” was part of the plot. At “GoMoPa”’ a person named Siegfried Siewers was officialy responsible for the press but never appeared in public. “GoMoPa”-victims say that this name was a cameo for “GoMoPa” frontrunner Klaus Maurischat who is controlled by the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzner, Berlin.

Siegfried Sievers, a former Stasi member is responsible for the pollution of millions Germanys for many years with dioxins. This was unveiled at 5th of January 2011 by German prosecutors.
The victims say that Maurischat (probably also a Stasi cameo) and Sievers were in contact as Sievers acted as Stasi Agent and was in fact already a specialist in dioxins under the Communist Terror Regime in Eastern Germany.
Furthermore the Stasi Top Agent Ehrenfried Stelzer disguised as Professor for Criminal studies during the Communist Regime at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University.

Background:
The man behind the Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch and his activities is Ehrenfried Stelzer, former Stasi Top officer in Berlin and “Professor for Criminal Studies” at the Eastern Berlin Humboldt University during the Communist regime, the SJB-GoMoPa-victims say (www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com) is responsable for the killing of German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach.
These informations stem from various sources who were close to the criminal organization of GoMoPa in the last years. The SJB-GoMoPa say that the well-known German watchdog and journalist Heinz Gerlach was killed by former Stasi members with dioxins. Polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (PCDDs), or simply dioxins, are a group of organic polyhalogenated compounds that are significant because they act as environmental pollutants. They are commonly referred to as dioxins for simplicity in scientific publications because every PCDD molecule contains a dioxin skeletal structure. Typically, the p-dioxin skeleton is at the core of a PCDD molecule, giving the molecule a dibenzo-p-dioxin ring system. Members of the PCDD family have been shown to bioaccumulate in humans and wildlife due to their lipophilic properties, and are known teratogens, mutagens, and confirmed (avered) human carcinogens. They are organic compounds.
Dioxins build up primarily in fatty tissues over time (bioaccumulate), so even small exposures may eventually reach dangerous levels. In 1994, the US EPA reported that dioxins are a probable carcinogen, but noted that non-cancer effects (reproduction and sexual development, immune system) may pose an even greater threat to human health. TCDD, the most toxic of the dibenzodioxins, is classified as a Group 1 carcinogen by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC).
In 2004, a notable individual case of dioxin poisoning, Ukrainian politician Viktor Yushchenko was exposed to the second-largest measured dose of dioxins, according to the reports of the physicians responsible for diagnosing him. This is the first known case of a single high dose of TCDD dioxin poisoning, and was diagnosed only after a toxicologist recognized the symptoms of chloracne while viewing television news coverage of his condition.
German dioxin scandal: In January 2011 about 4700 German farms were banned from making deliveries after tests at the Harles und Jentzsch plant in the state of Schleswig-Holstein showed high levels of dioxin. Again this incident appears to involve PCBs and not PCDDs at all. Dioxin were found in animal feed and eggs in many farms. The person who is responsible for this, Siegfried Sievert is also a former Stasi Agent. At “GoMoPa” the notorious Eastern-Berlin press agency (see article below) one of the henchmen acted under the name of “Siegfried Siewert”.
Further evidence for the killing of Mr.Heinz Gerlach is provided by the SJB-GoMoPa-victims by analyzing the dubious role of former Stasi-Top-agent Ehrenfried Stelzer, also a former “Professor for Crime Studies” under the Communist regime in Eastern Germany and the dubious role of “detective” Medard Fuchsgruber. Both are closely tied to the dubious “GoMoPa” and Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch.
According to the SJB-GoMoPa-victims is Berlin lawyer Jochen Resch the mastermind of the criminal organization “GoMoPa2. The victims state that they have a source inside “GoMoPa” who helped them discover  the shocking truth. The so-called “Deep Throat from Berlin” has information that Resch had the idea to found the criminal organization “GoMoPa” and use non-existing Jewish lawyers  named Goldman, Morgenstern & Partner as camouflage. Their “office” in Madison Avenue, New York, is a mailbox. This is witnessed by a German Ex-Patriot, a lawyer, whose father, Heinz Gerlach, died under strange circumstances.
Resch seems to use “GoMoPa” as an instrument to blackmail parts of the German Property and Investment section.

-”Worse than the Gestapo.” —Simon Wiesenthal, Nazi hunter said about the notorious “Stasi”.

Less than a month after German demonstrators began to tear down the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, irate East German citizens stormed the Leipzig district office of the Ministry for State Security (MfS)—the Stasi, as it was more commonly called. Not a shot was fired, and there was no evidence of “street justice” as Stasi officers surrendered meekly and were peacefully led away. The following month, on January 15, hundreds of citizens sacked Stasi headquarters in Berlin. Again there was no bloodshed. The last bit of unfinished business was accomplished on May 31 when the Stasi radioed its agents in West Germany to fold their tents and come home.
The intelligence department of the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA), the People’s Army, had done the same almost a week earlier, but with what its members thought was better style. Instead of sending the five-digit code groups that it had used for decades to message its spies in West Germany, the army group broadcast a male choir singing a children’s ditty about a duck swimming on a lake. There was no doubt that the singing spymasters had been drowning their sorrow over losing the Cold War in schnapps. The giggling, word-slurring songsters repeated the refrain three times: “Dunk your little head in the water and lift your little tail.” This was the signal to agents under deep cover that it was time to come home.
With extraordinary speed and political resolve, the divided nation was reunified a year later. The collapse of the despotic regime was total. It was a euphoric time for Germans, but reunification also produced a new national dilemma. Nazi war crimes were still being tried in West Germany, forty-six years after World War II. Suddenly the German government was faced with demands that the communist officials who had ordered, executed, and abetted crimes against their own people—crimes that were as brutal as those perpetrated by their Nazi predecessors—also be prosecuted.
The people of the former Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR), the German Democratic Republic, as the state had called itself for forty years, were clamoring for instant revenge. Their wrath was directed primarily against the country’s communist rulers—the upper echelon of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei (SED), the Socialist Unity Party. The tens of thousands of second-echelon party functionaries who had enriched themselves at the expense of their cocitizens were also prime targets for retribution.
Particularly singled out were the former members of the Stasi, the East German secret police, who previously had considered themselves the “shield and sword” of the party. When the regime collapsed, the Stasi had 102,000 full-time officers and noncommissioned personnel on its rolls, including 11,000 members of the ministry’s own special guards regiment. Between 1950 and 1989, a total of 274,000 persons served in the Stasi.
The people’s ire was running equally strong against the regular Stasi informers, the inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (IMs). By 1995, 174,000 had been identified as IMs, or 2.5 percent of the total population between the ages of 18 and 60. Researchers were aghast when they found that about 10,000 IMs, or roughly 6 percent of the total, had not yet reached the age of 18. Since many records were destroyed, the exact number of IMs probably will never be determined; but 500,000 was cited as a realistic figure. Former Colonel Rainer Wiegand, who served in the Stasi counterintelligence directorate, estimated that the figure could go as high as 2 million, if occasional stool pigeons were included.
“The Stasi was much, much worse than the Gestapo, if you consider only the oppression of its own people,” according to Simon Wiesenthal of Vienna, Austria, who has been hunting Nazi criminals for half a century. “The Gestapo had 40,000 officials watching a country of 80 million, while the Stasi employed 102,000 to control only 17 million.” One might add that the Nazi terror lasted only twelve years, whereas the Stasi had four decades in which to perfect its machinery of oppression, espionage, and international terrorism and subversion.
To ensure that the people would become and remain submissive, East German communist leaders saturated their realm with more spies than had any other totalitarian government in recent history. The Soviet Union’s KGB employed about 480,000 full-time agents to oversee a nation of 280 million, which means there was one agent per 5,830 citizens. Using Wiesenthal’s figures for the Nazi Gestapo, there was one officer for 2,000 people. The ratio for the Stasi was one secret policeman per 166 East Germans. When the regular informers are added, these ratios become much higher: In the Stasi’s case, there would have been at least one spy watching every 66 citizens! When one adds in the estimated numbers of part-time snoops, the result is nothing short of monstrous: one informer per 6.5 citizens. It would not have been unreasonable to assume that at least one Stasi informer was present in any party of ten or twelve dinner guests.

THE STASI OCTOPUS

Like a giant octopus, the Stasi’s tentacles probed every aspect of life. Full-time officers were posted to all major industrial plants. Without exception, one tenant in every apartment building was designated as a watchdog reporting to an area representative of the Volkspolizei (Vopo), the People’s Police. In turn, the police officer was the Stasi’s man. If a relative or friend came to stay overnight, it was reported. Schools, universities, and hospitals were infiltrated from top to bottom. German academe was shocked to learn that Heinrich Fink, professor of theology and vice chancellor at East Berlin’s Humboldt University, had been a Stasi informer since 1968. After Fink’s Stasi connections came to light, he was summarily fired. Doctors, lawyers, journalists, writers, actors, and sports figures were co-opted by Stasi officers, as were waiters and hotel personnel. Tapping about 100,000 telephone lines in West Germany and West Berlin around the clock was the job of 2,000 officers.
Stasi officers knew no limits and had no shame when it came to “protecting the party and the state.” Churchmen, including high officials of both Protestant and Catholic denominations, were recruited en masse as secret informers. Their offices and confessionals were infested with eavesdropping devices. Even the director of Leipzig’s famous Thomas Church choir, Hans-Joachim Rotch, was forced to resign when he was unmasked as a Spitzel, the people’s pejorative for a Stasi informant.
Absolutely nothing was sacred to the secret police. Tiny holes were bored in apartment and hotel room walls through which Stasi agents filmed their “suspects” with special video cameras. Even bathrooms were penetrated by the communist voyeurs.8 Like the Nazi Gestapo, the Stasi was the sinister side of deutsche Gründlichkeit (German thoroughness).
After the Berlin wall came down, the victims of the DDR regime demanded immediate retribution. Ironically, their demands were countered by their fellow Germans in the West who, living in freedom, had diligently built einen demokratischen Rechtsstaat, a democratic state governed by the rule of law. The challenge of protecting the rights of both the victims and the accused was immense, given the emotions surrounding the issue. Government leaders and democratic politicians recognized that there could be no “quick fix” of communist injustices without jeopardizing the entire system of democratic jurisprudence. Moving too rapidly merely to satisfy the popular thirst for revenge might well have resulted in acquittals or mistrials. Intricate jurisdictional questions needed to be resolved with both alacrity and meticulousness. No German government could afford to allow a perpetrator to go free because of a judicial error. The political fallout from any such occurrence, especially in the East, could prove fatal to whatever political party occupied the chancellor’s office in Bonn at the time.
Politicians and legal scholars of the “old federal states,” or West Germany, counseled patience, pointing out that even the prosecution of Nazi criminals had not yet been completed. Before unification, Germans would speak of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (“coming to grips with the past”) when they discussed dealing with Nazi crimes. In the reunited Germany, this word came to imply the communist past as well. The two were considered comparable especially in the area of human rights violations. Dealing with major Nazi crimes, however, was far less complicated for the Germans: Adolf Hitler and his Gestapo and Schutzstaffel (SS) chief, Heinrich Himmler, killed themselves, as did Luftwaffe chief and Vice Chancellor Hermann Göring, who also had been the first chief of the Gestapo. The victorious Allies prosecuted the rest of the top leadership at the International War Crimes Tribunal in Nürnberg. Twelve were hanged, three received life terms, four were sentenced to lesser terms of imprisonment (up to twenty years), and three were acquitted.
The cases of communist judges and prosecutors accused of Rechtsbeugung (perversion of justice) are more problematic. According to Franco Werkenthin, a Berlin legal expert charged with analyzing communist crimes for the German parliament, those sitting in judgment of many of the accused face a difficult task because of the general failure of German justice after World War II. Not a single judge or prosecutor who served the Nazi regime was brought to account for having perverted justice—even those who had handed down death sentences for infringements that in a democracy would have been considered relatively minor offenses. Werkenthin called this phenomenon die Jauche der Justiz, the cesspool of justice.
Of course, the crimes committed by the communists were not nearly as heinous as the Nazis’ extermination of the Jews, or the mass murders in Nazi-occupied territories. However, the communists’ brutal oppression of the nation by means including murder alongside legal execution put the SED leadership on a par with Hitler’s gang. In that sense, Walter Ulbricht or Erich Honecker (Ulbricht’s successor as the party’s secretary-general and head of state) and secret police chief Erich Mielke can justifiably be compared to Hitler and Himmler, respectively.
Arrest warrants were issued for Honecker and Mielke. The Soviet government engineered Honecker’s escape to Moscow, where he became the ward of Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev. When the Soviet Union crumbled, the new Russian President Boris Yeltsin expelled Honecker. He was arrested on his return to Germany, but a court decided against a trial when he was diagnosed with liver cancer. Honecker flew to Chile with his wife Margot to live with their daughter, a Chilean citizen by marriage. His exile was short, and he died in 1994. Mielke was not so fortunate: His KGB friends turned their backs on him. He was tried in Germany for the 1931 murder of two police officers, found guilty, and sentenced to six years in prison. Other charges, including manslaughter, were dismissed because of his advanced age and poor health.
Three other members of the twenty-one-member ruling Politburo also have been tried. Former Defense Minister Heinz Kessler was convicted of manslaughter in connection with the order to kill people who were trying to escape to the West. He received a seven-and-a-half-year term. Two others, members of the Central Committee and the National Defense Council, were tried with Kessler and sentenced to seven and a half years and five years, respectively. Politburo member Harry Tisch, who was also head of the communist trade union, was found guilty of embezzlement and served eighteen months. Six others, including Egon Krenz (Honecker’s successor as party chief), were charged with manslaughter. Krenz was found guilty, and on August 25, 1997, was sentenced to six and a half years in prison.
However, eight years after reunification, many of the 165 members of the Central Committee have not yet been put under investigation. In 1945, Nazis holding comparable or lesser positions were subject to automatic arrest by the Allies. They spent months or even years in camps while their cases were adjudicated. Moreover, the Nürnberg Tribunal branded the Reich and its Corps of Political Leaders, SS, Security Service (SD), Secret State Police (Gestapo), SA (Storm Troopers), and Armed Forces High Command criminal organizations. Similarly sweeping actions against communist leaders and functionaries such as Stasi officers were never contemplated, even though tens of thousands of political trials and human rights abuses have been documented. After the East German regime fell, German judicial authorities scrupulously avoided the appearance of waging witch-hunts or using the law as a weapon of vengeance. Prosecutors and judges made great efforts to be fair, often suspending legal action while requesting rulings from the supreme court on possible constitutional conflicts.
The victims of oppression clamored for revenge and demanded speedy prosecution of the erstwhile tyrants. They had little patience for a judicial system that was handicapped by a lack of unblemished and experienced criminal investigators, prosecutors, and judges. Despite these handicaps, the Berlin Central Police Investigations Group for Government Criminality, mindful that the statute of limitations for most communist crimes would expire at the end of 1999, made significant progress under its director Manfred Kittlaus, the able former director of the West Berlin state police. Kittlaus’s major task in 1998 was to investigate wrongful deaths, including 73 murders, 30 attempted murders, 583 cases of manslaughter, 2,938 instances of attempted manslaughter, and 425 other suspicious deaths. Of the 73 murders, 22 were classified as contract murders.
One of those tried and convicted for attempted contract murder was former Stasi collaborator Peter Haak, who was sentenced to six and a half years in prison. The fifty-two-year-old Haak took part in the Stasi’s 1981 Operation Scorpion, which was designed to pursue people who helped East Germans escape to the West. Proceedings against former General Gerhard Neiber, whose Stasi directorate was responsible for preventing escapes and for wreaking vengeance, were still pending in 1998.
Peter Haak’s murder plot was hatched after he befriended Wolfgang Welsch and his family. Welsch was a thorn in the side of the Stasi because of his success in smuggling people out of the DDR. Haak joined Welsch and the latter’s wife and seven-year-old daughter on a vacation in Israel, where he mixed a gram of thallium, a highly poisonous metallic chemical element used in rat poison, into the hamburgers he was preparing for a meal. Welsch’s wife and daughter vomited immediately after ingesting the poison and recovered quickly. Welsch suffered severe aftereffects, but eventually recovered: He had consumed a large amount of beer with the meal, and an expert testified that the alcohol had probably flushed the poison from his system.
Berlin Prosecutor General Christoph Schäfgen revealed that after the DDR’s demise 15,200 investigations had been launched, of which more than 9,000 were still active at the beginning of 1995. Indictments were handed down in 153 cases, and 73 perpetrators were convicted. Among those convicted were the aforementioned Politburo members as well as a number of border guards who had killed people who were trying to escape to the West.
Despite widespread misgivings about the judicial failures in connection with some Nazi crimes, a number of judges and prosecutors were convicted and jailed for up to three years for perversion of justice. In collusion with the Stasi, they had requested or handed down more severe sentences in political cases so that the state could collect greater amounts when the “convicts” were ransomed by the West German government. {The amount of ransom paid was governed by the time a prisoner had been sentenced to serve.)
The enormity of the task facing judicial authorities in reunified Germany becomes starkly evident when one examines the actions they have taken in all five former East German provinces and in East Berlin. From the end of 1990 to July 1996, 52,050 probes were launched into charges of murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, election fraud, and perversion of justice. A total of 29,557 investigations were halted for various reasons including death, severe illness, old age, or insufficient evidence. In those five and a half years, there were only 139 convictions.
The problem is even more staggering when cases of espionage are included. Between 1990 and 1996, the office of the federal prosecutor general launched 6,641 probes, of which 2,431 were terminated before trial—most due to the statute of limitations. Of 175 indictments on charges of espionage, 95 resulted in convictions. In addition to the cases handled at the federal level, the prosecutor general referred 3,926 investigations to state authorities, who terminated 3,344 without trial. State courts conducted 356 trials, resulting in 248 convictions. Because the statute of limitations for espionage is five years, the prosecutor general’s office told me in 1997 it was unlikely that more espionage trials would be conducted.
It is important to emphasize the difference between the statute’s application to so-called government crimes committed in East Germany before the collapse and to crimes, such as espionage, committed in West Germany. The Unification Treaty specifically permits the belated prosecution of individuals who committed acts that were punishable under the East German criminal code and who due to official connivance were not prosecuted earlier. There is no statute of limitations for murder. For most other crimes the limit is five years; however, due to the obstacles created by previous government connivance, the German parliament in 1993 doubled this time limit for prosecution of the more serious crimes. At the same time, the parliament decreed that all cases must be adjudicated by the end of 2002. For less serious offenses, the statute would have run out on December 31, 1997, but the parliament extended it to 2000.
A number of politicians, jurists, and liberal journalists pleaded for a general amnesty for crimes committed by former DDR leaders and Communist Party functionaries. A former West German supreme court judge, Ernst Mahrenholz, said the “sharp sword of justice prevents reconciliation.” Schäfgen, the Berlin prosecutor general, had this answer for the former high court judge and other amnesty advocates:

I cannot agree. We are raising no special, sharp sword against East Germans. We must pursue state-sponsored injustice in exactly the same manner as we do when a thief steals or when one human being kills another. If one wants to change that, then we would have to do away with the entire criminal justice system, because punishment always hurts. We are not criminalizing an entire people but only an ever shrinking, small portion.

German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, who was West Germany’s minister of justice when the nation was unified, said this at a session of parliament in September 1991: “We must punish the perpetrators. This is not a matter of a victor’s justice. We owe it to the ideal of justice and to the victims. All of those who ordered injustices and those who executed the orders must be punished; the top men of the SED as well as the ones who shot [people] at the wall.” Aware that the feelings against communists were running high among their victims, Kinkel pointed to past revolutions after which the representatives of the old system were collectively liquidated. In the same speech before parliament, he said:

Such methods are alien to a state ruled by law. Violence and vengeance are incompatible with the law in any case. At the same time, we cannot tolerate that the problems are swept under the rug as a way of dealing with a horrible past, because the results will later be disastrous for society. We Germans know from our own experience where this leads. Jewish philosophy formulates it in this way: “The secret of redemption is called remembering.”

Defense attorneys for communist officials have maintained that the difficulty lies in the fact that hundreds of thousands of political opponents were tried under laws of the DDR. Although these laws were designed to smother political dissent and grossly violated basic human rights and democratic norms, they were nonetheless laws promulgated by a sovereign state. How could one justly try individual Stasi officers, prosecutors, and judges who had simply been fulfilling their legal responsibility to pursue and punish violators of the law?
Opinions varied widely on whether and how the Stasi and other perpetrators of state-sponsored crimes should be tried. Did the laws of the DDR, as they existed before reunification, still apply in the east? Or was the criminal code of the western part of the country the proper instrument of justice in reunified Germany? However, these questions were moot: As Rupert Scholz, professor of law at the University of Munich and a Christian Democratic member of parliament, pointed out, the Unification Treaty specifies that the penal code of the DDR and not that of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) shall be applied to offenses committed in East Germany. Scholz’s view was upheld by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the supreme court. Most offenses committed by party functionaries and Stasi officers—murder, kidnapping, torture, illegal wiretapping, mail robbery, and fraud—were subject to prosecution in reunified Germany under the DDR’s penal code. But this would not satisfy the tens of thousands of citizens who had been sent to prison under East German laws covering purely political offenses for which there was no West German equivalent.
Nevertheless, said Scholz, judicial authorities were by no means hamstrung, because West Germany had never recognized the East German state according to international law. “We have always said that we are one nation; that the division of Germany led neither to full recognition under international law nor, concomitantly, to a recognition of the legal system of the DDR,” Scholz said. Accordingly, West German courts have consistently maintained that West German law protects all Germans equally, including those living in the East. Therefore, no matter where the crimes were committed, whether in the East or the West, all Germans have always been subject to West German laws. Applying this logic, East German border guards who had either killed or wounded persons trying to escape to the West could be tried under the jurisdiction of West Germany.
The “one nation” principle was not upheld by the German supreme court. Prior to the court’s decision, however, Colonel General Markus Wolf, chief of the Stasi’s foreign espionage directorate, and some of his officers who personally controlled agents from East Berlin had been tried for treason and convicted. Wolf had been sentenced to six years in prison. The supreme court ruling overturned that verdict and those imposed on Wolf’s cohorts, even though they had obtained the most closely held West German secrets and handed them over to the KGB. The maximum penalty for Landesverrat, or treason, is life imprisonment. In vacating Wolf’s sentence, the court said he could not be convicted because he operated only from East German territory and under East German law.
However, Wolf was reindicted on charges of kidnapping and causing bodily harm, crimes also punishable under East German law. The former Stasi three-star general, on March 24, 1955, had approved in writing a plan to kidnap a woman who worked for the U.S. mission in West Berlin. The woman and her mother were tricked by a Stasi agent whom the woman had been teaching English, and voluntarily got into his car. He drove them into the Soviet sector of the divided city, where they were seized by Stasi officers. The woman was subjected to psychological torture and threatened with imprisonment unless she signed an agreement to spy for the Stasi. She agreed. On her return to the American sector, however, the woman reported the incident to security officials. Wolf had committed a felony punishable by up to fifteen years’ imprisonment in West Germany. He was found guilty in March 1977 and sentenced to two years’ probation.
Those who have challenged the application of the statute of limitations to communist crimes, especially to the executions of citizens fleeing to the West, have drawn parallels to the notorious executive orders of Adolf Hitler. Hitler issued orders mandating the summary execution of Soviet Army political commissars upon their capture and initiating the extermination of Jews. An early postwar judicial decision held that these orders were equivalent to law. When that law was declared illegal and retroactively repealed by the West German Bundestag, the statute of limitations was suspended—that is, it never took effect. Many of those convicted in subsequent trials of carrying out the Führer’s orders were executed by the Allies. The German supreme court has ruled the same way as the Bundestag on the order to shoot people trying to escape to West Germany, making the statute of limitations inapplicable to such cases. The ruling made possible the trial of members of the National Defense Council who took part in formulating or promulgating the order. A number of border guards who had shot would-be escapees also have been tried and convicted.
Chief Prosecutor Heiner Sauer, former head of the West German Central Registration Office for Political Crimes, was particularly concerned with the border shootings. His office, located in Salzgitter, West Germany, was established in 1961 as a direct consequence of the Berlin Wall, which was erected on August 13 of that year. Willy Brandt, at the time the city’s mayor (later federal chancellor) had decided that crimes committed by East German border guards should be recorded. At his behest, a central registry of all shootings and other serious border incidents was instituted. Between August 13, 1961 and the opening of the borders on November 9, 1989, 186 border killings were registered. But when the Stasi archives were opened, investigators found that at least 825 people had paid with their lives for trying to escape to the West. This figure was reported to the court that was trying former members of the National Defense Council. In addition to these border incidents, the registry also had recorded a number of similar political offenses committed in the interior of the DDR: By fall 1991, Sauer’s office had registered 4,444 cases of actual or attempted killings and about 40,000 sentences handed down by DDR courts for “political offenses.”
During the early years of Sauer’s operation, the details of political prosecutions became known only when victims were ransomed by West Germany or were expelled. Between 1963 and 1989, West Germany paid DM5 billion (nearly US$3 billion) to the communist regime for the release of 34,000 political prisoners. The price per head varied according to the importance of the person or the length of the sentence. In some cases the ransom amounted to more than US$56,000. The highest sum ever paid to the East Germans appears to have been DM450,000 (US$264,705 using an exchange rate of US$1.70 to the mark). The ransom “object” in this case was Count Benedikt von Hoensbroech. A student in his early twenties, von Hoensbroech was attending a West Berlin university when the wall went up. He was caught by the Stasi while trying to help people escape and was sentenced to ten years at hard labor. The case attracted international attention because his family was related to Queen Fabiola of Belgium, who interceded with the East Germans. Smelling money, the East German government first demanded the equivalent of more than US$1 million from the young man’s father as ransom. In the end, the parties settled on the figure of DM450,000, of which the West German government paid DM40,000 (about $23,529). Such ransom operations were fully controlled by the Stasi.
Political prisoners released in the DDR could not be registered by the West Germans because their cases remained secret. The victims were admonished to keep quiet or face another prison term. Nonetheless, in the first year after reunification, Sauer’s office added another 20,000 documented cases, for a total of 60,000. Sauer said he believed the final figure of all political prosecutions would be somewhere around 300,000. In every case, the Stasi was involved either in the initial arrest or in pretrial interrogations during which “confessions” were usually extracted by physical or psychological torture, particularly between the mid-1940s and the mid-1960s.
Until 1987, the DDR imposed the death penalty for a number of capital crimes, including murder, espionage, and economic offenses. But after the mid-1950s, nearly all death sentences were kept quiet and executions were carried out in the strictest secrecy, initially by guillotine and in later years by a single pistol shot to the neck. In most instances, the relatives of those killed were not informed either of the sentence or of the execution. The corpses were cremated and the ashes buried secretly, sometimes at construction sites. In reporting about one executioner who shot more than twenty persons to death, the Berlin newspaper Bildzeitung said that a total of 170 civilians had been executed in East Germany. However, Franco Werkenthin, the Berlin official investigating DDR crimes, said he had documented at least three hundred executions. He declined to say how many were for political offenses, because he had not yet submitted his report to parliament. “But it was substantial,” he told me. The true number of executions may never be known because no complete record of death sentences meted out by civil courts could be found. Other death sentences were handed down by military courts, and many records of those are also missing. In addition, German historian Günther Buch believes that about two hundred members of the Stasi itself were executed for various crimes, including attempts to escape to the West.

SAFEGUARDING HUMAN DIGNITY?

The preamble to the East German criminal code stated that the purpose of the code was to “safeguard the dignity of humankind, its freedom and rights under the aegis of the criminal code of the socialist state,” and that “a person can be prosecuted under the criminal code only in strictest concurrence with the law.” However, many of the codified offenses for which East German citizens were prosecuted and imprisoned were unique to totalitarian regimes, both fascist and communist.
Moreover, certain sections of the code, such as those on “Treasonable Relaying of Information” and “Treasonable Agent Activity,” were perversely applied, landing countless East Germans in maximum security penitentiaries. The victims of this perversion of justice usually were persons who had requested legal exit permits from the DDR authorities and had been turned down. In many cases, their “crime” was having contacted a Western consulate to inquire about immigration procedures. Sentences of up to two and a half years’ hard labor were not unusual as punishment for such inquiries.
Engaging in “propaganda hostile to the state” was another punishable offense. In one such case, a young man was arrested and prosecuted for saying that it was not necessary to station tanks at the border and for referring to border fortifications as “nonsense.” During his trial, he “admitted” to owning a television set on which he watched West German programs and later told friends what he saw. One of those “friends” had denounced him to the Stasi. The judge considered the accused’s actions especially egregious and sentenced him to a year and a half at hard labor.
Ironically, another part of this section of the criminal code decreed that “glorifying militarism” also was a punishable offense, although the DDR itself “glorified” its People’s Army beyond any Western norm. That army was clad in uniforms and insignia identical to those of the Nazi Wehrmacht, albeit without eagles and swastikas. The helmets, too, were differently shaped, but the Prussian goose step was regulation during parades.
A nineteen-year-old who had placed a sign in an apartment window reading “When justice is turned into injustice, resistance becomes an obligation!” was rewarded with twenty-two months in the penitentiary. Earlier, the youth had applied for an exit visa and had been turned down. A thirty-four-year-old father of two who also had been denied permission to leave the “workers’ and peasants’ state” with his family similarly advertised that fact with a poster reading “We want to leave, but they won’t let us.” The man went to prison for sixteen months. The “crimes” of both men were covered by a law on “Interference in Activities of the State or Society.”
Two letters—one to a friend in West Germany, seeking assistance to legally emigrate to the West, and another containing a similar appeal to Chief of State Honecker—brought a four-year sentence to their writer, who was convicted under two laws: those on “establishing illegal contacts” (writing to his friend) and on “public denigration” (writing to Honecker). The Stasi had illegally intercepted both letters.
The East German party chiefs were not content to rely only on the Stasi’s millions of informers to ferret out antistate sentiments. Leaving nothing to chance, they created a law that made the failure to denounce fellow citizens a crime punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. One man was sentenced to twenty-three months for failing to report that a friend of his was preparing to escape to the West. The mandatory denunciation law had its roots in the statutes of the Socialist Unity Party, which were published in the form of a little red booklet. I picked up a copy of this booklet that had been discarded by its previous owner, a Stasi chauffeur, who had written “Ha, Ha” next to the mandate to “report any misdeeds, regardless of the person responsible, to leading party organs, all the way up to the Central Committee.”
Rupert Scholz, member of parliament and professor of law at the University of Munich, said many East Germans feel there is little determination among their Western brethren to bring the Stasi criminals to trial. “In fact, we already have heard many of them say that the peaceful revolution should have been a bloody one instead so they could have done away with their tormentors by hanging them posthaste,” Scholz told me.
The Reverend Joachim Gauck, minister to a Lutheran parish in East Germany, shared the people’s pessimism that justice would be done. Following reunification, Gauck was appointed by the Bonn government as its special representative for safeguarding and maintaining the Stasi archives. “We must at least establish a legal basis for finding the culprits in our files,” Gauck told me. “But it will not be easy. If you stood the millions of files upright in one line, they would stretch for 202 kilometers [about 121 miles]. In those files you can find an unbelievable number of Stasi victims and their tormentors.”
Gauck was given the mandate he needed in November 1991, when the German parliament passed a law authorizing file searches to uncover Stasi perpetrators and their informants. He viewed this legislation as first step in the right direction. With the evidence from Stasi files, the perpetrators could be removed from their public service jobs without any formal legal proceedings. Said Gauck: “We needed this law badly. It is not reasonable that persons who served this apparatus of oppression remain in positions of trust.”

See more at the journalist Bernd Pulch website http://www.berndpulch.org

Opfer: VON RUFMÖRDERN u. Serienbetrügern erfundene “GoMoPa-SJB”: “Wer stoppt Rufmorde ?”

http://www.victims-opfer.com/?p=16359

TOP-SECRET – Operación México: Programa argentino de rendición extraordinaria revelado por documentos desclasificados

En julio de 1978, fuerzas de seguridad argentinas, enviaron documentación a sus pares en Paraguay buscando al fugado Jaime Dri, único testigo sobreviviente de la Operación México.

Operación México: Programa argentino de rendición extraordinaria revelado por documentos desclasificados

Analista del National Security Archive presenta nueva evidencia ante un tribunal argentino

Septiembre 9, 2009, Washington, DC – El National Security Archive revela hoy un documento que Jaime Dri, único sobreviviente, conoció directamente sobre la Operación México que forzó a desaparecidos detenidos en Rosario a participar en un escuadrón de la muerte para infiltrar a la dirección de Montoneros en Ciudad de México en enero de 1978. “DRI JAIME ‘Pelado'” indica el documento, estuvo presente cuando vino “de regreso de México, la comisión oficial” que salió de Rosario.

Dri fue capturado en diciembre de 1977 y luego pasó por un periplo que lo llevó a varios centros de detención clandestina incluyendo el de Rosario donde encontró a 14 detenidos hoy desaparecidos, a Tucho Valenzuela y a agentes de inteligencia que forzaron a algunos a viajar a México. El 19 de Julio Dri se escapó a Asunción, Paraguay. Sus captores clandestinos, enviaron desesperadas peticiones a sus pares en Paraguay y dejaron pistas sobre lo que vio Dri durante esos ocho meses. Un informe del 21 de julio de 1978  del Estado Mayor General del Ejercito de las Fuerzas Armadas Paraguayas encontrado en el Archivo del Terror dice que han recibido un pedido de búsqueda de una agencia secreta argentina por Jaime Dri quien “se escapó de las Autoridades Argentinas de Pilcomayo, Argentina” hacia Paraguay. El pedido de Argentina incluye un prontuario de dos páginas sobre Dri donde claramente establecen que “De regreso de México, la comisión oficial que acompaño a ‘TUCHO’ le hizo saber a DRI JAIME ‘Pelado'” noticias de México. ‘TUCHO'” Valenzuela, fue uno de los secuestrados sacado de una prisión en Argentina y forzado a viajar con los agentes de inteligencia.

El informe descubierto por Carlos Osorio, director del Proyecto de Documentación del Cono Sur del National Security Archive, en el Archivo del Terror del Paraguay, fue presentado ayer ante el tribunal numero 1 de Rosario Argentina, donde se enjuicia a agentes del destacamento de inteligencia 121. La causa Guerrieri, por el nombre de uno de los imputados, trata de la detención ilegal y posterior asesinato de 14 insurgentes Montoneros en una cárcel secreta en la ciudad de Rosario, Argentina. Los prisioneros habrían sido testigos y forzados a colaborar en lo que se conoce como Operación México, un escuadrón de inteligencia militar enviado a Ciudad de México a liquidar a cabecillas Montoneros en enero de 1978. [Ver 1978: Operación Clandestina de la Inteligencia Militar Argentina en México, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 241]

Los documentos de Paraguay se complementan con la media docena de otros publicados en enero de 2008 por el National Security Archive provenientes de la Dirección Federal de Seguridad de México (DFS) que dan cuenta que la DFS capturó e interrogó a dos de los agentes secretos argentinos y los expulsó de vuelta a su país. “Los nuevos documentos concluyen una triangulación de evidencia documental internacional sobre Operación México y confirman la veracidad del testimonio de Dri que por años, fue conocido solamente por el libro Recuerdos de la Muerte” dijo Carlos Osorio.

Esta gacetilla electrónica incluye los documentos centrales provenientes del Archivo del Terror y están acompañados de otros doce de EEUU, Argentina y México que verifican la solidez de la historia aparecida en el libro Recuerdo de la Muerte. Paso a paso, los documentos que presentamos hoy en esta gacetilla presentan una narrativa que calza perfectamente con el testimonio de Dri: su captura y herida en Uruguay, su traslado clandestino a la Escuela Mecánica de la Armada (ESMA) en Buenos Aires y luego Rosario, el haber sido testigo de Operación México, estar nuevamente en la ESMA y haberse escapado a través de Asunción Paraguay. Un informe de la Embajada de EEUU por ejemplo informa que Dri fue “detenido cerca de Montevideo el pasado 15 de diciembre” y SERA entregado “solapadamente a las autoridades argentinas” en 1977. Por otra parte un documento secreto de una agencia de inteligencia argentina informa que en julio de 1978 “se escapó de un Taxi camino a Itá Enramada [Paraguay] de su custodia”.

Luego de escapar a Paraguay, Dri se refugió en la Embajada de Panamá, país de origen de su esposa y donde finalmente se radicó.


Documentos
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Los documentos del Archivo del Terror usados en esta publicación son propiedad de la Corte Suprema de Justicia y han sido puestos a disposición pública gracias a la cortesía y anuencia de la Excelentísima Corte Suprema de Justicia, en el marco de varios Convenios en apoyo del Centro de Documentación y Archivo (CDyA). Copias oficiales de los originales pueden ser pedidas al CDyA, PALACIO DE JUSTICIA, Testanova y Mariano Roque Alonso, 8vo. Piso Of.13, Asunción -Paraguay, Tel: 595-21-424212/15 Interno: 2269, e-mail: cdya_py@hotmail.com, http://www.pj.gov.py/cdya. Los nuevos descubrimientos han sido hechos usando una  herramienta clave de investigación del CDyA, el Archivo del Terror Digital (ATD). El ATD es un instrumento que cuenta con la digitalización en una base de datos de los más de 300,00 documentos del Archivo del Terror.


Diciembre 30, 1977 – Derechos Humanos: Arresto por el GOU del Pianista Miguel Estrella y Otros Presuntos Montoneros en Uruguay

Cable Secreto de la Embajada de EEUU en Montevideo

La Embajada de EEUU en Uruguay informa que el arresto del pianista argentino refugiado en Uruguay Miguel Ángel Estrella es parte de una serie de redadas llevadas a cabo entre el 15 y 16 de diciembre donde han sido capturados ocho Montoneros. Estos últimos “se encuentran esperando ser extraditados a Argentina”.

Jaime Dri, en el recuento de su detención clandestina, da cuenta* que él cayó en esta redada. La palabra “extraditados” es usada en el cable como un eufemismo. Investigaciones realizadas posteriormente dan prueba que los prisioneros fueron trasladados ilegalmente de una fuerza de seguridad uruguaya a una fuerza de seguridad argentina.

*”Al  menos era todo lo que el Pelado [Jaime Dri] recordaba. La explicación más sencilla era que toda la estructura clandestina había caído a partir de la vigilancia de la punta del iceberg: la casa de [Miguel Ángel] Estrella”.
(Bonasso, 56)


Enero 4, 1978 – Derechos Humanos: Rubén De Gregorio

Cable Secreto de la Embajada de EEUU en Montevideo

La Embajada estadounidense en Montevideo informa que el ciudadano argentino Rubén De Gregorio fue capturado por autoridades uruguayas mientras intentaba ingresar al país…. Al ser arrestado, De Gregorio tenía en su posesión un revolver calibre .38…” Posteriormente, dice el cable, fue “entregado a las autoridades argentinas”.

Jaime Dri en sus declaraciones* da cuenta de haber estado prisionero con De Gregorio en el centro clandestino de detención de la Escuela Mecánica de la Armada Argentina, ESMA.

*”‘Sordo De Gregorio, un oficial superior del Partido [Montoneros] que  había  caído en Colonia, cuando le encontraron un revólver  dentro  de  un  termo  para  el  mate” (Bonasso, 55-56)


Enero 6, 1978 – Rubén De Gregorio

Cable secreto de la Embajada de EEUU en Buenos Aires

Dando seguimiento al cable de la Embajada en Montevideo del 4 de enero, la Embajada de EEUU en Argentina informa que “una fuente de de habitud  confiable…. Dijo el 19 de diciembre de 1977 que De Gregorio era un oficial de alto rango dentro de los Montoneros y que estaba detenido en le Escuela Mecánica de la Armada”.

De Gregorio desapareció luego de ser visto prisionero en la ESMA por varios testigos incluyendo a Jaime Dri*.

*”Ya en las proximidades de la ESMA los del Falcon llamaron a Selenio, anunciando el regreso. Diez minutos después los enfermeros depositaban  al  Sordo [De Gregorio]  en  una  camilla de la enfermería”. (Bonasso, 321)


Enero 12, 1978 – Petición de Asistencia de EEUU para Encontrar a Parlamentario

Cable Secreto de la Embajada de EEUU en Roma

El Ministro Consejero (Deputy Chief of Mission) estadounidense en Roma explica al Departamento de Estado y las Embajadas en Montevideo y Buenos Aires que el Embajador ha recibido una carta del Nuncio Apostólico pidiendo ayuda para localizar a parlamentario argentino Jaime Dri. El Nuncio ha tomado esta iniciativa a instancias del hermano de Jaime Dri, quien es sacerdote en Roma. Según la información proporcionada, Jaime Dri se encontraba en Uruguay cuando se dejo de comunicar con su familia en diciembre. Se dice que la familia Dri tiene amistad con el presidente panameño Omar Torrijos. El Nuncio solicita que la embajada estadounidense en Montevideo investigue para aclarar lo que ha sido de Jaime Dri.


Enero 18, 1978 – [Conferencia de Prensa de Tucho Valenzuela]

Transcripción de la Dirección Federal de Seguridad de México

En una explosiva conferencia de prensa en Ciudad de México, el Montonero Tulio [Tucho] Valenzuela cuenta como fue capturado en Rosario, Argentina, a finales del año 1977, detenido clandestinamente junto a un grupo de Montoneros forzados a colaborar con el ejército argentino, y traído a México junto a otro colaborador y agentes de inteligencia argentinos con el fin de dar un golpe a Montoneros que tiene una base política en México. Una vez en esta ciudad, Valenzuela escapa al control de los agentes de inteligencia argentinos y denuncia la operación ante la prensa. Este documento obtenido de la Dirección Federal de Seguridad de México, transcribe las declaraciones de Valenzuela. Entre otras revelaciones, Valenzuela da cuenta que:

“En una parte del Segundo Cuerpo del Ejercito [argentino en Rosario] uno de los compañeros que está en esa quinta es el compañero Jaime Dri, quien me relata su historia de su detención y como llegó hasta ahí. El compañero fue detenido en la calle cuando estaba en un auto, después de una cita junto con el compañero Juan Alejandro Barry. Los chocaron en un auto. Ellos estaban desarmados. Esto fue en Uruguay. Trataron de escaparse… al compañero Barry lo matan y el compañero Jaime Dri recibe dos impactos, uno en cada pierna. Inmediatamente es trasladado… [a] dependencias militares del ejército del Uruguay y torturado salvajemente por 15 días…. Participan en el interrogatorio miembros de la Escuela Mecánica de la Armada de la Argentina… Trasladan al compañero Jaime Dri a la Escuela Mecánica de la Armada… posteriormente el compañero Jaime Dri es trasladado a Rosario, a la misma quinta donde estoy yo… Me relata también las circunstancias de la caída de un comandante segundo del partido [Montoneros], compañero De Gregorio, que fue capturado en Colonia [Uruguay] el 14 de Noviembre…”

Tulio Valenzuela informa además que antes de llegar a México los agentes de inteligencia y prisioneros pasaron por Brasil y Guatemala. En sus declaraciones aparecidas en el libro Recuerdo de la Muerte, Jaime Dri cuenta que fue trasladado de la ESMA a Rosario temporalmente, donde encontró a Tulio Valenzuela y se enteró de la operación de la inteligencia militar a México.

Nota: El transcriptor de la conferencia de prensa es seguramente un agente de inteligencia mexicano que desconoce el contexto por lo que varios nombres en la transcripción están cambiados seguramente por ignorancia del transcriptor sobre como deletrear los nombres originales. Jaime Dri por  ejemplo aparece como Jaime Lee. Una versión original de estas declaraciones encontrada entre los documentos del Departamento de EEUU, fue publicada en 2008 en la gacetilla electrónica Operación Clandestina de la Inteligencia Militar Argentina en México, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 241.


Enero 20, 1978 – [Carta al Presidente de EEUU James Carter de Olimpia Díaz]

Copia de carta en archivos del Departamento de Estado de EEUU

Dos días después de enterarse del testimonio del ciudadano argentino Tulio Valenzuela en México, la esposa de Jaime Dri, la panameña Olimpia Díaz, envía una carta dirigida al presidente estadounidense James Carter solicitando su ayuda para localizar a su esposo. Olimpia explica que antes de desaparecer, su esposo fue visto por última vez en Montevideo el 10 de diciembre de 1977, de camino a Panamá. Además, se ha enterado que a mediados de diciembre, varios argentinos fueron detenidos en Uruguay y trasladados a Argentina, lo cual coincide con la desaparición de su esposo y teme que él se encuentre entre ellos. Lo que confirmó sus sospechas fueron las declaraciones hechas por Tulio Valenzuela. Al final de su carta, Olimpia añade que su cuñado, hermano de Jaime Dri, “ha realizado gestiones ante la Santa Sede”.


Enero 23, 1978 – Parlamentario Desaparecido – Jaime Feliciano Dri Lodi

Cable Secreto de la Embajada de EEUU en Montevideo

En respuesta a la solicitud de la embajada estadounidense en Roma el 12 de enero de 1978, la embajada estadounidense en Montevideo envía un cable secreto dirigido a sus homólogos en Roma, explicando que Jaime Dri fue “detenido cerca de Montevideo el pasado 15 de diciembre, durante una redada de las fuerzas de seguridad locales contra terroristas argentinos Montoneros”. Y agrega que “el sujeto ofreció resistencia armada y fue herido en la pierna antes de su captura. Además nos han informado que el GOU [Gobierno de Uruguay] tiene la intención de entregar a todos los detenidos solapadamente a las autoridades argentinas… la detención del sujeto [Dri] no es, repito, no es de conocimiento público… Los detalles del incidente, las identidades de los arrestados que no han sido publicadas y su eventual destino, es información retenida firmemente por el GOU”. El cable termina diciendo que “la información anterior es clasificada y extremadamente sensible y es todo lo que está a disposición de la embajada y no pensamos que sea posible extraer información útil y desclasificada que pueda ser transmitida al Nuncio Apostólico en Roma”.


Marzo 17, 1978 – [Carta a Olimpia Díaz]

Inquisitoria Respecto de Jaime Dri
Documentos de la Embajada de EEUU en Panamá

A instancias de la Casa Blanca, la Segunda Secretaria de la embajada estadounidense en Panamá, Ruth Hansen, se comunica con Olimpia Díaz informándole que están requiriendo a la Embajada de EEUU en Argentina que recaben cualquier información que tengan respecto de Jaime Dri. Ese mismo día, Hansen envía un memorándum a la Embajada de EEUU en Buenos Aires pidiéndole información sobre el caso de Jaime Dri. Sorprendentemente, no se menciona por ninguna parte la información que tiene la Embajada de EEUU en Montevideo sobre la efectiva detención de Jaime Dri y su probable traslado a fuerzas de seguridad argentinas.


Abril 10, 1978 – [Carta de Horacio Domingo Maggio a Prensa Asociada]

[Carta de Horacio Domingo Maggio al Embajador de Estados Unidos]
Carta personal en los archivos del Departamento de Estado

Un prisionero clandestino que ha escapado de la Escuela Mecánica de la Armada envía una larga carta al Embajador de los Estados Unidos Raúl Castro y a la Prensa Asociada (Associated Press, AP). En ella da cuenta de un inmenso centro de detención en esas instalaciones y de las aberrantes prácticas de tortura. En particular, Horacio Domingo Maggio cuenta que “Me trasladaron a lo que luego supe era la Escuela Mecánica de la Armada. Fui sometido a torturas (‘picana’ o ‘maquina’ y ‘submarino’) al igual que la mayoría de la gente que estaba allí y que aun sigue estando. Entre otros… el dirigente nacional del Movimiento Peronista Montonero, Jaime Dri, que fuera secuestrado en Uruguay”.


Junio 23, 1978 – Desaparición de Jaime Dri  

En respuesta a la carta de la embajada estadounidense en Panamá del 17 de marzo de 1978, la embajada en Buenos Aires informa que presentó el caso de Jaime Dri al Grupo de Trabajo de Derechos Humanos de la Oficina del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores argentino. Sin embargo, Buenos Aires hace notar que esa oficina sólo suele responder a “solicitudes donde las personas han sido detenidas legalmente bajo cargos criminales o por decreto del ejecutivo”. La implicación es que probablemente no obtendrán respuesta positiva debido a que Dri está desaparecido, es decir detenido clandestinamente. Sorprende que al final el cable deje entrever que no conocen la información que la Embajada de Montevideo tiene respecto de la efectiva detención de Dri. El Embajador Castro concluye remitiendo “Para la Embajada de Montevideo: Materiales sobre este caso están siendo enviados por valija diplomática pues parece que el secuestro ocurrió en Uruguay”.


Julio 20, 1978 – Desaparición de Jaime Dri

Una breve nota de la Embajada de Panamá  responde al memo de Buenos Aires e indica que Olimpia Díaz fue notificada de los magros resultados que se han obtenido en Argentina. Según el informe, Olimpia Díaz también se ha puesto en contacto con el gobierno de Panamá, que supuestamente está investigando el caso a través de su embajada en Argentina.


Julio 20, 1978 – [Datos Personales del Sujeto Jaime Dri]

Nota de la Policía de Asunción, Paraguay

El Jefe de la policía de Asunción, Paraguay, remite a su subalterno Jefe de la Dirección de Investigaciones “fotocopia de la fotografía y datos personales del sujeto Jaime Dri, a fin de que se sirva disponer su captura”. Los datos han sido proveídos evidentemente a los paraguayos por una fuerza de seguridad argentina.

Junto a la fotografía, una serie de datos indican “Jaime Dri, ‘Pelado’, Oficial de Montoneros… Camisa a cuadros, pantalón gris”. Y concluyen “Ayer, se escapo de un Taxi camino a Itá Enramada de su custodia”*.

* En Recuerdo de la Muerte este episodio es relatado así: “- Yo me tomo un taxi…
-¡Vamos a Itá Enramada! – ordena [el custodia] Alberto… Antes de que se detenga la marcha, el Pelado [Jaime Dri] abre la puerta y se lanza…” (Bonasso, 428)


Julio 21, 1978

  1. Pedido de búsqueda N° 020/78:  Actividades de elementos subversivos Montoneros
  2. Anexo 1: Fotos, factura y documento de identidad

Documento del Estado Mayor General de la Fuerza Armada de  Paraguay (ESMAGENFA)

La Policía de Asunción, Paraguay, transcribe un informe del Departamento II de Inteligencia del Estado Mayor General de las Fuerzas Armadas Paraguayas (ESMAGENFA). El Ejército ha recibido de una “Agencia de Inteligencia de país amigo” una petición de capturar a Jaime Dri quien “se escapó de las Autoridades Argentinas de Pilcomayo, Argentina” hacia el Paraguay. “En el momento de la fuga, el causante vestía una camisa mangas largas a rayas verticales, color rosado y pantalones gris”*. Entre los anexos al pedido de búsqueda se incluyen fotos, una factura, documento de identidad y un Prontuario sobre Jaime Dri.

*En Recuerdo de la Muerte, Jaime Dri reflexiona que “[l]a policía debe tener ya la descripción de un hombre alto, calvo, así y así, vestido con un vaquero y una camisa de color rosado” (Bonasso, 430).


Julio 21, 1978 – Anexo 1: Prontuario: Informe Acerca de la Situación Personal de Jaime Dri, Pelado

Documento de Agencia de Seguridad Argentina

El Pedido de Búsqueda No 020/78 de la ESAMGENFA del Paraguay incluye un Prontuario de una agencia de inteligencia Argentina desconocida. El documento da un panorama general de Jaime Dri y sus actitudes disidentes de Montoneros. En un remarcable párrafo, el documento confirma media docena de aspectos secretos clave de Operación México, que hasta hoy sólo se conocían por el testimonio de Jaime Dri. Lanzada en enero de 1978, Operación México implicó a oficiales de inteligencia argentina, junto a Montoneros capturados, quienes viajaron desde Argentina hacia México a fin de asesinar a la dirigencia de Montoneros en Ciudad de México. La Operación falló, los agentes volvieron a Argentina y asesinaron a los prisioneros testigos. Jaime Dri sobrevivió.

Entre otros, Dri en su testimonio publicado da cuenta que:

  1. el  grupo de inteligencia salió en misión oficial de Rosario, Argentina rumbo a México
  2. llevaban prisionero al Montonero Tulio [Tucho] Valenzuela
  3. los agentes de inteligencia iban en misión oficial a México
  4. en el camino hicieron que Tucho aparentara no estar capturado y llamara a sus contactos en México
  5. respondió la esposa de Jaime Dri Olimpia Díaz quien informó volvería pronto a Panamá.
  6. Jaime Dri vio volver a los agentes de inteligencia luego de la fallida Operación México

El prontuario ratifica este recuento diciendo,

“De regreso de México, la comisión oficial que acompaño a ‘TUCHO’ le hizo saber a DRI JAIME ‘Pelado’, que en oportunidad de llamar ‘TUCHO’ desde Brasil a la casa Argentina en México, se comunicó con ella [su esposa] que en ese momento se encontraba allí; y había manifestado que el día siguiente regresaba a Panamá”.

*En recuerdo de la muerte varios episodios son relatados así:

“Valenzuela llama a México… Para su sorpresa lo atiende Olimpia Díaz. La negra le comenta… que regresa a Panamá…” (Bonasso, 208)

“Los protagonistas de la Operación México ya se habían reintegrado….” (Bonasso, 280)


Octubre 04, 1978 –
Desaparición de Jaime Dri

En octubre del 1978, la embajada estadounidense en Argentina, envía un informe a la embajada de Panamá lamentando la falta de información conseguida en el caso de Jaime Dri. Según el informe, “Nos parece que el Jaime Dri es uno de entre miles de desaparecidos cuyo destino es desconocido… en muy pocas ocasiones alguien que estaba desaparecido aparecerá en una lista de una prisión. La respuesta estándar por alguien que ha desaparecido es no hay registro de detención”.

Y concluye “Sentimos no poder ofrecer a la señora Dri algún tipo de aliento positivo o incluso información sólida.
Los oficiales de la embajada [de Panamá] se darán cuenta del nivel de secretividad que prevalece entre los oficiales argentinos sobre esta faceta de la campaña anti subversiva, y de por qué es improbable que alguna vez se conozca el destino de Jaime Dri a menos – que por alguna casualidad – este todavía vivo y las autoridades militares decidan hacerlo aparecer”.

TOP-SECRET – Archival Evidence of Mexico’s Human Rights Crimes: The Case of Aleida Gallangos

Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz, following his detention on July 26, 1968, in the midst of the student protests. The photograph was part of the Mexican intelligence files compiled by DFS agents, and made available in the AGN years later.

[Source: AGN, DFS files, 11-235, Legajo 30, Folio 17]

rchival Evidence of Mexico’s Human Rights Crimes: The Case of Aleida GallangosNational Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 307

Washington, DC, September 9, 2011 – A Mexican human rights activist who was orphaned in infancy when her parents disappeared at the hands of government forces filed a petition before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) yesterday, drawing on dozens of declassified U.S. and Mexican documents as evidence. Aleida Gallangos Vargas–whose case became widely known in 2004 when she tracked down her long-lost brother through intelligence records found in Mexico’s national archives–joined with her paternal grandmother to charge the State with responsibility for the secret detention and disappearance in 1975 of her parents, Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz and Carmen Vargas Pérez, among other family members. Today the National Security Archive is posting a selection of the documents being used in the case, obtained by the Archive through the Freedom of Information Act and from the Mexican government. Aleida was two years old when her parents were captured; she was rescued by a friend of her parents who himself was killed by security forces in 1976. Aleida was adopted by his family and renamed Luz Elba Gorostiola Herrera. Aleida’s brother Lucio Antonio, who was three when Roberto Antonio and Carmen disappeared, was taken by members of the government death squad that raided their home in June 1975; shortly afterwards he was delivered to an orphanage and in February 1976 was adopted by a couple and christened Juan Carlos Hernández Valadez. The two children grew up in separate lives knowing nothing of their true identities or of their relationship. The history of the Gallangos-Vargas family emerged in 2001 when a magazine published an interview with Roberto Antonio’s mother, Quirina Cruz Calvo, along with photographs of the disappeared couple and their two small children. Aleida’s adoptive family recognized Luz Elba’s face in the pictures and Aleida was reunited with her grandmother. She spent the next several years piecing together the circumstances of the Mexican government’s role in abducting and secretly detaining her parents. Using government records that had been located by the office of the Special Prosecutor assigned to investigate past political crimes, Aleida managed to track down her brother in the United States in 2004, 29 years after their separation. The records Aleida used to find Lucio Antonio–along with dozens more obtained by the National Security Archive through requests to the Mexican and U.S. governments–now serve as critical evidence in the case brought by Aleida on March 8 before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. The Inter-American system has been an important venue for victims and activists seeking recourse from the Mexican government for state-sponsored human rights crimes committed during the 1960s-80s. On November 23, 2009, the Inter-American Human Rights Court issued a landmark decision, finding Mexico responsible for the illegal detention and disappearance of Rosendo Radilla, a schoolteacher and social activist stopped at a military checkpoint in Atoyac, Guerrero on August 25, 1974. Radilla–known for his songs of social protest and his admiration of Lucio Cabañas, the popular guerrilla leader from Guerrero–was disappeared at the height of the State’s extralegal counterinsurgency campaign against rebels and their supporters in southern Mexico in the early 1970s [see NSA briefing book on Lucio Cabañas, and the Dawn of the Dirty War]. The 2009 ruling marked the first Inter-American decision against Mexico for abuses committed during the “dirty war.” The court ordered the government to pay reparations to the family members for the years of suffering inflicted as a result of the crime. The Radilla decision established an important precedent for future legal action targeting Mexico’s unresolved human rights crimes of the past. To date, Mexico’s political and judicial systems have proven incapable of dealing with even the most notorious atrocities of the “dirty war,” such as the 1968 and 1971 student massacres and the hundreds of cases of illegal detentions, torture, and forced disappearances carried out around the country in the 1970s and early 1980s. In addition to the Army’s rural counterinsurgency violence, Mexico’s intelligence services carried out a carefully orchestrated program of kidnappings and disappearances in the country’s urban centers in an effort to dismantle guerrilla networks and eliminate social and political opposition. One of the victims of the government’s urban counterinsurgency was Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz, an activist involved in the 1968 student movement and later a militant in the radical 23rd of September Communist League. In the summer of ’68, Roberto Antonio joined the anti-war protests in Mexico City and marched for greater democratic openness from Mexico’s closed political system. He became one of the hundreds of protestors monitored by government spies gathering information on student activists. Internal Mexican intelligence records report that Roberto Antonio participated in rallies, reciting anti-war poems such as “los tres pueblos,” which he delivered during a demonstration on April 23, 1968 [see Doc 5; DFS report on Roberto Antonio]. Security forces detained Roberto Antonio on July 26 during government round-ups of student agitators that culminated in the October 2 Tlatelolco massacre. (Note 1) He was held in the infamous Lecumberri prison in Mexico City for over two months, where state intelligence agents kept close tabs on his visitors. While the charges against him were insufficient to keep him in prison, the Federal Security Directorate (Dirección Federal de Seguridad – DFS) continued to monitor his activities following his release. Over the next seven years, government security services assembled a thick intelligence file documenting Roberto Antonio’s association with Mexico’s guerrilla groups. The violent efforts of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institutional—PRI) to crush the peaceful 1968 student movement was a pivotal moment that dramatically radicalized the social and political opposition, increasing popular support for Mexico’s insurgent groups. The 23rd of September Communist League (Liga Comunista de 23 de Septiembre) was one of the urban guerrilla groups that grew in strength as a result, and in turn became a central target of the organized violence that characterized the government’s counterinsurgency efforts during the period. Following the kidnapping by leftists of U.S. Consul General Terrance Leonhardy in May 1973 and U.S. Vice-Consul John L. Patterson in March 1974, Mexican security forces were given even greater freedom to attack insurgent groups and their supporters. The DFS in particular became the driving force behind State terror, serving as Mexico’s internal political police force [see Doc 1: on the growth of the DFS]. U.S. agencies also expanded their coordination with their Mexican intelligence counterparts, increasing their information gathering on Mexico’s leftists groups. The DFS agents regularly shared intelligence with the FBI attachés in the U.S. Embassy and consulates in Mexico’s northern cities [see FBI memorandum: Doc 2 on the 23 of September group]. The long connection between the DFS and the CIA also provided a central source of information for Mexico’s internal security apparatus to confront the armed groups. (Note 2) It was during this period of urban counterinsurgency that the web of Mexico’s intelligence services grew, as information flowed to and from Mexico City to the Army and police installations throughout the country. The DFS institutionalized the State’s ability to gather information, detain suspects, torture and disappear with ultimate deniability. Seven years after the 1968 crackdown, Roberto Antonio Gallangos became a victim of the DFS campaign of disappearances. According to Mexican intelligence documents obtained by the National Security Archive, Roberto Antonio – by then living underground as a member of the 23rd of September Communist League – was spotted walking on a Mexico City street by a police sergeant. After a brief shootout, police captured Gallangos and turned him over to the DFS [Doc 4]. DFS agents interrogated and tortured him, extracting information about his family, social, and organizational affiliations. The declassified Mexican documents describe Roberto Antonio Gallangos as a radical criminal, with links to a network of subversive organizations and a background in bank robberies, kidnapping and murder. It is difficult to evaluate the veracity of the many allegations made in the documents against him, his family, friends and associates. Federal security agents often exaggerated the threat from leftist groups in order to justify aggressive counterinsurgency measures. (Note 3) Torture and forced confessions were commonly used against suspected subversives, and photos taken of Gallangos during detention seem to show signs of torture [Doc 6]. But while the DFS files reported on his alleged crimes, the information was never meant for use as legal evidence in a court of law. Rather, intelligence gathered through surveillance, abduction and torture was used to locate associates of suspected guerrillas, dismantle social networks, and terrorize their base of support. In the case of Gallangos, the DFS agents sought information about his wife and other militant friends and family members, but it is uncertain whether or not what Gallangos told his interrogators was true. Security forces did not capture his wife Carmen Vargas Pérez for more than a month after his kidnapping (detained July 26, 1975); his brother Avelino Francisco Gallangos Cruz was caught one month after that (August 22, 1975). Both remain among Mexico’s disappeared (Note 4). What is clear is that the government’s detention of Gallangos on June 19, 1975, had tragic and lasting repercussions for Roberto’s family, including the “disappearance” of his children until they discovered their identities years later. The case exemplifies how government terror functioned not only to combat the guerrillas, but also destroy the social fabric of groups who opposed the government’s authority. The secret DFS documents obtained by the Archive expose the inner workings of Mexico’s urban counterinsurgency campaign in the 1970s and reveal the involvement of the highest levels of government in political crimes of state. The abuses included illegal spying and infiltration of leftist groups, unwarranted police raids, secret detentions and transfers of prisoners, abduction, torture, and murder. The intelligence files were signed by then-Chief of the agency, Capitan Luis de la Barreda Moreno (head from 1970-75). Senior DFS agents such as Miguel Nazar Haro participated directly in the operations, interrogation and torture of prisoners. (Note 5) The information gathered flowed to the Interior Ministry (Secretaría de Gobernación), at the time led by Mario Moya Palencia. Number two in Gobernación was the career-spy chief Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios, who served in the DFS for over 20 years and directed the agency from 1964 until his long-time friend de la Barreda took over in 1970. Gutiérrez Barrios occupied Mexico’s most senior intelligence position as Deputy Minister of the Interior, regularly receiving DFS traffic on suspected subversives, and playing a central role in the extermination campaign against Mexico’s left. At the top of the chain of command was Luis Echeverría, Interior Minister from 1964-70, and head of state from 1970-76. Despite evidence demonstrating direct government involvement in the urban disappearances, a special prosecutor assigned in 2002 by President Vicente Fox to investigate past human rights crimes failed to bring Luis Echeverría or any of his senior military, police or intelligence commanders to justice. In 2003, the prosecutor, Dr. Ignacio Carillo Prieto, asked the United State Embassy in Mexico City for declassified cables on de la Barreda and Nazar Haro [Doc 13] and brought charges against the officials for the forced disappearance of Jesús Piedra Ibarra, another member of the 23rd of September group detained in April 1975. But the special prosecutor was unable to win convictions and the charges were dropped. The DFS officials who have gone to jail since the “dirty war” have done so for their involvement in drug trafficking rather than for human rights crimes. There is a deep connection between the former Mexican intelligence service and the country’s drug mafias. As DFS agents took command of counterinsurgency raids in the 1970s, they often stumbled upon narcotics safe houses and quickly took on the job of protecting Mexico’s drug cartels. The DFS was disbanded in 1985 following revelations that it was behind the murder of DEA agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena, and Mexican journalist Manuel Buendia. (Note 6) Some 1,500 agents suddenly unemployed with the abolishment of the DFS found their training in covert activities and brutal counterinsurgency operations easily adaptable to the needs of the criminal underworld. Many joined the ranks of the powerful drug cartels or served the traffickers while working on local and federal police forces [see Doc 11 & Doc 12 on DFS agents and drugs]. By failing to prosecute a single case against the former agents, the Special Prosecutor missed a crucial opportunity to bring some of Mexico’s most corrupt officials to justice, allowing impunity to remain entrenched in Mexican society. The Special Prosecutor also failed to fully clarify the crimes of the past or locate any of Mexico’s disappeared. Carrillo Prieto claimed as his own success the discovery and identification of Lucio Antonio Gallangos Vargas, the missing son of Roberto Antonio Gallangos and Carmen Vargas. (Note 7) In fact it was due to the efforts Aleida Gallangos that her brother was located. Although she began her search as part of the “Citizen’s Committee” created by the Special Prosecutor’s office, she resigned from the committee in disgust with the prosecutor’s fruitless investigations. After traveling to Washington, where she says she was threatened by the Mexican consulate, she finally located her brother in the winter of 2004. The Special Prosecutor then organized an ad-hoc press conference in an attempt to take credit for locating Lucio Antonio. In a cable to Washington, U.S. Embassy officials discounted Carrillo Prieto’s claims and cited an independent evaluation of his work that called his office “unresponsive” to victims’ needs. [see Doc 14]. With yesterday’s filing of the case “Luz Elba Gorostiola Herrera and Quirina Cruz Calvo against the State of Mexico” before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, Aleida and her biological and adoptive families have underscored the failure of the Mexican government to bring the perpetrators of past human rights atrocities to justice. Mexico’s inability to resolve these cases has left survivors of the dirty war and families of the disappeared without legal recourse at the national level. With the groundbreaking Radilla decision of 2009, the Inter-American system offers new hope for victims of Mexico’s dirty war to find a measure of justice at last. It is a critical juncture for Mexican citizens searching for truth about the country’s dark period of state-sponsored violence that remains an impediment to justice in Mexico today.


U.S. and Mexican Documents on the Dirty War Disappearances, Drugs, and the Failure of the Special Prosecutor Document 1 January 4, 1974 The Current Security Situation in Mexico: An Appraisal U.S. Embassy in Mexico, Secret Airgram 13 pages The U.S. Embassy in Mexico reports on a rising wave of crime beginning in mid-September 1973, creating a “climate of some anxiety” in Mexico. The report provides background on the rising tide of armed opposition to the Mexican government, tracing the growing rebellion to the government’s brutal “counteraction” against 1968 student demonstrations. It also provides a list of “politically-motivated acts of violence” that characterized the first three years of the Echeverría administration, including the 1971 student killings by government forces, and the kidnapping by leftists of U.S. Consul General Terrance G. Leonhardy. To U.S. officials, these incidents demonstrated the “deficiencies” of the army and police forces, and highlighted the importance of covert operations under the direction of the Federal Security Directorate (Dirección Federal de Seguridad – DFS). The Embassy believed that the DFS, “whose responsibilities also include protection of the president, intelligence collection and coordination, surveillance of some foreign embassies, etc.”, was the only body to have “emerged from this period with reason for pride in its accomplishments.” While Luis Echeverría had increased DFS staff and power, the Embassy predicts that sporadic acts of political violence will continue until “security agencies have improved their capabilities to the point where they can quickly apprehend the perpetrators in a high percentage of cases and infiltrate terrorist groups in order to dismantle them completely.” Source: Released to the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act Document 2 March 11, 1974 Characterization of Mexican Revolutionary, Terrorist and Guerrilla Groups FBI, Legal Attaché in Mexico City, Secret Memorandum 12 pages The FBI attachés in Mexico produced regular reports on the urban guerrilla groups during this period, relating back to Washington the information they received from Mexican intelligence agents. This memorandum provides profiles of ten Mexican revolutionary and guerrilla groups, including the 23rd of September Communist League (LCS). It refers to the 23rd of September group as one of the most highly organized guerrilla organizations, and says that its many of its members have been involved in other revolutionary groups in Mexico. Source: Released to the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act Document 3 December 6, 1974 Mexican Terrorist Captured in Abortive Attempt to Negotiate Safe Passage out of Mexico U.S. Embassy in Mexico, Unclassified Cable 1 page DFS agents not only coordinated counterinsurgency strategies during the 1970s, but participated directly in operations, including detentions, extralegal raids, and forced disappearances. This cable reports on the arrest of Miguel Angel Torres Enríquez, an alleged member of the 23rd of September Communist League, on December 5, 1974, after he had taken two French embassy consular officers hostage in an attempt to secure safe passage to France. Working undercover, then-DFS agent Miguel Nazar Haro participated directly in the operation, posing as a Mexican Foreign Secretary official and, after exchanging himself for the hostages, bringing Torres to the airport where he was arrested. According to the Special Prosecutor’s report released years later, the search for Torres Enríquez involved raids by DFS agents on his house and violent attacks against his family and friends. Source: Released to the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act Document 4 June 19, 1975 “23 of September” Communist League; “Red Brigade” Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) 1 page This document, signed by DFS Director Luis de la Barreda Moreno, gives the agency’s version of the events that led to the arrest of Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz, alias “Simón.” According to the report, at 3:00 pm, July 19, 1975, police sergeant Lázaro Juárez Almaguer noticed an individual with a pistol hidden in his waist, who, when asked to identify himself, removed the weapon and fired, hitting one policeman in the arm. More police quickly arrived on the scene and detained the subject. DFS agents took custody of Roberto Antonio and interrogated him, identifying him as part of a clandestine cell of the urban guerrilla group the 23rd of September Communist League. Source: Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), made available by the Special Prosecutor’s Office [Fiscalía Especial para Movimientos Sociales y Políticos del Pasado (FEMOSPP)] Document 5 June 19, 1975 Antecedents of Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz (a) “Simón” Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) 7 pages This intelligence report reveals that prior to the 1975 arrest of Roberto Antonio Gallangos, government agents had him under surveillance for years. The type of information gathered since at least the late 1960s included personal details such as his birthplace, education, physical characteristics, organizational affiliation, and previous arrests. The report also contains extensive information about his political activities, beginning with his involvement in the 1968 student protests. At a demonstration on April 23, 1968, for example, RobertoAntonio recited the anti-war poem, Los Tres Pueblos, “referring to the horrors of war, and demands for peace.” The report describes his detention on July 26, 1968 in the midst of the student round-ups, and the government’s attempts to charge Roberto Antonio with crimes such as damage to public property, robbery, resisting arrest, and causing injury to state authorities. It also tracks his visitors during his time in prison. The surveillance continued after his release. According to DFS intelligence, Roberto Antonio went on to participate in political meetings with Mexico’s leftist organizations and became involved with a wide variety of insurgent groups. Source: Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), made available by the Special Prosecutor’s Office [Fiscalía Especial para Movimientos Sociales y Políticos del Pasado (FEMOSPP)] Document 6 Photo Undated, taken after June 19, 1975 detention Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) 2 pages This photograph of Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz was taken following his detention on June 19, 1975. The photo shows Roberto Antonio with a mark over his right eye, and a wet shirt; signs of the torture used by the DFS agents during his interrogation. Source: Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), DFS Exp. 11-235, Legajo 30, Folio 123 Document 7 June 20, 1975 “23 of September” Communist League Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) 1 page A report filed by DFS director Luis de la Barreda 24 hours after Gallangos Cruz’s capture contains the first results of the agency’s interrogation of their prisoner, when he reveals the address of a supposed guerrilla safe house. The police proceeded to conduct a raid on the house, finding communist propaganda from the Liga Comunista “23 de Septiembre” and other incriminating material. Source: Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), made available by the Special Prosecutor’s Office[Fiscalía Especial para Movimientos Sociales y Políticos del Pasado (FEMOSPP)] Document 8 July 1, 1975 “23 of September” Communist League Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) 1 page Under interrogation, Gallangos Cruz identified his wife and brother as fellow members of the Liga Comunista “23 de Septiembre.” This DFS report gives biographical background for Carmen Vargas Perez (“Sofía”) and Avelino Francisco Gallangos Cruz (“Federico,”). Source: Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), made available by the Special Prosecutor’s Office [Fiscalía Especial para Movimientos Sociales y Políticos del Pasado (FEMOSPP)] Document 9 August 22, 1975 “23 of September” Communist League Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) 3 pages Roberto Antonio’s brother, Avelino Francisco Gallangos Cruz, was arrested in Mexico City at 9:40 am by three police officers. He was reportedly carrying a gun that they determined belonged to a police agent who was assassinated on November 30, 1974. The document gives biographical details and intelligence information about “Federico,” compiled through interrogations of his family and friends. Source: Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), made available by the Special Prosecutor’s Office [Fiscalía Especial para Movimientos Sociales y Políticos del Pasado (FEMOSPP)] Document 10 August 23, 1975 Liga Comunista “23 de Septiembre” Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) 2 pages This document summarizes the result of the interrogations of Avelino Francisco Gallangos Cruz “Federico” and another member of the Liga Comunista “23 de Septiembre.” It describes how the Gallangos Cruz brothers joined the organization and contains details about the League’s purported activities. Source: Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), made available by the Special Prosecutor’s Office [Fiscalía Especial para Movimientos Sociales y Políticos del Pasado (FEMOSPP)] Document 11 March 27, 1990 Senior Customs Representative Hermosillo – Intelligence Report U.S. Consulate in Hermosillo, Mexico, redacted cable 7 pages Five years after the DFS was disbanded due to abuses and pervasive corruption, a U.S. Customs agent stationed in the Hermosillo Consulate, issues this report conveying growing concern over connections between former DFS agents and drug traffickers. The heavily redacted cable reports on drug kingpins who had worked with the DFS, and states that “several members of the DFS became heavily involved in drug trafficking and then in the murder of United States Drug Enforcement Administration Special Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar.” Source: Released to the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act Document 12 March 12, 1991 Javier García Paniagua to Head National Lottery, is Replaced by Santiago Tapia as Mexico City’s Police Chief U.S. Embassy in Mexico, Confidential Cable On March 7, 1991, Javier García Paniagua, former Director of Mexico’s Directorate of Federal Security (DFS), resigned as Mexico City’s Police Chief to become Director General of the National Lottery. García Paniagua had been police chief since 1988, and his appointment caused controversy due to accusations that he approved and used torture during his years in the DFS.  In the cable, Embassy officials describe the DFS as “an agency with a reputation for corruption and ruthlessness.” The cable notes that Miguel Nazar Haro, García Paniagua’s police deputy and intelligence chief, was accused of carrying out political killings and human rights abuses when he headed the DFS in the 1980s. In 1989, he was forced to resign from the Mexico City police amidst allegations that he protected drug traffickers. Source: Released to the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act Document 13 June 13, 2003 Mexican Supreme Court Hands Down Landmark Decision on Extradition of Ricardo Cavallo for Crimes Against Humanity U.S. Embassy in Mexico, Unclassified Cable 3 pages On September 12, 2000, the Mexican Supreme Court handed down a decision upholding the legal basis for the extradition of Argentine national Ricardo Miguel Cavallo to Spain. Cavallo was arrested by Mexican Interpol on August 24 and was extradited to Spain for crimes of genocide and terrorism committed between 1976 and 1983. In this cable the Embassy comments on the possibility of the decision affecting Mexican domestic human rights cases, such as the case against Miguel Nazar Haro and Luis de la Barreda, who were “both accused of torture and ‘disappearing’ leftists during the so-called ‘Dirty War’ in Mexico during the 60s, 70s, and 80s.” The cable reports that Special Prosecutor Ignacio Carrillo Prieto, assigned to investigate human rights cases of the past, asked the Embassy to provide copies of declassified cables with information on the two former intelligence chiefs and their involvement in human rights abuses. Source: Released to the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act Document 14 January 13, 2005 Special Prosecutor Makes Headlines but Limited Progress in Unraveling Past Human Rights Crimes U.S. Embassy in Mexico, Confidential Cable 3 pages The U.S. Embassy reports that the Special Prosecutor’s Office is moving slowly to prosecute Mexico’s political crimes of the past. Although the office had achieved some incremental progress, it was slow to locate victims and bring the perpetrators to trial. The cable cites the case of Aleida Gallangos and her efforts to locate her brother Lucio, almost 30 years after they were separated from their parents at the hands of government forces. Aleida had strongly criticized the Special Prosecutor’s Office, which, according to the cable, offered her little support in her search for her brother, but nevertheless tried to take the credit in a “hastily-called press conference,” after Aleida found Lucio living in the United States in December 2004. Source: Released to the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act


Notes

1. Chapter 6 of the Special Prosecutor’s Report lists Roberto Antonio among those detained on July 26, 1968.
2. For more information on the historical collaboration between the CIA station in Mexico and DFS intelligence agents, see NSA briefing book “LITEMPO: The CIA’s Eyes on Tlatelolco”.
3. See for example Sergio Aguayo, La charola: una historia de los servicios de intelligencia en México, México, D.F, Grijalbo; Hoja Editorial; Hechos Confiables, 2001, pp. 133-34 for a reference to the “fantasies and exaggerations” employed in DFS documents about student protesters in 1968.
4. Chapter 8 of the Special Prosecutor’s report lists Avelino Gallangos and Carmen Vargas among the 69 individuals disappeared in Mexico City during the dirty war.
5. Chapter 10 of the Special Prosecutor’s report describes the counterinsurgency operations carried out by DFS agents in the early 1970s, and reports that Nazar Haro participated directly in extralegal detentions and interrogations of suspected guerrillas.
6. DFS chief Zorrilla was charged and sentence in 1989 to thirty-five years for the 1984 murder of Manuel Buendia, a journalist who exposed DFS official links to narco-trade. Another DFS chief, Nazar Haro, was linked to the murder of U.S. DEA agent Enrique Camarena. For more information on the DFS and drugs, see Julia Preston and Samuel Dillon, Opening Mexico: The Making of a Democracy, New York, Straus and Giroux, 2004.
7. See chapter 10 of the Special Prosecutor’s report.
In front of Lecumberri, the “Black Palace” – formerly a detention center for political prisoners, now home to the historical National Archives (AGN) – activists hang pictures of Mexico’s disappeared [Undated Photo. Source: AGN files].
Luis Echeverría (president from 1970-76) visiting Mexican officers and soldiers in Guerrero during the height of the military’s “dirty war” counterinsurgency campaign against Lucio Cabañas and his Party of the Poor [Source: AGN files]
Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz, taken sometime in between 1968 and 1975. This picture was part of the DFS intelligence files, and was retrieved prior to his disappearance as part of the government’s surveillance efforts to monitor his activities after the 1968 protests [Source: AGN, DFS files]
Roberto Antonio Gallangos Cruz, with his hands tied behind his back, after being detained on June 19, 1975. [Source: AGN, DFS files, 11-235, Legajo 30, Folio 124]
Carmen Vargas Pérez, prior to her detention and disappearance by DFS agents. This picture was part of the DFS intelligence files, and was retrieved by intelligence agents as part of the government’s surveillance efforts [Source: AGN, DFS files, 11-235, Legajo 30, Folio 43]
Carmen Vargas Pérez, prior to her detention and disappearance by DFS agents [Source: family’s personal files]
Weapons and leftist propaganda reportedly obtained through counterinsurgency raids in Mexico’s urban centers
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<div align=”justify”>Suspected guerrillas detained by Mexican authorities

TOP-SECRET – Arms smuggling into Lebanon and the Gaza Strip

Cable dated:2009-11-18T14:32:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002501
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, PTER, KWBG, EG, IR, LE, IS
SUBJECT: 40TH JPMG: COUNTERSMUGGLING TECHNICAL DISCUSSION (PART 2 OF 4)
Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (S) Summary: Concurrent to the Joint Political Military Group (JPMG) Executive Session, IDF J5 and Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI) officers briefed U.S. JPMG delegation members on current arms transfers and weapons smuggling into Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. IDF J5 and IDI officers first focused on arms transfers to Hizballah in Lebanon via Iran and Syria, and provided current estimates of Hizballah arms. IDF J5 and IDI officers argued that Hizballah’s ultimate goal during any future conflict is to launch a massive number of missiles and rockets daily into Israeli territory, including those that can reach the Tel Aviv area. J5 and IDI also described the sophisticated smuggling routes from Iran into the Gaza Strip, arguing that Hamas is now more powerful than prior to Operation Cast Lead. IDF J5 and IDI officers noted improved countersmuggling efforts by Egypt, but stressed more must be done to curb smuggling into Gaza. This is the second of four cables (septel) reporting on the 40th Joint Political Military Group. End summary.

2. (SBU) Israeli attendees included representatives from the IDF J5, IDI, Shin Bet, and Mossad. The U.S. delegation was led by PM Coordinator for Counter Piracy Robert Maggi, and included PM/RSAT John Schwenk, OSD Israel Desk Officer Eric Lynn, J5 Israel Desk Officer LTC Alan Simms, U.S. DAO Tel Aviv Assistant Air Attache Matt Yocum, EUCOM LCDR Molly McCabe, and U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv political-military officer Jason Grubb.

3. (S) Maggi stressed the importance of and noted progress with counter-smuggling efforts into Gaza — but also acknowledged the GOI desire to see even further progress. He said the USG was looking for practical ideas to improve counter-smuggling efforts. IDF J5 officers argued that smuggling represents a strategic challenge for the GOI, which is facing a proliferation of knowledge and capabilities that are severely limiting Israel’s diplomatic options for peace. IDF J5 made the case that weapons and knowledge proliferate from state actors, which disrupts diplomatic regional efforts. IDF J5 highlighted “regional faultlines,” with the United States and Iran leading two opposing camps — and countries such as China, Russia, and Qatar remaining on the sidelines with unclear intentions.

4. (S) IDI officers briefed on arms “deliveries” to the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, making the case with the latter that these arms transfers were done openly and should not be considered smuggling. IDI noted that since 2006, Hizballah has increased its quantity of sophisticated arms with improved range and accuracy — these arms were acquired via Syria and Iran despite the presence of UNIFIL and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). IDI highlighted the continued desire by Hizballah to avenge the assassination of its former military commander Imad Mughniyah, and pointed to failed attempts to do so in Azerbaijan and Egypt. Finally, IDI reviewed the arms delivery route from Syria to Lebanon via the Beqa’a Valley, and then to points south through Beirut.

5. (S) IDI presented estimates of Hizballah arms in Lebanon, including a breakdown of arms south of the Litani River. According to the IDI, Hizballah possesses over 20,000 rockets, hundreds of 220 mm and 302 mm rockets, several hundred “Fajr” rockets, hundreds of simple anti-tank (AT) launchers with rockets and missiles, and hundreds of advanced anti-tank wire guided missiles (ATGM), dozens of SA-14, SA-7, and QW-1 anti-aircraft guns, several Ababil unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), an unknown quantity of C-802 coastal missiles and up to thousands of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

6. (S) Given this arsenal, Maggi asked what the IDF thought Hizballah’s intentions were. IDI officers opined that Hizballah was preparing for a long conflict with Israel in which it hopes to launch a massive number of rockets at Israel per day. IDI officers noted in the 2006 Second Lebanon War, Tel Aviv was left untouched — Hizballah will try to change the equation during the next round and disrupt everyday life in Tel Aviv. A Mossad official noted that Hizballah will want to ensure it can launch rockets and missiles to the very last day of the conflict, i.e., avoid running out of munitions. He estimated that Hizballah will try to launch 400-600 rockets and missiles at Israel per day — 100 of which will be aimed at Tel Aviv. He noted that Hizballah is looking to sustain such launches for at least two months.

7. (S) IDI then shifted focus to the Gaza Strip, describing three circles of arms smuggling: 1. arms sources and

TEL AVIV 00002501 002 OF 002

financing, such as Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and unfettered arms markets such as Eritrea and Yemen, and possibly China; 2. transit areas and states such as the Red Sea, Yemen, Sudan, Syrian, Lebanon, and Libya; and finally, 3. the “close circle” along the Sinai-Egyptian border and Philadelphi route. Maggi asked what percentage of arms transfers occurred via land, sea and air. IDI noted that it was difficult to determine: smugglers tend to prefer the naval route — as there are fewer obstacles — but the last segment almost always occurred overland. IDF J5 added that land smugglers are learning from past experience and building new overland “bypasses.” When asked about air routes from Iran over Turkey, IDI officials indicated that Turkey has been made aware of such activity, although a Mossad representative suggested Turkey may not be entirely aware of the extent of such activity, given the IRGC’s smuggling expertise. The GOI highlighted that focusing solely on the last phase of smuggling (e.g. along the Philadelphi route) would only lead to limited success, and that wider efforts were key.

8. (S) IDI also provided an analysis of weapons entering Gaza following Operation Cast Lead. IDI noted that one of the goals of Cast Lead was to damage Hamas’ ability to produce its own weapons. In this regard, the IDF was successful, but Hamas is reconstituting its capabilities. According to the IDI, Hamas possibly possesses a few rockets with ranges over 40 km — perhaps as far as 60-70 km, or within range of Tel Aviv. In addition, the IDI believes Hamas possesses quality AT systems such as the Kornet PG-29 and quality anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). These weapons join an already potent arsenal including Grad rockets with ranges up to 40 km, ammonium perchlorate (APC) oxidizer for indigenous rocket production, hundreds of 120, 80 and 60 mm MBs, dozens of mortars, C5 K air-to-surface rockets, PG-7 AT rockets and launchers, SA-7 MANPADS, PKS AAA MGs and thousands of rounds of ammunition, and quality AT, such as Sagger missiles and launchers, and light anti-tank weapon (LAW) rockets.

9. (S) IDF J5 presented some basic benchmarks for possible countersmuggling solutions for Gaza. First, Egyptian national commitment is required. Other benchmarks outlined by the IDF included a clear chain of command, control of the Sinai and its inhabitants, systematic treatment of tunnel infrastructure, trial and imprisonment of smugglers, and overcoming traditional failures such as bribery and lack of coordination. IDF J5 noted that Egyptian Intelligence Minister Soliman has been supportive, while there is growing awareness on the part of Egyptian Defense Minister Tantawi — who the IDF views as an obstacle to counter-smuggling efforts. However, IDF J5 said there is a lack of coordination between the Egyptian Army and intelligence service on counter-smuggling efforts.

10. (S) The IDF has observed a more systematic response by Egypt in recent months, including assigning guards to newly discovered tunnel entries, or even blowing up tunnels — by IDF estimates, the Egyptian Army has collapsed 20-40 tunnels in the last 4-5 months. Nevertheless, the IDF continues to see a lack of urgency on the part of Egypt regarding smuggling into the Sinai; little attention has been paid to improving the socio-economic conditions of Bedouins primarily responsible for Sinai smuggling. While Egypt has made several key arrests — including prominent smuggler Muhammad Sha’er — others are still at large. Finally, the IDF noted the construction of an underground barrier and sensors’ network — but in many cases, the smugglers have dug deeper tunnels to avoid the network.

11. (S) The IDF J5 outlined consultations with geology and tunnel experts, whom suggested several possible solutions to the Sinai-Gaza tunneling network: constant and specific mine activity in the vicinity of the border to a depth of 20-30 meters; the use of a shock device or stun charge, or smoke at a tunnel entrance for deterrence purposes; constructing underground obstacles 90 meters deep to destabilize current tunnel infrastructure; close supervision and inspection of buildings in urban areas, in which there is a high concentration of trucks and newly built rooftops and roads; and the arrest of major smugglers — such as Darwish Madi — and utilization of interrogation to discover major tunnels and dismantle smuggling networks.

12. (U) PM Coordinator for Counter Piracy Maggi has cleared this cable. CUNNINGHAM

TOP-SECRET – Yemeni insiders losing patience with Saleh

Cable dated:2005-05-23T14:26:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001352
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2015
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, KMCA, KMPI, DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: ROYG INSIDERS INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED WITH SALEH CLAN
REF: SANAA 966
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 b and d.

1. (S/NF) Ambassador met informally with XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that President Saleh is more interested in enriching his family than in making the strategic choices necessary to lead Yemen into the future. XXXXXXXXXXXX was gloomy about President Saleh’s ability to understand the importance of the issues of controlling SA/LW and intelligence sharing to U.S.-ROYG cooperation, and said Saleh did not comprehend what was necessary to maintain a close relationship with the USG in the long term. End Summary.

2. (S/NF) Echoing what we are increasingly hearing from those ROYG interlocutors closest to the Embassy, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Saleh is more and more isolated, and less and less responsive to advice from those practical, progressive ROYG insiders XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX moaned that Saleh “listens to no one,” and is “unrealistically and stupidly confident” that he will always make the right decisions. Saleh, he said, does not think strategically and cares only about enriching his own family, particularly: XXXXXXXXXXXX Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar Commander of Northern Army (considered the second most powerful man in Yemen); XXXXXXXXXXXX

3. (S/NF) Together with Sheikh Abdullah al Ahmar’s clan (speaker of the Parliament and supreme chief the Hashid tribal confederation which includes Saleh’s tribe), all of Yemen’s wealth is being squandered and stolen by Saleh who is increasingly “greedy and paranoid,” especially regarding American intentions, said XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX are making millions working the diesel smuggling and black market along with Ali Mohsen, using military vehicles and NSB and CSF staff to move the fuel to markets in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. XXXXXXXXXXXX

4. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that his contacts in Saada, including a leading sheikh (he would not give his name), are all furious with Saleh over the amount of indiscriminate killing and destruction perpetrated by the regular army in the north during last month’s suppression of the al-Houthi rebellion. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that the “Believing Youth” were by far the minority of the fighters in Saada, rather he said, most fighters came from tribes allied together against Saleh and the central government. He said Saleh is “extremely concerned” that he could lose control of the tribes in Saada and that this will spread to the al-Jawf and Ma’rib tribes.

5. (S/NF) “Everyone”, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, has had it with the corruption of Saleh and his family. As an example, XXXXXXXXXXXX cited the outrageous costs of this Sunday’s May 22 celebration of the fifteenth Unity Day being held in Mukalla at a cost, claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX, of more than 300 million USD, most of which will go into the pockets of those government officials arranging the show. (Note: The price tag XXXXXXXXXXXX gave likely includes some of the massive development projects in Mukalla and elsewhere that the government is rushing to complete before May 22. End Note.)

6. (S/NF) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX is only one source, and this is not the first time he has given a pessimistic assessment of Saleh and his cronies. XXXXXXXXXXXX. But we are increasingly hearing hints and murmurs from others, including XXXXXXXXXXXX and SXXXXXXXXXXXX (who told Ambassador recently that he “wants out” of politics because the President no longer listens to his advice). Even XXXXXXXXXXXX, who, while most certainly profiting from the corrupt business dealings of XXXXXXXXXXXX and Saleh, claimed that he and a group of young GPC and Islah MP‘s intend to band together to force the government to control corruption and enact reforms.

7. (S/NF) Comment Continued. We have heard rumors backing up XXXXXXXXXXXX’s claim of an opposition candidate in 2006. Saleh is worried about a possible political challenge next year from Islah and the new opposition coalition JMP, or even from within the GPC. We may well see another clamp-down on the press and political parties “for security reasons” that will roll back some or much of the progress made in democratic reforms and human rights just in time for this year’s MCC reports. End Comment. Krajeski

TOP-SECRET: US Navy Undersea Surveillance Processing Facilities Eyeball

Naval Ocean Processing Facility (NOPF), 352 Bullpup Street, Dam Neck, Virginia Beach, VA36.764744 -75.958012

Note high-security double-fencing customarily used at top secret facilities.

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Naval Ocean Processing Facility (NOPF), 352 Bullpup Street, Dam Neck, Virginia Beach, VA[Image]
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Naval Ocean Processing Facility, Whidbey Island NAS, WAhttp://maps.google.com/maps?q=Whidbey+Island+NAS,+WA&hl=en&ll=48.341457,-122.68394
&spn=0.001583,0.004292&sll=37.0625,-95.677068&sspn=62.484575,104.589844&vpsrc=6&t=h&z=19

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TOP-SECRET – FBI Mossad Sting Bags Big-Headed Egghead

Department of Justice

Office of Public Affairs

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Wednesday, September 7, 2011

Noted Scientist Pleads Guilty to Attempted Espionage

Scientist Arrested in 2009 Following Undercover Operation

WASHINGTON – Stewart David Nozette, a scientist who once worked for the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the White House’s National Space Council, pleaded guilty today to attempted espionage for providing classified information to a person he believed to be an Israeli intelligence officer.

The guilty plea, which took place this morning in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, was announced by Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia; and James W. McJunkin, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Washington Field Office.

Nozette, 54, of Chevy Chase, Md., pleaded guilty to one count of attempted espionage. Senior Judge Paul L. Friedman, who presided at the plea hearing, scheduled a status hearing for Nov. 15, 2011. No sentencing date was set. The plea agreement, which is subject to the judge’s approval, calls for an agreed-upon prison term of 13 years.

Nozette has been in custody since his arrest on Oct. 19, 2009. FBI agents arrested him following an undercover operation in which he provided classified materials on three occasions, including one occasion that forms the basis for today’s guilty plea. He was subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury. The indictment does not allege that the government of Israel or anyone acting on its behalf committed any offense under U.S. laws in this case.

“ Stewart Nozette betrayed America’s trust by attempting to sell some of the nation’s most closely-guarded secrets for profit. Today, he is being held accountable for his actions. As this case demonstrates, we remain vigilant in protecting America’s secrets and in bringing to justice those who compromise them,” said Assistant Attorney General Monaco.

“Stewart Nozette was once a trusted scientist who maintained high-level government security clearances and was frequently granted access to classified information relating to our national defense. Today he is a disgraced criminal who was caught red-handed attempting to trade American secrets for personal profit. He will now have the next 13 years behind bars to contemplate his betrayal,” said U.S. Attorney Machen. “The FBI and its partners deserve tremendous credit for their outstanding work on this case. This investigation and prosecution demonstrate our commitment to identifying and punishing those who would put our national security at risk.”

“Preventing the loss or compromise of high-technology and vital national security information is a top priority of the FBI,” said Assistant Director in Charge McJunkin. “This case is a prime example of what happens when a person decides to sell our nation’s most valuable secrets for individual gain.”

Background

Nozette received a Ph.D. in Planetary Sciences from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1983. He has worked in various capacities on behalf of the U.S. government in the development of state-of-the-art programs in defense and space. For example, Nozette worked at the White House on the National Space Council, Executive Office of the President, from approximately 1989 through 1990. He also worked as a physicist for the U.S. Department of Energy’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory from approximately 1990 to 1999, where he designed highly advanced technology.

Among other things, Nozette assisted in the development of the Clementine bi-static radar experiment which purportedly discovered water ice on the south pole of the moon. A version of the Clementine satellite currently hangs on display at the National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C., and was later hailed as the vanguard of the new “faster, cheaper, better” revolution in space exploration.

Nozette was also the president, treasurer and director of the Alliance for Competitive Technology (ACT), a non-profit organization that he organized in March 1990. Between January 2000 and February 2006, Nozette, through his company, ACT, entered into agreements with several government agencies to develop highly advanced technology. Nozette performed some of this research and development at the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, D.C., the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in Arlington, Va., and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Md.

According to a factual proffer in support of the guilty plea, from 1989 through 2006, Nozette held security clearances as high as TOP SECRET and had regular, frequent access to classified information and documents related to the national defense of the United States. The factual proffer also provides details about the undercover operation that led to Nozette’s arrest.

The Investigation

According to the factual proffer, on Feb. 16, 2007, law enforcement agents executed a search warrant at Nozette’s home in Maryland as part of a fraud investigation and found classified documents. Further investigation into the classified documents revealed that in 2002, Nozette sent an e-mail threatening to take a classified program he was working on, “to [foreign country] or Israel and do it there selling internationally…” As a result of this and other information giving rise to suspicion of espionage, the FBI decided to conduct an undercover operation.

On Sept. 3, 2009, Nozette was contacted via telephone by an individual purporting to be an Israeli intelligence officer from the Mossad, but who was, in fact, an undercover employee of the FBI. During that call, the defendant agreed to meet with the undercover employee that day on Connecticut Avenue N.W., in front of the Mayflower Hotel in downtown Washington, D.C.

Later that day, Nozette met with the undercover employee and had lunch in the restaurant of the Mayflower Hotel. After the undercover employee made it clear that he was a “Mossad” agent, Nozette stated, “Good. Happy to be of assistance.”

After lunch in the hotel restaurant, Nozette and the undercover employee retired to a hotel suite to continue their discussion. During the conversation, the defendant informed the undercover employee that he had clearances “all the way to Top Secret SCI, I had nuclear…,” that “anything that the U.S. has done in space I’ve seen,” and that he would provide classified information for money and a foreign passport to a country without extradition to the United States.

The defendant and the undercover employee met again on Sept. 4, 2009, at the Mayflower Hotel. During this encounter, Nozette assured the undercover employee that, although he no longer had legal access to any classified information at a U.S. government facility, he could, nonetheless, recall the classified information to which he had been granted access. The defendant said, “It’s in my” head, and pointed to his head.

Undercover Operation Continues

On Sept. 10, 2009, FBI agents left a letter in the prearranged “dead drop” facility for the defendant. In the letter, the FBI asked Nozette to answer a list of questions concerning classified U.S. satellite information. FBI agents also provided signature cards, in the defendant’s true name and an alias, for Nozette to sign and asked the defendant to provide four passport sized photographs for the Israeli passport the defendant requested. The FBI agents also left $2,000 cash for the defendant in the “dead drop” facility, which Nozette retrieved the same day, along with the questions and signature cards.

On Sept. 16, 2009, Nozette left a manila envelope in the “dead drop” facility in the District of Columbia. One of the “answers” provided by the defendant contained information classified as SECRET/SCI which related to the national defense, in that it directly concerned classified aspects and mission capabilities of a prototype overhead collection system and which disclosure would negate the ability to support military and intelligence operations. In addition to disclosing SECRET/SCI information, Nozette offered to reveal additional classified information that directly concerned nuclear weaponry, military spacecraft or satellites, and other major weapons systems.

On Sept. 17, 2009, FBI agents left a second communication in the “dead drop” facility for the defendant. In the letter, the FBI asked Nozette to answer another list of questions concerning classified U.S. satellite information. Nozette retrieved the questions from the “dead drop” facility later that same day.

On Oct. 1, 2009, Nozette left a manila envelope in the “dead drop” facility in the District of Columbia. The FBI also left a cash payment of $9,000 in the “dead drop” facility. Later that day, the FBI agents retrieved the sealed manila envelope left by the defendant. Inside the envelope, FBI agents discovered the encrypted thumb drive that was provided to Nozette on Sept. 17, 2009, which included another set of “answers” from the defendant. The “answers” contained information classified as TOP SECRET/SCI and other information classified as SECRET/SCI. This classified information related to the national defense, in that it directly concerned satellites, early warning systems, means of defense or retaliation against large-scale attack, communications intelligence information, and major elements of defense strategy. (This information is what formed the basis for the charge in today’s guilty plea.)

On Oct. 5, 2009, Nozette left a manila envelope in the “dead drop” facility in the District of Columbia. Later that day, the FBI agents retrieved the sealed manila envelope left by the defendant. Inside the envelope, FBI agents discovered the encrypted thumb drive that was provided to Nozette on Oct. 1, 2009, which included another set of “answers” from the defendant. The “answers” contained information classified as TOP SECRET/SAR. This classified information related to the national defense, in that it directly concerned capabilities of a U.S. military weapon system research and development effort.

Nozette and the undercover employee met again on Oct. 19, 2009, at the Mayflower Hotel. During that meeting, the following exchanges took place:

NOZETTE: “So, uh, I gave you even in this first run, some of the most classified information that there is. . . . I’ve sort of crossed the Rubicon. . . . Now the, uh, so I think when I said like fifty K, I think that was probably too low. . . .The cost to the U.S. Government was two hundred million. . . . to develop it all. Uh, and then that’s not including the launching of it. . .Uh, integrating the satellites. . . . So if you say okay that probably brings it to almost a billion dollars. . . So I tell ya at least two hundred million so I would say, you know, theoretically I should charge you certainly, you know, at most a one percent.”

Nozette was arrested soon after he made these statements. He was subsequently indicted on four charges of attempted espionage. Under the plea agreement, Nozette pleaded guilty to the third count of the indictment, arising out of his passing of TOP SECRET/SCI information on Oct. 1, 2009.

At the time of his arrest, Nozette was awaiting sentencing in another federal case. On Jan. 30, 2009, he pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to charges of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government with respect to false claims and tax evasion in an amount up to $399,999. In that case, Nozette agreed to pay restitution of $265,205 to the U.S. government. Nozette is awaiting sentencing in the case. Under terms of today’s plea, the sentence in the fraud case is to run concurrently with the sentence for attempted espionage.

This investigation was conducted by the FBI’s Washington Field Office, with assistance from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Naval Audit Service, National Reconnaissance Office, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Defense Computer Forensics Laboratory, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense Criminal Investigative Service, Defense Contract Audit Agency, U.S. Army 902nd Military Intelligence Group, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Office of Counterintelligence, NASA Office of Inspector General, Department of Energy , Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Criminal Investigation Division, IRS Tax Exempt & Government Entities group, U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Postal Inspection Service, as well as other partners in the U.S. intelligence community.

The prosecution is being handled by Trial Attorneys Deborah A. Curtis and Heather M. Schmidt, from the Counterespionage Section of the Justice Department’s National Security Division, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Anthony Asuncion, from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia.

11-1142

National Security Division

WIKIPEDIA ÜBER CYBERSTALKER wie die fingierten “GoMoPa”

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberstalking

Vorsicht: Cyber-Stalker im Netz

http://bonner-presseblog.de/2009/01/22/bonn-vorsicht-cyber-stalker-im-netz/

STALKING STUDIE DES WEISSEN RING

https://www.weisser-ring.de/internet/verwaltung/news/details/article/15290/59/neste/11/index.html?tx_ttnews%5BpS%5D=1277299889&cHash=a7e6028b0d

Süddeutsche Zeitung über die kriminellen Machenschaften der “GoMoPa”

https://immovationag.wordpress.com/2010/09/15/sueddeutsche-de-am-virtuellen-pranger/

Opfer fordern Entzug der Anwaltszulassung für mutmassliche “GoMoPa”-Paten

http://www.victims-opfer.com/?p=14675

Meridian Capital: Klaus Dieter Maurischat „GoMoPa“ in Detention

http://meridiancapital.wordpress.com

Meridian Capital über die Verhaftung von GoMoPa-Chef Klaus Maurischat durch das BKA in Berlin wg. Erpressung, Betruges & Cyberstalking

http://meridiancapital.wordpress.com/

Magisterarbeit Bernd Pulch an der Universität Mainz

http://www.kepplinger.de/node/50

Handelsblatt über die kriminellen “GoMoPa”-Betrüger

http://www.handelsblatt.com/finanzen/boerse-maerkte/boerse-inside/finanzaufsicht-untersucht-kursachterbahn-bei-wirecard/3406252.html

Neo-STASI-WARNUNG Wie auch Sie GoMoPa-Rufmordopfer werden können-

Stellen Sie sich bitte kurz vor, dass Sie mit einer tollen Geschäftsidee oder einer Geschäftserweiterung zu mehr Geld kommen möchten. Beispielsweise auch Ihr Unternehmen vergrössern oder gar Ihre Waren exportieren wollen.

Sie werben damit natürlich über die Medien….

Da meldet sich bei Ihnen möglicherweise ein Beauftragter des Finanz-Nachrichtendienstes GoMoPa mit der Mitteilung, dass im GoMoPa-Forum sehr negative Forenbeiträge über Ihre Person oder Ihr Vorhaben stünden. Äusserst Schlimmes wird über Sie berichtet. Zum Beispiel, dass Sie bisher schon Ihr Geld mit betrügerischen Machenschaften verdient hätten oder Ihr Sohn als erfolgreicher Sportler nach neuesten Ermittlungen in einem Kokain-Dealer-Ring verwickelt sei.

Ein anonymer User ( Schreiberling) habe dies geschrieben, wird vom GoMoPa-Beauftragten berichtet. Man könne jetzt noch nicht feststellen, ob dies so wahr sei. Man könne aber auch nicht den Beitrag einfach rausnehmen, denn es könne ja auch was Wahres daran sein!

Falls Sie selbst an der Wahrheitsfindung interessiert seien, könnten Sie auch beim ´seriösen Nachrichtendienst` GoMoPa als Gesellschafter oder als Premium-Mitglied einsteigen, dann könne man ja…..usf. …ganz einfach den Beitrag herausnehmen!

So ähnlich könnte es geschehen und glauben Sie mir: ´Dies ist kein böser Traum,-keine Fata Morgana`, sondern schon Zigtausendmal in der fast 10-Jährigen GoMoPa- Geschichte so abgelaufen.

Wir, von der CSA-Agency, wurden selbst aus Wettbewerbsgründen seit 2002 von GoMoPa auf primitivste Weise im Forum diffamiert oder die von uns als seriöse Dienstleister empfohlenen Unternehmungen wurden per Rufmord mit schmutzigsten, unwahren Verleumdungs-Attacken von anonymen Bloggern ( bezahlte Helfershelfer vom GoMoPa) nahezu ruiniert. Nicht nur finanziell , sondern auch gesundheitlich nieder gemacht! Nicht umsonst heisst es RUFMORD.

Der Begriff ´Stalking` ist da noch eine vornehme Bezeichnung.

Auf gut deutsch passt Rufmord besser.

Geschäftlicher und gesundheitlicher RUFMORD gehört auch entsprechend bestraft.

Die Justiz tut sich sehr schwer damit. Vor allem, wenn die Rufmörder mit Ihren Machenschaften mit Gesellschaften wie z.B. ´GoMoPa` als Briefkastenfirma aus dem Ausland agieren. UND zum anderen, weil sich die Stalking-Terror-Experten von GoMoPa sich mit ihren Methoden auch der Justiz und der Medien bedienen.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) über die Wirtschaftskriminellen der “GoMoPa”

http://www.faz.net/s/RubEC1ACFE1EE274C81BCD3621EF555C83C/Doc~EB5651ECDC72949FF907D2CA89D5AFE72~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html

Die Liste der “GoMoPa”- Opfer

http://www.victims-opfer.com/?page_id=15672

DIE FINANCIAL TIMES über die erfundenen “Goldman, Morgenstern und Partner” alias “GoMoPa”

http://www.victims-opfer.com/?page_id=11764

TOP-SECRET – US talks to Israeli security chief about Arabs and Gaza

Cable dated:2008-05-22T07:57:00

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TEL AVIV 001080
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2018
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PINR, KPAL, KWBG, EG, IS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR’S MEETING WITH SHIN BET CHIEF FOCUSES ON ISRAEL‘S ARABS, THE GAZA STRIP, AND OMAR SOLIMAN’S VISIT
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).

——- SUMMARY ——-

1. (S) In a May 13 meeting covering a range of subjects, Israeli Security Agency (ISA, or Shin Bet) Chief Yuval Diskin told Ambassador Jones the following:

— Israel’s Arabs are materially better off than many Arabs in neighboring countries, but increasingly feel disconnected from the State, and tend to identify themselves first as Arabs, and sometimes Muslims, rather than as Israelis. Arab-Israeli Knesset Members are not helping by flirting with enemy regimes in Syria and elsewhere, exploiting their parliamentary immunity. Diskin and the ISA have been advocates within the GOI for doing more to reconnect Israeli-Arabs with Israel. The many ideas Diskin and others have come up with to do this cost money, which the GOI does not have.

— The ISA understands the USG rationale for providing certain types of equipment to the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF), but will approve transfer requests on a case-by-case basis, depending on the capabilities of the equipment, and how the PASF intend to use them. The ISA cannot approve direct transfers of equipment to the PA Presidential Guard (PG) as the PG is XXXXXXXXXXXX as a result of activities by many of its officers during the Second Intifada. If necessary, equipment could be transferred to the PG via a third party.

— Egyptian Intelligence Chief Omar Soliman’s visit opened up a very sensitive period. Israel presented its conditions for a “cooling down”, or cease-fire/tahdiya with Hamas, and now it is Hamas’ turn to respond once Soliman conveys those conditions. They include a complete cessation of terrorist activity in the Gaza Strip. In addition, Israel will not tolerate any direction from the Gaza Strip of terrorist activities in the West Bank. Passages between Israel and the Gaza Strip will be opened gradually as Hamas and the other terrorist groups cease their attacks. Rafah Crossing can be opened, but PA President Abu Mazen must get credit for the opening. Diskin and many in the GOI are skeptical that Hamas will agree to the tahdiya, or that it would last long. Many in the GOI and IDF, including Diskin, believe Israel must re-enter Gaza in force sooner rather than later, to cut back the terrorists’ growing capabilities there.

2. (S) The Ambassador asked Diskin’s assistance in ensuring the ISA’s prompt approval of hundreds of entry permits for participants in the upcoming Bethlehem Conference. Diskin promised ISA would work as quickly as possible and approve as many permits as possible. At the Ambassador’s request, Diskin also promised to help a Palestinian student in the Gaza Strip receive an entry permit so that he could attend his visa interview for college study in the U.S. Diskin also said ISA would issue Palestinian Sheikh Tamimi entry permits for Jerusalem events one day at a time, “as long as he behaves himself.” END SUMMARY.

——————————————— ———–

DISKIN ON ISRAEL’S ARABS — COMPLICATED, GROWING PROBLEM ——————————————— ———–

3. (S) Responding to the Ambassador’s question about Diskin’s current assessment of the Arab-Israeli population — especially in light of an incident May 8 during which an Arab-Israeli MK claimed he had been attacked by an undercover police officer — Diskin initially expressed reluctance and discomfort in answering the question, explaining that how Israel treats its Arab citizens is its own internal affair. Then, opening up, Diskin proceeded to spend the next ten minutes describing his concerns about Israel’s Arab-Israeli population. According to the ISA chief, many of them “take their rights too far,” and the community itself is suffering from an identity crisis. Most, he claimed, want to live in Israel. At the same time, they see themselves first as Arabs, and then as Muslims. (He acknowledged that a small percentage are Christians.) He assessed that the Israeli-Arab political leadership is trying to take the Israel-Palestinian conflict in a new direction and give it a new “national color.” Thankfully, he observed, they are not succeeding, and their efforts are not filtering down to the general public, which is more concerned with daily life. Still, the ISA Chief said his agency is rightly concerned with this. He added that the ISA is also monitoring other

TEL AVIV 00001080 002 OF 005

forms of extremism within Israel’s population, including Jewish extremists. He added that the ISA is also aware that there are problems among Israel’s Bedouin and Druze.

4. (S) Diskin said that the main challenge for the GOI is to figure out how to “connect” these people with the State of Israel. It is complex as it requires them to live their daily lives in contradiction. Most of the time, he allowed, they have been loyal to the State over the previous sixty years — even during the 1967 and 1973 wars and “waves of terror” that followed. The percentage of families that have connections with “bad people on the other side doing bad things” is very low, he said. He claimed that most of the Israeli-Arabs who have caused problems were refugees who were given permits to re-enter Israel in order to reunify with family members already living in Israel. “In these cases,” he said, “they brought their bad ideas with them, and then acted on them.” He continued: “Allowing Palestinians to return over the past few years was foolish. The Bedouin have brought women with them from the Gaza Strip and Jenin and now have many children. We need to manage this immigration in a controlled way. It is hard for us to absorb large quantities of people the way we have been doing these last few years.”

5. (S) Diskin noted that one of the main problems the GOI is facing now is that Arab-Israeli Knesset members are visiting enemy states, exploiting their parliamentary immunity in order to visit countries like Syria and mix with groups like Hizballah. “These people,” he said, “are not spreading the democratic values of Israel. Instead, they are being co-opted by people like Bashar Assad.” Diskin lamented that the ISA has to “deal with them now,” as — in his words — the Israeli National Police have failed to do what they were supposed to do. Pointing to the high-profile case of MK Azmi Bishara, Diskin said, tongue in cheek, that Israel would “welcome his return” from Syria, and that he would likely spend many years in an Israeli prison if he returns.

6. (S) Diskin suggested that the ISA has been a voice for assisting Arab-Israelis constructively over the last several years. He claimed that the ISA has been “constantly pushing and prodding” the GOI to “prevent their issues from falling through the cracks.” While the GOI has come up with many good ideas, Diskin observed, it nevertheless lacks funding to follow through on them. He claimed he and President Peres had recently discussed the need for more high-tech employment opportunities for Arab-Israelis, as well as colleges and training centers. He added that Prime Minister Olmert is “deeply involved,” and noted that Olmert will chair a government-run conference in June on the situation of the Arab-Israeli population. “It will,” he said, “be a good start to making better policy on this issue.”

7. (S) The Ambassador replied that the USG offers a small number of scholarships every year for Arab-Israelis to help them with graduate-level studies in the U.S. He indicated that the embassy would be willing to consider candidates that the ISA brought to its attention. The Ambassador observed that Israel’s Arab and Druze minorities should be viewed as potential “bridges” to Israel’s neighbors. In the future, they could help to change thinking and promote reform in the Arab world.

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ISA CONSIDERING EQUIPMENT APPROVALS FOR PASF ——————————————–

8. (S) The Ambassador raised the issue of GOI approvals for equipment the USG is providing to the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) for their training and use. He noted that to date, the GOI has approved some of the equipment, and denied the provision of other pieces of equipment, including protective equipment like kevlar helmets, and vests. The Ambassador observed that it is likely the USG will be submitting more equipment requests to the GOI in the future. He noted that many equipment requests form packages that are designed to provide specific capabilities that cannot be achieved if the equipment packages are only partially approved. This was also the case with investment proposals. He urged Diskin to look at any investment proposals stemming from the Bethlehem Investment Conference sympathetically, and to take the benefits they would provide into account when deciding whether to approve them.

9. (S) Diskin replied that the ISA also hopes that the Bethlehem Conference will succeed, and that the PA will progress on the economic front, as it would help to secure progress on the political front. Diskin said he is worried

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that we may be asking for too much too quickly on the political front, and that it may lead to disaster in the West Bank. While he agreed that creating better living conditions in the West Bank is a good idea, he stressed that we have to be very careful. He pointed to incidents in the past to explain that arms, ammunition and vests given to the PASF can eventually make their way into Hamas’ hands. In the past, such equipment has included rifles and heavy machines guns that he claimed have been used against IDF helicopters and soldiers. “I do not think that we need more arms in the West Bank,” he stressed, adding, “We have given them too much ammunition already.” As for vests, Diskin said that whether the GOI approves them depends on how the PASF will use them, and the capabilities of the vests themselves. Admitting he did not know the MOD’s position on the vests, Diskin said that the ISA did not object to their provision to the PASF. He noted, however, that the ISA strongly opposes bringing armored vehicles into the West Bank.

10. (S) Diskin stressed that the ISA opposes providing equipment to the Presidential Guard (PG), XXXXXXXXXXXX as a result of its officers’ activities during the Second Intifada. Diskin recounted that he told PM Olmert that “it would not be good” for Israel to transfer arms and weapons to the PG directly. He said he told PM Olmert that such items could be given to a third party, and that they could then turn the items over to the PG. Diskin added, “We can find ways to give it to a third party.”

11. (S) Reiterating the importance of equipping the PASF, the Ambassador stressed that the USG is requesting permission to turn over almost 3,000 vests and helmets for the graduates of U.S. training programs. Diskin responded that the final answer is with the MOD: “ISA has no veto on this. Sometimes the MOD opposes us.” Reviewing USSC Dayton’s request, Diskin said that the ISA agreed with the USSC, although it pointed out the problem of directly transferring equipment to the PG. Diskin said that other pieces of equipment, including water trucks and ladders, are still being reviewed by the ISA, but indicated that he would approve most of them. He added that he will oppose the provision of AK-47 rifles and ammunition to the PASF: “There are too many guns and ammunition in the West Bank already.”

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DISKIN ON GAZA AND OMAR SOLIMAN’S VISIT —————————————-

12. (S) Asked about Egyptian Intelligence Chief Omar Soliman’s visit, Diskin noted that he had met with Soliman the day before (May 12). Diskin characterized it as an “interesting meeting — a good atmosphere swirling with many lies — exactly what is to be expected in the Middle East.” The situation now, in the wake of Soliman’s visit, is a sensitive one. Soliman was surprised to hear that Israel was ready for a tahdiya, but only under certain conditions. According to Diskin, ISA played a key role in formulating the conditions. Israel cannot accept a tahdiya without a commitment to stop weapons smuggling into the Gaza Strip. This requires Egypt’s commitment, as it is a sovereign state. While weapons entering the Gaza Strip are coming from Sudan, Eritrea, Yemen and other countries, Egypt is the last place they pass through before they enter the Strip. Diskin cautioned: “We have been too patient about this. We cannot tolerate this anymore.”

13. (S) Diskin added that terrorist attacks from the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank must stop. This includes, he stressed, the directing of terror attacks within the West Bank from the Gaza Strip. Diskin said that the ISA knows that terrorist organizations in the West Bank have contacts with organizations in the Gaza Strip including Hamas, the Popular Resistance Committees, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and especially the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. He claimed that Israeli security services have often found that terrorist infrastructure in the Gaza Strip provides funding and direction to operatives in the West Bank. Diskin said that he told Soliman that if, under a tahdiya, there is an attack in the West Bank and Israel determines that there was no connection with the Gaza Strip, then Israel will not retaliate against targets in the Gaza Strip. If, however, Israel determines that there is a Gaza Strip connection, then attacks will be carried out against Gaza Strip targets. Without elaborating, Diskin pointed out that, if the tahdiya is to start, Hamas will have to make commitments to Egypt. He said that Soliman seemed to understand the Israeli position. He added that PM Olmert and DefMin Barak also made

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the same points to the Egyptian intelligence chief.

14. (S) Diskin explained how observation of the tahdiya would correlate with opening of the Rafah crossing and passages between the Gaza Strip and Israel. As smuggling and terrorist attacks from the Gaza Strip decline, then the passages can be gradually opened. As for the Rafah crossing, in Israel’s view, it is essential that PA President Abbas be involved in its opening, so that he receives credit for it.

15. (S) Diskin said that Israel does not like the tahdiya — seeing it as a means whereby Hamas and other groups can regroup and re-arm — but also dislikes the current situation. The ISA, he said, believes that the best option now is a large-scale ground incursion into the Gaza Strip that allows the IDF to take over the southern part of the Gaza Strip and to stop smuggling and increase pressure on Hamas. “If you do this, it will cause big problems for Hamas’ survival in the Gaza Strip,” he said. “We can do it,” he added. He continued: “None of us like the idea of a military operation in the Gaza Strip, but we also believe we cannot avoid it. I do not believe in this ‘cooling down’ that the tahdiya would afford. Even if it starts, it will not last long. The way we are now treating the current situation is not effective. It is a waste of time, money and life. A ground invasion may lead to loss of life, but would be more effective. We need to be ready to take over the southern Gaza Strip and hold on to it for as long as necessary. Months and years if need be. Strategically, all of us understand that we cannot avoid the Gaza Strip if there is to be a roadmap and a peace process.” Diskin added, “My job is to tell the inconvenient truth. I am glad that others are finally realizing that the situation in the Gaza Strip is intolerable and getting worse every day. The situation in Lebanon makes it easier for us to make our case. We need to be very tough in dealing with the problem of the Gaza Strip. Egypt will not resolve the problem for us, and Abu Mazen will not and cannot.”

16. (S) Diskin observed that Soliman looks at the Gaza Strip the way any Arab and Egyptian would — with an eye towards kicking it down the road: “I believe his policy is to try to buy more time. It is not to solve a problem, but to see what will happen down the road.” Diskin lamented that there are so many problems in the Middle East that it prevents pursuing and implementing a long-term policy. He concluded, “It is hard to anticipate all the factors when formulating a course of action. Events in other states — things like the price of oil — surprise you. Everyone is surprised all the time. To survive in the Middle East, you have to be like a shark in the water. You have to keep moving forward or you will die.”

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DISKIN PROMISES TO ASSIST WITH ENTRY PERMITS ——————————————–

17. (C) The Ambassador requested Diskin’s assistance in ensuring that entry permits for Bethlehem Conference invitees are issued as quickly as possible. While noting our appreciation that more than 200 had been approved, the Ambassador pointed out that over 400 had been requested. He stressed that invitees are anxious and may start canceling participation if they do not receive their permits by the end of the week. Diskin said the ISA would do its best, and that he had told his staff two months ago to treat each request positively, unless an invitee posed a clear threat. Diskin said he would work closely with the MOD on the permits, and asked to be informed if any problems emerged. Diskin reiterated that he had given clear instructions to his staff to approve as many permits as possible.

18. (C) The Ambassador also requested Diskin’s assistance in obtaining an entry permit for Palestinian Sheikh Tamimi so that he could attend a May 27 interfaith meeting in Jerusalem. The Ambassador noted that FM Livni is also invited to attend the meeting. Diskin said Tamimi will receive a permit, but for that day only. The Ambassador undertook to have a U.S. security officer accompany Tamimi while he is in Jerusalem, as had been done during his previous interfaith meeting in Jerusalem.

19. (C) The Ambassador also requested Diskin’s assistance in obtaining an entry permit for a Palestinian student in the Gaza Strip who needs to travel to Jerusalem in order to undergo a May 22 visa interview in connection with his acceptance to MIT. Diskin promised to assist and requested all the information on the student. JONES

TOP-SECRET -Israel – calm before the storm?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 002473
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, MOPS, KWBG, IS, IR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF DEPUTY SECRETARY JAMES STEINBERG
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Luis G. Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) ( d)

1. (S) Summary. Israel is deceptively calm and prosperous. The security situation inside Israel is the best since the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the economy has weathered the storms of the international economic crisis, and Netanyahu’s governing coalition is stable, for the time being at least. Yet outside the storm is gathering and Israelis of many different political outlooks agree on the need to seize the initiative, even while they disagree about what exactly should be done. Israelis see Iran as the primary regional threat, both due to its nuclear program and its projection of power directly into Gaza and southern Lebanon. The Israeli navy’s seizure of a ship loaded with a huge shipment of Iranian arms November 3 has provided tangible proof of Iran’s involvement in arming Hamas and Hizballah. Syrian intentions are also a source of concern, as Israeli analysts see Asad moving closer to Iran and Hizballah even as Syria improves its relations with the West. The sharp decline in Israel’s long- standing strategic relationship with Turkey is adding a new element of instability into the picture. Prime Minister Erdogan’s rhetorical support for Ahmedinejad and his dismissal of the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program is feeding the sense here of impending crisis, although the robust U.S.-Israeli security relationship is profoundly reassuring to Israeli security officials and the general public alike. Finally, the failure to re-launch Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the political crisis in the Palestinian Authority is deeply disturbing to Israelis who still believe in a two-state solution. Even GOI skeptics are worried that the lack of a political dialogue and talk of a collapse of the PA are undermining the bottom-up approach they advocate as the alternative to a final-status agreement. Netanyahu insists that he is ready to start negotiations immediately without preconditions, but he will not negotiate on the basis of former PM Olmert’s offer of a year ago. The opposition Kadima Party’s number two, former IDF Chief of Staff and former Minister of Defense Shaul Mofaz, has generated considerable attention with a new peace plan that is based on offering the Palestinians a state with temporary borders in the next year or two, to be followed by intensive final status negotiations. Few here believe the Palestinians will accept this idea, but it may serve to push Netanyahu toward offering a peace initiative of his own. End Summary.

Calm Before the Storm?

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2. (S) Israel in the fall of 2009 is deceptively calm on the surface. Israelis are enjoying the best security situation since the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the result of Israeli intelligence successes in destroying the suicide bombing network in the West Bank as well as good security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority’s security forces. The Israeli economy has successfully weathered the world economic crisis, with only a slight uptick in unemployment and no major impact on the financial system. PM Netanyahu’s center-right coalition is stable, and faces no significant challenge from the opposition Kadima Party. Netanyahu personally enjoys approval ratings over sixty percent, and appears to have benefited politically from the media obsession with reports of frictions with the U.S. Administration. Netanyahu so far has managed the more right wing elements of Likud and other rightist elements in the coalition, although tensions with the far right are likely to reemerge over peace process issues, including a temporary settlement freeze or a decision to make good on Barak’s pledges to evacuate illegal outposts. There are signs of a growing split within the Labor Party, and Foreign Minister Lieberman continues to face the strong possibility of several criminal indictments for money laundering and obstruction of justice, but none of this threatens the stability of the coalition, at least not yet. The latest polls indicate that Likud would gain three seats if elections were held now.

And Looming Threats

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3. (S) Despite this good news for the government, Israelis are even more anxious than normal these days. Sixty-one years after the establishment of the State of Israel, Israelis sense a growing tide in the world challenging not just the occupation of territory seized in 1967, but even against the existence of the Jewish state within any borders. The GOI‘s alarm and outrage over the Goldstone Report was based on their view that the report represented an attempt to deny Israel the right to react military to terrorist threats.

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Security is indeed good and Israel’s borders are generally the quietest they have been in years, but it is common knowledge that Hamas in Gaza and Hizballah in Lebanon both now possess rockets capable of hitting the greater Tel Aviv area, Israel’s main population and economic center. When discussing Iran’s nuclear program, sophisticated Israeli interlocutors note that the issue is not just whether a nuclear-armed Iran would launch nuclear-tipped missiles at Israel – although that possibility cannot be dismissed – but rather the regional nuclear arms race that would ensue and the impact of the resulting uncertainty on Israeli elites and foreign investors alike. Israel’s remarkable high-tech economy is a great achievement, but it also makes Israel exceptionally vulnerable to a host of private decisions to live and invest elsewhere. Growing alienation among Israel’s twenty-percent Arab minority and the increasing domination of Israeli Arab politics by an elite that identifies with Palestinian nationalism further complicates Israel’s internal scene.

4. (S) Painstakingly constructed relations with Israel’s neighbors are also fraying. Even optimists about relations with Egypt and Jordan admit that Israel enjoys peace with both regimes, but not with their people. The transformation of Michel Aoun into Hizballah’s primary Lebanese ally may be the final nail in the coffin of Israel’s decades-old relations with Lebanon’s Maronite Christians. Finally, Israelis are deeply alarmed by the direction of Turkish foreign policy, and see Erdogan and Davutoglu as punishing Israel for the EU’s rejection of Turkey while driving Israel’s erstwhile strategic ally into an alternative strategic partnership with Syria and Iran.

Gaza Dilemmas

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5. (S) Gaza poses its own set of dilemmas. The IDF general responsible for Gaza and southern Israel, Major General Yoav Galant, recently commented to us that Israel’s political leadership has not yet made the necessary policy choices among competing priorities: a short-term priority of wanting Hamas to be strong enough to enforce the de facto ceasefire and prevent the firing of rockets and mortars into Israel; a medium-priority of preventing Hamas from consolidating its hold on Gaza; and a longer-term priority of avoiding a return of Israeli control of Gaza and full responsibility for the well-being of Gaza’s civilian population. Israel appears determined to maintain its current policy of allowing only humanitarian supplies and limited commercial goods into Gaza, while sealing the borders into Israel. There are indications of progress in the indirect negotiations with Hamas over the release of Gilad Shalit in return for the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, many of them hardened terrorists,but it is difficult to predict the timing of such a deal. Shalit’s release would likely result in a more lenient Israeli policy toward the Gaza crossings, but a large prisoner exchange would be played by Hamas as a major political achievement and thus further damage the standing of Abu Mazen among Palestinians.

Security Cooperation with the U.S. Reassuring ———————————————

6. (S) Especially given the sense of growing threats from all directions, Israelis from the Prime Minister on down to the average citizen are deeply appreciative of the strong security and mil-mil cooperation with the U.S. The U.S.-Israeli security relationship remains strong, as indicated by the joint U.S.-Israeli missile defense exercise Juniper Cobra 10 in which over 1,400 American personnel tested Israel’s defense – and U.S. support thereof – against ballistic missile threats in the region . The United States remains committed to Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME), and has taken a number of steps to alleviate Israeli concerns over some potential U.S arms sales to the region, including the creation of four new QME working groups to further discuss these arms transfers. These working groups will soon begin deliberations, focusing on previous arms transfer agreements, mitigation measures for the planned U.S. F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia, technical mitigation issues, and intelligence policy.

7. (S) While the United States and Israel may not agree on some U.S. arms transfers to the region, these QME working groups will ensure a transparent process so that Israel is not surprised by any U.S. potential transfer. As it does in assessing all threats, Israel approaches potential U.S. arms sales from a “worst case scenario” perspective in which current moderate Arab nations (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and

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Jordan) in the region could potentially fall victim to regime change and resume hostilities against Israel. It is primarily for this reason that Israel continues to raise concerns regarding the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia, especially if the aircraft are based at Tabuk airfield near the Israeli border. We have deflected Israeli requests for additional information regarding the F-15 sale until we receive an official Letter of Request (LOR) from Saudi Arabia.

8. (S) Finally, an argument can be made that Israel has continued to raise concerns over the F-15 sale as leverage in its attempts to modify its purchase of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Israel remains highly committed to the JSF as a successor to its aging F-16 fleet, although budgetary considerations have raised some doubts how Israel will be able to afford it. Nevertheless, Israel continues to press for the inclusion of an Israeli-made electronic warfare (EW) suite, indigenous maintenance capacity, and a lower cost per aircraft into its JSF purchase plans, and has repeatedly raised these issues with SecDef.

Impasse with the Palestinians

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9. (C) Polls show that close to seventy percent of Israeli Jews support a two-state solution, but a similar percentage do not believe that a final status agreement can be reached with the Palestinian leadership. Expressed another way, Israelis of varying political views tell us that after Abu Mazen spurned Ehud Olmert’s peace offer one year ago, it became clearer than ever that there is too wide a gap between the maximum offer any Israeli prime minister could make and the minimum terms any Palestinian leader could accept and survive. Sixteen years after Oslo and the Declaration of Principles, there is a widespread conviction here that neither final status negotiations nor unilateral disengagements have worked. While some on the left conclude that the only hope is a U.S.-imposed settlement, a more widely held narrative holds that the Oslo arrangements collapsed in the violence of the Second Intifada after Arafat rejected Barak’s offer at Camp David, while Sharon’s unilateral disengagement from Gaza resulted in the Hamas takeover and a rain of rockets on southern Israel. Netanyahu effectively captured the public mood with his Bar Ilan University speech last June, in which he expressed support for a two-state solution, but only if the Plestinian leadership would accept Israel as the ation-state of the Jewish people and the Palestiian state would be demilitarized (and subject toa number of other security-related restrictions o its sovereignty that he did not spell out in deail in the speech but which are well known in Wahington). Palestinian PM Fayyad has recently temed Netanyahu’s goal a “Mickey Mouse state” due to all the limitations on Palestinian sovereignty that it would appear to entail.

10. (S) Abu Mazen’s stated intent not to seek another term is widely seen here as an effort to put pressure on Washington to put pressure on Israel to meet Palestinian terms for starting negotiations. Abu Mazen’s statements have likely reinforced his image among Israelis as a decent man, and certainly a different breed from Arafat, but a weak and unreliable leader. Yet even some of the Israeli officials, including Avigdor Lieberman and Sylvan Shalom, who have been most skeptical about the prospects for a final status agreement in the near term, are now expressing concern at the lack of engagement with the PA and the prospects of the PA collapsing. Advocates of a bottom-up approach are finally realizing that without a political process, the security cooperation and economic development approach will become unsustainable. Netanyahu has told us that he considers Abu Mazen to be his negotiating partner, and in his latest public statements has stressed that he is not interested in negotiations for their own sake, but rather seeks a far-reaching agreement with the Palestinians, but it remains unclear to us how far Netanyahu is prepared to go. Netanyahu is interested in taking steps to strengthen Abu Mazen, but he will not agree to the total freeze on Israeli construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem that Abu Mazen insists is a requirement for engaging with Netanyahu.

Israeli Choices —————

11. (C) Former Defense Minister and former IDF Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz generated a lot of media attention this week when he announced a peace plan that calls for establishing a Palestinian state with temporary borders on sixty percent of the West Bank, then entering final status negotiations.

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Mofaz’ approach is similar to ideas that have been floated quietly over the past few months by Defense Minister Barak and President Peres, and Mofaz claims that both Barak and Peres support his plan. Mofaz’ plan is in part an effort to undermine the political position of his rival for Kadima party leadership, former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni. Livni, presumably drawing on her experience negotiating with the Palestinians during the Olmert government, says she opposes the idea of an interim solution, but instead supports intensive final status negotiations, perhaps this time with direct U.S. involvement. Livni and Mofaz both stress that they are motivated by a sense of urgency and that time is not on Israel’s side.

12. (C) Netanyahu still holds the political cards here, however, and we see no scenarios in which Livni or Mofaz become prime minister in the near future. As Mofaz told the Ambassador earlier this week, Netanyahu may wait until the Palestinian elections, if they are in fact held in January, but the initiative is in his hands. If the Palestinians continue to refuse to engage on terms that Netanyahu can accept, it is possible that Netanyahu could turn his attention to Syria. Media reports that Netanyahu asked President Sarkozy to deliver a message to Asad may turn out to be accurate, but as with the Palestinians, Netanyahu will not resume talks with Syria where they left off under Olmert, but will insist on negotiations without preconditions. CUNNINGHAM

Die “GoMoPa” – Wirecard Lüge

http://www.usag24-betrug.com/index.php/gomopas-wirecard-behauptungen-zweifelhaft-schuett-hat-keinerlei-behauptungen-zu-wirecard-gemacht/

STERN – Cyberstalking: Wer verfolgt wird, muss sich wehren

http://www.stern.de/…/cyberstalking-wer-verfolgt-wird-muss-sich-wehren-653334.html

FAZ ÜBER CYBERSTALKER A LA GoMoPa- MUTMASSLICHE PARTNER VON “GERD BENNEWIRTZ” UND “PETER EHLERS”

http://www.faz.net/s/Rub77CAECAE94D7431F9EACD163751D4CF/Doc~E70F3E028C8E542D9B0AD6B2A8B1179C3~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html

TOP-SECRET – THE TRUE PICS FROM THE PROTEST-REVOLT IN CHILE


[Image]Riot police hit students with their batons during a 48-hour national strike at Santiago August 25, 2011. Protesters battled police in Chile’s capital on Thursday, the second day of a two-day strike against unpopular President Sebastian Pinera that was marked by sporadic looting but had no impact on the vital mining sector. Reuters
[Image]Workers, students and citizens attend a 48-hour national strike at Santiago August 25, 2011. Protesters scuffled with police in the Chilean capital on Thursday, the second of a two-day strike against unpopular President Sebastian Pinera marked by sporadic looting, though the linchpin mining sector was not affected. Reuters
[Image]A demonstrator is detained by riot policemen during a 48-hour national strike at Santiago August 25, 2011. Protesters scuffled with police in the Chilean capital on Thursday, the second of a two-day strike against unpopular President Sebastian Pinera marked by sporadic looting, though the linchpin mining sector was not affected. Reuters
[Image]Carlos Burgos, who says he was shot at by the Chilean police, shows his wound in the Penalolen neighbourhood in Santiago August 26, 2011, where 16-year-old Manuel Gutierrez was shot dead during a 48-hour national strike against President Sebastian Pinera. Gutierrez died early on Friday after he was shot a day earlier in massive protests in the capital against the unpopular Pinera, the first fatality in months of social unrest. Police said he was shot in the chest as protesters battled them overnight in Santiago, in the aftermath of a 48-hour national strike against Pinera marked by violent clashes and sporadic looting. Reuters
[Image]Students march toward the Chilean consulate in Buenos Aires on August 25, 2011, supporting the Chilean students in their claim for free education and against Chile’s President Sebastian Pinera. Getty
[Image]A demonstrator stands next to a burning barricade on the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Roberto Candia)
[Image]Riot police detain a woman during a protest of public workers and students for the massive layoffs of government employees in Santiago, Chile, Thursday, Aug. 26, 2010. (Aliosha Marquez)
[Image]Police and protesters clash in front of the Gratitud Nacional Church during the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Sebastian Silva)
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[Image]Riot police detain a protester near La Moneda presidential palace during the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans are demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Victor R. Caivano)
[Image]Protesters throw stones at an armored police vehicle spraying tear gas during the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Sebastian Silva)
[Image]A police officer on horseback rides past a bus stop set on fire by demonstrators on the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Luis Hidalgo)
[Image]A protester kicks a tear gas canister during clashes with police in the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Jose Miguel Rojas)
[Image]A protester throws stones at an armored police vehicle after clashes broke out during a march on the second day of a national strike in Santiago, Chile, Thursday Aug. 25, 2011. Chileans marched Thursday, demanding profound changes in the country’s heavily centralized and privatized form of government. Union members, students, government workers and Chile’s center-left opposition parties joined the nationwide two-day strike. (Victor R. Caivano)
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[Image]Nearly one million people, including whole families, gathered at the Parque O’Higgins in a demonstration called “Family Sunday for Education”, organised by University students, high schools and the College of Teachers. Chile. 21st August 2011 Demotix

TOP-SECRET-Voice of America Antennas Eyeball


[Image]Source
Sites A (Top Center) and Site B (Bottom Center) Near Greenville and Washington, NChttp://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&ll=35.583897,-77.100334&spn=0.268322,0.41851&t=h&z=12&vpsrc=6

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Börse Online über “GoMoPa”-Betrüger und RA Jochen Resch

http://www.graumarktinfo.de/gm/aktuell/diskussion/:Gomopa–Anwaelte-als-Finanzierungsquelle/616477.html

DER BEWEIS – 2000: “INVESTMENT” entsteht auch in Deutschland – da hiess es bei Ehlers noch “Der Fonds”

http://berndpulch.org/2011/05/23/der-beweis-aus-dem-jahr-2000-so-regte-gruner-jahr-tochter-ipv-mich-an-den-titel-investment-zu-lancieren/

Crpytome – Financial Crisis Luxury Architecture


[Image]Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz. is interviewed on Capitol Hill in Washington, Tuesday, Aug. 2, 2011, after the Senate voted to pass debt legislation. (Jacquelyn Martin)
[Image]Madrid’s Stock Exchange is seen on Wednesday Aug. 10, 2011. A risky European Central Bank decision to fight the continent’s debt crisis by buying Spanish and Italian bonds on Monday started pushing down the soaring interest rates threatening those countries with financial disaster.(Daniel Ochoa de Olza)
[Image]In this Feb. 1, 2011 file photo, people queue outside an unemployment office in Madrid. Spain’s Labor Ministry says the number of people filing claims for unemployment benefits fell by 42,059 in July as the summer tourism season provided new jobs. The ministry said Tuesday, Aug. 2, 2011 that July’s fall was the fourth straight monthly decline. It left the number receiving benefits at 4.08 million, down from 4.12 million the previous month. (Arturo Rodriguez, File)
[Image]Lawmakers crowd the Parliament as Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi addresses the lower chamber on the state of the economy in Rome, Wednesday, Aug. 3, 2011. Berlusconi said economic growth is his government’s key policy aim. After a volatile day on markets, in which Italian borrowing rates touched a record high, Berlusconi told parliament that Italy “has not done little” in response to the crisis, but that it needs to do more. He says Italy needs to promote competitiveness and growth.
[Image]A beggar, his body covered with white paint, walks along a street in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Saturday, March 5, 2011. (Ramon Espinosa)
[Image]A nearly deserted atrium of the European Council is pictured in Brussels, Monday, Aug. 8, 2011. European have always valued their vacations, and their leaders are no exception. With modern communications, the leaders say they remain constantly in touch. So do their vacations matter? One financial analyst says yes: “It sends a terrible message to the markets … in the middle of a crisis.” (Yves Logghe)
[Image]Pensioners gather in a protest against the government’s austerity measures, Thursday, Aug. 25 2011, outside the prime minister’s official residence in Lisbon. Portugal’s European partners and the International Monetary Fund lent it the money to prevent the country going bankrupt but in return demanded a long list of spending cuts and economic reforms. Poster hanging from the umbrella reads “The government lied to the pensioners”. (Armando Franca)
[Image]French President Nicolas Sarkozy, left, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, right, attend a meeting at the Elysee Palace, Paris, Tuesday, Aug. 16, 2011. The leaders of Germany and France are meeting Tuesday to discuss Europe’s debt crisis as new figures show their economies stalled even before the latest bout of turmoil struck financial markets. (Patrick Kovarik, Pool)
[Image]A traveller smokes next to a beggar outside a public office in central Athens on Thursday, Aug. 11, 2011. Greece’s Statistical Authority says unemployment in the debt-ridden country jumped to 16.6 percent in May.The number of jobless stands at 822,719 in the country of about 11 million people. The graffiti reads “pigs, murderes” and “burn the parliament”. (Dimitri Messinis)
[Image]French President Nicolas Sarkozy, left, speaks during a special meeting on the financial crisis with head of the French Central Bank Christian Noyer, right, Finance Minister Francois Baroin, second from right, and Prime Minister Francois Fillon, third from right, at the Elysee Palace in Paris, Wednesday Aug. 10, 2011. Sarkozy is interrupted his vacation to hold an emergency government meeting about the uncertainty on world financial markets. (Denis/Pool)
[Image][Image]A view of Milan’s stock exchange headquarters is seen, Monday, July 11, 2011. Finance ministers gathered in Brussels are debating how to secure a private-sector contribution to a new Greek package and how to prevent the debt crisis spreading to bigger countries, including Italy. (Antonio Calanni)
[Image]E.U. and Stock Exchange’s flags fly outside the building of the Greek Stock Exchange in Athens, Friday, Aug. 5, 2011. The eurozone’s debt crisis battered markets once again Friday, challenging vacationing European leaders to find a way to keep the turmoil from pushing Spain and Italy to a financial collapse that would hit an already-waning global recovery. (Thanassis Stavrakis)
[Image]A woman holding a handkerchief to her face to protect herself from lingering tear gas passes by an elderly beggar while, in the background, two workers replace broken hotel windows in central Athens on Thursday, June 30, 2011. Rioters caused extensive property damage during anti-government protests Wednesday while police riposted with heavy use of chemicals. (Dimitri Messinis)
[Image]A tourist with her luggage enters a luxury hotel in central Athens as protesters demonstrate on Tuesday, Aug. 23, 2011. Dozens of protesters have been picketing the entrance to three luxury hotels on Athens’ main Syntagma Square as part of a 24-hour strike by hotel employees objecting to plans to cut their entitlement to early retirement. The banner on the left reads in Greek “Hands off” the ‘arduous and unhealthy’ classification of professions. (Petros Giannakouris)
[Image]Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DCSource
[Image]The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where high level meetings were held in a last attempt to save Lehman Brothers, is photographed August 25, 2009. A failed plan to rescue Lehman Brothers was followed Sunday by more seismic shocks from Wall Street, including an apparent government-brokered takeover of Merrill Lynch by the Bank of America. (Cryptome) Below, Board Room of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.[Image]

Source

[Image]Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou, left, talks with Greek President Karolos Papoulias during their meeting in Athens, on Friday, July 22, 2011. Eurozone countries and the International Monetary Fund pledged Thursday to give Greece a euro 109 billion ($155 billion) worth of rescue funds, on top of the euro 110 billion granted more than a year ago. (Petros Giannakouris)
[Image]People walk past a prostrate beggar at the entrance to the Syntagma Square metro station in central Athens, Thursday, Aug. 11, 2011. Greece’s Statistical Authority says unemployment in the debt-ridden country jumped to 16.6 percent in May.The number of jobless stands at 822,719 in the country of about 11 million people. (Dimitri Messinis)
[Image]Pedestrians walk past the New York Stock Exchange on Friday, Aug. 5, 2011 in New York. Fears that the economy might dip back into recession helped send the Dow Jones industrial average down 513 points on Thursday. European leaders are struggling to contain that region’s debt problems, prompting comparisons to the 2008 financial crisis. Markets tumbled from Tokyo to London Friday as overseas traders reacted to the selloff. (Jin Lee)
[Image]Political protest at the New York Stock Exchange, August 20, 2007. (Cryptome)
[Image]Rep. Jason Chaffetz, R-Utah, sponsor of the “Cut, Cap and Balance” deficit reduction plan that was passed in the GOP-controlled House, walks through the Capitol to get an update from the Senate on debt negotiations, in Washington, Sunday, July 31, 2011. (J. Scott Applewhite)
[Image]A beggar boy and a beggar rest near an entrance of a pedestrian underpass near Beijing’s Central Business District, China, Thursday, April 28, 2011. (Alexander F. Yuan)
[Image]A launching ceremony of the Severodvinsk nuclear-powered submarine is held at a defense shipyard in the Arctic port of Severodvinsk, Russia, Tuesday, June 15, 2010. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev attended the ceremony in Severodvinsk. (RIA-Novosti, Vladimir Rodionov, Presidential Press Service)
[Image]A beggar asks for donations in front of the synagogue in Novi Sad, some 80 kilometers (50 miles) north of Belgrade, Serbia, Tuesday, May 18, 2011. (Darko Vojinovic)
[Image]Citigroup Center, New York, NY. (Cryptome)[Image]

TOP-SECRET – CB Megadeath Horrors From Dugway Proving Ground-Sampling of Reports Available

The Desert West Technical Information Center, at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, holds more than 65,000 reports on biological and chemical warfare, including many as far back as World War One.

See a report of interest, just send a request letter to this location:

FOIA Office
FOIA & Privacy Officer/Paralegal Specialist
US Army Dugway Proving Ground
Command Judge Advocate: TEDT-DP-JA
5450 Doolittle Avenue
Dugway, UT 84022
PH:   435 831-3333
FAX:  435 831-3390

In addition to requesting individual reports, it is also possible to ask for a printout of all reports at the Desert West Technical Information Center created between any two dates, such as 1946 through 1955.

The reports below are selected from those originated during the years between 1918 and 1945.

====

Physical Properties and Aerosol Dissemination Characteristics of P. oryzae Spores, No date

Defoliation Project Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, 1943

Arpa-Supported Research on Brush Control and Chemical Defoliation Crops Protection Research Branch, 1943.

Dispersion of Chemicals by Bombs, July 1935

Soviet Report on CW and BW Preparations and Capabilities, March 1945

Supplementary Test of Tactics and Techniques of Chemical Spray (Jungle Phase), July 1945

Project Strange Man, Logistic Trial Test, AB-45Y-1, Simulant Fills Spray Tanks, no date

Research on Tularemia in the Soviet Union During the Last 25 Years, July 1945

Development of Tactics and Techniques for Dissemination of Chemicals From Aircraft for Crop Destruction, June 1945

Adaptation of Chemical Spray Tanks to Fighter Aircraft, June 1945

Development of Offensive Tactics Versus Japanese Fortifications, April 1944

Tactics and Techniques for Employment of Toxic Gas Bombs by the Army Air Forces, October 1945

Physicochemical Properties of XA Toxin, November 1945

Additional Studies on the Development of U1 as an Offensive Biological Warfare Agent, December 1945

Development of Defensive Measures Against US, October 1945

Development of N for Offensive Use in Biological Warfare, July 1945

Characteristics of Some BW Agents for Plants, August 1944

Test of Plasticized White Phosphorus Filled M47A2 Bombs, June 1945

Development of UL for Offensive Use in Biological Warfare, June 1944

The Present Status of the Offensive Development of US, September 1945

Investigations concerned with the Development of Phytophtora Infestans as a Potential Agent for Biological Warfare, October 1945

Development of X for Offensive Use in Biological Warfare, November 1945

The Development of E as an Agent for Biological Warfare, November 1945

The Development of E as an Agent for Biological Warfare, November 1945

Studies of the Virus Agents of the SI Group, November 1945

The Development of IR as a Biological Warfare Agent, January 1945

A Pilot Plant for the Production of Plant Pathogens, November 1945

The Development of C for Offensive Use in Biological Warfare, November 1945

Cloud Chamber Studies, 1, Methods Developed at Camp Detrick for Production and Study of Clouds of Highly Infective Agents, October 1945

Immunization of Man with Fluid Type a X Toxoid, May 1945

Immunization Against N, January 1945

The Purification of XA Toxin, September 1945

The Physiology of X Toxin, November 1945

The Offensive Phase of the SI Project, November 1945

Studies on the Nutrition, Growth and Virulence of OC, December 1945

Studies of Toxin and Toxoid Production of X Types C and D, October 1945

Etiology of Epizootic Encephalitis of the Rabbit, January 1924

Letter of completion for Dugway Proving Ground Test Plan DGPTP 496, Final

Engineering Testing of the E-20 Little John Warhead, GB Agent, no date

The Report of G

The Report of Q

A Study of short Interval Exposures of Goats to CG, CK and AC, November 1945

The Evaluation of the 4.2 inch Chemical Mortar Shell Filled with HD or HT when Fired into Open Terrain, 1945

400-lb, 1000-lb, 2000-lb and 4000-lb Bombs Filled with Nonpersistent Agents, June 1944

Florida Forest Field Trials of Non-Persistent and Persistent Agents, Part 1 Non-Persistent Agents, May 1944

The Behavior of Non-Persistent Gas Clouds Released from Bombs in the Targhee National Forest, December 1943

Micrometeorology of Woods and Open Areas within the Withlachoochee Land Use Project, Florida, 1944

The Assessment of HN1 when dispersed in Open Terrain under Semi-Tropical Conditions and a Comparison of HN1, H and HN3 under these Conditions, December 1945

Low Altitude Spray, March 1945

Toxicity of Goat Lung Exudates, December 1942

Production of X, April 1944

Penetration of the AN-M69 and M69X Incendiary Bombs into Japanese Structures When Released from Aimable Clusters, December 1944.

Attack against Cave-type Fortifications, October 1945

Studies of the Toxicity and Dispersibility of W in Munitions, July 1945

Anti-Psittacosis Protection, May 1944

Immunization Against UL, May 1944

Immunization Against US, May 1945

Immunization Against N, May 1944

Comparison of Anti-Personnel Effects of Plasticized WP and Solid WP in 4.2 inch Chemical Mortar Shells, June 1944

The Assessment of the M47A2 and M70 Bomb Filled with Levinstein Mustard, Parts A, B, C and D, 1945

Test No. W-20-1944, M2, 4.2-inch Chemical Mortar Shell, Plasticized WP-filled, July 1944

Use of the E5 Incendiary Bomb against Light Structures, July 1944

Immunization Against N, March 1944

Immunization Against UL, March 1944

Immunization Against N, December 1943

Immunization Against UL, December 1943

A Thumb-Nail Sketch of the Development of Biological Warfare, November 1942

Immunization Against UL, June 1944

Anti-Psittacosis Project, June 1944

Immunization Against US, June 1944

Pathogenesis of LA, June 1944

Hirsch Report: Soviet Report on CW and BW Preparations and Capabilities, Volumes 1, 2 and 3, March 1945

Chemical Methods for Use in Observational Program, USARDO, Fort Clayton, Canal Zone, no date

Standardization of Persistent Agent HT, March 1945

Hydrocynamic Acid.  The Toxicity and Speed of Action on Man, November 1942

Properties of War Gases:  Volume III, Vomiting and Choking Gases and Lacrimators, December 1944

Chemical Land Mines, 1905

Thickened Vesicants:  Thickening Purified H with Poliymethyl Methacrylate (MM), July 1944

Shellfish Poison, Monthly Reports 1 through 12, 1944-1945

Estimate of HS Persistency When Disseminated From Various Munitions, October 1937

Lewisite:  Dispersion as Airplane Chemical Spray, November 1942

The Construction and Operation of A Gassing Chamber for Human Tests, July 1945

A Study of the residual Effects of Phosgene Poisoning in Human Subjects, August 1945

A Review of the Insecticide Hexachlorocyclohexane ­ 666, September 1945

Gassing Chamber for Human Tests:  Construction and Operation, October 1944

Toxicity Determinations, Methods in Use in Medical Research Division, Edgewood Arsenal, July 1943

Toxic Dusts:  The Penetration of Protective Clothing by Sesqui HS, March 1941

Physical Constants of Products Used for the Flame Projectors, March 1918

Medical Division Status Summaries, October 1943 ­ April 1944, August 1944

Casualty and Incendiary Effects of Small Particles of WP, January 1940

Airplane Chemical Handling Equipment, 1941 Plan, February 1941

The Vesicant Action of Sesquimustard and Certain Sesquimustard-type Compounds, June 1943

Minutes of the Chemical Warfare Technical Committee, Numbers 1, 2 and 3, 1944

Summary and Discussion of Available Mustard Gas Data From Field Tests conducted Prior to 1928, April 1928

Biological Warfare:  An Annotated Bibliography, Appendix 1, December 1942

Report of the Joint Chemical Spray Project Sub-committee of the United States Chemical Warfare Committee, Sections 1, 2 and 3, 1944

A System for the Ultimate Analysis of Chemical Warfare Agents, August 1944

The Residual Effects of Warfare Gases, III:  Phosgene, IV:  Arsenical Compounds, 1933

Memorandum for Chief, CWS, Visit to Bushnell Florida, December 1943

Joint Chemical Spray Project, May 1944

Preparation and Properties of Derivatives of CW Agents, June 1944

Status Report on Technique of High Altitude Spray, April 1944

Toxicity of Chemical Warfare Agents, Informal Monthly Progress Reports, 1944-1945

Chemical Equipment for Use in Jungle Assault Operations, November 1943

101st Airborne Division Chemical Activities Summary CY 1968, 1969

Chronology of BW, 1945

Detection of BW Agents, May 1944

Constants and Physiological Action of Chemical Warfare Agents, July 1931

Review of the Research Activities of the Chemical Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 1919-1928, circa 1931

History of Gas Attacks Upon the American Expeditionary Forces During the World War, Parts 1, 2 and 3, February 1928

Resume of Recent Knowledge on the Technical Aspects of Chemical Warfare in the Field, May 1945

Munitions for Biological Warfare, Volume 2, September 1945

Pathogenesis of LA and HI, Comprehensive Report, November 1945

Final Report, Physical Properties of AB-1 Fermentor Cultures, no date

Camp Detrick ­ History of BW, no date

Methods of Estimating Lethal Dose for Man, no date

Wind-tunnel Studies of Gas Diffusion in a Typical Japanese Urban District, June 1945

Final Report:  A Study of Rickettsiae and Virus Combinations, no date

Final Report of Work Done Under Contract W-18-064-CWS-43 at the University of Kansas, June 1945

Sixth and Final Report on Contract Number W-266-CWS-246 Between the War Department and the Long Island Biological Associations, Inc., March 1943

Psychological Studies on the Effects of CW Agents, no date

Chamber Tests with Human Subjects, 13 reports, various dates

Transport, Dispersion and Deposition of Aerial Sprays, no date

Proposal to provide a Level of Effort Study to Determine the Feasibility of High Altitude Release of BW Agents over North America, NUS Corp, Rockville, MD, no date

Biological Warfare, An Annotated Bibliography, January 1942

The Chemistry of Certain Arsenical Chemical Warfare Agents as Water Contaminants, June 1944

The Deposition of Nonvolatile Aerosol Clouds in Open and Forested Areas, March 1944

Present Status of Development of Toxic Gases, December 1942

Report on Scientific Intelligence Survey in Japan:  September and October 1945, Volume 5:  Biological Warfare

Anthrax Project, Parke Davis and Co., no date

“SPIEGEL” über die STASI-Connection des mutmasslichen “GoMoPa”-Chefs Jochen Resch

http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-65717414.html

“DIE WELT” ÜBER DIE DIFFAMIERUNGSMETHODEN DER STASI – VORBILD FÜR “GoMoPa”

http://www.welt.de/print-wams/article145822/Wie_die_Stasi_Strauss_diffamierte.html

EHRE WEM EHRE GEBUEHRT: “DIE PISSNELKEN DES JAHRZEHNTS – GoMoPa UND PARTNER”

VORSICHT SATIRE –

Liebe Leser,

normalerweise bin ich kein Freund von “starken Worten und Auszeichnungen”.

Doch diesmal muss es sein.

Eindeutig zu den “Pisssnelken des Jahrzehnts” haben sich die selbsternannten “Scheisshausfliegen” von dem selbsternannten “Nachrichtendienst” “GoMoPa” und deren mutmassliche Auftraggeber “RA Resch, RA SchulteSchulte, Gerd Bennewirtz und Peter Ehlers” durchgekämpft.

Der “Pissnelken – Jahrzehnt-Preis”  vorher ging an Erich Mielke und Erich Honecker.

Im Jahrzehnt davor an “Mao”.

Meine herzliche Gratulation an die aktuellen “Pissnelken des Jahrzehnts”

Die Preise werden übrigens in SAN QUENTIN verliehen – in Form eines “Goldenen Strahls auf die Preisträger ”

Herzlichst Ihr

Bernd Pulch, Magister Artium

VORSICHT SATIRE –

TOP-SECRET – Saudi defence minister explains targeting of Yemeni rebels with air strikes

247619

S E C R E T RIYADH 000159

NOFORN

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ARP: JHARRIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2025 U

TAGS: PREL, PINR, SA, YM

SUBJECT: (S) SAUDI ARABIA: RENEWED ASSURANCES ON SATELLITE

IMAGERY

REF: SECSTATE 8892

Classified By: Amb. James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b, c and d)

SUMMARY

——–

1. (S/NF) Ambassador met with Assistant Minister of Defense and Aviation Prince Khaled bin Sultan to relay U.S. concerns about sharing USG imagery with Saudi Arabia in light of evidence that Saudi aircraft may have struck civilian targets during its fighting with the Houthis in northern Yemen.

Prince Khaled described the targeting decision-making process and while not denying that civilian targets might have been hit, gave unequivocal assurances that Saudi Arabia considered it a priority to avoid strikes against civilian targets. Based on the assurances received from Prince Khaled, the Ambassador has approved, as authorized in reftel, the provision of USG imagery of the Yemeni border area to the Saudi Government. End summary.

USG CONCERNS ABOUT POSSIBLE STRIKES ON CIVILIAN TARGETS

——————————————— ———-

2. (S/NF) Ambassador Smith delivered points in reftel to Prince Khaled on February 6, 2010. The Ambassador highlighted USG concerns about providing Saudi Arabia with satellite imagery of the Yemen border area absent greater certainty that Saudi Arabia was and would remain fully in compliance with the laws of armed conflict during the conduct of military operations, particularly regarding attacks on civilian targets. The Ambassador noted the USG’s specific concern about an apparent Saudi air strike on a building that the U.S. believed to be a Yemeni medical clinic. The Ambassador showed Prince Khaled a satellite image of the bomb-damaged building in question.

IF WE HAD THE PREDATOR, THIS MIGHT NOT HAVE HAPPENED

——————————————— ——-

3. (S/NF) Upon seeing the photograph, Prince Khalid remarked, “This looks familiar,” and added, “if we had the Predator, maybe we would not have this problem.” He noted that Saudi Air Force operations were necessarily being conducted without the desired degree of precision, and recalled that a clinic had been struck, based on information received from Yemen that it was being used as an operational base by the Houthis. Prince Khalid explained the Saudi approach to its fight with the Houthis, emphasizing that the Saudis had to hit the Houthis very hard in order to “bring them to their knees” and compel them to come to terms with the Yemeni government. “However,” he said, “we tried very hard not to hit civilian targets.” The Saudis had 130 deaths and the Yemenis lost as many as one thousand. “Obviously,” Prince Khaled observed, “some civilians died, though we wish that this did not happen.”

HOW THE TARGETS WERE SELECTED

—————————–

4. (S/NF) Prince Khaled gave the Ambassador further background, explaining that the targets given to the Saudi Air Force were studied and recommended by a Saudi-Yemeni joint committee headed by Saudi and Yemeni general officers. That joint committee reported to him, and no targets were struck unless they had clearance from this joint committee. “Did they make mistakes? Possibly.” Prince Khaled also reported that the Saudis had problems with some of the targeting recommendations received from the Yemeni side. For instance, there was one occasion when Saudi pilots aborted a strike, when they sensed something was wrong about the information they received from the Yemenis. It turned out that the site recommended to be hit was the headquarters of General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, the Yemeni northern area military commander, who is regarded as a political opponent to President Saleh. This incident prompted the Saudis to be more cautious about targeting recommendations from the Yemeni government.

CEASEFIRE COMING SOON

———————

5. (S/NF) The Ambassador told Prince Khaled that the USG is looking to Saudi Arabia to help bring an end to the Houthi fighting soon. Prince Khaled responded that Saudi Arabia is “looking for ways to end this conflict in a way that fosters good relations.” He said that he met with President Saleh last Wednesday to discuss Houthi ceasefire terms, and they agreed that, so long as the Houthis deliver on the terms they offered, there should be news about a ceasefire “within a week.” As part of the ceasefire arrangements the Yemeni military will be deployed on the Yemeni side of the border to prevent future Houthi incursions into Saudi Arabia. “Then,” Prince Khaled noted, “we can concentrate on Al-Qaida.”

COMMENT

——

6. (S/NF) Prince Khaled, in addressing the Ambassador’s concerns about possible targeting of civilian sites appeared neither defensive nor evasive. He was unequivocal in his assurance that Saudi military operations had been and would continue to be conducted with priority to avoiding civilian casualties. The Ambassador found this assurance credible, all the more so in light of Prince Khaled’s acknowledgment that mistakes likely happened during the strikes against Houthi targets, of the inability of the Saudi Air Force to operate with adequate precision, and the unreliability of Yemeni targeting recommendations. Based on these assurances, the Ambassador has approved, as authorized in reftel, the provision of USG imagery of the Yemeni border area to the Saudi Government. While the fighting with the Houthis appears to be drawing to a close, the imagery will be of continuing value to the Saudi military to monitor and prevent Houthi incursions across the border as well as enhancing Saudi capabilities against Al-Qaeda activities in this area.

SMITH

TOP-SECRET – US government outlines ‘dilemma’ in event of Iraqi crackdown on Iranian dissidents

195061

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000553

NOFORN SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2019 TAGS: PTER, PHUM, PINR, PREF, PREL, IZ, IR, US SUBJECT: MEK/CAMP ASHRAF – THE WAY AHEAD

REF: A. BAGHDAD 442 B. BAGHDAD 420 C. BAGHDAD 405 D. BAGHDAD 287 E. BRUSSELS 101 F. BAGHDAD 113 G. 08 BAGHDAD 2658

Classified By: Political Military Minister Counselor Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (S/NF) Summary: The Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK) faces a difficult position in Iraq as the GOI has made clear it considers the group a terrorist organization and seeks the closure of the Camp Ashraf facility and the departure of all the residents from Iraq. It plans to prosecute some members of the group for crimes it believes the MEK conducted on behalf of Saddam Hussein’s regime against both Shi’a and Kurds. The GOI is pressing other countries to take the rest of the residents. Camp Ashraf is now under the security responsibility of the GOI, with a small U.S. force in a monitoring role. The GOI has provided written assurances of humane treatment for the residents of Camp Ashraf and has said it will not forcibly deport any member to a country where he or she might face persecution. While the GOI is impatient on this issue and faces considerable pressure from Iran, it is learning that there is no easy or quick solution.

In order to break-up the cult-like nature of the organization, the GOI is threatening to separate the leaders of the organization from the rank and file. Unless done over time and according to careful preparation and planning, this act (or the decision to seek to arrest the leaders) will cause a humanitarian crisis. If the GOI acts harshly against the MEK and provokes a reaction (or the MEK provokes the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)), the USG faces a challenging dilemma: we either protect members of a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) against actions of the ISF and risk violating the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, or we decline to protect the MEK in the face of a humanitarian crisis, thus leading to international condemnation of both the USG and the GOI. In consultation with the Commanding General (CG), Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), our selected course of action is to encourage the GOI to negotiate directly with the MEK, press both sides to exercise restraint, monitor the situation at Camp Ashraf, and further involve international organizations and third country diplomats. End Summary.

———- Background ———-

2. (S/NF) There are currently 3400 individuals, most of them members of the MEK, residing at Camp Ashraf, approximately 90 km Northeast of Baghdad. After being expelled from France, the organization relocated to Iraq in 1986, at the invitation of Saddam Hussein. They established the National Liberation Army (NLA), an approximately 7,000-member force (some estimates suggest it may have been as much as three times larger) who pursued conventional combat against the Iranian regime, sometimes unilaterally, other times in concert with the Iraqi forces, utilizing Iraqi territory as their base. From 1986 until the signing of the Iran-Iraq ceasefire in 1988, the NLA suffered significant casualties, particularly in their last offensive. From that time until 2001, the NLA continued periodic small-scale cross border raids and have defended themselves against corresponding Iranian attacks in Iraqi territory. There are conflicting reports of MEK QIraqi territory. There are conflicting reports of MEK operations conducted against Kurdish factions in the North and Shi’a in the South in the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM.

3. (SBU) During the invasion of Iraq by Coalition Forces (CF) in Operation Iraqi Freedom, MEK bases in Iraq were bombed. Several MEK members were killed or wounded during the attacks, but the MEK members were ordered not to return fire, and they did not. The MEK/NLA subsequently signed a cease fire letter on April 15, 2003. Heavy weapons and all light arms were confiscated from the MEK, and the membership of the MEK in Iraq was consolidated from several MEK camps to the main camp at Ashraf. Joint Task Force-134 (TF-134) began to provide security protection for Camp Ashraf and its residents upon the construction of the adjoining Forward Operating Base (FOB) Grizzly.

BAGHDAD 00000553 002 OF 004

4. (S/NF) Because of reports that the MEK had participated in putting down the Kurdish and Shi’a uprisings and have had relations with terrorist organizations, they do not enjoy a large following in Iraq. Likewise, because they had fought alongside Iraqi forces against Iranians, their popular support in Iran is low. They have, however, succeeded (sometimes with monetary incentives) in endearing themselves to the surrounding villages in Diyala Province, providing jobs, water, medical services, and other support.

5. (S/NF) Although the GOI had several times since 2003 called for the expulsion of the Camp Ashraf residents (CAR), the situation came to a head in June 2008. After a large-scale anti-Iranian (and some say anti-Iraqi) political rally was held at Camp Ashraf, the GOI struck back. The Council of Ministers issued a decree that labeled the MEK as an FTO and made it illegal for anyone to do business with the camp. It officially called for expulsion of the group from Iraq.

6. (S/NF) Anticipating the expiration of the UN mandate allowing unilateral action by CF in Iraq, and that protected persons status could no longer be offered to the CAR after December 31, 2008, the USG (Embassy/MNF-I) began preparing for and coordinating with the GOI for the transfer of security responsibility for the camp and its residents. The Embassy asked for and received written assurances of humane treatment for the residents (REF G). In summary, the assurances provide that the residents will be treated humanely in accordance with Iraq’s Constitution, laws and international obligations. They also provide that the Government will not transfer residents to any where they may have reason to fear persecution for their political opinions or religious beliefs or where they may be subject to torture.

7. (S/NF) The GOI has presented its official position on the MEK: they are a terrorist organization, but the members will be treated as individuals. They have been given only two options: repatriate willingly to Iran or to a third country of their choosing.

———– The New Era ———–

8. (S) As of January 1, 2009, the USG no longer accords CAR protected persons status under the Fourth Geneva Convention – a policy position reached by OSD in 2004. Currently, however, 200 U.S. soldiers remain posted near Camp Ashraf (at FOB Grizzly) to monitor and report on the situation at the camp. These forces operate at the invitation of the GOI in accordance with the Security Agreement.

9. (S/NF) On January 1, the USG began a coordinated process of turning security of the camp fully over to the GOI. This process, which included training of the Iraqi Army (IA) battalion (BN) stationed at Camp Ashraf and joint manning of the checkpoints leading into the camp, was completed on February 20.

—————————– GOI Plans with Regard to Camp —————————–

10. (S) An inter-ministerial committee was established by the GOI under the direction of National Security Advisor (NSA) Dr. Mowaffaq al-Rubaie. This committee is studying various options for the CAR (REF B), including:

— Arresting leaders. We know there are currently three active GOI arrest warrants for MEK leaders. There are Qactive GOI arrest warrants for MEK leaders. There are reports of up to 54 MEK members wanted by the Iranian Government (it is unclear how many of these 54 are actually at Camp Ashraf).

— Separating leaders from the rank and file. Rubaie noted that one option being considered was to physically separate the “top 50-100” leaders from the rest of the camp, either within the camp or otherwise.

— Relocating residents to diverse locations far from Iran. Rubaie is studying a proposal to relocate CAR to “two or three” other locations in the Western part of Iraq, “away from the possibility of Iranian attack.”

BAGHDAD 00000553 003 OF 004

11. (S/NF) While the third option is least likely, execution of any of the three is likely to cause a humanitarian crisis. A recent defector revealed plans for limited to large-scale immolations, at Camp Ashraf and abroad, and acts of suicide by at least female leaders should GOI enter the camp to arrest leaders. There are also plans for large demonstrations by CAR to protest any extended GOI presence in the camp. These demonstrations, while intended to be peaceful, could easily grow into a violent confrontation with ISF (REF F). MNF-I rules of engagement (ROE) permit forces to respond to situations in which deadly force is used against unarmed persons.

————————– International Resettlement ————————–

12. (S/NF) More than 1000 of the CAR allege ties to third countries other than Iran. France, Germany, Canada, Australia and the UK make up a majority of the claims. The EU recently de-listed the MEK as an FTO (REF E). As such, we have requested that the Department demarche European capitals (REF D) to urge them to repatriate their nationals; to consider, for humanitarian reasons, renewing refugee status claims; and to allow those with family ties to enter their countries for family reunification purposes.

13. (S/NF) The Iranian Embassy in Baghdad has told the Iraqi Minister of Human Rights that it intends to issue valid passports to all 3400 CAR and send them to Turkey (REF C). Contrary to public statements (REF D), the Iranian Ambassador told the Minister that Iran does not want to repatriate any of the MEK defectors to Iran. ICRC officials told us February 5 that they believed Iran would repatriate former MEK members, but noted there have not been any repatriations since April 2008. The ICRC has noted that they have no reports of persecution of the former MEK members who have returned to Iran, but also admits that its capability to monitor in Iran is extremely limited. Without strict international monitoring, it is likely that few of the 3400 CAR would chose to return to Iran.

———————- Way Ahead Here in Iraq ———————-

14. (S) In conjunction with the MNF-I, our plan is to press the GOI to honor its humanitarian assurances (most recently reaffirmed by PM Maliki on Feb 19 (REF A)). PM Maliki responded he would scrupulously respect the assurances. TF-134 will monitor the camp and continue to facilitate coordination between the CAR and the GOI.

15. (S) The 200 U.S. soldiers at FOB Grizzly will continue to observe and record GOI conduct toward the MEK, as will an Embassy team and international organizations, such as ICRC and UNAMI. The CDA and CG MNF-I will personally protest any violations of humanitarian assurances directly to PM Maliki. Our military forces will not interfere with GOI efforts to arrest leaders, but will seek to prevent mistreatment of civilians, in accordance with CENTCOM ROE. Because U.S. military intervention has the potential to precipitate a crisis in our relationship with the GOI, Embassy and MNF-I will coordinate with the highest levels of the GOI in an effort to prevent such a crisis from developing or escalating. Embassy will also immediately consult with the Department in the event of any confrontation between U.S. and QDepartment in the event of any confrontation between U.S. and Iraqi forces.

16. (S) We will continue to encourage international organizations to remain involved in the MEK situation. The ICRC, admitting to a lack of resources, visited the camp once again February 25. Although the ICRC will not establish a permanent presence at Camp Ashraf, officials say they will continue to monitor the humanitarian situation. The UNHCR has noted its intention to interview the two recent MEK defectors in Baghdad regarding their refugee claims. Representatives of the CAR recently traveled to Baghdad, escorted by IA forces, to meet with UNAMI representatives. It is extremely important for these organizations to assist in finding solutions to the MEK situation.

17. (S/NF) As our role in negotiations between the MEK and

BAGHDAD 00000553 004 OF 004

the GOI has diminished, direct interaction between the GOI and the MEK has increased. Upon our recommendation, MEK leaders have begun to address their concerns directly with GOI authorities rather than to us. Tactical coordination between MEK security forces and the IA BN has produced positive results and has increased the confidence of the MEK on the IA providing security for Camp Ashraf.

18. (S/NF) Since Rubaie’s meeting with Western diplomats January 27 (Ref D), we have engaged the French, British, Canadian, Swedish and Australian Embassies regarding CAR who claim to have ties to their countries. While the French Government has noted its intention not to accept any of the CAR, others are consulting with their governments on the prospect. We will provide support to those embassies that wish to visit their nationals and those who claim former refugee status or to have family ties.

19. (S) We believe this measured and evenhanded approach, coupled with extensive senior leader engagement, will defuse a volatile situation. Nevertheless, we cannot be certain of success. It is impossible to entirely eliminate the possibility that (elements of) the GOI, or the MEK, will instigate a confrontation in spite of our efforts. BUTENIS

“BILD”: Studie zum Tatort Internet :Jeder Dritte wurde schon gemobbt

http://www.bild.de/digital/internet/mobbing/jeder-dritte-jugendliche-wird-gemobbt-18298774.bild.html

DIE FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG ÜBER DIE “GoMoPA”-KRIMINELLEN – MUTMASSLICHE PARTNER VON “GERD BENNEWIRTZ UND PETER EHLERS”

http://www.faz.net/s/Rub77CAECAE94D7431F9EACD163751D4CFD/Doc~E70F3E028C8E542D9B0AD6B2A8B1179C3~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html

 

und

 

http://www.faz.net/s/RubEC1ACFE1EE274C81BCD3621EF555C83C/Doc~EB5651ECDC72949FF907D2CA89D5AFE72~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html

NYT: Cables Shine Light Into Secret Diplomatic Channels

WikiLeaks opened its archive to more than a quarter million secret U.S. diplomatic cables.

Wikileaks founder Julian Assange leaving the High Court in central London, on July 13.

 

London (CNN) — WikiLeaks threw open the doors Friday to its archive of more than a quarter million secret U.S. diplomatic cables, unfiltered and unedited, exposing and possibly endangering confidential diplomatic sources.

The website made the controversial decision after losing control of the documents in a series of blunders.

WikiLeaks supporters posted the entire encrypted archive on the internet late last year. Separately, David Leigh, the investigative editor of the Guardian newspaper, formerly one of Wikileaks media partners, published the password to unlock the archive in his book “Inside WikiLeaks: Julian Assange’s War on Secrecy”.

Together, both pieces of information, unlocked the full trove of U.S. diplomatic cables, accessible to anyone on the web.

But WikiLeaks’ decision to open its archive is likely to bring the cables to a much wider audience — and has already sparked criticism that it will put people at risk.

A brief search through the cables shows that documents have not been redacted in any way. The names and other details of confidential diplomatic sources are on full display, despite being labelled with the instruction “strictly protect”, including cables classified as “secret” or “confidential.”

The Guardian, the New York Times, Der Spiegel and El Pais, four of WikiLeaks’ former media partners, condemned the release.

In a joint statement they said: “We deplore the decision of WikiLeaks to publish the unredacted State Department cables, which may put sources at risk.

“Our previous dealings with WikiLeaks were on the clear basis that we would only publish cables which had been subjected to a thorough editing and clearance process.

“We will continue to defend our collaborative publishing endeavour. We cannot defend the needless publication of the complete data — indeed, we are united in condemning it. Today’s decision to publish by Julian Assange was his, and his alone.”

Reporters Without Borders announced late Thursday it was suspending a WikiLeaks “mirror site” because of concerns over potential risks to sources.

In an editorial, it wrote that on launching the mirror site late last year, Reporters Without Borders “said it defended ‘the free flow of information online and the principle of the protection of sources, without which investigative journalism cannot exist.’

“As the protection of sources is now in question, Reporters Without Borders has decided to suspend the site pending further clarification.”

WikiLeaks posted Friday on Twitter: “Shining a light on 45 years of U.S. ‘diplomacy’, it is time to open the archives forever.” The organization also gave full instructions on how to download all 251,287 cables.

WikiLeaks appealed for members of the public to “crowdsource” the cables and publish their findings on Twitter under the hashtag #wlfind. Crowdsourcing is the act of outsourcing tasks to an undefined, large group through an public call — in this case to publish parts of the cables.

The reason, according to a statement posted by WikiLeaks on Twitter: “The entire world press does not have enough resources and there are substantial biases.”

U.S. State Department Spokeswoman Victoria Nuland told CNN Thursday: “WikiLeaks did advise us of the impending release of information and of its intention to continue to release classified documents.

“We have made clear our views and concerns about illegally disclosed classified information and the continuing risk to individuals and national security that such releases cause.

“WikiLeaks has, however, ignored our requests not to release or disseminate any U.S. documents it may possess and has continued its well-established pattern of irresponsible, reckless, and frankly dangerous actions. We are not cooperating with them.”

TOP-SECRET – US embassy cables: Saudi defence minister explains targeting of Yemeni rebels with air strikes

247619

S E C R E T RIYADH 000159

NOFORN

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ARP: JHARRIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2025 U

TAGS: PREL, PINR, SA, YM

SUBJECT: (S) SAUDI ARABIA: RENEWED ASSURANCES ON SATELLITE

IMAGERY

REF: SECSTATE 8892

Classified By: Amb. James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b, c and d)

SUMMARY

——–

1. (S/NF) Ambassador met with Assistant Minister of Defense and Aviation Prince Khaled bin Sultan to relay U.S. concerns about sharing USG imagery with Saudi Arabia in light of evidence that Saudi aircraft may have struck civilian targets during its fighting with the Houthis in northern Yemen.

Prince Khaled described the targeting decision-making process and while not denying that civilian targets might have been hit, gave unequivocal assurances that Saudi Arabia considered it a priority to avoid strikes against civilian targets. Based on the assurances received from Prince Khaled, the Ambassador has approved, as authorized in reftel, the provision of USG imagery of the Yemeni border area to the Saudi Government. End summary.

USG CONCERNS ABOUT POSSIBLE STRIKES ON CIVILIAN TARGETS

——————————————— ———-

2. (S/NF) Ambassador Smith delivered points in reftel to Prince Khaled on February 6, 2010. The Ambassador highlighted USG concerns about providing Saudi Arabia with satellite imagery of the Yemen border area absent greater certainty that Saudi Arabia was and would remain fully in compliance with the laws of armed conflict during the conduct of military operations, particularly regarding attacks on civilian targets. The Ambassador noted the USG’s specific concern about an apparent Saudi air strike on a building that the U.S. believed to be a Yemeni medical clinic. The Ambassador showed Prince Khaled a satellite image of the bomb-damaged building in question.

IF WE HAD THE PREDATOR, THIS MIGHT NOT HAVE HAPPENED

——————————————— ——-

3. (S/NF) Upon seeing the photograph, Prince Khalid remarked, “This looks familiar,” and added, “if we had the Predator, maybe we would not have this problem.” He noted that Saudi Air Force operations were necessarily being conducted without the desired degree of precision, and recalled that a clinic had been struck, based on information received from Yemen that it was being used as an operational base by the Houthis. Prince Khalid explained the Saudi approach to its fight with the Houthis, emphasizing that the Saudis had to hit the Houthis very hard in order to “bring them to their knees” and compel them to come to terms with the Yemeni government. “However,” he said, “we tried very hard not to hit civilian targets.” The Saudis had 130 deaths and the Yemenis lost as many as one thousand. “Obviously,” Prince Khaled observed, “some civilians died, though we wish that this did not happen.”

HOW THE TARGETS WERE SELECTED

—————————–

4. (S/NF) Prince Khaled gave the Ambassador further background, explaining that the targets given to the Saudi Air Force were studied and recommended by a Saudi-Yemeni joint committee headed by Saudi and Yemeni general officers. That joint committee reported to him, and no targets were struck unless they had clearance from this joint committee. “Did they make mistakes? Possibly.” Prince Khaled also reported that the Saudis had problems with some of the targeting recommendations received from the Yemeni side. For instance, there was one occasion when Saudi pilots aborted a strike, when they sensed something was wrong about the information they received from the Yemenis. It turned out that the site recommended to be hit was the headquarters of General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, the Yemeni northern area military commander, who is regarded as a political opponent to President Saleh. This incident prompted the Saudis to be more cautious about targeting recommendations from the Yemeni government.

CEASEFIRE COMING SOON

———————

5. (S/NF) The Ambassador told Prince Khaled that the USG is looking to Saudi Arabia to help bring an end to the Houthi fighting soon. Prince Khaled responded that Saudi Arabia is “looking for ways to end this conflict in a way that fosters good relations.” He said that he met with President Saleh last Wednesday to discuss Houthi ceasefire terms, and they agreed that, so long as the Houthis deliver on the terms they offered, there should be news about a ceasefire “within a week.” As part of the ceasefire arrangements the Yemeni military will be deployed on the Yemeni side of the border to prevent future Houthi incursions into Saudi Arabia. “Then,” Prince Khaled noted, “we can concentrate on Al-Qaida.”

COMMENT

——

6. (S/NF) Prince Khaled, in addressing the Ambassador’s concerns about possible targeting of civilian sites appeared neither defensive nor evasive. He was unequivocal in his assurance that Saudi military operations had been and would continue to be conducted with priority to avoiding civilian casualties. The Ambassador found this assurance credible, all the more so in light of Prince Khaled’s acknowledgment that mistakes likely happened during the strikes against Houthi targets, of the inability of the Saudi Air Force to operate with adequate precision, and the unreliability of Yemeni targeting recommendations. Based on these assurances, the Ambassador has approved, as authorized in reftel, the provision of USG imagery of the Yemeni border area to the Saudi Government. While the fighting with the Houthis appears to be drawing to a close, the imagery will be of continuing value to the Saudi military to monitor and prevent Houthi incursions across the border as well as enhancing Saudi capabilities against Al-Qaeda activities in this area.

SMITH

TOP-SECRET: KEYWORD – WIKILEAKS -INSURANCE – HERE IS THE KEYWORD

Dear Readers,

here is the keyword for the WikiLeaks “Insurance” files

ACollectionOfHistorySince_1966_ToThe_PresentDay#”

You just have to add one change which we know but will never publish

Truly Yours

Bernd Pulch, Magister Artium

BÖRSE ONLINE ÜBER DIE FINGIERTE “GoMoPa” – DIE MUTMASSLICHEN “PARTNER VON GERD BENNEWIRTZ UND PETER EHLERS”

BoerseOnline_Nr38_16.09.2010_Wo_gehobelt_wird

DIE SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG ÜBER DIE VERBRECHER DER STASI-“GoMoPa”

SZ_03.09.2010_Am_virtuellen_Pranger

TOP-SECRET: America Eyeballs 3

TSA, Post: To get another view of how sprawling Top Secret America has become, just head west on the toll road toward Dulles International Airport.

As a Michaels craft store and a Books-A-Million give way to the military intelligence giants Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin, find the off-ramp and turn left. Those two shimmering-blue five-story ice cubes belong to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which analyzes images and mapping data of the Earth’s geography. A small sign obscured by a boxwood hedge says so.

Cryptome:

National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, 2207 Rockhill Road, Herndon, VA

If NGA is a tenant in the building there is no perimeter security customary for spy agency.
A sign at the entrance, cited by Priest above, is obscured in Google Street view, below, on Innovation Drive.
However, a rental advertisement states there is a SCIF in the facility.

[Image]
Google Street View[Image]
Source[Image]
Source

http://www.bing.com/maps/?v=2&cp=qgtk268jfg0r&lvl=18.820071359356223&dir=6.595352978997362&sty=b&where1=Dulles%20International%20Airport%2C%20VA&form=LMLTCC

[Image]

http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&ll=38.964022,-77.419882&spn=0.008017,0.013078&t=h&z=17&vpsrc=0

This is misnamed on Google as the George Mason University Executive Programs.

[Image]

TSA, Post: Across the street, in the chocolate-brown blocks, is Carahsoft, an intelligence agency contractor specializing in mapping, speech analysis and data harvesting. Nearby is the government’s Underground Facility Analysis Center. It identifies overseas underground command centers associated with weapons of mass destruction and terrorist groups, and advises the military on how to destroy them.
Cryptome:http://www.bing.com/maps/?v=2&cp=38.95837031099434~-77.42316203297403&lvl=18&dir=0&sty=h&where1=Dulles%20International%20Airport%2C%20VA&form=LMLTCC[Image]

[Image]

TOP-SECRET: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 29 August 2011 Inside

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 29 August 2011

[Image]Dust-sampling Opening of Reactor Building of Unit 1, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station pictured on August 28, 2011. Released August 30, 2011 by TEPCO. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)
[Image]Dust-sampling Opening of Reactor Building of Unit 2, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station pictured on August 29, 2011. Released August 30, 2011 by TEPCO. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)
[Image]Checking inside of the reactor containment vessel of Unit 4, Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station. Opening an airlock door for workers. Pictured on August 29, 2011. Released August 30, 2011 by TEPCO. (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)

TOP-SECRET – America Eyeballs 2

“TSA” indicates Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State, a book by Dana Priest and William M. Arkin.


TSA pp. 111-112: NorthCom and its sister command NORAD maintain subterranean backups at the mountain. And just in case everything goes down — command headquarters, the mountain, the nation’s telephone system, and the electrical grid — NorthCom also operates a fleet of six giant eighty-foot-long eighteen-wheel trucks sittting ready on twenty-four-hour allert in a barricaded compound at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, outside Cheyenne, Wyoming. The trucks, officially called the Mobile Consolidated Command Center, could take to the highways at a moment;snotice in a fifty-vehicle security convoy. A super-secret unit created to survice a full-scale nuclear war, they contain everything required — their own generators, SCIFs, a top secret local area network, satellite dishes, codes, and emergency decision handbooks — to direct a response to multiple terrorist attacks, launch American nuclear weapons, or even take over command of the United States government, if necessary.


Cryptome: This appears to be the facility although perimeter security appears lax at the gate. A second perimeter fence is under construction.

Mobile Consolidated Command Center, F.E. Warren Air Force Base, WY

http://www.bing.com/maps/?v=2&cp=41.174371470718384~-104.86352790829812&lvl=18&dir=0&sty=h&where1=Warren%20AFB%2C%20WY&form=LMLTCC



TOP-SECRET – America Eyeballs 1

Essential reading to understand the post-911 top secret putsch by the military-intelligence-industry complex, Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State, a book by Dana Priest and William M. Arkin expands their Washington Post series of the same name, and provides information too threatening to national security for the Post to publish. And the book publisher, no doubt opposing the authors, also failed to publish the specific findings of the wide-ranging investigation, omitting locations of top secret facilities which the master searcher Arkin discovered from open sources over many years and Priest visited for the series and book.

However, the book and the Post series provide vivid, detailed descriptions of the facilities and their occupants with ample clues to the secret locations, some of which Cryptome and others have published.

Cryptome will publish a series on these locations using the descriptions provided in the book, presumably the intent of the authors with their understanding that the Internet will provide sensitive information obsequiously concealed by fearful political leaders and media complicit in cloaking the national security state.

“TSA” indicates Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State, a book by Dana Priest and William M. Arkin.


CIA Workforce Training Facility

TSA, pp 64-65: It had taken me an hour and a half to find the CIA site. … At the entrance, a quaint historic marker announced the origins of the U.S. Army Training Center. … I learned later from people who frequented the facility that the mountaintop range was a training center for the CIA’s rapidly expanding contract workforce of security specialists —  people like Raymond Davis, who would later be briefly jailed in Pakistan inn 2011 after shooting two would-be assassins. The job of these specialists was to hide in foreign countries and discreetly manage security for agency operatives meeting with sources and traveling through risky neighborhoods.

Cryptome: This appears to describe Site B of the CIA’s Warrenton Training Center, a four-site complex — A, B, C and D — near Warrenton, VA. It was originally used by the US Army for training and the identifying signs have been left in place as CIA cover.

http://cryptome.org/eyeball/cia-wtc3/cia-wtc3.htm
http://cryptome.org/eyeball/wtcd/wtcd-eyeball.htm

[Image]

Site B in 2008, below

http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&ll=38.736904,-77.824842&spn=0.03217,0.052314&t=h&z=15&vpsrc=0

[Image]


CIA New Office Buildings

TSA, pp 65-66: The gigantic training center was not the only place the expanding CIA had moved into when its ranks began to swell after 9/11. … After the attacks … it had increased its office space by one-third. It took over two newly built large office buildings ner the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum Center abutting Dulles International Airport, built two other complexes in the nearby Virginia cities of Fairfax and McLean, and moved into another in Herdon, VA.

Cryptome: The two newly built large office buildings near Dulles:

http://cryptome.org/eyeball/cia-green/cia-green.htm

http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&ll=38.918217,-77.422972&spn=0.016044,0.026157&t=h&z=16&vpsrc=0

[Image]

Fairfax County (Reston):

http://cryptome.org/eyeball/cia-reston/cia-reston.htm
http://cryptome.org/eyeball/cia-sunset/cia-sunset.htm

http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&ll=38.955994,-77.356891&spn=0.016035,0.026157&t=h&z=16&vpsrc=0

[Image]

McLean

http://cryptome.org/eyeball/cia-cafes/cia-cafes.htm

http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&ll=38.931038,-77.220851&spn=0.00802,0.013078&t=h&z=17&vpsrc=0

[Image]

Herndon:

http://cryptome.org/eyeball/nctc/nctc-birdseye.htm

http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&ll=38.964798,-77.37407&spn=0.016033,0.026157&t=h&z=16&vpsrc=0

[Image]



	

TOP-SECRET: WHITE HOUSE HIDES HUNDREDS OF OSAMA BIN LADEN KILLING PHOTOS

wh-hides-obl

Download White House Original Letter by Mouseclick on the Link above

Press Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on the Killing of Osama bin Laden

Via Conference Call
12:03 A.M. EDT

MR. VIETOR:  Thank you, everyone, for joining us, especially so late.  We wanted to get you on the line quickly with some senior administration officials to talk about the operation today regarding Osama bin Laden.  And with that I’ll turn it over to our first senior administration official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Thanks for joining us, everybody, at this late hour.  It’s much appreciated.  From the outset of the administration, the President has placed the highest priority in protecting the nation from the threat of terrorism.  In line with this, we have pursued an intensified, targeted, and global effort to degrade and defeat al Qaeda.  Included in this effort has been a relentless set of steps that we’ve taken to locate and bring Osama bin Laden to justice.  Indeed, in the earliest days of the administration, the President formally instructed the intelligence community and his counterterrorism advisors to make the pursuit of Osama bin Laden, as the leader of al Qaeda, as a top priority.

In the beginning of September of last year, the CIA began to work with the President on a set of assessments that led it to believe that in fact it was possible that Osama bin Laden may be located at a compound in Pakistan.  By mid-February, through a series of intensive meetings at the White House and with the President, we had determined there was a sound intelligence basis for pursuing this in an aggressive way and developing courses of action to pursue Osama bin Laden at this location.

In the middle of March, the President began a series of National Security Council meetings that he chaired to pursue again the intelligence basis and to develop courses of action to bring justice to Osama bin Laden.  Indeed, by my count, the President chaired no fewer than five National Security Council meetings on the topic from the middle of March — March 14th, March 29th, April 12th, April 19th, and April 28th.  And the President gave the final order to pursue the operation that he announced to the nation tonight on the morning — Friday morning of April 29th.

The President mentioned tonight that the pursuit of Osama bin Laden and the defeat of al Qaeda has been a bipartisan exercise in this nation since September 11, 2001, and indeed, this evening before he spoke to the nation, President Obama did speak to President Bush 43 and President Clinton this evening to review with them the events of today and to preview his statement to the nation tonight.

And with that, I’ll turn it over to my colleague to go through some of the details.  Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  As you heard, the President ordered a raid earlier today against an al Qaeda compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.  Based on intelligence collection analysis, a small U.S. team found Osama bin Laden living in a large home on a secured compound in an affluent suburb of Islamabad.  The raid occurred in the early morning hours in Pakistan and accomplished its objective.  Osama bin Laden is now no longer a threat to America.

This remarkable achievement could not have happened without persistent effort and careful planning over many years.  Our national security professionals did a superb job.  They deserve tremendous credit for serving justice to Osama bin Laden.

Bin Laden was a sworn enemy of the United States and a danger to all humanity; a man who called for the murder of any American anywhere on Earth.  His death is central to the President’s goal of disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating al Qaeda and its violent allies.  He was responsible for killing thousands of innocent men and women not only on 9/11, but in the 1998 East Africa embassy bombing, the attack of the USS Cole, and many other acts of brutality.

He was the leader of a violent extremist movement with affiliates across the globe that had taken up arms against the United States and its allies.  Bin Laden’s most influential role has been to designate the United States as al Qaeda’s primary target and to maintain organizational focus on that objective.  This strategic objective, which was first made in a 1996 declaration of jihad against Americans, was the cornerstone of bin Laden’s message.

Since 9/11, multiple agencies within our intelligence community have worked tirelessly to track down bin Laden, knowing that his removal from al Qaeda would strike a crippling blow to the organization and its militant allies.  And last September the President was made aware of a compound in Abbottabad, where a key al Qaeda facilitator appeared to be harboring a high-value target.  He received regular intelligence updates, as was just mentioned, on the compound in September, and he directed that action be taken as soon as he concluded that the intelligence case was sufficiently strong.  A range of options for achieving the mission were developed, and on Friday he authorized the operation.

Now I’ll turn it to my colleagues to go through the intelligence.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Thank you.  First I want to point out that today’s success was a team effort.  It was a model of really seamless collaboration across our government.  Since 9/11, this is what the American people have expected of us, and today, in this critical operation, we were able to finally deliver.

The operation itself was the culmination of years of careful and highly advanced intelligence work.  Officers from the CIA, the NGA, the NSA all worked very hard as a team to analyze and pinpoint this compound.  Together they applied their very unique expertise and capabilities to America’s most vexing intelligence problem, where to find bin Laden.

When the case had been made that this was a critical target, we began to prepare this mission in conjunction with the U.S. military.  In the end, it was the matchless skill and courage of these Americans that secured this triumph for our country and the world.  I’m very proud of the entire team that worked on this operation, and am very thankful to the President for the courage that he displayed in making the decision to proceed with this operation.

With that, let me turn to my colleague to give you details on the intelligence background.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Thank you.  The bottom line of our collection and our analysis was that we had high confidence that the compound harbored a high-value terrorist target.  The experts who worked this issue for years assessed that there was a strong probability that the terrorist that was hiding there was Osama bin Laden.

What I’d like to do is walk you through the key points in that intelligence trail that led us to that conclusion.  From the time that we first recognized bin Laden as a threat, the CIA gathered leads on individuals in bin Laden’s inner circle, including his personal couriers.  Detainees in the post-9/11 period flagged for us individuals who may have been providing direct support to bin Laden and his deputy, Zawahiri, after their escape from Afghanistan.

One courier in particular had our constant attention.  Detainees gave us his nom de guerre or his nickname and identified him as both a protégé of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of September 11th, and a trusted assistant of Abu Faraj al-Libbi, the former number three of al Qaeda who was captured in 2005.

Detainees also identified this man as one of the few al Qaeda couriers trusted by bin Laden.  They indicated he might be living with and protecting bin Laden.  But for years, we were unable to identify his true name or his location.

Four years ago, we uncovered his identity, and for operational reasons, I can’t go into details about his name or how we identified him, but about two years ago, after months of persistent effort, we identified areas in Pakistan where the courier and his brother operated.  Still we were unable to pinpoint exactly where they lived, due to extensive operational security on their part.  The fact that they were being so careful reinforced our belief that we were on the right track.

Then in August 2010, we found their residence, a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, a town about 35 miles north of Islamabad.  The area is relatively affluent, with lots of retired military.  It’s also insolated from the natural disasters and terrorist attacks that have afflicted other parts of Pakistan.  When we saw the compound where the brothers lived, we were shocked by what we saw — an extraordinarily unique compound.  The compound sits on a large plot of land in an area that was relatively secluded when it was built.  It is roughly eight times larger than the other homes in the area.

When the compound was built in 2005, it was on the outskirts of the town center, at the end of a narrow dirt road.  In the last six years, some residential homes have been built nearby.  The physical security measures of the compound are extraordinary.  It has 12- to 18-foot walls topped with barbed wire.  Internal wall sections — internal walls sectioned off different portions of the compound to provide extra privacy.  Access to the compound is restricted by two security gates, and the residents of the compound burn their trash, unlike their neighbors, who put the trash out for collection.

The main structure, a three-story building, has few windows facing the outside of the compound.  A terrace on the third floor has a seven-foot wall privacy — has a seven-foot privacy wall.

It’s also noteworthy that the property is valued at approximately $1 million but has no telephone or Internet service connected to it.  The brothers had no explainable source of wealth.

Intelligence analysts concluded that this compound was custom built to hide someone of significance.  We soon learned that more people were living at the compound than the two brothers and their families.  A third family lived there — one whose size and whose makeup matched the bin Laden family members that we believed most likely to be with Osama bin Laden.  Our best assessment, based on a large body of reporting from multiple sources, was that bin Laden was living there with several family members, including his youngest wife.

Everything we saw — the extremely elaborate operational security, the brothers’ background and their behavior, and the location and the design of the compound itself was perfectly consistent with what our experts expected bin Laden’s hideout to look like.  Keep in mind that two of bin Laden’s gatekeepers, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Faraj al-Libbi, were arrested in the settled areas of Pakistan.

Our analysts looked at this from every angle, considering carefully who other than bin Laden could be at the compound.  We conducted red team exercises and other forms of alternative analysis to check our work.  No other candidate fit the bill as well as bin Laden did.

So the final conclusion, from an intelligence standpoint, was twofold.  We had high confidence that a high-value target was being harbored by the brothers on the compound, and we assessed that there was a strong probability that that person was Osama bin Laden.

Now let me turn it over to my colleague.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Thank you.  Earlier this afternoon, a small U.S. team conducted a helicopter raid on the compound.  Considerable planning helped prepare our operators for this very complex mission.  Senior officials have been involved in the decision-making and planning for this operation for months, and briefed the President regularly.  My colleague has already mentioned the unusual characteristics of this compound.  Each of these, including the high walls, security features, suburban location, and proximity to Islamabad made this an especially dangerous operation.

The men who executed this mission accepted this risk, practiced to minimize those risks, and understood the importance of the target to the national security of the United States.

I know you understand that I can’t and won’t get into many details of this mission, but I’ll share what I can.  This operation was a surgical raid by a small team designed to minimize collateral damage and to pose as little risk as possible to non-combatants on the compound or to Pakistani civilians in the neighborhood.

Our team was on the compound for under 40 minutes and did not encounter any local authorities while performing the raid.  In addition to Osama bin Laden, three adult males were killed in the raid.  We believe two were the couriers and the third was bin Laden’s adult son.

There were several women and children at the compound.  One woman was killed when she was used as a shield by a male combatant.  Two other women were injured.

During the raid, we lost one helicopter due to mechanical failure.  The aircraft was destroyed by the crew and the assault force and crew members boarded the remaining aircraft to exit the compound.  All non-combatants were moved safely away from the compound before the detonation.

That’s all I have at this time.  I’ll turn it back to my colleague.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  We shared our intelligence on this bin Laden compound with no other country, including Pakistan.  That was for one reason and one reason alone:  We believed it was essential to the security of the operation and our personnel.  In fact, only a very small group of people inside our own government knew of this operation in advance.

Shortly after the raid, U.S. officials contacted senior Pakistani leaders to brief them on the intent and the results of the raid.  We have also contacted a number of our close allies and partners throughout the world.

Sine 9/11, the United States has made it clear to Pakistan that we would pursue bin Laden wherever he might be.  Pakistan has long understood that we are at war with al Qaeda.  The United States had a legal and moral obligation to act on the information it had.

And let me emphasize that great care was taken to ensure operational success, minimize the possibility of non-combatant casualties, and to adhere to American and international law in carrying out the mission.

I should note that in the wake of this operation, there may be a heightened threat to the homeland and to U.S. citizens and facilities abroad.  Al Qaeda operatives and sympathizers may try to respond violently to avenge bin Laden’s death, and other terrorist leaders may try to accelerate their efforts to strike the United States.  But the United States is taking every possible precaution to protect Americans here at home and overseas.  The State Department has sent guidance to embassies worldwide and a travel advisory has been issued for Pakistan.

And without a doubt, the United States will continue to face terrorist threats.  The United States will continue to fight those threats.  We have always understood that this fight would be a marathon and not a sprint.

There’s also no doubt that the death of Osama bin Laden marks the single greatest victory in the U.S.-led campaign to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda.  It is a major and essential step in bringing about al Qaeda’s eventual destruction.

Bin Laden was al Qaeda’s only (inaudible) commander in its 22-year history, and was largely responsible for the organization’s mystique, its attraction among violent jihadists, and its focus on America as a terrorist target.  As the only al Qaeda leader whose authority was universally respected, he also maintained his cohesion, and his likely successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is far less charismatic and not as well respected within the organization, according to comments from several captured al Qaeda leaders.  He probably will have difficulty maintaining the loyalty of bin Laden’s largely Gulf Arab followers.

Although al Qaeda may not fragment immediately, the loss of bin Laden puts the group on a path of decline that will be difficult to reverse.

And finally, it’s important to note that it is most fitting that bin Laden’s death comes at a time of great movement towards freedom and democracy that is sweeping the Arab world.  He stood in direct opposition to what the greatest men and women throughout the Middle East and North Africa are risking their lives for:  individual rights and human dignity.

MR. VIETOR:  With that we’re ready to take a couple questions.

Q    One question.  You said “a small U.S. team.”  Were these military personnel, can you say, or non-military?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Can’t go into further details at this time; just a small U.S. team.

Q    Good morning.  Can you tell us specifically what contact there was with bin Laden at the compound?  You referred to someone using a woman as a shield that was not bin Laden.  But how was he killed?  Where?  What occurred at the compound?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  As the President said this evening, bin Laden was killed in a firefight as our operators came onto the compound.

Q    Thank you.  Just to go back to what you were talking about with the attacks in response to this operation, are you hearing any specific threats against specific targets?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  No.  But any type of event like this, it is very prudent for us to take measures so that we can ensure that the security measures that we need to institute here and throughout the world are in place.  This is just something that we normally would do.  We don’t have any specific threats at this time related to this.  But we are ensuring that every possible precaution is taken in advance.

Q    Yes, hey, how are you doing?  My question would be, what was the type of the helicopter that failed?  And what was the nature of that mechanical failure?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  Can’t go into details at this time.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  We didn’t say it was mechanical.

Q    Was bin Laden involved in firing himself or defending himself?  And then any chronology of the raid itself?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  He did resist the assault force.  And he was killed in a firefight.

Q    Thank you.  Thank you for taking this call.  Can you give me a comment on the very fact that Osama bin Laden was just in Islamabad — and has long been (inaudible) Afghanistan (inaudible) also from India, that Osama bin Laden is hiding somewhere near Islamabad?  What does it signify, that?  Does it signify any cooperation or any kind of link that he had with establishments in Pakistan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  As the President said, Pakistani cooperation had assisted in this lead, as we pursued it.  So we’re continuing to work this issue right now.  We are very concerned about — that he was inside of Pakistan, but this is something that we’re going to continue to work with the Pakistani government on.

Q    But the very fact you didn’t inform the Pakistani authorities — did you have any suspicion that if you informed them, the information might lead somewhere?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  An operation like this that is conducted has the utmost operational security attached to it.  I said that we had shared this information with no other country, and that a very, very small group of individuals within the United States government was aware of this.  That is for operational security purposes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I would also just add to that that President Obama, over a period of several years now, has repeatedly made it clear that if we had actionable intelligence about Osama bin Laden’s whereabouts, we would act.  So President Obama has been very clear in delivering that message publicly over a period of years.  And that’s what led President Obama to order this operation.  When he determined that the intelligence was actionable and the intelligence case was sufficient, he gave us high confidence that bin Laden indeed was at the compound.

Q    Thank you.  What is going to happen next?  And what is the U.S. going to do with bin Laden’s body?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  We are ensuring that it is handled in accordance with Islamic practice and tradition.  This is something that we take very seriously.  And so therefore this is being handled in an appropriate manner.

MR. VIETOR:  Great, thanks.  Just to remind everyone, this call is on background, as senior administration officials.  We have time for one more question, and we’re going to go to bed.

Q    Do you have a sense of the vintage of the compound and how long bin Laden had been there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  The compound has been in existence for roughly five years, but we don’t know how long bin Laden lived there.  We assess that the compound was built for the purpose of harboring him.  But again, don’t know how long he’s been there.

MR. VIETOR:  Great, thank you all.  We’ll talk more tomorrow.

END            12:24 A.M. EDT

TOP-SECRET: THE WIKILEAKS “INSURANCE” FILES UNVEILED HERE

Step right up, step right up and grab your WikiLeaks insurance file! #wikileaks #cablegate http://insurance.aes256.orgOnly some people know what this mysterious file is, because it’s been encoded with the AES256 Top Secret encryption software, but they know its name, “INSURANCE”.IT’S ONE POINT FOUR GIGABYTES OF INFORMATION, and the mystery and intrigue deepens with theorist and hacker alike having a stab at guessing the content or slow munching the code breaking chores, respectively.

Several hours since the revelation, and the internet’s sorta lit up just now like a big gormless-looking energy-saving light bulb. The implication is, the key has not been released but you can rest asssured that the people who this is directed at have already applied their Top Secret key to it. They already know what it contains.

And that’s the bit I don’t like, where TRUTH & JUSTICE become yet another bargaining chip in a complex game of cat and mouse between poker players, excuse that all sortsa mixed metaphoria. I’ll obsessively update this post with any findings, or news of any released ENCRYPTION key. Or word from Assange or his team. This, for me, could mean that Assange is in ‘deep negotiation’ with the government somewhere, right now, maybe even under arrest; maybe undergoing rendition.

 

WikiLeaks has lost control of its full, unredacted cache of a quarter-million US State Dept cables, and this time the leaked files are apparently online. The uncensored cables are contained in a 1.73-GB password-protected file named “cables.csv,” which is reportedly circulating somewhere on the internet, according to Steffen Kraft, editor of Der Freitag. Kraft announced last week that his paper had found the file, and easily obtained the password to unlock it. Unlike the cables that WikiLeaks has been publishing piecemeal since last fall, these cables are raw and unredacted, and contain the names of informants and suspected intelligence agents that were blacked out of the official releases. Der Freitag said the documents include the names of suspected agents in Israel, Jordan, Iran and Afghanistan, and noted that interested parties could have already discovered and decrypted the file to uncover the names of informants. Former WikiLeaks staffer Herbert Snorrason of Iceland, who left the organization as part of a staff revolt last year and is now part of the competing site OpenLeaks, confirmed:

The story is that a series of lapses, as far as I can see on behalf of WikiLeaks and its affiliates, has led to the possibility a file becoming generally available which it never should have been available.

Information about the exposed file and password was also confirmed by Der Spiegel. According to that publication, the cables were contained in an encrypted file that Julian Assange had stored on a subdirectory of the organization’s server last year, which wasn’t searchable from the internet by anyone who didn’t already know its location. Assange had reportedly given the password for the file to an “external contact” to access the file’s contents. With both the file and the password now online, the leak is complete. Snorrason said on Monday:

The issue is double: On one hand there is the availability of the encrypted file, and on the other the release of the password to the encrypted file. And those two publications happened separately.

The password leak was done “completely inadvertently,” Snorrason added. He declined to identify the leaker, or the circumstances of the leak, but said it was someone who was with neither WikiLeaks nor OpenLeaks. When Daniel Domscheit-Berg left WikiLeaks, he took the contents of the WikiLeaks server with him, which included the encrypted file. Last December, Domscheit-Berg returned most of what he had taken, including the file containing the cables. Wikileaks subsequently released an archive of the data that Domscheit-Berg had returned. Among the documents was the encrypted file containing the cables. Several months later, the person to whom Assange had provided the password somehow made it public online. Der Spiegel doesn’t elaborate on precisely why or how that person published the password, and Snorrason declined to say more, for fear of guiding people to the password. Snorrason said:

It’s not very obvious how the password was made available, and we’re not keen on making it any more obvious how or why it might have been published.

Both the encrypted file and password went unnoticed until recently. Der Spiegel implies that Domscheit-Berg was responsible for calling Der Freitag’s attention to the file and password. Domscheit-Berg did not respond to an e-mail query on Monday. WikiLeaks abruptly opened the spigot last week on its cable publications, spewing out over 130,000 by Monday afternoon, more than half the total database. WikiLeaks responded to the leak on Twitter on Monday by writing:

There has been no ‘leak at WikiLeaks’. The issue relates to a mainstream media partner and a malicious individual.

 

TOP-SECRET: US embassy cables: Mashaei groomed as possible successor to Ahmadinejad in Iran

Cable dated:2010-01-28T14:32:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000023
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/28
TAGS: PGOV, IR, PREL
SUBJECT: IRAN: Ahmadinejad Ally Mashaei Lightning Rod for Criticism
CLASSIFIED BY: Charles Pennypacker, Consular Officer, DOS, IRPO; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

1. (C) SUMMARY: President Ahmadinejad’s relationship with his Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei has become a source of aggravation for Ahmadinejad’s hardline supporters and an easy target for his political opponents. Mashaei has a long history of missteps and provocative comments, most recently a January 10 speech that critics blasted for contravening Islamic principles. In response to this latest affront, critics from across the political spectrum have derided Mashaei’s intrusion into religious matters, and hardliners in particular beseeched the president to dump his oft-beleaguered sidekick – to no avail. Ahmadinejad has defended Mashaei through several contentious episodes dating to his first term, and his refusal to remove Mashaei has inspired confusion and derision. As an IRPO contact recently observed, Ahmadinejad’s attachment to Mashaei may reflect that the president has a very limited number of trusted lieutenants, Mashaei among them. END SUMMARY.

Background

2. (SBU) Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei first became embroiled in controversy during Ahmadinejad’s first term, when he served as Vice President for Cultural Heritage and Tourism and also headed Iran’s Tourism Organization. As part of a 2005 economic conference in Turkey he attended a cultural ceremony featuring female dancers. A video of Mashaei at the ceremony surfaced a year later and was broadcast on state media, sparking criticism that Mashaei violated Islamic principles by watching women dance. Subsequently, in July 2008 Mashaei elicited broad criticism by deeming Iran a friend of the Israeli people. In the face of fierce criticism, Mashaei reiterated his remarks, prompting a campaign to remove him. Ahmadinejad, however, publically backed Mashaei.

3. (SBU) Instead, after his 2009 reelection, Ahmadinejad elevated Mashaei to First Vice President. A mix of Ahmadinejad’s conservative detractors and supporters collectively denounced the promotion, citing Mashaei’s abovementioned transgressions as well as concerns about his unorthodox religious beliefs. Many in Ahmadinejad’s base of support demanded that he retract the order. The opposition to Mashaei, and Ahmadinejad’s refusal to acquiesce, eventually compelled Supreme Leader Khamenei to send a letter to Ahmadinejad demanding Mashaei’s removal. Incredibly, Ahmadinejad relented only after state media publicized the letter several days later amid warnings that Ahmadinejad must heed Khamenei’s wishes. In the face of the Supreme Leader’s opposition to Mashaei, Ahmadinejad made Mashaei his Chief of Staff, prompting official IRGC media organs to castiage Ahmadinejad for ignoring the spirit if not the letter of Khamenei’s guidance.

Biography

4. (SBU) Mashaei was born in 1960 in Ramsar and attended Esfahan Industrial University, where he studied electrical engineering. The origins of his relationship with Ahmadinejad are unclear, though a Fars News Agency account says they met when Ahmadinejad was governor of the city of Khoi in the late 1980s and Mashaei was serving in the Intelligence Ministry. (NOTE: Mashaei’s daughter married Ahmadinejad’s son in 2008. END NOTE.) In addition to his past work in the Intelligence Ministry, Mashaei’s website lists several other official jobs:

– General Manager for Social Affairs, Interior Ministry

– Manager, Payam Radio Station

– Manager, Tehran Radio Station

– Deputy for Social Affairs and Culture, Tehran Municipality

DUBAI 00000023 002 OF 003

– Director, Iran Tourism Organization

5. (SBU) Mashaei’s website also lists the various posts he currently holds in the Ahmadinejad government beyond his role as chief of staff:

– Director, Center for Study of Globalization

– President’s Deputy, Supreme Council for Iranians Abroad

– Member, Government Cultural Committee

– President’s Representative, Council Overseeing IRIB

– Member, Government Economic and Cultural Committee

6. (SBU) Ahmadinejad’s stubborn defense of Mashaei bespeaks his importance as a key advisor for the increasingly isolated president; he also has emerged as a spokesman for the Ahmadinejad administration. Ahmadinejad has even told press that he would gladly serve as Vice-President in a Mashaei administration, prompting many to speculate that Ahmadinejad seeks to have Mashaei replace him in 2013.

A Political Punching Bag

7. (C) Since his installation as Chief of Staff, Mashaei has attracted far more attention for his ‘unofficial’ comments about religion, bearing out the earlier whispers that the opposition to Mashaei stemmed from his unorthodox religious views. An IRPO contact last summer said many clerics were concerned by Mashaei’s belief in the imminent return of the Twelfth Imam and by the intrusion of a layman into religious matters. During Ahmadinejad’s second term Mashaei has repeatedly stoked withering criticism by airing his religious views – and, in doing so, provided great fodder too for the president’s political foes.

8. (C) The criticism of Mashaei, and Ahmadinejad by association, is both real and opportunistic. Ahmadinejad’s hardline backers bristle at Mashaei’s presence in his government and time again beseech him to dump him. Kayhan Newspaper in November responded to a Mashaei assertion that ‘God is not the axis of unity among men’ by arguing that his comments contravene Islam and other religions and suggesting to Ahmadinejad that the government, the people of Iran, and the president himself would all be better off without Mashaie. The IRGC newspaper Sobh-e Sadegh a week later sent Ahmadinejad the same message-that he should abandon Mashaei.

9. (C) On January 10 during a university speech Mashaei invited derision by denigrating past prophets’ management ability. According to BBC Farsi, Mashaei pointed out that the prophet Noah (there are many prophets in Islam) lived for 950 years and even in that time was not able to establish ‘justice,’ thus creating the need for more prophets. A clerical supporter responded by complaining that Mashaei’s presence on the Ahmadinejad government causes much pain for the president’s supporters. Kayhan followed suit and carried an article mocking Mashaei and asking that he stay out of such matters. Ahmadinejad’s brother Davud, the former head of the president’s office of inspection, accused Mashaei of saying “absurd” things to keep the system busy and to prevent progress towards Khomeini’s goals. He mockingly implied that Mashaei’s only ‘accomplishment’ is his friendship with Hooshang Amir Ahmadi. (COMMENT: Davud Ahmadinejad, who resigned his position as in August 2008, reportedly did so due to disagreements with his brother regarding Mashaei. END COMMENT.)

DUBAI 00000023 003 OF 003

10. (SBU) Ahmadinejad’s opponents use the president’s relationship with Mashaei for mockery and to score political points. Numerous IRPO contacts have related well known anecdotes about Mashaei’s religious views and firm belief in the imminent return of the Twelfth Imam. Among them is the political ‘urban myth’ in Tehran that Ahmadinejad’s devotion to Mashaei is said to stem from his belief that Mashaei is in fact in direct contact with the Twelfth Imam. According to these rumors, Mashaei allegedly occasionally enters a trance-like state to communicate with the Twelfth Imam or will sometimes randomly say ‘hello’ to no one at all and then explain that the Twelfth Imam just passed by.

11. (SBU) On January 17 the moderate website ‘Ayande News’ carried an article about a meeting between Ahmadinejad and his supporters in which he defended Mashaei and referred to him as ‘Ohleeah ollah’, a title reserved for Islam’s most revered. Afterwards, the meeting’s organizer compared the relationship of Ahmadinejad and Mashaei to that of a ‘disciple and a mystic master.’ The oppositionist website ‘Rah-e Sabz’ has carried innumerable derogatory stories about Mashaei, among them allegations that Mashaei has assisted in the sale of Iranian antiquities outside of the country and that Mashaei’s family members have received jobs at the state-owned carmaker Saipa.

12. (SBU) The recent attacks on Mashaei seemingly culminated with reports of Mashaei’s resignation. On January 20, for example, the website ‘Khabar Online’ (affiliated with Majlis Speaker Larijani) published rumors that Mashaei would soon resign his position. The report cited a Majlis member who said that he regarded Mashaei as a “spent force.” However, Mashaei that day denied the reports of his resignation and the protests continued. BBC Farsi on January 27 reported that a Majlis faction aligned with traditional conservatives, the ‘Front of the Followers of the Line of the Imam and the Supreme Leader,’ sent Ahmadinejad a letter asking him to remove Mashaei.

13. (C) COMMENT: Mashaei’s presence in the Ahmadinejad government and the criticism he elicits illustrates some of the ongoing factional divisions in Tehran. That Larijani and other more moderate principlists use Mashaei to badger Ahmadinejad is not surpising; these camps have been jockeying for position since the 2005 presidential election campaign. More interesting is the criticism from Ahmadinejad’s hardline supporters. These hardliners still rely on the traditional clergy for a patina of Islamic legitimacy, and the clerical class’ near universal distaste for Mashaei’s version of Islam contributes to the hardline animosity to Ahmadinejad. To date, the criticism of Mashaei has stopped short of attacking Ahmadinejad directly, but his backers seem increasingly weary of Mashaei’s antics and Ahmadinejad’s patience for them. Ahmadinejad, who reportedly believes Mashaei is merely misunderstood, seems doggedly determined to retain his chief of staff even in the face of protests from his base. It was only with Khamenei’s direct intervention that Ahmadinejad grudgingly retracted Mashaei’s elevation to first vice president; it seems that to depose Mashaei, his critics may need to enlist the Supreme Leader once again. END COMMMENT. EYRE

TOP-SECRET: Israel sees Iran’s uranium enrichment as ‘point of no return’

Thursday, 17 March 2005, 14:58
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001593
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/14/2015
TAGS PARM, PREL, MNUC, KNNP, EU, IR, IS, GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: C-NE4-01083: ISRAELI INTENTIONS REGARDING THE
IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
REF: STATE 26053
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer; Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D).

Summary
  1. Israel urges international pressure on Tehran but worries US may move towards a less tough EU position. Israel is aware that it will be harder to destroy Iranian nuclear sites than it was Iraq’s reactor in 1981. Expects Iran to hit back at coalition forces in Iraq and the Gulf and launch terrorist attacks. Key passage highlighted in yellow.
  2. Read related article

1. (S) SUMMARY: Israel sees Iran as the primary threat to its security and sees the enrichment cycle as the “point of no return” for Tehran’s nuclear weapons program. The GOI believes that diplomatic pressure with teeth, such as sanctions, can affect Iranian behavior, and is lobbying the EU-3 and IAEA on details of a permanent suspension agreement. The Israelis support a unified international front but are concerned that the USG may move toward the EU position. Despite the GOI‘s focus on the diplomatic track, public and private speculation about possible Israeli air strikes continues. In weighing the military options, the GOI is aware of significant differences from its successful strike against Iraq’s nuclear program in 1981, including an uncertain and dispersed target set, the presence of coalition forces in Iraq and the Gulf, Iranian capabilities to retaliate through Hizballah and terrorism, and the changed strategic environment. END SUMMARY.

——————————————— ———-

The Iranian Threat, “Point of No Return,” and Timelines

——————————————— ———-

2. (S) PM Sharon calls Iran “the main threat to Israel” and has recently expressed concern that some states are “getting used to” the idea of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons. Other senior Israeli officials echo this, cautioning that Tehran’s nuclear weapons program poses what Mossad Chief Meir Dagan calls an “existential threat” that alters the strategic balance in the region.

3. (C) In a meeting with congressional visitors in December, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz described operation of the enrichment cycle as the “point of no return” for the Iranian program, a view shared by many senior GOI officials. Mossad Chief Dagan went a step further, saying that the Iranian program will be unstoppable once it no longer requires outside assistance to complete the enrichment process. At the technical level, the director for external affairs at the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) told poloff that the critical step would be Iran’s operation of a centrifuge enrichment cascade.

4. (S) GOI officials have given different timelines for when they believe Iran will have full enrichment capability. In February, PM Sharon told the Secretary that he believes there is still time remaining to pressure Iran, but that the window of opportunity is closing quickly. DefMin Mofaz cautioned that Iran is “less than one year away,” while the head of research in military intelligence estimated that Iran would reach this point by early 2007. Technical experts at the IAEC predicted that Iran would have enrichment capability within six months of the end of the suspension agreement. A few GOI officials admitted informally that these estimates need to be taken with caution. The head of the MFA’s strategic affairs division recalled that GOI assessments from 1993 predicted that Iran would possess an atomic bomb by 1998 at the latest.

——————————————–

Focus on Diplomacy and Concern with the EU-3

——————————————–

5. (S) In the near term, Israel is focused on maintaining diplomatic pressure on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and EU-3. Sharon defines diplomatic pressure to include UNSC sanctions, e.g. on Iran’s airlines and trade, as noted below. President Katsav has said that Tehran is “very conscious of international opinion.” Other MFA and NSC officials point to the current suspension and to Iranian reaction to the Mykonos case as proof that diplomatic pressure can affect decision-making in Tehran.

6. (S) The Israelis often express disappointment with EU-3 efforts, but see no real alternative at this time. PM Sharon told reporters on March 10 that Iran uses the negotiations to “play for time.” In private, Sharon, his Cabinet, and military leaders have all complained that the Europeans are “too soft.” Similarly, President Katsav has cautioned that Iran will “cheat” on any commitments it makes. MFA staff told poloff that they do not believe that the EU-3 effort will be successful in obtaining a permanent suspension or that the Europeans will support effective sanctions against Iran.

7. (C) GOI technical experts said they have been lobbying the Europeans and IAEA on several issues. First, the GOI would like a clearer and more detailed listing of all activities covered by the suspension, along with timelines for each step. Second, they want more robust verification measures and greater focus on Iran’s denial of access to IAEA inspectors. Third, the Israelis insist that any final agreement must be endorsed by the UNSC to ensure that noncompliance will be dealt with at an appropriate level. Fourth, Israel is pushing the EU-3 to define benchmarks that would signal a failure of the process, and to identify the concrete consequences of such failure.

8. (C) According to the IAEC, the GOI has urged the Europeans to examine bilateral or EU sanctions with small, but noticeable, economic impacts. After telling the press on March 10 that “it would probably not be advisable to impose an oil embargo on Iran,” PM Sharon advocated trade and flight restrictions. Lower-level GOI officials said these steps could include restrictions on Iranians studying in Europe, limitations on travel by Iranian scientific personnel, and suspension of landing privileges for Iranian airlines within the EU. The goal, according to the deputy NSA for foreign affairs, is unified pressure from the EU, Russia, and U.S. for a “complete, full, verifiable cessation of the fuel cycle program.” In the short term, this means a full suspension of all enrichment, reprocessing, heavy-water-reactor construction, and related R&D activities.

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Israeli Preference for USG and UNSC Involvement

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9. (C) In light of their uneasiness with EU-3 efforts, the Israelis are hoping for robust U.S. involvement and action by the UNSC. PM Sharon has urged the EU-3 to continue its efforts, but also stressed the importance of preparing to take Iran to the UNSC. In a meeting with a CoDel on December 12, DefMin Mofaz pushed for the U.S. to take the lead with the Europeans and pursue all diplomatic solutions, including sanctions. President Katsav asked the Secretary not to “wait for the Europeans.”

10. (C) This desire for U.S. activity is amplified by the extremely limited options open to Israel on the diplomatic front. The IAEC’s director for non-proliferation admitted that the GOI sees “little we can do” to increase pressure on Iran as long as Tehran abides by the suspension agreement. The MFA’s office director for the Gulf states said that Israel would maintain its low-profile diplomatic activities, such as supplying IAEA members with intelligence material related to the Iranian program. She said the MFA believes that any overt Israeli pressure would backfire, leading to a surge of Arab support for Iran and focusing attention on Israel’s own nuclear activities.

11. (C) Following the recent announcements on Iran by the President and the Secretary, several Israeli officials asked if the USG is shifting its policy on Iran. The deputy NSA for foreign affairs acknowledged that the U.S. move is probably necessary to build international consensus for taking Iran to the UNSC. At the same time, he expressed concern that the USG would be influenced by what he called the EU’s habit of granting concessions to Iran prior to full compliance. Mid-level staffers at the NSC and IAEC were also disquieted by U.S. press reports claiming that the USG is re-examining its position on Hizballah.

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The Military Option: Bushehr is not Osirak

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12. (S) Despite frustrations with diplomatic efforts, Israeli officials are understandably reluctant to discuss possible military options. In public, PM Sharon has stressed the importance of the “political and economic” track. During a recent discussion with a visiting USG official, IDF Deputy Chief of Staff (and CoS-designate) Major General Dani Haloutz similarly said “we don’t want to go there.” In February, President Katsav told the Secretary that “the military option is not necessary — bring the issue to the Security Council.”

13. (S) Public speculation about possible military strikes usually focuses on the differences from the Israeli Air Force’s attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981. In private, GOI officials have acknowledged that several factors would make any attack against Iran a much more difficult mission. A senior military intelligence official told the Embassy that the GOI does not know where all of the targets are located and said that any attack would only delay, not end, the Iranian program. The MFA’s office director for the Gulf states noted that potential target sites are well dispersed throughout the country, with several located in built-up civilian areas. The IAEC stressed the importance of Russian assistance in restraining Iran’s nuclear ambitions and said that any attack on Bushehr would likely result in Russian casualties and endanger Moscow’s cooperation.

14. (C) MFA contacts said that the distance to the targets and the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq and the Gulf raise additional complications. An Israeli assault would necessitate prior coordination with coalition forces in Iraq, they maintained, leaving the USG open to retaliation throughout the Islamic world, especially in Iraq. MFA and NSC officials acknowledged that any attack would also elicit a strong response from Arab states and the Palestinians, effectively freezing the peace process.

15. (C) The Israelis realize that Iran would use any military strike as an excuse to cease cooperation with the EU-3 and the IAEA. In addition, the GOI is acutely aware of Iran’s ability to retaliate, both militarily and through attacks by its regional surrogates. PM Sharon has claimed that Hizballah has 11,000 rockets (and possibly UAVs) capable of reaching Israel from launching sites in Lebanon. The MFA’s office director for the Gulf states said that she believed that Iran would retaliate by inciting terrorist groups in Israel and the Occupied Territories.

16. (C) Current USG, EU-3, and IAEA focus on Iran also creates a situation that differs from 1981, when the Israelis felt that the international community was ignoring the Iraqi threat. Israelis hope that the others will solve the Iranian problem for them, or as Vice PM Shimon Peres has said, “I do not think that the matter of Iran needs to be turned into an Israeli problem — it is a matter of concern for the whole world.”

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Comment: Diplomatic Solution Preferred, but …

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17. (S) COMMENT: The Israelis are focusing on diplomatic channels in the IAEA and EU-3, and appear to have very real concerns about the feasibility of military strikes against the Iranian nuclear program. Nevertheless, the GOI has shown time and again that it will act militarily if it believes that its security is threatened, and the IDF is most certainly keeping contingency plans up to date. The Israeli press reported that in February PM Sharon’s Security Cabinet had given “initial authorization” for an attack on Iran. The press reports cited an unnamed “Israeli security source,” who claimed that the USG would “authorize” an Israeli attack. Post notes that it may not be possible to detect preparations for any military strike. Air defense operations would pose nearly perfect cover for civil defense and Air Force activities preceding any attack. Due to both the extreme sensitivity of the issue and the GOI‘s near inability to prevent leaks, any attack order would be closely held, probably even from many members of PM Sharon’s Cabinet.

18. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The GOI knows that we share its interest in preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, we should expect continued Israeli lobbying at the highest levels urging the USG to ensure that the EU-3 effort is on track and backed by a solid international front. We will also hear Israeli concerns that the U.S. position may move toward the EU stance. At the same time, we should recognize that Israeli intelligence briefings will understandably focus on worst-case scenarios and may not match current USG assessments.

********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv’s Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

You can also access this site through the State Department’s Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** KURTZER

TOP-SECRET – OIG Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was asked to prepare a report of the accountability of CIA officers for performance failures in countering the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, as revealed by earlier congressional hearings. The report was prepared in 2005, but kept secret until August 21 2007.

Responding to congressional pressure, the CIA released a bowdlerized executive summary only, which does not name responsible persons. CIA Director General Hayden and others objected to the release of the report, and Hayden also objects to the report’s recommendation that an Accountability Review Board should be set up to judge the persons responsible for the failures.

A report in searchable text form is here: OIG Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks. Actually the report itself, or what we can see of it, is pretty mild, considering the magnitude and inexplicability of many of the failures. While the report focuses on “little issues” like poor CIA-FBI cooperation and various tactical failures, it doesn’t consider the larger question of why radical Islamist terrorism in general, and Al-Qaeda in particular, was not ringing alarm bells everywhere. The report does ask why CIA Director Tenet didn’t formulate a plan to eliminate Al-Qaeda. A better question is why neither Tenet or nor anyone in the executive office of two administrations was not treating the threat as a war. After all, Bin-Laden had threatened to destroy the United States in his Fatwas, and Al-Qaeda had already carried out attacks in the SS Cole and on US embassies. Here was a clearly hostile enemy who was not making empty threats. The problem could be seen by anyone who looked, without the need for special intelligence information. Yet the issue was shunted aside.

The great failure perhaps was not the failure of George Tenet. A CIA director is not supposed to formulate policy. The great failure was the failure of the executive branch, which failed to identify a clear and present danger, and to put into operation an emergency plan to deal with it.

Read the full report and draw your own conclusions:

This document describing the unreadiness of the CIA for the attacks of 9-11 was prepared in June of 2005 by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the CIA . The CIA decided to keep the document secret. At length in August of 2007, the executive report portion of the document was released.

An article by Mark Mazetti in the The New York Times of August 21, summarized some of the findings:

A report released Tuesday by the Central Intelligence Agency includes new details of the agency’s missteps before the Sept. 11 attacks, outlining what the report says were failures to grasp the role being played by the terror mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and to assess fully the threats streaming into the C.I.A. in the summer of 2001.

The 19-page report, prepared by the agency’s inspector general, also says 50 to 60 C.I.A. officers knew of intelligence reports in 2000 that two of the Sept. 11 hijackers, Nawaf al-Hamzi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, may have been in the United States. But none of those officers thought to notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation about the potential domestic threat, the report says, evidence of what it calls a systemic failure.

The inspector general recommended that several top agency officials, including former director George J. Tenet, be held accountable for their failure to put in place a strategy to dismantle Al Qaeda in the years before Sept. 11, 2001. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, the current C.I.A. director, and his predecessor, Porter J. Goss, have declined to seek disciplinary action against Mr. Tenet  and others named in the report.

The report was not a spontaneous review initiated by the CIA. It begins “

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence requested that the CIA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) review the findings of their Joint Inquiry (JI) Report and undertake whatever additional investigations were necessary to determine whether any Agency employees were deserving of awards for outstanding service provided before the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), or should be held accountable for failure to perform their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner.

In other words, the legislative bodies had found problems in the functioning of the CIA, and requested the CIA to take appropriate corrective measures. The refusal to seek disciplinary action against CIA officers by the head of the CIA is therefore significant.

The summary also notes that “

(U) The Accountability Review Team assembled by the Inspector General (IG) focused exclusively on the issues identified by the JI. The IG was not asked by the Congress to conduct a comprehensive review of the capabilities and functioning of the Agency’s many components involved with counterterrorism programs, and the Team did not do so. As a result, this account does not document the many successes of the Agency and its officers at all levels (including many whose actions are discussed in this report) in the war on terrorism, both before and after 9/11.

(U) Similarly, because this report was designed to address accountability issues, it does not include recommendations relating to the systemic problems that were identified. Such systemic recommendations as were appropriate to draw from this review of the events of the pre-9/11 period have been forwarded separately to senior Agency managers. In its regular program of audits, investigations, and inspections, the OIG continues to review the counterterrorism programs and operations of the Agency, identifying processes that work well and those that might be improved.

The team notes that it used a “reasonable person” approach, that is, to determine if actions taken were responsible or negligent based on what a reasonable person would do. The results of this approach are sometimes peculiar. For example, the Team decided, in contradiction to congress, that the use of foreign liaison and walk-in (volunteer) “assets” by the CIA was not excessive. But then they decide that the CIA officials were not to blame for failures, because the failures were due to the lack of cooperation or limited operation provided by such assets and liaisons.

The problems that allowed 9-11 to happen would seem to be much deeper than personal failures, or even “systemic failures” related to CIA-FBI cooperation. The FBI and the CIA had been tracking Al-Qaeda for years. Inexplicably, they failed to do so at the crucial time. They are also indicative of a larger conceptual failure in understanding the Middle East, and in allocating the necessary intelligence and diplomatic resources. (See comment on the role of the CIA and FBI in the 9-11 failure).

An important recommendation of the report:

Concerning certain issues, the Team concluded that the Agency and its officers did not discharge their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner. As a result, the Inspector General recommends that the Director, Central Intelligence Agency establish an Accountability Board made up of individuals who are not employees of the Agency to review the performance of some individuals and assess their potential accountability.

General Hayden objects to creation of such a board. No agency likes to have external oversight.

The first page of the released report is numbered Roman Numeral v. We have tried to keep the formatting as close to the original as reasonably possible. The report has numerous areas that were whited out by the censor. These are indicated herein by XXXXXXXXXX. They include names of operatives, foreign liaisons, amounts of money and other information.

Ami Isseroff

9-11 Project at MidEastWeb9-11 Commission Report: Whitewash as a public service 9-11 commission report OIG Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attack Osama Bin Laden Fatwa of 1998 Osama Bin Laden Statement on Afghanistan War  Inside Al-Qaeda Who is Osama Bin Laden? – Fatwa of 1996 (Declaration of war) Terrorist threat greater than before 9-11


Notice – Copyright

This introduction is copyright 2007 by MidEastWeb Middle East http://www.mideastweb.org  and the author. Please tell your friends about MidEastWeb and link to this page. Please do not copy this page to your Web site. You may print this page out for classroom use provided that this notice is appended, and you may cite this material in the usual way. Other uses by permission only.  The source material below is placed in the public domain  and is free of copy restrictions. Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/Executive%20Summary_OIG%20Report.pdf


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(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence requested that the CIA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) review the findings of their Joint Inquiry (JI) Report and undertake whatever additional investigations were necessary to determine whether any Agency employees were deserving of awards for outstanding service provided before the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), or should be held accountable for failure to perform their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner.

(U) The Accountability Review Team assembled by the Inspector General (IG) focused exclusively on the issues identified by the JI. The IG was not asked by the Congress to conduct a comprehensive review of the capabilities and functioning of the Agency’s many components involved with counterterrorism programs, and the Team did not do so. As a result, this account does not document the many successes of the Agency and its officers at all levels

(including many whose actions are discussed in this report) in the war on terrorism, both before and after 9/11.

(U) Similarly, because this report was designed to address accountability issues, it does not include recommendations relating to the systemic problems that were identified. Such systemic recommendations as were appropriate to draw from this review of the events of the pre-9/11 period have been forwarded separately to senior Agency managers. In its regular program of audits, investigations, and inspections, the OIG continues to review the counterterrorism programs and operations of the Agency, identifying processes that work well and those that might be improved.

(U) After conducting its review, the Inspector General Team reports that, while its findings differ from those of the JI on a number of matters, it reaches the same overall conclusions on most of the important issues.

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Concerning certain issues, the Team concluded that the Agency and its officers did not discharge their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner. As a result, the Inspector General recommends that the Director, Central Intelligence Agency establish an Accountability Board made up of individuals who are not employees of the Agency to review the performance of some individuals and assess their potential accountability.

(U) In its deliberations, the Team used “reasonable person” approach and relied on Agency regulations-which are subjective-concerning standards of accountability. A discussion of those regulations is included in the Foreword. While the Team found that many officers performed their responsibilities in an exemplary fashion, it did not recommend individuals for additional recognition because these officers already have been rewarded.

(U) The Team found no instance in which an employee violated the law, and none of the errors discussed herein involves misconduct. Rather, the review focuses on areas where individuals did not perform their duties in a satisfactory manner; that is, they did not-with regard to the specific issue or issues discussed-act “in accordance with a reasonable level of professionalism, skill, and diligence,” as required by Agency regulation. On occasion, the Team has found that a specific officer was responsible for a particular action or lack of action, but has not recommended that an Accountability Board review the officer’s performance. Such a conclusion reflects the Team’s view that extenuating circumstances mitigate the case.

(U) The findings of greatest concern are those that identify systemic problems where the Agency’s programs or processes did not work as they should have, and concerning which a number of persons were involved or aware, or should have been. Where the Team found systemic failures, it has recommended that an Accountability Board assess the performance and accountability of those managers who, by virtue of their position and authorities, might reasonably have been expected to oversee and correct the process. In general, the fact that failures were systemic should not absolve responsible officials from accountability.

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(U) The Review Team found that Agency officers from the top down worked hard against the al-Qa’ida and Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) targets. They did not always work effectively and cooperatively, however. The Team found neither a “single point of failure” nor a “silver bullet” that would have enabled the Intelligence Community (IC) to predict or prevent the 9/11 attacks. The Team did find, however, failures to implement and manage important processes, to follow through with operations, and to properly share and analyze critical data. If IC officers had been able to view and analyze the full range of information available before 11 September 2001, they could have developed a more informed context in which to assess the threat reporting of the spring and summer that year.

(U) This review focuses only on those findings of the Joint Inquiry that relate to the Central Intelligence Agency. The Team cooperated with the Department of Justice Inspector General and the Kean Commission as they pursued their separate inquiries. For this report, the Team interviewed officers from other agencies who had been detailed to the CIA in the period before 9/11, but did not undertake to interview systematically other officers outside CIA and the IC Management Staff. This report reaches no conclusions about the performance of other agencies or their personnel.

(U) Senior Leadership and Management of the Counterterrorism Effort

(U) The JI concluded that, before 9/11, neither the US Government nor the IC had a comprehensive strategy for combating al-Qa’ida. It charged that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was either unwilling or unable to marshal the full range of IC resources necessary to combat the growing threat to the United States. The OIG Team also found that the IC did not have a documented, comprehensive approach to al-Qa’ida and that the DCI did not use all of his authorities in leading the IC’s strategic effort against UBL.

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(C) The Team found that the DCI was actively and forcefully engaged in the counterterrorism efforts of the CIA. Beginning in 1999, he received regular updates, often daily, on efforts to track and disrupt UBL. He was personally engaged in sounding the alarm about the threat to many different audiences in the policy community, military, Congress, and public, and he worked directly and personally with foreign counterparts to encourage their cooperation.

(S//NF) In December 1998, the DCI signed a memorandum in which he declared: “We are at war.” In addition to directives related to collection programs and other matters, this memorandum stated that the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence (DDCI) would chair an interagency group to formulate an integrated, interagency plan to counter the terrorist challenge posed by Usama Bin Ladin. The DCI wrote that he wanted “…no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community.”

(S//NF) The Team found that neither the DCI nor the DDCI followed up these warnings and admonitions by creating a documented, comprehensive plan to guide the counterterrorism effort at the Intelligence Community level. The DDCI chaired at least one meeting in response to the DCI directive, but the forum soon devolved into one of tactical and operational, rather than strategic, discussions. These subsequent meetings were chaired by the Executive Director of the CIA and included few if any officers from other IC agencies. While CIA and other agencies had individual plans and important initiatives underway, senior officers in the Agency and Community told the Team that no comprehensive strategic plan for the IC to counter UBL was created in response to the DCI’s memorandum, or at any time prior to 9/11.

(S//NF) The DCI Counterterrorist Center (CTC) was not used effectively as a strategic coordinator of the IC’s counterterrorism efforts. CTC’s stated mission includes the production of all-source intelligence and the coordination of the IC’s counterterrorism efforts. Before 9/11, however, the Center’s focus was primarily operational and tactical. While

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focusing on operations is critically important and does not necessarily mean that other elements of mission will be ignored, the Team found that this nearly exclusive focus-which resulted in many operational successes-had a negative impact on CTC’s effectiveness as a coordinator of IC counterterrorism strategy. The Team found that the most effective interagency effort against UBL was that of the Assistant DCI for Collection, who, from the early months of 1998 to 9/11, worked with representatives of several intelligence agencies to stimulate collection.

(S//NF)  In the years leading up to 9/11, the DCI worked hard and with some success, at the most senior levels of government, to secure additional budgetary resources to rebuild the CIA and the IC. At the same time, the Team found that he did not use his senior position and unique authorities to work with the National Security Council to elevate the relative standing of counterterrorism in the formal ranking of intelligence priorities, or to alter the deployment of human and financial resources across agencies in a coordinated approach to the terrorism target. While the nature of the IC makes the mission of managing it problematic and difficult, the DCI at the time had some authority to move manpower and funds among agencies. The Team found that, in the five years prior to 9/11, the DCI on six occasions used these authorities to move almost XXXXXX

in funds from other agencies to the CIA for a number of important purposes XXXXXX

XXXXXX  One of these transfers helped fund a middle East program that was terrorism-related, but none supported programs designed to counter UBL or al-Qa’ida. Nor were DCI authorities used to transfer any personnel into these programs in the five years prior to 9/11.

The Team notes that the former DCI recognized the need for an integrated, interagency plan, and believes that such a plan was needed to mobilize all of the operational, analytic, and resource capabilities of the IC to enable the several agencies of the Community to work cooperatively and with maximum effectiveness against al-Qa’ida. At the same time, the Team concludes that the former DCI, by virtue of his position, bears ultimate responsibility for the fact that no such strategic plan was

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ever created, despite his specific direction that this should be done.

(S//NF) The JI report discussed a persistent strain in relations between CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA) that impeded collaboration between the two agencies in dealing with the terrorist challenge from al-Qa’ida. The Team, likewise, found that significant differences existed between CIA and NSA over their respective authorities. The Team did not document in detail or take a position on the merits of this disagreement, but notes that the differences remained unresolved well into 2001 in spite of the fact that considerable management attention was devoted to the issue, including at the level of the Agency’s Deputy Executive Director. Senior officers of the CIA and the IC Management Staff stated that these interagency differences had a negative impact on the IC’s ability to perform its mission and that only the DCI’s vigorous personal involvement could have led to a timely resolution of the matter.

(C)The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the former DCI for failing to act personally to resolve the differences between CIA and NSA in an effective and timely manner.

(U) See the Team’s discussions of Systemic Findings 2 (The DCI’s Role); 4 (Application of Technology); and 7 (Computer Exploitation) for discussion of these issues.

(U) Management of CIA’s Resources for Counterterrorism

(C) Funding for the Agency’s counterterrorism programs increased significantly from Fiscal Year (FY)1998 to FY 2001 as a result of supplemental appropriations. These funds were appropriated, in part, because of the efforts of the CIA’s Director and senior leaders to convince the Administration and Congress that the Agency was short of resources for counterterrorism and other key programs. The Team preparing this report did not attempt to reach a

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counterterrorism programs.

(S) The Team did find, however, that during the same period they were appealing the shortage of resources, senior officials were not effectively managing the Agency’s counterterrorism funds. In particular, Agency managers moved funds from the base budgets of the Counterterrorist Center and other counterterrorism programs to meet other corporate and Directorate of Operations (DO) needs. The Team found that from FY 1997 to FY 2001 (as of 9/11),XXXXX XXXXXXXXXX

was redistributed from counterterrorism programs to other Agency priorities. Some of these funds were used to strengthen the infrastructure of the DO and, thus, indirectly supported counterterrorism efforts; other funds were used to cover nonspecific corporate “taxes” and for a variety of purposes that, based on the Agency’s budgetary definitions, were unrelated to terrorism. Conversely, no resources were reprogrammed from other Agency programs to counterterrorism, even after the DCI’s statement in December 1998 that he wanted no resources spared in the effort. The Team found that the Agency made little use of the Reserve for Contingencies to support its counterterrorism effort. Finally, CTC managers did not spend all of the funds in their base budget, even after it had been reduced by diversions of funds to other programs.

(C) The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the Executive Director, the Deputy Director for Operations, and the Chief of CTC during the years prior to 9/11 regarding their management of the Agency’s counterterrorism financial resources, including specifically their redirection of funds from counterterrorism programs to other priorities.

(C)  Concerning human resources, the Team found that the unit within CTC responsible for Usama Bin Ladin, UBL Station, by the accounts of all who worked there, had an excessive workload. Most of its officers did not have the operational experience, expertise, and training necessary to accomplish their mission in an effective manner. Taken together, these weaknesses contributed to performance lapses related to the handling of materials concerning

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individuals who were to become the 9/11 hijackers. The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the Chiefs of CTC during the period 1997-2001 regarding the manner in which they staffed the UBL component.

(C) The Team found that certain units within CTC did not work effectively together to understand the structure and operations of al-Qa’ida. This situation had a particularly negative impact on performance with respect to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. The Team, like the Joint Inquiry, found that CTC’s assigning principal responsibility for KSM to the Renditions Branch had the consequence that the resources of the Sunni Extremist Group, UBL Station, and CTC analysts were not effectively brought to bear on the problem. CTC considered KSM to be a high-priority target for apprehension and rendition, but did not recognize the significance of reporting from credible sources in 2000 and 2001 that portrayed him as a senior al-Qa’ida lieutenant and thus missed important indicators of terrorist planning. This intelligence reporting was not voluminous and its significance is obviously easier to determine in hindsight, but it was noteworthy even in the pre-9/11 period because it included the allegation that KSM was sending terrorists to the United States to engage in activities on behalf of Bin Ladin.

(C) The evidence indicates that the management approach employed in CTC had the effect of actively reinforcing the separation of responsibilities among the key CTC units working on KSM. The Team recommends that an

Accountability Board review the performance of the XXX

XXXX and XXXXX

for failure to provide proper oversight and guidance to their officers; to coordinate effectively with other units; and to allocate the workload to ensure that KSM was being covered appropriately. The Team also recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the Chief of CTC for failure to ensure that CTC units worked in a coordinated, effective manner against KSM. Finally, the Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the XXXXXX for

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failure to produce any XXXXXX coverage of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad from 1997 to 20011

  • (U) See the Team’s discussions of Systemic Finding 3 (Counterterrorism Resources) and Factual Finding 5i (Khalid Shaykh Muhammad) for further information on these issues.

(U) Information Sharing

The Team’s findings related to the issue of information sharing are in general accord with the JI’s overall assessment of CIA’s performance. Like the JI, the Team found problems in the functioning of two separate but related processes in the specific case of the Malaysia operation of early 2000: entering the names of suspected al-Qa’ida terrorists on the “watchlist” of the Department of State and providing information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in proper channels. The Team also found that CTC did not forward relevant information to XXXXXX

In regard to broader issues of information sharing, the Team found basic problems with processes designed to facilitate such sharing. In particular, CTC managers did not clarify the roles and responsibilities of officers detailed to CTC by other agencies.

(S//NF)  The Malaysia Operation. Agency officers did not, on a timely basis, recommend to the Department of State the watchlisting of two suspected al-Qa’ida terrorists, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. These individuals, who later were among the hijackers of 9/11, were known by the Agency in early January 2000 to have traveled to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to participate in a meeting of suspected terrorists. From Kuala Lumpur, they traveled to Bangkok. In January 2000, CTC officers received information that one of these suspected terrorists had a US visa; in March 2000,


‘ (U) As a result of a conflict of interest, the Inspector General recused himself from deliberations on the performance of Agency components and individuals relating to the KSM issue and to the strategic analysis issues discussed below. The two successive Deputy Inspectors General did participate in accountability discussions regarding analysis and all other issues.

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these officers had information that the other had flown from Bangkok to Los Angeles.

(S//NF) In the period January through March 2000, some 50 to 60 individuals read one or more of six Agency cables containing travel information related to these terrorists. These cables originated in four field locations and Headquarters. They were read by overseas officers and Headquarters personnel, operations officers and analysts, managers and junior employees, and CIA staff personnel as well as officers on rotation from NSA and FBI. Over an 18-month period, some of these officers had opportunities to review the information on multiple occasions, when they might have recognized its significance and shared it appropriately with other components and agencies. Ultimately, the two terrorists were watchlisted in late August 2001 as a result of questions raised in May 2001 by a CIA officer on assignment at the FBI.

(S//NF)  In 1998, CTC assumed responsibility for communicating watchlisting guidance in the Agency. As recently as December 1999, less than a month before the events of early January 2000, CTC had sent to all field offices of the CIA a cable reminding them of their obligation to watchlist suspected terrorists and the procedures for doing so. Field components and Headquarters units had obligations related to watchlisting, but they varied widely in their performance. That so many individuals failed to act in this case reflects a systemic breakdown-a breakdown caused by excessive workload, ambiguities about responsibilities, and mismanagement of the program. Basically, there was no coherent, functioning watchlisting program.

(S//NF) The Review Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the two Chiefs of CTC in the years between 1998 and 2001 concerning their leadership and management oversight of the watchlisting program.

(S//NF) Agency officers also failed to pass the travel information about the two terrorists to the FBI in the prescribed channels. The Team found that an FBI officer

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assigned to CTC on 5 January 2000 drafted a message about the terrorists’ travel that was to be sent from CIA to the FBI in the proper channels. Apparently because it was in the wrong format or needed editing, the message was never sent. On the same date, another CTC officer sent a cable to several Agency addressees reporting that the information and al-Mihdhar’s travel documents had been passed to the FBI. The officer who drafted this cable does not recall how this information was passed. The Team has not been able to confirm that the information was passed, or that it was not passed. Whatever the case, the Team found no indication that anyone in CTC checked to ensure FBI receipt of the information, which, a few UBL Station officers said, should have been routine practice.

(S//NF) addressees cables reporting that al-Hazmi and another al-Qa’ida associate had traveled to the United States. They were clearly identified in the cables as “UBL associates.” The Team has found no evidence, and heard no claim from any party, that this information was shared in any manner with the FBI or that anyone in UBL . Station took other appropriate operational action at that time.

(S//NF) In the months following the Malaysia operation, the CIA missed several additional opportunities to nominate al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar for watchlisting; to inform the FBI about their intended or actual travel to the United States; and to take appropriate operational action. These included a few occasions identified by the Joint Inquiry as well as several others.

(S//NF)   The consequences of the failures to share information and perform proper operational followthrough on these terrorists were potentially significant. Earlier watchlisting of al-Mihdhar could have prevented his re-entry into the United States in July 2001. Informing the FBI and good operational followthrough by CIA and FBI might have resulted in surveillance of both al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi. Surveillance, in turn, would have had the potential to yield information on flight training, financing, and links to others who were complicit in the 9/11 attacks.

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The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance ofXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

for failing

to ensure that someone in the Station informed the FBI and took appropriate operational action regarding al-Hazmi in March 2000. In addition, the Team recommends that the Accountability Board assess the performance of the latter three managers for failing to ensure prompt action relevant to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar during several later opportunities between March 2000 and August 2001.

(U) Broader Information Sharing Issues. The Joint Inquiry charged that CIA’s information-sharing problems derived from differences among agencies with respect to missions, legal authorities, and cultures. It argued that CIA efforts to protect sources and methods fostered a reluctance to share information and limited disclosures to criminal investigators. The report also alleged that most Agency officers did not focus sufficiently on the domestic terrorism front, viewing this as an FBI mission. The 9/11 Review Team’s findings are similar in many respects, but the Team believes the systemic failures in this case do not lie in reluctance to share. Rather, the basic problems were poor implementation, guidance, and oversight of processes established to foster the exchange of information, including the detailee program.

CTC and UBL Station had on their rosters detailees from many different agencies, including the FBI, NSA, Federal Aviation Administration , and State Department. The manner in which these detailees were managed left many of them unclear about the nature of their responsibilities. Many CIA managers and officers believed the detailees were responsible for conveying information to their home agencies, while most of the detailees maintained that they were working as CTC officers and had neither the time nor the responsibility to serve as links to their home agencies. The Team found, at a minimum, that there were fundamental ambiguities about the responsibilities of the detailees as they related to information sharing, and that these responsibilities were never delineated explicitly or in

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writing. The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the two Chiefs of CTC during the years before 9/11 concerning their oversight of the Center’s practices in management of the detailee program.

(U) See the Team’s discussions of Factual Finding 5b (The Watchlisting Failure) and Systemic Findings 9 (Information Sharing Within the IC) and 10 (Information Sharing with Non-IC Members) for elaboration on these issues.

(U) Strategic Analysis

The Team, like the JI , found that the IC’s understanding of al-Qa’ida was hampered by insufficient analytic focus, particularly regarding strategic analysis. The Team asked three individuals who had served as senior intelligence analysts and managers to conduct an independent review of the Agency’s analytic products dealing with UBL and al-Qa’ida for the period from 1998 to 2001 and assess their quality. They found that, while CTC’s tradecraft was generally good, important elements were missing. Discussion of implications was generally weak, for example. Most important, a number of important issues were covered insufficiently or not at all. The Team found:

    • No comprehensive strategic assessment of al-Qa’ida by CTC or any other component.
    • No comprehensive report focusing on UBL since 1993.
    • No examination of the potential for terrorists to use aircraft as weapons, as distinguished from traditional hijackings.
    • Limited analytic focus on the United States as a potential target.
    • No comprehensive analysis that put into context the threats received in the spring and summer of 2001.
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That said, CTC’s analytic component, the Assessments and Information Group (AIG), addressed aspects of these issues in several more narrowly focused strategic papers and other analyticproducts.

J,Sf The personnel resources of AIG were heavily dedicated to policy-support and operational-support activities. Analysts focused primarily on current and tactical issues rather than on strategic analysis. In the two years prior to 9/11, the Directorate of Intelligence’s

raised with CTC managers the need to dedicate some proportion of the analytic work force to strategic analysis, as was the practice in many DI offices. In early 2001, the DCI specifically directed CTC to establish a strategic analysis unit within AIG. The Chief of AIG had for some time been aware of the need to strengthen the analytic work force and was working to do so. The strategic analysis unit was formed in July 2001; as of late July, it was manned by XXXXXX analysts.

(S/NF) he Team found that the National Intelligence Council (NIC) addressed the al-Qa’ida threat to only a limited extent. The NIC produced a National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorist threat to the United States in 1995 and an update in 1997. It did not produce a similar, comprehensive assessment from that point until after 9/11, although preparation of such a product was underway, with a CTC drafter, in the early months of 2001 and was being edited as of 9/11.

(U) See Team discussions of Factual Findings 2 (Signs of an Impending Attack), 3 (The Threat to the United States), and 4 (Aircraft as Weapons) and Systemic Finding 5 (Strategic Analysis) for further information on these topics.

(U) Operations (Unilateral and Liaison)

(S/NF) The Joint Inquiry charges that CIA did not effectively develop and use human resources to penetrate al-Qa’ida’s inner circle, thus significantly limiting the IC’s

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ability to acquire actionable intelligence before 9/11. The report argues that this lack of sources resulted from an excessive reliance on foreign liaison services and walk-ins (sources who volunteer); a focus on disruption and capture rather than collection; and adherence to the dirty asset rules (guidelines that restricted the recruitment of sources who had committed certain proscribed acts).

The Review Team did not find that CIA’s reliance on liaison for collection was excessive but did find thatXXXXXX this reliance was not balanced with a strong focus on developing unilateral assets. The Team did not find that CIA reliance on walk-ins was misguided XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

‘Although the CIA focused its al-Qa’ida operations on Afghanistan, possibly limiting its ability to focus elsewhere, the Team believes that this approach was reasonable and that its purpose was collection on al-Qa’ida as well as disruption of al-Qa’ida’s activities. While

agreeing that the dirty asset rules may have created a climate that had the effect of inhibiting certain recruitment operations, the Team is unable to confirm or determine the extent of the impact. Finally, the Team found that several operational platforms XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

were not effectively engaged in the battle against al-Qa’ida. In the case of XXXX this reflected the weakness of the program itself. In the case XXXXX it reflected CTC’s focus on Afghanistan and the priority o its attempts to penetrate al-Qa’ida’s inner circle.

(S//NF) The Team found that the CIA’s relations with foreign liaison services were critical to its ability to disrupt al-Qa’ida and thwart some terrorist attacks on the United States. While the capabilities and cooperation of liaison services were uneven, the program itself did not detract from CIA’s efforts to mount its own unilateral operations. The Team did raise serious questions about whether CTC prior to 9/11 had made the most effective use of  XXXXXXXXX liaison services in its operations against al-Qa’ida. XXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

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XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Nevertheless, the Team observes that the complicated dynamics of liaison relationships, including lack of common goals and counterintelligence problems, suggest that CTC     managers made reasonable judgmentsXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

The Joint Inquiry particularly criticized CIA for the conduct of its operational relationship XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

It noted that CIA had unsuccessfully pressed XXXXXX

authorities for additional information on individuals later identified as associates of some of the hijackers. It placed some of the blame for this on CIA’s decisions. XXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX The Team also found that CIA was unable to acquire the information cited by the JI but found that it made repeated efforts to do so and that its lack of success was the result of a difficult operating environment and limited cooperation on the part of’ XXXXXX. The Team concluded that the decisions made with respect to XXXXXXXX were reasonable.

(S//NF) The Joint Inquiry also argued that both the FBI and CIA had failed to identify the extent of support from Saudi nationals or groups for terrorist activities globally or within the United States and the extent to which such support, to the extent it existed, was knowing or inadvertent. While most of the JI discussion on the Saudi issue dealt with issues involving the FBI and its domestic operations, the report also XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXX The Team found that a significant gap existed in the CIA’s understanding of Saudi extremists’ involvement in plotting terrorist attacks. The primary reasons for this gap were the difficulty of the task, the hostile operational environment, and’XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

(S//NF) The Team also found, however, that UBL Station and  XXXXX were hostile to each other and working at cross purposes over a period of years before 9/11. The Team cannot measure the specific impact of this counterproductive behavior. At a minimum, however, the Team found that organizational tensions clearly complicated

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and delayed the preparation of Agency approaches XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX(thus negatively affecting the timely and effective functioning of the exchange with  XXXXXXX on terrorism issues.

(U) See the Team’s discussions of Systemic Findings 11 (HUMINT Operations Against Al-Qa’ida) and 15 (Reliance on Foreign Liaison), Factual Finding 5h (The Hijackers’ Associates in Germany), and Related Finding 20 (Issues Relating to Saudi Arabia) for additional information.

(U) Covert Action

(91 The Joint Inquiry charged that US policymakers had wanted Usama Bin Ladin killed as early as August 1998 and believed CIA personnel understood that. However, the government had not removed the ban on assassination and did not provide clear direction or authorization for CIA to kill Bin Ladin or make covert attacks against al-Qa’ida0

The JI said that the CIA was reluctant to Iseek authority to assassinate Bin Ladin and averse to taking advantage of ambiguities in the authorities it did receive that might have allowed it more flexibility. The JI argued that these factors shaped the type of covert action the CIA undertook against Bin Ladin and that, before September 11, covert action had little impact on al-Qa’ida or Bin Ladin.

The findings and conclusions of the Review Team correspond with most but not all of the JI conclusions. The Team believes that the restrictions in the authorities given the CIA with respect to Bin Ladin, while arguably, although ambiguously, relaxed for a period of time in late 1998 and early 1999, limited the range of permissible operations. Given the law, executive order, and past problems with covert action programs, CIA managers refused to take advantage of the ambiguities that did exist. The Team believes this position was reasonable and correct. Ultimately, the Team concludes the failure of the Agency’s covert action against Bin Ladin lay not in the language and interpretation of its authorities, but in the limitations of its covert action capabilities: CIA’s heavy reliance on a single

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group of assets, who were of questionable reliability and had limited capabilities, proved insufficient to mount a credible operation against Bin Ladin. Efforts to develop other options had limited potential prior to 9/11.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX The Joint Inquiry states that US military officials were reluctant to use military assets to conduct operations in Afghanistan or to support or participate in CIA operations against al-Qa’ida prior to 9/11. At least in part, this was a result of the IC’s inability to provide the necessary intelligence to support military operations. The findings of the Team match those of the JI as they relate to the CIA. The Agency was unable to satisfy the demands of the US military for the precise, actionable intelligence that the military leadership required in order to deploy US troops on the ground in Afghanistan or launch cruise missile attacks against UBL-related sites beyond the August 1998 retaliatory strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan. Differences between CIA and the Department of Defense over the cost of replacing lost Predators also hampered collaboration over the use of that platform in Afghanistan. The Team concludes, however, that other impediments, including the slow-moving policy process, reduced the importance of these CIA-military differences. The Team believes CIA handled its relationship with the US military responsibly and within the bounds of what was reasonable and possible.

XXXXXXXX The Joint Inquiry charges that the CIA failed to attack UBL’s finances and failed to work cooperatively with the Department of the Treasury to develop leads and establish links to other terrorist funding sources. The Team, likewise, found that CIA failed to attack Bin Ladin’s moneysuccessfully but finds that this was not for lack of effort.  XXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXX The Team also agrees that bureaucratic obstacles and legal restrictions inhibited CIA’s partnership with the Department of the Treasury.

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U) See the Team’s discussions of Systemic Findings 13 (Covert Action), 14 (Collaboration with the Military), and 16 (Strategy to Disrupt Terrorist Funding) for more information on these issues.

(U) Technology

XXXXXXXXXXThe Joint Inquiry charged that

technology had not been fully and effectively applied in support of US counterterrorism efforts. The Team found that significant differences existed between CIA and NSA over several critical issues. One of these involved a dispute over which agency had authorityXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXX

This dispute had not yet been resolved in September 2001. The second issue involved NSA’s unwillingness to share raw SIGINT transcripts with CIA; this made it more difficult for CTC to perform its mission against al-Qa’ida. In the late 1990s, however, NSA managers offered to allow a CTC officer to be detailed to NSA to cull the transcripts for useful information. CTC sent one officer to NSA for a brief period of time in 2000, but failed to send others, citing resource constraints. The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the Chiefs of CTC for their failure to detail officers to NSA on a consistent, full-time basis to exploit this material in the years before 9/11.

(U) See the Team’s discussions of Systemic Findings 4 (Application of Technology) and 7 (Computer Exploitation) for discussion of the technology issue.

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TOP-SECRET – BORDABERRY CONDEMNED FOR 1973 COUP

BORDABERRY CONDEMNED FOR 1973 COUP

BECOMES FIRST LATIN AMERICAN PRESIDENT SUCCESSFULLY PROSECUTED FOR ATTACKING THE CONSTITUTION

National Security Archive Posts Declassified Evidence Used in Trial
U.S. Documents Implicated Bordaberry in Repression
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 309

 

Washington, DC, September 1, 2011 – For the first time in Latin America, a judge has sent a former head of state to prison for the crime of an “Attack against the Constitution.” In an unprecedented ruling last month in Montevideo, former Uruguayan President Juan María Bordaberry was sentenced to serve 30 years for undermining Uruguay’s constitution through an auto-coup in June 1973, and for his responsibility in nine disappearances and two political assassinations committed by the security forces while he was president between 1972 and 1976.

Hebe Martínez Burlé (reproducida por gentileza de La República)
Walter de León

Declassified U.S. documents provided as evidence in the case by the National Security Archive show that Bordaberry justified his seizure of extra-constitutional powers on June 27, 1973 by telling the U.S. Ambassador that “Uruguay’s democratic traditions and institutions…were themselves the real threat to democracy.” Another U.S. document used in the trial shows that within days after the coup, the police were ordered to launch, in coordination with the military, “intelligence gathering and operations of a ‘special’ nature”—references to death squad actions that ensued.

“These declassified U.S. documents,” said Carlos Osorio, who heads the National Security Archive’s Southern Cone project, “helped the Court open the curtain of secrecy on human rights crimes committed during Bordaberry’s reign of power.”

The ruling by Judge Mariana Motta on February 9, 2010, was based on a case presented by two lawyers, Walter de León and Hebe Martínez Burlé. “No one thought we had a chance to convict Bordaberry,” Ms. Martínez Burlé said. “Even among human rights advocates, some said we were crazy.”

Oscar Destouet, head of the Human Rights Directorate in the Ministry of Education which supported the prosecution, noted that “[t]his is the first time that a head of state is brought to justice for a coup d’état.” Certainly, the case is unprecedented in the Uruguayan judicial system. “The sentence points to a new dawn in Uruguayan jurisprudence,” says Jorge Pan, head of the Institute for Legal Studies of Uruguay [IELSUR].

Bordaberry was elected to the presidency in 1971 amidst social turmoil and the Tupamaro insurgency, which was the most active guerrilla movement in Latin America at the time. In order to crush the militants and quell unrest, he engineered a self coup d’état in June 1973, dissolving Congress and suspending the constitution, and then launched a ruthless counterinsurgency drive during which thousands were imprisoned and tortured and hundreds killed or disappeared. The Uruguayan security forces also coordinated their repressive actions with other Southern Cone countries –in what is known as “Operation Condor”– by tracking down and killing Uruguayan citizens who had taken refuge in other nations, such as Senator Zelmar Michelini and legislator Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz who were assassinated in Buenos Aires.

The quest for justice for human rights violations committed under the military regime has been blocked by an amnesty ratified in a referendum by 54% of the voters in 1989. In October 2009, another plebiscite to rescind the amnesty fell short with only 48% of support. Nevertheless, in August 2003, the Supreme Court removed Bordaberry’s immunity from prosecution as a former president and ruled that he must stand trial for “Atentado a la Constitución.”

According to Osorio, “U.S. documentation is helping judges to overcome the hurdles of impunity in Uruguay.” In December 2006, Osorio presented his testimony with more than 70 declassified U.S. documents before an investigative magistrate in charge of this historical case.

This briefing book presents eight declassified U.S. documents introduced in the case which identified Bordaberry’s role in the military putsch, his disdain for democratic institutions, and the role of security forces in crimes under his regime. It also includes:

The sentence of Judge Mariana Motta
A summary containing highlights of the case written by lawyer Walter de León
A chronology around the putsch headed by Juan María Bordaberry
A chronology of the trial for “Attack against the Constitution”

 


Documents

July 1, 1973 – Possible Effects of Uruguayan Tortures Charges on the AID Public Safety Program

In a memo to the U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission in Uruguay Frank Ortiz, a representative from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) expresses his fear that the latest charges of torture against Uruguayan police, as well as the military coup led by President Bordaberry, could endanger U.S. Congressional support for USAID’s police assistance program to Uruguay. The memo discusses allegations of torture by police in the city of Paysandu in addition to numerous allegations in other places across the country that are being investigated by Uruguayan legislators. All of this has contributed to conflict between the Uruguayan Congress and the military and Bordaberry.

Ortiz reports that “[t]he very final act of the Senate in the early hours of June 27 was to vote 16 to 1, an investigation of the Paysandu torture charges. Immediately afterwards the Senate was closed and dissolved by President Bordaberry… to an outside observer… the motivations for closing Congress would be both anger at the failure to prosecute Senator Erro for his Tupamaro ties, and desire by the President and the Armed Forces to prevent Congressional investigation of the tortures in Paysandu and elsewhere.”

July 2, 1973 – The United States and Events in Uruguay

Deputy Chief of Mission Frank Ortiz sends an update to the Department of State regarding the situation in Montevideo after the coup. “A decisive stage has been reached in Uruguay… The executive acting with and at the b[ehest of the armed forces] has now taken steps such as the dissolution of the congress and of the powerful communist-dominated labor confederation (CNT)…” The cable suggests that “there is a disposition to accept the assurances of the president that the illegal measures taken were necessary and temporary and that there will be a return to the traditional democratic forms.”

At the same time, Ortiz reports that “the opposition groups, the leaders of which are in hiding, are in a state of shock over the suddenness and the sweeping nature of the Government’s moves.” According to Amnesty International and many other human rights organizations, between 1973 and 1976, Uruguay became the country with the highest number of jailed and of tortured dissidents in Latin America.

July 25, 1973 Public Safety Division: Police Report

The Chief USAID Public Safety Advisor in Montevideo presents a report of “activities since the recent changes in the Uruguayan Government took place.” The report states that “[a]s of July 10, orders were received at the office of the Chief of Police to reintegrate military operations… coordinated operations have been ordered as of noon on this date… As of 1300 hours July 10 the Montevideo police received new orders which called for increased coordination between the military and the police operations… indications are that this will mostly be intelligence gathering and operations of ‘special’ nature.” The “special” operations highlighted in the document itself meant death squad activities in the counterinsurgency jargon of the security forces in the 1960’s and 1970’s.

November 12, 1973 Uruguay Four Months After Closing Congress

U.S. Ambassador Ernest Siracusa sends a report to the Department of State four months after the coup stating that “[s]ince June 27 the Bordaberry government has closed the Congress, proscribed political activity, imposed censorship to stifle criticism, outlawed the dominant communist controlled labor confederation, temporarily suspended activities of the national university and has plans to outlaw the federation of university students and its affiliated groups. The government’s power base has shifted to the Armed Forces…”

Regarding Bordaberry’s relationship with the military, Siracusa observes that “his characteristics make him comfortable with the military, and the interminable debates as to whether Bordaberry or the military is behind any given move usually miss the key point — that Bordaberry and the military generally are now thinking along the same lines… We believe that Bordaberry initiated the move to close the Congress. In like manner, it was Bordaberry, not the military, who drafted a decree expected to be issued soon outlawing or dissolving the Communist Party (PCU). These steps and others, conceived in terms of patriotism, morality, or more practical considerations, have allied the president frequently with the so-called hard-liners such as first division commander General Esteban Cristi.”

December 26, 1973 – Conversation with President Bordaberry

U.S. Ambassador Siracusa reports on a meeting with Bordaberry where they cover political economic and bilateral affairs. In one section, after expressing his feelings that Uruguayans are happy about the stability reached by the regime following the putsch in June, Siracusa says “I had detected also a certain sadness that Uruguay’s cherished democratic institutions had been to some extent sacrificed or limited as a price.” Bordaberry responds to the Ambassador by explaining that “the situation had truly arrived at the border of chaos and that had drastic action not been taken the country would eventually have been faced with acceptance of chronic anarchy or a truly military takeover as alternative.” Siracusa ends by stating that Bordaberry said “everything they have done has really been an effort to end the stagnation of more than two decades and to save Uruguay’s democratic traditions and institutions rather than do violence to them. In a sense… these institutions, as they operated, were themselves the real threat to democracy in Uruguay.”

August 14, 1975 Deaths and Disappearances of Chilean Extremists: GOA Involvement

Amidst a flurry of suspicious deaths of Chilean guerrillas in Argentina, the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires reports to the Department of State that the U.S. “Legatt [Legal Attaché] advises that police and especially the military establishments of Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Chile are well inter-connected… Also, assassination operations are known to be carried out by these governments’ security agencies for one another, though never provable.” The reports by FBI liaison in Argentina, Legal Attaché Robert Scherrer, on the collaboration of the Southern Cone security agencies, will eventually disclose the existence of Operation Condor in 1976.

June 18, 1976 Further Information on Zelmar Michelini and Luis Héctor Gutiérrez

A few weeks after exiled Uruguayan legislators Zelmar Michelini and Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz are killed by unknown men in Buenos Aires, the U.S. Ambassador in Montevideo, Ernest Siracusa, reports that “according to [a secret source] Michelini was considered by Argentine authorities to be working with the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) in Argentina in orchestrating the propaganda campaign against Uruguay. The JCR is the coordinating [sic] up for the terrorist/subversive groups of Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Bolivia.”

August 3, 1976  – ARA Monthly Report (July) The ‘Third World War’ and South America

Since the beginning of the year, numerous leftist guerrillas and opposition leaders of bordering Southern Cone countries have been killed in Buenos Aires. Among those killed were two Uruguayan legislators, a former Bolivian President, numerous other Chileans, Uruguayans, Bolivians, Brazilians and Paraguayans.

In this finalized analysis for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Assistant Secretary of State Harry Shlaudeman states that “the military regimes of the southern cone… are joining forces to eradicate ‘subversion’, which increasingly translates into non-violent dissent from the left and the center left. The security forces of the Southern Cone: now coordinate intelligence activities closely; operate in the territory of one another in pursuit of subversives; have established Operation Condor to find and kill terrorists of the Revolutionary Coordinating Committee [JCR] in their own countries and in Europe… Security cooperation is a fact: There is extensive cooperation between the security/intelligence operations of six governments: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Their intelligence services hold formal meetings to plan ‘Operation Condor’…”

Shlaudeman concludes that “the problem begins with the definition of ‘subversion’… [it] has grown to include nearly anyone who opposes government policy… Uruguayan Foreign Minister Blanco… was the first to describe the campaign against terrorists as a ‘Third World War’. The description is interesting for two reasons: it justifies harsh and sweeping ‘wartime’ measures; it emphasizes the international and institutional aspect, thereby justifying the exercise of power beyond national borders.” 


TOP-SECRET: KISSINGER BLOCKED DEMARCHE ON INTERNATIONAL ASSASSINATIONS TO CONDOR STATES

Washington, DC, September 1, 2011 – Only five days before a car bomb planted by agents of the Pinochet regime rocked downtown Washington D.C. on September 21, 1976, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger rescinded instructions sent to, but never implemented by, U.S. ambassadors in the Southern Cone to warn military leaders there against orchestrating “a series of international murders,” declassified documents obtained and posted by the National Security Archive revealed today.

The Secretary “has instructed that no further action be taken on this matter,” stated a September 16, 1976, cable sent from Lusaka (where Kissinger was traveling) to his assistant secretary of state for Inter-American affairs, Harry Shlaudeman. The instructions effectively ended efforts by senior State Department officials to deliver a diplomatic demarche, approved by Kissinger only three weeks earlier, to express “our deep concern” over “plans for the assassination of subversives, politicians, and prominent figures both within the national borders of certain Southern Cone countries and abroad.” Aimed at the heads of state of Chile, Argentina and Uruguay, the demarche was never delivered.

“The September 16th cable is the missing piece of the historical puzzle on Kissinger’s role in the action, and inaction, of the U.S. government after learning of Condor assassination plots,” according to Peter Kornbluh, the Archive’s senior analyst on Chile and author of the book, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. “We know now what happened: The State Department initiated a timely effort to thwart a ‘Murder Inc’ in the Southern Cone, and Kissinger, without explanation, aborted it,” Kornbluh said. “The Kissinger cancellation on warning the Condor nations prevented the delivery of a diplomatic protest that conceivably could have deterred an act of terrorism in Washington D.C.”

Kissinger’s September 16 instructions responded to an August 30, 1976 secret memorandum from Shlaudeman, titled “Operation Condor,” that advised him: “what we are trying to head off is a series of international murders that could do serious damage to the international status and reputation of the countries involved.” After receiving Kissinger’s orders, on September 20, Shlaudeman directed his deputy, William Luers, to “instruct the [U.S.] ambassadors to take no further action noting that there have been no reports in some weeks indicating an intention to activate the Condor scheme.”

The next day, a massive car bomb claimed the life of former Chilean foreign minister Orlando Letelier and his 26-year old American colleague, Ronni Karpen Moffitt, as they drove down Massachusetts Avenue in Washington, D.C. The bombing remains the most infamous attack of “Condor”—a collaboration between the secret police services in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil and several other Latin American military dictatorships, to track down and kill opponents of their regimes. Until 9/11, the Letelier-Moffitt assassination was known as the most significant act of international terrorism ever committed in the capital city of the United States.

In the August 30th memorandum Shlaudeman informed Kissinger that the U.S. ambassador to Montevideo, Ernest Siracusa, had resisted delivering the demarche against Condor assassinations to the Uruguayan generals for fear that his life would be endangered, and wanted further instructions. Shlaudeman recommended that Kissinger authorize a telegram to Siracusa “to talk to both [Foreign Minister Juan Carlos] Blanco and [military commander-in-chief] General [Julio César] Vadora” and a “parallel approach” in which Shlaudeman would meet with the Uruguayan ambassador in Washington. He also offered an alternative of having a CIA official meet with his counterpart in Montevideo. (This memo was obtained under the FOIA by Kornbluh.)

Several days earlier, the U.S. Ambassador to Chile, David Popper, had also protested the order to present the demarche to General Augusto Pinochet. “[G]iven Pinochet’s sensitivities,” Popper cabled, “he might well take as an insult any inference that he was connected with such assassination plots.”  Like Siracusa, Popper requested further instructions.

Kissinger did not respond to the Shlaudeman memo for more than two weeks. In his September 16th cable, Kissinger “declined to approve message to Montevideo” and effectively reversed instructions to the U.S. ambassadors in Chile and Argentina to deliver the demarche to General Augusto Pinochet and General Jorge Videla.

The cable was discovered by Archive Southern Cone analyst Carlos Osorio among tens of thousands of routinely declassified State Department cables from 1976.

“We now know that it was Kissinger himself who was responsible,” stated John Dinges, author of The Condor Years, and a National Security Archive associate fellow. “He cancelled his own order; and Chile went ahead with the assassination in Washington.”

Only after the Letelier-Moffitt assassination did a member of the CIA station in Santiago meet with the head of the Chilean secret police, Col. Manuel Contreras, to discuss the demarche. The meeting took place the first week of October. In a secret memorandum from Shlaudeman to Kissinger—also obtained by Kornbluh under the FOIA—he reported that passing U.S. concerns to Contreras “seems to me sufficient action for the time being. The Chileans are the prime movers in Operation Condor.”

The memorandum makes no mention of the CIA pressing Contreras on the issue of the Letelier-Moffitt assassination. Several years later, the FBI identified him as responsible for that atrocity, and the U.S. demanded his extradition, which the Pinochet regime refused. In November 1993, after Pinochet left power, a Chilean court found Contreras guilty for the Condor murders and sentenced him to seven years in a specially-constructed prison.

Henry Kissinger’s role in rescinding the Condor demarche was at the center of a contentious controversy at the prestigious journal, Foreign Affairs (FA), in 2004. In a FA review of Kornbluh’s book, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow Kenneth Maxwell referred to the undelivered demarche, and Shlaudeman’s September 20th instructions to the ambassadors to “take no further action.” In a response, the late William D. Rogers, Kissinger’s close associate, lawyer, and a former assistant secretary of State, stated—incorrectly it is now clear—that “Kissinger had nothing to do with the cable.” When Maxwell responded to the Rogers letter, he reiterated that the demarche was never made in Chile, and that the Letelier-Moffitt assassination “was a tragedy that might have been prevented” if it had.

In response, Kissinger enlisted two wealthy members of the Council to pressure the editor of FA, James Hoge, to allow Rogers to have the last word. In a second letter-to-the-editor, Rogers accused Maxwell of “bias,” and of challenging Shlaudeman’s integrity by suggesting that he had countermanded “a direct, personal instruction from Kissinger” to issue the demarche, “and to do it behind his back” while Kissinger was on a diplomatic mission in Africa. When Hoge refused to publish Maxwell’s response, Maxwell resigned from his positions at FA and the Council.

In the letter that his own employer refused to publish, Maxwell wrote that, to the contrary, “it is hard to believe that Shlaudeman would have sent a cable rescinding the [demarche] without the approval of the Secretary of State who had authorized [it] in the first place.” He called on Kissinger to step forward and clarify the progression of policy decisions leading up to the Letelier-Moffitt assassination, and for the full record to be declassified.

The declassification of Kissinger’s September 16th cable demonstrates that Maxwell was correct. It was Kissinger who ordered an end to diplomatic attempts to deliver the demarche and call a halt to Condor murder operations.


Documents

Document 1 – Department of State, Cable, “Operation Condor”, drafted August 18, 1976 and sent August 23, 1976

This action cable signed by Secretary of State Kissinger reflects a decision by the Latin American bureau in the State Department to try to stop the Condor plans known to be underway, especially those outside of Latin America. Kissinger instructs the ambassadors of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay to meet as soon as possible with the chief of state or the highest appropriate official of their respective countries and to convey a direct message, known in diplomatic language as a “demarche.” The ambassadors are instructed to tell the officials the U.S. government has received information that Operation Condor goes beyond information exchange and may “include plans for the assassination of subversives, politicians and prominent figures both within the national borders of certain Southern Cone countries and abroad.” Further, the ambassadors are to express the U.S. government’s “deep concern,” about the reports and to warn that, if true, they would “create a most serious moral and political problem.”

Document 2 – Department of State, Action Memorandum, Ambassador Harry Schlaudeman to Secretary Kissinger, “Operation Condor,” August 30, 1976

In his memo to Kissinger dated August 30, 1976, Schlaudeman spelled out the U.S. position on Condor assassination plots: “What we are trying to head off is a series of international murders that could do serious damage to the international status and reputation of the countries involved.” Shlaudeman’s memo requests approval from Kissinger to direct U.S. ambassador to Uruguay, Ernest Siracusa, to proceed to meet with high officials in Montevideo and present the Condor demarche.

Document 3 – Department of State, Cable, “Actions Taken,” September 16, 1976

In this cable, sent from Lusaka where Kissinger is traveling, the Secretary of State refuses to authorize sending a telegram to U.S. Ambassador to Uruguay, Ernest Siracusa, instructing him to proceed with the Condor demarche. Kissinger than broadens his instructions to cover the delivery of the demarche in Chile, Argentina and Uruguay: “The Secretary has instructed that no further action be taken on this matter.”  These instructions effectively end the State Department initiative to warn the Condor military regimes not to proceed with international assassination operations, since the demarche has not been delivered in Chile or Argentina.

Document 4 – Department of State, Cable, “Operation Condor,” Septmber 20, 1976

Kissinger’s Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs received his instructions on turning off the Condor demarche on September 16th. Three days later, while in Costa Rica, Shlaudeman receives another cable, which remains secret, from his deputy, William Luers, regarding how to proceed on the demarche. At this point, on September 20, Shlaudeman directs Luers, to “instruct the [U.S.] ambassadors to take no further action noting that there have been no reports in some weeks indicating an intention to activate the Condor scheme.”

Condor’s most infamous “scheme” comes to fruition the very next day when a car-bomb planted by agents of the Chilean secret police takes the life of former Chilean diplomat, and leading Pinochet opponent, Orlando Letelier, and his 26-year old American colleague, Ronni Karpen Moffitt, in downtown Washington D.C.

Document 5 – Briefing Memorandum, Ambassador Harry Schlaudeman to Secretary Kissinger, “Operation Condor,” October 8, 1976

In his October 8 memo to Kissinger transmitting a CIA memorandum of conversation with Col. Contreras, Schlaudeman argued that “the approach to Contreras seems to me to be sufficient action for the time being” because “the Chileans are the prime movers in Operation Condor.”


STASI-WARNUNG – VORBESTRAFTE RUFMÖRDER, SERIENBETRÜGER UND MUTMASSLICHE MÖRDER DER GoMoPa

Liebe Leser,

mit weiteren Lügen, Fälschungen und Rufmorden im Internet sollen wir dazu gebracht werden unsere Aufklärungsarbeit in Sachen STASI und “GoMoPa” und deren mutmassliche Auftraggeber/Partner  Gerd Bennewirtz und Peter Ehlers einzustellen und zu löschen.

DAS WIRD NICHT PASSIEREN !

Herzlichst Ihr

Bernd Pulch, Magister Artium

SZ: John le Carré: “Marionetten” Ihre eigenen Geschöpfe

Terror-Paranoia und eine Politik, die mit der Angst spielt: John le Carré beweist in seinem neuen Roman, dass kaum einer so viel über Deutschland weiß, wie er.

Während des Kalten Kriegs war Deutschland geteilt und nicht im Besitz seiner vollen Souveränitätsrechte. Das Land war einerseits machtlos, andererseits lag es in der Mitte der Weltpolitik, gewissermaßen im Auge des Orkans. Diese eigentümliche Mixtur aus Provinz und Weltbühne, aus Abseitigkeit und Zentralität hat kein Schriftsteller so prägnant erfasst wie der englische Thriller-Autor John le Carré. Der Titel eines seiner frühen Romane bringt es mit schlafwandlerischer Treffsicherheit auf den Begriff: “Eine kleine Stadt in Deutschland”. Wie viel altfränkische Verschlafenheit klingt da mit – und doch ist dieses Deutschland Hauptschauplatz des Kalten Kriegs, auch wenn andere dabei die Fäden in der Hand halten.

Bild vergrößern Arbeitete vor seiner Schriftstellerkarriere für den britischen Geheimdienst: John le Carré. (© Foto: dpa)

//

Damals, in den sechziger Jahren, waren die Zeiten der Großmachtsphantasien schon lange vorbei. Die Bundesrepublik war ein politischer Zwerg, der daran arbeitete, unter dem Sicherheitsschirm der USA zum wirtschaftlichen Riesen zu werden. Und doch war es dieses beschauliche Ländchen, das ganz kleine Brötchen buk, in dem die beiden Supermächte das Weiße im Auge ihres Feindes sehen konnten.

Vielleicht hat es ja sogar eine tiefere Bedeutung, wenn George Smiley, John le Carrés unvergesslicher Secret-Service-Mann, während seines Studiums der Literaturwissenschaft sich besonders passioniert der deutschen Literatur des Barock widmet – mithin jener Epoche, in der Deutschland in Folge des Dreißigjährigen Krieges in die Kleinstaaterei zerfiel.

//

Der Fremde

Dass der Fremde das Eigene schärfer zu erfassen vermag, als man selbst, ist ein Gemeinplatz – aber man muss ihn im Falle John le Carrés erneut bemühen: Er hat das Deutschland des Kalten Krieges erzählerisch ins Bild gesetzt. Er hat in seinem berühmtesten Roman, “Der Spion, der aus der Kälte kam”, die Glienicker Brücke zwischen Berlin und Potsdam zum geographischen Sinnbild der Block-Konfrontation werden lassen, wo die Geheimdienste aus West und Ost sich zum Agenten-Austausch trafen – noch heute ein Ort, an dem einen das Glück der Wiedervereinigung geradezu körperlich anspringt.

Für das Pathos wie für die Beschaulichkeit der politischen Situation der beiden Deutschlands hatte John le Carré ein Gespür wie kein zweiter. Als Mitarbeiter sowohl des British Foreign Office wie des britischen Geheimdienstes lebte le Carré, der nahezu akzentfrei Deutsch spricht, Anfang der sechziger Jahre in Bonn und in Hamburg.

In diesen Tagen hat “Arte” einen Film über den großen Spionage-Autor gezeigt. Da sah man John le Carré, mit seinen 77 Jahren noch immer ein blendend aussehender Gentleman, im Garten seines hinreißend zum Meer hin exponierten Hauses in Cornwall. Zu seiner Linken, die Steilküste hinunter, erstreckte sich eine große Bucht, an deren anderer Seite ein Städtchen zu sehen war: “Wie sagte Theodor Storm über Husum? ,Die graue Stadt am Meer’. Das dort ist meine graue Stadt am Meer.”

“Marionetten” heißt sein 21. Roman, und er spielt in Hamburg. Auf Englisch heißt das Buch “A Most Wanted man”. Aber der deutsche Titel ist gar nicht schlecht. Im Grunde greift er ein altes Motiv auf. Zwar ist Deutschland mittlerweile ein souveränes Land. Wenn es aber um den Krieg gegen den Terror geht, wird es zum Vasallen Amerikas, und seinen Geheimdiensten bleibt auf ihrem eigenen Territorium nichts anderes übrig, als die transatlantischen Kollegen walten und schalten zu lassen.

Keine der “Marionetten”-Figuren vermag souverän zu handeln, immer ziehen andere an den Strippen. Im Kleist’schen Sinne anmutig sind diese Marionetten nicht. Vielmehr werden sie ohne Rücksicht auf Verluste durch die Machtkämpfe der Weltpolitik geschleift, an ihren Fäden, mit polternden Körpern.

Issa, ein junger Moslem, gelangt illegal nach Deutschland. Annabel Richter, Tochter aus bester deutscher Juristen-Familie, arbeitet für die Organisation Fluchthafen, die politischen Flüchtlingen dabei hilft, ihren Aufenthalt in Deutschland zu legalisieren. Mit Issa hat sie einen schwierigen Fall. Er gibt sich als Tschetschene aus, spricht aber nur russisch. Seine Frömmigkeit stellt er umständlich zur Schau, aber manchmal wirkt sie gerade deshalb wie zwielichtiges Kasperltheater. Er hat geradezu heiligenmäßige Züge kindlicher Unschuld. Dann wieder wirkt er mit seiner gestelzten Ausdrucksweise wie von allen guten Geistern verlassen. Sein Körper jedenfalls weist Spuren von Folter auf.

Die Geschichte, die Issa seiner Anwältin Annabel auftischt, ist haarsträubend: Sein Vater sei ein russischer Oberst der Roten Armee gewesen, der wie nur je ein grausiger Warlord in Tschetschenien gewütet habe. Er habe seine tschetschenische Mutter vergewaltigt, sich dabei aber in sie und damit auch in seinen Bastard-Sohn verliebt. Seine Mutter sei wegen der Schande von ihrer eigenen Familie getötet worden, während sein Vater ihn auf einem russischen Internat habe großziehen lassen.

Nervös

Issa hasst seinen Vater und verehrt seine tote Mutter. Seine Loyalität gehört dem geschundenen tschetschenischen Volk. Der russische Geheimdienst hält ihn für einen gefährlichen Islamisten und hatte ihn hinter Gitter gebracht. Aber Issa gelang die Flucht. Und jetzt steht er nicht mit leeren Händen da. Von seinem Vater soll er ein gewaltiges Vermögen geerbt haben. Es ist schmutziges Geld, das weiß Issa, er möchte es deshalb islamischen Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen vermachen. Aber Hamburg ist auch die Stadt von Mohammed Atta, einem der 9/11-Attentäter. Da hatte der Verfassungsschutz des Stadtstaats auf ganzer Linie versagt. Entsprechend nervös sind jetzt alle. Der Erfolgsdruck bei den Geheimdiensten ist hoch. Die Briten, die Amerikaner sind anwesend und pfuschen den deutschen Diensten ins Spiel.

“Marionetten” erzählt davon, wie eine Politik, die mit der Angst spielt, ihre rechtsstaatliche Balance verliert. John le Carré hat während der Recherchen Murat Kurnaz interviewt, der nach Guantanamo verschleppt wurde. Die Terror-Paranoia schafft sich unter Umständen ihre eigenen Geschöpfe. Wenn die Agenten in “Marionetten” die Lage beschreiben, dann reden sie von den “verschlungenen Pfaden des Dschihadismus”. Dieser Roman führt meisterhaft vor, wie sich um ein Schlagwort eine ganze Sicherheits-Bürokratie bildet, ja, sich aus dem Begriff heraus eine eigene Handlungslogik entfaltet. In dieser Logik hat ein gläubiger Tschetschene, der uns wie Murat Kurnaz fremd und deshalb fanatisch vorkommt, keine Chance auf eine faire Beweisaufnahme. Im Zweifel für den Angeklagten – dieser Rechtsgrundsatz ist im Bann der Terrorangst aufgehoben.

Aber die Wege des Dschihadismus sind ja tatsächlich verschlungen; und le Carré ist niemand, der die Gefahr des Terrorismus unterschätzt. Was es mit Issa wirklich auf sich hat, das weiß auch sein Erfinder nicht. Klar ist nur, dass die Logik der Geheimdienste keine Rücksicht auf Verluste nimmt. Man klappt dies Buch stöhnend zu und möchte eine Welt, unsere Welt weit von sich weisen, in der es keine Möglichkeit gibt, sauber durchzukommen.

JOHN LE CARRÉ: Marionetten. Aus dem Englischen von Sabine Roth und Regina Rawlinson. Ullstein Verlag, Berlin 2008. 368 S., 22,90 Euro.


TOP-SECRET: TRIALS/EXECUTIONS OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS

R 090540Z MAR 72
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7682
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMCOMSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
UNCLASSIFIED SECTION 01 OF 01 TEHRAN 1381 

E.O. 12958: AS AMENDED; DECLASSIFIED JUNE 21, 2006
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR
SUBJECT: TRIALS/EXECUTIONS OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS: STUDENTS DEMONSTRATE AND SHAH LASHES OUT AT FOREIGN CRITICS 

1. IN PROTEST AGAINST RECENT TRIALS/PUNISHMENT (PARTICULARLY EXECUTIONS, WHICH NOW TOTAL 10) OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT-ELEMENTS, TEHRAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS -- LEAD BY FACULTY OF ENGINEERING STUDENTS-- MOUNTED ON-CAMPUS DEMONSTRATION AFTERNOON OF MARCH 7 AND EVEN LARGE ONE (CIRC 600) MORNING OF MARCH 8. WHILE UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION FELT CAPABLE OF HANDLING MARCH 7 DEMONSTRATION WITHOUT HELP OF OUTSIDE POLICE, THEY APPARENTLY FELT UNABLE DO SO MARCH 8 AND CALLED NATIONAL POLICE ONTO CAMPUS FOR BRIEF PERIOD. RESULT WAS MUCH MANHANDLING OF STUDENTS BUT THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF ANY SERIOUS CASUALTIES/CLASHES, AND UNIVERSITY WAS QUIET BY EARLY AFTERNOON. 

2. SOME FACULTIES AT OTHER TEHRAN UNIVERSITIES (E.G. ARYAMEHR, NATIONAL AND POLYTECHNIC) ARE REPORTED TO HAVE ENGAGED IN SYMPATHY STRIKES" MARCH 8 BUT SO FAR NO DEMONSTRATIONS REPORTED* THERE IS RELIABLE REPORT THAT DEMONSTRATIONS BY STUDENTS AT UNIVERSITY OF MESHED (SIX OF 10 EXECUTED CAME FROM MESHED AREA) BECAME SERIOUS ENOUGH THAT UNIVERSITY WAS CLOSED THREE DAYS AGO AND STILL REMAINS CLOSED. (COMMENT: WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF GOI ORDERS TEHRAN UNIVERSITIES CLOSED UNTIL AFTER NO RUZ HOLIDAY.) 

3. FROM COMMENTS OF STUDENTS AND OBSERVERS CLOSE TO ACADEMIC CIRCLES, IT SEEMS CLEAR LARGE PART OF MOTIVATION FOR DEMONSTRATION AND SYMPATHY STRIKES  IS STUDENT ANGER OVER GOI'S CONTINUED DETENTION OF SEVERAL STUDENTS AS "ANTI-STATE" SUBVERSIVES AND, EVEN MORE, ANGER OVER RECENT TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS OF THOSE CONVICTED OF ANTI-STATE ACTIVITIES. THERE ARE ALREADY INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, THAT GOI CONSIDERS TIMING OF DEMONSTRATIONS (PERHAPS DEMONSTRATIONS THEMSELVES) PROMOTED BY ANTI-STATE ELEMENTS TO EMBARRASS GOI DURING VISIT OF CHANCELLOR BRANDT AND HIS CONSIDERABLE PRESS RETINUE. 

4. IN RELATED DEVELOPMENT, WHICH MIGHT WELL HAVE BEEN INTENDED FOR EARS OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS AND THEIR SYMPATHIZERS SHAH LASHED OUT STRONGLY IN MARCH 7 PRESS CONFERENCE (WITH GERMAN PRESSMEN) AT WHAT HE LABELLED DISTORTED FOREIGN REPORTING ABOUT TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS. HIM HIT AT LE MONDE VIGOROUSLY AND REPEATEDLY, AND TOOK PARTICULAR EXCEPTION TO LE MONDE'S APPEAL FOR CLEMENCY FOR THOSE CONVICTED IN RECENT TRIALS. AFTER ASKING TWO RHETORICAL QUESTIONS "HAS LE MONDE EVER ASKED WHETHER THESE MURDERERS HAVE RIGHT TO TAKE LIVES OF INNOCENT PEOPLE? HAS LE MONDE EVER WRITTEN ONE WORD OF CONDEMNATION AGAINST TERRORISTS AND ASSASSINS SENT BY IRA TO EXTERMINATE PEOPLE?"), SHAH SAID FOREIGN PRESS HAS NO RIGHT GIVE ADVICE ON MATTERS THEY KNOW NOTHING ABOUT. HE RECALLED HIS "CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY" NOT TO PERMIT "TERROR OR ATTEMPTS AGAINST MY COUNTRY'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY BY AGENTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES." 

EXEMPT 

HECK

TOP-SECRET: CONTINUING TERRORIST VIOLENCE

UNCLASSIFIED TEHRAN 5055 

E.O. 12958: AS AMENDED; DECLASSIFIED JUNE 21, 2006
TAGS: IR PTER
SUBJECT: CONTINUING TERRORIST VIOLENCE 

REF: TEHRAN 4887 

SUMMARY: FOLLOWING ASSASSINATION OF GENERAL SAID TAHERI, BOMBING AND OTHER TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAVE CONTINUED TO INCREASE. SAVAK MAINTAINING ITS POLICY OF WIDESPREAD PREVENTIVE ARRESTS AND, WHILE THIS RUNS RISK OF HEIGHTENING RESENTMENT AMONG POPULACE, OFFICIALS SEEM CONFIDENT THAT GUERRILLAS ARE ON THE RUN. WE ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE OFFICIAL OPTIMISM AND FEEL THAT SANGUINE PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND THE GUERRILLA REACTION THEY USUALLY PROVOKE MAY FURTHER ERODE CREDIBILITY OF SECURITY ORGANS IN MIND OF PUBLIC.
END SUMMARY 

1. IN WAKE OF SMOOTHLY HANDLED ASSASSINATION AUGUST 13 OF HEAD OF PRISONS BRIGADIER GENERAL SAID TAHERI (REFTEL) WHO WAS ALSO CHIEF OF AN ANTI-GUERRILLA SUBCOMMITTEE WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, FREQUENCY OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAS INCREASED. RECENT CONFIRMED INCIDENTS HAVE INCLUDED A BOMB IN A TEHRAN DEPARTMENT STORE WHICH INJURED THE TERRORIST PLANTING IT, BOMB IN TEHRAN NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY BUILDING WHICH KILLED WATCHMAN, APPREHENSION OF A TERRORIST IN SOUTH TEHRAN WHICH RESULTED IN ONE KILLED AND FIVE WOUNDED, AND SHOOTING TO DEATH OF THREE POLICEMEN IN A SMALL BAZAAR IN SOUTH TEHRAN. NUMEROUS OTHER BOMBINGS AND SHOOTINGS RUMORED BUT NOT VERIFIED BY EMBASSY OR CONFIRMED BY GOI. 

2. SAVAK AND OTHER SECURITY ORGANS ARE PROCEEDING WITH A WIDESPREAD AND, WE HEAR, NOT VERY WELL TARGETED ROUND-UP OF SUSPECTS, AIDED BY LISTS OF NAMES AND OTHER DOCUMENTS FOUND IN DWELLING OF A RECENTLY SLAIN TERRORIST LEADER. POLICE NETS, WHICH ARE REPORTEDLY HAULING IN THE INNOCENT WITH THE GUILTY, HAVE EXTENDED AS FAR AFIELD AS ISFAHAN WHERE A NUMBER OF SUSPECTS WERE ARRESTED TWO WEEKS AGO. 

3. DESPITE INCREASING LEVEL OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY, POLICE OFFICIALS REMAIN OPTIMISTIC. CHIEF OF NATIONAL POLICE LTG JAFFARQOLI SADRI ASSURED EMBOFF AUG. 17 THAT CURRENT FLURRY OF INCIDENTS CONSTITUTES DYING GASP OF GUERRILLAS WHO, HE CLAIMS, HAVE BEEN REDUCED BY TWO THIRDS IN PAST YEAR AND ARE FORCED TO ACT NOW TO SHOW THEY STILL EXIST. IN A MEDIA INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN LOCAL PRESS AUG. 19, SADRI UPPED FIGURE FOR REDUCTION OF GUERRILLA FORCES TO THREE FOURTHS, PREDICTED THAT REMAINING TERRORISTS WOULD SOON BE WIPED OUT AND REITERATED STANDARD GOVERNMENT LINE THAT GUERRILLAS ARE CONFUSED MISGUIDED INDIVIDUALS OF MARXIST-LENINIST BENT BUT WITHOUT GOALS OR PROGRAM. IN DISCUSSION WITH EMBOFF SADRI ATTACHED NO PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO MURDER OF GENERAL TAHERI, ASSERTING THAT TERRORISTS WOULD HAVE BEEN SATISIFED WITH ANY HIGH-RANKING OFFICER AND CHOSE TAWERI ONLY BECUASE OF IOSLATED LOCATION OF HIS HOUSE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR LONG WALKS ALONE. SADRI ALSO DISCOUNTED POSSIBILITY THAT ASSASSINS WERE OF HIGHER CALIBER THAN RUN-OF-THE-MILL GUERRILLAS, POINTING OUT THAT SHOTS WHICH KILLED TAHERI HAD BEEN FIRED FROM 50 CENTIMETERS AND THAT "A CHILD COULD HIT A MAN FROM THAT DISTANCE." 

COMMENT: WE CONSIDER IT MORE LIKELY THAT TAHERI WAS PERSONALLY TARGETED DUE TO HIS DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES. MOREOVER, SKILLFUL MANNER IN WHICH ASSASSINATION CARRIED OUT, REQUIRING CAREFUL PLANNING AND RECONNAISSANCE AS WELL AS DEFT EXECUTION, APPEARS TO INDICATE THAT THOSE INVOLVED WERE MUCH BETTER TRAINED THAN AVERAGE TERRORISTS, SOME OF WHOM HAVE BEEN BLOWN UP BY THEIR OWN BOMBS. 

IT IS POSSIBLE THAT NUMBER OF GUERRILLA INCIDENTS WILL BEGIN TO TAPER OFF, BUT WE DO NOT SHARE SADRI'S CONFIDENCE THAT HIS TACTICS AND THOSE OF SAVAK CAN COMPLETELY HALT TERRORIST ACTIVITY. IN FACT OVER REACTION AND TOO ZEALOUS A REPRESSION BY SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS SEEM AT LEAST AS LIKELY TO RECRUIT NEW GUERRILLAS AS TO STAMP OUT OLD ONES. IN ADDITION WISDOM SEEMS QUESTIONABLE OF SECURITY OFFICIALS MAKING PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS ABOUT BREAKUP OF GUERRILLA GROUPS AND PREDICTIONS OF THEIR DEMISE. WE RECALL THAT THE LAST SUCH ANNOUNCEMENT LAST JANUARY WAS FOLLOWED BY SERIES OF EXPLOSIONS ON US-PROPERTIES AND OTHER SITES IN TEHRAN. IN OUR VIEW SUCH PUBLIC DECLARATIONS RUN RISK OF INCREASING CREDIBILITY GAP AND RESENTMENT ON PART OF PUBLIC WHO LIKELY BE INCREASINGLY APPREHENSIVE OF INDISCRIMINATE ARRESTS THAT DO NOT SEEM TO BE STAMPING OUT TERRORISTS. 

THE PROGNOSTICATION THEREFORE IS FOR A CONTINUATION OF THE TERRORISM BUT, DESPITE SUCCESSFUL MURDER OF TAHERI, WE DO NOT CONCLUDE THAT GUERRILLAS WILL NOW PLACE GREATER RELIANCE ON ASSASSINATION AS A TOOL. REASON IS THAT TERRORISTS STILL LACK ENOUGH TRAINED PERSONNEL TO PULL OFF ASSASSINATIONS ON REGULAR BASIS. 

FARLAND

TOP-SECRET: The United States vs. Rito Alejo del Río

Former Colombian Army Gen. Rito Alejo del Río Rojas (ret.)

The United States vs. Rito Alejo del Río

Ambassador Cited Accused Colombian General’s Reliance on Death Squads

“Systematic” Support of Paramilitaries “Pivotal to his Military Success”

Infamous General a “Not-So-Success” Story of U.S. Military Training

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 327

Former U.S. ambassador to Colombia Curtis Kamman called Del Río’s reliance on paramilitaries “pivotal.”

Washington, D.C., September 29, 2010 – The U.S. ambassador to Colombia reported in 1998 that the “systematic arming and equipping of aggressive regional paramilitaries” was “pivotal” to the military success of Gen. Rito Alejo del Río Rojas, now on trial for murder and collaboration with paramilitary death squads while commander of a key army unit in northern Colombia.

The Secret “Biographic Note” from Ambassador Curtis Kamman is one of several documents published today by the National Security Archive pertaining to Del Río, whose trial resumes this month after years of impunity and delay. The documents are also the subject of an article published today in Spanish at VerdadAbierta.com, the leading online gateway for information on paramilitarism in Colombia. The article was also published in English today on the Web site of the National Security Archive.

“The collection is a unique and potentially valuable source of evidence in the case against Del Río, reflecting years of reports linking the senior army commander to paramilitarism,” said Michael Evans, director of the Archive’s Colombia Documentation Project. “As Del Río’s trial resumes, the court should examine the contemporaneous accounts of U.S. officials who were required by law to monitor and certify Colombia’s human rights performance.”

Other revelations include:

  • The U.S. embassy takes a favorable view of Col. Carlos Alfonso Velásquez, who called for an investigation of Del Río’s ties to paramilitary groups, noting that his statements “add credibility to our human rights report.”
  • A report on a conversation with Col. Velásquez, who told U.S. military officials that cooperation with paramilitaries “had gotten much worse under Del Río.”
  • Documents reporting conspicuous increases in anti-paramilitary operations after Del Río’s transfer out of northern Colombia. The embassy said it was “more than coincidental that the recent anti-paramilitary actions have all taken place since the departure from northern Colombia of military personnel believed to favor paramilitaries.”
  • The embassy notes a disturbing instance of possible military-paramilitary complicity in a paramilitary attack outside Bogotá just weeks after Del Río took command of the nearby military brigade.
  • The shifting U.S. opinion about Del Río is clearly evident in two U.S. military reports from early 1998. In the first, Del Río, who attended the U.S. Army School of the Americas, is lauded as a U.S. military training “success story.” But a second, corrected, report from March 1998 lists Del Río instead as a “not-so-success” story, citing his alleged paramilitary ties.

The United States vs. Rito Alejo del Río
By Michael Evans

Curtis Kamman will not be called to testify in the trial of Rito Alejo del Río, the former Colombian Army general on trial for murder and collaboration with paramilitary death squads, but we do have some idea what the former U.S. ambassador to Colombia might have said, thanks to declassified documents published today on the Web site of the National Security Archive.

In a Secret “Biographic Note” attached to an August 1998 cable to Washington, Kamman asserted that the former 17th Brigade commander’s “systematic arming and equipping of aggressive regional paramilitaries was pivotal to his military success” in northern Colombia.

Obtained through the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, these documents are a unique and potentially valuable source of evidence in the case against Del Río, reflecting years of reports linking the senior army commander to paramilitarism. As Del Río’s trial resumes, the court would do well to examine the contemporaneous accounts of U.S. officials who were required by law to monitor and certify Colombia’s human rights performance.

Once lauded as a staunch anti-guerrilla fighter, Del Río first came under scrutiny in 1996 after his deputy at the Urabá-based 17th Brigade, Col. Carlos Alfonso Velásquez, wrote an internal report (published last week by VerdadAbierta) calling on the Army to investigate the unit’s paramilitary ties and accusing Del Río of turning a blind eye to paramilitary activity. Rather than heed his warning, the Army fired Velásquez, forcing him into early retirement for insubordination. Velásquez offered similar testimony last week as a key witness in the case.

Interviewed by the embassy in December 1997, Velásquez directly implicated his former commander, lamenting the “body count syndrome” that “fueled human rights abuses” and stressing that 17th Brigade collaboration with paramilitaries “had gotten much worse under Del Río.” Another embassy report on the Velásquez episode testifies to the colonel’s integrity, noting that Velásquez was an “admired and much-decorated” military officer who had helped bring down the Cali drug mafia and had once gone public about an extramarital affair rather than submit to a cartel blackmail attempt.

His statements “bring extra pressure to bear on the Colombian military,” noted U.S. Ambassador Myles Frechette, who was then involved in tense negotiations with the army over its rights record. “They will add credibility to our human rights report.”

By then the embassy had begun to notice that paramilitary activity tended to flourish in areas where Del Río commanded troops and that anti-paramilitary operations seemed to increase in those same zones after he left. In January 1998, the embassy noted that an unprecedented string of 17th Brigade actions against paramilitaries “took place only about a week after the departure of the Brigade’s commander, Brig. Gen. Rito Alejo del Río, who was long-alleged to be not unfriendly toward paramilitaries.” A February report called it “more than coincidental” that a recent series of military blows against paramilitaries had “all taken place since the departure from northern Colombia of former First Brigade commander MG Iván Ramírez and his 17th Brigade commander BG Rito Alejo Del Río, who were widely believed to have contributed to a command climate conducive to turning a blind eye to paramilitaries, or worse.”

At the same time, the embassy noted a disturbing instance of possible military-paramilitary complicity in a paramilitary attack in La Horqueta, outside Bogotá, just weeks after Del Río left Urabá to take command of the nearby military brigade. “Why was it necessary,” the embassy asked in a January 1998 cable, “for another army unit to travel all the way from Bogotá in order to intervene?”

Del Río’s 13th Brigade was “strangely non-reactive” to the killing, notable as the first paramilitary massacre to occur so close to the Colombian capital. Also implicating Del Río was the discovery that the paramilitary who led the attack was the president of a legal Convivir militia group from Urabá, Del Río’s former area of operations, “who had been imported to the region to strike back against the FARC.”

The general’s star was falling so fast in 1998 that U.S. reporting could barely keep up. The shifting opinion about Del Río is clearly evident in two U.S. military reports from early 1998. In the first, Del Río, a 1967 graduate of the U.S. Army School of the Americas, is lauded as a U.S. military training “success story.” But a second, corrected, report from March 1998 lists Del Río instead as a “not-so-success” story, noting that he was “alleged to have ties not only to paramilitary elements on the north coast and in the Urabá region…but also in the conflictive ‘Magdalena Medio’ region before that” and was also”implicated in the 1985 theft of a [Colombian Army] weapons shipment destined for Magdalena Medio paramilitaries.”

By August 1998, Colombian prosecutors had opened a preliminary investigation of the general’s ties to paramilitaries, a development Kamman said would “serve as a marker to those army officers who continue to assist or otherwise work with paramilitary groups.” Del Río had been “very successful” against FARC guerrillas, the ambassador said in his Secret “Biographic Note,” and his “systematic arming and equipping of aggressive regional paramilitaries was pivotal to his military success at the time.”

The ambassador’s reports had an impact in Washington, where human rights figured prominently in negotiations over the nascent Plan Colombia aid package. In January 1999, two senior State Department officials wrote to Kamman to express their dissatisfaction with Colombia’s progress on human rights, noting in particular the “appointment to key positions of several generals credibly alleged to have ties to paramilitaries” including Del Río, who had recently been named the army’s operations director.

Frustrated and essentially out of options, the State Department took the unusual step of cancelling Del Río’s visa for “drug trafficking and terrorist activities” precipitating his forced retirement and the end of his military career in April 1999.

As years went on, the United States became increasingly concerned about official impunity in Colombia, especially for senior military officers like Del Río, prompting sharp discussions after Prosecutor General Luis Camilo Osorio dropped all charges against the former general in 2001. A briefing paper for the State Department’s top human rights official, Lorne Craner, notes “concern in Congress” that Osorio’s dismissal of the case showed that he was “less focused on prosecuting paramilitaries and military personnel accused of colluding with paramilitary.” A 2005 State Department memorandum found it “troubling” that the government had not yet sent “a clear message” regarding impunity for Del Río.

More than five years later, the case has finally come to trial, and the court will hear the testimony of many important witnesses, each of whom brings a unique perspective to the proceedings. And while no U.S. officials will appear, the court should consider the declassified perspective of the U.S. government and the formerly secret files on one of its “not-so-success” stories.


Read the Documents

Document 1
1998 August 13
General Ramirez Lashes Out at State Department; Two More Generals Under Investigation for Paramilitary Links
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, 1998 Bogota 9345

This U.S. Embassy cable from August 13, 1998, reports, among other things, that Gen. Del Río was under investigation for links to illegal paramilitary groups. In a “Biographic Note,” the Embassy says that Del Río’s “systematic arming and equipping of aggressive regional paramilitaries was pivotal to his military success at the time.”

Biographic Note: Although brigade commands are generally rotated every year, General Del Rio was allowed to remain in command of the 17th Brigade in highly-conflictive Uraba region for two years, apparently because he had been very successful in bloodying the FARC’s nose during the period of his command. His systematic arming and equipping of aggressive regional paramilitaries was pivotal to his military success at the time.

Document 2
1997 January 11
Retired Army Colonel Lambastes Military for Inaction against Paramilitaries
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, 1997 Bogota 274

In this cable, the U.S. Embassy in Colombia reports the public statements of former Colombian Army colonel Carlos Alfonso Velásquez that his commanding officer at the 17th Brigade, Gen. Rito Alejo del Río, had been negligent in not combating paramilitary groups in Urabá. In its analysis of the information, the Embassy takes a favorable view of Velásquez:

[Embassy officers] who know Velasquez speak highly of his performance as head of the anti-narcotics special joint command’s Army component in Cali. When the cartel tried to blackmail him, then Minister of Defense Botero saved him from dismissal. Botero characterized him as clean, among the best, and of unquestionable integrity. [Several lines deleted] Velasquez’s statements bring extra pressure to bear on the Colombian military as they prepare for a new defense minister. They will add credibility to our human rights report.

Document 3
1997 December 24
Retired Army Colonel Talks Freely About the Army He Left Behind
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report

In this document, a U.S. military attaché reports his conversation with a retired Colombian Army colonel (almost certainly Carlos Alfonso Velásquez) about his time at the 17th Brigade in Urabá. The report notes that the colonel “seems to know a lot about paramilitaries and their links to drug traffickers and the Army.” The colonel says that there is a “body count syndrome” in the Colombian Army “when it comes to pursuing the guerrillas.” This way of thinking “tends to fuel human rights abuses by otherwise well-meaning soldiers trying to get their quota to impress superiors.” The colonel said he had served under one commander he respected, as well as Rito Alejo del Río, “about whom he had fewer nice things to say.”

[Name deleted] was asked if the paramilitary wave of violence in the Uraba region and related military collusion were recent phenomena. [Deleted] replied in the negative, saying that military cooperation with the paramilitaries had been occurring for a number of years, but that it had gotten much worse under Del Río.”

Document 4
1998 January 09
Colombians Strike Two Blows Against the Paras
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, 1998 Bogota 120

The U.S. Embassy noted with interest the sudden surge of anti-paramilitary activity by the 17th Brigade immediately after the departure of Del Río as brigade commander.

It is interesting to note that the 17th Brigade confrontation took place only about a week after the departure of the brigade’s commander, Brig. Gen. Rito Alejo del Río, who was long-alleged to by not unfriendly toward paramilitaries. His own former deputy, Col. Carlos Alfonso Velasquez, was retired from the Army under a cloud in January 1997 for privately criticizing Del Río’s refusal to combat the paramilitaries headquartered in the region. Although the Army has claimed for some time that the 17th Brigade has moved against the paramilitaries, we are unaware of any other such encounters that have been publicly confirmed.

Document 5
1998 January 28
Narcos Arrested for La Horqueta Paramilitary Massacre
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable

The U.S. Embassy questions why it was another military unit, and not the Army’s 13th Brigade, under the command of Gen. Del Río, that finally responded to the January 1998 La Horqueta paramilitary massacre.

If the Army was immediately in the area in the immediate aftermath of the killings, however, as the priest asserts, why was it necessary for another Army unit to travel all the way from Bogotá in order to intervene? That is precisely the question prosecutors are now asking. Finally, the strangely non-reactive 13th Brigade recently came under the command of BG Rito Alejo Del Rio, who earned considerable attention as commander of the 17th Brigade covering the heartland of Carlos Castaño’s paramilitaries in Cordoba and Uraba.

Document 6
1998 February 09
Colombian Army Reportedly Captures 23 Paramilitaries
U.S. Embassy cable, 1998 Bogota 1249

The Embassy speculates that a recent surge in 17th Brigade anti-paramilitary activity in Urabá may be related to the departure of Gen. Rito Alejo del Río as commander.

We are encouraged by this development but we are not yet sure how to interpret it. Until recently, the military has had little success in capturing paramilitaries… The 17th Brigade has a new commander, which may also have contributed to an increased surge in anti-paramilitary activity. The previous commander, Brigadier General Rito Alejo Del Rio, now the head of the 13th Brigade in Bogota, was rumored to have been quite tolerant of paramilitary activity in Uraba.

Document 7
1998 February 25
U.S. Army School of the Americas Success Stories
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report

A U.S. military intelligence report, subsequently revised (see Document 9), lists Gen. Del Río among U.S. military training “success stories.”

Document 8
1998 February 26
Military and Police Begin Clearly Cracking Down on Paramilitaries Around Carlos Castano
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, 1998 Bogota 2097

The U.S. Embassy says that it “seems more than coincidental” that recent anti-paramilitary operations by the military “have all taken place since the departure from northern Colombia” of First Division commander Gen. Iván Ramírez and 17th Brigade commander Gen. Rito Alejo del Río.

We note that these latest anti-paramilitary incidents have all taken place since the departure from northern Colombia of former first division commander MG Ivan Ramirez and his 17th Brigade commander BG Rio [sic] Alejo Del Rio, who were widely believed to have contributed to a command climate conducive to turning a blind eye to paramilitaries, or worse. Nothing is irreversible, but at long last those days appear to be over.

We note that this new-found effectiveness in curbing the paramilitaries correlates closely with the recent change of command in several key military positions in northern Colombia, including the First Division in Santa Marta (formerly headed by Major General Ivan Ramirez), the 17th Brigade in Uraba, and the 11th Brigade in Monteria… It seems more than coincidental that the recent anti-paramilitary actions have all taken place since the departure from northern Colombia of military personnel believed to favor paramilitaries.

Document 9
1998 March 31
U.S. Army School of the Americas Not-So-Success Stories – Digging Back into History (Corrected Report)
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report

The U.S. military attaché in Colombia corrects an earlier report on Colombian military graduates from the U.S. Army School of the Americas, noting that Gen. Rito Alejo del Río was alleged to have ties to paramilitaries in Urabá as well as the Magdalena Medio, where “he was implicated in the 1985 theft of a [Colombian Army] weapons shipment destined for Magdalena Medio paramilitaries.”

Report follows up earlier detailed IIR on high-ranking/high-visibility Colombian military/national police graduates of the School of the Americas. Since then, additional—mostly derogatory—info on some of the older, mostly now retired, officers has come to light.

Brigadier General Rito Alejo ((Del Rio)) Rojas—Alleged to have ties not only to paramilitary elements on the north coast and in the Uraba region (adjacent to the Darien region of Panama), but also in the conflictive “Magdalena Medio” region before that. For example, he was implicated in the 1985 theft of a [Colombian Army] weapons shipment destined for Magdalena Medio paramilitaries. The case came to light only because the overloaded airplane crashed. BG Del Rio is currently serving as commander of the 13th Brigade in Bogota.

Document 10
1998 May 14
Army/Fiscalia Raid on a Church Based NGO Viewed as a Major Blunder
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, 1998 Bogota 5554

The U.S. Embassy asserts that a raid by the Army’s 13th Brigade on the offices of the Comisión Interclesial de Justicia y Paz might be “related to long-standing friction between the Jesuit director of the NGO and the commander of the Army’s 13th Brigade.

Comment. [Two lines deleted] Jesuit priest Father Javier Giraldo worked in Uraba during the time period in which General Rito Alejo Del Rio was commanding the 17th Brigade there. [Two lines deleted] Recently, General Del Rio was reassigned to his new, more responsible position commanding the 13th Brigade; the brigade which participated in the raid on Justicia y Paz.

Document 11
1999 January 25
Official Informal for Ambassador Kamman from WHA/AND Director Chicola and DRL DAS Gerson
U.S. State Department cable, 1999 State 13985

Two senior U.S. officials register their dissatisfaction with Colombia’s progress on human rights during the first six months of the Pastrana government, noting the “appointment to key positions of several generals credibly alleged to have ties to paramilitaries. These include Generals Fernando Millan Perez, Rito Aleto Del Rio Rojas, and Rafael Hernandez Lopez.”

Document 12
2001 December 13
Your Meeting with Fiscal General Luis Camilo Osorio
U.S. State Department briefing memorandum

A briefing paper for the State Department’s top human rights official, Lorne Craner, notes “concern in the US Congress” that Osorio is “less focused on prosecuting paramilitaries and military personnel accused of colluding with paramilitary,” citing his dismissal of charges against Rito Alejo del Río.

Document 13
Circa 2005
Memorandum of Justification Concerning Human Rights Conditions with Respect to Assistance for Colombian Armed Forces
U.S. State Department memorandum

A U.S. State Department review of Colombia’s human rights performance finds it “troubling” that the government had not yet sent “a clear message” regarding impunity for Del Río.

TOP-SECRET: THE CIA FILE ON LUIS POSADA CARRILES

T

THE CIA FILE
ON LUIS POSADA CARRILES

A FORMER AGENCY ASSET GOES ON TRIAL IN THE U.S

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 334

Washington, D.C., January 11, 2011 – As the unprecedented trial of Cuban exile Luis Posada Carriles begins this week in El Paso, Texas, the National Security Archive today posted a series of CIA records covering his association with the agency in the 1960s and 1970s. CIA personnel records described Posada, using his codename, “AMCLEVE/15,” as “a paid agent” at $300 a month, being utilized as a training instructor for other exile operatives, as well as an informant.  “Subject is of good character, very reliable and security conscious,” the CIA reported in 1965. Posada, another CIA document observed, incorrectly, was “not a typical ‘boom and bang’ type of individual.”

Today’s posting includes key items from Posada’s CIA file, including several previously published by the Archive, and for the first time online, the indictment from Posada’s previous prosecution–in Panama–on charges of trying to assassinate Fidel Castro with 200 pounds of dynamite and C-4 explosives (in Spanish).

“This explosive has the capacity to destroy any armored vehicle, buildings, steel doors, and the effects can extend for 200 meters…if a person were in the center of the explosion, even if they were in an armored car, they would not survive,” as the indictment described the destructive capacity of the explosives found in Posada’s possession in Panama City, where Fidel Castro was attending an Ibero-American summit in November 2000.

The judge presiding over the perjury trial of Posada has ruled that the prosecution can introduce unclassified evidence of his CIA background which might be relevant to his “state of mind” when he allegedly lied to immigration officials about his role in a series of hotel bombings in Havana in 1997. In pre-trial motions, the prosecution has introduced a short unclassified “summary” of Posada’s CIA career, which is included below.  Among other things, the summary (first cited last year in Tracey Eaton’s informative blog, “Along the Malecon”) reveals that in 1993, only four years before he instigated the hotel bombings in Havana, the CIA anonymously warned former agent and accused terrorist Luis Posada of an assassination threat on his life.

A number of the Archive’s CIA documents were cited in articles in the Washington Post, and CNN coverage today on the start of the Posada trial. “The C.I.A. trained and unleashed a Frankenstein,” the New York Times quoted Archive Cuba Documentation Project director Peter Kornbluh as stating.  “It is long past time he be identified as a terrorist and be held accountable as a terrorist.”

Posada was convicted in Panama in 2001, along with three accomplices, of endangering public safety; he was sentenced to eight years in prison. After lobbying by prominent Cuban-American politicians from Miami, Panamanian president Mireya Moscoso pardoned all four in August 2004. A fugitive from justice in Venezuela where he escaped from prison while being tried for the October 6, 1976, mid air bombing of a Cuban jetliner which killed all 73 people on board, Posada showed up in Miami in March 2005. He was arrested on May 17 of that year by the Department of Homeland Security and held in an immigration detention center in El Paso for two years, charged with immigration fraud during the Bush administration.  Since mid 2007, he has been living on bail in Miami. In April 2009, the Obama Justice Department added several counts of perjury relating to Posada denials about his role in organizing a series of hotel, restaurant and discotheque bombings in 1997.  Since mid 2007, he has been living on bail in Miami

According to Kornbluh, “it is poetic justice that the same U.S. Government whose secret agencies created, trained, paid and deployed Posada is finally taking steps to hold him accountable in a court of law for his terrorist crimes.”


Read the Documents

Document 1: CIA, Unclassified, “Unclassified Summary of the CIA’s Relationship With Luis Clemente Posada Carriles,” Undated.

This unclassified summary of the relationship between Luis Posada Carriles and the CIA, which was provided to the court by the US Justice Department, says the CIA first had contact with Posada in connection with planning the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. He remained a paid agent of the CIA from 1965-1967 and again from 1968-1974. From 1974-76, Posada provided unsolicited threat reporting. (Additional documents introduced in court show that he officially severed ties with the CIA in February 1976.) According to this document, the CIA last had contact with Posada in 1993 when they anonymously contacted him in Honduras by telephone to warn him of a threat to his life. (This document was first cited last year in Tracey Eaton’s informative blog, “Along the Malecon.”)

Document 2: CIA, “PRQ Part II for AMCLEVE/15,” September 22, 1965.

“PRQ Part II,” or the second part of Posada’s Personal Record Questionnaire, provides operational information. Within the text of the document, Posada is described as “strongly anti-Communist” as well as a sincere believer in democracy. The document describes Posada having a “good character,” not to mention the fact that he is “very reliable, and security conscious.” The CIA recommends that he be considered for a civil position in a post-Castro government in Cuba (codenamed PBRUMEN).

Document 3: CIA, Cable, “Plan of the Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE) to Blow Up a Cuban or Soviet Vessel in Veracruz, Mexico,” July 1, 1965.

This CIA cable summarizes intelligence on a demolition project proposed by Jorge Mas Canosa, then the head of RECE. On the third page, a source is quoted as having informed the CIA of a payment that Mas Canosa has made to Luis Posada in order to finance a sabotage operation against ships in Mexico. Posada reportedly has “100 pounds of C-4 explosives and some detonators” and limpet mines to use in the operation.

 Document 4: CIA, Memorandum, “AMCLEVE /15,” July 21, 1966.

This document includes two parts-a cover letter written by Grover T. Lythcott, Posada’s CIA handler, and an attached request written by Posada to accept a position on new coordinating Junta composed of several anti-Castro organizations. In the cover letter, Lythcbtt refers to Posada by his codename, AMCLEVE/I5, and discusses his previous involvement withthe Agency. He lionizes Posada, writing that his ”performance in all assigned tasks has been excellent,” and urges that he be permitted to work with the combined anti-Castro exile groups. According to the document, Lythcott suggests that Posada be taken off the CIA payroll to facilitate his joining the anti-Castro militant junta, which will be led by RECE. Lythcott insists that Posada will function as an effective moderating force considering he is “acutely aware of the international implications of ill planned or over enthusiastic activities against Cuba.” In an attached memo, Posada, using the name “Pete,” writes that if he is on the Junta, “they will never do anything to endanger the security of this Country (like blow up Russian ships)” and volunteers to “give the Company all the intelligence that I can collect.”

Document 5: CIA, Personal Record Questionnaire on Posada, April 17, 1972.

This “PRQ” was compiled in 1972 at a time Posada was a high level official at the Venezuelan intelligence service, DISIP, in charge of demolitions. The CIA was beginning to have some concerns about him, based on reports that he had taken CIA explosives equipment to Venezuela, and that he had ties to a Miami mafia figure named Lefty Rosenthal. The PRQ spells out Posada’s personal background and includes his travel to various countries between 1956 and 1971. It also confirms that one of his many aliases was “Bambi Carriles.”

Document 6: CIA, Report, “Traces on Persons Involved in 6 Oct 1976 Cubana Crash,” October 13, 1976.

In the aftermath of the bombing of Cubana flight 455, the CIA ran a file check on all names associated with the terror attack. In a report to the FBI the Agency stated that it had no association with the two Venezuelans who were arrested. A section on Luis Posada Carriles was heavily redacted when the document was declassified. But the FBI retransmitted the report three days later and that version was released uncensored revealing Posada’s relations with the CIA.

Document 7: CIA, Secret Intelligence Report, “Activities of Cuban Exile Leader Orlando Bosch During his Stay in Venezuela,” October 14, 1976.

A source in Venezuela supplied the CIA with detailed intelligence on a fund raiser held for Orlando Bosch and his organization CORU after he arrived in Caracas in September 1976. The source described the dinner at the house of a Cuban exile doctor, Hildo Folgar, which included Venezuelan government officials. Bosch was said to have essentially asked for a bribe in order to refrain from acts of violence during the United Nations meeting in November 1976, which would be attended by Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez. He was also quoted as saying that his group had done a “great job” in assassinating former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier in Washington D.C. on September 21, and now was going to “try something else.” A few days later, according to this intelligence report, Luis Posada Carriles was overheard to say that “we are going to hit a Cuban airplane” and “Orlando has the details.”

Document 8: First Circuit Court of Panama, “Fiscalia Primera Del Primer Circuito Judicial De Panama: Vista Fiscal No. 200”, September 28, 2001.

This lengthy document is the official indictment in Panama of Luis Posada Carriles and 4 others for the attempted assassination of Fidel Castro at the 10th Ibero-American Summit in November 2000. In this indictment, Posada Carriles is accused of possession of explosives, endangerment of public safety, illicit association, and falsification of documents. After traveling to Panama, according to the evidence gathered, “Luis Posada Carriles and Raul Rodriguez Hamouzova rented a red Mitsubishi Lancer at the International Airport of Tocumen, in which they transported the explosives and other devices necessary to create a bomb.” (Original Spanish: “Luis Posada Carriles y Raul Rodriguez Hamouzova rentaron en el Aeropuerto Internacional de Tocumen de la referida empresa el vehículo marca Mitsubishi Lancer, color rojo, dentro del cual se transportaron los explosives y artefactos indicados para elaborar una bomba.”)  This bomb was intended to take the life of Fidel Castro; Castro was to present at the Summit on November 17th, and what Carriles had proposed to do “wasn’t easy, because it occurred at the Summit, and security measures would be extreme.” (Original Spanish: “lo que se proponía hacer no era fácil, porque ocurría en plena Cumbre, y las medidas de seguridad serían extremas.”)

After being discovered by agents of the Explosives Division of the National Police, they ascertained that “this explosive has the capacity to destroy an armored vehicle, buildings, steel doors, and the effects of an explosive of this class and quality can extend for 200 meters.” Additionally, “to a human, from a distance of 200 meters it would affect the senses, internal hemorrhages, and if the person were in the center of the explosion, even if they were in an armored car, they would not survive…the destructive capacity of this material is complete.” (Original Spanish: “Este explosivo tiene la capacidad de destruir cualquier carro blindado, puede destruir edificios, puertas de acero, y que la onda expansiva de esta calidad y clase de explosive puede alcanzar hasta 200 metros…Al ser humano, sostienen, a la distancia de 200 metros le afectaría los sentidos, hemorragios internos, y si la persona estuviese en el centro de la explosion, aunque estuviese dentro de un carro blindado no sobreviviría…la capacidad destructive de este material es total.”)

The indictment states that when Posada was “asked about the charges against him, including possession of explosives, possession of explosives that endanger public safety, illicit association, and falsification of documents…he expresses having fought subversion against democratic regimes along several fronts, specifically Castro-sponsored subversion.” (Original Spanish: “Preguntado sobre los cargos formulados, es decir Posesión de Explosivos, Posesión de Explosivos que implica Peligro Común, Asociación Ilicita, y Falsedad de Documentos…Expresa haber combatido en distintos frentes la subversión contra regimens democráticos, ‘quiero decir la subversión castrista.’”)

Posada and his accomplices were eventually convicted of endangering public safety and sentenced to 8 years in prison. He was pardoned by Panamanian president, Mireya Moscosa, after only four years in August 2004 and lived as a fugitive in Honduras until March 2005 when he illegally entered the United States and applied for political asylum.


TOP-SECRET: Ex-Kaibil Officer Connected to Dos Erres Massacre Arrested in Alberta, Canada

Graduation ceremony at the school for the Guatemalan Army’s elite Kaibil, counterinsurgency unit formed in the mid-1970s. [Photo © Jean-Marie Simon]

Ex-Kaibil Officer Connected to Dos Erres Massacre Arrested in Alberta, Canada

Declassified documents show that U.S. officials knew the Guatemalan Army was responsible for the 1982 mass murder

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 316

Kaibil unit on Army Day, Campo de Marte field, Guatemala City. [Photo © Jean-Marie Simon]

Washington, D.C. – August 30, 2011 – Jorge Vinicio Sosa Orantes was arrested in Alberta, Canada on January 18, 2011 on charges of naturalization fraud in the United States. Sosa Orantes, 52, is a former commanding officer of the Guatemalan Special Forces, or Kaibil unit, which brutally murdered more than 250 men, women and children during the 1982 massacre in Dos Erres, Guatemala. Sosa Orantes, a resident of Riverside County, California where he was a well known martial arts instructor, was arrested near the home of a relative in Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada. The charges for which he was arrested stem from an indictment by the United States District Court, Central District of California on charges of making false statements under oath on his citizenship application. Sosa Orantes will come before the Canadian court in Calgary to face possible extradition to the United States.

In an interview with the Calgary Sun, U.S. Justice Department prosecutor David Gates said that the extradition request was not a result of the allegations against Sosa Orantes for his involvement in the massacre; his extradition is being requested for alleged naturalization fraud. However, considering the similar case against Gilberto Jordan, it is possible that the precedence set with the ruling on that case may affect the outcome of Sosa Orantes’s case.

On September 16, 2010 in a historic ruling, former Guatemalan special forces soldier Gilberto Jordán, who confessed to having participated in the 1982 massacre of hundreds of men, women and children in Dos Erres, Guatemala, was sentenced today by a judge in a south Florida courtroom to serve ten years in federal prison for lying on his citizenship application about his role in the crime. Calling the massacre, “reprehensible,” U.S. District Judge William Zloch handed down the maximum sentence allowed for naturalization fraud, stating he wanted the ruling to be a message to “those who commit egregious human rights violations abroad” that they will not find “safe haven from prosecution” in the United States.

On May 5, 2010, agents from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested Gilberto Jordan, 54, in Palm Beach County, Florida, based on a criminal complaint charging Jordán with lying to U.S. authorities about his service in the Guatemalan Army and his role in the 1982 Dos Erres massacre. The complaint alleged that Jordán, a naturalized American citizen, was part of the special counterinsurgency Kaibiles unit that carried out the massacre of hundreds of residents of the Dos Erres village located in the northwest Petén region. Jordán allegedly helped kill unarmed villagers with his own hands, including a baby he allegedly threw into the village well.

The massacre was part of the Guatemalan military’s “scorched earth campaign” and was carried out by the Kaibiles ranger unit. The Kaibiles were specially trained soldiers who became notorious for their use of torture and brutal killing tactics. According to witness testimony, and corroborated through U.S. declassified archives, the Kaibiles entered the town of Dos Erres on the morning of December 6, 1982, and separated the men from women and children. They started torturing the men and raping the women and by the afternoon they had killed almost the entire community, including the children. Nearly the entire town was murdered, their bodies thrown into a well and left in nearby fields. The U.S. documents reveal that American officials deliberated over theories of how an entire town could just “disappear,” and concluded that the Army was the only force capable of such an organized atrocity. More than 250 people are believed to have died in the massacre.

The Global Post news organization conducted an investigative report into the investigation of the Guatemalan soldiers living in the United States and cited declassified documents released to the National Security Archive’s Guatemala Documentation Project under the Freedom of Information Act. These documents are part of a collection of files assembled by the Archive and turned over to Guatemala’s truth commission investigators, who used the files in the writing of their ground-breaking report, “Guatemala: Memory of Silence.” [see CEH section on Dos Erres]

The documents include U.S. Embassy cables that describe first-hand accounts by U.S. officials who traveled to the area of Dos Erres and witnessed the devastation left behind by the Kaibiles. Based on their observations and information obtained from sources during their trip, the American officials concluded “that the party most likely responsible for this incident is the Guatemalan Army.”


Declassified U.S. Documents on Kaibiles and the Dos Erres Massacre

December 1980
Military Intelligence Summary (MIS), Volume VIII–Latin America
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Secret, Intelligence Summary, 12 pages

Photos courtesy of Jean-Marie Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyranny. More photos of Guatemala can be found in Jean-Marie Simon’s newly-released Spanish version of her book Guatemala: Eterna Primavera, Eterna Tiranía.

The Defense Intelligence Agency periodically produces intelligence summary reports with information on the structure and capabilities of foreign military forces. On page six of this 1980 summary on the Guatemalan military, the DIA provides information on the Kaibil (ranger) counterinsurgency training center, which is located in La Pólvora, in the Péten. The report describes how each of Guatemala’s infantry battalions has a Kaibil platoon, “which may be deployed as a separate small unit. These platoons are used as cadre for training other conscripts in insurgency and counterinsurgency techniques and tactics. The Air Force sends personnel to the Kaibil School for survival training.”

November 19, 1982
Army Establishes a Strategic Reaction Force
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Confidential, Cable, 2 pages

Less than a month before the Dos Erres killings, the DIA reports on the creation of a “strategic reaction force” made up of 20 Kaibil ranger instructors based out of Guatemala City’s Mariscal Zavala Brigade. The special unit was assembled in order to carry out the mission “of quickly deploying to locations throughout the country to seek and destroy guerrilla elements.” The document indicates that the Kaibil unit was placed under direct control of Guatemala’s central military command. It states; “the unit’s huge success in previous engagement with the enemy have prompted the Guatemalan Army General Staff (AGS) to assume direct command and control of this unit.”

December 10, 1982
Guatemalan Counter Terrorism Capabilities
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, Secret Cable, 3 pages

Days after the Dos Erres massacre the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala sends a secret cable back to Washington with information on the counter-terrorist tactical capability of the Guatemalan police and military forces. The cable reports that a Kaibil unit, based in the Mariscal Zavala Brigade headquarters, “has recently been deployed to the Petén, and is now operationally under the Poptún Military Bridage.”

This reporting coincides with the CEH and OAS summary of the events leading up to the Dos Erres massacre.

December 28, 1982
Alleged Massacre of 200 at Village of Dos R’s, Petén
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, Secret Cable, 3 pages 

As information begins to surface about the Dos Erres massacre U.S. officials look into the matter and report on information obtained through a “reliable embassy source” who tells U.S. officials that the Guatemalan Government Army may have massacred the 200 villagers of Dos Erres. According to the source, an Army unit disguised as guerrillas entered the Dos Erres village gathered the people together and demanded their support. The source tells officials that the villagers knew they were not with the guerrilla, and did not comply with their demands. One villager who managed to escape later recounts the story to people in Las Cruces, 12 kilometers from Dos Erres, and to the Embassy source who relays the information to American officials. Another witness tells the source that the village was completely deserted, and claimed to have found burnt identification cards in the nearby Church.  They also claim that the Army came back to the village a few days later and took roofing and furniture to the Army Base in Las Cruces.

The U.S. officials offer possible theories on why no bodies were found, and on how the entire Dos Erres population could have just “disappeared.” One theory was that the Army killed everyone in the village, dumped the bodies into the well, and covered the well over. This was based on the local testimonies of those who had gone into the village and saw that the well was covered over, but they were afraid to look inside.

The cable goes on to say that because of the reliability of the source, and the seriousness of the allegations, that an embassy office will go to investigate on Dec. 30th, 1982.

December 31, 1982
Possible Massacre in “Dos R’s”, El Petén
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, Secret Cable, 4 pages

On December 30th three mission members from the U.S. Embassy and a Canadian diplomat visit Las Cruces in Poptún to investigate the allegations of the Dos R’s massacre. The document verifies the existence of the Dos Erres village, noting that the settlement was deserted and many of the houses burnt to the ground.

The Mission Team visit the Army Base in Poptún, El Petén, where they speak with the operations officer (S3), who tells the mission members that the area near Las Cruces was exceptionally dangerous because of recent guerrilla activity. Army officials explain how Dos Erres “had suffered from a guerrilla attack in early December,” and that it would pose a considerable risk for them to visit the town.  From Poptún, the mission Members fly directly to the town of Las Cruces (using the directions provided by their source) and then to the village of Las Dos Erres. When they reach Dos Erres, however, the helicopter pilot refuses to touch down, but agrees to sweep low over the area. From this view the Embassy officials could see that houses had been “razed or destroyed by fire.” They then fly back to Las Cruces to speak with locals, including a member of the local civil defense patrol (PAC) and a “confidant of the Army in the area.” He tells officials that the Army was responsible for the disappearance of the people in Dos Erres and that he had been told to keep out of the area in early December, because the army was going to “sweep through.” He also confirms the prior reports that the Army officials wore civilian dress during the sweep, but had identifiable Army combat boots and Galil rifles. The cable notes that this information matches that of previous reftel source.

Based on the information obtained during their trip, the cable reports that “Embassy must conclude that the party most likely responsible for this incident is the Guatemalan Army.”

TOP-SECRET: Landmark Conviction in Colombia’s Palace of Justice Case

Former Colombian Army Col. Luis Alfonso Plazas Vega (ret.) [Photo: Revista Semana]
andmark Conviction in Colombia’s Palace of Justice CaseFirst-Ever Criminal Sentence Handed Down in Infamous Army AssaultDeclassified Documents Implicate Colonel, Army, in Civilian Killings, Disappearances

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 319

The Palace of Justice burned to the ground during military efforts to retake the building from M-19 guerrillas. Eleven Supreme Court justices died in the blaze, along with dozens of others. [Photo: Revista Semana]

Washington, D.C., August 30, 2011 – To mark the first-ever criminal conviction in Colombia’s infamous Palace of Justice case, the Archive today posts a selection of key declassified documents pertaining to the episode, including a 1999 U.S. Embassy cable that found that Colombian Army soldiers under the command of Col. Alfonso Plazas Vega had “killed a number of M-19 members and suspected collaborators hors de combat [“outside of combat”], including the Palace’s cafeteria staff.”

On Wednesday, a Colombian court sentenced retired Col. Plazas Vega to 30 years in prison for the disappearances of 11 people, including members of the cafeteria staff, during Army operations to retake the building from M-19 guerrillas who seized control of the building in November 1985. In all, more than 100 people died in the conflagration that followed, including 11 Supreme Court justices.

U.S. Embassy Situation Reports obtained by the National Security Archive in collaboration with the Truth Commission on the Palace of Justice shed light on how the Colombian government and military forces responded to the crisis, indicating widespread agreement that the operation be carried out expeditiously and using whatever force necessary. In one cable sent to Washington during the crisis, the Embassy said: “We understand that orders are to use all necessary force to retake building.” Another cable reported : “FonMin [Foreign Minister] said that President, DefMin [Defense Minster], Chief of National Police, and he are all together, completely in accord and do not intend to let this matter drag out.”

The Embassy documents also include a pair of reports on the fate of “guerrillas” detained during the operation: one saying that “surviving guerrillas have all been taken prisoner,” and another, two days later, reporting that “None of the guerrillas survived.”

The landmark ruling, coming nearly 25 years after these tragic events, was welcomed by the families of the victims and hailed by human rights groups, but harshly condemned by President Álvaro Uribe and members of the military high command, who said they were saddened by the decision. Yesterday, Uribe called an emergency meeting with the country’s top military commanders to discuss the outcome of the case, and last night proposed new legislation to shield the military from civil prosecution. The Colombian military has long resisted efforts by civilian authorities to prosecute senior military commanders and a military judge unsuccessfully tried to seize control of the case in 2009. Members of the M-19 guerrilla group are covered by a general amnesty declared as part of disarmament negotiations in 1990.

The conviction of Plazas Vega comes six months after the Truth Commission on the Palace of Justice, established by the Colombian Supreme Court, issued its final report, finding that “there never was a real or effective plan by the national government to try to save the lives of the hostages.” The Commission found that state responsibility for deaths and disappearances during the crisis stemmed from two fundamental decisions by President Betancur: “the decision to not participate in a dialogue (with the insurgents)” and the decision “to authorize or tolerate military operations [to retake the building] until its final consequences.”

At least three other former Army officers face similar charges in the case, including former Army commander Gen. Jesús Armando Arias Cabrales, and former Army intelligence officers Gen. Ivan Ramirez Quintero and Col. Edilberto Sánchez Rubiano.

Colombian security forces lead survivors of the Palace of Justice assault across the street to the Casa del Florero. [Photo: Revista Semana]

Col. Plazas defended his role in the Palace of Justice operation in a 1995 meeting with U.S. Embassy officials after being denied consular positions in Germany and the United States on human rights grounds. Embassy officials told Plazas that the U.S. “took no position on the veracity of the charges against him, and that he should get an official explanation for the withdrawal of his nomination to San Francisco from the [Colombian] Foreign Ministry.” Plazas offered that “if any guerrillas were captured alive [during the Palace of Justice assault], the only ones that might have taken them away would have been from Army Intelligence, about whose operations he knew nothing,” according to the Embassy report. A subsequent Embassy document found that, “None of the above allegations [against Plazas] were ever investigated by the authorities – a common problem during the 1980’s in Colombia.”

Gen. Arias Cabrales, the former armed forces commander, was sanctioned in 1990 by the government’s inspector general (Procuraduría) for failure to take the necessary measures to protect civilian lives during the assault and was forcibly retired from the military in 1994. That investigation caused considerable friction between the military and the watchdog agency, with public denouncements similar to those heard this week from Uribe and others. Arias now faces criminal charges in his role as commander of the Army brigade that oversaw the assault on the Palace.

Also under investigation is Gen. Ramírez Quintero, considered the architect of Colombia’s military intelligence program during the 1990s. Ramírez and others connected to the Army’s 20th Intelligence Brigade came under scrutiny in the mid-1990s for connections to illegal paramilitary death squads. The U.S. revoked his visa in 1998.


Read the Documents

Document 1
1985 November 6
Terrorist Attack on Colombian Palace of Justice
U.S. Embassy Bogota cable, Secret

During the midst of the crisis, the U.S. Embassy reports its understanding “that orders are to use all necessary force to retake the building.”

Document 2
1985 November 7 (Sitrep as of November 6, 7:00 PM)
Terrorist Attack on Colombian Palace of Justice
U.S. Embassy Bogota cable, Secret

Another crisis report from the U.S. Embassy, based on a conversation with Colombian Foreign Minister Augusto Ramírez Ocampo, says that “FonMin [Foreign Minister] said that President, DefMin [Defense Minster], Chief of National Police, and he are all together, completely in accord and do not intend to let this matter drag out.”

Document 3
1985 November 7 (Sitrep as of November 7, 5:00 PM)
Terrorist Attack on Colombian Palace of Justice
U.S. Embassy Bogota cable, Secret

This Embassy report notes that “surviving guerrillas have all been taken prisoner.”

Document 4
1985 November 9
The Palace of Justice Attack – Losses and Gains
U.S. Embassy Bogota cable, Confidential

An initial Embassy post-mortem on the Palace of Justice attack notes that “none of the guerrillas survived,” differing from the November 7 report that surviving guerrillas had been “taken prisoner.”

Document 5
1990 November 2
Charges Brought in Palace of Justice Case
U.S. Embassy Bogota cable, Confidential

Charges brought by the Procuraduría (Inspector General) against Colombian Army officers, including Gen. Arias Cabrales, for excessive use of force in the Palace of Justice case “may lead to increased friction between the Army and the independent institution,” according to this Embassy report. “Many officers will note that, while Sanchez and Arias face public condemnation, the M-19, whose terrorist assault led to the 1985 massacre, has converted itself into a respected political party.”

Document 6
1990 November 7
Palace of Justice—Procuraduria Disciplinary Sanctions Provoke a Storm of Criticism
U.S. Embassy Bogota cable, Confidential

The decision by the Procuraduría to officially remove from office retired Gen. Arias Cabrales “has generated a firestorm of criticism,” according to this Embassy cable. The outcry over the ruling from influential circles of the government and top military commanders is likely “to limit the independent institution’s ability to perform its constitutional responsibility as a watchdog for human rights and other abuses committed by government officials effectively.”
The Embassy concludes:

It seems inevitable that the virtually universal condemnation of the Procuraduria will undermine the prestige of the independent institution. Undoubtedly, some military officers will insist on inaccurately interpreting the decision against Arias and recent investigations by the Procuraduria into Army human rights abuses as reflections of a conspiracy to cripple the Army as an institution.

Document 7
1994 April 15
General’s Dismissal Stirs Controversy
U.S. Embassy Bogota cable, Confidential

The dismissal of Gen. Arias Cabrales has provoked a round of intense criticism, according to this cable. The Embassy says it agrees “with General Arias that [in dismissing him] both President Gaviria and Minister Pardo were forced into action.”

Document 8
1995 October 5
Conversation with Retired Colonel Alfonso Plazas Vega
U.S. Embassy Bogota cable, Confidential

In a meeting with U.S. Embassy officials, Col. Plazas defends his role in the Palace of Justice operation after being denied consular positions in Germany and the United States on human rights grounds. Embassy officials told Plazas that the U.S. “took no position on the veracity of the charges against him, and that he should get an official explanation for the withdrawal of his nomination to San Francisco from the [Colombian] Foreign Ministry.” Plazas noted that “if any guerrillas were captured alive, the only ones that might have taken them away would have been from Army Intelligence, about whose operations he knew nothing.”

Document 9
1996 February 7
Information on Colombian [Deleted]
U.S. Embassy Bogota cable, Confidential

In response to an inquiry for human rights-related information on Col. Plazas Vega, the Embassy concludes that, “None of the above allegations [against Plazas] were ever investigated by the authorities — a common problem during the 1980’s in Colombia.”

Document 10
1999 January 15
Colombian Military: Our Judiciary Requires No Reform, and Police Have Responsibility for Combatting Paramilitaries
U.S. Embassy Bogota cable, Confidential

A U.S. Embassy cable about a meeting between military officials and members of civilian non-governmental organizations appears to blame the Colombian Army and Col. Plazas Vega for civilian deaths following the Palace of Justice assault.[Please note that the French phrase “hors de combat“, means, literally, “outside of combat”.]

The presence among the “NGO representatives” of two military officers (one active duty, one retired), who killed time with lengthy, pro-military diatribes, also detracted from the military-NGO exchange. One of the two was retired Colonel Alfonso Plazas Vargas [sic], representing the “Office for Human Rights of Retired Military Officers.” Plazas commanded the November, 1985 raid on the Supreme Court building after it had been taken over by the M-19. That raid resulted in the deaths of more than 70 people, including eleven Supreme Court justices. Soldiers killed a number of M-19 members and suspected collaborators hors de combat, including the Palace’s cafeteria staff.

TOP-SECRET – THE FBI FILEAS ABOUT THE AMERICAN NAZI PARTY

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DOWNLOAD THE FBI FILEY BY MOUSECLICK ABOVE

American Nazi Party

American Nazi Party
NS Party of America flag.gif
Founder George Lincoln Rockwell
Founded 1959
Headquarters Arlington, Virginia
Ideology Neo-Nazism
White Separatism
White Nationalism
Antisemitism
National Socialism
Political position Far-Right
Website
http://www.americannaziparty.com/

The American Nazi Party (ANP) was an American political party founded by discharged U.S. Navy Commander George Lincoln Rockwell. Headquartered in Arlington,Virginia, Rockwell initially called it the World Union of Free Enterprise National Socialists (WUFENS), but later renamed it the American Nazi Party in 1960 to attract maximum media attention.[1] The party was based largely upon the ideals and policies of Adolf Hitler‘s NSDAP in Germany during the Third Reich but also expressed allegiance to the Constitutional principles of the U.S.’s Founding Fathers[citation needed]. It also added a platform of Holocaust denial.

Headquarters

The WUFENS headquarters was first located in a residence on Williamsburg Road in Arlington, but was later moved as the ANP headquarters to a house at 928 North Randolph Street (now a hotel and office building site). Rockwell and some party members also established a “Stormtrooper Barracks” in a farmhouse in the Dominion Hills section of Arlington at what is now the Upton Hill Regional Park, the tallest hill in the county. After Rockwell’s death, the headquarters was moved again to one side of a duplex brick and concrete storefront at 2507 North Franklin Road which featured a swastika prominently mounted above the front door. This site was visible from busy Wilson Boulevard. Today the Franklin Road address is often misidentified as Rockwell’s headquarters when in fact it was the successor organization’s last physical address in Arlington (now a coffeehouse).[2] [3]

Name change and party reform

After several years of living in impoverished conditions, Rockwell began to experience some financial success with paid speaking engagements at universities where he was invited to express his controversial views as exercises in free speech. This inspired him to end the rancorous “Phase One” party tactics and begin “Phase Two”, a plan to recast the group as a legitimate political party by toning down the verbal and written attacks against non-whites, replacing the party rallying cry of “Sieg Heil!” with “White Power!”, limiting public display of the swastika, and entering candidates in local elections. On January 1, 1967 Rockwell renamed the ANP to the National Socialist White People’s Party (NSWPP), a move that alienated some hard-line members. Before he could fully implement party reforms, Rockwell was assassinated on August 25, 1967 by disgruntled follower, John Patler.

Assassination of George Lincoln Rockwell

An assassination attempt was made on Rockwell on June 28, 1967. As Rockwell returned from shopping, he drove into the party headquarters driveway on Wilson Boulevard and found it blocked by a felled tree and brush. Rockwell assumed that it was another prank by local teens. As a young boy cleared the obstruction, two shots were fired at Rockwell from behind one of the swastika-embossed brick driveway pillars. One of the shots ricocheted off the car, right next to his head. Leaping from the car, Rockwell pursued the would-be assassin. On June 30, Rockwell petitioned the Arlington County Circuit Court for a gun permit; no action was ever taken on his request.

On August 25, 1967, Rockwell was killed by John Patler, a former party member whom Rockwell had ejected from the party for allegedly trying to introduce Marxist doctrine into the party’s platforms. While leaving the Econowash laundromat at the Dominion Hills Shopping Center in Arlington, Virginia, two bullets entered his car through his windshield, striking Rockwell in the head and chest. His car slowly rolled backwards to a stop and Rockwell staggered out of the front passenger side door of the car, and then collapsed on the pavement.[4]

Koehl succession and ideological divisions

Rockwell’s deputy commander, Matt Koehl, a staunch Hitlerist, assumed the leadership role after a party council agreed that he should retain command. Koehl continued some of Rockwell’s reforms such as emphasizing the glories of a future all-white society but retained the pseudo-Nazi uniforms of the party’s “Storm Troopers” who had been modeled on the NSDAP‘s Sturmabteilung, and the swastika-festooned party literature. In 1968 Koehl moved the party to a new headquarters at 2507 North Franklin Road, clearly visible from Arlington‘s main thoroughfare, Wilson Boulevard. He also established a printing press, a “George Lincoln Rockwell Memorial Book Store”, and member living quarters on property nearby.

The party began to experience ideological division among its followers as it entered the 1970s. In 1970, member Frank Collin, who was secretly an ethnic Jew, broke away from the group and founded the National Socialist Party of America, which became famous due to an attempt to march through Skokie, Illinois, which led to anUnited States Supreme Court Case.[5]

Other dissatisfied members of the NSWPP chose to support William Luther Pierce, eventually forming the National Alliance in 1974.

Further membership erosion occurred as Koehl, drawing heavily upon the teachings of Hitlerian mystic Savitri Devi, began to suggest that National Socialism was more akin to a religious movement than a political one. He espoused the belief that Hitler was the gift of an inscrutable divine providence sent to rescue the white race from decadence and gradual extinction caused by a declining birth rate and miscegenation. Hitler’s death in 1945 was viewed as a type of martyrdom; a voluntary, Christ-like self-sacrifice, that looked forward to a spiritual resurrection of National Socialism at a later date when the Aryan race would need it the most. These esoteric beliefs led to disputes with the World Union of National Socialists, which Rockwell had founded and whose leader, Danish neo-Nazi Povl Riis-Knudsen, had been appointed by Koehl. Undaunted, Koehl continued to recast the party as a new religion in formation. Public rallies were gradually phased out in favor of low-key gatherings in private venues. On Labor Day 1979, in a highly unpopular move for some members, Koehl disbanded the party’s paramilitary “Storm Troopers”. The Koehl organization is now known as the New Order and operates so far from the public spotlight that few of today’s neo-Nazis are aware of its existence or know that it is the linear descendant of Rockwell’s original ANP. On November 3, 1979, members of the American Nazi Party and the Ku Klux Klan attacked a Communist Workers’ Party protest march. The alliance of Nazis and Klansmen shot and killed five marchers. Forty Klansmen and Nazis, and several Communist marchers were involved in the shootings; sixteen Klansmen and Nazis were arrested and the six best cases were brought to trial first. Two criminal trials resulted in the acquittal of the defendants by all-white juries. However, in a 1985 civil lawsuit the survivors won a $350,000 judgment against the city, the Klan and the Nazi Party for violating the civil rights of the demonstrators. The shootings became known as the “Greensboro Massacre“.

Namesake organization

Today, the name “American Nazi Party” has been adopted by an organization headed by Rocky J. Suhayda. Headquartered in Westland, Michigan, this group claims George Lincoln Rockwell as their founder, but there is no actual connection to the original ANP or its successor organizations, apart from the fact that their website sells nostalgic reprints of Rockwell’s 1960s-era magazine “The Stormtrooper”.

Notable former members

TOP-SECRET – THE FBI FILES ABOUT WERNHER VON BRAUN – THE SS-LEADER AND THE NASA-BRAIN

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Wernher von Braun

Wernher von Braun

Von Braun at his desk at Marshall Space Flight Center in May 1964, with models of the Saturn rocket family
Born March 23, 1912
WirsitzGerman Empire
Died June 16, 1977 (aged 65)
Alexandria, VirginiaUnited States
Cause of death Pancreatic cancer
Resting place AlexandriaVirginiaUnited States
Nationality German, American
Alma mater Technical University of Berlin
Occupation Rocket engineer and designer
Spouse Maria Luise von Quistorp(m. 1947–1977)
Children Iris Careen von Braun
Margrit Cecile von Braun
Peter Constantine von Braun
Parents Magnus von Braun (senior) (1877-1972)
Emmy von Quistorp (1886-1959)
Military career
Allegiance Nazi Germany
Service/branch SS
Years of service 1937–1945
Rank SturmbannführerSS
Battles/wars World War II
Awards Knights Cross of the War Merit Cross (1944)
War Merit Cross, First Class with Swords (1943)
Other work Rocket engineer, NASA, Built the Saturn V rocket of the Apollo manned moon missions

Wernher Magnus Maximilian, Freiherr[1] von Braun (March 23, 1912 – June 16, 1977) was a German rocket scientistaerospace engineerspace architect, and one of the leading figures in the development of rocket technology in Nazi Germany during World War II and in the United States after that.

A former member of the Nazi party, commissioned Sturmbannführer of the paramilitary SS and decorated Nazi war hero, von Braun would later be regarded as the preeminent rocket engineer of the 20th century in his role with the United States civilian space agency NASA.[2] In his 20s and early 30s, von Braun was the central figure in Germany’s rocket development program, responsible for the design and realization of the deadly V-2 combat rocket during World War II. After the war, he and some of his rocket team were taken to the U.S. as part of the then-secret Operation Paperclip. Von Braun worked on the US Army intermediate range ballistic missile(IRBM) program before his group was assimilated by NASA, under which he served as director of the newly-formed Marshall Space Flight Center and as the chief architect of the Saturn V launch vehicle, the superbooster that propelled the Apollo spacecraft to the Moon.[3] According to one NASA source, he is “without doubt, the greatest rocket scientist in history. His crowning achievement was to lead the development of the Saturn V booster rocket that helped land the first men on the Moon in July 1969.”[4] In 1975 he received the National Medal of Science.

Early life

Wernher von Braun was born in Wirsitz (Wyrzysk), Province of Posen, then a part of the German Empire, and was the second of three sons. He belonged to anaristocratic family, inheriting the German title of Freiherr (equivalent to Baron). His father, conservative civil servant Magnus Freiherr von Braun (1878–1972), served as a Minister of Agriculture in the Federal Cabinet during the Weimar Republic. His mother, Emmy von Quistorp (1886–1959), could trace her ancestry through both parents to medieval European royalty, a descendant of Philip III of FranceValdemar I of DenmarkRobert III of Scotland, and Edward III of England.[5][6] Von Braun had a younger brother, also named Magnus Freiherr von Braun.[7] After Wernher von Braun’s Lutheran confirmation, his mother gave him a telescope, and he developed a passion for astronomy. When Wyrzysk was transferred to Poland at the end of World War I, his family, like many other German families, moved to Germany. They settled in Berlin, where 12-year-old von Braun, inspired by speed records established by Max Valier and Fritz von Opel in rocket-propelled cars,[8] caused a major disruption in a crowded street by detonating a toy wagon to which he had attached a number of fireworks. He was taken into custody by the local police until his father came to collect him.

Von Braun was an accomplished amateur musician who could play Beethoven and Bach from memory. Von Braun learned to play the cello and the piano at an early age and originally wanted to become a composer. He took lessons from Paul Hindemith, the famous composer. The few pieces of von Braun’s youthful compositions that exist are reminiscent of Hindemith’s style.[9]

Beginning in 1925, von Braun attended a boarding school at Ettersburg Castle near Weimar where he did not do well in physics and mathematics. In 1928 his parents moved him to the Hermann-Lietz-Internat (also a residential school) on the East Frisian North Sea island of Spiekeroog. There he acquired a copy of Die Rakete zu den Planetenräumen (1929) (By Rocket into Interplanetary Space) (in German)[10] by rocket pioneer Hermann Oberth. Space travel had always fascinated von Braun, and from then on he applied himself to physics and mathematics to pursue his interest in rocket engineering.

In 1930 he attended the Technical University of Berlin, where he joined the Verein für Raumschiffahrt (VfR, the “Spaceflight Society”) and assisted Willy Ley in his liquid-fueled rocket motor tests in conjunction withHermann Oberth.[11] He also studied at ETH Zurich. Although he worked mainly on military rockets in his later years there, space travel remained his primary interest.

The following episode from the early 1930s is telling in this respect. At this time von Braun attended a presentation given by Auguste Piccard. After the talk the young student approached the famous pioneer of high-altitude balloon flight, and stated to him: “You know, I plan on travelling to the Moon at some time.” Piccard is said to have responded with encouraging words.[12]

He was greatly influenced by Oberth, and he said of him:

Hermann Oberth was the first, who when thinking about the possibility of spaceships grabbed a slide-rule and presented mathematically analyzed concepts and designs…. I, myself, owe to him not only the guiding-star of my life, but also my first contact with the theoretical and practical aspects of rocketry and space travel. A place of honor should be reserved in the history of science and technology for his ground-breaking contributions in the field of astronautics.[13]

German career

]The Prussian rocketeer and working under the Nazis

Walter Dornberger, Friedrich OlbrichtWilhelm von Leeb, and von Braun at Peenemünde, 1941

Von Braun was working on his creative doctorate when the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP, or Nazi party) came to power in a coalition government in Germany; rocketry almost immediately became part of the national agenda. An artillery captain, Walter Dornberger, arranged an OrdnanceDepartment research grant for Von Braun, who then worked next to Dornberger’s existing solid-fuel rocket test site at Kummersdorf. He was awarded a doctorate in physics[14] (aerospace engineering) on July 27, 1934 from the University of Berlin for a thesis titled About Combustion Tests; his doctoral advisor was Erich Schumann.[15] However, this thesis was only the public part of von Braun’s work. His actual full thesis, Construction, Theoretical, and Experimental Solution to the Problem of the Liquid Propellant Rocket (dated April 16, 1934) was kept classified by the army, and was not published until 1960.[16] By the end of 1934, his group had successfully launched two rockets that rose to heights of 2.2 and 3.5 kilometers.

At the time, Germany was highly interested in American physicist Robert H. Goddard‘s research. Before 1939, German scientists occasionally contacted Goddard directly with technical questions. Wernher von Braun used Goddard’s plans from various journals and incorporated them into the building of the Aggregat(A) series of rockets. The A-4 rocket is the well known V-2.[17] In 1963, von Braun reflected on the history of rocketry, and said of Goddard’s work: “His rockets … may have been rather crude by present-day standards, but they blazed the trail and incorporated many features used in our most modern rockets and space vehicles.”[8] Goddard confirmed his work was used by von Braun in 1944, shortly before the Nazis began firing V-2s at England. A V2 crashed in Sweden and some parts were sent to an Annapolis lab where Goddard was doing research for the Navy. If this was the so-called Bäckebo Bomb, it had been procured by the British in exchange for Spitfires; Annapolis would have received some parts from them. Goddard is reported to have recognized components he had invented, and inferred that his brainchild had been turned into a weapon.[18]

There were no German rocket societies after the collapse of the VFR, and civilian rocket tests were forbidden by the new Nazi regime. Only military development was allowed and to this end, a larger facility was erected at the village of Peenemünde in northern Germany on the Baltic Sea. This location was chosen partly on the recommendation of von Braun’s mother, who recalled her father’s duck-hunting expeditions there. Dornberger became the military commander at Peenemünde, with von Braun as technical director. In collaboration with the Luftwaffe, the Peenemünde group developed liquid-fuel rocket engines for aircraft and jet-assisted takeoffs. They also developed the long-range A-4 ballistic missile and the supersonic Wasserfall anti-aircraft missile.

In November 1937 (other sources: December 1, 1932), von Braun joined the National Socialist German Workers Party. An Office of Military Government, United States document dated April 23, 1947, states that von Braun joined the Waffen-SS (Schutzstaffel) horseback riding school in 1933, then the National Socialist Party on May 1, 1937, and became an officer in the Waffen-SS from May 1940 until the end of the war.

Amongst his comments about his NSDAP membership von Braun has said:

I was officially demanded to join the National Socialist Party. At this time (1937) I was already technical director of the Army Rocket Center at Peenemünde … My refusal to join the party would have meant that I would have to abandon the work of my life. Therefore, I decided to join. My membership in the party did not involve any political activities … in Spring 1940, one SS-Standartenführer (SS Colonel) Müller … looked me up in my office at Peenemünde and told me that Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler had sent him with the order to urge me to join the SS. I called immediately on my military superior … Major-General W. Dornberger. He informed me that … if I wanted to continue our mutual work, I had no alternative but to join.[19]

Schematic of the A4/V2

That claim has been often disputed because in 1940, the Waffen-SS had shown no interest in Peenemünde yet.[20] Also, the assertion that persons in von Braun’s position were pressured to join the Nazi party, let alone the SS, has been disputed.[21] When shown a picture of him behind Himmler, Braun claimed to have worn the SS uniform only that one time,[citation needed] but in 2002 a former SS officer at Peenemünde told the BBC that von Braun had regularly worn the SS uniform to official meetings; it should be noted that this was mandatory.[22] He began as an Untersturmführer (Second Lieutenant) and was promoted three times by Himmler, the last time in June 1943 to SS-Sturmbannführer (Wehrmacht Major). Von Braun claimed this was a technical promotion received each year regularly by mail.[22]

On December 22, 1942, Adolf Hitler signed the order approving the production of the A-4 as a “vengeance weapon” and the group developed it to target London. Following von Braun’s July 7, 1943 presentation of a color movie showing an A-4 taking off, Hitler was so enthusiastic that he personally made von Braun a professor shortly thereafter.[23] In Germany at this time, this was an exceptional promotion for an engineer who was only 31 years old.

By that time the British and Soviet intelligence agencies were aware of the rocket program and von Braun’s team at Peenemünde. Over the nights of 17 and 18 August 1943RAF Bomber Command‘s Operation Hydra dispatched raids on the Peenemünde camp consisting of 596 aircraft and dropping 1,800 tons of explosives.[24] The facility was salvaged and most of the science team remained unharmed; however, the raids killed von Braun’s engine designer Walter Thiel and Chief Engineer Walther, and the rocket program was delayed.[25][26]

The first combat A-4, renamed the V-2 (Vergeltungswaffe 2 “Retaliation/Vengeance Weapon 2”) for propaganda purposes, was launched toward England on September 7, 1944, only 21 months after the project had been officially commissioned. Von Braun’s interest in rockets was specifically for the application of space travel, which led him to say on hearing the news from London: “The rocket worked perfectly except for landing on the wrong planet.” He described it as his “darkest day”.[citation needed] However, satirist Mort Sahl is often credited with mocking von Braun with the paraphrase “I aim at the stars, but sometimes I hit London“.[27] In fact that line appears in the film I Aim at the Stars, a 1960 biopic on von Braun.

Experiments with rocket aircraft

During 1936 von Braun’s rocketry team working at Kummersdorf investigated installing liquid-fuelled rockets in aircraft. Ernst Heinkel enthusiastically supported their efforts, supplying a He 72 and later two He 112sfor the experiments. Late in 1936 Erich Warsitz was seconded by the RLM to Wernher von Braun and Ernst Heinkel, because he had been recognized as one of the most experienced test-pilots of the time, and because he also had an extraordinary fund of technical knowledge.[28] After von Braun familiarized Warsitz with a test-stand run, showing him the corresponding apparatus in the aircraft, he asked:

“Are you with us and will you test the rocket in the air? Then, Warsitz, you will be a famous man. And later we will fly to the moon – with you at the helm!”[29]

A regular He 112

In June 1937, at Neuhardenberg (a large field about 70 kilometres east of Berlin, listed as a reserve airfield in the event of war), one of these latter aircraft was flown with itspiston engine shut down during flight by test pilot Erich Warsitz, at which time it was propelled by von Braun’s rocket power alone. Despite the wheels-up landing and having the fuselage on fire, it proved to official circles that an aircraft could be flown satisfactorily with a back-thrust system through the rear.[30]

At the same time, Hellmuth Walter‘s experiments into Hydrogen peroxide-based rockets were leading towards light and simple rockets that appeared well-suited for aircraft installation. Also the firm of Hellmuth Walter at Kiel had been commissioned by the RLM to build a rocket engine for the He 112, so there were two different new rocket motor designs at Neuhardenberg: whereas von Braun’s engines were powered by alcohol and liquid oxygen, Walter engines had hydrogen peroxide and calcium permanganate as acatalyst. Von Braun’s engines used direct combustion and created fire, the Walter devices used hot vapours from a chemical reaction, but both created thrust and provided high speed.[31] The subsequent flights with the He 112 used the Walter-rocket instead of von Braun’s; it was more reliable, simpler to operate and the dangers to test-pilot Erich Warsitz and machine were less.[32]

Slave labor

SS General Hans Kammler, who as an engineer had constructed several concentration camps including Auschwitz, had a reputation for brutality and had originated the idea of using concentration camp prisoners as slave laborers in the rocket program. Arthur Rudolph, chief engineer of the V-2 rocket factory at Peenemünde, endorsed this idea in April 1943 when a labor shortage developed. More people died building the V-2 rockets than were killed by it as a weapon.[33] Von Braun admitted visiting the plant at Mittelwerk on many occasions, and called conditions at the plant “repulsive”, but claimed never to have witnessed any deaths or beatings, although it had become clear to him by 1944 that deaths had occurred.[34] He denied ever having visited the Mittelbau-Dora concentration camp itself, where 20,000 died from illness, beatings, hangings and intolerable working conditions.[35]

On August 15, 1944, von Braun wrote a letter to Albin Sawatzki, manager of the V-2 production, admitting that he personally picked labor slaves from the Buchenwald concentration camp, who, he admitted 25 years later in an interview, had been in a “pitiful shape”.[not in citation given][3]

In Wernher von Braun: Crusader for Space, numerous statements by von Braun show he was aware of the conditions but felt completely unable to change them. A friend quotes von Braun speaking of a visit to Mittelwerk:

It is hellish. My spontaneous reaction was to talk to one of the SS guards, only to be told with unmistakable harshness that I should mind my own business, or find myself in the same striped fatigues!… I realized that any attempt of reasoning on humane grounds would be utterly futile. (Page 44)

When asked if von Braun could have protested against the brutal treatment of the slave laborers, von Braun team member Konrad Dannenberg told The Huntsville Times, “If he had done it, in my opinion, he would have been shot on the spot.”[36]

Others claim von Braun engaged in brutal treatment or approved of it. Guy Morand, a French resistance fighter who was a prisoner in Dora, testified in 1995 that after an apparent sabotage attempt:

Without even listening to my explanations, [von Braun] ordered the Meister to have me given 25 strokes…Then, judging that the strokes weren’t sufficiently hard, he ordered I be flogged more vigorously…von Braun made me translate that I deserved much more, that in fact I deserved to be hanged…I would say his cruelty, of which I was personally a victim, are, I would say, an eloquent testimony to his Nazi fanaticism.[37]

Robert Cazabonne, another French prisoner, testified that von Braun stood by and watched as prisoners were hung by chains from hoists.[38] Von Braun claimed he “never saw any kind of abuse or killing” and only “heard rumors…that some prisoners had been hanged in the underground galleries”.[39]

Arrest and release by the Nazi regime

According to André Sellier, a French historian and survivor of the Mittelbau-Dora concentration camp, Himmler had von Braun come to his Hochwald HQ in East Prussia in February 1944. To increase his power-base within the Nazi régime, Heinrich Himmler was conspiring to use Kammler to gain control of all German armament programs, including the V-2 program at Peenemünde.[40] He therefore recommended that von Braun work more closely with Kammler to solve the problems of the V-2, but von Braun claimed to have replied that the problems were merely technical and he was confident that they would be solved with Dornberger’s assistance.

Apparently von Braun had been under SD surveillance since October 1943. A report stated that he and his colleagues Riedel and Gröttrup were said to have expressed regret at an engineer’s house one evening that they were not working on a spaceship and that they felt the war was not going well; this was considered a “defeatist” attitude. A young female dentist who was an SS spy reported their comments.[40] Combined with Himmler’s false charges that von Braun was a communist sympathizer and had attempted to sabotage the V-2 program, and considering that von Braun was a qualified pilot who regularly piloted his government-provided airplane that might allow him to escape to England, this led to his arrest by the Gestapo.[40]

The unsuspecting von Braun was detained on March 14 (or March 15),[41] 1944 and was taken to a Gestapo cell in Stettin (now Szczecin, Poland),[40] where he was imprisoned for two weeks without even knowing the charges against him. It was only through the Abwehr in Berlin that Dornberger was able to obtain von Braun’s conditional release and Albert Speer, Reichsminister for Munitions and War Production, convinced Hitler to reinstate von Braun so that the V-2 program could continue.[40] Quoting from the “Führerprotokoll” (the minutes of Hitler’s meetings) dated May 13, 1944 in his memoirs, Speer later relayed what Hitler had finally conceded: “In the matter concerning B. I will guarantee you that he will be exempt from persecution as long as he is indispensable for you, in spite of the difficult general consequences this will have.”

Von Braun (with arm cast) immediately after his surrender

Surrender to the Americans

The Soviet Army was about 160 km from Peenemünde in the spring of 1945 when von Braun assembled his planning staff and asked them to decide how and to whom they should surrender. Afraid of the well known Soviet cruelty to prisoners of war, von Braun and his staff decided to try to surrender to the Americans. Kammler had ordered relocation of von Braun’s team to central Germany; however, a conflicting order from an army chief ordered them to join the army and fight. Deciding that Kammler’s order was their best bet to defect to the Americans, von Braun fabricated documents and transported 500 of his affiliates to the area around Mittelwerk, where they resumed their work. For fear of their documents being destroyed by the SS, von Braun ordered the blueprints to be hidden in an abandoned mine shaft in the Harzmountain range.[42]

While on an official trip in March, von Braun suffered a complicated fracture of his left arm and shoulder after his driver fell asleep at the wheel. His injuries were serious, but he insisted that his arm be set in a cast so he could leave the hospital. Due to this neglect of the injury he had to be hospitalized again a month later where his bones had to be re-broken and re-aligned.[42]

In April, as the Allied forces advanced deeper into Germany, Kammler ordered the science team to be moved by train into the town of Oberammergau in the Bavarian Alpswhere they were closely guarded by the SS with orders to execute the team if they were about to fall into enemy hands. However, von Braun managed to convince SS Major Kummer to order the dispersion of the group into nearby villages so that they would not be an easy target for U.S. bombers.[42]

On May 2, 1945, upon finding an American private from the U.S. 44th Infantry Division, von Braun’s brother and fellow rocket engineer, Magnus, approached the soldier on a bicycle, calling out in broken English: “My name is Magnus von Braun. My brother invented the V-2. We want to surrender.”[7][43] After the surrender, von Braun spoke to the press:

“We knew that we had created a new means of warfare, and the question as to what nation, to what victorious nation we were willing to entrust this brainchild of ours was a moral decision more than anything else. We wanted to see the world spared another conflict such as Germany had just been through, and we felt that only by surrendering such a weapon to people who are guided by the Bible could such an assurance to the world be best secured.”[44]

The American high command was well aware of how important their catch was: von Braun had been at the top of the Black List, the code name for the list of German scientists and engineers targeted for immediate interrogation by U.S. military experts. On June 19, 1945, two days before the scheduled handover of the area to the Soviets, US Army Major Robert B. Staver, Chief of the Jet Propulsion Section of the Research and Intelligence Branch of the U.S. Army Ordnance Corps in London, and Lt Col R. L. Williams took von Braun and his department chiefs by jeep from Garmisch to Munich. The group was flown to Nordhausen, and was evacuated 40 miles (64 km) southwest to Witzenhausen, a small town in the American Zone, the next day.[45] Von Braun was briefly detained at the “Dustbin” interrogation center at Kransberg Castle where the elite of the Third Reich’s economy, science and technology were debriefed by U.S. and British intelligence officials.[46] Initially he was recruited to the U.S. under a program called “Operation Overcast,” subsequently known as Operation Paperclip.

American career

U.S. Army career

On June 20, 1945, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull[dubious – discuss] approved the transfer of von Braun and his specialists to America; however this was not announced to the public until October 1, 1945.[47]Von Braun was among those scientists for whom the U.S. Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency created false employment histories and expunged Nazi Party memberships and regime affiliations from the public record. Once “bleached” of their Nazism, the US Government granted the scientists security clearance to work in the United States. “Paperclip,” the project’s operational name, derived from the paperclips used to attach the scientists’ new political personæ to their “US Government Scientist” personnel files.[48]

The first seven technicians arrived in the United States at New Castle Army Air Field, just south of Wilmington, Delaware, on September 20, 1945. They were then flown to Boston and taken by boat to the Army Intelligence Service post at Fort Strong in Boston Harbor. Later, with the exception of von Braun, the men were transferred to Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland to sort out the Peenemünde documents, enabling the scientists to continue their rocketry experiments.

Finally, von Braun and his remaining Peenemünde staff (see List of German rocket scientists in the United States) were transferred to their new home at Fort Bliss, Texas, a large Army installation just north of El Paso. Von Braun would later write he found it hard to develop a “genuine emotional attachment” to his new surroundings.[49] His chief design engineer Walther Reidel became the subject of a December 1946 article “German Scientist Says American Cooking Tasteless; Dislikes Rubberized Chicken,’ exposing the presence of von Braun’s team in the country and drawing criticism from Albert Einstein and John Dingell.[49]Requests to improve their living conditions such as laying linoleum over their cracked wood flooring were rejected.[49] Von Braun remarked that “…at Peenemünde we had been coddled, here you were counting pennies…”[49] At the age of 26, von Braun had thousands of engineers who answered to him, but was now answering to “pimply” 26 year-old Major Jim Hamill who possessed an undergraduate degree in engineering.[49] His loyal Germans still addressed him as Herr Professor, but Hamill addressed him as Wernher and never bothered to respond to von Braun’s request for more materials, and every proposal for new rocket ideas were dismissed.[49]

While there, they trained military, industrial and university personnel in the intricacies of rockets and guided missiles. As part of the Hermes project they helped to refurbish, assemble and launch a number of V-2s that had been shipped from Germany to the White Sands Proving Ground in New Mexico. They also continued to study the future potential of rockets for military and research applications. Since they were not permitted to leave Fort Bliss without military escort, von Braun and his colleagues began to refer to themselves only half-jokingly as “PoPs,” “Prisoners of Peace.”

In 1950, at the start of the Korean War, von Braun and his team were transferred to Huntsville, Alabama, his home for the next 20 years. Between 1950 and 1956, von Braun led the Army’s rocket development team at Redstone Arsenal, resulting in the Redstone rocket, which was used for the first live nuclear ballistic missile tests conducted by the United States.

As director of the Development Operations Division of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA), von Braun, with his team, then developed the Jupiter-C, a modified Redstone rocket.[50] The Jupiter-C successfully launched the West’s first satellite, Explorer 1, on January 31, 1958. This event signaled the birth of America’s space program.

Despite the work on the Redstone rocket, the twelve years from 1945 to 1957 were probably some of the most frustrating for von Braun and his colleagues. In the Soviet UnionSergei Korolev and his team of scientists and engineers plowed ahead with several new rocket designs and the Sputnik program, while the American government was not very interested in von Braun’s work or views and only embarked on a very modest rocket-building program. In the meantime, the press tended to dwell on von Braun’s past as a member of the SS and the slave labor used to build his V-2 rockets.

Popular concepts for a human presence in space

Repeating the pattern he had established during his earlier career in Germany, von Braun – while directing military rocket development in the real world – continued to entertain his engineer-scientist’s dream of a future world in which rockets would be used for space exploration. However, instead of risking being sacked, he now was increasingly in a position to popularize these ideas. The May 14, 1950 headline of The Huntsville Times (“Dr. von Braun Says Rocket Flights Possible to Moon”) might have marked the beginning of these efforts. These disclosures rode a moonflight publicity wave that was created by the two 1950 U.S. science fiction films, Destination Moon and Rocketship X-M.

In 1952, von Braun first published his concept of a manned space station in a Collier’s Weekly magazine series of articles entitled “Man Will Conquer Space Soon!“. These articles were illustrated by the space artist Chesley Bonestell and were influential in spreading his ideas. Frequently von Braun worked with fellow German-born space advocate and science writer Willy Ley to publish his concepts, which, unsurprisingly, were heavy on the engineering side and anticipated many technical aspects of space flight that later became reality.

The space station (to be constructed using rockets with recoverable and reusable ascent stages) would be a toroid structure, with a diameter of 250 feet (76 m). The space station would spin around a central docking nave to provide artificial gravity, and would be assembled in a 1,075 mile (1,730 km) two-hour, high-inclination Earth orbit allowing observation of essentially every point on earth on at least a daily basis. The ultimate purpose of the space station would be to provide an assembly platform for manned lunar expeditions. The notion of a rotating wheel-shaped station was introduced in 1929 by Herman Potočnik in his bookThe Problem of Space Travel – The Rocket Motor. More than a decade later, the movie version of 2001: A Space Odyssey would draw heavily on the design concept in its visualization of an orbital space station.

Von Braun envisaged these expeditions as very large-scale undertakings, with a total of 50 astronauts travelling in three huge spacecraft (two for crew, one primarily for cargo), each 49 m (160.76 ft) long and 33 m (108.27 ft) in diameter and driven by a rectangular array of 30 rocket propulsion engines.[51] Upon arrival, astronauts would establish a permanent lunar base in the Sinus Roris region by using the emptied cargo holds of their craft as shelters, and would explore their surroundings for eight weeks. This would include a 400 km expedition in pressurized rovers to the crater Harpalus and the Mare Imbrium foothills.

Walt Disney and von Braun, seen in 1954 holding a model of his passenger ship, collaborated on a series of three educational films.

At this time von Braun also worked out preliminary concepts for a manned Mars mission that used the space station as a staging point. His initial plans, published in The Mars Project (1952), had envisaged a fleet of ten spacecraft (each with a mass of 3,720 metric tons), three of them unmanned and each carrying one 200-ton winged lander[52] in addition to cargo, and nine crew vehicles transporting a total of 70 astronauts. Gigantic as this mission plan was, its engineering and astronautical parameters were thoroughly calculated. A later project was much more modest, using only one purely orbital cargo ship and one crewed craft. In each case, the expedition would use minimum-energy Hohmann transfer orbits for its trips to Mars and back to Earth.

Before technically formalizing his thoughts on human spaceflight to Mars, von Braun had written a science fiction novel, set in 1980, on the subject. According to his biographer, Erik Bergaust, the manuscript was rejected by no less than 18 publishers. Von Braun later published small portions of this opus in magazines, to illustrate selected aspects of his Mars project popularizations. The complete manuscript, titled Project MARS: A Technical Tale, did not appear as a printed book until December 2006.[53]

In the hope that its involvement would bring about greater public interest in the future of the space program, von Braun also began working with Walt Disney and the Disney studios as a technical director, initially for three television films about space exploration. The initial broadcast devoted to space exploration was Man in Space, which first went on air on March 9, 1955, drawing 42 million viewers and unofficially the second-highest rated television show in American history.[49][54]

Later (in 1959) von Braun published a short booklet[55] — condensed from episodes that had appeared in This Week Magazine before—describing his updated concept of the first manned lunar landing. The scenario included only a single and relatively small spacecraft—a winged lander with a crew of only two experienced pilots who had already circumnavigated the moon on an earlier mission. The brute-force direct ascent flight schedule used a rocket design with five sequential stages, loosely based on the Novadesigns that were under discussion at this time. After a night launch from a Pacific island the first three stages would bring the spacecraft (with the two remaining upper stages attached) to terrestrial escape velocity, with each burn creating an acceleration of 8-9 times standard gravity. Residual propellant in the third stage would be used for the deceleration intended to commence only a few hundred kilometers above the landing site in a crater near the lunar north pole. The fourth stage provided acceleration to lunar escape velocity while the fifth stage would be responsible for a deceleration during return to the Earth to a residual speed that allows aerocapture of the spacecraft ending in a runway landing, much in the way of the Space Shuttle. One remarkable feature of this technical tale is that the engineer Wernher von Braun anticipated a medical phenomenon that would become apparent only years later: being a veteran astronaut with no history of serious adverse reactions to weightlessness offers no protection against becoming unexpectedly and violently spacesick.

Von Braun with President Kennedy at Redstone Arsenal in 1963

Von Braun with the F-1 engines of the Saturn V first stage at the US Space and Rocket Center

Still with his rocket models, von Braun is pictured in his new office at NASA headquarters in 1970

Concepts for orbital warfare

Von Braun developed and published his space station concept during the very “coldest” time of the Cold War, when the U.S. government for which he worked put the containment of the Soviet Union above everything else. The fact that his space station – if armed with missiles that could be easily adapted from those already available at this time – would give the United States space superiority in both orbital and orbit-to-ground warfare did not escape him. Although von Braun took care to qualify such military applications as “particularly dreadful” in his popular writings, he elaborated on them in several of his books and articles. This much less peaceful aspect of von Braun’s “drive for space” has recently been reviewed by Michael J. Neufeld from the Space History Division of the National Air and Space Museum in Washington.[56]

]NASA career

The U.S. Navy had been tasked with building a rocket to lift satellites into orbit, but the resulting Vanguard rocket launch system was unreliable. In 1957, with the launch of Sputnik 1, there was a growing belief within the United States that America lagged behind the Soviet Union in the emerging Space Race. American authorities then chose to utilize von Braun and his German team’s experience with missiles to create an orbital launch vehicle, something von Braun had originally proposed in 1954 but had been denied.[49]

NASA was established by law on July 29, 1958. One day later, the 50th Redstone rocket was successfully launched from Johnston Atoll in the south Pacific as part ofOperation Hardtack I. Two years later, NASA opened the Marshall Space Flight Center at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, and the ABMA development team led by von Braun was transferred to NASA. In a face-to-face meeting with Herb York at the Pentagon, von Braun made it clear he would go to NASA only if development of the Saturn was allowed to continue.[57] Presiding from July 1960 to February 1970, von Braun became the center’s first Director.

Charles W. Mathews, von Braun, George Mueller, and Lt. Gen. Samuel C. Phillips in the Launch Control Center following the successful Apollo 11 liftoff on July 16, 1969

The Marshall Center’s first major program was the development of Saturn rockets to carry heavy payloads into and beyond Earth orbit. From this, the Apollo program for manned moon flights was developed. Wernher von Braun initially pushed for a flight engineering concept that called for an Earth orbit rendezvous technique (the approach he had argued for building his space station), but in 1962 he converted to the more risky lunar orbit rendezvous concept that was subsequently realized.[58] During Apollo, he worked closely with former Peenemünde teammate, Kurt H. Debus, the first director of the Kennedy Space Center. His dream to help mankind set foot on the Moonbecame a reality on July 16, 1969 when a Marshall-developed Saturn V rocket launched the crew of Apollo 11 on its historic eight-day mission. Over the course of the program, Saturn V rockets enabled six teams of astronauts to reach the surface of the Moon.

During the late 1960s, von Braun was instrumental in the development of the U.S. Space & Rocket Center in Huntsville. The desk from which he guided America’s entry in the Space Race remains on display there.

During the local summer of 1966–67, von Braun participated in a field trip to Antarctica, organized for him and several other members of top NASA management.[59] The goal of the field trip was to determine whether the experience gained by US scientific and technological community during the exploration of Antarctic wastelands would be useful for the manned exploration of space. Von Braun was mainly interested in management of the scientific effort on Antarctic research stations, logistics, habitation and life support, and in using the barren Antarctic terrain like the glacial dry valleys to test the equipment that one day would be used to look for signs of life on Mars and other worlds.

In an internal memo dated January 16, 1969,[60] von Braun had confirmed to his staff that he would stay on as a center director at Huntsville to head the Apollo Applications Program. A few months later, on occasion of the first moon-landing, he publicly expressed his optimism that the Saturn V carrier system would continue to be developed, advocating manned missions to Mars in the 1980s.[61]

However, on March 1, 1970, von Braun and his family relocated to Washington, D.C., when he was assigned the post of NASA’s Deputy Associate Administrator for Planning at NASA Headquarters. After a series of conflicts associated with the truncation of the Apollo program, and facing severe budget constraints, von Braun retired from NASA on May 26, 1972. Not only had it become evident by this time that his and NASA’s visions for future U.S. space flight projects were incompatible; it was perhaps even more frustrating for him to see popular support for a continued presence of man in space wane dramatically once the goal to reach the moon had been accomplished.

Von Braun and William R. Lucas, the first and third Marshall Space Flight Center directors, viewing a Spacelabmodel in 1974

Dr. von Braun also developed the idea of a Space Camp that would train children in fields of science and space technologies as well as help their mental development much the same way sports camps aim at improving physical development.

Career after NASA

After leaving NASA, von Braun became Vice President for Engineering and Development at the aerospace company, Fairchild Industries in Germantown, Maryland on July 1, 1972.

In 1973 a routine health check revealed kidney cancer, which during the following years could not be controlled by surgery.[62]Von Braun continued his work to the extent possible, which included accepting invitations to speak at colleges and universities as he was eager to cultivate interest in human spaceflight and rocketry, particularly with students and a new generation of engineers. On one such visit in the spring of 1974 to Allegheny College, von Braun revealed a more personal side, including an allergy to feather pillows and a disdain for some rock music of the era.[citation needed]

Von Braun helped establish and promote the National Space Institute, a precursor of the present-day National Space Society, in 1975, and became its first president and chairman. In 1976, he became scientific consultant to Lutz Kayser, the CEO ofOTRAG, and a member of the Daimler-Benz board of directors. However, his deteriorating health forced him to retire from Fairchild on December 31, 1976. When the 1975 National Medal of Science was awarded to him in early 1977 he was hospitalized, and unable to attend the White House ceremony.

Personal life

Maria von Braun, wife of Wernher von Braun

During his stay at Fort Bliss, von Braun mailed a marriage proposal to 18-year-old Maria Luise von Quistorp (born June 10, 1928), his cousin on his mother’s side. On March 1, 1947, having received permission to go back to Germany and return with his bride, he married her in a Lutheran church in Landshut, Germany. He and his bride, as well as his father and mother, returned to New York on March 26, 1947.

On 9 December 1948, the von Brauns’ first daughter, Iris Careen, was born at Fort Bliss Army Hospital.[50] The von Brauns eventually had two more children, Margrit Cécile on May 8, 1952 and Peter Constantine on June 2, 1960.

On April 15, 1955, von Braun became a naturalized citizen of the United States.

Death

On June 16, 1977, Wernher von Braun died of pancreatic cancer in Alexandria, Virginia, at the age of 65.[63][64] He was buried at the Ivy Hill Cemetery in Alexandria, Virginia.[65]

Grave of Wernher von Braun in Ivy Hill Cemetery (Alexandria, Virginia)

Published works

  • Proposal for a Workable Fighter with Rocket Drive. July 6, 1939.
    • The proposed vertical take-off interceptor[66] for climbing to 35,000 ft in 60 seconds was rejected by the Luftwaffe in the autumn of 1941[26]:258 for the Me 163 Komet[67] and never produced. (The differingBachem Ba 349 was produced during the 1944 Emergency Fighter Program.)
  • ‘Survey’ of Previous Liquid Rocket Development in Germany and Future Prospects. May 1945.[68]
  • A Minimum Satellite Vehicle Based on Components Available from Developments of the Army Ordnance Corps. September 15, 1954. “It would be a blow to U.S. prestige if we did not [launch a satellite] first.”[68]
  • The Mars Project, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, (1953). With Henry J. White, translator.
  • German Rocketry, The Coming of the Space Age. New York: Meredith Press. 1967.
  • First Men to the Moon, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York (1958). Portions of work first appeared in This Week Magazine.
  • Daily Journals of Werner von Braun, May 1958-March 1970. March 1970.[68]
  • History of Rocketry & Space Travel, New York, Crowell (1975). With Frederick I. Ordway III.
  • The Rocket’s Red Glare, Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, (1976). With Frederick I. Ordway III.
  • Project Mars: A Technical Tale, Apogee Books, Toronto (2006). A previously unpublished science fiction story by von Braun. Accompanied by paintings from Chesley Bonestell and von Braun’s own technical papers on the proposed project.
  • The Voice of Dr. Wernher von Braun, Apogee Books, Toronto (2007). A collection of speeches delivered by von Braun over the course of his career.
  • Wernher von Braun, Crusader for Space, A Biographical Memoir, Ernst Stuhlinger and Fredrick I. Ordway III, Krieger ISBN 0-89464-842-X. Two volumes on the life of von Braun,

Recognition and critique

In 1970, Huntsville, Alabama honored von Braun’s years of service with a series of events including the unveiling of a plaque in his honor. Pictured (l–r), his daughter Iris, wife Maria, U.S. Sen. John Sparkman, Alabama Gov. Albert Brewer, von Braun, son Peter, and daughter Margrit.

  • Apollo space program director Sam Phillips was quoted as saying that he did not think that America would have reached the moon as quickly as it did without von Braun’s help. Later, after discussing it with colleagues, he amended this to say that he did not believe America would have reached the moon at all.[citation needed]
  • The crater von Braun on the Moon is named after him.
  • Von Braun received a total of 12 honorary doctorates, among them, on January 8, 1963, one from the Technical University of Berlin from which he had graduated.
  • Von Braun was responsible for the creation of the Research Institute at the University of Alabama in Huntsville. As a result of his vision, the university is one of the leading universities in the nation for NASA-sponsored research. The building housing the university’s Research Institute was named in his honor, Von Braun Research Hall, in 2000.
  • Several German cities (BonnNeu-IsenburgMannheimMainz), and dozens of smaller towns have named streets after Wernher von Braun.
  • The Von Braun Center (built 1975) in Huntsville is named in von Braun’s honor.
  • Scrutiny of von Braun’s use of forced labor at the Mittelwerk intensified again in 1984 when Arthur Rudolph, one of his top affiliates from the A-4/V2 through to the Apollo projects, left the United States and was forced to renounce his citizenship in place of the alternative of being tried for war crimes.[69]
  • A science- and engineering-oriented Gymnasium in Friedberg, Bavaria was named after Wernher von Braun in 1979. In response to rising criticism, a school committee decided in 1995, after lengthy deliberations, to keep the name but “to address von Braun’s ambiguity in the advanced history classes.”
  • An avenue in the Annadale section of Staten Island, New York was named for him in 1977.
  • Von Braun’s engineering approach was very conservative, building in additional strength to structure designs, a point of contention with other engineers who struggled to keep vehicle weight down. Von Braun’s insistence on further tests after Mercury-Redstone 2 flew higher than planned, has been identified as contributing to the Soviet Union’s success in launching the first human in space.[70]

Summary of SS career

  • SS number: 185,068
  • Nazi Party number: 5,738,692

Dates of rank

  • SS-Anwärter: November 1, 1933 (received rank upon joining SS Riding School)
  • SS-Mann: July 1934

(left SS after graduation from the school; commissioned in 1940 with date of entry backdated to 1934)

Honors

Quotations

On surrendering with his rocket team to the Americans in 1945: “We knew that we had created a new means of warfare, and the question as to what nation, to what victorious nation we were willing to entrust this brainchild of ours was a moral decision more than anything else. We wanted to see the world spared another conflict such as Germany had just been through, and we felt that only by surrendering such a weapon to people who are guided by the Bible could such an assurance to the world be best secured.”[75]

“All of man’s scientific and engineering efforts will be in vain unless they are performed and utilized within a framework of ethical standards commensurate with the magnitude of the scope of the technological revolution. The more technology advances, the more fateful will be its impact on humanity.”

“You must accept one of two basic premises: Either we are alone in the universe, or we are not alone in the universe. And either way, the implications are staggering”.

“If the world’s ethical standards fail to rise with the advances of our technological revolution, the world will go to hell. Let us remember that in the horse-and-buggy days nobody got hurt if the coachman had a drink too many. In our times of high-powered automobiles, however, that same drink may be fatal….”

On Adolf Hitler: “I began to see the shape of the man – his brilliance, the tremendous force of personality. It gripped you somehow. But also you could see his flaw — he was wholly without scruples, a godless man who thought himself the only god, the only authority he needed.”[77]

“Science and religion are not antagonists. On the contrary, they are sisters. While science tries to learn more about the creation, religion tries to better understand the Creator. While through science man tries to harness the forces of nature around him, through religion he tries to harness the force of nature within him.”

“My experiences with science led me to God. They challenge science to prove the existence of God. But must we really light a candle to see the sun?”

“Late to bed, early to rise, work like hell and advertise.”

DIE WELT: Wie in Brandenburg die Stasi wieder mitregiert

In Brandenburgs SPD machen Stasi-Spitzel Karriere – und das ausgerechnet im Wahlkreis von Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Viele Genossen sind entsetzt.

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Es ist der Wahlkreis des prominentesten Brandenburger SPD-Genossen: Frank-Walter Steinmeier, einst Außenminister und heute SPD-Bundestagsfraktionschef, errang 2009 in Brandenburg an der Havel erstmals ein eigenes Bundestagsmandat.

Stasi
Foto: dpa/DPA Regale mit Akten des einstigen Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit der DDR (Stasi) im Archiv der Jahn-Behörde

Dafür genügten ihm 32,8 Prozent der Wählerstimmen. Ausgerechnet hier, in der drittgrößten Stadt Brandenburgs, ist der SPD-Unterbezirk von Stasi-Spitzeln durchsetzt. Weder das politische Schwergewicht Steinmeier noch Brandenburgs Ministerpräsident und SPD-Landeschef Matthias Platzeck konnten bislang den Wiederaufstieg der alten Seilschaften stoppen.

 

Bereits im März mussten die beiden Vorzeige-Sozialdemokraten hilflos zusehen, wie mit Dirk Stieger (IM „Bergmann“) und Thomas Reichelt (IM „Wolfgang“) gleich zwei ehemalige Spitzel der SED-Geheimpolizei in den Parteivorstand des SPD-Unterbezirks gewählt wurden.

 

Brisante Papiere für die Presse

Doch das war erst die Ouvertüre. Jetzt hat die Stasi-Unterlagen-Behörde von Roland Jahn brisante Papiere für die Presse freigegeben. Es sind nur 51 Seiten, doch die haben es in sich. Denn sie beleuchten die Vergangenheit des SPD-Kandidaten für das Amt des Oberbürgermeisters in der kreisfreien Stadt – genau vier Monate vor dem Urnengang ein Debakel sondergleichen.

Anzeige

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Ohnehin steht die rot-rote Regierungskoalition in Potsdam unter keinem guten Stern. Als sie im Herbst 2009 ihre Arbeit aufnahm, wurden reihenweise Mandatsträger der Linkspartei, darunter eine stattliche Zahl von Landtagsabgeordneten, als ehemalige Mitarbeiter des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit (MfS) enttarnt.

Stasi-Beauftragter mit Stasi-Akte
Roland Jahn
Foto: dpa Der Journalist und Bürgerrechtler Roland Jahn ist der neue Bundesbeauftragte für Stasi-Unterlagen. Mit der Staatssicherheit hat er selbst einige Erfahrungen gemacht.
Foto: Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft Schon als Student in Jena (Bild von 1975) fiel der junge Roland Jahn der Staatssicherheit als “feindlich-negativ” auf und musste das Studium der Wirtschaftswissenschaften aufgeben. Dagegen…
Foto: Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft/ Manfred Hildebrand/Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft/Manfred Hildebrand … protestierte er mit einer Postkarte, die ihn mit überklebtem Mund zeigte. Als er auch noch die unabhängige polnische Gewerkschaft Solidarnosc in der DDR unterstützte, platzte der SED der Kragen: Am 1. September 1982 wurde er festgenommen …
Foto: Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft … und in Isolationshaft mit psychischer Folter und falschen Angaben dazu gebracht, einen Ausreiseantrag zu unterschreiben. Auf Druck der Bundesrepublik wurde er im Februar 1983 freigelassen. Das Bild zeigt Jahn am Ende seiner Haft. Trotzdem gab er…
Foto: MDA … nicht auf. Hier nimmt Roland Jahn im Jahr 1983 mit der Jenaer Friedensgemeinschaft an einer offiziellen Demonstration teil. Dabei…
Foto: Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft/Albrecht/Kleindienst … hatten die Bürgerrechtler eigene, nicht von der DDR-Regierung vorgesehene Transparente mitgebracht. Das…
Foto: Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft/Albrecht/Kleindienst … wurde von Stasi-Angehörigen und FDJ-Funktionären bestraft. Das Bild zeigt, wie sie die Friedensaktivisten angreifen und ihre Plakate zerstören.
Foto: Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft Für die SED waren Jahns öffentliche Aktionen zu viel: Im Juni 1983 wurde er abgeschoben. Die bundesdeutschen Grenzer begrüßte er mit den Worten “Ich bin immer noch Bürger der DDR”. Doch auch von Westdeutschland aus (hier auf der West-Seite der Berliner Mauer) arbeitete Roland Jahn weiter für die Bürgerrechte in der DDR.
Foto: Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft Als Journalist für die rbb-Sendung “Kontraste” drehte Jahn (r.) mit seinem Kollegen Peter Wensierski zahlreiche DDR-kritische Beiträge. Nach dem Ende der DDR machten sie sich um die Aufarbeitung verdient.
Foto: Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft/Nicola Kuzma, Super illu Als neuer Beauftragter für Stasi-Unterlagen hat Roland Jahn die Arbeit als TV-Journalist niedergelegt. Sein Thema bleibt aber das gleiche.

http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article13341878/Wie-in-Brandenburg-die-Stasi-wieder-mitregiert.html// //

Die SPD war geschockt. Jetzt zeigen die Vorgänge in Brandenburg an der Havel, dass die Sozialdemokraten sich auch ernsthafte Sorgen über die Vorgänge in den eigenen Reihen machen müssen. Offenbar wurde es versäumt, genauer hinzuschauen – zumindest in jener Stadt, die wegen ihres markanten Doms und einer mehr als 1000-jährigen Geschichte weit über die Landesgrenzen hinaus bekannt ist.

 

Dilemma für die SPD

Das Dilemma, in dem die SPD dort steckt, war vorhersehbar. Denn die Partei nominierte im März den umstrittenen Kommunalpolitiker Norbert Langerwisch zum Spitzenkandidaten für das höchste Amt im Rathaus. Ausgerechnet Langerwisch – der frühere Polizeichef und Bürgermeister hatte schon in der Vergangenheit mit einer Affäre bundesweit für Schlagzeilen gesorgt.

Kurz nachdem er 2003 bei der damaligen Oberbürgermeisterwahl gegen die CDU-Bewerberin Dietlind Tiemann unterlegen war, fanden sich bei einem Drogendealer Hunderte Blanko-Wahlzettel, die den Verdacht einer Manipulation des Wählervotums nahelegten. Langerwisch bestritt Kontakte zu der Unterweltsgröße – später musste er sie jedoch einräumen. Die Stadtverordneten wählten ihn daraufhin ab.

Vergeblich hat Platzeck jetzt versucht, eine neuerliche Kandidatur von Langerwisch zu verhindern. Doch eine Alternative fand sich nicht. Daraufhin schwenkte der Ministerpräsident und SPD-Landeschef um, nun lobte er den Parteifreund in höchsten Tönen.

 

Platzeck lobte Langerwisch

In einer am 28. April veröffentlichten Erklärung schrieb Platzeck: „Norbert Langerwisch ist eine gute Wahl für Brandenburg. Als Bürgermeister und als Polizist hat er seine Heimatstadt mitgestaltet und viel bewegt.“ Gut möglich, dass der Brandenburger Regierungschef diese Worte inzwischen bedauert. Denn Langerwisch hatte mit der DDR-Staatssicherheit offenbar engere Kontakte als bisher eingeräumt.

Die Jahn-Behörde jedenfalls hat den Sozialdemokraten, der zu DDR-Zeiten treu der SED diente, als Inoffiziellen MfS-Mitarbeiter eingestuft. Das Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz, auf dem die Arbeit der Jahn-Behörde beruht, ließ da keine andere Wahl. Denn laut seiner Akte hat Langerwisch noch kurz vor dem Fall der Mauer brisante Informationen an die SED-Geheimpolizei geliefert. Ausweislich der Stasi-Dokumente denunzierte er einen Kollegen der Volkspolizei, der „sehr dem Alkohol“ zuspreche, und berichtete über Familienangehörige mit West-Kontakten.

 

MfS spendierte Weinbrand

Das MfS war angetan: Laut einer überlieferten Quittung spendierte es dem Zuträger eine Flasche Weinbrand im Wert von 48 DDR-Mark. Langerwisch will nicht völlig ausschließen, dass er das Geschenk angenommen hat: „Das kann sein, die Stasi kam immer zum Geburtstag.“ Doch die Einstufung als Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter des MfS empört den SPD-Politiker, der nie eine Verpflichtungserklärung unterschrieben hat. „Ich habe keine inoffiziellen Informationen übermittelt“, sagte der Polizist dieser Zeitung. Er könne nichts dafür, was ein Stasi-Offizier über ihn aufgeschrieben habe. Dessen Darstellung entspringe „lebhafter Fantasie“.

Mehrere Überprüfungen auf eine Stasi-Tätigkeit seien ergebnislos verlaufen. Doch laut Stasi-Unterlagengesetz kommt es bei der Einstufung als IM allein darauf an, ob jemand bereit war, Informationen zu liefern.

Aus Langerwischs Sicht hat es sich um offizielle Kontakte in seiner Funktion bei der Volkspolizei gehandelt. In der Akte liest sich das anders. Dort heißt es, Langerwisch sei „aufgeschlossen“ und habe „keine Vorbehalte, sich zu Interna zu äußern“ – und zwar hinter dem Rücken seines Chefs, jedenfalls wenn stimmt, was in den Papieren steht.

 

Stasi-Mitarbeiter in der Justiz

Während Platzeck mit einer Wirtschaftsdelegation die USA bereist, gibt es weitere Hiobsbotschaften aus der Heimat. In Brandenburgs Justiz sind deutlich mehr Stasi-belastete Mitarbeiter tätig als bislang bekannt. Justizminister Volkmar Schöneburg (Linke) korrigierte am Mittwoch frühere Angaben nach oben: Demnach haben 152 Beschäftigte eine Stasi-Vergangenheit. Davon sind 13 Richter, einer ist Staatsanwalt.

Damit sind nun fast doppelt so viele Fälle bekannt wie noch vor knapp zwei Monaten. Juristen zeigten sich erstaunt über die neuen Angaben. „Mit dieser Zahl hätte ich nicht gerechnet“, sagte der Brandenburger Generalstaatsanwalt Erardo Rautenberg. „Die Zahl ist erstaunlich“, so Matthias Deller, Chef des Deutschen Richterbundes in Brandenburg.

 

Landesregierung muss politische Hygiene herstellen

Die Vereinigung der Opfer der Stalinismus (VOS) pocht auf Konsequenzen. Offensichtlich hätten in Brandenburg „Erich Mielkes Enkel in Scharen Karriere machen dürfen“, kritisierte der stellvertretende VOS-Bundeschef Hugo Diederich. Die Landesregierung in Potsdam sei gefordert, endlich die politische Hygiene in Brandenburg herzustellen. Er forderte eine Regelüberprüfung für den öffentlichen Dienst. Justizminister Schöneburg lehnt selbst eine Überprüfung der etwa 800 Richter im Lande ab.

 

Die SPD wiederum tut sich im Umgang mit ihrem Parteifreund Langerwisch schwer. Dessen Glaubwürdigkeit ist schwer erschüttert. Die CDU-Landeschefin Saskia Ludwig wirft Platzeck schon mangelnde Durchsetzungskraft in der eigenen Partei vor. „Dieser Mann hätte niemals aufgestellt werden dürfen.“ Der laxe Umgang der SPD mit ihrem politischen Personal „schadet dem Ansehen des Landes Brandenburg in Deutschland“.

Auch im Bundestag sind der Aktenfund und der Zustand der SPD im Unterbezirk Brandenburg an der Havel ein Thema. „Die Kandidatur einer Person wie Langerwisch beschädigt die Demokratie“, sagte der stellvertretende Vorsitzende der CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Arnold Vaatz, dieser Zeitung.

 

Platzeck muss Angelegenheit zur Chefsache machen

Der ehemalige Bürgerrechtler ist erstaunt, dass sich Platzeck noch jüngst hinter den Parteifreund gestellt hatte. „Er muss die Angelegenheit jetzt zur Chefsache machen und dafür sorgen, dass die Kandidatur zurückgezogen wird“, forderte Vaatz. Geschehe dies nicht, könne „aus der Personalie des OB-Kandidaten schnell eine Personalie Platzeck werden“.

In der Verantwortung sieht Vaatz aber auch Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Der gilt zwar nicht gerade als ein Freund des rot-roten Modells in Potsdam, hat aber bislang keinen Anlass gesehen, sich von den Stasi-Seilschaften in seinem Wahlkreis zu distanzieren. Ob er diese Linie bis zur Oberbürgermeisterwahl im September durchhält, wird sich zeigen.

 

http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article13341878/Wie-in-Brandenburg-die-Stasi-wieder-mitregiert.html

GAST-BEITRAG: “Die Täter sind unter uns – STASI-Seilschaften”

Die Täter sind unter uns. Über das Schönreden der DDR-Diktatur referierte der Historiker Dr. Hubertus Knabe am vergangenen Dienstag im voll besetzten Saal des Steigenberger Hotels in Hamburg.

Nach einleitenden Worten des Moderators Dr. Siegfried Schöne von der der CDU-nahen Konrad Adenauer Stiftung äußerte sich der Direktor der Gedenkstätte im ehemaligen Zentralgefängnis der DDR Staatssicherheit in Berlin Hohenschönhausen, Dr. Hubertus Knabe, äußerst kritisch über die Aufarbeitung der SED Verbrechen seit der Wiedervereinigung: „Die DDR wird vielfach verharmlost.”

Opfer benachteiligt

Knabe versteht sich gleichwohl als Anwalt der Opfer. So machte er deutlich, dass das Opferschutzgesetz für politisch Verfolgte in der kommunistischen DDR bis heute unzureichend sei.

Im Gegensatz zu NS-Opfern liege die Beweislast für erlittene Gesundheitsschäden durch Haft und Verfolgung bei den SED Opfern. Das erkläre, warum 95 Prozent der Anträge auf Opferrente von den Behörden abgelehnt werden. So komme es dazu, dass ein ehemaliger Wärter im Stasi-Knast Bautzen heute mehr Rente bekommt als ein damals dort inhaftierter Systemgegner. Hier konnte der Zuhörer leicht den Eindruck gewinnen, dass sich das Eintreten für Freiheits- und Menschenrechte und der Kampf gegen ein totalitäres Regime nicht „gelohnt” hat. Der Historiker forderte, dass nach den lobenden Worten für das Stasi-Filmdrama „Das Leben der Anderen” nun auch praktische Taten für die Opfer der Stasi folgen sollten.

„Mauertote selbst schuld an ihrem Tod”

Die Stasi-Offiziere von damals haben sich in verschiedenen Vereinigungen zu einem Netzwerk zur Durchsetzung ihrer Interessen organisiert, berichtete der Referent. Mit Hilfe findiger Juristen haben sie nicht nur die von der Bundesregierung geplante Kürzung ihrer Renten verhindert, sondern oftmals mit erfolgreichen Unterlassungsklagen, gerichtlichen Verfügungen und Durchsetzung hoher Geldstrafen eine Aufdeckung ihres menschenverachtenden Wirkens unterbunden. Hierbei berufen sich die Täter von damals auf das heutige Recht zur Wahrung ihres Persönlichkeitsschutzes. Auch seien die Mauertoten selbst daran schuld, dass sie tot seien, sie hätten ja Grenzübergänge benutzen können, so die dreiste öffentliche Behauptung der organisierten MfS-Mitarbeiter* Diese treten nun zunehmend selbstbewusster in der Öffentlichkeit auf. Knabe sieht die Ursache dafür in den fehlenden gesetzlichen Grundlagen für eine angemessene Strafverfolgung. Diese seien im Einigungsvertrag vom Bundestag nicht festgeschrieben worden. Aufgrund dieser Schilderung konnte der Zuhörer zur Erkenntnis gelangen, eine Ahndung des DDR-Unrechts sei politisch nicht gewollt. Schließlich seien in 40 Jahren DDR immer neue Kredite von der BRD in den offiziell verhassten Nachbarstaat geflossen, eingefädelt von ranghohen Bundespolitikern.

„Stasis-Peiniger nun Fallmanager”

Mangels Ausbildung geeigneter Mitarbeiter wurden nach der Wende in bundesdeutschen Behörden sehr viel mehr Bedienstete aus Polizei und Staatssicherheit der DDR übernommen als bisher angenommen. Ganz besonders sei dies bei den Arbeitsämtern der Fall, führte Knabe aus.

Nicht selten komme es vor, das dort ein arbeitsloses SED-Opfer seinem Peiniger aus DDR-Zeiten gegenübersitzt, der sich ihm dann als sein „Fallmanager” vorstellt. Schlimmer könne Demütigung nicht sein, sagte Knabe.

„Chance der Aufarbeitung nicht genutzt”

Statt die Chance zu ergreifen sich zu offenbaren und an der Aufklärung ihres Wirkens für einen neuen gesellschaftlichen Anfang beizutragen, haben die Täter von damals den erlernten Weg der Konspiration fortgesetzt.

Über den konstruierten Rechtspositivismus** des Leugnens und Klagens sind auch heute noch zahlreiche Personen in Amt und Würden, wie man an den Beispielen des Juristen Gregor Gysi (PDS) und des Politikers Manfred Stolpe (SPD) erkennen könne, bemerkte Knabe abschließend .

Die Freiheitskämpfer und Bürgerrechtler der DDR als wahre Helden der Wendezeit führen heute jedoch größtenteils ein Leben in der Bedeutungslosigkeit.

„Vergangenheitsbewältigung endet mit NS-Zeit”

Nach dem Vortrag entbrannte eine lebhafte Diskussion. Ein Teilnehmer sagte: „Ich war 10 Jahre wegen des „Verbrechens” der geplanten Republikflucht in Bautzen inhaftiert und halte heute Vorträge an Hamburger Schulen. Nach meinem letzten Vortrag kam ein Schüler auf mich zu und bedankte sich. In 13 Jahren Schule habe er noch nie von seinen Lehrern etwas über diese schlimme Zeit in Deutschland erfahren. Anscheinend endet die deutsche Vergangenheitsbewältigung mit der NS-Zeit auf dem Lehrplan!”

Thilo Gehrke

* MfS: Ministerium für Saatssicherheit, ein Instrument der SED zur Unterdrückung und Überwachung der DDR-Bürger

** Rechtspositivismus: Richtung der Rechtswissenschaft, die im Unterschied zum Naturrecht das Recht mit den in einem Staat tatsächlich (›positiv‹) geltenden Normen (gesetztes Recht und Gewohnheitsrecht) gleichsetzt und seine Rechtfertigung in der staatlichen Macht sieht. (aus: Meyers Lexikon)

http://www.epochtimes.de/126236_wenn-das-unrecht-verblasst-stasi-seilschaften-.html

DIE WELT: “STASI-Seilschaften” in Cottbus attackieren die Pressefreiheit a la “GoMoPa”

Telefonterror, Bedrohung der Interviewpartner, diskreditierende Unterstellungen – in den vergangenen Monaten war die Chefreporterin der “Lausitzer Rundschau”, Simone Wendler, unzähligen Einschüchterungsversuchen ausgesetzt. Ihr Haus wurde observiert, die Mailbox ihres Handys gar mit Morddrohungen besprochen. Seit kurzem nun wird versucht, Simone Wendler und ihre Arbeitsweise auch öffentlich zu diffamieren.

Vorreiter dieser Attacke auf den Ruf der 46-Jährigen ist “Der Märkische Bote”, ein in Cottbus erscheinendes Anzeigenblatt. Am 8. August schrieb Jürgen Heinrich, Herausgeber des Blattes, dass die “Journalistin ?S.W.’ den Verhör-Stil als journalistische Methode” betreibe. Dem Präsidenten der Handwerkskammer, Werner Schröter, sei durch ihre Berichterstattung zum Cottbuser Baufilz ein “kaum reparierbarer seelischer und geschäftlicher Schaden” zugefügt worden. Unterstützung fand “Der Märkische Bote” in dem Stadtfernsehen LTV, das Bilder von Simone Wendler mit den Worten begleitete, sie bedrohe ihre Interviewpartner.

Hintergrund der Angriffe auf Simone Wendler ist ihre fortwährende Berichterstattung über Filz und Korruption in Cottbus. Dadurch war die Chefreporterin, die nach der Wende für die “Berliner Morgenpost”, den “Tagesspiegel”, die “Frankfurter Rundschau” sowie für Antenne Brandenburg gearbeitet hatte, maßgeblich an der Aufklärung des Cottbuser Bau-Skandals im Herbst vergangenen Jahres beteiligt. Die führenden Köpfe der städtischen Gebäudewirtschaft GWC hatten, so fand Wendler bei ihren Nachforschungen heraus, bevorzugt an Bekannte oder Unternehmen Aufträge vergeben, an denen die Manager selbst oder Angehörige beteiligt waren. Inzwischen hat sich die GWC, die mit 23 500 Wohnungen der größte Vermieter und auch wichtigste Bauauftraggeber ist, von ihrem Geschäftsführer Günter Thiesaat getrennt. Die Staatsanwaltschaft Neuruppin ermittelt gegen Thiesaat sowie gegen zwei Manager.

In Cottbus wird nun vermutet, dass sich die derzeitigen Angriffe auf Simone Wendler darauf gründen, dass “Die Lausitzer Rundschau” erneut den Namen eines Mannes genannt hat: Helmut Rauer. Der Unternehmer, der früher hauptamtlicher Mitarbeiter im Ministerium für Staatsicherheit war, habe es vermutlich nicht gern gesehen, im Zusammenhang mit einem Bericht über Schröter genannt zu werden. Das Blatt hatte im Juli geschrieben, dass Schröter als eine Art Strohmann für seine eigene Firma, die Werner Schröter GmbH, fungiere, an der Ex-Stasi-Mann Rauer stiller Teilhaber ist.

Es sei erschreckend, sagt Peter Stefan Herbst, Chefredakteur der “Lausitzer Rundschau”, dass alte Stasi-Seilschaften in Cottbus immer noch Macht und Einfluss besitzen, und auch heute noch griffen die ehemaligen Stasi-Mitarbeiter zu den Methoden von damals. “Dieser Fall hat eine ganz besondere Qualität,” so Herbst. Trotzdem lasse man sich nicht einschüchtern. “Wir werden unsere Berichterstattung natürlich fortsetzen.” Auch für Simone Wendler steht außer Frage, bei entsprechenden Hinweisen weiter über die Situation in Cottbus zu berichten. “Alles andere käme einer Kapitulation der Pressefreiheit gleich.”

http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article469360/Stasi_Seilschaften_in_Cottbus_attackieren_die_Pressefreiheit.html

TOP-SECRET: BELARUS BI-WEEKLY POL/ECON REPORT

VZCZCXRO5335
RR RUEHIK
DE RUEHSK #0059/01 0591540
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 281540Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MINSK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0699
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0053
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0709
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MINSK 000059 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR EUR/UMB (ASHEMA), DRL (DNADEL), AND EUR/ACE (KSALINGER)
EMBASSY KYIV FOR USAID (JRIORDAN AND KMONAGHAN) 

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON ENRG ETRD BO
SUBJECT: BELARUS BI-WEEKLY POL/ECON REPORT - FEBRUARY 26, 2009 

MINSK 00000059  001.3 OF 004 

1. The following are brief items of interest compiled by Embassy
Minsk. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Civil Society
-------------
- GOB Crackdown on Polish Minority Sparks Flash Point with EU
- The Aggressive Suppression of Peaceful Demonstrations Returns
- New Election Law But GOB Control of Election Commission Endures
- State Media is Encouraged to Criticize Opposition Candidates 

Economy
-------
- Belarus Accepts New Russian Oil Tariff, But Only for Six Months
- Gazprom Now Has 50% of Beltransgaz, But May Want Majority
- IMF Most Likely To Issue Final SBA Tranche in late March
- Belarus Suspends Unilateral WTO Accession Talks 

Quote of the Week
----------------- 

-------------
Civil Society
------------- 

2. GOB Crackdown on the Polish Minority Sparks Flash Point with
EU 

During his meeting with Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw
Sikorski in Kyiv on February 25, President Lukashenka termed the
conflict between Polish minority groups in Belarus a
"misunderstanding" that would be resolved.  He stated that there
were no bilateral problems stemming from differences between the
Union of Poles of Belarus (UPB) recognized by the GOB and the
Warsaw-backed UPB.  Sikorski said that Lukashenka had agreed to
set up an expert group to study the issue of Belarus' Polish
minority.  The meeting came as a European Parliament (EP)
delegation arrived in Minsk on February 25 for a three-day
fact-finding mission.  The delegation will meet with GOB
officials, representatives of civil society, and opposition
forces.  The mission is expected to issue a report based on its
findings that will be incorporated into an EP resolution on the
human rights situation in Belarus.  The report will also include
recommendations on membership of a Belarus' delegation to the
EU-Neighborhood East Parliamentary Assembly Euronest to be
comprised of ten participants with observer status, likely
representing MPs and civil society and opposition parties, a
position the GOB opposes.  Anzhelika Borys, Leader of the
Warsaw-backed UPB, was in Brussels and Warsaw recently for a
series of meetings with EP members and the Polish President who
expressed solidarity with the Polish minority in Belarus.  Borys
explained that the GOB has sought "to present it as an internal
conflict in order to distract peoples' attention, so that the
issue is not seen in the context of human rights."  The
Spokesperson for Catherine Ashton, the EU's High Representative
on foreign policy, expressed EU FMs' concerns about the human
rights situation in Belarus and announced that the EU will
"remain vigilant and continue to raise the issue."  In addition,
Ashton condemned police action against the Warsaw-backed union
and what she called "attempts by authorities to impose a new
leadership on the Polish community."  Critical statements and
yet another round of confrontation between the official and
unrecognized unions stemmed from the February 17 GOB ruling that
ordered Borys' union to vacate the Polish House in Ivyanets.  In
addition, Borys was sentenced February 15 to a $365 fine for
participating in an unsanctioned demonstration in Hrodna on
February 10 in support of Teresa Sobal, the ousted manager of
the Ivyanets Polish House.  Borys' three senior associates
received five-day jail sentences for similar charges on February
15.  A senior Polish MFA official was quoted on February 19 as
saying that all the 16 Polish Houses in Belarus should be under
control of the Borys' union.  Only two of the Polish Houses,
which serve as social and cultural centers, still remain outside
control of the GOB-controlled union. 

3. The Aggressive Suppression of Peaceful Demonstrations Returns 

After permitting the monthly Solidarity Day demonstrations to
take place this fall (reftel Minsk 024), authorities cracked
down aggressively, manhandling and arresting demonstrators, as 

MINSK 00000059  002.3 OF 004 

activists attempted to stage three public protests in February.
Belarus security forces arrested 29 democratic activists
demonstrating in downtown Minsk on February 16 in remembrance of
opposition leaders who disappeared in 1999-2000.  Police for the
first time grabbed people as they approached the venue dragged
them off to waiting vans, while others were arrested in the
square a few minutes later.  Only two of the several dozen
policemen on site were in uniform.  Officers in plainclothes
used force against journalists, blocking photo and video
cameras, and pushing them away from the demonstrators.  In a
separate incident on February 14, police broke up a St.
Valentine's Day march staged by the Malady Front and arrested 22
activists, including four legal minors.  Young Belarus and
European Belarus civil groups held three rallies at different
venues on February 8 in support of the two Vaukavysk activists,
Mikalay Autukhovich and Uladzimir Asipenka, who have been held
in pretrial detention on terrorism charges since February 8,
2009.  Approximately 20 activists from those groups were
detained.  On all three days, people detained were eventually
released without charges but many reported being fingerprinted
and recorded on video and complained of suffering bruises and
scratches while in police detention, as well being threatened
verbally. 

4. New Election Law But GOB Control of Election Commission
Endures 

At a press conference on February 1, Central Election Commission
(CEC) Chairwoman Lidziya Yarmoshyna said that for the April 25
local elections 1,495 territorial election commissions covering
regional, town, and village councils have been established in
Belarus, with a total membership of 11,697.  Of those, 51.9
percent were nominated through the collection of voter
signatures, 35.3 percent were nominated by NGOs and political
parties, and 12.8 percent by "workers' collectives."  The
requirement that one-third of commissions' membership be
nominated by NGOs and political parties is a new requirement in
the electoral law.  However, as it has turned out only 105
persons or 0.9 percent of the total territorial commission
members are affiliated with political parties; and of these only
15 represent opposition parties, including nine with the
Spravedlivy Mir Belarusian Party of the Left, four with the
United Civic Party, and two with the Belarusian Social
Democratic Party Hramada.  There are 4,024 NGO members on the
territorial commission, but the vast majority are associated
with the state-controlled NGOs or associations such as Belaya
Rus, National Youth Union, Women's Union, Veterans' Union,
Federation of Trade Unions and others.  Independent observers
concluded that the overwhelming majority of territorial
commission members had served on commissions during previous
elections campaigns in Belarus and described them as
"ideologically" loyal to the regime.  At the district level,
there are 367 elections commissions (covering Oblast/Regional
councils and the Minsk city council).  The district commissions
have a total of 4,542 members, of whom 43 percent were nominated
by NGOs, mostly GOB-controlled, 18.2 percent by "workers'
collectives," 6.7 percent by political parties; 32.1 percent
sought membership through the collection of signatures.  Of the
political party representatives, only 72 come from opposition
parties.  The deadline for establishment of precinct-level
electoral commissions is March 7. 

5. State Media is Encouraged to Criticize Opposition Candidates 

On February 16, CEC Chairwoman Yarmoshyna stated at a workshop
on the role of the media in the election process that state
media have the right to criticize "opposition candidates" during
the election campaign.  The First Deputy Head of the
Presidential Administration Natallya Pyatkevich echoed her
remarks, saying that any journalist has the right to hold an
opinion and "report" it.  It is up to the journalist to do this
"correctly," she said, arguing that the interest of freedom of
information should be counterbalanced by responsibility on the
part of reporters. 

-------
Economy
------- 

6. Belarus Accepts New Russian Oil Tariff, But Only for Six
Months 

MINSK 00000059  003.3 OF 004 

Lukashenka issued an edict on February 12 approving the January
27 bilateral agreement on oil imports from Russia.  Russian
President Medvedev signed the amendments into law on February
15.  According to the new agreement, Belarus will receive 6.3
million tons of Russian oil duty-free in 2010 for internal use;
but additional supplies for refinement and export to any market
other than Russia will be subject to a 100% export duty.
Russian duty-free quota for Belarus may be reduced if Belarus
imposes additional transit duties on Russian oil passing through
Belarus to Europe.  Domestic consumption of crude oil for each
year will be adjusted by October 1.  While Lukashenka made no
public comments after signing the amendments, some senior GOB
officials have repeatedly argued that the export duty applied to
Russian oil supplies to Belarus violates Russia's commitments
under principles of the Custom Union of Belarus, Russian and
Kazakhstan.  Belarus' Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Yevdochenko
announced on February 16 that Belarus will insist that the
export duty be abolished starting July 1, 2010, when the single
Customs Union is scheduled to become operational.  In the
meantime, the GOB is looking for ways maintain the profitability
of the country's two oil refineries, which are facing serious
difficulty in adjusting to terms of the new oil supply agreement
with Russia.  IMF has calculated that GOB will lose no less than
$2 billion dollars in revenues since it is no longer able to
pocket the difference between the subsidized oil it use to
receive from Russia, and the refined petroleum products it sold
mainly to Europe at market rates. 

7. Gazprom Now Has 50% of Beltransgaz, But May Want Majority 

According to media reports, Russia's Gazprom transferred $625
million on February 24 for 12.5% stock in the Beltransgaz
natural gas transportation company, thus increasing its stake in
Beltransgaz to 50%. This was the final tranche under $2.5
billion agreement signed on May 18, 2007.  On February 25, the
Russian Ambassador to Belarus Alexander Surikov told the press
that Gazprom is interested in acquiring a controlling stake in
OAO Beltransgaz. "If Gazprom paid for 50% in Beltransgaz, it
definitely wants to have more. What other reason is there to buy
a 50% stake?" he explained.  On a separate issue, according to
the First Deputy Director of Beltransgaz Sorokhan, Belarus did
pay for Russian gas delivered in January 2010 under the terms
outlined in the five-year gas supply contract signed with
Gazprom in 2006, that will remove Russian subsidies on gas in
full by 2011.  The average import price Belarus paid in 2009 was
$148 per 1,000 cubic meters.  In the first quarter of 2010,
Belarus will pay $168, and given the current trends in world
prices, expects the price to go up $4 in the 2nd quarter "unless
we have contract adjustments," the official explained.  Belarus
has already been forced to raise natural gas prices for its
industrial consumers by 25% to $217.7 per 1,000 cubic meters.
The country imported a total of 17.6 billion cubic meters of
Russian natural gas in 2009 - 20.4% short of the agreed volume,
but Gazprom, according to Russian Ambassador to Belarus
Alexander Surikov, is not likely to seek compensation from
Belarus for importing less than agreed.  At the same time,
Belarus' Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Yevdochenko stated on
February 16 that Belarus objected to the Gazprom's monopoly of
gas supply within the Belarusian, Russian, and Kazakhstani
Customs Union. Commenting on the wish of the Belarusian
authorities to revise Gazprom's monopoly on gas supplies to
Belarus the Russian Ambassador said that Belarus must respect
the monopoly of Russia's Gazprom on natural gas export. When
Belarusian monopoly exporters supply tractors and trucks to
Russia, "this is considered normal but when a single Russian
exporter supplies natural gas, it is considered wrong," he argued 

8. IMF Most Likely To Issue Final SBA Tranche in late March 

An IMF staff mission and the GOB have reached an agreement,
subject to approval by the IMF Executive Board at the end of
March, on completion of the fourth and final review of the $3.52
billion Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with Belarus, the IMF
announced.  The final tranche is valued at approximately $700
million under the current SBA.  According to the IMF staff
mission statement, "performance under the economic program
supported by the SBA has been good.  All end-December
performance criteria and structural benchmarks were met~ The
recent agreement with Russia on the pricing of imported crude
oil, in the absence of any offsetting measures, would widen
significantly the current account deficit and the general
government deficit.  The government is taking strong actions to 

MINSK 00000059  004.3 OF 004 

contain the effects of the oil price increase on the budget and
the balance of payments, and Fund staff support these measures.
Monetary policy and, more specifically, further tightening of
the limits on lending under government programs would support
the credibility of the exchange rate regime.  The current
exchange rate regime remains appropriate~  The authorities made
good progress on the financial sector issues~ The privatization
process has been slower than expected and the authorities need
to step it up to reduce government intervention in the economy
and to attract foreign direct investment.  The mission reached
understandings with the authorities on the measures which would
move the privatization process forward~  The authorities
expressed interest in continued cooperation with the IMF after
the expiration of the current program.  A possible follow-up
program with the Fund could be considered upon the completion of
the current [15-month] SBA."  The estimated external financial
gap that GOB will face in 2010 is $2 billion. 

9. Belarus Suspends Unilateral WTO Accession Talks 

Belarus Foreign Ministry official, Anton Kudasaw, announced on
February 19 that the WTO will soon take up consideration of the
possibility of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia jointly joining
WTO as a single Customs Union.  A negotiating team has been
formed to hold consultations with WTO members on the
simultaneous accession of the three countries. "Our side is
suspending unilateral negotiations on accession to the WTO," the
official explained.  Negotiations may begin after WTO members
study the explanatory notes for the Customs Union that are
expected to be submitted soon. 

-----------------
Quote of the Week
----------------- 

10. Speaking at the seminar for ideology officials of Minsk
region on February 17 the Fist Deputy Head of the Presidential
Administration Natalia Petkevich said: 

"Political and economic culture of Belarusians has grown. As a
result, their attitude to life and the world has become more
critical. In this context, ideology methods should change. They
should not be prohibitive. One should act subtler, wiser and
more cunningly~ We need an informal approach. The time of
slogans is gone. We should proceed from life and follow the
needs of people. If they need information, you should give it to
them. Otherwise, they will get it from other sources~ Let the
information originate from ideology services rather than
opposition websites."
SCANLAN

TOP-SECRET: DOCUMENTS ON SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

O 190550Z DEC 86
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS STATE 391887 

FOR POLITICAL OFFICERS, INFO PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS 

E.O. 12356:   N/A
TAGS: PTER SY
SUBJECT:      DOCUMENTS ON SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM 

1.  FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A FACT PAPER ON SYRIAN
SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AND A CHRONOLOGY OF SELECTED
TERRORIST INCIDENTS BY SYRIAN-SUPPORTED GROUPS.  EARLIER
VERSIONS OF BOTH DOCUMENTS WERE RELEASED TO THE PRESS ON
NOVEMBER 14 AND APPEARED IN THE USIA WIRELESS FILE ON
THAT DATE.  BOTH DOCUMENTS HAVE NOW BEEN REVISED TO
REFLECT THE HASI CONVICTION IN WEST BERLIN ON NOVEMBER
26.  WE ASSUME USIS MADE APPROPRIATE USE OF THE MATERIAL
APPEARING IN THE WIRELESS FILE.  WE ARE SENDING THE
REVISED VERSIONS SO THAT POLOFFS MAY SHARE THE
INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THESE DOCUMENTS WITH HOST
GOVERNMENTS. 

2.  (BEGIN TEXT OF FACT PAPER) 

DECEMBER 5, 1986 

SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:  1983-1986 

NEW EVIDENCE OF SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR AND DIRECT INVOLVEMENT
IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO LIGHT IN
TWO RECENT TRIALS INCLUDING THE CONVICTION IN GREAT
BRITAIN OF NIZAR HINDAWI FOR THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING OF AN
EL AL CIVILIAN AIRPLANE WITH 375 PASSENGERS ABOARD. 

SYRIA CLEARLY HAS A LONG RECORD OF INVOLVEMENT IN
TERRORISM.  SYRIA IS ONE OF THE "CHARTER MEMBERS" OF
COUNTRIES ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S TERRORISM LIST, WHICH
WAS FIRST COMPILED IN 1979.  (COUNTRIES CURRENTLY ON THE
LIST ARE SYRIA, LIBYA, IRAN, SOUTH YEMEN, AND CUBA.) 

THE PATTERN OF SYRIAN ACTIVITY IN SUPPORT OF TERRORISM
HAS VARIED.  FROM THE MID-1970'S THROUGH 1983, SYRIAN
PERSONNEL ARE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN
TERRORIST OPERATIONS.  THESE OPERATIONS WERE PRIMARILY
DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER ARABS, SUCH AS SYRIAN DISSIDENTS,
MODERATE ARAB STATES SUCH AS JORDAN, AND PRO-ARAFAT
PALESTINIANS, AS WELL AS ISRAELI AND JEWISH TARGETS.  IN
1982, FOR EXAMPLE, A CAR BOMB EXPLODED IN FRONT OF THE
OFFICES OF A LEBANESE-OWNED PRO-IRAQI NEWSPAPER IN
DOWNTOWN PARIS, KILLING ONE PERSON AND INJURING SCORES OF
OTHERS.  FRANCE LATER EXPELLED TWO SYRIAN DIPLOMATS AND
ORDERED ITS AMBASSADOR HOME FOR CONSULTATIONS. 

BY LATE 1983 DAMASCUS HAD CURTAILED USE OF ITS OWN
PERSONNEL.  INSTEAD, IT BEGAN TO RELY MORE HEAVILY ON
TERRORIST GROUPS MADE UP OF NON-SYRIANS WHO HAVE BASES
AND TRAINING FACILITIES IN SYRIA AND SYRIAN-OCCUPIED
AREAS OF LEBANON.  THE MOST NOTORIOUS OF THESE IS THE ABU
NIDAL ORGANIZATION. 

AVAILABLE EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT SYRIA PREFERS TO
SUPPORT GROUPS WHOSE ACTIVITIES ARE GENERALLY IN LINE
WITH SYRIAN OBJECTIVES, RATHER THAN TO SELECT TARGETS OR
CONTROL OPERATIONS ITSELF.  DAMASCUS UTILIZES THESE
GROUPS TO ATTACK OR INTIMIDATE ENEMIES AND OPPONENTS AND
TO EXERT ITS INFLUENCE IN THE REGION.  YET AT THE SAME
TIME IT CAN DISAVOW KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR OPERATIONS.  SUCH
SYRIAN-SUPPORTED GROUPS HAVE CARRIED OUT SCORES OF
ATTACKS AGAINST PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB, TURKISH,
ISRAELI AND WESTERN TARGETS DURING THE PAST THREE
YEARS. 

THIS YEAR, INVESTIGATIONS INTO MAJOR INCIDENTS HAVE
REVEALED ANOTHER CHANGE IN SYRIAN ACTIVITIES:  THAT SYRIA
HAS NOT ABANDONED ITS WILLINGNESS TO BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED
IN TERRORIST ATTACKS.  THE BRITISH TRIAL AND
INVESTIGATION OF THE ABORTIVE EL AL BOMBING EXPOSED THE
DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF PRESIDENT ASSAD'S INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES.  AND THE WEST BERLIN TRIAL INTO THE BOMBING OF
THE GERMAN-ARAB FRIENDSHIP UNION IN WEST BERLIN REVEAED
THE INVOLVEMENT OF SYRIAN OFFICIALS.  TO A LARGE DEGREE,
SYRIA HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN COVERING ITS TRACKS.  NOW,
HOWEVER, IN BRITAIN AND BERLIN, EVIDENCE OF MORE DIRECT
SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT HAS EMERGED. 

LONDON AND BERLIN INVESTIGATIONS 

IN THE BRITISH INVESTIGATION OF THE ABORTED EL AL ATTACK,
HINDAWI TOLD BRITISH POLICE HE WAS RECRUITED BY HAITHAM
SAID, AN AIDE TO MAJOR GENERAL AL-KHULI, CHIEF OF SYRIAN
AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE.  ACCORDING TO THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL, AL-KHULI'S OPERATIVES: (1)
SUPPLIED HINDAWI, A JORDANIAN, WITH A SYRIAN PASSPORT;
(2) GAVE HIM DOLLARS 12,000 AND PROMISED HIM MORE MONEY
WHEN HE COMPLETED HIS MISSION TO PLANT A BOMB ABOARD AN
EL AL CIVILIAN AIRLINER; (3) PROVIDED HIM WITH THE BOMB
WHICH WAS CARRIED INTO LONDON ABOARD THE SYRIAN ARAB
AIRLINES, WHICH ALSO GAVE HIM SAA CREW MEMBER HOTEL
ACCOMMODATIONS; AND (4) TRAINED HIM IN THE BOMB'S USE. 

HINDAWI TRIED TO USE HIS PREGNANT GIRL FRIEND AS THE
UNWITTING CARRIER OF THE SOPHISTICATED BOMB WHICH WAS
BUILT INTO HER CARRY-ON BAG.  IF AN ALERT SECURITY
OFFICIAL HAD NOT SPOTTED THE DEVICE AFTER HER BAG CLEARED
AN EARLIER CHECK, 375 INNOCENT PERSONS, INCLUDING SOME
230 AMERICANS, WOULD HAVE PERISHED. 

AFTER THE APRIL 17 PLAN FAILED, ACCORDING TO EVIDENCE
PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL, HINDAWI FOLLOWED INSTRUCTIONS TO
GO TO THE SYRIAN EMBASSY, WHERE HE WAS GREETED BY THE
AMBASSADOR AND HIDDEN IN A SYRIAN SAFEHOUSE IN LONDON.
BRITISH PRESS REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION SAY BRITAIN
ALSO HAS EVIDENCE THAT THE SYRIAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON
WAS PERSONALLY INVOLVED SEVERAL MONTHS BEFORE THE
ATTEMPTED BOMBING IN RECRUITING HINDAWI FOR SYRIAN
INTELLIGENCE. 

IN WEST BERLIN, HINDAWI'S BROTHER, AHMAD HASI, AND
ANOTHER ARAB, FAROUK SALAMEH, WERE CONVICTED FOR THE
MARCH 29 BOMBING OF THE GERMAN-ARAB FRIENDSHIP UNION IN
WEST BERLIN IN WHICH ELEVEN PERSONS WERE INJURED.  IN A
SWORN STATEMENT, HASI SAID HE PICKED UP THIS BOMB AT THE
SYRIAN EMBASSY IN EAST BERLIN FROM A SENIOR SYRIAN AIR
FORCE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, HAITHEM SAEED, AND A SYRIAN
EXPLOSIVES EXPERT WAS SENT FROM DAMASCUS TO REPAIR THE
DEVICE AFTER IT TWICE FAILED TO EXPLODE. 

ABU NIDAL 

SYRIA CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE MOST ACTIVE AND BRUTAL
INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUP OPERATING TODAY, ABU NIDAL.
(SEE NOTE BELOW)  ALTHOUGH ABU NIDAL NOW ALSO RECEIVES
BACKING AND SUPPORT FROM LIBYA, AND SANCTUARY IN EASTERN
EUROPE, DAMASCUS HAS PROVIDED ABU NIDAL WITH IMPORTANT
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT EVER SINCE THE GROUP MOVED FROM IRAQ
IN 1983.  SYRIA ALLOWS ABU NIDAL'S GROUP TO MAINTAIN
TRAINING CAMPS IN THE LEBANESE BIQA' VALLEY, AN AREA
UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE SYRIAN ARMED FORCES.  SYRIA
PROVIDES THE GROUP WITH TRAVEL DOCUMENTS AND PERMITS ITS
OPERATIVES TO TRANSIT FREELY THROUGH DAMASCUS WHEN
DEPARTING ON MISSIONS.  SYRIA CONTINUES TO PERMIT
OPERATION OF ABU NIDAL FACILITIES IN DAMASCUS.  (THE
SYRIAN GOVERNMENT ASSERTS THAT THE SOLE FUNCTION OF THESE
FACILITIES IS LIMITED TO CULTURAL AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS.) 

ALTHOUGH LAST DECEMBER'S ROME AIRPORT ATTACK WAS
COMMITTED UNDER LIBYAN SPONSORSHIP, THE SURVIVING MEMBER
OF THE FOUR-MAN TERRORIST TEAM, ACCORDING TO REPORTS ON
THE ITALIAN INVESTIGATION, TOLD INVESTIGATORS THE TEAM
WAS TRAINED IN SYRIAN-OCCUPIED AREAS OF LEBANON BY
SYRIANS.  THE TEAM THEN TRAVELED TO DAMASCUS, WHERE IT
REMAINED WHILE FINAL PREPARATIONS WERE MADE FOR THE
ATTACK IN WHICH 16 CIVILIANS AND 3 TERRORISTS WERE
KILLED. 

IN ANKARA ON NOVEMBER 6, TURKISH PROSECUTERS ISSUED AN
INDICTMENT ACCUSING SIX PALESTINIANS WORKING FOR THE ABU
NIDAL ORGANIZATION OF KILLING A JORDANIAN DIPLOMAT IN
JULY, 1985.  THE INDICTMENT ALSO LINKED THE MEN WITH FOUR
OTHER ACTIONS, INCLUDING THE SEPTEMBER 6, 1986 ATTACK ON
AN ISTANBUL SYNAGOGUE, KILLING 21 PERSONS AND A 1983
ATTEMPT TO PLACE A BOMB ON AN ALITALIA FLIGHT, AND THE
ATTEMPTED CAR BOMBING OF A U.S. OFFICERS CLUB IN IZMIR IN
1983. 

(BEGIN NOTE)  THE OFFICIAL NAME OF THE ABU NIDAL
ORGANIZATION IS "FATAH - REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL."  IT IS
HEADED BY SABRI AL-BANNA, A PALESTINIAN WHO USES THE NOM
DE GUERRE ABU NIDAL.  THE GROUP'S ORIGINAL NAME WAS THE
BLACK JUNE ORGANIZATION WHEN IT WAS FORMED IN 1976.
IRONICALLY, THIS GROUP FIRST CONCENTRATED ON SYRIAN
TARGETS, INCLUDING AN ATTACK ON SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
KHADDAM, NOW VICE PRESIDENT, IN 1977.  (END NOTE) 

THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION'S MOVE TO SYRIA IN 1983 WAS
FOLLOWED BY A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN THE GROUP'S TERRORIST
ATTACKS:  MORE THAN A DOZEN ATTACKS IN 1984 AND TWICE
THAT NUMBER IN 1985.  MORE THAN HALF OF THE 1985 ATTACKS
OCCURRED IN WESTERN EUROPE, INCLUDING ATTACKS ON BRITISH
TOURISTS AT HOTELS IN ATHENS.   WHEN KING HUSSEIN
LAUNCHED HIS FEBRUARY 1985 PEACE INITIATIVE, JORDAN
BECAME A MAJOR TARGET.  BUT WHEN JORDANIAN-SYRIAN
RELATIONS BEGAN TO WARM IN MID-1985, ATTACKS ON
JORDANIANS AT HOME AND ABROAD DIMINISHED. 

IN ITS DEALINGS WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES, SYRIA HAS
CONSISTENTLY TRIED TO PLAY DOWN THE IMPORTANCE OF ITS
CONNECTION WITH ABU NIDAL AND HAS DENIED PERMITTING HIS
GROUP TO ENGAGE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY.  HOWEVER, THERE IS
NO EVIDENCE THAT DAMASCUS HAS ACTUALLY RESTRAINED ABU
NIDAL'S ACTIVITIES (ABU NIDAL TRAINING CAMPS IN THE
SYRIAN-CONTROLLED BIQA' VALLEY CONTINUE TO OPERATE FOR
EXAMPLE) OR CUT BACK ON OTHER FORMS OF SUPPORT.  ALTHOUGH
IT MAY NOT KNOW ABOUT EVERY OPERATION, GIVEN THE AMOUNT
AND NATURE OF SYRIAN SUPPORT, DAMASCUS COULD INFLUENCE
AND CONSTRAIN THE ABU NIDAL GROUP'S ACTIVITIES IN SYRIA
AND SYRIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS OF LEBANON IF IT CHOSE TO DO
SO. 

OTHER SYRIAN-SUPPORTED PALESTINIAN GROUPS 

SYRIA ALSO PROVIDES VARYING AMOUNTS OF SUPPORT TO OTHER
RADICAL PALESTINIAN GROUPS.  THESE INCLUDE:  SAIQA, WHICH
IS UNDER TOTAL SYRIAN CONTROL; THE ABU MUSA GROUP, NOW
ALMOST TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON DAMASCUS; THE POPULAR FRONT
FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE--GENERAL COMMAND
(PFLP-GC); AND THE MARXIST POPULAR FRONT FOR THE
LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), WHICH NOW MAINTAINS ITS
PRINCIPAL BASE IN DAMASCUS. 

IN ALL, SYRIAN-SPONSORED GROUPS, INCLUDING THE ABU NIDAL
ORGANIZATION, WERE LINKED TO ABOUT 30 TERRORIST ATTACKS
DURING 1985, A QUARTER OF THEM IN GREECE ALONE.  THE ABU
MUSA GROUP ANNOUNCED FROM DAMASCUS ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR
ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO BOMB AN EL AL AIRLINER, IN MADRID ON
JUNE 26 OF THIS YEAR.  THE SUSPECT IN THAT ATTEMPT HAS
ADMITTED BEING A MEMBER OF THE GROUP.  TWO WEEKS LATER,
OTHER GROUPS SUPPORTED BY SYRIA, THE PFLP AND THE
LEBANESE SYRIAN SOCIAL NATIONALIST PARTY, ATTEMPTED AN
ATTACK ON AN ISRAELI RESORT TOWN ON JULY 10, 1986. 

SUPPORT FOR NON-PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS 

IN ADDITION TO THE RADICAL PALESTINIAN GROUPS, A VARIETY
OF OTHER TERRORISTS HAVE FACILITIES AND RECEIVED
TERRORIST TRAINING IN SYRIA OR SYRIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS OF
LEBANON:  THE JAPANESE RED ARMY, THE KURDISH LABOR PARTY,
THE ARMENIAN SECRET ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION OF ARMENIA
(ASALA), AND THE PAKISTANI AL ZULFIKAR.  IN ADDITION, THE
LEBANESE ARMED REVOLUTIONARY FACTION (LARF) IS BASED IN
THE LEBANESE VILLAGE OF QUBAYAT, WITHIN THE AREA OF
SYRIAN CONTROL IN LEBANON. 

TO THESE GROUPS MUST BE ADDED THE INDIVIDUAL
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS WHO FREQUENT DAMASCUS.   BRUNO
BREGUET, AN ASSOCIATE OF CARLOS, THE INTERNATIONAL
TERRORIST, WAS ARRESTED IN PARIS IN FEBRUARY 1982 FOR
TRANSPORTING ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES.  LATER RELEASED, HE WAS
RECENTLY SIGHTED ON A FLIGHT TO DAMASCUS, MET ON ARRIVAL
BY SYRIAN AUTHORITIES, AND ESCORTED THROUGH THE AIRPORT
WITHOUT HAVING TO PASS THROUGH THE NORMAL CONTROLS.
EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT FREDERIC ORIACH, A MILITANT MEMBER
OF THE  FRENCH ACTION DIRECT, SPENT JULY AND AUGUST 1986
IN DAMASCUS PURSUING IDEOLOGICAL AND MILITARY STUDIES. 

CASUALTIES AND CONTROL 

ATTACKS BY SYRIAN-SUPPORTED GROUPS SINCE 1983 HAVE KILLED
OR WOUNDED NEARLY 500 PEOPLE. 

SYRIAN-SUPPORTED GROUPS HAVE ATTACKED U.S. FACILITIES IN
THE MIDDLE EAST OVER 10 TIMES SINCE 1983.  IN JORDAN LAST
YEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SYRIAN-SPONSORED JORDANIAN PEOPLES
REVOLUTIONARY PARTY ATTEMPTED TWO ANTI-U.S. ATTACKS.
BOMBS WERE FOUND AT A USAID EMPLOYEE'S HOME AND AT THE
AMERICAN CENTER FOR ORIENTAL STUDIES.  THESE OPERATIONS,
AS WELL AS OTHERS AIMED AGAINST JORDANIAN TARGETS, HAVE
HALTED SINCE THE SYRIAN-JORDANIAN RAPPROCHEMENT LATE LAST
YEAR--UNDERSCORING SYRIA'S ABILITY, IF IT WISHES, TO
CONTROL ITS SURROGATES' ACTIVITIES AND TO SEVERELY CURB
THE CAPABILITY OF THOSE TO WHOM IT PROVIDED SAFE HAVEN
AND SUPPORT. 

THIS HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED BY A TOP SYRIAN OFFICIAL WHO
TRIED TO DISMISS, IN A WASHINGTON POST PRESS INTERV1EW
THIS SEPTEMBER, EVIDENCE THAT ABU NIDAL'S GROUP WAS
INVOLVED IN TERRORIST ATTACKS.  SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
FAROUK CHARAA SAID IN DISCUSSING THE ACTIONS OF THE ABU
NIDAL GROUP:  "WHOEVER KNOWS MY GOVERNMENT MUST REALIZE
THAT SUCH ATTACKS COULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT ITS
AWARENESS."  (END TEXT OF FACT PAPER.) 

3.  (BEGIN TEXT OF CHRONOLOGY) 

CHRONOLOGY OF SELECTED TERRORIST INCIDENTS BY
SYRIAN-SUPPORTED GROUPS:  1983-1986 

 THE FOLLOWING LIST OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS IS NOT
INTENDED TO BE ALL-INCLUSIVE BUT IS ILLUSTRATIVE OF
SYRIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN AND SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AND
TERRORIST GROUPS.  THE GROUPS CITED HERE HAVE LINKS WITH
SYRIA. 

1986 

26 NOVEMBER WEST BERLIN.  A COURT CONVICTED TWO ARABS FOR
        THE MARCH 29 BOMBING OF THE GERMAN-ARAB
        FRIENDSHIP UNION WHICH INJURED 11 PERSONS.  IN
        A SWORN STATEMENT ONE OF THE DEFENDENTS, AHMAD
        HASI, SAID HE PICKED UP THE BOMB AT THE SYRIAN
        EMBASSY IN EAST BERLIN FROM A SYRIAN AIR FORCE
        INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.  HASI IS A BROTHER OF
        NIZAR HINDAWI, WHO WAS CONVICTED IN A BRITISH
        COURT FOR THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING OF AN EL AL
        AIRLINER. 

6 NOVEMBER  TURKEY.  TURKISH PROSECUTORS ISSUED AN
        INDICTMENT ACCUSING SIX PALESTINIANS WORKING
        FOR THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION OF KILLING A
        JORDANIAN DIPLOMAT IN JULY 1985.  AN ARREST
        WARRANT ALSO WAS ISSUED FOR THE SYRIAN EMBASSY
        SECOND SECRETARY, MOHAMMED DARWICHI, WHO WAS
        ONE OF THE ORIGINAL DEFENDENTS AND LEFT
        TURKEY.  THE INDICTMENT ALSO LINKED MEMBERS OF
        THE GROUP WITH FOUR OTHER ACTIONS:  THE
        SEPTEMBER 6, 1986 ATTACK ON AN ISTANBUL
        SYNAGOGUE, WHICH KILLED 22 PERSONS; AN ATTEMPT
        TO PLACE A BOMB ON AN ALITALIA FLIGHT IN 1983;
        THE ATTEMPTED CAR BOMBING OF A U.S. OFFICERS'
        CLUB IN IZMIR IN 1983, AND THE KILLING OF A
        PALESTINIAN STUDENT IN ANKARA IN 1982. 

26 JUNE     MADRID.  A SPANIARD ATTEMPTED TO BOARD AN EL
       AL FLIGHT WITH A SUITCASE BOMB, APPARENTLY
       WITHOUT KNOWING IT.  THE SUSPECT ARRESTED BY
       SPANISH POLICE CARRIED A SYRIAN PASSPORT.  A
       SPOKESMAN FOR THE ABU MUSA GROUP, WHICH IS
       ALMOST TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON DAMASCUS, CLAIMED
       RESPONSIBILITY FOR PLANTING THE BOMB, ALTHOUGH
       THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT DENIED INVOLVEMENT. 

17 APRIL  LONDON.  EL AL SECURITY DISCOVERED A SYRIAN-MADE
      BOMB IN THE LUGGAGE OF AN IRISH WOMAN AS SHE
      ATTEMPTED TO BOARD A PLANE FOR TEL AVIV.  A
      BRITISH COURT FOUND HER BOYFRIEND, NIZAR
      HINDAWI, GUILTY OF THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING, AND
      THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAD
      CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF SYRIAN OFFICIAL
      INVOLVEMENT IN THE TERRORIST ACT. 

2 MARCH   WEST BANK.  TWO GUNMEN ASSASSINATED THE MAYOR OF
      NABLUS, ZAFER AL-MASRI, A PALESTINIAN APPOINTED
      BY ISRAEL.  BOTH THE ABU NIDAL GROUP AND THE
      POPULAR FRONT FOR LIBERATION OF PALESTINE
      CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

1985 

27 DEC.   ROME AND VIENNA.  ABU NIDAL TERRORISTS
      SIMULTANEOUSLY ATTACKED EL AL TICKET COUNTERS IN
      THE ROME AND VIENNA AIRPORTS, KILLING MORE THAN
      20 PEOPLE, INCLUDING FIVE AMERICANS, AND
      WOUNDING SOME 120 OTHERS.  (ALTHOUGH THESE
      ATTACKS WERE COMMITTED UNDER LIBYAN SPONSORSHIP,
      REPORTS ON THE ITALIAN INVESTIGATION INDICATE
      THAT THE ROME TERRORIST TEAM RECEIVED TRAINING
      IN SYRIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS OF LEBANON AND PASSED
      THROUGH DAMASCUS.) 

30 SEPT.  NETHERLANDS.  A SMALL BOMB DAMAGED THE EL AL
      OFFICE OF AMSTERDAM.  FATAH REVOLUTIONARY
      COUNCIL--THE ABU NIDAL GROUP'S OFFICIAL
      NAME--CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

25 SEPT.  ITALY.  A BOMB EXPLODED IN A BRITISH AIRWAYS
      OFFICE IN ROME, INJURING 15 PEOPLE.  POLICE
      ARRESTED HASSAN ITAB FLEEING THE SCENE.  ITAB
      CLAIMED HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
      ORGANIZATION OF SOCIALIST MOSLEMS, AN ABU NIDAL
      "COVER" NAME, AND WAS LATER IDENTIFIED BY
      WITNESSES AS THE SAME MAN WHO THREW A GRENADE AT
      THE JORDANIAN AIRLINE OFFICE IN ATHENS IN MARCH. 

18 SEPT.  GREECE.  MICHEL NIMRI, A JORDANIAN MAGAZINE
      PUBLISHER AND REPORTEDLY A PERSONAL FRIEND OF
      YASSIR ARAFAT, WAS ASSASSINATED IN ATHENS.
      BLACK SEPTEMBER, A NAME USED BY THE ABU NIDAL
      GROUP, CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY THE NEXT DAY. 

16 SEPT.  ITALY.  A GRENADE ATTACK ON A ROME SIDEWALK CAFE
      INJURED 38 TOURISTS, INCLUDING NINE AMERICANS.
      POLICE ARRESTED A PALESTINIAN IN CONNECTION WITH
      THE ATTACK.  THE REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF
      SOCIALIST MOSLEMS, ANOTHER SYRIAN-LINKED GROUP,
      CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY ON 19 SEPTEMBER. 

3 SEPT.   GREECE.  TERRORISTS THREW HAND GRENADES THAT
      WOUNDED 19 BRITISH TOURISTS AT THE GLYFADA HOTEL
      IN ATHENS.  BLACK SEPTEMBER CLAIMED THE ATTACK
      WAS TO PRESSURE THE GREEK AUTHORITIES TO RELEASE
      A MAN ARRESTED NEAR THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY ON 31
      AUGUST. 

31 AUGUST GREECE.  POLICE ARRESTED A HEAVILY ARMED MAN
      NEAR THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY IN ATHENS.  SAMIR
      SALAMEH ACKNOWLEDGED MEMBERSHIP IN BLACK
      SEPTEMBER AND CLAIMED HE PLANNED TO ASSASSINATE
      THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR. 

8 AUGUST  GREECE.  A BOMB EXPLODED IN THE KITCHEN OF THE
      LONDON HOTEL IN ATHENS, INJURING 13 PEOPLE--NINE
      OF THEM BRITISH SUBJECTS.  THE REVOLUTIONARY
      ORGANIZATION OF SOCIALIST MOSLEMS CLAIMED
      RESPONSIBILITY, CONTENDING THE HOTEL WAS A
      "HIDEOUT" FOR BRITISH SPIES. 

24 JULY   TURKEY.  THE FIRST SECRETARY AT THE JORDANIAN
      EMBASSY IN ANKARA WAS ASSASSINATED BY A LONE
      GUNMAN.  THE INCIDENT WAS CLAIMED BY BLACK
      SEPTEMBER. 

11 JULY   KUWAIT.  TWO BOMBS EXPLODED WITHIN MINUTES OF
      EACH OTHER KILLING EIGHT PEOPLE AND INJURING 89
      IN TWO CAFES ABOUT TEN KILOMETERS APART.  THE
      ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES CLAIMED
      RESPONSIBILITY. 

1 JULY    SPAIN.  A BOMB EXPLODED AT THE BRITISH AIRWAYS
      TICKET OFFICE IN MADRID, ALSO DAMAGING THE TWA
      OFFICE UPSTAIRS.  THE ALIA ROYAL JORDANIAN
      AIRLINES TICKET OFFICE NEARBY WAS HIT BY
      AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE AND TWO GRENADES THAT
      FAILED TO EXPLODE.  ONE PERSON WAS KILLED AND 27
      WERE WOUNDED.  CLAIMED BY ORGANIZATION OF THE
      OPPRESSED, REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF
      SOCIALIST MOSLEMS, AND BLACK SEPTEMBER. 

4 APRIL   GREECE.  A ROCKET WAS FIRED AT A JORDANIAN
      AIRLINER AS IT WAS TAKING OFF FROM ATHENS
     AIRPORT.  THE PROJECTILE HIT THE PLAN BUT DID
     NOT EXPLODE.  BLACK SEPTEMBER CLAIMED
     RESPONSIBILITY. 

3 APRIL   ITALY.  A ROCKET NARROWLY MISSED THE JORDANIAN
     EMBASSY ON THE FIFTH FLOOR OF AN OFFICE BUILDING
     IN ROME.  NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED.  BLACK
     SEPTEMBER CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

21 MARCH  ITALY.  THREE UNIDENTIFIED MEN THREW HAND
     GRENADES INTO A JORDANIAN AIRLINE OFFICE IN
     ROME, INJURING TWO PEOPLE.  BLACK SEPTEMBER
     CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

21 MARCH  GREECE.  AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN THREW A HAND
     GRENADE INTO THE JORDANIAN AIRLINE OFFICE IN
     ATHENS, INJURING THREE PEOPLE.  CLAIMED BY BLACK
     SEPTEMBER.  (SEE SEPTEMBER 25, 1985 INCIDENT.) 

21 MARCH  CYPRUS.  AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN THREW TWO HAND
     GRENADES INTO THE JORDANIAN AIRLINE OFFICE IN
     NICOSIA.  CLAIMED BY BLACK SEPTEMBER. 

9 MARCH   UNITED ARAB EMIRATES.  A BOMB WAS FOUND ON A
     JORDANIAN AIRLINER.  THE YOUNG PALESTINIAN WHO
     CARRIED THE BOMB ONTO THE KARACHI-TO-AMMAN
     FLIGHT SAID HE THOUGHT HE WAS TRANSPORTING DRUGS
     TO SUPPORT ABU NIDAL TERRORIST OPERATIONS. 

22 FEB.   JORDAN.  THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY
     PARTY PLACED A BOMB AT THE AMERICAN CENTER FOR
     ORIENTAL RESEARCH IN AMMAN.  THE BOMB WAS FOUND
     AND DEFUSED. 

10 JAN.   JORDAN.  A BOMB PLANTED BY THE JORDANIAN
     PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY WAS DEFUSED NEAR A
     USAID EMPLOYEE'S HOME.  THE EXPLOSIVES HAD
     NEITHER A POWER SOURCE NOR A TIMING DEVICE. 

1984 

29 DEC.   JORDAN.  TWO UNIDENTIFIED GUNMEN ASSASSINATED
     FAH AL-QAWASMEH, A MEMBER OF THE PLO EXECUTIVE
     COMMITTEE AND FORMER MAYOR OF HEBRON, OUTSIDE
     HIS HOME IN AMMAN.  TWO WITNESSES TO THE
     SHOOTING WERE INJURED BY GUNFIRE AS THEY TRIED
     TO BLOCK THE ASSASSINS' FLEEING VEHICLE.  BLACK
     SEPTEMBER CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

14 DEC.   ITALY.  ISMAIL DARWISH, A LEADING MILITARY
      FIGURE IN THE FATAH MOVEMENT, WAS GUNNED DOWN ON
      A ROME STREET BY AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN WHO FLED ON
      A WAITING MOTOR SCOOTER.  ARAB REVOLUTIONARY
      BRIGADES CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

4 DEC.    ROMANIA.  THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION OF THE
       JORDANIAN EMBASSY WAS SHOT AND KILLED AS HE WAS
      GETTING INTO HIS CAR IN BUCHAREST.  BLACK
      SEPTEMBER CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

2 DEC.    JORDAN.  A GUARD DISCOVERED A BOMB CONCEALED IN
       AN ATTACHE CASE INSIDE THE AMERICAN LIFE
       INSURANCE AND CITIBANK BUILDING IN AMMAN.  BOMB
       TECHNICIANS DEFUSED THE DEVICE, WHICH CONTAINED
       18 BLOCKS OF TNT AND A TIMER.  THE JORDANIAN
       PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY WAS LATER
       DETERMINED TO BE RESPONSIBLE. 

4 OCT.    CYPRUS.  A CAR BOMB EXPLODED BEHIND THE ISRAELI
       EMBASSY IN NICOSIA, SLIGHTLY INJURING ONE
       PERSON.  CLAIMED BY ABU MUSA'S FATAH DISSIDENT
       ORGANIZATION. 

13 AUGUST JORDAN.  JORDANIAN POLICE DEFUSED A BOMB
       CONSISTING OF SEVERAL HUNDRED GRAMS OF
       SOVIET-MADE EXPLOSIVES NEAR THE RESIDENCE OF A
       US EMBASSY OFFICIAL.  THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE'S
       REVOLUTIONARY PARTY WAS LATER DETERMINED TO BE
       RESPONSIBLE. 

11 AUGUST JORDAN.  MEMBERS OF THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE'S
       REVOLUTIONARY PARTY TRIED TO SET OFF A BOMB
       OUTSIDE THE JORDAN RADIO AND TELEVISION
       STATION.  THE BOMB WAS DISCOVERED AND DEFUSED. 

3 AUGUST  JORDAN.  A BOMB EXPLODED UNDER A WATER TRUCK
       PARKED NEAR THE U.S. EMBASSY WAREHOUSE IN
       AMMAN.  THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES AND ONLY MINOR
       DAMAGE.  THE ABU NIDAL GROUP CLAIMED
       RESPONSIBILITY. 

29 MAY    CYPRUS.  A FORMER SAIQA OFFICER WHO HAD SWITCHED
       HIS ALLEGIANCE TO ARAFAT, ABDULLAH AHMAD
       SULEIMAN EL SAADI, WAS MURDERED IN LIMASSOL.
       FOUR SYRIAN MEN AND TWO WOMEN WERE ARRESTED FOR
       THE MURDER AND SUBSEQUENTLY DEPORTED FROM CYPRUS. 

3 MAY     CYPRUS.  AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN SHOT AND KILLED
      PALESTINIAN PUBLISHER HANNA MUQBIL AND WOUNDED
      HIS SECRETARY IN NICOSIA.  MUQBIL WAS REPORTEDLY
      A FORMER MEMBER OF ABU NIDAL WHO HAD DEFECTED TO
      ARAFAT'S CAMP. 

24 MARCH  JORDAN.  A BOMB WAS DEFUSED OUTSIDE THE BRITISH
      CONSULATE IN AMMAN.  THE ABU NIDAL GROUP CLAIMED
      RESPONSIBILITY. 

24 MARCH  JORDAN.  A BOMB WAS DISCOVERED AND DEFUSED
      OUTSIDE THE BRITISH CULTURAL CENTER.  THE ABU
      NIDAL GROUP CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

24 MARCH  JORDAN.  A BOMB EXPLODED IN THE PARKING LOT OF
      THE INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL, WHICH IS ACROSS THE
      STREET FROM THE U.S. EMBASSY, DAMAGING TWO
      VEHICLES AND SLIGHTLY INJURING A USAID EMPLOYEE
      AND HIS DAUGHTER.  A SECOND BOMB WAS DISCOVERED
      IN THE PARKING LOT AND DEFUSED.  THE ABU NIDAL
      GROUP CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

1983 

29 DEC.   SPAIN.  TWO JORDANIAN EMBASSY EMPLOYEES WERE
      ATTACKED BY A LONE GUNMAN AS THEY WERE LEAVING
      THE EMBASSY.  WALID JAMAL BALKIS WAS KILLED
      INSTANTLY, AND IBRAHIM SAMI MOHAMMED WAS
      SERIOUSLY WOUNDED.  THE ARAB REVOLUTIONARY
      BRIGADES CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

19 DEC.   TURKEY.  A CAR BOMB WAS DISCOVERED IN AN
      ABANDONED RENTAL CAR MIDWAY BETWEEN THE FRENCH
      CULTURAL HOUSE AND THE CORDON HOTEL USED BY
      AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN IZMIR.  THE
      BOMB'S TIMER APPARENTLY MALFUNCTIONED.  TURKISH
      POLICE LINKED THE ABU NIDAL GROUP AND SYRIAN
      AGENTS TO THE INCIDENT. 

7 NOV.    GREECE.  TWO SECURITY GUARDS OF THE JORDANIAN
      EMBASSY WERE WOUNDED ON A CROWDED STREET IN
      ATHENS.  ONE OF THE TWO VICTIMS DIED FROM HIS
      WOUNDS.  THE ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES CLAIMED
      RESPONSIBILITY. 

26 OCT.   ITALY.  THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE VATICAN
      AND HIS DRIVER WERE WOUNDED IN AN ASSASSINATION
      ATTEMPT IN ROME.  THE ARAB REVOLUTIONARY
      BRIGADES CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

25 OCT.   INDIA.  JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR WOUNDED BY AN
     UNKNOWN ASSAILANT IN NEW DELHI.  CLAIMED BY THE
     ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES. 

13 OCT.   JORDAN.  TWO HAND GRENADES WERE THROWN INTO A
     POLICE BARRACKS IN AMMAN.  A MEMBER OF THE
     POLICE RECRUITED BY SAIQA CONFESSED TO THE
     ATTACK.  LOCAL AUTHORITIES SUSPECTED THAT ABU
     NIDAL ELEMENTS MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED. 

21 AUGUST GREECE.  A HIGH-LEVEL PLO OFFICIAL, MA'MUM
     MURAYSH, WAS SHOT AND KILLED BY TWO UNIDENTIFIED
     MEN ON A MOTORCYCLE.  THE VICTIM'S SON AND HIS
     DRIVER WERE WOUNDED.  THE MOVEMENT FOR
     REBUILDING FATAH CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

10 APRIL  PORTUGAL.  THE PLO OBSERVER TO AN INTERNATIOAL
     CONFERENCE OF SOCIALISTS, ISAM AL-SARTAWI, WAS
     SHOT TO DEATH IN A HOTEL LOBBY.  SARTAWI'S
     SECRETARY WAS SLIGHTLY WOUNDED IN THE ATTACK.
     THE ABU NIDAL GROUP CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

1 JANUARY ISRAEL.  A GRENADE ATTACK ON A CIVILIAN BUS IN
     TEL AVIV INJURED 12.  BOTH SAIQA AND ABU NIDAL
     CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. 

(END TEXT OF CHRONOLOGY.) 

4.  MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR BEIRUT, KABUL, MOSCOW, AND
LENINGRAD. 

SHULTZ

TOP-SECRET:TO SAVE DAN MITRIONE NIXON ADMINISTRATION URGED DEATH THREATS FOR URUGUAYAN PRISONERS

Dan Mitrione

TO SAVE DAN MITRIONE NIXON ADMINISTRATION URGED
DEATH THREATS FOR URUGUAYAN PRISONERS

In Response Uruguayan Security Forces Launched Death Squads to Hunt and Kill Insurgents

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 324

President Richard M. Nixon
Secretary of State William Rogers
U.S. ambassador to Uruguay Charles Adair
Uruguayan Foreign Minister Jorge Peirano

Washington, D.C., August 11, 2010 – Documents posted by the National Security Archive on the 40th anniversary of the death of U.S. advisor Dan Mitrione in Uruguay show the Nixon administration recommended a “threat to kill [detained insurgent] Sendic and other key [leftist insurgent] MLN prisoners if Mitrione is killed.” The secret cable from U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, made public here for the first time, instructed U.S. Ambassador Charles Adair: “If this has not been considered, you should raise it with the Government of Uruguay at once.”

The message to the Uruguayan government, received by the U.S. Embassy at 11:30 am on August 9, 1970, was an attempt to deter Tupamaro insurgents from killing Mitrione at noon on that day. A few minutes later, Ambassador Adair reported back, in another newly-released cable, that “a threat was made to these prisoners that members of the ‘Escuadrón de la Muerte’ [death squad] would take action against the prisoners’ relatives if Mitrione were killed.”

Dan Mitrione, Director of the U.S. AID Office of Public Safety (OPS) in Uruguay and the main American advisor to the Uruguayan police at the time, had been held for ten days by MLN-Tupamaro insurgents demanding the release of some 150 guerrilla prisoners held by the Uruguayan government. Mitrione was found dead the morning of August 10, 1970, killed by the Tupamaros after their demands were not met.

“The documents reveal the U.S. went to the edge of ethics in an effort to save Mitrione—an aspect of the case that remained hidden in secret documents for years,” said Carlos Osorio, who directs the National Security Archive’s Southern Cone project. “There should be a full declassification to set the record straight on U.S. policy to Uruguay in the 1960’s and 1970’s.”

“In the aftermath of Dan Mitrione’s death, the Uruguayan government unleashed the illegal death squads to hunt and kill insurgents,” said Clara Aldrighi, professor of history at Uruguay’s Universidad de la República, and author of “El Caso Mitrione” (Montevideo: Ediciones Trilce, 2007). “The U.S. documents are irrefutable proof that the death squads were a policy of the Uruguayan government, and will serve as key evidence in the death squads cases open now in Uruguay’s courts,” Osorio added. “It is a shame that the U.S. documents are writing Uruguayan history. There should be declassification in Uruguay as well,” stated Aldrighi, who collaborated in the production of this briefing book.

Uruguay, with a long-standing democratic tradition, entered a crisis during most of the 1960’s and 1970’s. The U.S. government feared the strongest Latin American insurgency at the time, the leftist Movimiento Nacional de Liberación (MLN-Tupamaros) would topple a weak Uruguayan government so they therefore supported the Uruguayan Government with economic and security assistance. The U.S. AID Office of Public Safety helped enhance the counterinsurgency techniques of a Uruguayan police renowned for the wide use of torture among prisoners. Under Dan Mitrione, the OPS consolidated the Uruguayan police’s National Directorate for Information and Intelligence (Dirección Nacional de Información e Inteligencia, DNII). It was right at this time that the Tupamaro insurgents kidnapped Mitrione on July 31, 1970, and demanded the release of 150 Tupamaro prisoners.

During the ten days Mitrione was kidnapped, the U.S. went to great lengths to secure his release. Nixon administration officials pressured the Uruguayan government to negotiate, offer ransom and, in the words of President Richard Nixon himself, “spare no effort to secure the safe return of Mr. Mitrione.”

Dan Mitrione was a policeman from Richmond, Indiana who later became an FBI agent. In the mid 1960’s, he was hired by the U.S. AID Office of Public Safety to train policemen in Brazil and Uruguay. According to A. J. Langguth in his book Hidden Terrors (Pantheon Books, 1978, p. 286) in Uruguay, as the U.S.-trained officers came to occupy key positions in the police, the claims of torture grew. Langguth believed Mitrione taught torture to Uruguayan officers. Mitrione’s activities inspired filmmaker Costa Gavras for his film “State of Siege” which portrays the U.S. support for a dictatorial government and the widespread use of torture by security forces in Uruguay.

The nine documents posted today by the National Security Archive contain evidence that the Government of Uruguay unleashed death squads activity in the wake of Mitrione’s execution, and that the United States was aware of these extra-judicial operations. While further declassification is needed to fully comprehend the development of death squad activities in Uruguay, the release of these documents is an important step in advancing international understanding of the Mitrione case and this chapter of U.S. and Uruguayan history.


Read the Documents

July 31, 1970 – [Kidnapping of Dan Mitrione]
(Time: 13:31 UR – 11:31 US – 16:31 Z)
[National Security Archive Southern Cone FOIA Project]

At 1:31 pm, Uruguay time, the CIA Director is informed that “[D]uring morning 31 July [excised] terrorists, presumably MLN or FARO, made four kidnapping attempts in Montevideo. Kidnapped and still missing as of 1300 hours [excised] time are U.S. Public Safety advisor Daniel Mitrione and Brazilian Consul in Montevideo Aloysio Mares Dias Gomide. Embassy economic officer Gordon Jones was also kidnapped but escaped shortly thereafter. Police reports also indicate that an unsuccessful attempt was made against Uruguayan Minister of Public Works Walter Pintos Risso.”

Note: U.S. government documents bear a Zulu (z) or Greenwich standard time. For clarity as to how events evolved, we have included here Uruguayan (UR) and (US) times also.


August 1970 – DNII Memoria Mensual Mes de Agosto 1970 [part one]

DNII Memoria Mensual Mes de Agosto 1970 [part two]
[Obtained by Clara Aldrighi at DNII Archive, Uruguay]

This monthly summary of insurgent activities by the National Directorate of Information and Intelligence (Dirección Nacional de Información e Inteligencia-DNII) of the Uruguayan police includes information on the kidnapping and eventual death of Dan Mitrione on August 10. Some of the entries report:

On August 1st the MLN-Tupamaros issue a communiqué requesting the liberation of detained Tupamaros which at the time amounted to 150 prisoners. The communiqué reports on the health situation of Mitrione who had a wound on his upper abdomen.

In the morning of August 7, Tupamaros kidnap American agricultural advisor Claude Fly. Later in the day, police forces capture Tupamaro founder and leader Raul Sendic along with other eight high-ranking Tupamaros.

On August 8, the Tupamaros announce that their demand for the release of insurgent prisoners has not been met and that they will kill Dan Mitrione at noon on Sunday, August 9.

Note: This document was found by Clara Aldrighi who was granted access to the DNII archives in Montevideo along with a group of researchers in 2005.
August 6, 1970 – Mitrione Kidnapping
(Time: 17:05 UR – 15:05 US – 20:05 Z )
[Obtained by Clara Aldrighi at U.S. National Archive, NARA]

In a personal message addressed to Uruguayan President Pacheco, President Richard Nixon expresses his appreciation for “your assurances in your cable of August 2 to employ every means available to you to secure the most rapid release of Dan Anthony Mitrione […]” Nixon concludes by stressing “I am confident that consistent with the spirit of your cable you will not foreclose any actions which could bring about the safe return of Mr. Mitrione […]”
August 09, 1970 – Mitrione Kidnapping – Meeting at Foreign Ministry
(Time: 22:34 UR – 20:34 US – 01:34 Z)
[Obtained by Clara Aldrighi at US National Archive, NARA]

On Saturday, August 8, U.S. Ambassador Charles Adair, along with Embassy officials and Uruguayan Foreign Minister Peirano and his staff, meet in Montevideo for half an hour at around 19:00 hours. The day before, nine top MLN-Tupamaro leaders had been captured by the police and the Tupamaros announced that they would kill Mitrione at noon on Sunday if their request for the release of all MLN members in prisons is not met.

In this cable, Adair reviews his conversation: “I briefly reviewed current situation and expressed growing concern over now critical position of Mitrione… I then handed him a list of four suggestions for activity:

A. Appeal publicly to those few who are holding Mitrione for safe delivery Mitrione. Offer them amnesty or amnesty plus an award (5 million pesos).

B. Offer amnesty to key persons now being held in return for information leading to release of the three men [Mitrione, Dias Gomide, Fly]

C. Repeat (and repeat) offer of reward for information.

D. If information has been received and 5 million pesos paid– thank the person (not identified) publicly and urge others to come forth with more information.”

Peirano dismisses public calls for a reward for information and favors communication with the insurgents through discreet channels. Adair reports that Peirano “wanted to suggest to me that the US government (Repeat, US government) itself undertake secret ransom effort directly with MLN.” Adair rejects the idea and Peirano accepts it.

An official whose name is excised in the cable, states that the “Uruguayan Government is now asking judge for authority to utilize sodium pentathol [truth serum] on MLN prisoners and has requested assistance from Buenos Aires. Also interior Ministry would shortly issue communiqué saying it intended to undertake most extreme police measures to locate kidnap victims.”

Adair adds in the cable that Peirano called him after this meeting to say that a private channel had been established to negotiate amnesty and reward to someone within the Tupamaros. Adair closes his report by asking the Department of State to get ready to come through with the U.S. government offer for cash “as it is conceivable GOU or private contact (unknown to us) who now dealing with subject may before noon tomorrow approach us for participation in funding the operation.”

Note: Brazilian Consul Dias Gomide and American agricultural advisor Claude Fly were eventually released unharmed after months of being captive.
August 9, 1970 – Ambassador from the Secretary
(Time: 11:35 UR – 09:35 US – 14:35 Z)
[National Security Archive Southern Cone FOIA Project]

Nine days after Dan Mitrione’s kidnapping, the Uruguayan security forces still had no information of his whereabouts. They did, however, capture Raúl Sendic, MLN leader/founder, and several other important MLN leaders on August 7.

On August 9, thirty minutes before the deadline set by the Tupamaros to kill Mitrione, in a “flash” secret cable urging action from Ambassador Adair, Secretary of State William Rogers writes,

“[w]e have assumed that the Government of Uruguay has considered use of threat to kill Sendic and other key MLN prisoners if Mitrione is killed. If this has not been considered, you should raise it with GOU at once.”

The cable bears the Exclusive Distribution caption EXDIS, meaning that the information in this message is highly classified and should be shared only with the recipient (Adair), the Secretary of State and the White House.

Note: Raul Sendic escaped from prison in 1971, was recaptured by police in 1972 and remained in prison until the military dictatorship ended in 1985.


August 09, 1970, – Mitrione/Fly kidnapping – Last Minute Meeting with Foreign Minister
(Time: 12:01 UR – 10:01 US – 15:01 Z)
[Obtained by Clara Aldrighi at US National Archive, NARA]

Right at the time of the noon deadline, Ambassador Adair reports in this cable about a meeting he held at 11 am with the Uruguayan Foreign Minister to discuss the situation.

Adair reports that he spoke to Foreign Minister Peirano who had just “returned from President Pacheco’s office. I told him that at this last moment, we were receiving number of telephone calls and (as a backdoor method of bringing up subject of possible U.S. contribution to Uruguayan Government efforts) I told him one had been from Uruguayan vigorously complaining that money offered by Uruguayan Government was not sufficient.” Adair states that the Uruguayan government now is clear that money should not be an issue and implies that the U.S. is ready to provide whatever is necessary. He then goes on to describe ongoing secret meetings with undisclosed contacts.

Nevertheless, Adair writes that the Uruguayans have “an increasing feeling that in fact Mitrione is dead.” Adair reports that “[w]hen the noon deadline is reached, the Uruguayan Government intends to take what [excised] called ‘severe measures’ (which he did not describe).”

August 9, 1970 – For Secretary from Ambassador
(Time: 12:03 UR – 10:03 US – 15:03 Z)
[National Security Archive Southern Cone FOIA Project]

In his response to Secretary Rogers’ suggestions, Ambassador Adair explains that he showed the Secretary of State’s message to the Uruguayan Foreign Minister. While the latter stated that “his type of government did not permit such action,” but “he [the Foreign Minister] understood that through indirect means, a threat was made to these prisoners that members of the ‘Escuadrón de Muerte’ (Death Squad) would take action against the prisoners’ relatives if Mitrione were killed.”

This cable represents the earliest recorded recognition of the existence of Uruguayan death squads by the U.S. government, and evidence of Washington’s knowledge of their use.

Note: This document was found by National Security Archive Southern Cone FOIA Project intern George Leyh.
August 09, 1970 – [Letter from President Nixon to President Pacheco]
(Time: 18:07 UR – 16:07 US – 21:07 Z)
[Obtained by Clara Aldrighi at US National Archive, NARA]

Since there is no conclusive reports that Dan Mitrione is dead, on the evening of August 9, 1970, President Nixon sends a message to President Pacheco insisting that his government “spare no effort to secure the safe return of Mr. Mitrione and Dr. Fly.”


August 1987 – The Mitrione Kidnapping in Uruguay
[National Security Archive Southern Cone FOIA Project]

This sixty page joint study report by the RAND Corporation for the Department of State concludes that

“Policemen found Mitrione’s body at 4:15 a.m… August 10… He had been shot several times at close range. U.S. Public Safety advisers, including two experienced homicide detectives, rushed to the scene… [They] concluded without doubt that death must have occurred at or shortly before 4:00 a.m., well after the Tupamaro deadline.”

Written originally in 1981, the report was later revised to include additional declassified records documenting the policies and actions of the U.S., the Uruguayan government and the Tupamaros during the 11 days of Mitrione’s kidnapping.

“Heavy police and military operations were authorized…” by the Uruguayan government during that period. The U.S. government efforts included “urgent diplomatic suggestions and even pressure for the Uruguayan government to break the communications impasse and open some channel to the kidnappers; [and] intensive participation of Public Safety Advisers in local police operations.”

The report writers evidently did not have access to the key documents showing U.S. support of death threats against prisoners nor the Uruguayan government’s launching of death squads. Nevertheless, a brief mention of the subject on page 55 states that at the time of the kidnappings, “[o]minous talk…hinted at the prospective formation of death-squad and vigilante paramilitary organizations.”

TOP-SECRET: The United States vs. Rito Alejo del Río

Former Colombian Army Gen. Rito Alejo del Río Rojas (ret.)

The United States vs. Rito Alejo del Río

Ambassador Cited Accused Colombian General’s Reliance on Death Squads

“Systematic” Support of Paramilitaries “Pivotal to his Military Success”

Infamous General a “Not-So-Success” Story of U.S. Military Training

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 327

Former U.S. ambassador to Colombia Curtis Kamman called Del Río’s reliance on paramilitaries “pivotal.”

Washington, D.C., August 29, 2011 – The U.S. ambassador to Colombia reported in 1998 that the “systematic arming and equipping of aggressive regional paramilitaries” was “pivotal” to the military success of Gen. Rito Alejo del Río Rojas, now on trial for murder and collaboration with paramilitary death squads while commander of a key army unit in northern Colombia.

The Secret “Biographic Note” from Ambassador Curtis Kamman is one of several documents published today by the National Security Archive pertaining to Del Río, whose trial resumes this month after years of impunity and delay. The documents are also the subject of an article published today in Spanish at VerdadAbierta.com, the leading online gateway for information on paramilitarism in Colombia. The article was also published in English today on the Web site of the National Security Archive.

“The collection is a unique and potentially valuable source of evidence in the case against Del Río, reflecting years of reports linking the senior army commander to paramilitarism,” said Michael Evans, director of the Archive’s Colombia Documentation Project. “As Del Río’s trial resumes, the court should examine the contemporaneous accounts of U.S. officials who were required by law to monitor and certify Colombia’s human rights performance.”

Other revelations include:

  • The U.S. embassy takes a favorable view of Col. Carlos Alfonso Velásquez, who called for an investigation of Del Río’s ties to paramilitary groups, noting that his statements “add credibility to our human rights report.”
  • A report on a conversation with Col. Velásquez, who told U.S. military officials that cooperation with paramilitaries “had gotten much worse under Del Río.”
  • Documents reporting conspicuous increases in anti-paramilitary operations after Del Río’s transfer out of northern Colombia. The embassy said it was “more than coincidental that the recent anti-paramilitary actions have all taken place since the departure from northern Colombia of military personnel believed to favor paramilitaries.”
  • The embassy notes a disturbing instance of possible military-paramilitary complicity in a paramilitary attack outside Bogotá just weeks after Del Río took command of the nearby military brigade.
  • The shifting U.S. opinion about Del Río is clearly evident in two U.S. military reports from early 1998. In the first, Del Río, who attended the U.S. Army School of the Americas, is lauded as a U.S. military training “success story.” But a second, corrected, report from March 1998 lists Del Río instead as a “not-so-success” story, citing his alleged paramilitary ties.

The United States vs. Rito Alejo del Río
By Michael Evans

Curtis Kamman will not be called to testify in the trial of Rito Alejo del Río, the former Colombian Army general on trial for murder and collaboration with paramilitary death squads, but we do have some idea what the former U.S. ambassador to Colombia might have said, thanks to declassified documents published today on the Web site of the National Security Archive.

In a Secret “Biographic Note” attached to an August 1998 cable to Washington, Kamman asserted that the former 17th Brigade commander’s “systematic arming and equipping of aggressive regional paramilitaries was pivotal to his military success” in northern Colombia.

Obtained through the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, these documents are a unique and potentially valuable source of evidence in the case against Del Río, reflecting years of reports linking the senior army commander to paramilitarism. As Del Río’s trial resumes, the court would do well to examine the contemporaneous accounts of U.S. officials who were required by law to monitor and certify Colombia’s human rights performance.

Once lauded as a staunch anti-guerrilla fighter, Del Río first came under scrutiny in 1996 after his deputy at the Urabá-based 17th Brigade, Col. Carlos Alfonso Velásquez, wrote an internal report (published last week by VerdadAbierta) calling on the Army to investigate the unit’s paramilitary ties and accusing Del Río of turning a blind eye to paramilitary activity. Rather than heed his warning, the Army fired Velásquez, forcing him into early retirement for insubordination. Velásquez offered similar testimony last week as a key witness in the case.

Interviewed by the embassy in December 1997, Velásquez directly implicated his former commander, lamenting the “body count syndrome” that “fueled human rights abuses” and stressing that 17th Brigade collaboration with paramilitaries “had gotten much worse under Del Río.” Another embassy report on the Velásquez episode testifies to the colonel’s integrity, noting that Velásquez was an “admired and much-decorated” military officer who had helped bring down the Cali drug mafia and had once gone public about an extramarital affair rather than submit to a cartel blackmail attempt.

His statements “bring extra pressure to bear on the Colombian military,” noted U.S. Ambassador Myles Frechette, who was then involved in tense negotiations with the army over its rights record. “They will add credibility to our human rights report.”

By then the embassy had begun to notice that paramilitary activity tended to flourish in areas where Del Río commanded troops and that anti-paramilitary operations seemed to increase in those same zones after he left. In January 1998, the embassy noted that an unprecedented string of 17th Brigade actions against paramilitaries “took place only about a week after the departure of the Brigade’s commander, Brig. Gen. Rito Alejo del Río, who was long-alleged to be not unfriendly toward paramilitaries.” A February report called it “more than coincidental” that a recent series of military blows against paramilitaries had “all taken place since the departure from northern Colombia of former First Brigade commander MG Iván Ramírez and his 17th Brigade commander BG Rito Alejo Del Río, who were widely believed to have contributed to a command climate conducive to turning a blind eye to paramilitaries, or worse.”

At the same time, the embassy noted a disturbing instance of possible military-paramilitary complicity in a paramilitary attack in La Horqueta, outside Bogotá, just weeks after Del Río left Urabá to take command of the nearby military brigade. “Why was it necessary,” the embassy asked in a January 1998 cable, “for another army unit to travel all the way from Bogotá in order to intervene?”

Del Río’s 13th Brigade was “strangely non-reactive” to the killing, notable as the first paramilitary massacre to occur so close to the Colombian capital. Also implicating Del Río was the discovery that the paramilitary who led the attack was the president of a legal Convivir militia group from Urabá, Del Río’s former area of operations, “who had been imported to the region to strike back against the FARC.”

The general’s star was falling so fast in 1998 that U.S. reporting could barely keep up. The shifting opinion about Del Río is clearly evident in two U.S. military reports from early 1998. In the first, Del Río, a 1967 graduate of the U.S. Army School of the Americas, is lauded as a U.S. military training “success story.” But a second, corrected, report from March 1998 lists Del Río instead as a “not-so-success” story, noting that he was “alleged to have ties not only to paramilitary elements on the north coast and in the Urabá region…but also in the conflictive ‘Magdalena Medio’ region before that” and was also”implicated in the 1985 theft of a [Colombian Army] weapons shipment destined for Magdalena Medio paramilitaries.”

By August 1998, Colombian prosecutors had opened a preliminary investigation of the general’s ties to paramilitaries, a development Kamman said would “serve as a marker to those army officers who continue to assist or otherwise work with paramilitary groups.” Del Río had been “very successful” against FARC guerrillas, the ambassador said in his Secret “Biographic Note,” and his “systematic arming and equipping of aggressive regional paramilitaries was pivotal to his military success at the time.”

The ambassador’s reports had an impact in Washington, where human rights figured prominently in negotiations over the nascent Plan Colombia aid package. In January 1999, two senior State Department officials wrote to Kamman to express their dissatisfaction with Colombia’s progress on human rights, noting in particular the “appointment to key positions of several generals credibly alleged to have ties to paramilitaries” including Del Río, who had recently been named the army’s operations director.

Frustrated and essentially out of options, the State Department took the unusual step of cancelling Del Río’s visa for “drug trafficking and terrorist activities” precipitating his forced retirement and the end of his military career in April 1999.

As years went on, the United States became increasingly concerned about official impunity in Colombia, especially for senior military officers like Del Río, prompting sharp discussions after Prosecutor General Luis Camilo Osorio dropped all charges against the former general in 2001. A briefing paper for the State Department’s top human rights official, Lorne Craner, notes “concern in Congress” that Osorio’s dismissal of the case showed that he was “less focused on prosecuting paramilitaries and military personnel accused of colluding with paramilitary.” A 2005 State Department memorandum found it “troubling” that the government had not yet sent “a clear message” regarding impunity for Del Río.

More than five years later, the case has finally come to trial, and the court will hear the testimony of many important witnesses, each of whom brings a unique perspective to the proceedings. And while no U.S. officials will appear, the court should consider the declassified perspective of the U.S. government and the formerly secret files on one of its “not-so-success” stories.


Read the Documents

Document 1
1998 August 13
General Ramirez Lashes Out at State Department; Two More Generals Under Investigation for Paramilitary Links
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, 1998 Bogota 9345

This U.S. Embassy cable from August 13, 1998, reports, among other things, that Gen. Del Río was under investigation for links to illegal paramilitary groups. In a “Biographic Note,” the Embassy says that Del Río’s “systematic arming and equipping of aggressive regional paramilitaries was pivotal to his military success at the time.”

Biographic Note: Although brigade commands are generally rotated every year, General Del Rio was allowed to remain in command of the 17th Brigade in highly-conflictive Uraba region for two years, apparently because he had been very successful in bloodying the FARC’s nose during the period of his command. His systematic arming and equipping of aggressive regional paramilitaries was pivotal to his military success at the time.

Document 2
1997 January 11
Retired Army Colonel Lambastes Military for Inaction against Paramilitaries
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, 1997 Bogota 274

In this cable, the U.S. Embassy in Colombia reports the public statements of former Colombian Army colonel Carlos Alfonso Velásquez that his commanding officer at the 17th Brigade, Gen. Rito Alejo del Río, had been negligent in not combating paramilitary groups in Urabá. In its analysis of the information, the Embassy takes a favorable view of Velásquez:

[Embassy officers] who know Velasquez speak highly of his performance as head of the anti-narcotics special joint command’s Army component in Cali. When the cartel tried to blackmail him, then Minister of Defense Botero saved him from dismissal. Botero characterized him as clean, among the best, and of unquestionable integrity. [Several lines deleted] Velasquez’s statements bring extra pressure to bear on the Colombian military as they prepare for a new defense minister. They will add credibility to our human rights report.

Document 3
1997 December 24
Retired Army Colonel Talks Freely About the Army He Left Behind
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report

In this document, a U.S. military attaché reports his conversation with a retired Colombian Army colonel (almost certainly Carlos Alfonso Velásquez) about his time at the 17th Brigade in Urabá. The report notes that the colonel “seems to know a lot about paramilitaries and their links to drug traffickers and the Army.” The colonel says that there is a “body count syndrome” in the Colombian Army “when it comes to pursuing the guerrillas.” This way of thinking “tends to fuel human rights abuses by otherwise well-meaning soldiers trying to get their quota to impress superiors.” The colonel said he had served under one commander he respected, as well as Rito Alejo del Río, “about whom he had fewer nice things to say.”

[Name deleted] was asked if the paramilitary wave of violence in the Uraba region and related military collusion were recent phenomena. [Deleted] replied in the negative, saying that military cooperation with the paramilitaries had been occurring for a number of years, but that it had gotten much worse under Del Río.”

Document 4
1998 January 09
Colombians Strike Two Blows Against the Paras
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, 1998 Bogota 120

The U.S. Embassy noted with interest the sudden surge of anti-paramilitary activity by the 17th Brigade immediately after the departure of Del Río as brigade commander.

It is interesting to note that the 17th Brigade confrontation took place only about a week after the departure of the brigade’s commander, Brig. Gen. Rito Alejo del Río, who was long-alleged to by not unfriendly toward paramilitaries. His own former deputy, Col. Carlos Alfonso Velasquez, was retired from the Army under a cloud in January 1997 for privately criticizing Del Río’s refusal to combat the paramilitaries headquartered in the region. Although the Army has claimed for some time that the 17th Brigade has moved against the paramilitaries, we are unaware of any other such encounters that have been publicly confirmed.

Document 5
1998 January 28
Narcos Arrested for La Horqueta Paramilitary Massacre
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable

The U.S. Embassy questions why it was another military unit, and not the Army’s 13th Brigade, under the command of Gen. Del Río, that finally responded to the January 1998 La Horqueta paramilitary massacre.

If the Army was immediately in the area in the immediate aftermath of the killings, however, as the priest asserts, why was it necessary for another Army unit to travel all the way from Bogotá in order to intervene? That is precisely the question prosecutors are now asking. Finally, the strangely non-reactive 13th Brigade recently came under the command of BG Rito Alejo Del Rio, who earned considerable attention as commander of the 17th Brigade covering the heartland of Carlos Castaño’s paramilitaries in Cordoba and Uraba.

Document 6
1998 February 09
Colombian Army Reportedly Captures 23 Paramilitaries
U.S. Embassy cable, 1998 Bogota 1249

The Embassy speculates that a recent surge in 17th Brigade anti-paramilitary activity in Urabá may be related to the departure of Gen. Rito Alejo del Río as commander.

We are encouraged by this development but we are not yet sure how to interpret it. Until recently, the military has had little success in capturing paramilitaries… The 17th Brigade has a new commander, which may also have contributed to an increased surge in anti-paramilitary activity. The previous commander, Brigadier General Rito Alejo Del Rio, now the head of the 13th Brigade in Bogota, was rumored to have been quite tolerant of paramilitary activity in Uraba.

Document 7
1998 February 25
U.S. Army School of the Americas Success Stories
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report

A U.S. military intelligence report, subsequently revised (see Document 9), lists Gen. Del Río among U.S. military training “success stories.”

Document 8
1998 February 26
Military and Police Begin Clearly Cracking Down on Paramilitaries Around Carlos Castano
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, 1998 Bogota 2097

The U.S. Embassy says that it “seems more than coincidental” that recent anti-paramilitary operations by the military “have all taken place since the departure from northern Colombia” of First Division commander Gen. Iván Ramírez and 17th Brigade commander Gen. Rito Alejo del Río.

We note that these latest anti-paramilitary incidents have all taken place since the departure from northern Colombia of former first division commander MG Ivan Ramirez and his 17th Brigade commander BG Rio [sic] Alejo Del Rio, who were widely believed to have contributed to a command climate conducive to turning a blind eye to paramilitaries, or worse. Nothing is irreversible, but at long last those days appear to be over.

We note that this new-found effectiveness in curbing the paramilitaries correlates closely with the recent change of command in several key military positions in northern Colombia, including the First Division in Santa Marta (formerly headed by Major General Ivan Ramirez), the 17th Brigade in Uraba, and the 11th Brigade in Monteria… It seems more than coincidental that the recent anti-paramilitary actions have all taken place since the departure from northern Colombia of military personnel believed to favor paramilitaries.

Document 9
1998 March 31
U.S. Army School of the Americas Not-So-Success Stories – Digging Back into History (Corrected Report)
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report

The U.S. military attaché in Colombia corrects an earlier report on Colombian military graduates from the U.S. Army School of the Americas, noting that Gen. Rito Alejo del Río was alleged to have ties to paramilitaries in Urabá as well as the Magdalena Medio, where “he was implicated in the 1985 theft of a [Colombian Army] weapons shipment destined for Magdalena Medio paramilitaries.”

Report follows up earlier detailed IIR on high-ranking/high-visibility Colombian military/national police graduates of the School of the Americas. Since then, additional—mostly derogatory—info on some of the older, mostly now retired, officers has come to light.

Brigadier General Rito Alejo ((Del Rio)) Rojas—Alleged to have ties not only to paramilitary elements on the north coast and in the Uraba region (adjacent to the Darien region of Panama), but also in the conflictive “Magdalena Medio” region before that. For example, he was implicated in the 1985 theft of a [Colombian Army] weapons shipment destined for Magdalena Medio paramilitaries. The case came to light only because the overloaded airplane crashed. BG Del Rio is currently serving as commander of the 13th Brigade in Bogota.

Document 10
1998 May 14
Army/Fiscalia Raid on a Church Based NGO Viewed as a Major Blunder
U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, 1998 Bogota 5554

The U.S. Embassy asserts that a raid by the Army’s 13th Brigade on the offices of the Comisión Interclesial de Justicia y Paz might be “related to long-standing friction between the Jesuit director of the NGO and the commander of the Army’s 13th Brigade.

Comment. [Two lines deleted] Jesuit priest Father Javier Giraldo worked in Uraba during the time period in which General Rito Alejo Del Rio was commanding the 17th Brigade there. [Two lines deleted] Recently, General Del Rio was reassigned to his new, more responsible position commanding the 13th Brigade; the brigade which participated in the raid on Justicia y Paz.

Document 11
1999 January 25
Official Informal for Ambassador Kamman from WHA/AND Director Chicola and DRL DAS Gerson
U.S. State Department cable, 1999 State 13985

Two senior U.S. officials register their dissatisfaction with Colombia’s progress on human rights during the first six months of the Pastrana government, noting the “appointment to key positions of several generals credibly alleged to have ties to paramilitaries. These include Generals Fernando Millan Perez, Rito Aleto Del Rio Rojas, and Rafael Hernandez Lopez.”

Document 12
2001 December 13
Your Meeting with Fiscal General Luis Camilo Osorio
U.S. State Department briefing memorandum

A briefing paper for the State Department’s top human rights official, Lorne Craner, notes “concern in the US Congress” that Osorio is “less focused on prosecuting paramilitaries and military personnel accused of colluding with paramilitary,” citing his dismissal of charges against Rito Alejo del Río.

Document 13
Circa 2005
Memorandum of Justification Concerning Human Rights Conditions with Respect to Assistance for Colombian Armed Forces
U.S. State Department memorandum

A U.S. State Department review of Colombia’s human rights performance finds it “troubling” that the government had not yet sent “a clear message” regarding impunity for Del Río.

TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE FBI: THE ADOLF HITLER PARTY FILES

Adolph Hitler (1889-1945) was leader of the National Socialist (Nazi) Party and Chancellor of Germany from 1933-1945; he led that country into World War II in 1939. The documents in this file range from 1933 to 1947, but primarily fall either in 1933 or between 1945 and 1947. In 1933, the FBI investigated an assassination threat made against Hitler. In the aftermath of Germany’s surrender in 1945, western Allied forces suspected that Hitler had committed suicide but did not immediately find evidence of his death. At the time, it was feared that Hitler may have escaped in the closing days of the war, and searches were made to determine if he was still alive. FBI Files indicate that the Bureau investigated some of the rumors of Hitler’s survival.

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TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE FBI – THE MAFIA MONOGRAPH FILES

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Download the Files above

Italian Organized Crime

Overview

Analysts training in the classroom

Since their appearance in the 1800s, the Italian criminal societies known as the Mafia have infiltrated the social and economic fabric of Italy and now impact the world. They are some of the most notorious and widespread of all criminal societies.

There are several groups currently active in the U.S.: theSicilian Mafia; the Camorra or Neapolitan Mafia; the’Ndrangheta or Calabrian Mafia; and the Sacra Corona Unita or United Sacred Crown.

We estimate the four groups have approximately 25,000 members total, with 250,000 affiliates worldwide. There are more than 3,000 members and affiliates in the U.S., scattered mostly throughoutthe major cities in the Northeast, the Midwest, California, and the South. Their largest presence centers around New York, southern New Jersey, and Philadelphia.

Their criminal activities are international with members and affiliates in Canada, South America, Australia, and parts of Europe. They are also known to collaborate with other international organized crime groups from all over the world, especially in drug trafficking.

The major threats to American society posed by these groups are drug trafficking and money laundering.They have been involved in heroin trafficking for decades. Two major investigations that targeted Italian organized crime drug trafficking in the 1980s are known as the “French Connection” and the “Pizza Connection.”

These groups don’t limit themselves to drug running, though. They’re also involved in illegal gambling, political corruption, extortion, kidnapping, fraud, counterfeiting, infiltration of legitimate businesses, murders, bombings, and weapons trafficking. Industry experts in Italy estimate that their worldwide criminal activity is worth more than $100 billion annually.

A Long History

These enterprises evolved over the course of 3,000 years during numerous periods of invasion and exploitation by numerous conquering armies in Italy. Over the millennia, Sicilians became more clannish and began to rely on familial ties for safety, protection, justice, and survival.

An underground secret society formed initially as resistance fighters against the invaders and to exact frontier vigilante justice against oppression. A member was known as a “Man Of Honor,” respected and admired because he protected his family and friends and kept silent even unto death.

Sicilians weren’t concerned if the group profited from its actions because it came at the expense of theoppressive authorities. These secret societies eventually grew into the Mafia.

Since the 1900s, thousands of Italian organized crime figures—mostly Sicilian Mafiosi—have come illegally to this country. Many who fled here in the early 1920s helped establish what is known today as La Cosa Nostra or the American Mafia.

Charles “Lucky” Luciano, a Mafioso from Sicily, came to the U.S. during this era and is credited for making the American La Cosa Nostra what it is today. Luciano structured the La Cosa Nostra after theSicilian Mafia. When Luciano was deported back to Italy in 1946 for operating a prostitution ring, he became a liaison between the Sicilian Mafia and La Cosa Nostra.

Sicilian Mafia (based in Sicily)

The Sicilian Mafia formed in the mid-1800s to unify the Sicilian peasants against their enemies. In Sicily,the word Mafia tends to mean “manly.” The Sicilian Mafia changed from a group of honorable Sicilian men to an organized criminal group in the 1920s.

In the 1950s, Sicily enjoyed a massive building boom. Taking advantage of the opportunity, the SicilianMafia gained control of the building contracts and made millions of dollars. Today, the Sicilian Mafia has evolved into an international organized crime group. Some experts estimate it is the second largest organization in Italy.

The Sicilian Mafia specializes in heroin trafficking, political corruption, and military arms trafficking—and is also known to engage in arson, frauds, counterfeiting, and other racketeering crimes. With an estimated 2,500 Sicilian Mafia affiliates it is the most powerful and most active Italian organized crime group in the U.S.

The Sicilian Mafia is infamous for its aggressive assaults on Italian law enforcement officials. In Sicily theterm “Excellent Cadaver” is used to distinguish the assassination of prominent government officials fromthe common criminals and ordinary citizens killed by the Mafia. High-ranking victims include police commissioners, mayors, judges, police colonels and generals, and Parliament members.

On May 23, 1992, the Sicilian Mafia struck Italian law enforcement with a vengeance. At approximately 6 p.m., Italian Magistrate Giovanni Falcone, his wife, and three police body guards were killed by a massive bomb. Falcone was the director of Criminal Affairs in Rome. The bomb made a crater 30 feet in diameter in the road. The murders became known as the Capaci Massacre.

Less than two months later, on July 19, the Mafia struck Falcone’s newly named replacement, Judge Paolo Borsellino in Palermo, Sicily. Borsellino and five bodyguards were killed outside the apartment of Borsellino’s mother when a car packed with explosives was detonated by remote control.

Under Judge Falcone’s tenure the FBI and Italian law enforcement established a close working relationship aimed at dismantling Italian organized crime groups operating in both countries. That relationship has intensified since then.

Camorra or Neapolitan Mafia (based in Naples)

The word “Camorra” means gang. The Camorra first appeared in the mid-1800s in Naples, Italy, as a prison gang. Once released, members formed clans in the cities and continued to grow in power. TheCamorra has more than 100 clans and approximately 7,000 members, making it the largest of the Italian organized crime groups.

In the 1970s, the Sicilian Mafia convinced the Camorra to convert their cigarette smuggling routes into drug smuggling routes with the Sicilian Mafia’s assistance. Not all Camorra leaders agreed, leading tothe Camorra Wars that cost 400 lives. Opponents of drug trafficking lost the war.

The Camorra made a fortune in reconstruction after an earthquake ravaged the Campania region in 1980. Now it specializes in cigarette smuggling and receives payoffs from other criminal groups for any cigarette traffic through Italy. The Camorra is also involved in money laundering, extortion, alien smuggling, robbery, blackmail, kidnapping, political corruption, and counterfeiting.

It is believed that nearly 200 Camorra affiliates reside in this country, many of whom arrived during theCamorra Wars.

’Ndrangheta or Calabrian Mafia (based in Calabria)

The word “’Ndrangheta” comes from the Greek meaning courage or loyalty. The ’Ndrangheta formed inthe 1860s when a group of Sicilians was banished from the island by the Italian government. They settled in Calabria and formed small criminal groups.

There are about 160 ’Ndrangheta cells with roughly 6,000 members. They specialize in kidnapping and political corruption, but also engage in drug trafficking, murder, bombings, counterfeiting, gambling, frauds, thefts, labor racketeering, loansharking, and alien smuggling.

Cells are loosely connected family groups based on blood relationships and marriages. In the U.S.,there are an estimated 100-200 members and associates, primarily in New York and Florida.

Sacra Corona Unita or United Sacred Crown (based in the Puglia region)

Law enforcement became aware of the Sacra Corona Unita in the late 1980s. Like other groups, it started as a prison gang. As its members were released, they settled in the Puglia region in Italy and continued to grow and form links with other Mafia groups. The Sacra Corona Unita is headquartered in Brindisi, located in the southeastern region of Puglia.

The Sacra Corona Unita consists of about 50 clans with approximately 2,000 members and specializes in smuggling cigarettes, drugs, arms, and people. It is also involved in money laundering, extortion, and political corruption. The organization collects payoffs from other criminal groups for landing rights on thesoutheast coast of Italy, a natural gateway for smuggling to and from post-Communist countries like Croatia, Yugoslavia, and Albania.

Very few Sacra Corona Unita members have been identified in the U.S., although some individuals in Illinois, Florida, and New York have links to the organization.


La Cosa Nostra

La Cosa Nostra is the foremost organized criminal threat to American society. Literally translated into English it means “this thing of ours.” It is a nationwide alliance of criminals—linked by blood ties or through conspiracy—dedicated to pursuing crime and protecting its members.

La Cosa Nostra, or the LCN as it is known by the FBI, consists of different “families” or groups that are generally arranged geographically and engaged in significant and organized racketeering activity. It is also known as the Mafia, a term used to describe other organized crime groups.

The LCN is most active in the New York metropolitan area, parts of New Jersey, Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago, and New England. It has members in other major cities and is involved in international crimes.

History of La Cosa Nostra

Although La Cosa Nostra has its roots in Italian organized crime, it has been a separate organization for many years. Today, La Cosa Nostra cooperates in various criminal activities with different criminal groups that are headquartered in Italy.

Giuseppe Esposito was the first known Sicilian Mafia member to emigrate to the U.S. He and six other Sicilians fled to New York after murdering the chancellor and a vice chancellor of a Sicilian province and 11 wealthy landowners. He was arrested in New Orleans in 1881 and extradited to Italy.

New Orleans was also the site of the first major Mafia incident in this country. On October 15, 1890, New Orleans Police Superintendent David Hennessey was murdered execution-style. Hundreds of Sicilians were arrested, and 19 were eventually indicted for the murder. An acquittal generated rumors of widespread bribery and intimidated witnesses. Outraged citizens of New Orleans organized a lynch mob and killed 11 of the 19 defendants. Two were hanged, nine were shot, and the remaining eight escaped.

The American Mafia has evolved over the years as various gangs assumed—and lost—dominance overthe years: the Black Hand gangs around 1900; the Five Points Gang in the 1910s and ‘20s in New York City; Al Capone’s Syndicate in Chicago in the 1920s. By the end of the ‘20s, two primary factions had emerged, leading to a war for control of organized crime in New York City.

The murder of faction leader Joseph Masseria brought an end to the gang warfare, and the two groups united to form the organization now dubbed La Cosa Nostra. It was not a peaceful beginning: Salvatore Maranzano, the first leader of La Cosa Nostra, was murdered within six months.

Charles “Lucky” Luciano became the new leader. Maranzano had established the La Cosa Nostra code of conduct, set up the “family” divisions and structure, and established procedures for resolving disputes. Luciano set up the “Commission” to rule all La Cosa Nostra activities. The Commission included bosses from six or seven families.

Luciano was deported back to Italy in 1946 based on his conviction for operating a prostitution ring.There, he became a liaison between the Sicilian Mafia and La Cosa Nostra.

Other Historical Highlights:

1951: A U.S. Senate committee led by Democrat Estes Kefauver of Tennessee determined that a “sinister criminal organization” known as the Mafia operated in this nation.

1957: The New York State Police uncovered a meeting of major LCN figures from around the country inthe small upstate New York town of Apalachin. Many of the attendees were arrested. The event was thecatalyst that changed the way law enforcement battles organized crime.

1963: Joseph Valachi became the first La Cosa Nostra member to provide a detailed looked inside theorganization. Recruited by FBI agents, Valachi revealed to a U.S. Senate committee numerous secrets ofthe organization, including its name, structure, power bases, codes, swearing-in ceremony, and members of the organization.

Today, La Cosa Nostra is involved in a broad spectrum of illegal activities: murder, extortion, drug trafficking, corruption of public officials, gambling, infiltration of legitimate businesses, labor racketeering, loan sharking, prostitution, pornography, tax-fraud schemes, and stock manipulation schemes.

The Genovese Crime Family

Named after legendary boss Vito Genovese, the Genovese crime family was once considered the most powerful organized crime family in the nation. Members and their numerous associates engaged in drug trafficking, murder, assault, gambling, extortion, loansharking, labor racketeering, money laundering, arson, gasoline bootlegging, and infiltration of legitimate businesses.

Genovese family members are also involved in stock market manipulation and other illegal frauds and schemes as evidenced by the recent FBI investigation code named “Mobstocks.”

The Genovese crime family has its roots in the Italian criminal groups in New York controlled by Joseph Masseria in the 1920s. The family history is rife with murder, violence, and greed.

Early History—Masseria and Maranzano

Masseria sparked the so-called “Castellammarese War” in 1928 when he tried to gain control of organized crime across the country. The war ended in 1931 when Salvatore Maranzano conspired with Masseria’s top soldier, Charles “Lucky” Luciano, to have Masseria killed. Maranzano emerged as themost powerful Mafia boss in the nation, setting up five separate criminal groups in New York and calling himself “Boss of Bosses.”

Two of the most powerful La Cosa Nostra families—known today as the Genovese and Gambino families—emerged from Maranzano’s restructuring efforts. Maranzano named Luciano the first boss of what would later be known as the Genovese family. Luciano showed his appreciation less than five months later by sending five men dressed as police officers to Maranzano’s office to murder him.

Luciano, Costello, and Genovese

With Maranzano out of the way, Luciano become the most powerful Mafia boss in America and used his position to run La Cosa Nostra like a major corporation. He set up the LCN Commission, or ruling body, composed of seven bosses, and divided the different rackets among the families.

In 1936, Luciano was sentenced to 30 to 50 years in prison. Ten years later, he was released from prison and deported to Italy, never to return. When he was convicted, Frank Costello became acting boss because Genovese—then just an underboss—had fled to Italy to avoid a murder charge. His return to thestates was cleared when a key witness against him was poisoned and the charges were dropped.

Costello led the family for approximately 20 years until May of 1957 when Genovese took control by sending soldier Vincent “the Chin” Gigante to murder him. Costello survived the attack but relinquished control of the family to Genovese. Attempted murder charges against Gigante were dismissed when Costello refused to identify him as the shooter.

In 1959, it was Genovese’s turn to go to prison following a conviction of conspiracy to violate narcotics laws. He received a 15-year sentence but continued to run the family through his underlings from his prison cell in Atlanta, Georgia.

Valachi Sings—and Lombardo Leads

About this time, Joseph Valachi, a “made man,” was sent to the same prison as Genovese on a narcotics conviction. Labeled an informer, Valachi survived three attempts on his life behind bars. Still in prison in 1962, he killed a man he thought Genovese had sent to kill him. He was sentenced to life forthe murder.

The sentencing was a turning point for Valachi, who decided to cooperate with the U.S. government. On September 27, 1963, he appeared before the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and testified that he was a member of a secret criminal society in the U.S. known as La Cosa Nostra.

In 1969, several years after Valachi began cooperating with the FBI, Vito Genovese died in his prison cell. By then the Genovese family was under the control of Philip “Benny Squint” Lombardo. Unlike the bosses before him, Lombardo preferred to rule behind his underboss. His first, Thomas Eboli, was murdered in 1972. Lombardo promoted Frank “Funzi” Tieri, and later Anthony “Fat Tony” Salerno as his front men.

Throughout the 1980s, the Genovese family hierarchy went through several changes. Tieri, recognized onthe street as the Genovese family boss in the late 1970s, was convicted for operating a criminal organization through a pattern of racketeering that included murder and extortion.

Salerno then fronted as boss until he had stroke in 1981. In 1985, Salerno and the bosses of the other four New York families were convicted for operating a criminal enterprise—the LCN Commission. Lombardo, his two captains in prison and his health failing, turned full control of the Genovese family over to Gigante—the man who tried to kill Costello 30 years earlier.

Fish on the Hook

In 1986, a second member turned against the Genovese family when Vincent “Fish” Cafaro, a soldier and right-hand-man to Anthony Salerno, decided to cooperate with the FBI and testify. According to Cafaro’s sworn statement, Gigante ran the family from behind the scenes while pretending to be mentally ill. Cafaro said this behavior helped further insulate Gigante from authorities while he ran theGenovese family’s criminal activities.

Gigante’s odd behavior and mumbling while he walked around New York’s East Village in a bathrobe earned him the nickname “the Odd Father.” After an FBI investigation, Gigante was convicted of racketeering and murder conspiracy in December 1997 and sentenced to 12 years. Another FBIinvestigation led to his indictment on January 17, 2002, accusing him of continuing to run the Genovese family from prison. He pled guilty to obstruction of justice in 2003.

Gigante died in prison in December 2005 in the same federal hospital where Gambino family leader John Gotti had died in 2002.


The Italian American Working Group

Over the years, FBI investigations have revealed how organized criminal groups have proliferated and impacted much of the world. Partnerships with foreign law enforcement agencies are essential to combat global organized crime groups.

Among the partnerships the FBI is involved with is the Italian American Working Group, which meets every year. The group addresses organized crime, cyber crime, money laundering, international terrorism, illegal immigration, cooperating witnesses, drug smuggling, art theft, extradition matters, and cigarette smuggling. The U.S. and Italy take turns hosting the meetings.


Labor Racketeering

Labor racketeering is the domination, manipulation, and control of a labor movement in order to affect related businesses and industries. It can lead to the denial of workers’ rights and inflicts an economic loss on the workers, business, industry, insurer, or consumer.

The historical involvement of La Cosa Nostra in labor racketeering has been thoroughly documented:

  • More than one-third of the 58 members arrested in 1957 at the Apalachin conference in New York listed their employment as “labor” or “labor-management relations.”
  • Three major U.S. Senate investigations have documented La Cosa Nostra’s involvement in labor racketeering. One of these, the McClellan Committee, in the late-1950s, found systemic racketeering in both the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union.
  • In 1986, the President’s Council on Organized Crime reported that five major unions—includingthe Teamsters and the Laborers International Union of North America—were dominated by organized crime.
  • In the early 1980s, former Gambino Family Boss Paul Castellano was overheard saying, “Our job is to run the unions.”

Labor racketeering has become one of La Cosa Nostra’s fundamental sources of profit, national power, and influence.

FBI investigations over the years have clearly demonstrated that labor racketeering costs the American public millions of dollars each year through increased labor costs that are eventually passed on to consumers.

Labor unions provide a rich source for organized criminal groups to exploit: their pension, welfare, and health funds. There are approximately 75,000 union locals in the U.S., and many of them maintain their own benefit funds. In the mid-1980s, the Teamsters controlled more than 1,000 funds with total assets of more than $9 billion.

Labor racketeers attempt to control health, welfare, and pension plans by offering “sweetheart” contracts, peaceful labor relations, and relaxed work rules to companies, or by rigging union elections.

Labor law violations occur primarily in large cities with both a strong industrial base and strong labor unions, like New York, Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, and Philadelphia. These cities also have a large presence of organized crime figures.

We have several investigative techniques to root out labor law violations: electronic surveillance, undercover operations, confidential sources, and victim interviews. We also have numerous criminal and civil statutes to use at our disposal, primarily through the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Statute.

The civil provisions of the RICO statute have proven to be very powerful weapons, especially the consent decrees. They are often more productive because they attack the entire corrupt entity instead of imprisoning individuals, who can easily be replaced with other organized crime members or associates.

Consent decrees are most effective when there is long-term, systemic corruption at virtually every level of a labor union by criminal organizations. A civil RICO complaint and subsequent consent decree can restore democracy to a corrupt union by imposing civil remedies designed to eliminate such corruption and deter its re-emergence.

The Teamsters are the best example of how efficiently the civil RICO process can be used. For decades,the Teamsters has been substantially controlled by La Cosa Nostra. In recent years, four of eight Teamster presidents were indicted, yet the union continued to be controlled by organized crime elements. The government has been fairly successful at removing the extensive criminal influence from this 1.4 million-member union by using the civil process.

We work closely with the Office of Labor Racketeering in the Department of Labor and with the U.S. Attorneys’ offices in investigating violations of labor law.

TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE FBI – The Marilyn Monroe Files

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Marilyn Monroe

Marilyn Monroe

Monroe in the trailer for Some Like It Hot(1959)
Born Norma Jeane Mortenson
June 1, 1926
Los Angeles
Died August 5, 1962 (aged 36)
Brentwood, Los Angeles
Cause of death Barbiturate overdose
Resting place Westwood Village Memorial Park CemeteryWestwood, Los Angeles
Other names Norma Jeane Baker
Norma Jeane Dougherty
Norma Jeane DiMaggio
Occupation Actress, model, film producer, singer
Years active 1947–1962
Religion Christian (1926-1956),
Jewish (1956-1962)
Spouse James Dougherty (m. 1942–1946) (divorced)
Joe DiMaggio (m. 1954–1954)(divorced)
Arthur Miller (m. 1956–1961)(divorced)
Signature

Marilyn Monroe (pronounced /mɒnˈroʊ/ or /mənˈroʊ/, born Norma Jeane Mortenson but baptized and raised as Norma Jeane Baker; June 1, 1926 – August 5, 1962[1]) was an American actress, singer and model.[2] After spending much of her childhood in foster homes, Monroe began a career as a model, which led to a film contract in 1946. Her early film appearances were minor, but her performances in The Asphalt Jungle and All About Eve (both 1950) were well received. By 1953, Monroe had progressed to leading roles. Her “dumb blonde” persona was used to comedic effect in such films as Gentlemen Prefer Blondes (1953), How to Marry a Millionaire (1953) and The Seven Year Itch (1955). Limited by typecasting, Monroe studied at the Actors Studio to broaden her range, and her dramatic performance inBus Stop (1956) was hailed by critics, and she received a Golden Globe nomination. Her production company, Marilyn Monroe Productions, released The Prince and the Showgirl (1957), for which she received a BAFTA Award nomination and won a David di Donatello award. She received a Golden Globe Award for her performance inSome Like It Hot (1959).

The final years of Monroe’s life were marked by illness, personal problems, and a reputation for being unreliable and difficult to work with. The circumstances of her death, from an overdose of barbiturates, have been the subject of conjecture. Though officially classified as a “probable suicide”, the possibility of an accidental overdose, as well as the possibility of homicide, have not been ruled out. In 1999, Monroe was ranked as the sixth greatest female star of all time by the American Film Institute. In the years and decades following her death, Monroe has often been cited as a pop and cultural icon as well as an eminent American sex symbol

Family and early life

Marilyn Monroe was born on June 1, 1926 in the Los Angeles County Hospital[6] as Norma Jeane Mortenson (soon after changed to Baker), the third child born to Gladys Pearl Baker (née Monroe) (May 27, 1902 – March 11, 1984).[7] Monroe’s birth certificate names the father as Martin Edward Mortensen with his residence stated as “unknown”.[8] The name Mortenson is listed as her surname on the birth certificate, although Gladys immediately had it changed to Baker, the surname of her first husband and which she still used. Martin’s surname was misspelled on the birth certificate leading to more confusion on who her actual father was. Gladys Baker had married a Martin E. Mortensen in 1924, but they had separated before Gladys’ pregnancy.[9] Several of Monroe’s biographers suggest that Gladys Baker used his name to avoid the stigma of illegitimacy.[10]Mortensen died at the age of 85, and Monroe’s birth certificate, together with her parents’ marriage and divorce documents, were discovered. The documents showed that Mortensen filed for divorce from Gladys on March 5, 1927, and it was finalized on October 15, 1928.[11][12] Throughout her life, Marilyn Monroe denied that Mortensen was her father.[9] She said that, when she was a child, she had been shown a photograph of a man that Gladys identified as her father, Charles Stanley Gifford. She remembered that he had a thin mustache and somewhat resembled Clark Gable, and that she had amused herself by pretending that Gable was her father.[9][13]

Gladys was mentally unstable and financially unable to care for the young Norma Jeane, so she placed her with foster parents Albert and Ida Bolender of Hawthorne, California, where she lived until she was seven. One day, Gladys visited and demanded that the Bolenders return Norma Jeane to her. Ida refused, she knew Gladys was unstable and the situation would not benefit her young daughter. Gladys pulled Ida into the yard, then quickly ran back to the house and locked herself in. Several minutes later, she walked out with one of Albert Bolender’s military duffel bags. To Ida’s horror, Gladys had stuffed a screaming Norma Jeane into the bag, zipped it up, and was carrying it right out with her. Ida charged toward her, and their struggle split the bag apart, dumping out Norma Jeane, who wept loudly as Ida grabbed her and pulled her back inside the house, away from Gladys.[14] In 1933, Gladys bought a house and brought Norma Jeane to live with her. A few months later, Gladys began a series of mental episodes that would plague her for the rest of her life. In My Story, Monroe recalls her mother “screaming and laughing” as she was forcibly removed to the State Hospital in Norwalk.

Norma Jeane was declared a ward of the state. Gladys’ best friend, Grace McKee, became her guardian. It was Grace who told Monroe that someday she would become a movie star. Grace was captivated by Jean Harlow, and would let Norma Jeane wear makeup and take her out to get her hair curled. They would go to the movies together, forming the basis for Norma Jeane’s fascination with the cinema and the stars on screen. When she was 9, McKee married Ervin Silliman “Doc” Goddard in 1935, and subsequently sent Monroe to the Los Angeles Orphans Home (later renamed Hollygrove), followed by a succession of foster homes.[15] While at Hollygrove, several families were interested in adopting her; however, reluctance on Gladys’ part to sign adoption papers thwarted those attempts. In 1937, Monroe moved back into Grace and Doc Goddard’s house, joining Doc’s daughter from a previous marriage. Due to Doc’s frequent attempts to sexually assault Norma Jeane, this arrangement did not last long.

Grace sent Monroe to live with her great-aunt, Olive Brunings in Compton, California; this was also a brief stint ended by an assault (some reports say it was sexual)–one of Olive’s sons had attacked the now middle-school-aged girl. Biographers and psychologists have questioned whether at least some of Norma Jeane’s later behavior (i.e. hypersexuality, sleep disturbances, substance abuse, disturbed interpersonal relationships), was a manifestation of the effects of childhood sexual abuse in the context of her already problematic relationships with her psychiatrically ill mother and subsequent caregivers.[16][17] In early 1938, Grace sent her to live with yet another one of her aunts, Ana Lower, who lived in Van Nuys, another city in Los Angeles County. Years later, she would reflect fondly about the time that she spent with Lower, whom she affectionately called “Aunt Ana.” She would explain that it was one of the only times in her life when she felt truly stable. As she aged, however, Lower developed serious health problems.

In 1942, Monroe moved back to Grace and Doc Goddard’s house. While attending Van Nuys High School, she met a neighbor’s son, James Dougherty (more commonly referred to as simply “Jim”), and began a relationship with him.[18][19][20] Several months later, Grace and Doc Goddard decided to relocate to Virginia, where Doc had received a lucrative job offer. Although it was never explained why, they decided not to take Monroe with them. An offer from a neighborhood family to adopt her was proposed, but Gladys rejected the offer. With few options left, Grace approached Dougherty’s mother and suggested that Jim marry her so that she would not have to return to an orphanage or foster care, as she was two years below the California legal age. Jim was initially reluctant, but he finally relented and married her in a ceremony arranged by Ana Lower. During this period, Monroe briefly supported her family as a homemaker.[18][21] In 1943, during World War II, Dougherty enlisted in the Merchant Marine. He was initially stationed on Santa Catalina Island off California’s west coast, and Monroe lived with him there in the town of Avalon for several months before he was shipped out to the Pacific. Frightened that he might not come back alive, Monroe begged him to try and get her pregnant before he left. Dougherty disagreed, feeling that she was too young to have a baby, but he promised that they would revisit the subject when he returned home. Subsequently, Monroe moved in with Dougherty’s mother.

Career

Early work: 1945–47

Mrs. Norma Jeane Dougherty,Yank Magazine, 1945

While Dougherty served in the Merchant Marine, Monroe began working in the Radioplane Munitions Factory, mainly spraying airplane parts with fire retardant and inspectingparachutes. During that time, Army photographer David Conover noticed her and snapped a photograph of her for a Yank magazine article. He encouraged her to apply to The Blue Book Modeling Agency. She signed with the agency and began researching the work of Jean Harlow and Lana Turner. She was told that they were looking for models with lighter hair, so Norma Jeane bleached her brunette hair to a golden blonde.

Monroe became one of Blue Book’s most successful models; she appeared on dozens of magazine covers. Her successful modeling career brought her to the attention of Ben Lyon, a 20th Century Fox executive, who arranged a screen test for her. Lyon was impressed and commented, “It’s Jean Harlow all over again.”[22] She was offered a standard six-month contract with a starting salary of $125 per week. Lyon did not like the name Norma Jeane and chose “Carole Lind” as a stagename, after Carole Lombard and Jenny Lind, but he soon decided it was not an appropriate choice. Monroe was invited to spend the weekend with Lyon and his wife Bebe Daniels at their home. It was there that they decided to find her a new name. Following her idol Jean Harlow, she decided to choose her mother’s maiden name of Monroe. Several variations such as Norma Jeane Monroe and Norma Monroe were tried and initially “Jeane Monroe” was chosen. Eventually, Lyon decided Jeane and variants were too common, and he decided on a more alliterative sounding name. He suggested “Marilyn”, commenting that she reminded him of Marilyn Miller. Monroe was initially hesitant because Marilyn was the contraction of the name Mary Lynn, a name she did not like.[citation needed] Lyon, however, felt that the name “Marilyn Monroe” was sexy, had a “nice flow”, and would be “lucky” due to the double “M”[23] and thus Norma Jeane Baker took the name Marilyn Monroe.

Marilyn Monroe’s first movie role was an uncredited role as a telephone operator in The Shocking Miss Pilgrim in 1947.[24] She won a brief role that same year in Dangerous Yearsand extra appearances in Green Grass of Wyoming and You Were Meant for Me, she also won a three scene role as Betty in Scudda Hoo! Scudda Hay!. Monroe’s part in Scudda Hoo! Scudda Hay! was to be three scenes long, but before the release of the film her part was cut down to a brief one-line scene.[citation needed] Green Grass of WyomingYou Were Meant For Me, and Scudda Hoo! Scudda Hay!, wouldn’t be released until 1948, which was months after Monroe’s contract had ended in late 1947. She attempted to find opportunities for film work, and while unemployed, she posed for nude photographs. She was paid $50 and signed the model release form as “Mona Monroe”.[citation needed] It would be the only time she would get paid for the nude photos. That year, she was also crowned the first “Miss California Artichoke Queen” at the annual artichoke festival in Castroville.[25]

Breakthrough: 1948–51

In 1948, Monroe signed a six-month contract with Columbia Pictures and was introduced to the studio’s head drama coach Natasha Lytess, who became her acting coach for several years.[26] She starred in the low-budget musical Ladies of the Chorus (1948). Monroe was capitalized as one of the film’s bright spots, but the movie didn’t bring any success for Monroe nor Columbia.[27] During her short stint at Columbia, studio head Harry Cohn softened her appearance somewhat by correcting a slight overbite she had.

in The Asphalt Jungle (1950)

She had a small role in the Marx Brothers film Love Happy (1949). Monroe impressed the producers, who sent her to New York to feature in the film’s promotional campaign.[28] Love Happy brought Monroe to the attention of the talent agentJohnny Hyde, who agreed to represent her. He arranged for her to audition for John Huston, who cast her in the drama The Asphalt Jungle as the young mistress of an aging criminal. Her performance brought strong reviews,[28] and was seen by the writer and director, Joseph Mankiewicz. He accepted Hyde’s suggestion of Monroe for a small comedic role in All About Eve as Miss Caswell, an aspiring actress, described by another character as a student of “The Copacabana School of Dramatic Art”. Mankiewicz later commented that he had seen an innocence in her that he found appealing, and that this had confirmed his belief in her suitability for the role.[29] Following Monroe’s success in these roles, Hyde negotiated a seven-year contract for her with 20th Century Fox, shortly before his death in December 1950.[30] It was at some time during this 1949–50 period that Hyde arranged for her to have a slight bump of cartilage removed from her somewhat bulbous nose which further softened her appearance and accounts for the slight variation in look she had in films after 1950.

In 1951, Monroe enrolled at University of California, Los Angeles, where she studied literature and art appreciation,[31] and appeared in several minor films playing opposite such long-established performers as Mickey RooneyConstance BennettJune AllysonDick Powell and Claudette Colbert.[32] In March 1951, she appeared as a presenter at the 23rd Academy Awards ceremony.[33] In 1952, Monroe appeared on the cover of Look magazine wearing a Georgia Tech sweater as part of an article celebrating female enrollment to the school’s main campus. In the early 1950s, Monroe and Gregg Palmer both unsuccessfully auditioned for roles as Daisy Mae and Abner in a proposed Li’l Abner television series based on the Al Capp comic strip, but the effort never materialized.[34]

[edit]Leading films: 1952–55

First issue of Playboy, December 1953

In March 1952, Monroe faced a possible scandal when one of her nude photos from a 1949 session with photographer Tom Kelley was featured in a calendar. The press speculated about the identity of the anonymous model and commented that she closely resembled Monroe. As the studio discussed how to deal with the problem, Monroe suggested that she should simply admit that she had posed for the photograph but emphasize that she had done so only because she had no money to pay her rent.[35] She gave an interview in which she discussed the circumstances that led to her posing for the photographs, and the resulting publicity elicited a degree of sympathy for her plight as a struggling actress.[35]

She made her first appearance on the cover of Life magazine in April 1952, where she was described as “The Talk of Hollywood”.[36] Stories of her childhood and upbringing portrayed her in a sympathetic light: a cover story for the May 1952 edition of True Experiences magazine showed a smiling and wholesome Monroe beside a caption that read, “Do I look happy? I should — for I was a child nobody wanted. A lonely girl with a dream — who awakened to find that dream come true. I am Marilyn Monroe. Read my Cinderella story.”[37] It was also during this time that she began dating baseball player Joe DiMaggio. A photograph of DiMaggio visiting Monroe at the 20th Century Fox studio was printed in newspapers throughout the United States, and reports of a developing romance between them generated further interest in Monroe.[38]

Four films in which Monroe featured were released beginning in 1952. She had been lent to RKO Studios to appear in a supporting role in Clash by Night, a Barbara Stanwyckdrama, directed by Fritz Lang.[39] Released in June 1952, the film was popular with audiences, with much of its success credited to curiosity about Monroe, who received generally favorable reviews from critics.[40]

With Keith Andes in Clash by Night(1952)

This was followed by two films released in July, the comedy We’re Not Married!, and the drama Don’t Bother to KnockWe’re Not Married! featured Monroe as a beauty pageant contestant. Variety described the film as “lightweight”. Its reviewer commented that Monroe was featured to full advantage in a bathing suit, and that some of her scenes suggested a degree of exploitation.[41] In Don’t Bother to Knock she played the starring role[42] of a babysitter who threatens to attack the child in her care. The downbeat melodrama was poorly reviewed, although Monroe commented that it contained some of her strongest dramatic acting.[42] Monkey Business, a successful comedy directed byHoward Hawks starring Cary Grant and Ginger Rogers, was released in September and was the first movie in which Monroe appeared in with platinum blonde hair.[43] In O. Henry’s Full House for 20th Century Fox, released in August 1952, Monroe had a single one-minute scene with Charles Laughton, yet she received top billing alongside him and the film’s other stars, including Anne BaxterFarley GrangerJean Peters and Richard Widmark.

Darryl F. Zanuck considered that Monroe’s film potential was worth developing and cast her in Niagara, as a femme fatale scheming to murder her husband, played byJoseph Cotten.[44] During filming, Monroe’s make-up artist Whitey Snyder noticed her stage fright (that would ultimately mark her behavior on film sets throughout her career); the director assigned him to spend hours gently coaxing and comforting Monroe as she prepared to film her scenes.[45]

As Rose in Niagara

Much of the critical commentary following the release of the film focused on Monroe’s overtly sexual performance,[44] and a scene which shows Monroe (from the back) making a long walk toward Niagara Falls received frequent note in reviews.[46] After seeing the film, Constance Bennett reportedly quipped, “There’s a broad with her future behind her.”[47] Whitey Snyder also commented that it was during preparation for this film, after much experimentation, that Monroe achieved “the look, and we used that look for several pictures in a row … the look was established.”[46] While the film was a success, and Monroe’s performance had positive reviews, her conduct at promotional events sometimes drew negative comments. Her appearance at the Photoplay awards dinner in a skin-tight gold lamé dress was criticized. Louella Parsons‘ newspaper column quoted Joan Crawford discussing Monroe’s “vulgarity” and describing her behavior as “unbecoming an actress and a lady”.[48] Monroe had previously received criticism for wearing a dress with a neckline cut almost to her navel when she acted as Grand Marshall at the Miss America Parade in September 1952.[49] A photograph from this event was used on the cover of the first issue of Playboy in December 1953, with a nude photograph of Monroe, taken in 1949, inside the magazine.[50]

Her next film was Gentlemen Prefer Blondes (1953) co-starring Jane Russell and directed by Howard Hawks. Her role as Lorelei Lee, a gold-digging showgirl, required her to act, sing, and dance. The two stars became friends, with Russell describing Monroe as “very shy and very sweet and far more intelligent than people gave her credit for”.[51] She later recalled that Monroe showed her dedication by rehearsing her dance routines each evening after most of the crew had left, but she arrived habitually late on set for filming. Realizing that Monroe remained in her dressing room due to stage fright, and that Hawks was growing impatient with her tardiness, Russell started escorting her to the set.[52]

At the Los Angeles premiere of the film, Monroe and Russell pressed their hand- and footprints in the cement in the forecourt of Grauman’s Chinese Theatre. Monroe received positive reviews and the film grossed more than double its production costs.[53] Her rendition of “Diamonds Are a Girl’s Best Friend” became associated with her.Gentlemen Prefer Blondes also marked one of the earliest films in which William Travilla dressed Monroe. Travilla dressed Monroe in eight of her films including Bus Stop,Don’t Bother to KnockHow to Marry a MillionaireRiver of No ReturnThere’s No Business Like Show BusinessMonkey Business, and The Seven Year Itch.[54] How to Marry a Millionaire was a comedy about three models scheming to attract wealthy husbands. The film teamed Monroe with Betty Grable and Lauren Bacall, and was directed by Jean Negulesco.[55] The producer and scriptwriter, Nunnally Johnson, said that it was the first film in which audiences “liked Marilyn for herself [and that] she diagnosed the reason very shrewdly. She said that it was the only picture she’d been in, in which she had a measure of modesty… about her own attractiveness.”[56]

Monroe’s films of this period established her “dumb blonde” persona and contributed to her popularity. In 1953 and 1954, she was listed in the annual “Quigley Poll of the Top Ten Money Making Stars”, which was compiled from the votes of movie exhibitors throughout the United States for the stars that had generated the most revenue in their theaters over the previous year.[57] “I want to grow and develop and play serious dramatic parts. My dramatic coach, Natasha Lytess, tells everybody that I have a great soul, but so far nobody’s interested in it.” Monroe told the New York Times.[58] She saw a possibility in 20th Century Fox’s upcoming film, The Egyptian, but was rebuffed by Darryl F. Zanuck who refused to screen test her.[59]

Marilyn Monroe and Jane Russell putting signatures, hand and foot prints in cement atGrauman’s Chinese Theatre on June 26, 1953

Instead, she was assigned to the western River of No Return, opposite Robert Mitchum. Director Otto Preminger resented Monroe’s reliance on Natasha Lytess, who coached Monroe and announced her verdict at the end of each scene. Eventually Monroe refused to speak to Preminger, and Mitchum had to mediate.[60] Of the finished product, she commented, “I think I deserve a better deal than a grade Z cowboy movie in which the acting finished second to the scenery and the CinemaScopeprocess.”[61] In late 1953 Monroe was scheduled to begin filming The Girl in Pink Tights with Frank Sinatra. When she failed to appear for work, 20th Century Fox suspended her.[62]

International success: 1954–57

Marilyn Monroe, appearing with the USO, poses for soldiers in Korea after a performance at the 3rd U.S. Inf. Div. area, February 17, 1954.

Monroe and Joe DiMaggio were married in San Francisco on January 14, 1954. They traveled to Japan soon after, combining a honeymoon with a business trip previously arranged by DiMaggio. For two weeks she took a secondary role to DiMaggio as he conducted his business, having told a reporter, “Marriage is my main career from now on.”[63] Monroe then traveled alone to Korea where she performed for 13,000 American Marines over a three-day period. She later commented that the experience had helped her overcome a fear of performing in front of large crowds.[64] Edward H. Comins (1932–2011) of Las Vegas, Nevada, the winner of a Bronze Star medal in the Korean War, reported having cooked for Monroe during one of her engagements abroad.[65]

Returning to Hollywood in March 1954, Monroe settled her disagreement with 20th Century Fox and appeared in the musical There’s No Business Like Show Business. The film failed to recover its production costs[61] and was poorly received. Ed Sullivan described Monroe’s performance of the song “Heat Wave” as “one of the most flagrant violations of good taste” he had witnessed.[66] Time magazine compared her unfavorably to co-star Ethel Merman, while Bosley Crowther for The New York Timessaid that Mitzi Gaynor had surpassed Monroe’s “embarrassing to behold” performance.[67] The reviews echoed Monroe’s opinion of the film. She had made it reluctantly, on the assurance that she would be given the starring role in the film adaptation of the Broadway hit The Seven Year Itch.[68]

An iconic image entered popular culture.[69]

One of Monroe’s most notable film roles was shot in September 1954, a skirt-blowing key scene for The Seven Year Itch in New York City. In it, she stands with her co-star, Tom Ewell, while the air from a subway grating blows her skirt up. A large crowd watched as director Billy Wilder ordered the scene to be refilmed many times. Joe DiMaggio was reported to have been present and infuriated by the spectacle.[70] After a quarrel, witnessed by journalist Walter Winchell, the couple returned to California where they avoided the press for two weeks, until Monroe announced that they had separated.[71] Their divorce was granted in November 1954.[72] The filming was completed in early 1955, and after refusing what she considered to be inferior parts in The Girl in the Red Velvet Swing and How to Be Very, Very Popular, Monroe decided to leave Hollywood on the advice of Milton Greene. The role of Curly Flagg in How to Be Very, Very Popular went to Sheree North, and Girl in the Red Velvet Swing went to Joan CollinsThe Seven Year Itch was released and became a success, earning an estimated $8 million.[73] Monroe received positive reviews for her performance and was in a strong position to negotiate with 20th Century Fox.[73] On New Year’s Eve 1955, they signed a new contract which required Monroe to make four films over a seven-year period. The newly formed Marilyn Monroe Productions would be paid $100,000 plus a share of profits for each film. In addition to being able to work for other studios, Monroe had the right to reject any script, director or cinematographer she did not approve of.[74][75] In June 2011, the dress was sold for $4.6 million to an undisclosed buyer.[76]

Milton Greene had first met Monroe in 1953 when he was assigned to photograph her for Look magazine. While many photographers tried to emphasize her sexy image, Greene presented her in more modest poses, and she was pleased with his work. As a friendship developed between them, she confided in him her frustration with her 20th Century Fox contract and the roles she was offered. Her salary for Gentlemen Prefer Blondes amounted to $18,000, while freelancer Jane Russell was paid more than $100,000.[77] Greene agreed that she could earn more by breaking away from 20th Century Fox. He gave up his job in 1954, mortgaged his home to finance Monroe, and allowed her to live with his family as they determined the future course of her career.[78]

On April 8, 1955, veteran journalist Edward R. Murrow interviewed Greene and his wife Amy, as well as Monroe, at the Greenes’ home in Connecticut on a live telecast of the CBS program Person to Person. The kinescope of the telecast has been released on home video.[79]

Truman Capote introduced Monroe to Constance Collier, who gave her acting lessons. She felt that Monroe was not suited to stage acting, but possessed a “lovely talent” that was “so fragile and subtle, it can only be caught by the camera”. After only a few weeks of lessons, Collier died.[80] Monroe had met Paula Strasberg and her daughter Susan on the set of There’s No Business Like Show Business,[81] and had previously said that she would like to study with Lee Strasberg at the Actors Studio. In March 1955, Monroe met with Cheryl Crawford, one of the founders of the Actors Studio, and convinced her to introduce her to Lee Strasberg, who interviewed her the following day and agreed to accept her as a student.[82]

In May 1955, Monroe started dating playwright Arthur Miller; they had met in Hollywood in 1950 and when Miller discovered she was in New York, he arranged for a mutual friend to reintroduce them.[83] On June 1, 1955, Monroe’s birthday, Joe DiMaggio accompanied Monroe to the premiere of The Seven Year Itch in New York City. He later hosted a birthday party for her, but the evening ended with a public quarrel, and Monroe left the party without him. A lengthy period of estrangement followed.[84][85] Throughout that year, Monroe studied with the Actors Studio, and found that one of her biggest obstacles was her severe stage fright. She was befriended by the actors Kevin McCarthy and Eli Wallach who each recalled her as studious and sincere in her approach to her studies, and noted that she tried to avoid attention by sitting quietly in the back of the class.[86] When Strasberg felt Monroe was ready to give a performance in front of her peers, Monroe and Maureen Stapleton chose the opening scene from Eugene O’Neill‘s Anna Christie, and although she had faltered during each rehearsal, she was able to complete the performance without forgetting her lines.[87] Kim Stanley later recalled that students were discouraged from applauding, but that Monroe’s performance had resulted in spontaneous applause from the audience.[87] While Monroe was a student, Lee Strasberg commented, “I have worked with hundreds and hundreds of actors and actresses, and there are only two that stand out way above the rest. Number one is Marlon Brando, and the second is Marilyn Monroe.”[87]

The first film to be made under the contract and production company was Bus Stop directed by Joshua Logan. Logan had studied under Constantin Stanislavski, approved of method acting, and was supportive of Monroe.[88] Monroe severed contact with her drama coach, Natasha Lytess, replacing her with Paula Strasberg, who became a constant presence during the filming of Monroe’s subsequent films.[89]

Monroe’s dramatic performance as Chérie in Bus Stop(1956), a saloon singer with little talent, marked a departure from her earlier comedies.

In Bus Stop, Monroe played Chérie, a saloon singer with little talent who falls in love with a cowboy, Beauregard “Bo” Decker, played by Don Murray. Her costumes, make-up and hair reflected a character who lacked sophistication, and Monroe provided deliberately mediocre singing and dancing. Bosley Crowther of The New York Times proclaimed: “Hold on to your chairs, everybody, and get set for a rattling surprise. Marilyn Monroe has finally proved herself an actress.” In his autobiography, Movie Stars, Real People and Me, director Logan wrote: “I found Marilyn to be one of the great talents of all time… she struck me as being a much brighter person than I had ever imagined, and I think that was the first time I learned that intelligence and, yes, brilliance have nothing to do with education.” Logan championed Monroe for an Academy Award nomination and complimented her professionalism until the end of his life.[90] Though not nominated for an Academy Award,[91] she received a Golden Globe nomination.

In The Prince and the Showgirl (1957), Monroe co-starred with Laurence Olivier, who also directed the film.

Bus Stop was followed by The Prince and the Showgirl directed by Laurence Olivier, who also co-starred. Prior to filming, Olivier praised Monroe as “a brilliant comedienne, which to me means she is also an extremely skilled actress”. During filming in England he resented Monroe’s dependence on her drama coach, Paula Strasberg, regarding Strasberg as a fraud whose only talent was the ability to “butter Marilyn up”. He recalled his attempts at explaining a scene to Monroe, only to hear Strasberg interject, “Honey — just think of Coca-Cola and Frank Sinatra.”[92] Olivier later commented that in the film “Marilyn was quite wonderful, the best of all.”[93] Monroe’s performance was hailed by critics, especially in Europe, where she won the David di Donatello, the Italian equivalent of the Academy Awards, as well as the French Crystal Star Award. She was also nominated for a BAFTA. It was more than a year before Monroe began her next film. During her hiatus, she summered with Miller in Amagansett, New York. She suffered a miscarriage on August 1, 1957.[94][95]

Last films: 1958–62

With Miller’s encouragement she returned to Hollywood in August 1958 to star in Some Like It Hot. The film was directed by Billy Wilder and co-starred Jack Lemmon andTony Curtis. Wilder had experienced Monroe’s tardiness, stage fright, and inability to remember lines during production of The Seven Year Itch. However her behavior was now more hostile, and was marked by refusals to participate in filming and occasional outbursts of profanity.[96] Monroe consistently refused to take direction from Wilder, or insisted on numerous retakes of simple scenes until she was satisfied.[97] She developed a rapport with Lemmon, but she disliked Curtis after hearing that he had described their love scenes as “like kissing Hitler”.[98] Curtis later stated that the comment was intended as a joke.[99] During filming, Monroe discovered that she was pregnant. She suffered another miscarriage in December 1958, as filming was completed.[100]

Some Like it Hot became a resounding success, and was nominated for six Academy Awards. Monroe was acclaimed for her performance and won the Golden Globe Award for Best Actress – Motion Picture Musical or Comedy. Wilder commented that the film was the biggest success he had ever been associated with.[101] He discussed the problems he encountered during filming, saying “Marilyn was so difficult because she was totally unpredictable. I never knew what kind of day we were going to have… would she be cooperative or obstructive?”[102] He had little patience with her method-acting technique and said that instead of going to the Actors Studio “she should have gone to a train-engineer’s school … to learn something about arriving on schedule.”[103] Wilder had become ill during filming, and explained, “We were in mid-flight – and there was a nut on the plane.”[104] In hindsight, he discussed Monroe’s “certain indefinable magic” and “absolute genius as a comic actress.”[102]

By this time, Monroe had only completed one film, Bus Stop, under her four-picture contract with 20th Century Fox. She agreed to appear in Let’s Make Love, which was to be directed by George Cukor, but she was not satisfied with the script, and Arthur Miller rewrote it.[105] Gregory Peck was originally cast in the male lead role, but he refused the role after Miller’s rewrite; Cary GrantCharlton HestonYul Brynner andRock Hudson also refused the role before it was offered to Yves Montand.[106] Monroe and Miller befriended Montand and his wife, actress Simone Signoret, and filming progressed well until Miller was required to travel to Europe on business. Monroe began to leave the film set early and on several occasions failed to attend, but her attitude improved after Montand confronted her. Signoret returned to Europe to make a film, and Monroe and Montand began a brief affair that ended when Montand refused to leave Signoret.[107] The film was not a critical or commercial success.[108]

Monroe’s health deteriorated during this period, and she began to see a Los Angeles psychiatrist, Dr. Ralph Greenson. He later recalled that during this time she frequently complained of insomnia, and told Greenson that she visited several medical doctors to obtain what Greenson considered an excessive variety of drugs. He concluded that she was progressing to the point of addiction, but also noted that she could give up the drugs for extended periods without suffering any withdrawal symptoms.[109] According to Greenson, the marriage between Miller and Monroe was strained; he said that Miller appeared to genuinely care for Monroe and was willing to help her, but that Monroe rebuffed while also expressing resentment towards him for not doing more to help her.[110] Greenson stated that his main objective at the time was to enforce a drastic reduction in Monroe’s drug intake.[111]

Monroe in her final completed film, The Misfits (1961)

In 1956, Arthur Miller had briefly resided in Nevada and wrote a short story about some of the local people he had become acquainted with, a divorced woman and some aging cowboys. By 1960 he had developed the short story into a screenplay, and envisaged it as containing a suitable role for Monroe. It became her last completed film.The Misfits, directed by John Huston and costarring Clark GableMontgomery CliftEli Wallach and Thelma Ritter. Shooting commenced in July 1960, with most taking place in the hot Northern Nevada desert.[112] Monroe was frequently ill and unable to perform, and away from the influence of Dr. Greenson, she had resumed her consumption of sleeping pills and alcohol.[111] A visitor to the set, Susan Strasberg, later described Monroe as “mortally injured in some way,”[113] and in August, Monroe was rushed to Los Angeles where she was hospitalized for ten days. Newspapers reported that she had been near death, although the nature of her illness was not disclosed.[114] Louella Parsons wrote in her newspaper column that Monroe was “a very sick girl, much sicker than at first believed”, and disclosed that she was being treated by a psychiatrist.[114] Monroe returned to Nevada and completed the film, but she became hostile towards Arthur Miller, and public arguments were reported by the press.[115] Making the film had proved to be an arduous experience for the actors; in addition to Monroe’s distress, Montgomery Clift had frequently been unable to perform due to illness, and by the final day of shooting, Thelma Ritter was in hospital suffering from exhaustion. Gable, commenting that he felt unwell, left the set without attending the wrap party.[116] Monroe and Miller returned to New York on separate flights.[117]

Within ten days Monroe had announced her separation from Miller, and Gable had died from a heart attack.[118] Gable’s widow, Kay, commented to Louella Parsons that it had been the “eternal waiting” on the set of The Misfits that had contributed to his death, though she did not name Monroe. When reporters asked Monroe if she felt guilty about Gable’s death, she refused to answer,[119] but the journalist Sidney Skolsky recalled that privately she expressed regret for her poor treatment of Gable during filming and described her as being in “a dark pit of despair”.[120] Monroe later attended the christening of the Gables’ son, at the invitation of Kay Gable.[120] The Misfits received mediocre reviews, and was not a commercial success, though some praised the performances of Monroe and Gable.[120] Huston later commented that Monroe’s performance was not acting in the true sense, and that she had drawn from her own experiences to show herself, rather than a character. “She had no techniques. It was all the truth. It was only Marilyn.”[120]

During the following months, Monroe’s dependence on alcohol and prescription medications began to take a toll on her health, and friends such as Susan Strasberg later spoke of her illness.[121] Her divorce from Arthur Miller was finalized in January 1961, with Monroe citing “incompatibility of character”,[121] and in February she voluntarily entered the Payne Whitney Psychiatric Clinic. Monroe later described the experience as a “nightmare”.[122] She was able to phone Joe DiMaggio from the clinic, and he immediately traveled from Florida to New York to facilitate her transfer to the Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center. She remained there for three weeks. Illness prevented her from working for the remainder of the year; she underwent surgery to correct a blockage in her Fallopian tubes in May, and the following month underwent gallbladdersurgery.[123] She returned to California and lived in a rented apartment as she convalesced.

In 1962, Monroe began filming Something’s Got to Give, which was to be the third film of her four-film contract with 20th Century Fox. It was to be directed by George Cukor, and co-starred Dean Martin and Cyd Charisse. She was ill with a virus as filming commenced, and suffered from high temperatures and recurrent sinusitis. On one occasion she refused to perform with Martin as he had a cold, and the producer Henry Weinstein recalled seeing her on several occasions being physically ill as she prepared to film her scenes, and attributed it to her dread of performing. He commented, “Very few people experience terror. We all experience anxiety, unhappiness, heartbreaks, but that was sheer primal terror.”[124]

On May 19, 1962, she attended the early birthday celebration of President John F. Kennedy at Madison Square Garden, at the suggestion of Kennedy’s brother-in-law, actor Peter Lawford. Monroe performed “Happy Birthday” along with a specially written verse based on Bob Hope‘s “Thanks for the Memory“. Kennedy responded to her performance with the remark, “Thank you. I can now retire from politics after having had ‘Happy Birthday’ sung to me in such a sweet, wholesome way.”[125] (also see entry Happy Birthday, Mr. President)

Monroe returned to the set of Something’s Got to Give and filmed a sequence in which she appeared nude in a swimming pool. Commenting that she wanted to “push Liz Taylor off the magazine covers”, she gave permission for several partially nude photographs to be published by Life. Having only reported for work on twelve occasions out of a total of 35 days of production,[124] Monroe was dismissed. The studio 20th Century Fox filed a lawsuit against her for half a million dollars,[126] and the studio’s vice president, Peter Levathes, issued a statement saying “The star system has gotten way out of hand. We’ve let the inmates run the asylum, and they’ve practically destroyed it.”[126] Monroe was replaced by Lee Remick, and when Dean Martin refused to work with any other actress, he was also threatened with a lawsuit.[126] Following her dismissal, Monroe engaged in several high-profile publicity ventures. She gave an interview to Cosmopolitan and was photographed at Peter Lawford’s beach house sipping champagne and walking on the beach.[127] She next posed for Bert Stern for Vogue in a series of photographs that included several nudes.[127] Published after her death, they became known as ‘The Last Sitting‘. Richard Meryman interviewed her for Life, in which Monroe reflected upon her relationship with her fans and her uncertainties in identifying herself as a “star” and a “sex symbol”. She referred to the events surrounding Arthur Miller’s appearance before the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1956, and her studio’s warning that she would be “finished” if she showed public support for him, and commented, “You have to start all over again. But I believe you’re always as good as your potential. I now live in my work and in a few relationships with the few people I can really count on. Fame will go by, and, so long, I’ve had you fame. If it goes by, I’ve always known it was fickle. So at least it’s something I experienced, but that’s not where I live.”[128]

In the final weeks of her life, Monroe engaged in discussions about future film projects, and firm arrangements were made to continue negotiations on Something’s Got to Give.[129] Among the projects was a biography of Jean Harlow filmed two years later unsuccessfully with Carroll Baker. Starring roles in Billy Wilder‘s Irma la Douce[130] and What a Way to Go! were also discussed; Shirley MacLaine eventually played the roles in both films. Kim Novak replaced her in Kiss Me, Stupid, a comedy in which she was to star opposite Dean Martin. A film version of the Broadway musical, A Tree Grows In Brooklyn, and an unnamed World War I–themed musical co-starring Gene Kelly were also discussed, but the projects never materialized due to her death.[129] Her dispute with 20th Century Fox was resolved, and her contract renewed into a $1 million two-picture deal, and filming of Something’s Got to Give was scheduled to resume in early fall 1962. Marilyn, having fired her own agent and MCA in 1961 managed her own negoiations as President of Marilyn Monroe Productions. Also on the table was an Italian four film deal worth 10 million giving her script, director, and co-star approval.[131] Allan “Whitey” Snyder who saw her during the last week of her life, said Monroe was pleased by the opportunities available to her, and that she “never looked better [and] was in great spirits”.[129]Death and aftermath

The crypt of Marilyn Monroe (2005)

On August 5, 1962, LAPD police sergeant Jack Clemmons received a call at 4:25 am from Dr Ralph Greenson, Monroe’s psychiatrist, proclaiming that Monroe was found dead at her home in Brentwood, Los Angeles, California.[132] She was 36 years old. At the subsequent autopsy, eight milligram per cent of Chloral hydrate and 4.5 milligram percent of Nembutal were found in her system,[133] and Dr. Thomas Noguchi of the Los Angeles County Coroners office recorded cause of death as “acutebarbiturate poisoning,” resulting from a “probable suicide.”[134] Many theories, including murder, circulated about the circumstances of her death and the timeline after the body was found. Some conspiracy theories involved John and Robert Kennedy, while other theories suggested CIA or Mafia complicity. It was reported that the last person Monroe called was the President.[135][136]

On August 8, 1962, Monroe was interred in a crypt at Corridor of Memories #24, at the Westwood Village Memorial Park Cemetery in Los Angeles. Lee Strasbergdelivered the eulogy. The crypt space immediately to the left of Monroe’s was bought and reserved by Hugh Hefner in 1992.[137] DiMaggio took control of the funeral arrangements which consisted of only 31 close family and friends. Police were also present to keep the press away.[138] Her casket was solid bronze and was lined with champagne colored silk.[139] Allan “Whitey” Snyder did her make-up which was supposedly a promise made in earlier years if she were to die before him.[139] She was wearing her favorite green Emilio Pucci dress.[139] In her hands was a small bouquet of pink teacup roses.[139] For the next 20 years, red roses were placed in a vase attached to the crypt, courtesy of Joe DiMaggio.[138]

In August 2009, the crypt space directly above that of Monroe was placed for auction[140] on eBay. Elsie Poncher plans to exhume her husband and move him to an adjacent plot. She advertised the crypt, hoping “to make enough money to pay off the $1.6 million mortgage” on her Beverly Hills mansion.[137] The winning bid was placed by an anonymous Japanese man for $4.6 million,[141] but the winning bidder later backed out “because of the paying problem”. Playboy magazine founder Hugh Hefner, who never met Monroe, bought the crypt next to hers at the Westwood Village Memorial Park Cemetery. He affirmed that the initial success of his magazine directly correlated with Monroe.[citation needed]

Administration of estate

Monroe’s Brentwood home (1992)

In her will, Monroe stated she would leave Lee Strasberg her personal effects, which amounted to just over half of her residuary estate, expressing her desire that he “distribute [the effects] among my friends, colleagues and those to whom I am devoted”.[142] Instead, Strasberg stored them in a warehouse, and willed them to his widow, Anna, who successfully sued Los Angeles-based Odyssey Auctions in 1994 to prevent the sale of items consigned by the nephew of Monroe’s business manager, Inez Melson. In October 1999, Christie’s auctioned the bulk of Monroe’s effects, including those recovered from Melson’s nephew, netting an amount of $13,405,785. Subsequently, Strasberg sued the children of four photographers to determine rights of publicity, which permits the licensing of images of deceased personages for commercial purposes. The decision as to whether Monroe was a resident of California, where she died and where her will was probated,[143] or New York, which she considered her primary residence, was worth millions.[144]

On May 4, 2007, a New York judge ruled that Monroe’s rights of publicity ended at her death.[145][146][147] In October 2007, California Governor Arnold Schwarzeneggersigned Senate Bill 771.[148] The legislation was supported by Anna Strasberg and the Screen Actors Guild.[149] Senate Bill 771 established that non-family members may inherit rights of publicity through the residuary clause of the deceased’s will, provided that the person was a resident of California at the time of death.[150] In March 2008, the United States District Court in Los Angeles ruled that Monroe was a resident of New York at the time of her death, citing the statement of the executor of her estate to California tax authorities, and a 1966 sworn affidavit by her housekeeper.[151] The decision was reaffirmed by the United States District Court of New York in September 2008.[152]

In July 2010, Monroe’s Brentwood home was put up for sale by Prudential California Realty. The house was sold for $3.6 million.[153] Monroe left to Lee Strasberg an archive of her own writing – diaries, poems, and letters, which Anna discovered in October 1999. In October 2010, the documents were published as a book, Fragments.[154][155]

Personal life

Relationships

Monroe had three marriages, all of which ended in divorce. The first was to James Dougherty, the second to Joe DiMaggio, and lastly to Arthur Miller. Allegedly, she was briefly married to writer Robert “Bob” Slatzer. She is alleged to have had affairs with both John and Robert KennedyMarlon Brando, in his autobiography Songs My Mother Taught Me, claimed that he had had a relationship with her, and enduring friendship lasting until her death. She also suffered two miscarriages and an ectopic pregnancy during her three marriages.[156][157]

Monroe married James Dougherty on June 19, 1942, at the home of Chester Howell in Los Angeles. As a result of her modeling career, he began to lose interest in her and stated that he did not approve of her new job. Monroe then decided to divorce Dougherty. The marriage ended when he returned from overseas in 1946. In The Secret Happiness of Marilyn Monroe and To Norma Jeane with Love, Jimmie, he claimed they were in love, but dreams of stardom lured her away. In 1953, he wrote a piece called “Marilyn Monroe Was My Wife” for Photoplay, in which he claimed that she threatened to jump off the Santa Monica Pier if he left her. She was reported to have been furious and explained in 1956 interview that she confessed to having attempted suicide during the marriage and stated that she felt trapped and bored by Dougherty, even blaming their marriage on her foster mother.[158] In her autobiography, explaining the sudden dissolution of their marriage, Monroe stated, “My marriage didn’t make me sad, but it didn’t make me happy either. My husband and I hardly spoke to each other. This wasn’t because we were angry. We had nothing to say. I was dying of boredom.”[159]

Doc Goddard had plans to publish extra details about the marriage, citing that he hoped to clear up rumors about an arranged marriage, but decided against the publication at the last minute.[160] In the 2004 documentary Marilyn’s Man, Dougherty made three new claims: that he invented the “Marilyn Monroe” persona; studio executives forced her to divorce him; and that he was her true love and her “dedicated friend for life”.

Monroe eloped with Joe DiMaggio at San Francisco City Hall on January 14, 1954. In 1951, DiMaggio saw a photograph of Monroe alongside Chicago White Sox players Joe Dobson and Gus Zernial, prompting him to request a date with her in 1952. Of their initial meeting, Monroe wrote in My Story that she did not have a desire to know him, as she had feared a stereotypical jock. During their honeymoon in Japan, she was asked to visit Korea as part of the USO. She performed ten shows in four days for over 100,000 servicemen.

Joe DiMaggio and Marilyn Monroe staying at Imperial Hotel in Tokyo on their honeymoon (1954)

Maury Allen quoted New York Yankees PR man Arthur Richman that Joe told him that the marriage went wrong from then. On September 14, 1954, Monroe filmed the famed skirt-blowing scene for The Seven Year Itch in front of New York’s Trans-Lux Theater. Bill Kobrin, then Fox’s east coast correspondent, told the Palm SpringsDesert Sun in 1956 that it was Billy Wilder‘s idea to turn the shoot into a media circus, and that the couple had a “yelling battle” in the theater lobby.[161] She filed for divorce on grounds of mental cruelty nine months after the wedding. In February 1961, Monroe was admitted to the Payne Whitney Psychiatric Clinic. She contacted DiMaggio, who secured her release. She later joined him in Florida, where he was serving as a batting coach at the New York Yankees‘ training camp. Bob Hope jokingly dedicated Best Song nominee The Second Time Around to them at the 1961 Academy Awards. According to Allen, on August 1, 1962, DiMaggio – alarmed by how Monroe had fallen in with people he considered detrimental to her well-being – quit his job with a PX supplier to ask her to remarry him. After Monroe’s death, DiMaggio claimed her body and arranged her funeral. For 20 years, he had a half-dozen red roses delivered to her crypt three times a week. In 2006, DiMaggio’s adopted granddaughters auctioned the bulk of his estate, which featured two letters Monroe penned to him and a photograph signed “I love you, Joe, Marilyn.”[162]

On June 29, 1956, Monroe married playwright Arthur Miller, in a civil ceremony in White Plains, New York. Monroe met Miller in 1950. During this filming of Bus Stop, the relationship between Monroe and Miller had developed, and although the couple were able to maintain their privacy for almost a year, the press began to write about them as a couple,[163] often referred to as “The Egghead and The Hourglass”.[164] The reports of their romance were soon overtaken by news that Miller had been called to testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee to explain his supposed communist affiliations. Called upon to identify communists he was acquainted with, Miller refused and was charged with contempt of Congress. He was acquitted on appeal.[165] During the investigation, Monroe was urged by film executives to abandon Miller, rather than risk her career but she refused, later branding them as “born cowards”.[165] The press began to discuss an impending marriage, but Monroe and Miller refused to confirm the rumor. In June 1956, a reporter was following them by car, and as they attempted to elude him, the reporter’s car crashed, killing a female passenger. Monroe became hysterical upon hearing the news, and their engagement was announced, partly in the expectation that it would reduce the excessive media interest they were being subjected to.[164] City Court Judge Seymour D. Robinowitz presided over the hushed ceremony in the law office of Sam Slavitt (the wedding had been kept secret from both the press and the public). Monroe and Miller wed again two days later in a Jewish ceremony before a small group of guests. Rabbi Robert E. Goldburg, a Reform rabbi at Congregation Mishkan Israel, presided over the ceremony.[166] Their nuptials were celebrated at the home of Miller’s literary agent, Kay Brown, in Westchester County, New York. Some 30 friends and relatives attended the hastily arranged party. Less than two weeks after the wedding, the Millers flew to London, where they were greeted at Parkside House by Laurence Olivier and wife Vivien Leigh. Monroe created chaos among the normally staid British press. In reflecting on his courtship of Monroe, Miller wrote, “She was a whirling light to me then, all paradox and enticing mystery, street-tough one moment, then lifted by a lyrical and poetic sensitivity that few retain past early adolescence.”[167] Nominally raised as a Christian but before her 1956 conversion (to Judaism),[168] Monroe laughingly rejected Jane Russell‘s conversion attempts during the 1953 filming of “Gentlemen Prefer Blondes” saying “Jane tried to convert me (to religion) and I tried to introduce her to Freud”.[169] She did convert to Judaism before marrying Miller.[170][171][172][173] After she finished shooting The Prince and the Showgirl with Laurence Olivier, the couple returned to the United States from England and discovered she was pregnant. Tony Curtis, her co-star from Some Like It Hot, claims he got Monroe pregnant during their on-off affair that was rekindled during the filming of Some Like It Hot in 1959, while she was still married to Arthur Miller.[174][175][176][177]

Miller’s screenplay for The Misfits, a story about a despairing divorcée, was meant to be a Valentine gift for his wife, but by the time filming started in 1960 their marriage was beyond repair. A Mexican divorce was granted on January 24, 1961 in Ciudad Juarez by Francisco José Gómez Fraire. On February 17, 1962, Miller married Inge Morath, one of the Magnum photographers recording the making of The Misfits. In January 1964, Miller’s play After The Fall opened, featuring a beautiful and devouring shrew named Maggie. Simone Signoret noted in her autobiography the morbidity of Miller and Elia Kazan resuming their professional association “over a casket”. In interviews and in his autobiography, Miller insisted that Maggie was not based on Monroe. However, he never pretended that his last Broadway-bound work, Finishing the Picture, was not based on the making of The Misfits. He appeared in the documentary The Century of the Self, lamenting the psychological work being done on her before her death.

From President Kennedy’s birthday gala where Monroe sang “Happy Birthday, Mr. President“, May 19, 1962.

On May 19, 1962, Monroe made her last significant public appearance, singing “Happy Birthday, Mr. President” at a birthday party for President John F. Kennedy at Madison Square Garden. The dress that she wore to the event, specially designed and made for her by Jean Louis, sold at an auction in 1999 for $1.26 million.[178] Monroe reportedly had an affair with President John F. Kennedy. JFK’s reputed mistress Judith Exner, in her 1977 autobiography, also wrote about an affair that she said the president and Monroe had.[179] Journalist Anthony Summers examines the issue of Monroe’s relationships with the Kennedy brothers at length in two books: his 1993 biography of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, entitled Official and Confidential: The Secret Life of J. Edgar Hoover, and his 1985 biography of Monroe, entitled Goddess. In the Hoover book, Summers concludes that Monroe was in love with President Kennedy and wanted to marry him in the early 1960s; that she called the White House frequently; and that, when the married President had to break off their affair, Monroe became even more depressed, and then turned to Robert Kennedy, who visited Monroe in Los Angeles the day that she died.[180] Patricia Seaton Lawford, the fourth wife of actor Peter Lawford, also deals with the Monroe-Kennedy matters in her 1988 biography of Peter Lawford, entitled The Peter Lawford Story. Lawford’s first wife was Patricia Kennedy Lawford, a sister of John and Robert; Lawford was very close to the Kennedy family for over a decade, including the time of Monroe’s death. In 1997, documents purporting to prove a coverup of a relationship between JFK and Monroe were discovered to be fraudulent.[181]

Psychoanalysis

Monroe had a long experience with psychoanalysis. She was in analysis with Margaret Herz Hohenberg, Anna FreudMarianne Rie Kris, Ralph S. Greenson (who found Monroe dead), and Milton Wexler.[182]

Politics

In Monroe’s last interview she pleaded with a reporter to end the article with the folllowing quote: “What I really want to say: That what the world really needs is a real feeling of kinship. Everybody: stars, laborers, Negroes, Jews, Arabs. We are all brothers. Please don’t make me a joke. End the interview with what I believe.”[183]

Monroe was friends with Ella Fitzgerald and helped Ella in her career. Ella Fitzgerald later recounted, “I owe Marilyn Monroe a real debt…it was because of her that I played the Mocambo, a very popular nightclub in the ’50s. She personally called the owner of the club, and told him she wanted me booked immediately, and if he would do it, she would take a front table every night. She told him – and it was true, due to Marilyn’s superstar status – that the press would go wild. The owner said yes, and Marilyn was there, front table, every night. The press went overboard. After that, I never had to play a small jazz club again. She was an unusual woman – a little ahead of her times. And she didn’t know it.”[184]

Political discussions were recounted with Robert Kennedy as to policy towards Cuba, and President Kennedy. The latter said to have taken place at had luncheon with the Peter Lawfords. She was very pleased, as she had asked the President a lot of socially significant questions concerning the morality of atomic testing.[185] Monroe supported Peace Action, which was created from a merge of Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy and the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign.[186]

While in Mexico in 1962, she openly associated with Americans who were identified by the FBI as communists, such as Frederick Vanderbilt Field. The daughter of Monroe’s last psychiatrist, Joan Greenson, said that Monroe was “passionate about equal rights, rights for blacks, rights for the poor. She identified strongly with the workers.”[187]

TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE FBI – The Mexican Mafia

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The Mexican Mafia (Spanish : Mafia Mexicana), also known as La Eme (Spanish for the letter M) is a Mexican American criminal organization, and is one of the oldest and most powerful prison gangs in the United States

Mexican Mafia

Mexican Mafia/La Eme
Mexican Mafia tattoo.jpg
Gang’s name tattooed on gang member’s abdomen.

Foundation

The Mexican Mafia was formed in 1957 by Chicano street gang members incarcerated at the Deuel Vocational Institution, a state prison located in Tracy, California.[7]The founder of the gang was Luis “Huero Buff” Flores, who was previously a member of the Hawaiian Gardens gang.[9] According to Tony Rafael,

By the time that Luis Flores got his brainstorm idea about creating La Mafia Mexicana, as it was first called, gang warfare between Hispanic neighborhoods had become an established fact. Rivalries were then set in stone; gangs like White Fence, San Fer, Avenues, Clanton, Varrio Nuevo Estrada, and Hoyo Maravilla were already into their second decade and firmly established as self sustaining entities… Given such deep street rivalries, it was a marvel that Luis Flores ever got so far as to suggest that inmates who were enemies on the streets should abandon their animosity when they hit the prisons. But he did and it worked.[10]

Luis Flores initially recruited violent members to the gang, in an attempt to create a highly-feared organization which could control the black market activities of the Deuel prison facilities.[9] According to Eme turncoat Ramon “Mundo” Mendoza,

“The goal in the beginning was to terrorize the prison system and enjoy prison comforts while doing time.”[11]

According to Luis Flores,

“It was a kid’s trip then, just a bunch of homeboys from East L.A. If I felt like killing somebody, I would, if I didn’t, I wouldn’t. We were just having fun then. The power was intoxicating.”[12]

As new members of La Eme filtered out back into the streets, Anacleta “Annie” Ramirez, a well-known member of the East Los Angeles community, took many of them under her wing and paired them up with neighborhood youngsters who lacked direction. Ramirez a sharp, tough woman, taught the youngsters discipline, rules of street life, and, at first, petty crime. This later escalated to her role as a shot caller–as drugs became a major part of the trade–who would get rid of her enemies by ordering youth loyal to her on missions. After she had given the directive, many of her enemies were reportedly murdered on sight. [13]

Rise

Sinaloa Cartel hierarchy in early 2008

According to Chris Blatchford,

“By 1961, administrators at DVI, alarmed by the escalating violence, had transferred a number of the charter Eme members to San Quentin, hoping to discourage their violent behavior by intermingling them with hardened adult convicts. It didn’t work. For example, the story goes that Cheyenne Cadena arrived on the lower yard and was met by a six-foot-five, 300-pound black inmate who planted a kiss on his face and announced this scrawny teenager would now be his ‘bitch.’ Chy returned a short time later, walked up to the unsuspecting predator, and stabbed him to death with a jailhouse knife, or shank. There were more than a thousand inmates on the yard. No witnesses stepped forward, and only one dead man entertained the idea that Cadena was anyone’s bitch.”[14]

A string of other slayings soon followed as Eme members sought to establish a reputation among the inmates of San Quentin.[15] According to Blatchford,

The Eme quest for complete control alienated many other Mexican-American inmates who were fed up with Mexican Mafia bullies stabbing, killing, and stealing their watches, rings, cigarettes and anything else of value. Some of them secretly founded a new prison gang called La Nuestra Familia (NF) or “Our Family.” It was first established in the mid-1960s at the California Training Facility in Soledad. Some of the early members were from the Los Angeles area, but NF soon drew inmates primarily from rural communities in northern California. The Mexican Mafia saw NF as lame and inferior, just a bunch of farmers, or farmeros. However, in 1968 at San Quentin, a full scale riot broke out after a Mexican Mafia soldier, orsoldado, stole shoes from an NF sympathizer. Nineteen inmates were stabbed, and one Eme associate ended up dead. The battle became known as the “Shoe War” and it established the Nuestra Familia as a major Eme rival.[16]

Criminal activities

The Mexican Mafia is an organization involved in extortion, drug trafficking, and murder, both inside and outside the prison system.[7] According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Mexican Mafia had arranged for contract killings to be carried out by the Aryan Brotherhood, a white prison gang. Both the Mexican Mafia and the Aryan Brotherhood are mutual enemies of the African-American gang Black Guerilla Family.[17]

The first prison gang street execution in Los Angeles was committed by the Mexican Mafia in 1971.[9] Responsible for the murder was Joe “Pegleg” Morgan – the notorious white godfather of La Eme who had ascended by then to become one of the highest-ranking bosses of the entire Eme organization, even with no “official” Mexican blood himself. His connections with cocaine and heroin suppliers in Mexico helped pave the foundation for the Mexican Mafia’s narcotics distribution throughout California.[9] During the 1970s, while under the control of Morgan’s protégé Rodolfo Cadena, the Mexican Mafia often took control over various community groups. The gang was able to filter money from alcohol and drug prevention programs to finance their criminal activities.[9][18] The Mexican Mafia and the Italian-American Los Angeles crime family collaborated in skimming money from Get Going, a taxpayer-funded drug treatment program. By 1977, Get Going founder Ellen Delia was determined to expose the infiltration of her beloved program. Shortly before an appointment with the California State Secretary of Health and Welfare Services, Delia was murdered. Her collection of evidence on Italian and Mexican Mafia infiltration of the Get Going program was never recovered.[19]

In 1995, United States federal authorities indicted 22 members and associates of the Mexican Mafia, charged under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act with crimes which included extortion, murder and kidnapping.[20] One of the arrested members, Benjamin “Topo” Peters, was allegedly the Mexican Mafia’s highest ranking member at the time, and was engaged in a power struggle with fellow member Ruben “Tupi” Hernandez.[20] Another indicted member was accused of having plotted the death of an anti-gang activist who served as a consultant for the film American Me. The indictments marked a two-year investigation by federal, local and state law enforcement officials.[20]

In 2006, a 36-count federal indictment was brought against members of the Mexican Mafia. The arrests were made for alleged acts of violence, drug dealing, and extortion against smaller Latino street gangs.[21]According to the federal indictment, Mexican Mafia members exert their influence in both federal and state prison systems through either violence or the threat of violence.[21]

Members and associates of the gang remain fiercely loyal to the criminal organization both in and outside of prison, particularly in Southern California cities such as Los Angeles and San Diego. The gang asserts its influence over Chicano gangs throughout Southern California by threatening violence against their members should they ever become incarcerated. Gangs and drug dealers who refuse to pay a protection “tax” to the Mexican Mafia are often murdered or threatened with murder.[21] High-ranking members of the Mexican Mafia who are locked in private cells for 23 hours of each day are still able to communicate with their associates, through methods which range from tapping in code on prison plumbing pipes to smuggled letters.[21]

Membership

While the Mexican Mafia is a highly-organized criminal entity, it is believed that the gang presently is not presided over by a single leader.[21] Prison membership of the gang is believed to consist of hundreds of members with authority to order murders, and at least thousands of associates who can carry out those orders.[21]

Members of the Mexican Mafia are expected to engage in tests of their loyalty to the gang, which may include theft or murder. The penalty for refusing orders or failing to complete an assigned task is often death.[8]According to the gang’s constitution, members may also be punished or murdered if they commit any of four major infractions. These include becoming an informant, acts of homosexuality, acts of cowardice, and showing disrespect against fellow gang members.[8] According to gang policy, a member of the Mexican Mafia may not be murdered without prior approval by a vote of three members, yet the murder of non-members requires no formal approval.[8]

During the early 1960s at San Quentin Prison, Luis Flores and Rudy “Cheyenne” Cadena established a blood oath for members of the Mexican Mafia.[9] Prior to the establishment of the oath, members of the Mexican Mafia were allowed to return to their street gangs after incarceration. The new oath stipulated that the only way for a member to leave the Mexican Mafia was to be killed.[9] Flores and Cadena also established a set of gang commandments.[9] These included policies such as: a new member must be sponsored by an existing member, unanimous approval from all existing members to join (no longer policy), prioritizing the gang over one’s family, denial of the existence of the Mexican Mafia to law enforcement or non-members, respect of other members, forgiving street conflicts which existed before incarceration. Execution of a member of the gang for policy violation must be committed by the gang member who sponsored him.[9]

While mostly found in California, the Mexican Mafia has a membership which extends to other states including TexasArizona, and New Mexico.[7]

Allies and rivals

The Mexican Mafia is the controlling organization for almost every Chicano gang in Southern California. All members of Chicano gangs in Southern California are obligated under the threat of death to carry out any and all orders from made Mexican Mafia members. The Mexican Mafia also holds a loose alliance with the Aryan Brotherhood, mainly due to their common rivals within the prison system.

The primary rivals of the Mexican Mafia are Nuestra Familia.[22] The Mexican Mafia is also a rival of the Black Guerrilla Family prison gang, which holds a loose alliance with Nuestra Familia.[22]

Symbols

Mexican Mafia symbols include print of a black hand.[21] and the Mayan number thirteen.

The new Arizona Mexican Mafia’s primary symbol, which is often used in tattoos by members, is the national symbol of Mexico (eagle and a snake) atop a flaming circle over crossed knives.[8]

Street gangs that are aligned with the Mexican Mafia often use the number 13 as a gang identifier, as the letter “M” is the 13th letter of the modern Latin-derived alphabet.[9]

In popular culture

The Mexican Mafia received mainstream notoriety after being featured in the 1992 movie American Me. The film was coproduced, directed and starred in by actor Edward James Olmos, who allegedly received death threats by members of the Mexican Mafia for what they considered an unflattering depiction of the gang.[23] Three consultants for the film were murdered shortly after the film’s release.[23] The Mexican Mafia was allegedly displeased with the portrayal of the murder of Rodolfo Cadena (who was the basis for Olmos’ character Santana) as being committed by his fellow gang members.[23] Mexican Mafia Members were also allegedly offended by the portrayal of homosexually inspired sodomy committed by Olmos’ character in the film. Olmos subsequently applied for a concealed handgun permit, which was denied to him.[24]

Joe Morgan, while serving a life sentence for murder at Pelican Bay State Prison, filed a $500,000 lawsuit against Olmos, Universal Studios and other producers of the film. Morgan claimed that one of the principal characters in the film was based on him without obtaining his permission.[23]

TOP-SECRET: THE CIA FILE ON LUIS POSADA CARRILES

Washington, D.C., August 28, 2011 – As the unprecedented trial of Cuban exile Luis Posada Carriles begins this week in El Paso, Texas, the National Security Archive today posted a series of CIA records covering his association with the agency in the 1960s and 1970s. CIA personnel records described Posada, using his codename, “AMCLEVE/15,” as “a paid agent” at $300 a month, being utilized as a training instructor for other exile operatives, as well as an informant.  “Subject is of good character, very reliable and security conscious,” the CIA reported in 1965. Posada, another CIA document observed, incorrectly, was “not a typical ‘boom and bang’ type of individual.”

Today’s posting includes key items from Posada’s CIA file, including several previously published by the Archive, and for the first time online, the indictment from Posada’s previous prosecution–in Panama–on charges of trying to assassinate Fidel Castro with 200 pounds of dynamite and C-4 explosives (in Spanish).

“This explosive has the capacity to destroy any armored vehicle, buildings, steel doors, and the effects can extend for 200 meters…if a person were in the center of the explosion, even if they were in an armored car, they would not survive,” as the indictment described the destructive capacity of the explosives found in Posada’s possession in Panama City, where Fidel Castro was attending an Ibero-American summit in November 2000.

The judge presiding over the perjury trial of Posada has ruled that the prosecution can introduce unclassified evidence of his CIA background which might be relevant to his “state of mind” when he allegedly lied to immigration officials about his role in a series of hotel bombings in Havana in 1997. In pre-trial motions, the prosecution has introduced a short unclassified “summary” of Posada’s CIA career, which is included below.  Among other things, the summary (first cited last year in Tracey Eaton’s informative blog, “Along the Malecon”) reveals that in 1993, only four years before he instigated the hotel bombings in Havana, the CIA anonymously warned former agent and accused terrorist Luis Posada of an assassination threat on his life.

A number of the Archive’s CIA documents were cited in articles in the Washington Post, and CNN coverage today on the start of the Posada trial. “The C.I.A. trained and unleashed a Frankenstein,” the New York Times quoted Archive Cuba Documentation Project director Peter Kornbluh as stating.  “It is long past time he be identified as a terrorist and be held accountable as a terrorist.”

Posada was convicted in Panama in 2001, along with three accomplices, of endangering public safety; he was sentenced to eight years in prison. After lobbying by prominent Cuban-American politicians from Miami, Panamanian president Mireya Moscoso pardoned all four in August 2004. A fugitive from justice in Venezuela where he escaped from prison while being tried for the October 6, 1976, mid air bombing of a Cuban jetliner which killed all 73 people on board, Posada showed up in Miami in March 2005. He was arrested on May 17 of that year by the Department of Homeland Security and held in an immigration detention center in El Paso for two years, charged with immigration fraud during the Bush administration.  Since mid 2007, he has been living on bail in Miami. In April 2009, the Obama Justice Department added several counts of perjury relating to Posada denials about his role in organizing a series of hotel, restaurant and discotheque bombings in 1997.  Since mid 2007, he has been living on bail in Miami

According to Kornbluh, “it is poetic justice that the same U.S. Government whose secret agencies created, trained, paid and deployed Posada is finally taking steps to hold him accountable in a court of law for his terrorist crimes.”


Read the Documents

Document 1: CIA, Unclassified, “Unclassified Summary of the CIA’s Relationship With Luis Clemente Posada Carriles,” Undated.

This unclassified summary of the relationship between Luis Posada Carriles and the CIA, which was provided to the court by the US Justice Department, says the CIA first had contact with Posada in connection with planning the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. He remained a paid agent of the CIA from 1965-1967 and again from 1968-1974. From 1974-76, Posada provided unsolicited threat reporting. (Additional documents introduced in court show that he officially severed ties with the CIA in February 1976.) According to this document, the CIA last had contact with Posada in 1993 when they anonymously contacted him in Honduras by telephone to warn him of a threat to his life. (This document was first cited last year in Tracey Eaton’s informative blog, “Along the Malecon.”)

Document 2: CIA, “PRQ Part II for AMCLEVE/15,” September 22, 1965.

“PRQ Part II,” or the second part of Posada’s Personal Record Questionnaire, provides operational information. Within the text of the document, Posada is described as “strongly anti-Communist” as well as a sincere believer in democracy. The document describes Posada having a “good character,” not to mention the fact that he is “very reliable, and security conscious.” The CIA recommends that he be considered for a civil position in a post-Castro government in Cuba (codenamed PBRUMEN).

Document 3: CIA, Cable, “Plan of the Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE) to Blow Up a Cuban or Soviet Vessel in Veracruz, Mexico,” July 1, 1965.

This CIA cable summarizes intelligence on a demolition project proposed by Jorge Mas Canosa, then the head of RECE. On the third page, a source is quoted as having informed the CIA of a payment that Mas Canosa has made to Luis Posada in order to finance a sabotage operation against ships in Mexico. Posada reportedly has “100 pounds of C-4 explosives and some detonators” and limpet mines to use in the operation.

 Document 4: CIA, Memorandum, “AMCLEVE /15,” July 21, 1966.

This document includes two parts-a cover letter written by Grover T. Lythcott, Posada’s CIA handler, and an attached request written by Posada to accept a position on new coordinating Junta composed of several anti-Castro organizations. In the cover letter, Lythcbtt refers to Posada by his codename, AMCLEVE/I5, and discusses his previous involvement withthe Agency. He lionizes Posada, writing that his ”performance in all assigned tasks has been excellent,” and urges that he be permitted to work with the combined anti-Castro exile groups. According to the document, Lythcott suggests that Posada be taken off the CIA payroll to facilitate his joining the anti-Castro militant junta, which will be led by RECE. Lythcott insists that Posada will function as an effective moderating force considering he is “acutely aware of the international implications of ill planned or over enthusiastic activities against Cuba.” In an attached memo, Posada, using the name “Pete,” writes that if he is on the Junta, “they will never do anything to endanger the security of this Country (like blow up Russian ships)” and volunteers to “give the Company all the intelligence that I can collect.”

Document 5: CIA, Personal Record Questionnaire on Posada, April 17, 1972.

This “PRQ” was compiled in 1972 at a time Posada was a high level official at the Venezuelan intelligence service, DISIP, in charge of demolitions. The CIA was beginning to have some concerns about him, based on reports that he had taken CIA explosives equipment to Venezuela, and that he had ties to a Miami mafia figure named Lefty Rosenthal. The PRQ spells out Posada’s personal background and includes his travel to various countries between 1956 and 1971. It also confirms that one of his many aliases was “Bambi Carriles.”

Document 6: CIA, Report, “Traces on Persons Involved in 6 Oct 1976 Cubana Crash,” October 13, 1976.

In the aftermath of the bombing of Cubana flight 455, the CIA ran a file check on all names associated with the terror attack. In a report to the FBI the Agency stated that it had no association with the two Venezuelans who were arrested. A section on Luis Posada Carriles was heavily redacted when the document was declassified. But the FBI retransmitted the report three days later and that version was released uncensored revealing Posada’s relations with the CIA.

Document 7: CIA, Secret Intelligence Report, “Activities of Cuban Exile Leader Orlando Bosch During his Stay in Venezuela,” October 14, 1976.

A source in Venezuela supplied the CIA with detailed intelligence on a fund raiser held for Orlando Bosch and his organization CORU after he arrived in Caracas in September 1976. The source described the dinner at the house of a Cuban exile doctor, Hildo Folgar, which included Venezuelan government officials. Bosch was said to have essentially asked for a bribe in order to refrain from acts of violence during the United Nations meeting in November 1976, which would be attended by Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez. He was also quoted as saying that his group had done a “great job” in assassinating former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier in Washington D.C. on September 21, and now was going to “try something else.” A few days later, according to this intelligence report, Luis Posada Carriles was overheard to say that “we are going to hit a Cuban airplane” and “Orlando has the details.”

Document 8: First Circuit Court of Panama, “Fiscalia Primera Del Primer Circuito Judicial De Panama: Vista Fiscal No. 200”, September 28, 2001.

This lengthy document is the official indictment in Panama of Luis Posada Carriles and 4 others for the attempted assassination of Fidel Castro at the 10th Ibero-American Summit in November 2000. In this indictment, Posada Carriles is accused of possession of explosives, endangerment of public safety, illicit association, and falsification of documents. After traveling to Panama, according to the evidence gathered, “Luis Posada Carriles and Raul Rodriguez Hamouzova rented a red Mitsubishi Lancer at the International Airport of Tocumen, in which they transported the explosives and other devices necessary to create a bomb.” (Original Spanish: “Luis Posada Carriles y Raul Rodriguez Hamouzova rentaron en el Aeropuerto Internacional de Tocumen de la referida empresa el vehículo marca Mitsubishi Lancer, color rojo, dentro del cual se transportaron los explosives y artefactos indicados para elaborar una bomba.”)  This bomb was intended to take the life of Fidel Castro; Castro was to present at the Summit on November 17th, and what Carriles had proposed to do “wasn’t easy, because it occurred at the Summit, and security measures would be extreme.” (Original Spanish: “lo que se proponía hacer no era fácil, porque ocurría en plena Cumbre, y las medidas de seguridad serían extremas.”)

After being discovered by agents of the Explosives Division of the National Police, they ascertained that “this explosive has the capacity to destroy an armored vehicle, buildings, steel doors, and the effects of an explosive of this class and quality can extend for 200 meters.” Additionally, “to a human, from a distance of 200 meters it would affect the senses, internal hemorrhages, and if the person were in the center of the explosion, even if they were in an armored car, they would not survive…the destructive capacity of this material is complete.” (Original Spanish: “Este explosivo tiene la capacidad de destruir cualquier carro blindado, puede destruir edificios, puertas de acero, y que la onda expansiva de esta calidad y clase de explosive puede alcanzar hasta 200 metros…Al ser humano, sostienen, a la distancia de 200 metros le afectaría los sentidos, hemorragios internos, y si la persona estuviese en el centro de la explosion, aunque estuviese dentro de un carro blindado no sobreviviría…la capacidad destructive de este material es total.”)

The indictment states that when Posada was “asked about the charges against him, including possession of explosives, possession of explosives that endanger public safety, illicit association, and falsification of documents…he expresses having fought subversion against democratic regimes along several fronts, specifically Castro-sponsored subversion.” (Original Spanish: “Preguntado sobre los cargos formulados, es decir Posesión de Explosivos, Posesión de Explosivos que implica Peligro Común, Asociación Ilicita, y Falsedad de Documentos…Expresa haber combatido en distintos frentes la subversión contra regimens democráticos, ‘quiero decir la subversión castrista.’”)

Posada and his accomplices were eventually convicted of endangering public safety and sentenced to 8 years in prison. He was pardoned by Panamanian president, Mireya Moscosa, after only four years in August 2004 and lived as a fugitive in Honduras until March 2005 when he illegally entered the United States and applied for political asylum.

TOP-SECRET: Ex-Kaibil Officer Connected to Dos Erres Massacre Arrested in Alberta, Canada

Graduation ceremony at the school for the Guatemalan Army’s elite Kaibil, counterinsurgency unit formed in the mid-1970s. [Photo © Jean-Marie Simon]

Washington, D.C. – January 20, 2011 – Jorge Vinicio Sosa Orantes was arrested in Alberta, Canada on January 18, 2011 on charges of naturalization fraud in the United States. Sosa Orantes, 52, is a former commanding officer of the Guatemalan Special Forces, or Kaibil unit, which brutally murdered more than 250 men, women and children during the 1982 massacre in Dos Erres, Guatemala. Sosa Orantes, a resident of Riverside County, California where he was a well known martial arts instructor, was arrested near the home of a relative in Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada. The charges for which he was arrested stem from an indictment by the United States District Court, Central District of California on charges of making false statements under oath on his citizenship application. Sosa Orantes will come before the Canadian court in Calgary to face possible extradition to the United States.

In an interview with the Calgary Sun, U.S. Justice Department prosecutor David Gates said that the extradition request was not a result of the allegations against Sosa Orantes for his involvement in the massacre; his extradition is being requested for alleged naturalization fraud. However, considering the similar case against Gilberto Jordan, it is possible that the precedence set with the ruling on that case may affect the outcome of Sosa Orantes’s case.

On September 16, 2010 in a historic ruling, former Guatemalan special forces soldier Gilberto Jordán, who confessed to having participated in the 1982 massacre of hundreds of men, women and children in Dos Erres, Guatemala, was sentenced today by a judge in a south Florida courtroom to serve ten years in federal prison for lying on his citizenship application about his role in the crime. Calling the massacre, “reprehensible,” U.S. District Judge William Zloch handed down the maximum sentence allowed for naturalization fraud, stating he wanted the ruling to be a message to “those who commit egregious human rights violations abroad” that they will not find “safe haven from prosecution” in the United States.

On May 5, 2010, agents from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested Gilberto Jordan, 54, in Palm Beach County, Florida, based on a criminal complaint charging Jordán with lying to U.S. authorities about his service in the Guatemalan Army and his role in the 1982 Dos Erres massacre. The complaint alleged that Jordán, a naturalized American citizen, was part of the special counterinsurgency Kaibiles unit that carried out the massacre of hundreds of residents of the Dos Erres village located in the northwest Petén region. Jordán allegedly helped kill unarmed villagers with his own hands, including a baby he allegedly threw into the village well.

The massacre was part of the Guatemalan military’s “scorched earth campaign” and was carried out by the Kaibiles ranger unit. The Kaibiles were specially trained soldiers who became notorious for their use of torture and brutal killing tactics. According to witness testimony, and corroborated through U.S. declassified archives, the Kaibiles entered the town of Dos Erres on the morning of December 6, 1982, and separated the men from women and children. They started torturing the men and raping the women and by the afternoon they had killed almost the entire community, including the children. Nearly the entire town was murdered, their bodies thrown into a well and left in nearby fields. The U.S. documents reveal that American officials deliberated over theories of how an entire town could just “disappear,” and concluded that the Army was the only force capable of such an organized atrocity. More than 250 people are believed to have died in the massacre.

The Global Post news organization conducted an investigative report into the investigation of the Guatemalan soldiers living in the United States and cited declassified documents released to the National Security Archive’s Guatemala Documentation Project under the Freedom of Information Act. These documents are part of a collection of files assembled by the Archive and turned over to Guatemala’s truth commission investigators, who used the files in the writing of their ground-breaking report, “Guatemala: Memory of Silence.” [see CEH section on Dos Erres]

The documents include U.S. Embassy cables that describe first-hand accounts by U.S. officials who traveled to the area of Dos Erres and witnessed the devastation left behind by the Kaibiles. Based on their observations and information obtained from sources during their trip, the American officials concluded “that the party most likely responsible for this incident is the Guatemalan Army.”


Declassified U.S. Documents on Kaibiles and the Dos Erres Massacre

December 1980
Military Intelligence Summary (MIS), Volume VIII–Latin America
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Secret, Intelligence Summary, 12 pages

Photos courtesy of Jean-Marie Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal Tyranny. More photos of Guatemala can be found in Jean-Marie Simon’s newly-released Spanish version of her book Guatemala: Eterna Primavera, Eterna Tiranía.

The Defense Intelligence Agency periodically produces intelligence summary reports with information on the structure and capabilities of foreign military forces. On page six of this 1980 summary on the Guatemalan military, the DIA provides information on the Kaibil (ranger) counterinsurgency training center, which is located in La Pólvora, in the Péten. The report describes how each of Guatemala’s infantry battalions has a Kaibil platoon, “which may be deployed as a separate small unit. These platoons are used as cadre for training other conscripts in insurgency and counterinsurgency techniques and tactics. The Air Force sends personnel to the Kaibil School for survival training.”

November 19, 1982
Army Establishes a Strategic Reaction Force
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Confidential, Cable, 2 pages

Less than a month before the Dos Erres killings, the DIA reports on the creation of a “strategic reaction force” made up of 20 Kaibil ranger instructors based out of Guatemala City’s Mariscal Zavala Brigade. The special unit was assembled in order to carry out the mission “of quickly deploying to locations throughout the country to seek and destroy guerrilla elements.” The document indicates that the Kaibil unit was placed under direct control of Guatemala’s central military command. It states; “the unit’s huge success in previous engagement with the enemy have prompted the Guatemalan Army General Staff (AGS) to assume direct command and control of this unit.”

December 10, 1982
Guatemalan Counter Terrorism Capabilities
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, Secret Cable, 3 pages

Days after the Dos Erres massacre the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala sends a secret cable back to Washington with information on the counter-terrorist tactical capability of the Guatemalan police and military forces. The cable reports that a Kaibil unit, based in the Mariscal Zavala Brigade headquarters, “has recently been deployed to the Petén, and is now operationally under the Poptún Military Bridage.”

This reporting coincides with the CEH and OAS summary of the events leading up to the Dos Erres massacre.

December 28, 1982
Alleged Massacre of 200 at Village of Dos R’s, Petén
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, Secret Cable, 3 pages 

As information begins to surface about the Dos Erres massacre U.S. officials look into the matter and report on information obtained through a “reliable embassy source” who tells U.S. officials that the Guatemalan Government Army may have massacred the 200 villagers of Dos Erres. According to the source, an Army unit disguised as guerrillas entered the Dos Erres village gathered the people together and demanded their support. The source tells officials that the villagers knew they were not with the guerrilla, and did not comply with their demands. One villager who managed to escape later recounts the story to people in Las Cruces, 12 kilometers from Dos Erres, and to the Embassy source who relays the information to American officials. Another witness tells the source that the village was completely deserted, and claimed to have found burnt identification cards in the nearby Church.  They also claim that the Army came back to the village a few days later and took roofing and furniture to the Army Base in Las Cruces.

The U.S. officials offer possible theories on why no bodies were found, and on how the entire Dos Erres population could have just “disappeared.” One theory was that the Army killed everyone in the village, dumped the bodies into the well, and covered the well over. This was based on the local testimonies of those who had gone into the village and saw that the well was covered over, but they were afraid to look inside.

The cable goes on to say that because of the reliability of the source, and the seriousness of the allegations, that an embassy office will go to investigate on Dec. 30th, 1982.

December 31, 1982
Possible Massacre in “Dos R’s”, El Petén
U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, Secret Cable, 4 pages

On December 30th three mission members from the U.S. Embassy and a Canadian diplomat visit Las Cruces in Poptún to investigate the allegations of the Dos R’s massacre. The document verifies the existence of the Dos Erres village, noting that the settlement was deserted and many of the houses burnt to the ground.

The Mission Team visit the Army Base in Poptún, El Petén, where they speak with the operations officer (S3), who tells the mission members that the area near Las Cruces was exceptionally dangerous because of recent guerrilla activity. Army officials explain how Dos Erres “had suffered from a guerrilla attack in early December,” and that it would pose a considerable risk for them to visit the town.  From Poptún, the mission Members fly directly to the town of Las Cruces (using the directions provided by their source) and then to the village of Las Dos Erres. When they reach Dos Erres, however, the helicopter pilot refuses to touch down, but agrees to sweep low over the area. From this view the Embassy officials could see that houses had been “razed or destroyed by fire.” They then fly back to Las Cruces to speak with locals, including a member of the local civil defense patrol (PAC) and a “confidant of the Army in the area.” He tells officials that the Army was responsible for the disappearance of the people in Dos Erres and that he had been told to keep out of the area in early December, because the army was going to “sweep through.” He also confirms the prior reports that the Army officials wore civilian dress during the sweep, but had identifiable Army combat boots and Galil rifles. The cable notes that this information matches that of previous reftel source.

Based on the information obtained during their trip, the cable reports that “Embassy must conclude that the party most likely responsible for this incident is the Guatemalan Army.”

WIE AUCH SIE EIN OPFER DER DIOXIN- UND RUFMÖRDER DER GoMoPa-DDR-Gestapo WERDEN KOENNEN

Liebe Leserin, lieber Leser!

Stellen Sie sich bitte kurz vor, dass Sie mit einer tollen Geschäftsidee oder einer Geschäftserweiterung zu mehr Geld kommen möchten. Beispielsweise auch Ihr Unternehmen vergrössern oder gar Ihre Waren exportieren wollen.

Sie werben damit natürlich über die Medien….

Da meldet sich bei Ihnen möglicherweise ein Beauftragter des Finanz-Nachrichtendienstes GoMoPa mit der Mitteilung, dass im GoMoPa-Forum sehr negative Forenbeiträge über Ihre Person oder Ihr Vorhaben stünden. Äusserst Schlimmes wir über Sie berichtet. Zum Beispiel, dass Sie bisher schon Ihr Geld mit betrügerischen Machenschaften verdient hätten oder Ihr Sohn als erfolgreicher Sportler nach neuesten Ermittlungen in einem Kokain-Dealer-Ring verwickelt sei.

Ein anonymer User ( Schreiberling) habe dies geschrieben, wird vom GoMoPa-Beauftragten berichtet. Man könne jetzt noch nicht feststellen, ob dies so wahr sei. Man könne aber auch nicht den Beitrag einfach rausnehmen, denn es könne ja auch was Wahres daran sein!

Falls Sie selbst an der Wahrheitsfindung interessiert seien, könnten Sie auch beim ´seriösen Nachrichtendienst` GoMoPa als Gesellschafter oder alsPremium-Mitglied einsteigen, dann könne man ja…..usf. …ganz einfach den Beitrag herausnehmen!

So ähnlich könnte es geschehen und glauben Sie mir: ´Dies ist kein böser Traum,-keine Fata Morgana`, sondern schon Zigtausendmal in der fast 10-Jährigen GoMoPa- Geschichte so abgelaufen.

Wir, von der CSA-Agency, wurden selbst aus Wettbewerbsgründen seit 2002 von GoMoPa auf primitivste Weise im Forum diffamiert oder die von uns als seriöse Dienstleister empfohlenen Unternehmungen wurden per Rufmord mit schmutzigsten, unwahren Verleumdungs-Attacken von anonymen Bloggern ( bezahlte Helfershelfer vom GoMoPa) nahezu ruiniert. Nicht nur finanziell , sondern auch gesundheitlich nieder gemacht! Nicht umsonst heisst esRUFMORD.

Der Begriff ´Stalking` ist da noch eine vornehme Bezeichnung.

Auf gut deutsch passt Rufmord besser.

Geschäftlicher und gesundheitlicher RUFMORD gehört auch entsprechend bestraft.

Die Justiz tut sich sehr schwer damit. Vor allem, wenn die Rufmörder mit Ihren Machenschaften mit Gesellschaften wie z.B. ´GoMoPa` als Briefkastenfirma aus dem Ausland agieren. UND zum anderen, weil sich dieStalking-Terror-Experten von GoMoPa sich mit ihren Methoden auch der Justiz und der Medien bedienen.

Die seriöse Alternative zu systematischem Rufmord

Seriöse Aufklärung hilft!Auch der zuweilen personell überforderten Justizkann mit entsprechender Aufklärung zum Hintergrund der Go-Mafia ´GoMoPa` und ihrem Paten Klaus Maurischat geholfen werden!

oMoPa”-”EXPERTE” Gerd-Wilhelm Benenwirtz, 1989 – ein Jahr nach dem Fall der Mauer gründete er SJB

Das Stasi-Problem war mit dem Zusammenbruch der DDR keineswegs beendet. Ehemalige Stasi-Mitarbeiter gelangten nach der Wende in höchste Positionen. In Brandenburg hatten es sogar mehrere ehemalige Stasi-Mitarbeiter bis in die aktuelle rot-rote Landesregierung geschafft, um dort die Regierung zu übernehmen. Auch in Sachsen-Anhalt könnten nach der Landtagswahl ehemalige Stasi-Mitarbeiter in die Regierung gelangen. Und auch in der Wirtschaft sind viele Stasi-Mitarbeiter in hohe Positionen gelangt. So auch der Herr Sievert. Doch was bezweckte dieser tatsächlich mit der Dioxinvergiftung? Handelte er wirklich aus Profitgier, oder war die bundesweite Vergiftung eine verspätete Rache der Stasi gegen den ehemaligen Klassenfeind?

Zum Zeitpunkt des Zusammenbruches der DDR gab es in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland rund 2000 aktive MfS-Spione, wie die veröffentlichte Auswertung der sogenannten Rosenholz-Dateien im März 2004 ergab. Die Anzahl der IM, welche für die Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung in der DDR selbst tätig waren, wurde dabei mit 20.000 beziffert. Das MfS unterstützte in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ihm nützlich erscheinende politische Kräfte. So wurden unter dem Decknamen „Gruppe Ralf Forster“ in der DDR ausgewählte Kader der DKP im Nahkampf und Sprengstoffeinsatz ausgebildet. Die Unterlagen des MfS zur „Gruppe Ralf Forster“ wurden geschreddert und im Jahr 2004 wieder in der Birthler-Behörde rekonstruiert. Die Agenten der MfS-Abteilung für Spezialkampfführung sollten eine militärische Besetzung des „Operationsgebietes“ durch Diversion, Spionage und Sabotage vorbereiten, sie waren in der Bundesrepublik und anderen westlichen Staaten, so auch in der Schweiz (z. B. Agentenpaar Müller-Hübner) aktiv

Stasi-Morde mit Dioxin: Millionen von Menschen kennen das Thema durch die Berichterstattung über den Dioxin-Skandal hervorgerufen durch Stasi-Top-Agent Siegfried Sievert. Sein Namensvetter Siegfried Siewert (ein Pseudonym) für einen „GoMoPa“-Mitarbeiter steht unter Mordverdacht im Fall Heinz Gerlach.
Bei der Staatsanwaltschaft Münster ist eine Strafanzeige wegen versuchten Mordes aus Habgier gegen den in den Dioxin-Skandal verwickelten Futtermittellieferanten Harles und Jentzsch eingegangen. Schwere Körperverletzung und Giftbeimischung lauteten weitere Vorwürfe, sagte Oberstaatsanwalt Wolfgang Schweer.
Demnach hat ein Arzt aus der Nähe von Münster die Firma aus Schleswig-Holstein angezeigt. Die Staatsanwaltschaft Münster wird den Fall vermutlich an die Behörden in Oldenburg oder Itzehoe abgeben. Dort laufen derzeit Ermittlungen wegen Verstößen gegen das Lebensmittelbedarfsgegenstände- und Futtermittel-Gesetz.
Die Firma Harles und Jentzsch aus dem schleswig-holsteinischen Uetersen hatte seit März vergangenen Jahres dioxinbelastetes Futterfett an Abnehmer in mehreren Bundesländern ausgeliefert. Bundesweit sind gegenwärtig rund 4.700 Betriebe wegen Dioxin-Verdachts geschlossen
Chef der Firma Harles und Jentzsch ist der ehemalige Stasi-Top-Agent und Dioxin-Panscher Siegfried Sievert.
Offensichtlich ist Dioxin bereits in der DDR-Zeit von Sievert im Auftrag der Stasi benutzt worden.
Beweis: „Stasi-Akte des Dioxin-Panschers belegt: Harles & Jentzsch-Geschäftsführer Sievert arbeitete 17 Jahre für die Stasi. Er trug den Decknamen “IM Pluto”.

Die Akte trägt die Registriernummer II 153/71, ist mehrere
Hundert Seiten dick. Auf dem Deckel ein Name: “Pluto“. Unter
diesem Decknamen spionierte Siegfried Sievert (58), der als Geschäftsführer
des Futtermittel-Herstellers Harles und Jentzsch mutmaßlich für
den Dioxin-Skandal verantwortlich ist, 18 Jahre lang für die
Staatssicherheit der DDR.“

http://infokriegergreifswald.blogspot.com/2011/01/stasi-dioxin-panscher.html

Die „Zeit“ schreibt:
Knapp 200 Seiten hat die Stasi-Akte von Siegfried Sievert. Der Chef des Fettherstellers Harles und Jentzsch ist für den Staatssicherheitsdienst der DDR tätig gewesen. Das geht aus Akten der Birthler-Behörde hervor, aus denen die Süddeutsche Zeitung zitiert. Sievert sei 18 Jahre lang bis zur Wende als IM Pluto geführt worden. Schon damals arbeitete er für fettverarbeitende Betriebe wie dem VEB Märkische Ölwerke in Wittenberge, schrieb die Zeitung weiter.
“Der IM hat keinerlei Vorbehalte bei der Belastung von Personen aus seinem Umgangskreis”, zitierte die Süddeutsche Zeitung aus seiner Akte. Weiter heißt es, dass Sievert nicht aus Überzeugung für die Stasi arbeite, sondern nur, weil er  “persönliche Vorteile/Nachteile in Erwägung” ziehe. Sievert wollte sich laut der Zeitung auf Anfrage nicht äußern.
Sievert ist Geschäftsführer des mittlerweile insolventen Fettherstellers Harles und Jentzsch im schleswig-holsteinischen Uetersen. Die Firma hatte dioxinbelastete Fettsäuren mit unbelasteten Fetten gemischt. Die Fette wurden zu Futtermitteln verarbeitet und führten bundesweit zur Dioxin-Belastung von Hühnern und Schweinen.
Derweil schrieb die Berliner Zeitung, dass der Fetthersteller Harles und Jentzsch regelmäßig und in viel größerem Ausmaß dioxinbelastete Fettsäuren gemischt und ausgeliefert haben soll als bislang bekannt. Die Zeitung berief sich dabei auf Messergebnisse des Niedersächsischen Landesamts für Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit (Laves). Insgesamt 92 der 153 überprüften Fettproben haben Laves zufolge den zulässigen Dioxin-Grenzwert von 0,75 Nanogramm pro Gramm überschritten.
Ein besonderes Merkmal der Ergebnisse ist, dass sich der Dioxingehalt in den Proben eklatant voneinander unterscheidet. Der Dioxingehalt lag bei 1,0, in anderen bei 11,7 und 28,7 Nanogramm, auch Werte von 48,0 bis 61,6 Nanogramm kamen vor. Für die Ermittler erhöht sich damit der Verdacht, dass das erhöhte Dioxin nicht zufällig in den Fetten vorhanden ist sondern unterschiedlich belastete Fette vorsätzlich miteinander vermengt wurden.
Alle Proben stammen aus der Zeit vom 11. November bis zum 13. Dezember. Die Behörden schätzen, dass die Firma Harles und Jentzsch in diesem Zeitraum rund 2500 Tonnen Futtermischfette hergestellt hat und diese an 20 niedersächsische Futtermittelunternehmer lieferte. Diese hätten dann die Fette mit anderen Futtermitteln weiterverarbeitet. Daraus ergebe sich für Niedersachsen eine Futtermittelmenge von 25.000 bis 125.000 Tonnen, die auf diese Weise in der Nahrungskette eingegangen sind.“
Beweise: http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2011-01/dioxin-stasi-sievert

http://www.shz.de/nachrichten/schleswig-holstein/artikeldetail/article/111/dioxin-panscher-soll-als-im-pluto-fuer-die-ddr-stasi-gearbeitet.html

http://www.bz-berlin.de/aktuell/deutschland/war-fett-dioxin-panscher-bei-der-stasi-article1094984.html

GoMoPa” – “EXPERT” level Gerd Wilhelm Wirtz, 1989 – one year after the fall of the Berlin Wall, he founded SJB

The Stasi problem had led to the collapse of the GDR no. Former Stasi officers arrived after the turn into the highest positions. In Brandenburg, there were even several former Stasi members to the current red-red state government made in order to take over the government. In Saxony-Anhalt state election could after the former Stasi employees enter the government. And in the economy, many former Stasi members have come into high positions. So also the Lord Sievert. But what this actually was intended with the dioxin poisoning? He really acted out of greed, or was the nationwide poison a belated revenge against the Stasi the former class enemy?

At the time of the collapse of the GDR, there were in the Federal Republic of Germany, about 2,000 active-Stasi spies, as the published evaluation of the so-called Rose-Wood files in March 2004 found. The number of IM, which for the Main Intelligence Directorate in the GDR were self-employed was estimated at 20,000 here. The Stasi supported in the Federal Republic of Germany, it appears useful political forces. Thus, under the pseudonym “Ralf Forster group” trained in East Germany squad selected the DKP in the melee and explosives use. The records of the Stasi for “Ralf Forster Group” were shredded in 2004 and reconstructed in the Birthler Authority. The agents of the Stasi department for special warfare should prepare a military occupation of the “operational area” through sabotage, espionage and sabotage, they were in Germany and other Western states, including in Switzerland (eg agent pair Müller-Hübner) active

Stasi murders with dioxin: Millions of people know the issue by reporting on the dioxin scandal caused by Stasi top agent Siegfried Sievert. His namesake Siegfried Siewert (a pseudonym) for a “GoMoPa” employee is under suspicion of murder in the case of Heinz Gerlach.
Munster to the prosecutor a criminal complaint for attempted murder out of greed against the complex in the dioxin scandal feed suppliers Harles and Jentzsch has been received. Serious injury and toxic admixture denominated further allegations, said senior prosecutor Wolfgang Schweer.
Accordingly, a doctor from the nearby Cathedral, the company from Schleswig-Holstein has shown. The prosecution will give Munster the case probably due to the authorities in Oldenburg and Itzehoe. There currently under investigation for violations of the food commodities and animal feed law.
The company Harles and Jentzsch from the Schleswig-Holstein Uetersen had delivered since March last year, dioxin-contaminated feed fat to customers in several states. Nationwide are currently around 4,700 businesses closed because of suspected dioxin
Head of the company and Harles Jentzsch is a former Stasi agent and top-dioxin adulterator Siegfried Sievert.
Dioxin is apparently already in the communist era of Sievert on behalf of the Stasi was used.
Proof: “Stasi file of dioxin-occupied adulterator: Harles & Jentzsch, CEO Sievert worked 17 years for the Stasi. He bore the code name “IM Pluto.”

The record bears the registration number is 153/71 II, several
Hundred pages thick. On the cover of a name “Pluto”. Under
that code name spied Siegfried Sievert (58), who as CEO
the feed manufacturer Harles Jentzsch and presumably for
the dioxin scandal is responsible for 18 years for the
State Security of the GDR. ”

http://infokriegergreifswald.blogspot.com/2011/01/stasi-dioxin-panscher.html

The “Time” wrote:
Sievert has nearly 200 pages of the Stasi file Siegfried. The head of the grease manufacturer Harles and Jentzsch is for the State Security Service of the GDR had worked. This is clear from the files of the Birthler Authority, which quoted from the Süddeutsche Zeitung. Sievert was conducted for 18 years until the turn of Pluto as IM. Even then, he worked for fat-processing companies such as the VEB Märkische oil plants in Wittenberg, wrote on the paper.
“The IM has no reservations with the load of people from his circle of acquaintances”, the Sueddeutsche Zeitung quoted from his file. It said that Sievert work not out of conviction for the Stasi, but only because he had “personal advantages / disadvantages into consideration” pull. Sievert refused to comment on request according to the newspaper.
Sievert is the CEO of the now insolvent and Jentzsch Harles grease manufacturer in Schleswig-Holstein Uetersen. The company had mixed dioxin-contaminated fat with fat unloaded. The fats are processed into animal feed and carried nationwide on dioxin contamination of chickens and pigs.
Meanwhile, the Berliner Zeitung wrote, that should have mixed the grease manufacturer Harles and Jentzsch regularly and to a much greater extent dioxin-contaminated fatty acids and delivered as previously announced. The newspaper on the basis that results from the Lower Saxony State Office for Consumer Protection and Food Safety (Laves). A total of 92 of the 153 examined fat samples have exceeded the permissible according Laves dioxin limit of 0.75 nanograms per gram.
A special feature of the results is that the dioxin content in the samples blatantly differ. The dioxin content was 1.0, occurred in another at 11.7 and 28.7 nanograms, and values ​​from 48.0 to 61.6 nanograms. For the investigators will thus increase the suspicion that the elevated dioxin accident in the fats present but differently charged lipids were intentionally mixed together.
All samples are from the period of 11 November to 13 December. The authorities estimate that the company Harles and Jentzsch has produced in this period around 2500 tons of feed mixing fats and delivered them at 20 Lower Saxony feed business. These were then further processed with other feed fats. It follows a feed lot for Lower 25000-125000 tons that arrived in this way in the food chain. ”
Prove http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2011-01/dioxin-stasi-sievert

SECRET: STATUS OF COALITION PARTNERS IN IRAQ; RECOMMENDED DEMARCHE FOR AUSTRALIA

VZCZCXRO7603
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3794/01 3381547
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 031547Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0674
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 0038
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0072
RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR IMMEDIATE 0018
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN IMMEDIATE 0012
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003794 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS IZ ES RO AS EN
SUBJECT: STATUS OF COALITION PARTNERS IN IRAQ; RECOMMENDED DEMARCHE FOR AUSTRALIA

Classified By: Pol-Mil Minister-Counselor Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (S) This is an action request, see paragraph 11. 

2. (S) Summary:  As the GOI moves beyond the process of
gaining agreement for the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, it is
focusing on the terms for the continued presence of four
Coalition partners (Australia, Romania, El Salvador and
Estonia) beyond December 31. (The British are engaging with
the GOI at the highest level and have made significant
progress on a mechanism to permit them to stay in Iraq.)
Regarding the other four, the GOI made clear its conditions
for agreement: 1) that the Government will not present any
more security agreements to the Council of Representatives
(COR) and 2) that the forces of the four must conduct
non-combat missions.  The GOI is pressing for the simplest
exchange of letters or diplomatic notes or signed MOUs to
permit continued operations. 

3. (S) Summary Continued: An Estonian parliamentary
delegation recently visited Iraq and an MOD official remained
behind to continue discussions with us and the GOI.  The
Salvadoran Defense Minister and team will be in Iraq December
5.  The Australians have a high-level team in Baghdad and are
working with the GOI but to date remain convinced that they
need an agreement ratified by the COR.  Given the importance
of the 42 Australian staff officers to MNF-I operations in
Iraq, we request the Department consider sending an urgent
demarche to Canberra pressing the GOA to look for a mechanism
short of COR ratification to allow the continued presence of
its military officers.  Additionally, NATO is proceeding to
formalize the GOI's strong interest in the continuation of
NATO Training Mission Iraq (NTM-I) and will renew an exchange
of letters with the GOI, citing the U.S. Security Agreement
in lieu of the UNSCR. End Summary. 

4. (S) Following the adoption by the COR of the U.S. Security
Agreement, the GOI has clearly stated its conditions for the
continued presence of the remaining four Coalition partners
(Australia, Romania, El Salvador and Estonia).  The PM has
made it absolutely clear in discussions with the Ambassador
and MNF-I CG Odierno that it will not support any further
agreements which require COR ratification.  The GOI has also
reiterated that the continued presence of these Coalition
forces will be in a "non-combat" assistance capacity. The
British are conducting high-level discussions with the GOI to
provide protection and conduct specific combat missions. 

5. (S) Instead of engaging in another campaign with the
various political factions in the COR, PM Nouri al-Maliki has
said he strongly prefers an exchange of diplomatic notes or a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) referencing provisions in
the U.S. Security Agreement. 

6. (S) Post has met repeatedly and at various levels with the
Australians concerning a suitable agreement.  The GOA remains
convinced that in order for any such agreement to be binding,
it must be ratified by the COR.  The Australians have 42
staff officers embedded within the Multi-National Forces Iraq
(MNF-I) in key positions.  Additionally, the Australians
participate in TF158 operating in Iraqi waters to protect
Iraq's oil installations.  The Australians understand the
complexity of including combat forces (TF158) in their
Qcomplexity of including combat forces (TF158) in their
agreement and may be willing to drop this in order to focus
on the non-combat embedded officers. 

7. (S) Given the clear position of PM al-Maliki and the
importance of the Australians to MNF-I, we recommend the
Department consider sending an urgent demarche to Canberra
recommending that the GOA consider an exchange of diplomatic
notes with the GOI, referencing provisions in the U.S.
Security Agreement.  We also recommend that Australia agree
to limit its agreement to the 42 embedded staff officers
currently serving with MNF-I (See proposed points in
paragraph 11). 

8. (S) Mati Raidma, Chairman of the National Defense Council of the Estonian Parliament, led a visit by Estonian Parliament Members to Baghdad last week, accompanied by MOD officials, to participate in discussions with the GOI on Estonia's continued presence in Iraq. One MOD official remained behind to follow up on these talks. Post met with the Estonian delegation and advised they pursue an exchange of diplomatic notes with the GOI, also reiterating that Estonia's continued presence would be in a non-combat assistance capacity. The Estonian Members were clear on this matter and in a meeting with the Iraqi Minister of Defense on November 27, did not raise the issue of Estonian forces conducting combat operations. We linked the Estonians with the Australians to facilitate their understanding of the negotiating process, while focusing on an exchange of diplomatic notes rather than COR ratification. The Salvadoran MOD will visit Iraq on December 5, at which time Post will advise the same course of action.

9. (S) As for Romania, its Embassy is engaged on this matter
and we are supporting their efforts.  Post has advised
Romania to consider a similar approach to Estonia through an
exchange of diplomatic notes, referencing provisions in the
U.S. Security Agreement. 

10. (S) NTM-I was invited by PM al-Maliki on January 29 to
remain in Iraq until the end of 2009.  NTM-I's current legal
status is derived from an exchange of letters between NATO
and the GOI, referencing the UNSCR.  NATO has approved a
draft exchange of letters and NATO Assistant Secretary
General for Operations Martin Howard will travel to Baghdad
next week to negotiate the exchange of letters. 

---------------
ACTION REQUEST
--------------- 

11. (S) Post recommends that the Department consider
instructing our Embassy in Canberra to urgently demarche the
GOA to suggest strongly that the GOA consider an exchange of
diplomatic notes or other legal mechanism that does not
require action by the COR, referencing provisions in the U.S.
security agreement.  Post suggests that the demarche be based
on the following points: 

- Now that the U.S. has concluded its complex negotiations
with the GOI for a bilateral security agreement, the GOI is
focused on negotiating Coalition security agreements. 

- The U.S. strongly supports the presence of Australian staff
officers in MNF-I beyond January 1, 2009 and Australia's
other significant contributions to Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

- The GOI has made it clear that Australia's continued
presence will be in a non-combat assistance capacity. 

- PM al-Maliki has stated that he will not present any other
bilateral security agreements to the COR. 

- Canberra should strongly consider an exchange of diplomatic
notes or a MOU with the GOI, referencing provisions in the
U.S. Security Agreement with Iraq in order to establish a
basis for the continued presence of Australian officers in
Iraq. 

AS APPROPRIATE IF THIS REMAINS AN ISSUE: We understand that
the GOA wishes to include its combat forces in TF158 in its
bilateral agreement.  We recommend that this be addressed
separately given PM al-Maliki's position against combat
forces and that the GOA focus on a security agreement
covering the Australian staff officers embedded with MNF-I
only. 

CROCKER

27 Years Later, Justice for Fernando García

Family snapshot of Nineth de García, daughter Alejandra and husband Fernando before his abduction on February 18, 1984. Photo from “Guatemala, The Group for Mutual Support,” An Americas Watch Report. [Courtesy of Jean-Marie Simon]
Update on the conviction of the Guatemalan police officers
responsible for Fernando García’s “forced disappearance”

Washington, D.C., February 18, 2011 – Twenty-seven years ago today, Guatemalan labor activist Edgar Fernando García was shot and kidnapped by government security forces off a street in downtown Guatemala City. He was never seen again. In recognition of the anniversary of his disappearance, the National Security Archive today posts the complete text of the historic ruling issued last October by a Guatemalan court that convicted two former policemen to 40 years in prison for the crime, as well as key documents from the Guatemalan National Police Archive that were used in the prosecution.

Fernando García’s family continues to fight for justice inside Guatemala and internationally. The groundbreaking trial that found Héctor Roderico Ramírez Ríos and Abraham Lancerio Gómez – both low-ranking police agents at the time of the abduction – guilty of García’s “forced disappearance” ended with the court’s unprecedented order that the government investigate their superior officers. Meanwhile in Washington, where the García case has been pending before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission for over a decade, the commission announced on February 9 its decision to send the case to the Inter-American Court in Costa Rica due to Guatemala’s failure to act on commission findings.

The Fernando García trial took place over several days last October in a crowded courtroom in the “Tribunals Tower” in downtown Guatemala City, and brought together an extraordinary array of experts and witnesses testifying on behalf of the prosecution. (To see a more complete description of the first days of the trial, see Kate Doyle’s blog posting.) Congresswomen Nineth Montenegro, García’s wife and mother of their infant daughter, Alejandra, at the time of his abduction, told the court about her anguished search for her husband in the months following his disappearance, leading to the creation of one of Guatemala’s first human rights organizations, the Mutual Support Group (GAM). Alejandra García Montenegro, now a lawyer who served as the querellante adhesivo or “private prosecutor” in the case, spoke movingly at the trial’s end about the impact of his disappearance on her family and her own childhood. García’s elderly mother also testified, expressing the pain she has endured for almost three decades in losing her son without knowing his ultimate fate.

At the heart of the prosecution’s case were the official records of the former National Police of Guatemala, recovered by the Office of the Human Rights Prosecutor in 2005 and now being examined for evidence of human right crimes. Velia Muralles Bautista, an investigator with the Historic Archives of the National Police (AHPN), gave expert testimony on hundreds of police records connected to the February 1984 counterinsurgency operation that resulted in Fernando García’s abduction. Muralles drew particular attention to a handful of key documents that contained powerful evidence of the Guatemalan government’s role in planning and carrying out García’s capture. They included records of the police Joint Operations Center (Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas, or COC), which controlled and commanded the police units involved in the operation [documents 3, 4, 5, and 6]; a hand-drawn map of Guatemala City, assigning Zone 11— where García and his companion, Danilo Chinchilla, were captured — to the Fourth Corps of the National Police [document 7]; and the recommendation from the National Police hierarchy that the defendants be considered for medals for their heroic actions in the counterinsurgency operation on that day, at the time, and in the place of the capture of Edgar [document 2].

On the last days of the trial, Marco Tulio Alvarez, head of Guatemala’s Archivos de la Paz (Archives of Peace), testified on the political and historical context of Fernando García’s disappearance. His testimony addressed the coordination between government agencies in “cleansing operations”, specifically between the military and the National Police. In his testimony, Tulio Alvarez referred to documents from the AHPN, the Death Squad Diary, and declassified U.S. documents obtained by the National Security Archive, among other Guatemalan government documents. Tulio Alvarez used this documentary evidence to paint a picture for the court of government repression of those who spoke against the government, groups the Guatemalan government considered “internal enemies.” His testimony touched on the regime’s desire to “annihilate local secret communities, and military units…” which was described in a military document, Plan Victoria 82.

For a more detailed account of the last days of the trial and other witnesses, see the report written by C. Carolina López, our associate in Guatemala.

Now, the pressure is on the Guatemalan government, not only from the ruling of the three judges in Guatemala who heard this case, but also the pending hearing before the Inter-American Court in Costa Rica. An indictment and trial of superior officers allegedly responsible for ordering the cleansing operations would truly be a landmark development for human rights justice in Guatemala.


Read the Documents

Document 1
October 28, 2010
Organismo Judicial, Guatemala. C-01069-1997-00001 Oficial Tercero. Tribunal Octavo de Sentencia Penal, Narcoactividad y Delitos Contra el Ambiente, Guatemala.(Judicial Body of Guatemala, Third Official, Eighth Criminal Court Convcition, Drug-trafficking and Environmental Crimes, Guatemala)
93 pages

This document is the official ruling of the Guatemalan court, which convicted former National Police officers Héctor Roderico Ramírez Ríos and Abraham Lancerio Gómez of forced disappearance in the case of Edgar Fernando García. The two men received the maximum sentence of 40 years in prison. The ruling, written by three Guatemala judges, acknowledges that Edgar Fernando García was illegally detained; the disappearance was committed by state security agents within national security policy; and the crime was against the individual liberties and freedoms of Fernando García.

The official ruling also includes parts of the testimony from eye witnesses, as well as expert witness testimony on the documents from the Historical Archive of the National Police (AHPN) and the declassified U.S. government documents from the National Security Archive collections.

Document 2
Undated
Cuarto Cuerpo Guatemala, Nomina del Personal del Cuarto Cuerpo de la Policia Nacional que se hace a distinciones, según el reclamento de condecoraciones. (Fourth Corps Guatemala, Nomination of Personnel of the Fourth Corps of the National Police for distinction, according to regulations for awards)
Souce: Historical Archive of the National Police of Guatemala (Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional)
3 pages

This documents records the nomination of four police officers, Hector Roderico Ramírez Ríos, Alfonso Guillermo de Leon, Hugo Rolando Gomez Osorio, and Abraham Lancerio Gómez to receive awards for their actions on February 18, 1984 at 11:00 in the morning with their encounter with “two subversives” who had subversive propaganda and fire arms at the “Mercado de Guarda” in zone 11. This was the exact date, time, and place that Fernando García and his companion Danilo Chinchilla were abducted. In her testimony, expert witness Velia Muralles used this document to demonstrate that these four former National Police officers took part in the crime of the forced disappearance of Fernando García because of the awards they received for participating in the cleansing operation the morning he was shot and disappeared.

Document 3
February 10, 1984
Oficio COC – 165 – WA, Guatemala.
Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas (Joint Operations Center)
Souce: Historical Archive of the National Police of Guatemala (Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional)
1 page

Document 4
February 11, 1984
Oficio COC – 173 – WA, Guatemala.
Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas (Joint Operations Center)
Source: Historical Archive of the National Police of Guatemala (Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional)
1 page

Document 5
February 12, 1984
Oficio COC/185-opp, Guatemala.
Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas (Joint Operations Center)
Historical Archive of the National Police of Guatemala (Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional)
1 page

Document 6
February 17, 1984
Oficio COC/207-laov, Guatemala
Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas (Joint Operations Center)
Historical Archive of the National Police of Guatemala (Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional)
1 page

These four documents (three through six) are from the “Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas” or COC, which was the “Center of Cooperative Operations” between the military and the police. These documents are from February 1984, days before Fernando García was disappeared. Expert witness Muralles explained that this document showed the coordination between the military and police in the overall national strategy of “cleansing operations” or “operación limpieza.”
Document 6, from February 17, 1984 shows detailed instructions from COC Chief, Monico Antonio Cano Perez for a member of the National Police to carry out an operation on the morning of February 18, between 9:00am and 12:00pm, the exact window during which Fernando García was abducted.

Document 7
February 17, 1984
Oficio COC/201/WA, Guatemala
Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas (Joint Operations Center)
Historical Archive of the National Police of Guatemala (Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional)
4 pages

This is another document from Joint Operations Center giving instructions to the National Police regarding cleansing operations. This documents contains two pages that show which sectors of the city were assigned to specific corps of the National Police. The second to last page, titled “Sectores de la Ciudad Capital para Operaciones Limpieza de los Cuerpos P.N.” shows that the Fourth Corps was in charge of Zone 11 for the patrol for “operacion limpieza”. The defendents, Héctor Roderico Ramírez Ríos and Abraham Lancerio Gómez, were members of the fourth corps. The last page, titled “Croquis Demostrativo Sectores Ciudad Capital Para Operacion Limpeza de los Cuerpos P.N.” is a hand-drawn map shows a yellow-gold outline for Zone 11, where Fernando García was captured.

Document 8
February 18, 1984
Cuadro para control de operaciones, de los cuerpos, escuela y narcoticos, de la policia nacional en diferentes zonas de la ciudad capital. (Chart for orders of operations, of the corps, school and narcotics, and of the National Police in different zones of the capital city.)
Historical Archive of the National Police of Guatemala (Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional)
1page

This document is a logbook list of which units were assigned to patrol which areas on certain days. We see that the Fourth Corps of the National Police was assigned to patrol Zones 11 and 12 during the hours of 9:00am and 12:00pm on Feburary 18, 1984. The defendents, Héctor Roderico Ramírez Ríos and Abraham Lancerio Gómez, were members of the fourth corps.

“Learn from History”, 31st Anniversary of the Assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero

Archbishop Romero minutes after he was shot celebrating mass at a small chapel located in a hospital called “La Divina Providencia” at around 6:30pm on March 24, 1980.

Washington, D.C., August 27, 2011 – Thirty one years ago tomorrow, El Salvador’s Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero was shot and killed by right-wing assassins seeking to silence his message of solidarity with the country’s poor and oppressed. The assassination shocked Salvadorans already reeling in early 1980 from attacks by security forces and government-backed death squads on a growing opposition movement. Romero’s murder further polarized the country and set the stage for the civil war that would rage for the next twelve years. In commemoration of the anniversary, the National Security Archive is posting a selection from our digital archive of 12 declassified U.S. documents that describe the months before his death, his assassination and funeral, as well as later revelations about those involved in his murder.

The documents are being posted as President Barack Obama leaves El Salvador, his final stop on a five-day trip to Latin America. Obama spent part of his time in the country with a visit to Monsignor Romero’s tomb last night. Although the United States funneled billions of dollars to the tiny country in support of the brutal army and security forces during a counterinsurgency war that left 75,000 civilians dead, the president made no reference to the U.S. role, seeking in his speeches instead to focus on immigration and security concerns. The day before his visit to Romero’s gravesite, Obama had told an audience in Chile that it was important that the United States and Latin America “learn from history, that we understand history, but that we not be trapped by history, because many challenges lie ahead.”

Just weeks before his murder, Archbishop Romero published an open letter to President Jimmy Carter in the Salvadoran press, asking the United States not to intervene in El Salvador’s fate by arming brutal security forces against a popular opposition movement. Romero warned that U.S. support would only “sharpen the injustice and repression against the organizations of the people which repeatedly have been struggling to gain respect for their fundamental human rights.” Despite his plea, President Carter moved to approve $5 million in military aid less than one year after the archbishop’s murder, as Carter was leaving office in January 1981.

Included in the posting are documents reporting on a secret, behind-the-scene effort by the United States to enlist the Vatican in pressuring Romero over his perceived support for the Salvadoran left; an account of the archbishop’s powerful March 23, 1980, homily, given the day before his assassination; a description of the murder by the U.S. defense attaché in El Salvador; and an extraordinary embassy cable describing a meeting organized by rightist leader Roberto D’Aubuisson in which participants draw lots to determine who would be the triggerman to kill Romero.

Although the declassified documents do not reveal the extent of the plot to kill Romero or the names of those who murdered him, details in them support the findings of the 1993 report by the U.N.-mandated Truth Commission for El Salvador. Released shortly after the signing of the peace accords that ended the war in El Salvador, the report identified D’Aubuisson, Captains Alvaro Rafael Saravia and Eduardo Avila, and Fernando (“El Negro”) Sagrera as among those responsible for the assassination. On March 25 of last year, Carlos Dada of El Salvador’s on-line news site El Faro published an extraordinary interview with Alvaro Saravia, one of the masterminds of Romero’s killing. In the interview, Saravia revealed chilling details of the plot to murder Romero; see a transcript of the interview, “How We Killed the Archbishop”, here and here en español.

The documents posted below are from the National Security Archive’s Digital National Security Archive’s two El Salvador collections, El Salvador: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1977–1984 and El Salvador: War, Peace, and Human Rights, 1980–1994. These two full collections, among others, are available through a subscription with the ProQuest research database.


Read the Documents

Document 1
October 11, 1979
Confidential, Cable, “The Archbishop and the Military”, 2 pp.
United States Embassy. El Salvador

In his homily, Archbishop Romero decries repression by the Salvadoran military and criticizes the army for abandoning its role as the nation’s defender to become “guardian of the interests of the oligarchy.”

Document 2
December 17, 1979
Unclassified, Cable, “Archbishop Strongly Urges Agrarian Reform”, 3 pp.
United States Embassy. El Salvador

Archbishop Oscar A. Romero speaks in support of agrarian reform, criticizing the oligarchy for arming those who seek to preserve the status quo and citing the Catholic Church’s Medellin Council recognition of “right of oppressed to exert pressure, but not through armed violence.”

Document 3
January 31, 1980
Secret, Memorandum, [Draft Letter Attached], “Letter from Dr. Brzezinski to the Pope”, 5 pp.
United States. Department of State, Office of the Secretary

Presents draft of letter to Pope John Paul II outlining areas of concern in Central America and requesting assistance in persuading Archbishop Romero not to “abandon” Revolutionary Governing Junta in favor of more radical leftists in El Salvador.

Document 4
February 19, 1980
Unclassified, Cable, “Text of Archbishop’s Letter to President Carter“, 1 pp.
United States Embassy. El Salvador

Archbishop Romero addresses President Jimmy Carter, imploring him not to provide military aid or any other form of assistance that could exacerbate state violence targeting Salvadoran citizens. “I am very worried by the news that the government of the United States is studying a form of abetting the arming of El Salvador,” Romero writes. “The contribution of your government instead of promoting greater justice and peace in El Salvador will without doubt sharpen the injustice and repression against the organizations of the people which repeatedly have been struggling to gain respect for their fundamental human rights.”

Document 5
March 1, 1980
Confidential, Cable, “Reply to Archbishop’s Letter to President Carter“,1 pp.
United States Embassy. El Salvador

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance responds to Archbishop Romero’s letter regarding criticisms of U.S. security assistance to El Salvador, assuring him that President Carter shares his concerns about the human rights of Salvadoran citizens. “Any equipment and training which we might provide would be designed to overcome the most serious deficiencies of the Armed Forces, enhancing their professionalism so that they can fulfill their essential role of maintaining order with a minimum of lethal force.”

Document 6
March 23, 1980
Confidential, Cable “Archbishop’s Homily, March 23”, 4 pp.
United States Embassy. El Salvador

This cable reports on Archbishop Romero’s homily, the day before he was assassinated. He speaks of the increasing tension with Salvadoran security forces and condemns rampant killings: “In the name of God, in the name of this suffering people whose cries rise to heaven more loudly each day, I implore you, I beg you, I order you in the name of God: stop the repression!”

Document 7
March 25, 1980
Confidential, Cable, “Archbishop Romero Assassinated, 2 pp.
United States Defense Intelligence Agency. Office of the Defense Attaché, El Salvador

This document reports the assassination of Archbishop Romero and includes brief description of events.

Document 8
March 26, 1980
Confidential, Cable, “Archbishop’s Assassination: Peaceful Procession”, 2 pp.
United States Embassy. El Salvador

This cable reports on the procession of thousands of people accompanying Archbishop Romero’s coffin from the basilica to the National Cathedral.

Document 9
March 26, 1980,
Unclassified, Cable, “White House Statement on Archbishop Romero’s Assassination”, 2 pp.
United States. Department of State

The United States government issues statement condemning the assassination of Archbishop Romero.

Document 10
November 19, 1980,
Secret, Cable “Conversation with National Guard Officer”, 3 pp.
United States Embassy. El Salvador

A source from the National Guard tells a U.S. embassy political officer that National Republican Alliance (Alianza Republicana Nacional—ARENA) founder Roberto D’Aubuisson organized a meeting a day or two before the assassination of Archbishop Romero in which “participants drew lots for the task of killing the archbishop.”

Document 11
February 25, 1981
Unclassified, Cable, “El Salvador: Army Officers Implicated in Romero Killing”, 1 pp.
United States. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Panama

Radio Venceremos clandestinely broadcasts an interview with “disillusioned army officer” Lt. Col. Ricardo Bruno Navarrete implicating Roberto D’Aubuisson, and members of the Salvadoran armed forces in the assassination of Archbishop Romero.

Document 12
December 21, 1981
Secret, Cable, “Assassination of Archbishop Romero”, 2 pp.
United States Embassy. El Salvador

This document is a follow-up to the November 19 embassy cable concerning a meeting to plan the assassination of Archbishop Romero. In it, a U.S. political officer reports additional information from the same National Guard source indicating that Romero’s killer was Walter “Musa” Antonio Alvarez. [The UN Truth Commission Report on El Salvador would later identify Alvarez as involved in conveying money supplied by Roberto D’Aubuisson as payment to Romero’s assassin, see pp. 130-1.]

TOP-SECRET:Los documentos de Chiquita

Este es un fragmento de una nota manuscrita de 2000 en la que se describe que Chiquita pagó a grupos armados por seguridad y no como una extorsión. National Security Archive.Haga clic en la foto para ampliar.

Cientos de memorandos internos de la multinacional bananera Chiquita Brands, desclasificados por el National Security Archive, muestran que la empresa hizo pagos a guerrilleros, paramilitares y miembros del Ejército a cambio de seguridad.

Por Michael Evans especial para VerdadAbierta.com*

Memorandos confidenciales internos de Chiquita Brands International revelan que el gigante del banano se benefició de sus pagos a grupos paramilitares colombianos y la guerrilla, contradiciendo el acuerdo de culpabilidad (plea agreement) que firmó con fiscales de Estados Unidos de 2007, en el que alegó que nunca había recibido “ningún servicio de seguridad o equipos de seguridad a cambio de los pagos”. Chiquita había tildado estos pagos como una “extorsión”.

Chiquita entregó miles de documentos al Departamento de Justicia de Estados Unidos como parte de un acuerdo de sentencia, en el que admitió años de pagos ilegales a las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, Auc, grupo que el Departamento de Estado había señalado como “organización terrorista extranjera” y con el que acordó pagar una multa de 25 millones de dólares.

El National Security Archive obtuvo más de 5.500 páginas de documentos internos de Chiquita del Departamento de Justicia bajo un derecho de petición en EE.UU (Freedom of Information Act) y publica en línea varios de estos documentos que están incluídos en la colección: Colombia y los Estados Unidos: Violencia Política, Narcotráfico y Derechos Humanos, 1948-2010.

Los papeles proporcionan evidencia de “transacciones” de beneficio mutuo entre las filiales colombianas de Chiquita y varios grupos armados ilegales en Colombia y arroja claridad sobre más de una década de pagos relacionados con la seguridad a la guerrilla, los paramilitares, las fuerzas colombianas de seguridad y las cooperativas privadas Convivir, grupos armados auspiciados por el gobierno.

La colección de documentos también detalla los esfuerzos de la compañía por ocultar lo que denominaron pagos “delicados” en las cuentas de gastos de los directivos de la empresa y a través de diferentes trucos contables (Ver documento).

La investigación del Departamento de Justicia concluyó que muchos de los pagos de Chiquita a las Auc (también llamadas como “Autodefensas” en muchos de los documentos) se realizaron a través de organizaciones legales Convivir supervisadas por el ejército colombiano.

Estas nuevas pruebas de que Chiquita se benefició de los pagos ilícitos pueden aumentar su exposición a demandas de las víctimas de grupos armados ilegales de Colombia. La colección es el resultado de una colaboración National Security Archive con la Universidad de Georgetown, su Escuela de Leyes y Derechos Humanos y la Clínica de Abogados y Justicia Pública, y se ha utilizado en apoyo de una demanda civil contra Chiquita encabezado por Earth Rights International a nombre de cientos de víctimas colombianas de los paramilitares.

“Estos registros extraordinarios son las pruebas más detalladas hasta la fecha del verdadero costo de hacer negocios en Colombia”, dijo Michael Evans, director del proyecto de documentación de Colombia del National Security Archive. “El aparente acuerdo de Chiquita con las guerrillas y paramilitares es responsable de los incontables asesinatos, desmiente el acuerdo de culpabilidad firmado por la empresa con el Departamento de Justicia de Estados Unidos”.

El esfuerzo de la compañía para ocultar los indicios de sus nexos con grupos armados ilegales en Colombia es evidente en un par de memorandos legales de enero de 1994. El primero de ellos indica que las guerrillas le prestaban seguridad en algunas de las plantaciones de Chiquita.

El director general de operaciones de Chiquita en Turbo dijo a abogados de la compañía que los guerrilleros fueron “utilizados para suministrar el personal de seguridad en diferentes granjas”.

Una anotación manuscrita en un documento membreteado de la compañía, clasificado como confidencial, se pregunta: “¿Por qué es relevante?” y, “¿Por qué está siendo escrito?”. En el documento los abogados han tachado la palabra “transacciones” – lo que sugiere un acuerdo de canje- y lo sustituyeron por el término más neutro de “pagos”. Los contables de la empresa incluyeron los gastos como “pagos de extorsión de guerrillas”, pero los registraron en los libros como “seguridad ciudadana”, de acuerdo con estas notas.

Otro documento muestra que Chiquita también pagó a paramilitares por servicios de seguridad -incluyendo información de inteligencia sobre las operaciones de la guerrilla- después de que las Auc arrebataron el control de la región a la guerrilla, a mediados de la década de 1990.

En marzo de 2000, el abogado senior de Chiquita, Robert Thomas, escribió un memo (ver) de una conversación con los directores de la filial en Colombia de Chiquita, Banadex, en la que indican que los paramilitares de Santa Marta crearon una empresa ficticia, Inversiones Manglar, para ocultar “el verdadero propósito de garantizar la seguridad”.

Inversiones Manglar se presentaba como una empresa de exportación agrícola, pero producía “información sobre los movimientos guerrilleros”, según la nota. Según Thomas, funcionarios de Banadex le dijeron que “todas las compañías bananeras están contribuyendo en Santa Marta” y que Chiquita “debe continuar haciendo los pagos”, ya que “no se puede obtener el mismo nivel de apoyo (seguridad) de los militares”.

Los papeles de Chiquita también destacan el papel de los militares colombianos para presionar a la empresa a financiar a las Auc a través de las Convivir y para facilitar los pagos ilegales.

Un indicio de esto se encuentra en otro documento escrito por Thomas, en septiembre de 2000, que describe una reunión en 1997, con el líder de las Auc, Carlos Castaño, quien sugirió por primera vez a los directores de Banadex apoyar la creación de la Convivir llamada La Tagua del Darién.

Según la nota, los funcionarios de Banadex adujeron que “no tenían más remedio que asistir a la reunión” porque no hacerlo sería “antagonizar con los militares de Colombia, funcionarios locales y estatales, y las Autodefensas”.

Entre los funcionarios que más apoyaron las Convivir durante este tiempo se encontraba Álvaro Uribe, entonces gobernador de Antioquia, en el que tenía su centro de operaciones Chiquita en Colombia. En el memo de septiembre de 2000, Thomas señala: “Es bien conocido en el momento en que oficiales de alto rango del ejército colombiano y el Gobernador del Departamento de Antioquia estaban haciendo campaña para el establecimiento de una organización Convivir de Urabá”.

Un memorando de 1995 indica que, tanto Uribe como otro político de la región, Alfonso Núñez, recibieron donaciones de otra de las filiales en Colombia de Chiquita, la Compañía Frutera de Sevilla. Uribe fue presidente de Colombia desde 2002 hasta 2010.

Más tarde, un memo legal de agosto de 1997 escrito en papel membretado de Chiquita, dice que la empresa era “miembro de una Convivir llamada Puntepiedra, SA”, que el autor clasifica como “una persona jurídica en la que participamos con otros exportadores de banano en la región de Turbo”. La nota dice que la “única función” de las Convivir era “proporcionar información sobre los movimientos guerrilleros.”

La compañía había estado haciendo pagos sensibles de seguridad durante años – primero en forma directa a militares y grupos guerrilleros, y luego, a través de organizaciones comerciales locales y Convivir-. Para 1991, unos 15 mil dólares de “pagos delicados” para las diversas unidades del ejército colombiano se muestran junto a un desembolso de más de 31 dólares a “guerrilla” (Ver documento).

Una versión diferente del mismo documento no solo omite los nombres de los beneficiarios de pagos, sino que incluye una anotación manuscrita junto a la “guerrilla”. Una entrada dice: “Pago extorsión.” Otra anotación dice: “Sobre todo no son pagos ilegales – estos son legales – gasolina, el ejército, la policía, los políticos . El pago no ofrece nada, ni beneficios”.

Registros contables de 1997-1998 también señalan el papel de las fuerzas de seguridad colombianas en el fomento de pagos de la empresa a paramilitares.

A partir del segundo trimestre de 1997 y hasta el segundo trimestre de 1998, Banamex realizó pagos a cooperativas “Convivir”, que registraron como “donación al grupo de ciudadanos de reconocimiento a petición del Ejército.” En 2002(ver documento) y 2003(ver documento), la empresa realizó pagos similares a cooperativas Convivir junto con desembolsos a “funcionarios militares y de Policía” para “pagos de servicios de seguridad.”

Otro documento escrito a mano de 1999 revela un aparente esfuerzo por un general del Ejército de Colombia para establecerse como un intermediario en los pagos de los paramilitares. El documento describe a un “general que ha estado en la zona desde hace varios años” que había sido acusado por el alcalde de San José de Apartadó de ser parte de “[un] escuadrón de la muerte” y que había sido “suspendido del Ejército”.

El documento señala que el general “nos ha ayudado personalmente” con “seguridad” y con “información que impidió secuestros”. Las notas hacen referencia indirecta a un pago de 9 mil dólares, agregando que “otras compañías están poniendo en sus…”

“Los papeles de Chiquita refuerzan la idea de que, en 1997, las Auc crecieron en las regiones bananeras del norte de Colombia, y que los funcionarios del gobierno local, oficiales militares y líderes empresariales apoyaron a sus operaciones paramilitares”, dijo Evans.

“Estas revelaciones son más que académicas”, dijo el profesor Arturo Carrillo, Director de la Clínica Internacional de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Georgetown. “Los documentos refuerzan la media docena de demandas federales pendientes en contra de Chiquita, que la empresa fue cómplice, y por lo tanto responsable de las atrocidades cometidas por las Auc en Urabá. Uno sólo puede esperar que revelando la información obtenida y publicada por el National Security Archive se dará lugar a una mayor responsabilidad por las acciones criminales de Chiquita en Colombia, ya que con el acuerdo de la empresa con el Departamento de Justicia, este se ha negado a procesar a los ejecutivos de Chiquita por su mal accionar”.

“La publicación de estos documentos es sólo el comienzo”, agregó Evans. “Las miles de páginas de registros financieros y jurídicos incluidos en esta colección son las semillas de futuros proyectos de investigación para los que estén dispuestos a reconstruir la compleja red de legales, pseudo-legales, y las entidades ilegales que participaron en operaciones de seguridad de Chiquita, incluyendo oficiales militares, la guerrilla, los paramilitares, empresarios prominentes, las asociaciones comerciales y las milicias Convivir”.

* Michael Evans es director del Proyecto Documental de Colombia del National Security Archive.

Última actualización el Viernes, 08 de Abril de 2011 06:00

TOP-SECRET: The Chiquita Papers-Banana Giant’s Paramilitary Payoffs Detailed in Trove of Declassified Legal, Financial Documents

March 2000 notes of Chiquita Senior Counsel Robert Thomas indicate awareness that payments were for security services.

Banana Giant’s Paramilitary Payoffs Detailed in Trove of Declassified Legal, Financial Documents

Evidence of Quid Pro Quo with Guerrilla, Paramilitary Groups Contradicts 2007 Plea Deal

Colombian Military Officials Encouraged, Facilitated Company’s Payments to Death Squads

More than 5,500 Pages of Chiquita Records Published Online by National Security Archive

Bogotá, Colombia, April 7, 2011 – Confidential internal memos from Chiquita Brands International reveal that the banana giant benefited from its payments to Colombian paramilitary and guerrilla groups, contradicting the company’s 2007 plea agreement with U.S. prosecutors, which claimed that the company had never received “any actual security services or actual security equipment in exchange for the payments.” Chiquita had characterized the payments as “extortion.”

These documents are among thousands that Chiquita turned over to the U.S. Justice Department as part of a sentencing deal in which the company admitted to years of illegal payments to the paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)–a State Department-designated foreign terrorist organization–and agreed to pay a $25 million fine. The Archive has obtained more than 5,500 pages of Chiquita’s internal documents from the Justice Department under the Freedom of Information Act and is publishing the entire set online today. Key documents from the Chiquita Papers are included in the recently-published document collection, Colombia and the United States: Political Violence, Narcotics, and Human Rights, 1948-2010, now available as part of the Digital National Security Archive from ProQuest.

The documents provide evidence of mutually-beneficial “transactions” between Chiquita’s Colombian subsidiaries and several illegal armed groups in Colombia and shed light on more than a decade of security-related payments to guerrillas, paramilitaries, Colombian security forces, and government-sponsored Convivir militia groups. The collection also details the company’s efforts to conceal the so-called “sensitive payments” in the expense accounts of company managers and through other accounting tricks. The Justice Department investigation concluded that many of Chiquita’s payments to the AUC (also referred to as “Autodefensas” in many of the documents) were made through legal Convivir organizations ostensibly overseen by the Colombian army.

New evidence indicating that Chiquita benefited from the illicit payments may increase the company’s exposure to lawsuits representing victims of Colombia’s illegal armed groups. The collection is the result of an Archive collaboration with George Washington University Law School’s International Human Rights and Public Justice Advocacy Clinics and has been used in support of a civil suit brought against Chiquita led by Earth Rights International on behalf of hundreds of Colombian victims of paramilitary violence.

“These extraordinary records are the most detailed account to date of the true cost of doing business in Colombia,” said Michael Evans, director of the National Security Archive’s Colombia documentation project. “Chiquita’s apparent quid pro quo with guerrillas and paramilitaries responsible for countless killings belies the company’s 2007 plea deal with the Justice Department. What we still don’t know is why U.S. prosecutors overlooked what appears to be clear evidence that Chiquita benefited from these transactions.”

The company’s effort to conceal indications that it benefited from the payments is evident in a pair of legal memos from January 1994. The first of these indicates that leftist guerrillas provided security at some of Chiquita’s plantations. The general manager of Chiquita operations in Turbó told company attorneys that guerrillas were “used to supply security personnel at the various farms.” A handwritten annotation on a subsequent draft of the document asks, “Why is this relevant?” and, “Why is this being written?” Throughout the document, lawyers have crossed out the word “transactions”–suggestive of a quid pro quo arrangement–and replaced it with the more neutral term “payments.” Company accountants characterized the expenditures as “guerrilla extortion payments” but recorded them in the books as “citizen security,” according to these memos. (Note 1)

Another document shows that Chiquita also paid right-wing paramilitary forces for security services–including intelligence on guerrilla operations–after the AUC wrested control of the region from guerrillas in the mid-1990s. The March 2000 memo, written by Chiquita Senior Counsel Robert Thomas and based on a convesation with managers from Chiquita’s wholly-owned subsidiary, Banadex, indicate that Santa Marta-based paramilitaries formed a front company, Inversiones Manglar, to disguise “the real purpose of providing security.” (Note 2)

Ostensibly an agricultural export business, Inversiones Manglar actually produced “info on guerrilla movements,” according to the memo. Banadex officials told Thomas that “all other banana companies are contributing in Santa Marta” and that Chiquita “should continue making the payments” as they “can’t get the same level of support from the military.”

The Chiquita Papers also highlight the role of the Colombian military in pressuring the company to finance the AUC through the Convivir groups and in facilitating the illegal payments.

One indication of this is found in another document written by Thomas in September 2000 describing the 1997 meeting where notorious AUC leader Carlos Castaño first suggested to Banadex managers that they support a newly-established Convivir called La Tagua del Darien. According to the memo, the Banadex officials said that they had “no choice but to attend the meeting” as “refusing to meet would antagonize the Colombia military, local and state govenment officials, and Autodefensas.” (Note 3)

Among the officials most supportive of the Convivir groups during this time was Álvaro Uribe, then the governor of Antioquia, the hub of Chiquita’s operations in Colombia. Thomas’ September 2000 memo notes that, “It was well-known at the time that senior officers of the Colombian military and the Governor of the Department of Antioquia were campaigning for the establishment of a Convivir organization in Uraba.” A 1995 memo indicates that both Uribe and another politician, Alfonso Nuñez, received substantial donations from another of Chiquita’s Colombian subsidiaries, Compañía Frutera de Sevilla. Uribe was president of Colombia from 2002-2010.

Later that year, an August 1997 legal memo written on Chiquita letterhead says that the company was “member[s] of an organization called CONVIVIR Puntepiedra, S.A.,” which the author characterizes as “a legal entity in which we participate with other banana exporting companies in the Turbó region.” The memo says that the “sole function” of the the Convivir was “to provide information on guerrilla movements.”

The company had been making sensitive security payments for years–first in the form of direct payoffs to military officers and guerrilla groups, then through local trade organizations and the Convivir militias. For 1991, some $15,000 worth of “sensitive payments” to various units of the Colombian military are listed alongside a more than $31,000 disbursement to “Guerrilla.” A different version of the same document omits the names of the payment recipients but includes a handwritten annotation next to the “Guerrilla” entry that says, “Extortion Payment.” Another annotation reads, “Mainly not illegal payments — these are legal — pay gasoline, army, police, politicians — payment doesn’t provide anything or benefits.” [Emphasis added.]

Accounting records from 1997-1998 also point to the role of Colombian security forces in encouraging the company’s illegal paramilitary payments. Beginning in the second quarter of 1997 and continuing through the second quarter of 1998, sensitive payment schedules for Banadex record large payments to “Convivir” as “Donation to citizen reconaissance group made at request of Army.” Similar records from 2002 and 2003 list Convivir payments alongside disbursements to “Military and Police Officials” for “Facilitating payments for security services.”

Another handwritten document from 1999 reveals an apparent effort by a Colombian Army general to establish himself as an intermediary for the paramilitary payments. The document (transcribed here) describes a “General in the zone for several years” who had been accused of being “with [a] death squad” by the mayor of San José de Apartadó (Note 4) and had been “suspended from the Army.” The document notes that the general had “helped us personally” with “Security” and “information that prevented kidnaps.” The notes make oblique reference to a $9,000 payment, adding that “Other companies are putting in their…”

“The Chiquita Papers reinforce the idea that, by 1997, the AUC ran the show in the banana-growing regions of northern Colombia, and that local government officials, military officers, and business leaders supported their paramilitary operations,” said Evans.

“These troublesome revelations are more than academic,” said Professor Arturo Carrillo, Director of GW’s International Human Rights Clinic. “They reinforce the claim, advanced in half a dozen federal lawsuits currently pending against Chiquita, that the company was knowingly complicit in, and thus liable for, the atrocities committed by the AUC in Urabá while on the Chiquita payroll. One can only hope that the revealing information obtained and published by the National Security Archive will lead to greater accountability for Chiquita’s criminal actions in Colombia, since the company’s plea agreement with the Justice Department, which has refused to prosecute Chiquita executives for wrongdoing, amounts to little more than a slap on the corporate wrist.”

“The publication of these documents is just the beginning,” added Evans. “The thousands of pages of financial and legal records included in this collection are the seeds of future research projects for investigators prepared to deconstruct the complex web of legal, psuedo-legal, and illegal entities involved in Chiquita’s security operations, including military officers, guerrillas, paramilitary thugs, prominent businessmen, trade associations, and Convivir militias.”


The Chiquita Papers – A Selected Chronology

The following is a chronological list of some of the most interesting documents in the Chiquita Papers as selected by the National Security Archive.

1990 April 19First of many Chiquita memos on the subject of “Accounting for Sensitive Payments.”

1992 February 21 – Lists “Sensitive Payments” for Chiquita subsidiary Compañía Frutera de Sevilla in 1991, including disbursements to the Naval Station, Operative Command, the Army in Turbó, and the Guerrilla. Purpose for all: “Expedite Turbo operation.” [See annotated version.]

1992 May 8 – Chiquita legal memo on whether support for Colombian military counterinsurgency operations through a “trade association of banana exporters” known as Fundiban is a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).

1992 February 21 – Some $15,000 worth of “sensitive payments” to various units of the Colombian military are listed alongside a more than $31,000 disbursement to “Guerrilla.” A different version of the same document omits the names of the payment recipients but includes a handwritten annotation next to the “Guerrilla” entry that says, “Extortion Payment.” Another annotation reads, “Mainly not illegal payments — these are legal — pay gasoline, army, police, politicians — payment doesn’t provide anything or benefits.” [Emphasis added.]

1992 September 20 – Transcription of voicemail left for Chiquita’s general counsel from contact in Medellín, Colombia.

1993 August 10A handwritten note based on discussion with Chiquita in-house counsel notes indicates that company has begun to channel its security payments to the Colombian Army through a “banana association” in Turbó known as “Agura” at a price of three cents per box of bananas shipped.

1994 January 4Draft legal memo describes reporting of transactions in Turbó and Santa Marta for “security purposes and payments to the respective trade association.” The outlays are described as “guerrilla extortion payments” made through “our intermediary or Security Consultant, Rene Osorio,” who is said to be the company’s “contact with the various guerrilla groups in both Divisions.” The guerrilla payments are called “citizen security” and are “expensed via the Manager’s Expense Account.” The author of the memo was told by the General Manager in Turbó “that the Guerrilla Groups are used to supply security personnel at the various farms.”

1994 January 5 – Second draft of January 4, 1994, memo includes annotations asking, “Why is this relevant?” and, “Why is this being written?”

1994 June 10 – Memo from Chiquita counsel (Medellín) to Chiquita in-house counsel discusses Colombian legal standards in cases of kidnapping and exotortion; notes that Constitutional Court decision that “when a person acts under one of the justified circumstances” they act in a “State of Necessity” and “cannot be penalized.”

1995 February 20Chiquita memo describes payments to Álvaro Uribe ($5935 on Oct. 24, 1994) and Alfonso Nuñez ($2000 on Oct. 30, 1994), both candidates for governor of Antioquia.

1997 February 3 – Memo from local outside counsel (Medellín) to Chiquita in-house counsel discusses application of Colombian law in cases of extortion and finds that “when one acts in a state of necessity, no punishment will be applied.” … “In other words, a person who pays for extortion is a victim, not an accomplice to the crime, and therefore cannot be punished.”

1997 May 7 – Handwritten notes: “Spent approx $575,000 over last 4 years on security payments = Guerrilla payments”; “$222,000 in 1996 — $21,763 Convivir – Rest guerrillas”; “Budget for 1997 — $80,000 Guerrillas — $120,000 Convivir”; “[Deleted] indicates Convivirs legal”; “Not FCPA issue”

“Cost of doing business in Colombia – Maybe the question is not why are we doing this but rather we are in Colombia and do we want to ship bananas from Colombia.”
“Need to keep this very confidential – People can get killed.”

1997-1998 – Sensitive payment schedules for Banadex record large payments to “Convivir” as “Donation to citizen reconaissance group made at request of Army.”

1997 August ca. – In-house attorney handwritten notes regarding “Convivir”:
“CONVIVIR PUNTE PIEDRA, S.A.”
“(We have our own)”
“Organismo Juridico … Participamos con las otras bananeras. (We were last to participate)”
“We pay [cents]0.03/box. Wk 18/1997 – Wk 17/199[8?]”
“Under military supervision. Proporcionan información and some are armed (but they’re not paramilitary groups?). Radios, motorcycles”
Legalmente operan en Colombia
“Negotiate through a lawyer. We are not shareholders. We don’t know who the owners are. Pushed by the gov’t locally and the military.”

1997 August 29 – Memo written Chiquita in-house counsel says, “we currently are members of an organization called CONVIVIR Puntepiedra, S.A., a legal entity in which we participate with other banana exporting companies in the Turbo region. Banadex currently pays $0.03 per box to this CONVIVIR.” Memo also says that the Convivir “operate under military supervision (and have offices at the military bases)” and that “their sole function is to provide information on guerrilla movements.”

1997 September 9Memo from local outside counsel (Baker & McKenzie) regarding “Payments to guerrilla groups” in response to Chiquita query regarding legal consequences of such payments “in case of extortion or kidnapping.” Baker memo highlights Colombian Constitutional Court challenge to 1993 law that made it a crime for foreign companies to pay extortion/ransom and that “necessity” is a condition under which such payments are permitted. However, the memo also says that “he who obtains personal benefit from a state of necessity … incurs in a criminal action.”

1999 July 6In-house counsel notes discuss former Colombian “general” forced out of military for supposed association with “death squads.” Notes indicate that the officer “helped us personally” with “security” and “information that prevented kidnaps.” Notes also say that “Turbo improved while he was there.” Note also refers obliquely to $9,000 payment.

2000 March 6Chiquita in-house counsel handwritten notes about front company set up by paramilitaries in Santa Marta to collect security payments from Banadex.
“disguised the real purpose of providing security”
“don’t know who the shareholders are”
“Same people who formed Convivir formed this new company; govt won’t permit another Convivir; too much political pressure re: para-military”
“Don’t know whether the gov’t is aware what this organization does.”
“Military in Santa Marta may know what this company does. Military won’t acknowledge formally that they know what the corporation does.”
“Note: In Turbo we issue a check to Convivir [or/of] another code name and deliver it to a variety of intermediaries for transfer to Convivir.”
“Tagua del Darien is name of cooperative formed as part of Convivir movement.”
“Santa Marta  3[cents]/box; first payment in October 1999. Money for info on guerrilla movements; info not given to gov’t military.”
“Checks made out to Inversiones Manglar SA à Asociacion Para la Paz Del Magdalena.”
“Natural persons w/ no affiliation to military formed Inversions Manglar S.A.”
“[Deleted] says we should continue making the payments; can’t get the same level of support from the military.”

2000 September ca.Draft memo details initial meetings between paramilitaries and Banadex officials.

2001 May 7 – Outside local counsel (Posse, Herrera & Ruiz) provides legal analysis of Convivir organizations: “We should underline that the legality of payments, is subject to the due observance of the requisites described above. In addition the actual use … of contributed funds should be borne in mind. If funds are used for the conduction of activities that comply with legal requirements, legality of such payments will be preserved. However, if funds are used in connection of activities beyond the scope authorized … including the conductions of activities that are contrary to law, the actual (or even constructive) knowledge of such activities by the contributing party may taint such payments as illegal and even result in criminal prosecution.”

2003 ca.PowerPoint presentation on options for how to conceal improper payments.

2004 January 28 – Chiquita turns over attorney-client privileged documents to Dept. of Justice. Memo from counsel Kirkland & Ellis describes scope and limitations of the documents provided.

2007 March 13 – The U.S. Department of Justice reaches a plea deal with Chiquita for making payments to the AUC, a designated foreign terrorist organization.


Notes

1. A 1997 legal memo drawn up by Chiquita’s U.S. counsel specifically warned that an extortion defense would not apply in situations where the company actually benefited from the payments. Another legal memo from the company’s attorneys in Colombia cautioned that payments to ostensibly legal Convivir militias could be considered illegal if there were actual or constructive knowledge that they were connected to illegal activities.

2. Although Thomas’ name does not appear in any of these records, his authorship has been confirmend by comparing the documents to the report of the Special Litigation Committee (SLC) established by Chiquita’s Board of Directors that issued its final report in 2009.

3. Although the identity of the paramilitary leader who first approached the Banadex officials is not revealed in the redacted document, both the SLC report and the sentencing agreement confirm that it was Castaño who was at the meeting and who personally requested that the company support the La Tagua group.

4. The “Peace Community” of San José de Apartadó is one of several Colombia towns that during this time had taken a neutral position in the country’s civil conflict.

TOP-SECRET: CIA SUED FOR ‘HOLDING HISTORY HOSTAGE’ ON BAY OF PIGS INVASION

The Houston, a supply ship for the CIA’s invasion force, was sunk by Cuban T-33s on the morning of April 17, 1961 (CIA photo)

Washington, D.C., April 14, 2011 – Fifty years after the failed CIA-led assault on Cuba, the National Security Archive today filed a FOIA lawsuit to compel the Agency to release its “Official History of the Bay of Pigs Invasion.” The suit charges that the CIA has “wrongfully withheld” the multi-volume study, which the Archive requested under the FOIA in 2005.  As the “official history,” the court filing noted, the document “is, by definition, the most important and substantive CIA-produced study of this episode.”

The Top Secret report, researched and written by CIA historian Jack Pfeiffer, is based on dozens of interviews with key operatives and officials and a review of hundreds of CIA documents and was compiled over the course of nine years that Pfeiffer served as the CIA’s in-house historian. Pfeiffer’s internal study is divided into five volumes: I, Air Operations; II, Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy; III, Evolution of CIA’s Anti-Castro Policies, 1951-January 1961; IV, The Taylor Committee Report; and V, Internal Investigation Report.  (In 1998 the CIA released Vol. III under the Kennedy Assassination Records Act.)

In 1987, Pfeiffer himself filed a FOIA lawsuit seeking the release of Vol 5; the CIA successfully convinced the court that it could not be declassified.

“The CIA is holding history hostage,” according to Peter Kornbluh, who directs the Archive’s Cuba Documentation Project. Kornbluh called on the CIA to release the report under President Obama’s Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information which states that “no information may remain classified indefinitely.” He noted that “fifty years after the invasion, it is well past time for the official history to be declassified and studied for the lessons it contains for the future of U.S.-Cuban relations.”

In 1998, the Archive’s Cuba project successfully obtained the declassification of the CIA’s internal investigation into the failure of the invasion, the “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation,” written in 1961 by the Agency’s Inspector General, Lyman Kirkpatrick. The report provided a scathing critique of the CIA misconduct and ineptitude in conducting a massive paramilitary operation that went “beyond the area of Agency responsibility as well as Agency capability.”

To commemorate the 50th anniversary of the invasion, which began with a preliminary airstrike on April 15, 1961, the Archive re-posted a collection of the major reports and documents that address the Bay of Pigs, among them the Inspector General’s report, and Vol. III of the Pfeiffer report which was originally discovered and posted by Villanova professor David Barrett in 2005.

The Archive also posted the only existing interview with the two managers of the Bay of Pigs invasion, Jacob Esterline and Col. Jack Hawkins, that Peter Kornbluh conducted in 1996. The interview was published in Kornbluh’s book, Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba.

In March of 2001, the National Security Archive organized a 40th anniversary conference in Havana, Cuba on the Bahia de Cochinos. The conference brought together retired CIA officers, Kennedy White House officials, and members of the exile brigade with Fidel Castro and his military commanders to discuss this history. Other documents and revelations generated by the conference can be accessed here.


Read the Documents

LawsuitOn April 14, 2011, the National Security Archive filed a lawsuit against the CIA under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to secure the declassification of several volumes of an Official history of the Bay of Pigs Operation compiled between 1974 and 1983. Nearly a decade after the failed invasion, on August 8, 1973, CIA Director William Colby tasked the Agency’s History Staff to “develop accurate accounts of certain of CIA’s past activities in terms suitable for inclusion in Government-wide historical and declassification programs, while protecting intelligence sources and methods.” Historian Jack Pfeiffer assumed responsibility for this history, which was written over the course of 9 years and is divided into 5 volumes; it is based on dozens of interviews with key operatives and officials and hundreds of CIA documents. Volume III of the Pfeiffer report was declassified by the CIA in 1998, and the rest of the report is now the last major internal study that remains secret, fifty years after the Bay of Pigs.

Document 1 – CIA, “Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Volume III: Evolution of CIA’s Anti-Castro Policies, 1951- January 1961”

Jack Pfeiffer, the chief historian at the CIA, researched and wrote a comprehensive history of the Bay of Pigs operation between 1974 and 1983.  The CIA declassified only Volume III of the five-volume history in 1998, under the Kennedy Assassination Records Act. This three-hundred page report was discovered in the National Archives by Villanova professor of political science David Barrett in 2005, and first posted on his university’s website. Volume III focuses on the last two years of the Eisenhower administration and the transition to the Kennedy presidency. It is newsworthy for clarifying the role of Vice-President Richard Nixon, who, the report reveals, intervened in the planning of the invasion on behalf of a wealthy donor.

This volume also contains the extraordinary revelation that CIA task force in charge of the invasion did not believe it could succeed. On page 149, Pfeiffer quotes minutes of the Task Force meeting held on November 15, 1960, to prepare a briefing for the new President-elect, John F. Kennedy: “Our original concept is now seen to be unachievable in the face of the controls Castro has instituted,” the document states. “Our second concept (1,500-3000 man force to secure a beach with airstrip) is also now seen to be unachievable, except as a joint Agency/DOD action.”

This candid assessment was not shared with the President-elect then, nor later after the inauguration. As Pfeiffer points out, “what was being denied in confidence in mid-November 1960 became the fact of the Zapata Plan and the Bay of Pigs Operation in March 1961”—run only by the CIA, and with a force of 1,200 men.

Document 2 – CIA, October 1961, “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation and Associated Documents”

This internal analysis of the CIA’s Bay of Pigs operation, written by CIA Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick after a six month investigation, is highly critical of the top CIA officials who conceived and ran the operation, and places blame for the embarrassing failure squarely on the CIA itself. The report cites bad planning, inadequate intelligence, poor staffing, and misleading of White House officials including the President, as key reasons for the failure of the operation.  “Plausible denial was a pathetic illusion,” the report concluded. “The Agency failed to recognize that when the project advanced beyond the stage of plausible denial it was going beyond the area of Agency responsibility as well as Agency capability.” The declassified report also contains a rebuttal to Kirkpatrick from the office of deputy director Richard Bissell, challenging those conclusions.  Volume V of the Pfeiffer report, titled “Internal Investigation Report,” which remains classified, also critiques Kirkpatrick’s conclusions.

Document 3 – DOD,  5/5/1961, “Record of Paramilitary Action Against the Castro Government of Cuba, 17 March 1960- May 1961”

This May 5, 1961 report was written by Colonel Jack Hawkins, the paramilitary chief of the Bay of Pigs operation. His 48-page report cites poor CIA organization, and “political considerations” imposed by the Kennedy administration, such as the decision to cancel D-day airstrikes which “doomed the operation,” as key elements of its failure. “Paramilitary operations cannot be effectively conducted on a ration-card basis,” the report concludes. “The Government and the people of the United States are not yet psychologically conditioned to participate in the cold war with resort to the harsh, rigorous, and often dangerous and painful measures which must be taken in order to win.” Hawkins also recommended that further covert operations to depose Castro, unless accompanied by a military invasion, “should not be made.” Castro, according to the report, could “not be overthrown by means short of overt application” of U.S. force.

Document 4 – CIA, 3/9/1960, “First Meeting of Branch 4 Task Force, 9 March 1960”

This is a memorandum of conversation of the first CIA Task Force meeting to plan what became the Bay of Pigs, a covert operation to recruit, train, and infiltrate paramilitary units into Cuba to overthrow Fidel Castro. The meeting is noteworthy because the chief of the Western Hemisphere division, J.C. King states that “unless Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara could be eliminated in one package—which is highly unlikely—this operation can be a long, drawn out affair and the present government will only be overthrown by the use of force.”

Document 5 – CIA, 3/16/1960, “A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime”

This memorandum outlines the original plans for what became the Bay of Pigs. It was presented to and authorized by President Eisenhower on March 17, 1960. Components of the plan include the creation of a unified Cuban opposition, development of broadcasting facilities, and the training of paramilitary forces.  The purpose of the operations, according to the proposal, is to “bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention.” The original proposed budget is $4.4 million; by the time of the invasion the budget has risen to $45 million.

Document 6 – NSC, 3/11/1961, “Memorandum of Discussion on Cuba, March 11, 1961”

This top secret memorandum of conversation from a meeting of the National Security Council describes continued planning of paramilitary operations in Cuba. President Kennedy says he plans to authorize an operation in which “patriotic Cubans return to their homeland.”

Document 7 – White House, 3/2/1963, [Audio conversation between President John F. Kennedy and Attorney General Robert Kennedy]

[Part 1 – mp3] [Part 2 – mp3]

In this telephone conversation between President Kennedy and his brother Attorney General Robert Kennedy, they discuss concerns that a Senate investigating committee might reveal that the President had authorized jets from the US aircraft carrier Essex to provide one hour of air coverage, to create a no-fly zone for Bay of Pigs B-26 bombers the morning of April 19. Due to a timing mistake, the jets never met up with the bombers; 2 bombers were shot down, leading to the deaths of 4 Americans.

Document 8 – White House, “Memorandum for the President: Conversation with Commandante Ernesto Guevara of Cuba,” August 22, 1961.

In this memorandum of conversation, aide Richard Goodwin recounts for President Kennedy his conversation with Ernesto “Che” Guevara, who seeks to establish a “modus vivendi” with the U.S. government. This document is noteworth for the Bay of Pigs because Guevara “wanted to thank us very much for the invasion- that it had been a great political victory for them- enabled them to consolidate- and transformed them from an aggrieved little country to an equal.”

InterviewIn October 1996, the National Security Archive’s Cuba Documentation project arranged for the two chief managers of the Bay of Pigs operation, Jacob Esterline and Colonel Jack Hawkins, to meet in a Washington DC hotel for a lengthy filmed interview on the invasion. The meeting marked the first time they had seen each other since the weekend of April 17-19, 1961, and the first time they had together recalled the events surrounding the failed invasion. This interview was conducted by the Archive’s Peter Kornbluh and is excerpted in his book, Bay of Pigs Declassified (New York: The New Press, 1998).

CONFIDENTIAL: EXTENDED NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS OVER HIGH SEAS

P R 281848Z DEC 66
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USCINCSO
CINCLANT
AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
STATE GRNC
UNCLASSIFIED BUENOS AIRES 2481 

Original Telegram was Confidential but has since been
de-classified 

--------------------------------------------- ----
Copy from the National Archives
RG 59: General Records of the Department of state
1964-66 Central Foreign Policy File
File: POL 33-4 ARG
--------------------------------------------- ---- 

E.O. 12958: DECL: DECLASSIFIED BY NARA 09/02/2009
TAGS: EFIS PBTS AR
SUBJECT:  EXTENDED NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS OVER HIGH SEAS 

REF: STATE 106206 CIRCULAR; STATE CA-3400 NOV 2, 1966 

1.  PRESS REPORTS AND VARIETY EMBASSY SOURCES CONFIRM
NEW ARGENTINE LEGISLATION UNILATERALLY CHANGING SEAS JURIS-
DICTION NOW UNDER ADVANCED REVIEW.  REPORTEDLY LAW WOULD
ESTABLISH SIX MILE TERRITORIAL SEA, PLUS ANOTHER SIX MILES
OF EXCLUSIVE FISHING JURISDICTION, PLUS ANOTHER EXTENDED ZONE
OF "PREFERENTIAL JURISDICTION" FOR FISHING PURPOSES.  DRAFT-
LAW UNDER CONSIDERATION IN ARGENTINE SENATE BEFORE JUNE 28
COUP WOULD HAVE DEFINED ZONE OF PREFERENTIAL JURISDICTION
AS "EPICONTINENTAL SEA OUT TO 200 METER ISOBAR".  IN SOUTHERN
ARGENTINA THIS ZONE SEVERAL HUNDRED MILES WIDE AND BLANKETS
FALKLAND ISLANDS. 

2.  NAVATT STATES ARGENTINE NAVY THINKING OF PREFERENTIAL
JURISDICTION OUT TO 200 MILES (AS IN PERU, ECUADOR, CHILE)
RATHER THAN EPICONTINENTAL SEA.  200 MILE LIMIT DOES NOT
RPT NOT REACH FALKLANDS.  ARGENTINE NAVY OFF TOLD NAVATT
"200 MILE LIMIT SOON WILL BE STANDARD THROUGH HEMISPHERE". 

3.  FONOFF OFFICIALS REFERRING TO RECENT BRAZILIAN AND US
LEGISLATION HAVE INFORMALLY INDICATED DECISION ALREADY
FINAL RE SIX MILE TERRITORIAL SEA PLUS SIX MILE EXCLUSIVE
FISHING JURISDICTION, BUT THAT "PREFERENTIAL JURISDICTION"
STILL UNDER STUDY.  TWO FONOFF MEN VOLUNTARILY AND INFORMALLY
SOUGHT EMBASSY REACTION TO POSSIBLE EXTENDED PREFERENTIAL
JURISDICTION BY SUGGESTING THAT US IN FACT HAS ACCEPTED
UNILATERALLY CREATED ECUADORIAN, PERUVIAN AND CHILEAN 200 MILE
LIMITS.  EMBOFF REJECTED IDEA US ACCEPTS THESE LIMITS IN ANY
WAY AND POINTED OUT 1965 AMENDMENTS TO AID LEGISLATION AIMED
AT FURTHER PROTECTING US FISHING RIGHTS. 

4.  FONOFF LEGAL ADVISOR CONCEDES DISTINCTION BETWEEN
"EXCLUSIVE" AND "PREFERENTIAL" FISHING JURISDICTION A SEMANTIC
NICETY.  HE UNDERSTANDS THAT IN ZONE OF "PREFERENTIAL" JURIS-
DICTION ARGENTINA WOULD CLAIM RIGHT TO TAX, LICENSE AND OTHER-
WISE CONTROL ALL ACTIVITIES RELATED TO EXPLOITATION OF
RESOURCES OF SEA. 

5.  DRAFT LEGISLATION ON SEAS JURISDICTION LAY DORMANT UNTIL
SUDDEN AND SUBSTANTIAL IN FISHIN ARGENTINE EPICONTINENTAL SEAS
BY CUBAN AND EAST EUROPEAN (ESPECIALLY SOVIET) VESSELS PAST
SIX MONTHS ALARMED ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES.  (SEE NAVATT IR
5-804-0-140-66 OF NOV 18) NOT RPT NOT ALL SOVIET VESSELS WERE
FISHING OR FACTORY TYPES.  FONOFF SOURCES INFORMALLY STATE
ARMED FORCES PRESSURE MAKES EMISSION NEW LAW IMPERATIVE, QUITE
POSSIBLY APPEARING WITHIN NEXT FEW WEEKS.  WHEN ASKED BY FONOFF
MEN ABOUT "SECURITY PROBLEMS CREATED BY SOVIET TRAWLERS OFF US
COAST", EMBASSY OFF REPLIED US DID NOT RPT NOT SEE THAT
UNILATERAL ATTEMPT TO EXTEND SEAS JURISDICTION OFFERED ANY
REALISTIC SOLUTION FOR POSSIBLE SECURITY PROBLEMS, WHILE SUCH
ACTION COULD CREATE NEW SOURCES POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING AND
CONFLICT. 

6.  RE PAR 3 STATE 106206 BELIEVE OUTLINED PROPOSAL MIGHT
FORESTALL UNILATERAL ARGENTINE ATTEMPT TO SUBSTANTIALLY EXTEND
"PREFERENTIAL" FISHING JURISDICTION ONLY IF EMBASSY CAN BE
AUTHORIZED DISCUSS IDEA WITH ARGENTINES IMMEDIATELY. EVEN THEN
CHANCES SUCCESS LIMITED BY (A) ADVANCED STAGE PROPOSED ARGENTINE
LAW AND (B) PRIMACY SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS ARGENTINE THINKING.
WE WOULD BENEFIT SOME FROM FONOFF LEGAL ADVISORS' QUALMS ABOUT
UNILATERAL ACTION, AND FROM RESTRAINT OF RECENT BRAZILIAN
LEGISLATION WHICH DID NOT RPT NOT GO BEYOND 12-MILE LIMIT. 

7.  FOR DISCUSSION WITH ARGENTINES WOULD MODIFY TEXT IN STATE
10942 CIRCULAR TO:  (A) MAKE ALL REFERENCES TO ARGENTINA, VICE
CANADA; (B) REFER TO PROPOSED ARGENTINE CLAIMS OF PREFERENTIAL
JURISDICTION OVER WATERS WE REGARD AS HIGH SEAS; (C) ELIMINATE
REFERENCES TO "TRADITIONAL DISTANT WATER FISHERIES", SINCE
ARGENTINE COAST NOT RPT NOT TRADITIONAL FISHING ZONE (WHEREAS
NO. 3);  (D) ADD NOTATION THERE NO TRADITIONAL FISHING AND
CONFINE OPERATIVE AGREEMENT TO PROVISIONS FOR NON-TRADITIONAL
FISHING; (E) ELIMINATE LAST THREE PARS OF AIDE-MEMOIRE HANDED
TO CANADIAN AMB. 

8.  IF AUTHORIZED, ENVISAGE TWO-STEP APPROACH TO FONOFF.
FIRST, INFORMAL AND ORAL, STRESSING OUR INTEREST IN FREEDOM OF
HIGH SEAS, NOTING EARLIER FONOFF CONFIRMATION NEW LAW UNDER
STUDY, OUTLINING OUR PROPOSAL IN GENERAL TERMS.  ON BASIS
FONOFF REACTION, WE WOULD THEN COUCH AIDE-MEMOIRE IN TERMS
WHICH WOULD APPEAR MOST LIKELY TO SUCCEED. 

GP-3
SACCIO

TOP-SECRERT: 1989 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT FOR THE UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 03111 

S/CT FOR WHARTON 

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PTER UK
SUBJECT:  1989 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT FOR THE UK 

REF:  STATE 363024 

MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN IN 1989
--------------------------------------------- ----
1.  THROUGHOUT 1989, AS IN PREVIOUS YEARS, THE MOST
SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST THREAT TO THE UK AND UK INTERESTS
WERE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE OUTLAWED PROVISIONAL IRISH
REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, THE
ACTIVITIES OF OUTLAWED PROTESTANT TERRORIST GROUPS IN
NORTHERN IRELAND.  THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND
CAUSED THE DEATHS OF 62 PEOPLE  IN 1989, INCLUDING 14
MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY FORCES AND 9 POLICEMEN KILLED IN
TERRORIST ATTACKS.  PIRA TERRORIST ATTACKS ON TARGETS IN
BRITAIN AND IN MAINLAND EUROPE RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF
AN ADDITIONAL FIFTEEN UK ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL OR THEIR
FAMILY MEMBERS IN 1989. 

2.  HMG CONTINUED IN 1989 TO DEMAND INFORMATION FROM
LIBYA ABOUT ITS SUPPORT FOR THE PIRA, INCLUDING
DELIVERIES OVER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL YEARS OF EXPLOSIVES,
ARMAMENTS, AND AMMUNITION IN LARGE QUANTITIES.  DESPITE
CONTINUING OCCASIONAL CAPTURES OF PIRA ARMS AND SUPPLIES
IN 1989, THE PIRA WAS BELIEVED STILL TO HAVE ENOUGH
LIBYAN-SUPPLIED ARMS TO SUSTAIN ITS DESTRUCTIVE
TERRORIST CAMPAIGN FOR AT LEAST A DECADE. 

3.  THE FATWA -- OR DEATH EDICT -- OF IRAN'S AYATOLLAH
KHOMEINI AGAINST THE BRITISH AUTHOR SALMAN RUSHDIE ON 14
FEBRUARY 1989 LED TO WIDESPREAD PUBLIC DISTURBANCES
AMONG ISLAMIC COMMUNITIES IN BRITAIN AND ABROAD.  THERE
WERE SEVERAL INSTANCES OF BOMBINGS OF BOOKSTORES SELLING
RUSHDIE'S BOOK "SATANIC VERSES."  THREATS AGAINST
PUBLISHERS AND MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES REQUIRED POLICE
PROTECTION.  UK AUTHORITIES ARRESTED AND DEPORTED 23
IRANIANS ON NATIONAL SECURITY GROUNDS IN 1989. 

4.  BRITISH POLICE PROVIDED ROUND-THE-CLOCK PROTECTION
FOR SALMAN RUSHDIE THROUGHOUT THE REST OF 1989 TO
PREVENT HIS MURDER BY MUSLIM FANATICS WHO MIGHT SEEK TO
CARRY OUT THE "SENTENCE OF DEATH" AGAINST THE AUTHOR.
HMG OFFICIALS REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS
TO IRANIAN AUTHORITIES THAT THE UK HELD IRAN DIRECTLY
RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY ACTION TAKEN AGAINST BRITISH OR
OTHER NATIONALS AS A RESULT OF THE FATWA. 

5.  UK AUTHORITIES CONTINUED IN 1989 TO INVESTIGATE THE
BOMBING OF PAN AMERICAN FLIGHT 103 OVER LOCKERBIE,
SCOTLAND IN DECEMBER 1988.  THE INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN
EXTREMELY FAR-REACHING AND COSTLY BUT HAS RESULTED IN
CONSIDERABLE NEW INFORMATION ABOUT THE NATURE OF
TERRORIST ATTACKS ON COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT AND IN
SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN AVIATION SECURITY SYSTEMS
AND PROCEDURES.  UK INVESTIGATORS HAVE WORKED CLOSELY ON
THE CASE WITH CRIMINAL SPECIALISTS AND FORENSIC
SCIENTISTS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE FRG, AND OTHER
CONCERNED COUNTRIES.  BRITAIN SHARES A POSITION OF
LEADERSHIP IN THE WORLD-WIDE EFFORT TO CONCLUDE NEW
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON AVIATION SECURITY, CONTROL
OF EXPLOSIVES, AND THE SHARING OF INFORMATION AND
TECHNOLOGY TO COMBAT TERRORIST THREATS TO CIVIL AVIATION. 

6.  THE UK PROVIDES TRAINING, ADVICE, AND MATERIAL
ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES TO ASSIST THEIR OWN
EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORIST THREATS. 

7.  THE UK IS ACTIVE IN THE UN, THE EC, AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL FORA IN EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM AND
PROVIDES SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN EFFORTS
TO ISOLATE AND PENALIZE COUNTRIES WHICH SUPPORT TERRORISM. 

RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
-------------------------------
8.  UK COURTS IN BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND CONTINUED
IN 1989 TO PROSECUTE CASES AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE PIRA
AND OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN THE
DISTURBANCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND. 

9.  BECAUSE OF THE SIGNIFICANT THREAT OF PIRA TERRORIST
ATTACKS IN THE UK, BRITAIN CONTINUED IN 1989 TO EXERCISE
THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF LAW CONTAINED IN THE 1984
PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT.  THE ACT, AMONG ITS OTHER
ELEMENTS, ENABLES SPECIAL COURTS TO OPERATE IN NORTHERN
IRELAND DESPITE THE PERSISTENT THREAT OF PIRA TERRORISM
AGAINST JUDGES AND JURIES. 

10.  THERE ARE OUTSTANDING UK ARREST WARRANTS AGAINST
PIRA TERRORISTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND SEVERAL
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.  UK AUTHORITIES CONTINUED IN 1989 TO
COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH OFFICIALS IN IRELAND, BELGIUM,
THE NETHERLANDS, THE FRG, FRANCE, AND OTHER COUNTRIES
DEALING WITH INCIDENTS OF PIRA TERRORISM AND ATTEMPTING
TO ARRANGE EXTRADITION OF PIRA MEMBERS WANTED FOR
TERRORIST ATTACKS. 

CATTO

Den dunklen Machenschaften der STASI ist am besten mit dem Licht der Öffentlichkeit zu begegnen.“

Liebe Leser,

nachstehend publiziere ich Material, das unserer Redaktion in Bezug auf die STASI-Mörder-Bande von STASI-Opfern zugespielt wurde.

Herzlichst Ihr

Magister Bernd Pulch

Den dunklen Machenschaften der

S t a s i

ist am besten mit dem Licht der

Öffentlichkeit zu begegnen.“

 PRESSE INFO DER OPFER: DAS GIFT DOSSIER VON STASI OBERST EHRENFRIED STELZER ”GoMoPa” ERFINDER

neiber I PRESSE INFO DER OPFER: DAS GIFT DOSSIER VON STASI OBERST EHRENFRIED STELZER ”GoMoPa” ERFINDER

 PRESSE INFO DER OPFER: DAS GIFT DOSSIER VON STASI OBERST EHRENFRIED STELZER ”GoMoPa” ERFINDER

 PRESSE INFO DER OPFER: DAS GIFT DOSSIER VON STASI OBERST EHRENFRIED STELZER ”GoMoPa” ERFINDER

 PRESSE INFO DER OPFER: DAS GIFT DOSSIER VON STASI OBERST EHRENFRIED STELZER ”GoMoPa” ERFINDER

felix toxdat rgb PRESSE INFO DER OPFER: DAS GIFT DOSSIER VON STASI OBERST EHRENFRIED STELZER ”GoMoPa” ERFINDER

. . . . noch mehr Link’s zu diesem Thema

“Mord – eine Arbeitsmethode des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit”

von Prof. Dr. Dieter Voigt

“Anleitung zu Entführung, Mord und Totschlag”

PLAN   “Operativen Maßnahmen zur Liquidierung”

“Operativen Maßnahme zur Liquidierung von Michael Gartenschläger”

“Der Giftschrank der Staatssicherheit”

Viele Unfälle und Erkrankungen von ehemaligen
DDR-Systemkritikern sind noch lange nicht geklärt.

. . Vielen Dank an !   Dr.  B********  Dr.  S******  Dr.  R******

shareplus PRESSE INFO DER OPFER: DAS GIFT DOSSIER VON STASI OBERST EHRENFRIED STELZER ”GoMoPa” ERFINDER

INSIDER: STASI-MORD AN HEINZ GERLACH MIT DIOXIN-GoMoPa “weiss” sofort die Todesursache


110206 16 STASI MORD AN HEINZ GERLACH MIT DIOXIN GoMoPa weiss sofort die Todesursache

Heinz Gerlach

Wir in den Medien:

http://investment-on.com/Investment-Magazin/opfer-ra-resch-unterstuetzt-ex-stasi-hauptmann-und-detektiv-fuchsgruber.html

(Investment Magazin, Investment, Das Investment) DAS ORIGINAL – „Neue Erkenntnisse in der Affäre Resch/GoMoPa-Stasi haben wir recherchiert“, erläutert SJB.-GoMoPa-Sprecher Heinz Friedrich. „Neben dem Stasi-Top-Agenten und früheren Leiter der Kriminologie an der Ost-Berliner Humboldt-Universität, Ehrenfried Stelzer, hat Rechtsanwalt Jochen Resch den sogenannten „Wirtschaftsdetektiv“ Medard Fuchsgruber  als Protege´ gefördert.

01 STASI MORD AN HEINZ GERLACH MIT DIOXIN GoMoPa weiss sofort die TodesursacheRA Jochen Resch

Fuchsgruber spielte eine besonders dubiose Rolle in den letzten Tagen und Wochen vor dem Tode von Heinz Gerlach. Er sollte im Auftrag der von „GoMoPa“ erpressten Kasseler Firma Immovation AG Erkennntnisse über „GoMoPa“ sammeln und diese auch dem „GoMoPa“-Kritiker Heinz Gerlach zur Verfügung stellen. Er hatte jederzeit freien Zugang zu Heinz Gerlach und dessen Privaträumen.

 STASI MORD AN HEINZ GERLACH MIT DIOXIN GoMoPa weiss sofort die Todesursache

8. Juli 2009 … Der Wirtschaftsdetektiv Medard Fuchsgruber soll zum neuen Geschäftsführer des Deutschen Instituts für Anlegerschutz (DIAS) gewählt werden“, meldete http://www.anlegerschutz.tv/

Zwei Tage später starb Heinz Gerlach.

Am 10. Juli 2010 starb Heinz Gerlach angeblich an „Blutvergiftung“. GoMoPa brachte die Meldung nur wenige Stunden nach dem Ableben – mit der Todesursache „Blutvergiftung“ – diese Todesursache kann sehr leicht und sher schnell durch Dioxinvergiftung herbeigeführt werden. Diese „Pressemeldung“ ist inzwischen von der Webseite der „GoMoPa“ verwschwunden.

Aber auch andere Insider, ausser uns  haben sie gesehen:

Siehe hier in der Akte Heinz Gerlach::

„Zum Tode von Heinz Gerlach »
11.07.10 Sondermeldung
HEINZ GERLACH VERSTORBEN
(Eigener Bericht)
Heinz Gerlach ist tot. Am Sonnabend Abend ist der äußerst umstrittene “Anlegerschützer” in Oberursel verstorben. Das vermeldet der Finanzmarketingberater Michael Oehme in einem Rundbrief. Heinz Gerlach wäre am 9. August 65 Jahre alt geworden.
Auf den Internetseiten der Heinz Gerlach Medien eK ist bislang keine Bestätigung für diese Nachricht zu erhalten.
Die Todesumstände sind völlig unklar. Der Finanznachrichtendienst Gomopa spekuliert, Gerlach sei einer Blutvergiftung erlegen.
Bei allen kritikwürdigen Geschäftsmethoden war Heinz Gerlach ein Mensch, der eine Familie hinterlässt. Unser Mitgefühl gilt seinen Angehörigen.
Wie und ob unsere Berichterstattung weitergeht, hängt davon ab, auf welche Weise die Geschäfte des Unternehmens nach Heinz Gerlachs Tod geführt werden.
Bereits vorbereitete Artikel und Enthüllungen werden wir aus Pietät zunächst nicht veröffentlichen.“
http://www.akte-heinz-gerlach.info/11-07-10-sondermeldung-heinz-gerlach-verstorben/ (noch ist der Link verfügbar)
Während selbst die Gerlach-kritische Akte schreibt „die Todeusursache sind noch völlig unklar“, WEISS „GoMoPa“ BEREITS ZU DIESEM ZEITPUNKT; dss die ANGEBLICHE TODESURSACHE EINE BLUTVERGIFTUNG WAR.

Heinz Gerlach 3 STASI MORD AN HEINZ GERLACH MIT DIOXIN GoMoPa weiss sofort die TodesursacheGoMoPa”-”Aushängeschild” Klaus Maurischat alias Siefried Siewert

Von da an nahm die Legende ihren Lauf – über hessische Provinzzeitungen, die keine Quelle angaben.

Wir erinnern uns, das Pseudonym von Klaus Maurischat (dessen Lebenslauf und Identität wohl gefälscht sein dürften), ist Siegfried Siewert. Siegfried Sievert ist ein ehemaliger Stasi-Agent und nunmehr für den DIOXIN-Skandal verantwortlich.

dioxin STASI MORD AN HEINZ GERLACH MIT DIOXIN GoMoPa weiss sofort die Todesursache

Er gab zu im Auftrag der Stasi, BLUTFETT-VERSUCHE vorgenommen zu haben.

“Dieser Kerl panschte Gift-Fett in unser Essen”, titelt die Bild-Zeitung über den Chef des Futtermittelherstellers Harles & Jentzsch aus Uetersen (Kreis Pinneberg). Gemeint ist Siegfried Sievert, 58 Jahre alt.  Wer ist der Mann, der für einen der größten Lebensmittelskandale Deutschlands verantwortlich sein könnte?
Der Unternehmer lebt in einer Villa in Kiebitzreihe (Kreis Steinburg) und ist seit 16 Jahren bei Harles & Jentzsch in leitender Position tätig. Seit 2005 ist er alleinvertretungsberechtigter Geschäftsführer. Als nach dem Dioxinfund klar wurde, dass die verseuchte Mischfettsäure nur für technische Zwecke verwendet werden darf, erklärte Sievert: “Wir waren leichtfertig der irrigen Annahme, dass die Mischfettsäure, die bei der Herstellung von Biodiesel aus Palm-, Soja- und Rapsöl anfällt, für die Futtermittelherstellung geeignet ist.”
Sievert hat sich für Qualitätsstandards stark gemacht
Diese Aussage erstaunt Branchenexperten, die mit Sievert gearbeitet haben. Christof Buchholz ist Geschäftsführer des Deutschen Verbands des Großhandels mit Ölen, Fetten und Ölrohstoffen (Grofor), in dem 120 Unternehmen organisiert sind, darunter auch Harles & Jentzsch. Buchholz sagt: “Ich kenne Herrn Sievert gut. Er hat sich seit Jahren für hohe Qualitätsstandards stark gemacht, insbesondere für das holländische System.” Dabei würden akribisch all jene Gefahren aufgelistet, die eine mechanische oder chemische Verunreinigung verursachen könnten – und Standards für die sichere Produktion von Futtermitteln definiert.
Sievert dürfte demnach ein Experte für eine saubere Futtermittelproduktion sein. Er besuchte auch die jährlichen Grofor-Treffen, bei denen sich Experten aus ganz Europa austauschen. Wie glaubwürdig ist dann seine Aussage, er habe angenommen, die Mischfettsäure verwenden zu dürfen – zumal der niederländische Lieferant Petrotec AG in Verträgen, Lieferscheinen und Rechnungen darauf hingewiesen haben will, dass diese billigere Fettsäure ausschließlich zur technischen Verwendung bestimmt sei?
“Wir können das nicht nachvollziehen”
Christof Buchholz: “Bei uns war die Überraschung groß. Es ist ein No-go für Futtermittelhersteller, technische Mischfettsäuren zu verwenden. Wir können das nicht nachvollziehen.” Er habe deshalb Siegfried Sievert angerufen. “Wir haben ein kurzes Gespräch geführt. Herr Sievert war verzweifelt und erklärte auch mir, dass er dachte, das sei in Ordnung.” Während des Telefonats sei zudem besprochen worden, woher die Dioxine gekommen sein könnten. Christof Buchholz: “Herr Sievert wusste darauf keine Antwort und klagte, dass es so viele Fragezeichen gebe.”
Seine erste Aussage hat er mittlerweile revidiert. Dem niedersächsischen Agrar ministerium teilte Harles & Jentzsch jetzt mit, das dioxinverseuchte Industriefett sei versehentlich in die Produktion gelangt. Ministeriumssprecher Gert Hahne: “Die Darstellung, da hat einer den falschen Hahn aufgedreht, erscheint uns sehr unglaubwürdig.”
Sievert drohen drei Jahre Gefängnis
Die Staatsanwaltschaft Itzehoe ermittelt wegen des Verdachts einer vorsätzlichen Straftat gegen Siegfried Sievert. Ihm drohen wegen Verunreinigung von Lebens- und Futtermitteln bis zu drei Jahren Gefängnis oder eine Geldstrafe. Außerdem droht eine Prozess-Lawine. Auf was dürfen Landwirte hoffen, die auf Schadensersatz klagen?
Die Harles & Jentzsch GmbH ist im Mai 1980 in Pinneberg gegründet worden, zog 1994 nach Uetersen. Im Handelsregister gibt das Unternehmen als Geschäftszweck an: Handel und Veredelung, Im- und Export von Ölen, Fetten, Fettsäuren und deren Derivaten. Unter dem Markennamen “Hajenol” verkauft Harles & Jentzsch Futterfett für Rinder, Schweine, Geflügel und Legehennen, produziert aber auch Industriefette für die Papierverarbeitung. Das Stammkapital der GmbH betrug 1994 genau 537 800 Mark. Diese Summe scheint zwischenzeitlich nicht erhöht worden zu sein, obwohl der Jahresumsatz des Zwölf-Mann-Betriebs zuletzt 20 Millionen Euro betrug.
Sollte Harles & Jentzsch vorsätzlich gehandelt haben, wird die Betriebshaftpflichtversicherung nicht einspringen. Der Bauernverband geht von einem Millionenschaden aus. Es geht um mehr als 1000 Landwirte, die ihre Höfe schließen mussten und deren Tiere teilweise verbrannt werden. Als Entschädigung wird das Stammkapital und selbst das Gesellschaftsvermögen nicht reichen. Dem Vertriebschef der Firma zufolge soll am Donnerstag eine Bestandsaufnahme erfolgen. Danach werde entschieden, ob Insolvenz angemeldet werde. Gegen Sievert und seine Mitarbeiter hat es derweil Morddrohungen gegeben. Am Telefon seien Mitarbeiter mit den Worten “Wir machen euch fertig” bedroht worden, so Sievert.
Bild schreibt: –„ Die Akte trägt die Registriernummer II 153/71, ist mehrere Hundert Seiten dick. Auf dem Deckel – in feiner Schreibschrift – ein Name: „Pluto“. Unter diesem Decknamen spionierte Siegfried Sievert (58) 18 Jahre lang für die Staatssicherheit der DDR – der Futtermittelpanscher, der mutmaßlich für den deutschen Dioxin-Skandal verantwortlich ist!

sievert 19232653 mbqftemplateIdrenderScaledpropertyBildheight3491 STASI MORD AN HEINZ GERLACH MIT DIOXIN GoMoPa weiss sofort die TodesursacheSiegfried Sievers
Auf Antrag von BILD gab die zuständige Birthler-Behörde die Unterlagen jetzt heraus. Die Dokumente zeichnen das Bild eines Mannes, der rücksichtslos ist, skrupellos und vor allem auf eigenen Profit bedacht.
Rückblick. 1971 wird die Stasi auf den 18-jährigen Sievert aufmerksam. Sie beobachtet sein „dekadentes Aussehen“, seine hohe Intelligenz und seine „guten Verbindungen zu anderen jugendlichen Personenkreisen“. Sievert wird angeworben. Aus einem Bericht vom 16. März 1971: „Der Kandidat kann zur Absicherung der Jugend (…) eingesetzt werden.“
Sievert wählt seinen Decknamen selbst, kassiert fortan Prämien für seine „inoffizielle Mitarbeit“. In den Unterlagen finden sich zahlreiche Quittungen, eine vom 6. November 1987: „Hiermit bescheinige ich den Erhalt von 100 Mark für geleistete Arbeit.“
Nach dem Abitur studiert Sievert in Greifswald Physik. Er macht Karriere, wird Geschäftsführer für „Absatz und Beschaffung“ in der „Märkischen Ölmühle“ in Wittenberge (Brandenburg).
Eifrig spitzelt Sievert weiter, berichtet über intime Verhältnisse seiner Kollegen.
So notiert „IM-Pluto“ am 25. September 1986: „Die beiden beabsichtigen, gemeinsam die BRD zu besuchen.“ Zwei Kollegen hätten angegeben, von einem Freund eingeladen worden zu sein. „Fakt ist jedoch, daß zwischen dem Kollegen und der Kollegin seit langer Zeit Intimbeziehungen bestehen. (…) Aus dieser Tatsache ist abzuleiten, daß eine gemeinsame Reise in die BRD mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit für eine Flucht benutzt wird.“
Skrupel zeigte Sievert laut Stasi-Akte keine. Ein Führungsoffizier notiert: „Der IM hatte keinerlei Vorbehalte bei der Belastung von Personen aus seinem Umgangskreis.“
Nach dem Mauerfall verlässt Sievert die Ölmühle. Ehemalige Kollegen wundern sich über seinen Wohlstand, werfen ihm vor, er habe Lieferungen der Ölmühle unterschlagen, dafür unter der Hand kassiert. Ein Vorwurf, für den es derzeit keine Belege gibt.
1993 steigt Sievert beim Futtermittelhersteller „Harles & Jentzsch“ ein. 2005 wird er alleiniger Geschäftsführer, steigert in nur fünf Jahren den Umsatz von 4,3 auf rund 20 Millionen Euro, vervierfacht den Gewinn. Ein Futtermittelmischer aus Niedersachsen zu BILD: „Solch ein Wachstum ist mit normalen Methoden unmöglich.“
Mit Panscherei möglicherweise schon: Das dioxinverseuchte Tierfutter von „Harles & Jentzsch“ war durch das Einmischen von Industriefetten entstanden. Die sind deutlich billiger als Futterfette.
Allein im November und Dezember 2010 soll Sieverts Firma mindestens 3000 Tonnen verseuchtes Futterfett verarbeitet haben. Etwa 150 000 Tonnen belastetes Futter könnten so in die Nahrungskette gelangt sein.
Martin Hofstetter, Agrarexperte von Greenpeace zu BILD: „Wenn man sich die Zahlen von ,Harles & Jentzsch‘ anschaut und die bisherigen Erkenntnisse und Veröffentlichungen berücksichtigt, kann man eigentlich nur zu einem Schluss kommen: Hier wurde systematisch betrogen und gepanscht.“

pROFESSOR mORD1 STASI MORD AN HEINZ GERLACH MIT DIOXIN GoMoPa weiss sofort die Todesursache

UND: Stasi-Top-Agent Ehrenfried Stelzer war auch Professor für Kriminologie an der Berliner Humboldt-Universität zu SED-Zeiten. Von Stelzer gibt es bislang kein offizielelsBild…

SJB-GoMoPa-Sprecher heinz Friedrich kommentiert: „Der verdacht liegt nahe, dass hier eine Verschwörung zum Tode von Heinz Gerlach geführt hat, der dieser Gruppierung im Wege stand. Auch wir und unsere Angehörigen wuurden mit Stas-Methoden bedroht und eingeschüchtert.“ Und fügt er hinzu: „Wie das Dioxin in die Blutbahn von heinz Gerlach kam, werden diese Stas-Agenten und ihre Mitverschwörer wohl wissen.“

Nach dem Tode von Gerlach wechelte Fuchsgruber endgültig und offen die Seiten in das „GoMoPa“-Team und hat sollte auch als DIAS-Geschäftsführer den Stasi-Agenten Ehrenfried Stelzer abgelöst – auf Betreiben des „Anlegerschutz“-Anwaltes RA Jochen Resch (siehe unten).

Nachstehende Erklärung publizierte dann Immovation AG:

„Nach den höchsterfreulichen gerichtlichen Erfolgen gegen den u. a. von rechtskräftig verurteilten Betrügern betriebenen, im Ausland domizilierten “Informationsdienst” Gomopa geht die Kasseler IMMOVATION Immobilien Handels AG auch straf- und zivilrechtlich gegen den Wirtschaftsdetektiv Medard Fuchsgruber vor.
Dieser hatte den IMMOVATION-Vorständen Lars Bergmann und Matthias Adamietz im Frühjahr 2010 angeboten, unwahre, diffamierende Veröffentlichungen auf der Website der gomopa.net beseitigen zu lassen und weitere rechtswidrige Veröffentlichungen dieser Art zu verhindern. Diese beauftragten Medard Fuchsgruber entsprechend und entrichteten ein Honorar von insgesamt EUR 67.500,00. Entgegen allen Zusagen von Fuchsgruber erfolgen über Gomopa jedoch – insbesondere seit Juli diesen Jahres – weiterhin schwer diffamierende Veröffentlichungen, gegen deren wesentlichste das traditionsreiche Kasseler Unternehmen in der Zwischenzeit bereits vor Gericht eine einstweilige Verfügung durchsetzen konnte (LG Berlin; Az.: 27 O 658/10).
Fuchsgruber ist – nach Entgegennahme des Vorabhonorars – offenbar seit Juni selbst “Kooperationspartner” bei Gomopa und wirbt sogar mit dieser Funktion, auch bei Gomopa wird das Engagement Fuchsgrubers besonders willkommen geheißen. Nach Auffassung der IMMOVATION hat Fuchsgruber damit von Beginn an über sein beabsichtigtes Engagement für die IMMOVATION getäuscht, was das Unternehmen im Rahmen einer Strafanzeige und eines Strafantrags inzwischen von der zuständigen Staatsanwaltschaft überprüfen lässt. Zudem hat die IMMOVATION das vorab bezahlte Honorar zurückgefordert und wird erforderlichenfalls den zivilrechtlichen Klageweg beschreiten.
Absurde Erklärungsversuche
Die von Fuchsgruber offenkundig in Journalisten- und Branchenkreisen zirkulierte Einschätzung, er hätte auftragsgemäß für IMMOVATION gehandelt, zielt völlig ins Leere: Denn nach seinem Einstieg bei Gomopa haben die über einen Serverstandort im Ausland verbreiteten Schmähungen nachweislich sogar zugenommen. Und schließlich: Selbst wenn dem so wäre, wie ließe sich dann der Umstand erklären, dass Fuchsgruber weiterhin als “Kooperationsparter” bei Gomopa fungiert, wenn doch nun für Gomopa öffentlich bekannt ist, dass Fuchsgruber im Auftrag der diffamierten IMMOVATION aktiv werden sollte?
Eine unmittelbare Beendigung der Zusammenarbeit Fuchsgruber und Gomopa wäre daher die logische Konsequenz, die jedoch bezeichnenderweise bis heute offenkundig ausgeblieben ist, was den von der IMMOVATION erhobenen Vorwurf weiter untermauert. Bemerkenswert ist darüber hinaus, dass sich der Einstieg Fuchsgrubers beim “Informationsdienst” Gomopa laut Medienberichten in enger zeitlicher Nähe zum Scheitern Fuchsgrubers beim Deutschen Institut für Anlegerschutz (DIAS) vollzog.“

Und im November 2010 durfte Fuchgruber dann auf der „GoMoPa“-Webseite für sich werben:

http://www.gomopa.net/Pressemitteilungen.html?id=603&meldung=Wucherbeitraege-Medard-Fuchsgruber-gruendete-Aktionsgemeinschaft-fuer-Versicherte#thumb (Noch ist der Link da)

Hintergrund:

Der Beleg, wie eng „GoMoPa“ und der laut den SJB-GoMoPa-Opfern hinter „GoMoPa“ stehende Rechtsanwalt Resch stehen, lesen Sie nachfolgend. Und: RA Resch fördert einen Ex-STASI-Hauptmann:

Zitat:

GoMoPa: Warum haben Sie ausgerechnet einen Stasi-Oberst und zudem noch hochbetagt, nämlich Ehrenfried Stelzer (78), als Nachfolger von Pietsch bei DIAS eingesetzt?

Resch: “Der Verein stand ohne Geschäftsführer da. Stelzer war der einzige, der Zeit hatte. Alle im Verein haben gesagt, 20 Jahre nach der Wende ist die Stasizeit nicht mehr so wichtig. Schließlich war Stelzer Professor für Kriminalistik an der Humboldt-Uni. Aber im Nachhinein war das kein so kluger Zug.”

GoMoPa: Stelzer wurde inzwischen von Wirtschaftsdetektiv Medard Fuchsgruber abgelöst, der nach eigenen Worten die aggressive Verfolgung von Kapitalmarktverbrechen fortsetzen will. Der Verein soll künftig von mehreren Rechtsanwälten bezahlt werden.“

Zitatende

Mehr unter http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com

Ausgrechnet der dubiose Detektiv Fuchsgruber, der die Seiten von Immovation AG hin zu „GoMoPa“ wechelt ist also ein Resch-Protege´.

Und: Fuchsgruber bemühte sich nachweislich um Gerlachs Archiv in der Insolvenzmasse. Und: er hatte freien Zugang zu Heinz Gerlachs Privaträumen.

Und: Fuchsgruber wechselte erst OFFIZIELL nach Heinz Gerlachs für alle überraschenden Tod zu „GoMoPa“ und wurde ein Protege´von Resch.

Und: Das Pseudonym von Klaus Maurischat „Siegfried Siewert“ ist ein Anagramm des Namen des früheren Stasi-Agenten und Dioxin Panschers Siegfried Sievers.

Und: Die Stasi führte Menschenversuche mit Dioxin durch.

Alles Zufälle ? Rein statistisch gesehen wohl kaum.

Dazu passt, dass diese Gruppierung die Publikation dieser Fakten mit allen Umständen verhindern will. Sie werden wissen weshalb…

Beispiel GMAC:

Laut den SJB-GoMoPa-Opfern versuchte GoMoPa wohl im Auftrag von Resch die General Motors-Tochter GMAC zu erpressen.

Zitata aus „GoMoPa“: Der Berliner Anlegerschutzanwalt Jochen Resch, der zahlreiche Käufer von GMAC-RFC-finanzierten Wohnungen vertritt, sagte dem Finanznachrichtendienst GoMoPa.net: “Anfangs wurde das Fünffache, später sogar das Siebenfache des Nettoverdienstes eines Kreditnehmers als Kredit vergeben. Wer also 40.000 Euro netto im Jahr verdiente, bekam einen Kredit bis zu 280.000 Euro, obwohl, wie sich nach Überprüfung herausstellt, die Immobilie nur 140.000 Euro wert war.

Dazu genügte eine Anmeldung beim Internet-Vermittler Creditweb, und die Kredite wurden bei entsprechender Verdienstbescheinigung im Eiltempo durchgewunken.

Was die Wohnung wirklich wert war, war nicht mehr das Problem von GMAC-RFC . Denn sie verschnürte die Wohnungen zu Paketen von 500 Millionen Euro und verkaufte die Pakete zur Refinanzierung nach Holland.

Nutzniesser der Baufilligenz der GMAC-RFC waren aber nicht die Käufer, die mit dem Kredit über dreißig Jahre eine überteuerte Wohnung abzahlen. Nutzniesser waren die Verkäufer und Vermittler, die 50 Prozent auf den wahren Verkehrswert der Wohnung draufgeschlagen hatten.

Für die Vermittler von Wohnungsfinanzierungen begann ein wahres Schlaraffenland

Anlegerschutzanwalt Resch beschreibt den Aufstieg der Ami-Bank so: “Vertriebsorganisationen sahen die große Chance, ihren bei anderen Banken nur schwer finanzierbaren Kunden einen Kredit zu vermitteln. Für den Vertrieb der entscheidende Vorteil. Nur wenn Geld fließt, fließen auch die Provisionen. Bis zu 35 Prozent des Kaufpreises.

Dieses attraktive Angebot ließ die GMAC-RFC Bank innerhalb kurzer Zeit zu einem ernsthaften Konkurrenten für die übrigen finanzierenden Banken auf dem Schrottimmobilienmarkt aufsteigen. Innerhalb kurzer Zeit erreichte die GMAC-RFC Bank deshalb ein Gesamtkreditvolumen von mehr als zwei Milliarden Euro.

Der Grund für die großzügige Kreditgewährung dürfte gewesen sein, dass die GMAC-RFC Bank das Risiko verkaufte. Sie wollte von vornherein die Kredite nicht behalten. Sie schnürte große Kreditpakete und verkaufte diese an holländische Zweckgesellschaften.

Die GMAC-RFC wurde schnell zum heißen Tipp auf dem Immobilienmarkt. Denn Verkäufer und Vermittler bekamen sogar Antragsteller ohne Eigenkapital durch, die bei jeder anderen Bank durchgefallen wären.”

Die GMAC-RFC Bank feierte sich in einer Pressemitteilung vom Januar 2007 wie folgt: „Mit Einführung der neuen Baufilligenz® – einer Produktinnovation, mit der erstmals in Deutschland standardisierte Vollfinanzierungen für Eigennutzer und Kapitalanleger bis zu 110 Prozent des Kaufpreises angeboten werden – haben wir nicht nur innerhalb kurzer Zeit die Produktführerschaft erreicht, sie zeichnet auch als Wachstumstreiber für die Verdoppelung des Neugeschäftes gegenüber 2005 verantwortlich.“

Im September 2008 war das Innovations-Konzept der GMAC sowohl in den USA als auch in Deutschland gescheitert. Die GMAC-RFC vergibt seitdem keine Hypothekendarlehen mehr.

Anlegerschutzanwalt Resch: “Zum 30. September 2008 gab die GMAC-RFC Bank ihre Lizenz zurück. Es wurde den Kunden mitgeteilt, dass alles beim Alten bleibe. Die GMAC-RFC Servicing GmbH werde jetzt die Kunden weiter betreuen.

Schon damals entstanden jedoch Zweifel, ob dieses Angebot ernst gemeint war. Wir hatten befürchtet, dass sich die Konditionen bei der Prolongation des Darlehens verschlechtern würden.”

Die Befürchtungen bestätigt die GMAC-RFC indirekt in ihrem Rundbrief vom 23. September 2010. Der Vorteil einer Umschuldung auf eine andere Bank sei die Möglichkeit einer „besseren Zinskondition“.

Theoretisch dürfte die GMAC-RFC damit recht haben. Praktisch wird es allerdings dazu führen, dass die GMAC-RFC Darlehensnehmer bei dem Versuch einer Umschuldung bemerken werden, dass sie wohl keine einzige Bank finden werden, die in das Risiko einsteigt.

Es wird offenbar werden, dass viele Anleger nur durch das institutionelle Zusammenwirken zwischen Vertrieb, Verkäufer und GMAC-RFC Bank einen Kredit bekommen hatten.

Es wird offenbar werden, dass die Hausbank des Kunden die Umschuldung nur bei Stellung weiterer Sicherheiten vornehmen wird.

Es wird offenbar werden, dass vielfach die Wohnung sittenwidrig überteuert ist. Sie bringt beim Weiterverkauf nicht einmal die Hälfte dessen, was die GMAC-RFC Bank finanziert hat.

Das einzig Gute ist, dass viele ahnungslose Anleger beim Versuch einer Umschuldung bemerken, was ihnen seinerzeit angetan wurde.”

GoMoPa.net schickte der GMAC-RFC Servicing GmbH folgende Fragen:

1) Ist es richtig, dass dieses Angebot zur Umschuldung damit zusammenhängt, dass die zur Refinanzierung an holländische Zweckgesellschaften verkauften Kredite nur unzureichend bedient werden und durch die Umschuldung die Rückzahlung und die Zinszahlungen für die Anleihen der Zweckgesellschaften gesichert werden müssen?

2) Ist es richtig, dass die GMAC-RFC Bank seit ihrem Auftreten auf dem deutschen Immobilienmarkt im Jahr 2004 ein Gesamtvolumen von über zwei Milliarden Euro an Krediten ausgereicht hat, die in fünf „Paketen“ an holländische Zweckgesellschaften verkauft wurden?

3) Ist es richtig, dass ausschließlich über das Internetportal Creditweb Darlehensanträge bei der GMAC eingereicht werden konnten? Wenn nein, welche weiteren Internetportale waren dazu berechtigt?

4.) Ist es richtig, dass die mit der Creditweb kooperierenden Vertriebe keine Originalunterlagen der Kreditsuchenden, sondern lediglich Kopien eingereicht haben? Hat sich die GMAC-RFC Bank seinerzeit Originale der Lohn- und Gehaltsunterlagen der Kreditnehmer vorlegen lassen?

5.) Ist es richtig, dass in dem Baufilligenzprogramm es lediglich auf die finanzielle Situation des Darlehensnehmers ankam und dass Kredite bis zur Höhe des siebenfachen Jahresnettoeinkommens finanziert wurden?

6.) Ist es richtig, dass die Gewährung der Kredite auf der Grundlage des Pfandbriefgesetzes erfolgte?

7.) Wie erfolgt der Nachweis der Aktivlegitimation der GMAC Servicing GmbH in Fällen, in denen die Vollstreckung bei notleidenden oder gekündigten Darlehen erforderlich wird?

GoMoPa.net ersuchte die GMAC-RFC Servicing GmbH in Wiesbaden mehrmals, zu dem Rundbrief an die deutschen Kreditnehmer Stellung zu beziehen. Die Geschäftsführerin Jennifer Anderson sei in den USA, eine Telefonnummer sei nicht bekannt. Die Pressesprecherin Katharina Dahms sei in Urlaub und hätte keine Vertretung. Und der Prokurist Sven Klärner, der noch Auskunft geben könnte, rief trotz mehrfacher Bitten von GoMoPa.net nicht zurück – er wird wissen warum. „

Zitatende

Hintergrund:
Die SJB-GoMoPa-Opfer behaupten: „Der abgetauchte Berliner Zweig der GoMoPa-Gangster will nun zusammen mit ihrem Hausanwalt RA Jochen Resch, Berlin,  die DKB erpressen – so wie sie dies vorher mit Immovation versucht haben.
Estavis hat bezahlt, damit ein Grundsatzurteil gegen sie nicht unter den Käufer ihrer Immobilien verbreitet wird. Dasselbe Spiel versuchen der Knacki Maurischat und sein Kumpan Resch nun auch bei der DKB durchzuziehen.
Eigengartig, da schliesst ein Finanzforum aus Deutschland mit Briefkasten in New York einen Vertrag ab mit einem börsenkotierten Immobilien-Unternehmen aus Berlin, derESTAVIS AG. Dieser Vertrag umfasst Dienstleistungen im Marketingbereich für den Abverkauf Denkmalgeschützter Eigentumswohnungen. Kontraktwert: € 100’000 ! Eine sehr eigenartige Vereinbarung.“
Börse Online: „Der Anlegeranwalt Jochen Resch kommt neuerdings oft in den Pressemitteilungen vor, die der Finanzdienst Gomopa ungefragt an Redaktionen verschickt. Als „Deutschlands bekannteste Anlegerschutzkanzlei“ wird Resch Rechtsanwälte in einem Bericht über das Ende der Noa Bankvorgestellt. Zu Schrottimmobilien äußert sich Resch, zu einem Skandal um den Immobilienfondsanbieter Volkssolidarität. Die Offenheit ist neu. Früher ging Gomopa Resch hart an und konfrontierte ihn mit Vorwürfen. Doch einige Formulierungen in einer Teilhaberinformation zur finanziellen Situation Gomopas vom Juli 2010 legen nahe, dass der Sinneswandel vielleicht nicht nur Zufall ist.
Gomopa, eigentlich Goldman Morgenstern & Partners Consulting LLC mit Sitz in New York, ist seit mehr als zehn Jahren aktiv. Auf der Website ist unter den Fachautoren der bekannte Bestsellerautor Jürgen Roth aufgelistet. Im Handelsregister der deutschen Zweigniederlassung ist als Geschäftszweck an erster Stelle „wirtschaftliche Beratung, insbesondere des Mittelstandes“ aufgelistet. Dazu gehöre „die Präsentation von Firmen im Internet und anderen Medien“. Die Verbindung des Dienstes mit einem Nachrichtenportal im Internet sieht Gomopa-Gründer Mark Vornkahl nicht als Problem: „Ein Interessenkonflikt zwischen kostenpflichtiger Beratung, Informationsabonnement und öffentlicher Aufklärung ist uns seit Bestehen nicht untergekommen.“
Doch die Nutzer des Portals erfuhren bislang nicht, ob mit Personen oder Organisationen, über die berichtet wurde, vertragliche Beziehungen bestehen. Reschs Kanzlei war laut Teilhaberinformation zeitweise eine wichtige Finanzierungsquelle von Gomopa. Darin berichtet Gomopa-Mitgründer Klaus Maurischat, dass eine Vereinbarung mit der Kanzlei „momentan 7500,- Euro im Monat einbringt – rund 25 Prozent unserer monatlichen Kosten!“. Für „individuelle Mandantenanwerbung“ stehe die Gesellschaft mit mehreren Anwaltskanzleien in Verhandlungen.
Anwalt Resch stellt zum Inhalt der Vereinbarung klar: „Wir haben einen einmaligen Rechercheauftrag erteilt, der im üblichen Rahmen honoriert wird.“ Mit Mandantenbeschaffung habe das nichts zu tun. Was Gomopa von einer Mandantenanwerbung hätte, ist auch unklar. Denn Anwälte dürfen dafür nicht bezahlen. Auf unsere Anfrage zu dieser und weiteren Fragen gab Vornkahl keine inhaltliche Antwort beziehungsweise verwahrte sich gegen Zitate aus den entsprechenden Passagen seiner E-Mail, weil er einem Mitbewerber „keine Auskünfte zur Ausgestaltung unseres Geschäftsbetriebes gebe.“
Hier eine vorläufige Liste der von RA Resch bearbeiteten Fälle:
Liste der bearbeiteten Fälle:
ALLWO (Badenia Heinen & Biege)
B & V
BADENIA (Allwo, Heinen&Biege)
BAG, Hamm
BBI Beteiligungsgesellschaft Bayrische Immobilien
Beißer Gruppe
BEMA / OSPA
Betreutes Wohnen
BHW Bank, Hameln
Brentana Wohnbau
C & C CyberCooperation AG
dieser Eintrag wurde gelöscht
CFG Grundbesitz GmbH
Contest (heute CFG Grundbesitz GmbH)
Conzeptbau Bagge
DBVI Privatbank Reithinger
Dedimax (S&C Grund & Kapital)
DEGEWO
Deutscher Informationsdienst, Hannover
DM Beteiligungen AG
Dubai Invest Immobilienfonds GmbH & Co. KG / First Real Estate
Eagle Immobilien
EECH Gruppe
EURO Convent AG
EURO-Gruppe
Falk-Fonds
Finanz Concept GmbH
First Real Estate Grundbesitz GmbH
Fondax Beteiligungsfonds 1
Fondax Beteiligungsfonds 2
Fondax Capital – Select GmbH & Co.KG
Fortissimo
Forum IV GbR
Frankonia Sachwert AG (jetzt Deltoton)
FUNDUS – Gruppe
GABAU GmbH & Co.KG
Gallinat Bank, Essen
Global Real Estate
Göttinger Gruppe
Grüezi GmbH, Berlin
Grund & Boden
Hansa Grundinvest OHG
Hauser Wohnbau GmbH
HCC Fonds
Heberle & Kollegen, Rostock
Horst Bogatz
IBH – Immobilienfonds
ISP Internationaler Sachwert Plan
KK Royal Basement
Köllner
Madrixx AG, Berlin
Morena GmbH, Berlin
Papenburg Carré
Plan-Immofonds
Prime Estate GmbH, Berlin
Private Commercial Office – US Land Banking
Prokon
PS Haus – & Grundbesitzmarketing GmbH, Berlin
Quadro – Bau GmbH & Co. KG
R & R First Concept, Berlin
RB Real Estate
RCM Royal Capital Management, Berlin
Rentadomo
RJS Grundstück-u. Immobiliengesellschaft mbH
Rolf Albern Vermögensverwaltungs GmbH
S & C/ PK Multifonds
Securenta / Göttinger Gruppe / Langenbahn AG
Südwestrentaplus
Treuconcept
TREUCONSULT
UVBD
VEAG Immobilienfonds Nr. 298 KG
VermögensGarant AG
W K West Finanz Kapital Beteiligungs AG
WBG Leipzig-West
WHe Kommunalfonds Fürstenwalde KG
WI – RN GmbH
Wirtschaftskontor Berlin Kusch & Co. GmbH
WKVI, Düsseldorf
Wollenberg & Branke GmbH & Co KG

Ein Insider: „Was glauben Sie, wer auf die Idee kam,  die ominöse Briefkastenfirm Goldman, Morgenstern & Partner LLC, „GoMoPa“, einen angeblichen Zusammenschluss jüdischer Anwälte in den USA zu gründen und wer die vielen Anwälte wie RA Albrecht Saß, Hamburg, OLG Richter a.D. Matthias Schillo, Potsdam,  und RA Thomas Schulte, Berlin,  zur Reputationsaufbesserung aufbot ?
a)    RA Jochen Resch oder b) Ex-Gefängnisinsasse Klaus Maurischat, der kaum Englisch spricht ? Und: Heinz Gerlach war dicht dran, diese Zusammenhänge aufzuklären über den „Estavis“-“Beratungsvertrag“. Seine Tochter, eine Rechtsanwältin in New York, hatte bereits eine eidesstattliche Versicherung über die Brifekasetn Firma „Goldman, Morgenstern & Partner LLC“ und deren Briefkastenadresse in New York abgegeben und er hatte Strafanzeige wegen der „Estavis“Beratungs-Affäre“ abgegeben. Dann wechselt auf einmal der von Immovation zur Aufklärung von „GoMoPa“ beauftrage „Detektiv“ Meinhard Fuchs trotz eines bereits bezahlten Honorares von über € 60.000,- die Seiten hin zu „GoMoPa“ und Heinz Gerlach stirbt plötzlich und für alle unerwartet angeblich an Blutvergiftung, seltsam…“

ENDE DES ARTIKELS

TOP-SECRET FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVES: The Report of the Historical Archives of the National Police

Members of the archive’s National Advisory Board stand with Ana Carla Ericastilla, director of the General Archives of Central America (front, center), Gustavo Meoño (back, right), representatives from several embassies (back), and National Security Archive’s Kate Doyle at release of the report, “Del Silencio a la Memoria” at the University of San Carlos in Guatemala City, Guatemala on June 7, 2011. [Daniel Hernández-Salazar © 2011]
he Police Archive’s new Web page was launched with the publication of the report, containing photographs, texts, links, and an electronic portal to submit information requests to the archive directly. http://www.archivohistoricopn.org/

Bookmark and Share

Related Evidence Project Postings:

UNREDACTED: Decades Later, NARA Posts Documents on Guatemalan Syphilis Experiments

UNREDACTED: Wikileaks Guatemala – Corruption and Crime in the National Civil Police

UNREDACTED:”I wanted him back alive.” An Account of Edgar Fernando García’s Case from “Inside the Tribunal Towers.”

Guatemala’s Police Archives: Breaking the Stoney Silence – By Kate Doyle in ReVista Harvard Review of Latin America

Operation Sofia: Documenting Genocide in Guatemala
Archive expert presents Guatemalan military document in international genocide case

Historical Archives Lead to Arrest of Police
Officers in Guatemalan Disappearance

The Spanish Genocide Case
Summaries of the testimony provided by five Mayan Quiché survivors and four expert witnesses

Death Squad Dossier
Military logbook of the disappeared

The Guatemalan National Police Archives

Drugs and The Guatemalan Military
A Report from the Texas Observer

The Guatemalan Military: What the U.S. Files Reveal

Colonel Byron Disrael Lima Estrada

U.S. Policy in Guatemala, 1963-1993

The CIA and Assassinations
The Guatemala 1954 Documents

Dear Mr. President: Lessons on Justice from Guatemala

Mexico’s Southern Front: Guatemala and the Search for Security

 

Guatemala City, Guatemala, June 7, 2011 – This text is a copy of the speech given by Kate Doyle at the ceremony of the presentation of the report, “From Silence to Memory: Revelations of the Historical Archive of the National Police” at the University of San Carlos in Guatemala City, Guatemala.

**********

I’m honored to be here today on behalf of the International Advisory Board of the Project to Recover the Historical Archives of the National Police in order to congratulate the archive’s staff for its tremendous work in rescuing documents that represent a critical aspect of the country’s political and social history and the patrimony of the people of Guatemala. Archives – and in particular the Historical Archive of the National Police (AHPN) – play an indispensible role in the defense of human rights in Guatemala and the struggle against forgetting. The fruits of your labor, including the report being presented here today, are now apparent, both inside and outside the country.

The International Advisory Board  consists of representatives of archives and human rights organizations from diverse countries, and includes Dr. Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, Nobel Peace Prize winner and President of the Provincial Commission for Memory in Argentina; Fina Solá, International Secretary of Archives Without Borders, based in Barcelona; Spain’s renowned expert in archives, Antonio González Quintana; Maripaz Vergara Low, Executive Secretary of the Vicariate of Solidarity in Chile; Dr. Patrick Ball, scientist and statistician from the Benetech Group in California; and your own Arturo Taracena, writer, researcher and doctor of history, a Guatemalan living in Mexico – among others. We form part of a broad international community of experts in the fields of archives and human rights that are firm supporters of the Historic Archive of the National Police, admirers of your achievements, standing with you in solidarity in the fight against impunity.  The Archive, in short, should feel well accompanied.

The title of the AHPN publication is a tribute to the final report of the Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH), “Memory of Silence”: not only in the sense that the commission was able to deliver to the people of Guatemala the results of an unprecedented and powerful investigation, but as an implicit reference to one of the thorniest problems the commission faced – the lack of official information.  Not the lack of testimony from survivors. Not the lack of bones, unearthed in exhumations. Not the lack of publications of human rights organizations, or the decisions of inter-American institutions. Not the lack of press clippings, reports of the church, the family requests or eyewitness testimony. Only the lack of official government information in Guatemala: from the Army and from its accomplice and subordinate institution, the National Police.

In the twelfth and final volume of its report, the CEH published dozens of letters exchanged between the three commissioners and the high command of the country’s security institutions, including the then-Minister of Defense, Héctor Mario Barrios Celada, and Interior Minister Rodolfo Mendoza Rosales. The communications capture the commission’s exasperation and intense frustration in trying to obtain even the most basic documents from the parties to the internal conflict in order to be able to carry out their investigations in a rigorous and balanced way. They also capture the implacable and inevitable response of the officials: No. There were no documents, the documents never existed, they were destroyed, they were lost, or worse, the documents were still classified under the seal of national security.

In one letter to President Alvaro Arzú Irigoyen dated May 24, 1998, the commissioners wrote, “It is difficult to accept that the information does not exist in Government archives. If that were true, then every time we perceived a serious irregularity indicating the State’s responsibility in human rights violations, we would consider it necessary to receive assurances of the investigative measures adopted to determine the precise causes of the loss of historic documents of an official nature. We consider that such measures form part of the Government’s obligation to cooperate with the Commission, as well as the State’s duty to investigate and sanction human rights violations…”

Of course, Guatemala is not the only country in Latin America that suffers from the silence, denial and secrecy of its own institutions in relation to the region’s painful history of repression. Peru, for example, has very similar problems, as the prosecutors named in the Fujimori case discovered. When they requested archives from the armed forces in order to be able to analyze the characteristics of military units involved in massacres, the Army responded that all the relevant documents had been burned. Burned? How were they burned, and when? The prosecutors never received a response – the Army never submitted a copy of an order to burn records nor a list of the archives supposedly destroyed. They did not consider it necessary – as though these were their own documents and not the property of the people of Peru – and they were right. The government of Peru did not demand accountability from the military in the matter.

In its call for the State’s obligation to produce its archives – and in particular in its insistence that the authorities justify any missing information and make an effort to recover it through internal investigations – the CEH anticipated by more than ten years an extraordinary ruling from the Inter-American Court, issued in December of last year. In “Gomes Lund v. Brazil,” the Court resolved that Brazilian authorities had to turn over all official documents to family members of a group of some 60 militants disappeared by security forces during the 1970s in the Araguaia region. The Court emphasized the existence of a “regional consensus about the importance of access to public information.” (§198) The Court affirmed the right to the truth of people affected by atrocities committed during the counterinsurgency campaign against the Araguaia militants. The Court established that “in cases of human rights violations, government authorities cannot hide behind mechanisms such as State secrecy or the confidentiality of the information, or for reasons of public interest or national security, in order to avoid providing information required by judicial or administrative authorities charged with a pending investigation or process. In addition, when an investigation concerns a punishable offense, the decision to qualify information as secret and refuse its disclosure must never depend exclusively on the government organ whose members are implicated in the commission of the crime.” (§202)

Finally, and very important in the case of Guatemala, “In the opinion of this Tribunal, the State cannot seek protection by using the lack of evidence concerning the existence of the documents; on the contrary, it must justify the refusal to provide them, demonstrating that it has taken every measure to confirm that, effectively, the requested information does not exist. It is clearly essential that, in order to guarantee the right to information, the authorities act in good faith and diligently carry out the necessary actions to secure the effectiveness of this right, especially when it involves the truth about serious human rights violations like the forced disappearances and the extrajudicial execution of the present case.” (§211)

For too long the Guatemalan State institutions have been able to use silence, denial, and secrecy to cover up the violations committed by their own agents without fear of sanction. The work of the Historical Archive of the National Police – and in particular the publication of the extraordinary report that we celebrate today – is a direct challenge to this dark legacy.

For Guatemala, the report reveals some ugly truths about the principle institution charged with the protection of citizens’ security. How, for example, the anti-communist functions of the National Security Directorate – established shortly after the installation of the military dictatorship in the 1950s – were granted as powers to investigate, monitor, arrest, interrogate and detain any person under the flimsiest of pretexts.  How the directorate’s functions quickly exceeded in importance and prestige the ordinary anti-crime functions of the police— ultimately infecting the culture of the police. How the National Police were militarized just as quickly, in all aspects: their structure, their ranks, their reporting, and their operations. How they were subordinated to the army. How, in the 60s, 70s, 80s, and 90s, the intensity of the social control exercised by the police and the ferocity of their repressive actions, were mirrored negatively by their total incompetence and lack of interest in their supposed main function: to investigate crimes, including the crimes of kidnapping and assassination.

For the United States, the report has lessons of a different nature. Because although some documents located within the AHPN tell of the close relations between the security forces and their North American supporters and sponsors, hundreds of declassified documents from the United States already existed that describe our ignominious history in relation to the National Police. Instead, for us, the report serves as a reminder of the role we played for decades in Guatemala, providing every kind of assistance possible in line with our notorious national security doctrine to the repressive forces in this country.

Of course, you will read the report yourselves; interested people from all over the world will read it: historians, researchers, journalists, specialists, archivists, activists, family, and prosecutors. You will discover the riches that it offers on your own. But I would like to emphasize an aspect of the report that you might miss: that is, the transparency of the archival process that underlies the document.

Read the introduction to see how carefully the mechanisms and research methodology behind the AHPN investigations are explained: the analysis, statistical studies, and internal and external debate about the issue of public access. Read pages 38-39 about “The criteria to record the names that appear in the AHPN documents,”—a profound and serious reflection about the decision to publish without restriction all of the names that appear in the report. It is worth quoting: “The armed internal conflict and repressive practices characterized a recent historic period in Guatemala that affected and continues to affect society enormously. In the face of this reality, the conclusion is inevitable that the political events that took place between 1960 and 1996 form part of the collective history of the Nation. This should be understood in its fullest dimension, so that no one has the right to hide information that comes from the actions by the State and its officials.”

In reference to the legal instruments that guarantee the right to information – such as, for example, Article 24 of the Access to Information Law, which prohibits the withholding as confidential or classified any information that could contribute to the clarification of violations against fundamental human rights – the AHPN chose to include “the first and last names of all actors, active and passive, mentioned in the documents, be they government or public employees (in the case of the National Police and other state entities such as the Army), confidential collaborators, individuals such as victims and their family members, those who file criminal complaints, individuals with police files, and petitioners, among others.”

And read the hundreds of footnotes referring to documents cited in the text – read them and enjoy the links that were incorporated in the digital version of the report so that we can go directly to the scanned image of the document and read it in its entirety, if we want. This is transparency: an obligation for the State authorities, and a valuable tool for civil society.

I am here on behalf of my own archive and NGO, the National Security Archive in Washington, and have visited and worked in several other archives throughout the Americas. Based on that experience, I can say with certainty that there are very few examples of archival institutions that provide indexes, not to mention an investigative report, such as the one we celebrate today. The example of Mexico is sufficient. In 2002, President Vicente Fox took the decision—in the context of the political transition—to order his military, defense, and intelligence institutions to transfer documents related to the so-called “dirty war” (1968-1983) to the Mexican National Archives (Archivo General Nacional – AGN).  I was living in Mexico at that time and it seemed to us a wonderful idea and we congratulated the government. Then we went to the archives to try to actually use the famous documents from the dirty war, and guess what? It was an exercise in complete frustration. Because no one had created an index to the collections, and no one thought to sensitize AGN employees how to manage this special collection, not to mention the researchers – among them family members, sometimes humble, vulnerable or fearful people arriving at the archives for the first time. In the section where the most sensitive documents were stored, records from the Federal Security Directorate (Dirección Federal de Seguridad – DFS)—the Mexican version of the CIA and FBI combined—an official from the very same intelligence agency was placed in charge of providing public access to the intelligence files. Needless to say, after a few months, the public stopped coming to the AGN to consult the “dirty war” documents.

So access to information is much, much more, than announcing the declassification of documents. It means organizing the documents in a way that is clear to ordinary people; it means creating indexes, catalogs and databases – instruments, that is, to render the files readable, comprehensible and searchable. It means preparing and training the staff so they can cater to special users: those same family members, or prosecutors working on criminal cases. In very rare instances does it mean publishing an investigative report such as this one – From Silence to Memory – which offers us indispensable insights into the treasure trove that is the Historical Archive of the National Police. The report will serve as a guide to the collections for researcher for years to come, but also as a history of the security institutions of Guatemala, a deep analysis of the logic of urban counterinsurgency and the instruments of repression, and an assessment of seven specific human rights cases. It is a gift to all of us – to Guatemalan society and to all those interested in history, memory and justice.

Thank you.

_________________________________________________________________

Documents

From Silence to Memory: Revelations of the Historical Archive of the National Police

Complete Report – (9.61 MB)

The following is a selection of document highlights from the report:


Document 1

(pg. 90 of report)
Fotografía I.1.a
28 October 1981
 “Información confidencial con remisión manuscrita al COCP 1981”

This document illuminates the role of the Joint Operations Center of the National Police (Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas de la Policía – COCP). The command center directed communications between the National Police headquarters (Dirección General – DG) and units in the Military.

The police Joint Operations Center transmitted information from the police investigations unit to the military intelligence command, such as the President’s own intelligence service, the Archivo General y Servicios de Apoyo del EMP. The Archivo was part of the President’s General Staff (EMP) and maintained personal information on civilians since its inception in the 1960s. The intelligence and operational unit was at the heart of the urban terror campaign to kidnap, torture, and disappear suspected subversives during under the governments of Fernando Romero Lucas García (1978-1982), Efraín Rios Montt (1982-1983) and Oscar Mejía Víctores (1983-1985).

This document was sent to the Archivo to notify its agents of “delinquent subversives,” and gives the exact address of where they could be found. It also describes the weapons maintained by the bodyguard of the local police chief, and of the local chief of transportation.

Document 2
(pg. 93 of report, footnote number 148)
Undated
Nace un nuevo cuerpo“,

This internal newsletter, the National Police Review (Revista Policía Nacional),titled “Birth of a new corps” (“Nace un nuevo cuerpo“), reported on the formation of the new “Fifth Corps” of the police, also known as the Special Operations Command (COE – Comando de Operaciones Especiales) or the Reaction and Special Operations Battalion (BROE – Batallón de Reacción y Operaciones Especiales). The unit would go on to become notorious for its brutal countersubversive sweeps aimed at dismantling insurgent networks, and is linked to dozens of documented forced disappearances.

The newsletter contains the follow sections, among others: “National Police Infrastructure”, “Women and Public Security”, the “Sacrifice of Police Work”, “Daily Living of an Agent”, “Anonymous Heroes”, and the importance and origin of “School Security Patrols.”
The newsletter also contains a section titled “Human Rights,” where it states that, “human rights continue to be the first priority when each police officer carries out civil control duties.”

Document 3
(pg. 140 of report)
Fotografía I.25
circa 1981
Ejemplo de nómina de personal 1981

The police documents include personnel lists for all the major police units in the capital as well as in major cities across Guatemala. These lists provide key information for investigators documenting individual responsibility for government-sponsored abuses.

This record, from 1981, lists names of personnel and their positions from January 1, 1980 through December 31, 1980. The director general, German Chupina Barahona is listed as the director general, along with two other senior staff, administrative staff, corps chiefs, and department chiefs.

Document 4
(pg. 341 of report, footnote 106)
Undated
“Interrogatorio”

Throughout the conflict the Guatemalan government used what it called the “management of information” to identify and destroy networks of guerrillas and suspected subversives in what was known among security officials as the “urban guerrilla war” (guerra de guerillas urbanas). The collecting of first-hand information from captured resistance leaders and militants through interrogation and torture was one of the main methods of “managing” information. The first-hand information enabled the security forces to analyze the infrastructure of the guerrilla movement and quickly move to capture its members.

This document provides instruction to police forces on how to properly conduct an interrogation:

“The captured enemy will talk only if the interrogator is properly prepared to carry out the interrogation. The information that is extracted will serve future operations and correct errors in those operations.”

In order to properly carry out the interrogation, the police official is instructed to personally observe the prisoner, taking notes on clothing, mood, and attitude. The interrogator is instructed to know details of the prisoner’s capture, and how he/she was treated by other officers when they were captured.

The document then continues with a list of questions the interrogator should ask them self while preparing for the interrogation, including:

“a. What appears to be his attitude?  Afraid, calm, willing to cooperate, etc.
b. What can you do to increase or prolong his fear?
c. What can you do to eliminate or alleviate his fear?
d. What documents or effects that the individual was carrying when captured that could be used to help you during questioning?
e. What information is required urgently?”

Document 5
(pg. 404 in report)
Fotografía IV.7
20 September 1978

These pictures are from a confidential report prepared by the Detective Corps in relation to student protests held in solidarity with Nicaragua on September 20, 1978. In the third photograph, the student with the white pants with a cross marked on his leg is Oliverio Castañeda de Leon.

Castañeda, an economics student at San Carlos University, was the Secretary General of the University Student Association and an iconic figure for the democratic and revolutionary left. He was a member of many student groups that were constantly monitored by state security forces because of suspected subversive activities. This set of photographs, only a few from a vast collection, exemplifies the level of control and vigilance with which the National Police monitored student leaders. Two months after this photo was taken, on October 20, 1978, the 23 year-old Castañeda was assassinated just blocks away from the presidential palace after leaving a demonstration in Guatemala City’s central plaza.


Document 6
(pg. 407 in report, footnote number 18)
19 October 1978
Ejército Secreto Anti-Comunista – Boletin No. 3

One day before Oliverio Castañeda de León’s murder, on October 19, his name appeared on the Secret Anti-Communist Army’s “Condemned to Death” list, published in the group’s Bulletin Number Three. Castañeda’s name is underlined in the bulletin, a copy of which was discovered in the AHPN.

Document 7
(pg. 466 in report)
Fotografía IV.13
11 August 1980
“Ficha post mortem de Vicente Hernández Camey”

The large cache of records from the Police Archive’s Identification Bureau (Gabinete de Identificación) was significantly deteriorated when discovered in July 2005. Despite their poor condition, the documents are an essential key to identifying the bodies of the unknown from the conflict.

In February 1969, the National Police implemented the “Henry Fingerprinting System” as part of a cold-war police training program headed by Sergio Roberto Lima Morales, Chief of the Identification Bureau. This system enabled the police to identify cadáveres xx, or “unidentified bodies”. This document displays the product of the “Henry” fingerprinting system, named after a British police inspector who developed his method for criminal investigations in colonial India.

These are the post-mortem fingerprints of Vincente Hernández Camey a member of the Vecinos Mundial, or “Global Neighbors”, a private organization of the indigenous Kaqchiquel community in Chimaltenango. Hernández Camey was forcibly disappeared along with a companion, Roberto Xihuac—also a member of Global Neighbors—on August 7, 1979. Originally, Hernández Camey entered the National Police system as an unidentified body; however, the police were able to positively identify him by using the fingerprinting system.

National Security Archive’s Kate Doyle speaks at the ceremony for the release of the report, “From Silence to Memory: Revelations of the Historical Archive of the National Police” in Guatemala City, Guatemala on June 7, 2011. [Daniel Hernández-Salazar © 2011]
Coordinator of the Historical Archives of the National Police (AHPN), Gustavo Meoño, speaks to audience at release of the report, “Del Silencio a la Memoria” at the University of San Carlos in Guatemala City, Guatemala on June 7, 2011. [Daniel Hernández-Salazar © 2011]
Coordinator of the Historical Archives of the National Police (AHPN) Gustavo Meoño, and AHPN Investigator, Velia Muralles recieve the Intstitute for Policy Studies (IPS) Letelier-Moffitt Human Rights Special Recognition Award in October 2010 on behalf of the AHPN. Joy Zarembka, interim director of IPS, presents the award. [Photo (c) Intstitute for Policy Studies]
Oliverio Castañeda de Leon, Secretary General of San Carlos University Student Association and iconic figure for democratic and revolutionary left, was assassinated on October 20, 1978. Castañeda had been named by the Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA) in its “Death List” published in the Guatemalan press on October 19, 1978. AHPN documents about Castañeda are included in the AHPN report on page 397.
A copy of an internal newsletter, The National Police Reivew, is incorporated in the Historical Archives of the National Police (AHPN) report being released today. see page 93 of report, footnote number 148.
Piles of documents at the Historical Archives of the National Police (AHPN) in Guatemala City, Guatemala. [Daniel Hernández-Salazar © 2005]

SECRET: FULL TEXT OF ISLAMIC JIHAD 17 MARCH STATEMENT

R 201307Z MAR 85
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2276
INFO AMEMBASSY BERN
UNCLAS BEIRUT 01725 

E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS: PTER PREL LE
SUBJECT:  FULL TEXT OF ISLAMIC JIHAD 17 MARCH STATEMENT 

1.  AP PROVIDED EMBASSY WITH FULL TEXT OF ISLAMIC
JIHAD STATEMENT AS TELEPHONED MARCH 17 TO
REUTERS AND AFP. 

2.  BEGIN TEXT: 

"THE ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION IN THE NAME OF GOD
THE ALL MERCIFUL.  THE PUNISHMENT OF THOSE IS THE
CURSE OF GOD, THE ANGELS AND ALL PEOPLE.  THE DETENTION
OF TERRY ANDERSON, BRIAN LEVICK AND JERRY (GEOFFRY?)
NASH COMES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF OUR CONTINUING
OPERATIONS AGAINST AMERICA AND ITS AGENTS.  WE ARE
DEFINITE THAT ISLAMIC BEIRUT IS FULL OF AGENTS FROM
ALL SIDES AND ACCORDINGLY WE ARE WORKING DAY AND
NIGHT TO PURGE OUR REGION OF ANY SUBVERSIVE ELEMENT
OF THE  MOSSAD, CIA OR ALLIED INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES.  WE ADDRESS A FINAL WARNING TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS RESIDING  IN OUR ISLAMIC REGIONS TO
RESPECT OUR HOSPITALITY AND NOT TO EXPLOIT THEIR
PRESENCE AMONG US TO UNDERTAKE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
AGAINST US.  ASSUMING THE PROFESSION OF A JOURNALIST,
MERCHANT, INDUSTRIALIST, SCIENTIST AND RELIGIOUS
MAN WILL FROM NOW ON BE OF NO AVAIL TO SPIES
STAYING AMONG US.  THEY HAVE BEEN EXPOSED, AND THEIR
PUNISHMENT IS WELL KNOWN.  ON THE OTHER HAND, WE
LEARNED THAT SWITZERLAND IS PLANNING TO BUY WEAPONS
AND PILOTLESS RECONNAISSANCE PLANES FROM THE
ZIONIST STATE.  WE WARN BERNE AGAINST MAKING SUCH
A STEP AS IT WILL REMOVE FROM IT ITS NEUTRAL
CHARACTER AND THREATEN ITS INTERESTS, ESTABLISHMENTS
AND NATIONALS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAMIC AND WESTERN WORLD."
"WE HAVE DELAYED RELEASING THIS
STATEMENT UNTIL THE THREE WERE TAKEN OUTSIDE BEIRUT."
END TEXT. 

3.  INDIVIDUAL TAKING CALL SAID IT WAS FROM
THE "USUAL" MAN WHO CALLED, SPEAKING LEBANESE
ACCENTED ARABIC, ABOUT 1900 ON MARCH 17. 

BARTHOLOMEW

SECRET: FURTHER ON HIZBALLAH “MANIFESTO”

O 191237Z FEB 85
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1805
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
UNCLAS BEIRUT 01013 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

E.O. 12356:  NA
TAGS: PGOV PINT PTER LE IR
SUBJECT:  FURTHER ON HIZBALLAH "MANIFESTO" 

REF:  BEIRUT 992 

1.  AS REPORTED REFTEL, HIZBALLAH PUBLISHED ON FEBRUARY 16
FOR THE FIRST TIME IN LEBANON A POLITICAL "MANIFESTO."
HIZBALLAH'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVES, AS CITED FROM THE
MANIFESTO BY THE LOCAL FRENCH-LANGUAGE PRESS, FOLLOW. 

BEGIN TEXT. 

--  THE DEPARTURE OF THE ISRAELIS, PRELUDE TO THE
ANNIHILATION OF ISRAEL AND THE LIBERATION OF THE HOLY CITY
OF JERUSALEM. 

--  THE DEFINITIVE DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON OF THE UNITED
STATES, FRANCE, AND THEIR ALLIES AND THE END OF THE
INFLUENCE OF ANY COLONIALIST STATE OVER THE COUNTRY. 

--  THE JUDGMENT OF PHALANGE PARTY MEMBERS FOR ALL THE
CRIMES THEY HAVE COMMITTED AGAINST MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS,
WITH THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL. 

--  THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR ALL THE SONS OF OU
PEOPLE, AND FREEDOM OF CHOICE OF THE POLITICAL REGIME
WHICH THEY DESIRE. 

WE DO NOT HIDE, HOWEVER, OUR PREFERENCE FOR AN ISLAMIC
REGIME AND CALL ON EVERYONE TO CHOOSE IT, BECAUSE IT ALONE
GUARANTEES JUSTICE AND DIGNITY FOR ALL AND PREVENTS ANY
ATTEMPTS AT NEOCOLONIALIST INFILTRATION INTO OUR COUNTRIES 

END TEXT. 

2.  ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL PRESS, THE ABOVE OBJECTIVES
WERE CONTAINED IN A FIFTY-PAGE MANIFESTO ENTITLED "OPEN
LETTER TO THE OPPRESSED OF LEBANON AND THE WORLD."  THE
MANIFESTO WAS PRESENTED BY SHEIKH HASSAN GHIBRISS,
SPOKESMAN OF THE "HIZBALLAH NATION," TO A GATHERING OF
ABOUT 1000 SUPPORTERS ON FEBRUARY 16 IN THE SOUTHERN
BEIRUT SUBURB OF SHIYAH. 

3.  SEVERAL SHIITE AND SUNNI RELIGIOUS LEADERS REPORTEDLY
ATTENDED THE GATHERING, MOST NOTABLY SHEIKHS SOBHI TUFAYLI
HASSAN NASRALLAH, AND JALAL EDDIN ARKANDAN.  HOWEVER, BOTH
HIZBALLAH "SPIRITUAL GUIDE" SHEIKH FADLALLAH AND TAWHIID
MOVEMENT LEADER SHEIKH SHA'BAN WERE ABSENT DUE TO THEIR
CURRENT VISIT TO IRAN WHERE, ACCORDING TO LEBANESE
TELEVISION, THEY WERE RECEIVED BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI ON
FEBRUARY 15. 

4.  WE WOULD ALSO DRAW ADDRESSEES' ATTENTION TO FBIS
GF190720 AND GF190722 IN WHICH TEHRAN RADIO REPORTS
A MEETING ON FEBRUARY 16 BETWEEN SHEIKH FADLALLAH AND
GRAND AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI FOLLOWING WHICH THE TWO
RELIGIOUS LEADERS CALLED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN
ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON. 

BARTHOLOMEW

TOP-SECRET: THE HIZBALLAH “MANIFESTO”

P 050846Z MAR 85
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2022
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 01351 

E.O. 12356:  NA
TAGS: PINT PTER LE
SUBJECT:  HIZBALLAH "MANIFESTO" 

REF:  BEIRUT 1013 

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ARTICLE WHICH APPEARED IN
FEBRUARY 23 "MIDDLE EAST REPORTER."  IT SUMMARIZES
48-PAGE HIZBALLAH TRACT ISSUED ON FEBRUARY 16 (REFTEL).
EMBASSY HAS REQUIRED ORIGINAL ARABIC-LANGUAGE TEXT OF
FULL MANIFIESTO, WHICH WE WILL POUCH TO INR AND
NEA/ARN. 

BEGIN TEXT. 

"HIZBULLAH" DEFINES ITS MILITANT POLICY
--------------------------------------- 

"HIZBULLAH" (PARTY OF GOD) HAS NOW PUBLICLY DEFINED ITS
POLICY, GOALS AND IDEOLOGY.  AS A GROUP OF FUNDAMENTALIST
SHIITES, THEY ARE DEDICATED TO PROMOT ISLAM ON THE
PATTERN OF KHOMEINI'S REVOLUTION IN IRAN.  THEY DERIVE
THEIR APPELATION FROM TWO KORANIC VERSES WHICH READ:
(1) "AND WHO SO TAKETH ALLAH AND HIS MESSANGER AND THOSE
WHO BELIEVE FOR FRIEND (WILL KNOW THAT), LO* THE PARTY
OF ALLAH THEY ARE THE VICTORIOUS." (SURAH 5/56); (2)
"THOU WILT NOT FIND FOLK WHO BELIEVE IN ALLAH AND HIS
MESSENGER, EVEN THOUGH THEY BE THEIR FATHERS OR THEIR
SONS OR THEIR BRETHREN OR THEIR CLAN.  AS FOR SUCH, HE
HATH WRITTEN FAITH UPON THEIR HEARTS AND HATH STRENGTHENED
THEM WITH A SPIRIT FROM HIM, AND HE WILL BRING THEM INTO
GARDENS UNDERNEATH WHICH RIVERS FLOW, WHEREIN THEY WILL
ABIDE.  ALLAH IS WELL PLEASED WITH THEM, AND THEY ARE
WELL PLEASED WITH HIM.  THEY ARE ALLAH'S PARTY, LO* IS
IT NOT ALLAH'S PARTY WHO ARE THE SUCCESSFUL.  (SURAH
58/22-23). 

ANNIVERSARY: MARKING THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE
VIOLENT DEATH OF THE MOSLEM CLERIC SHEIKH RAGHEB HARB,
THE IMAM OF THE VILLAGE OF JABSHIT IN SOUTH LEBANON,
"HIZBULLAH" STAGED A MASS RALLY AT THE CHIYAH SUBURB
SATURDAY, FEB. 16, 1985.  SHEIKH HARB WAS A STAUNCH
OPPONENT OF ISRAEL OCCUPATION, AND AN ADVOCATE OF
"HIZBULLAH" AND THE RISE OF A PAN-ISLAMIC "NATION OF THE
PARTY OF GOD."  HE WAS ASSASSINATED REPORTEDLY BY
ISRAEL'S AGENTS IN HIS NATIVE VILLAGE ON FEB. 16, 1984. 

THE ORGANIZATION SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITY TO REFUTE THE
ACCUSATION THAT IT WAS A HAND OF TERRORISTS.  IT UNDER-
LINED ITS ALLEGIANCE TO "WELAYAT AL FAQIH" (RULE OF THE
THEOLOGIAN) UNDER IRAN'S AYATULLAH RUHALLAH KHOMEINI.
AMERICA, FRANCE, ISRAEL AND THE PHALANGE PARTY WERE
DECLARED AS ITS PRIME ENEMIES.  IT DESCRIBED THE PRESENT
LEBANESE SYSTEM AS "DESPOTIC" AND RENOUNCED THE REGIME
OF PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL. 

OPENING THE MEETING, SHEIKH GHABRIS SAID THAT "HIZBULLAH"
WAS "MISLEADINGLY DESCRIBED AS A HANDFUL OF FANATICS BENT
ON KILLING, PLUNDER AND ROBBERY;" AND THAT THEY WERE
"BLAMED FOR EVERY UNPLEASANT INCIDENT."  "BUT," HE
EMPHASIZED, "IT WAS "HIZBULLAH" WHICH ACTIVATED THE
(FREEDOM) FIGHTERS AND EXPELLED THE ENEMY." 

MANIFESTO: LATER SHEIKH IBRAHIM AL AMIN READ OUT AT THE
RALLY A 48-PAGE "MESSAGE" DEDICATED TO THE "MARTYR
SHEIKH RAGHEB HARB" WHICH WAS TANTAMOUNT TO A MANIFESTO
OF THE PARTY. (SEE MER OF FEB. 19, PAGE ').  THIS WAS
THE FIRST TIME "HIZBULLAH" DEFINED ITS MILITANT POSITION
AND IDEOLOGY SINCE IT MADE ITS IMPACT ON LEBANESE
POLITICS IN THE PAST TWO YEARS.  THE MESSAGE IDENTIFIED
THE MOSLEM FUNDAMENTALIST MEMBERS OF "HIZBALLAH" AS "THE
CHILDREN OF THE NATION WHOSE VANGUARD IN IRAN WAS
BESTOWED WITH VICTORY." 

"THIS VANGUARD," THE MESSAGE WENT ON, "HAS LAID THE
FOUNDATION OF A PAN-ISLAMIC STATE UNDER THE WISE GUIDANCE
OF THE FULLY QUALIFIED FAQIH AYATULLAH RUHALLAH KHOMEINI.
"HIZBULLAH" MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT HAD NO CARD-CARRYING
MEMBERS, "BUT IT IS LINKED TO ALL MOSLEMS IN THE WORLD
BY THE STRONG IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL BOND OF ISLAM." 

EAST AND WEST:  THE STATEMENT ATTACKED THE "HAUTY" POWERS
OF THE EAST AND WEST ALIKE.  IT SAID: "AMERICA HAS TRIED,
THROUGH ITS LOCAL AGENTS, TO CONVEY THE IMPRESSION THAT
THOSE WHO DESTROYED ITS ARROGANCE IN LEBANON AND FOILED
ITS CONSPIRACIES WERE BUT A HANDFUL OF FANATIC TERRORISTS
WHO HAVE NO MISSION BUT TO BLOW UP LIQUOR STORES,
GAMBLING CASINOS AND AMUSEMENT MACHINES." 

THE STATEMENT POINTED OUT THAT SUCH PRACTICES WERE ONLY
MARGINAL DEALING WITH THE TAIL INSTEAD OF THE HEAD. "WE
ARE HEADED FOR DEALING WITH EVIL AT THE ROOTS, AND THE
ROOTS ARE AMERICA," IT SAID, AND STRESSED THAT NOTHING
WILL TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER FIGHTING THE U.S.
"HIZBULLAH" BELIEVES THAT BOTH WESTERN CAPITALISM AND
EASTERN COMMUNISM HAVE FAILED TO PROVIDE THE REQUIREMENTS
OF THE MASSES.  "THE ANSWER LIES IN THE MISSION OF ISLAM,"
IT SAID. 

DEMANDS:  THE DECLARATION DEMANDED: 1. COMPLETE EVACUATION
OF ISRAEL ARMY FROM LEBANON "AS A PRELUDE FOR THE REMOVAL
OF ISRAEL FROM EXISTENCE AND LIBERATING JERUSALEM FROM
CLAWS OF OCCUPATION."  2. "AMERICA, FRANCE AND THEIR
ALLIES MUST LEAVE LEBANON ONCE AND FOR ALL, AND ANY
IMPERIAL INFLUENCE IN THE COUNTRY MUST BE TERMINATED."
3. "THE PHALANGISTS MUST BE SUBJECTED TO JUSTICE AND BE
BROUGHT TO TRIAL FOR ALL THE CRIMES THEY HAVE COMMITTED
AGAINST THE MOSLEMS AND THE CHRISTIANS WITH ENCOURAGEMENT
FROM AMERICAN AND ISRAEL."  4. "ALL OUR LEBANESE PEOPLE
MUST BE GIVEN THE CHANCE OF DETERMINING THEIR FUTURE
AND CHOOSES THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THEY WANT, BEARING
IN MIND THAT WE WILL NOT GIVE UP OUR COMMITMENT TO THE
RULE OF ISLAM." 

POLITICAL "MARONISM":  THE POLICY OF THE LEADERS OF
"POLITICAL MARONISM" AS IMPLEMENTED THROUGH THE "LEBANESE
FRONT" AND THE "LEBANESE FORCES" MILITIA CAN NEVER
ACHIEVE PEACE OR STABILITY FOR THE CHRISTIANS, SAID
"HIZBULLAH".  "IT IS A POLICY BASED ON FANATICISM,
SECTARIAN PRIVILEGES AND ALLIANCE WITH IMPERIALISM AND
ISRAEL," IT ADDED. 

UNIFIL:  THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING FORCE
(UNIFIL) OPERATING IN SOUTH LEBANON, IS ACCUSED
BY "HIZBULLAH" OF STANDING AS A "BUFFER" IMPEDING
THEIR RESISTANCE AND "MAINTAINING ISRAELI'S
SECURITY AND INVADING FORCES."  "HIZBULLAH"
DOES NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SHOWDOWN
WITH UNIFIL "IF IT CONTINUED TO CONNIVE WITH THE
ENEMY." 

OTHER ARAB STATES "ANXIOUSLY SEEKING PEACE WITH
ISRAEL" ALSO CAME UNDER FIRE FROM "HIZBULLAH".
THEY WERE URGED INSTEAD TO CLOSE THEIR RANKS,
DEFINE THEIR AIMS PRECISELY AND BREAK THE
FETTERS RESTRICTING THEIR WILL. 

MARCH:  ARMED MEMBERS OF "HIZBULLAH WERE REPORTED
TO HAVE MARCHED INTO SIDON MONDAY, FEB. 18,
AND TORE LEBANESE FLAGS AND PICTURES OF PRESIDENT
GEMAYEL.  (SEE MER OF FEB. 19, PAGE 2).  THEY
SMASHED A NUMBER OF STORES AND SUPER MARKETS
SELLING LIQUOR, AND RAISED IRANIAN FLAGS AND
PORTRAITS OF THE IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADER
AYATULLAH KHOMEINI.  THE ACTION WAS SEEN AS A
BACKLASH TO THE VISIT TO THE CITY THE DAY BEFORE
BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL JEERED BY THE ARMED DEM-
ONSTRATORS "THE SHAH OF LEBANON". 

THE GEMAYELS:  IN ITS STATEMENT, "HIZBULLAH"
LASHED OUT AGAINST PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL AND HIS
BROTHER THE LATE BASHIR.  IT SAID:  "THE BUTCHER
BASHIR HAD REACHED THE PRESIDENCY WITH THE
HELP OF ISRAEL, THE ARAB OIL PRINCES AND SYCOPHANT
MOSLEM MPS FLATTERING THE PHALANGISTS." 

"THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY AN ATTEMPT TO RECTIFY HIS
REPUGNANT IMAGE BY AN EXERCISE CALLED THE
"SALVATION COMMITTEE," WHICH WAS BUT AN
AMERICAN-ISRAELI BRIDGE USED BY THE PHALANGISTS
TO ACHIEVE CONTROL OVER THE OPPRESSED PEOPLE.
HOWEVER, OUR PEOPLE COULD NOT TOLERATE SUCH
HUMILIATION.  THEY DASHED THE DREAMS OF THE
ZIONISTS AND THEIR ALLIES.  AMERICA NEVERTHELESS,
PERSISTED IN ITS FOLLIES AND BROUGHT (PRESIDENT)
AMIN GEMAYEL TO SUCCEED HIS BROTHER.  THE FIRST
THING HE DID WAS TO DESTROY THE HOUSES OF THE
DISPLACED PEOPLE FROM THE SOUTH, DEFILE THE
ISLAMIC MOSQUES, ORDER THE ARMY TO BOMBARD THE
DOWN-TRODDAN SUBURB AND DESTRUCT  THE HOUSES
ON THEIR OCCUPANTS, AND TO CALL IN NATO FORCES
TO HELP HIM AGAINST US, CONCLUDE THE NOTORIOUS
17 MAY ACCORD WITH ISRAEL WHICH WOULD HAVE
TRANSFORMED LEBANON INTO AN ISRAELI PROTECTORATE
OR AN AMERICAN COLONY." 

U.S. AND NATO:  "HIZBULLAH" DECLARED "CLEARLY
AND FRANKLY" THAT "WE FEAR NO ONE BUT GOD, AND
WE CANNOT TOLERATE INJUSTICE, AGGRESSION AND
HUMILIATION."  IT WENT ON TO ANNOUNCE:  "THE
UNITED STATES AND ITS NATO PARTNERS AND THE
ZIONIST STATE WHICH HAS USURPED THE HOLY ISLAM
LAND OF PALESTINE, HAVE EXERCISED, AND ARE STILL
EXERCISING AGGRESSION ON US WITH A VIEW TO
HUMILIATING US.  WE, THEREFORE, ARE ALWAYS ON
THE ALERT AND CONSTANTLY GIRDING OURSELVES TO
REPEL THE AGGRESSION AND DEFEND OUR RELIGION,
EXISTENCE AND DIGNITY."  END TEXT. 

LYNE

CONFIDENTIAL: HIZBALLAH CALLS FOR ISLAMIC REPUBLIC IN LEBANON

P 181159Z FEB 85
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1795
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
UNCLAS BEIRUT 00992 

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PINT PTER LE
SUBJECT: HIZBALLAH CALLS FOR ISLAMIC REPUBLIC IN LEBANON 

1.  IN A STATEMENT PUBLISHED IN BEIRUT NEWSPAPERS ON
FEBRUARY 18, HIZBALLAH DECLARED ITS ALLEGIANCE TO
AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND PLEDGED TO ESTABLISH "REVOLUTION-
ARY ISLAMIC RULE" IN LEBANON.  STATEMENT DENIED THAT
HIZBALLAH WOULD ESTABLISH ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST RULE
BY FORCE, BUT "WE DO NOT HIDE OUR COMMITMENT TO
ISLAMIC RULE, AND WE CALL ON ALL PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THIS
REGIME.  WE WILL FIGHT ABSOLUTISM TO ITS ROOTS." 

2.  STATEMENT IS REPORTED BY LOCAL PRESS TO BE
HIZBALLAH'S FIRST PUBLIC MANIFESTO. 

BARTHOLOMEW

TOP SECRET CIA ‘OFFICIAL HISTORY’ OF THE BAY OF PIGS: REVELATIONS

TOP SECRET CIA ‘OFFICIAL HISTORY’ OF THE BAY OF PIGS: REVELATIONS

‘Friendly Fire’ Reported as CIA Personnel Shot at Own Aircraft
New Revelations on Assassination Plots, Use of Americans in Combat

National Security Archive FOIA Lawsuit Obtains Release of Last Major Internal Agency Compilation on Paramilitary Invasion of Cuba

Washington, D.C., August 24, 2011 – In the heat of the battle at the Bay of Pigs, the lead CIA field operative aboard one of the transport boats fired 75mm recoilless rifles and .50-caliber machine guns on aircraft his own agency had supplied to the exile invasion force, striking some of them.  With the CIA-provided B-26 aircraft configured to match those in the Cuban air force, “we couldn’t tell them from the Castro planes,” according to the operative, Grayston Lynch. “We ended up shooting at two or three of them. We hit some of them there because when they came at us…it was a silhouette, that was all you could see.”

This episode of ‘friendly fire’ is one of many revelations contained in the Top Secret multi-volume, internal CIA report, “The Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation.”  Pursuant to a Freedom of Information lawsuit (FOIA) filed by the National Security Archive on the 50th anniversary of the invasion last April, the CIA has now declassified four volumes of the massive, detailed, study–over 1200 pages of comprehensive narrative and documentary appendices.

Archive Cuba specialist Peter Kornbluh, who filed the lawsuit, hailed the release as “a major advance in obtaining the fullest possible record of the most infamous debacle in the history of the CIA’s covert operations.” The Bay of Pigs, he noted, “remains fundamentally relevant to the history of the CIA, of U.S. foreign policy, and of U.S. intervention in Cuba and Latin America. It is a clandestine history that must be understood in all its inglorious detail.”

In an article published today in the “Daily Beast,” Kornbluh described the ongoing “FOIA wars” with the CIA to obtain the declassification of historical documents the CIA continues to keep secret. He characterized the process of pressing the CIA to release the Official History and other historically significant documents as “the bureaucratic equivalent of passing a kidney stone.”

The “Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operations” was written between 1974 and 1984 by Jack Pfeiffer, a member of the Agency’s staff who rose to become the CIA’s Chief Historian. After he retired in the mid 1980s, Pfeiffer attempted to obtain the declassification of Volumes 4 and 5 of his study, which contained his lengthy and harsh critiques of two previous official investigations of the Bay of Pigs: the report of the Presidential Commission led by Gen. Maxwell Taylor; and the CIA’s own Inspector General’s report written in the aftermath of the failed assault. Both the Taylor Commission and the IG report held the CIA primarily responsible for the failure of the invasion—a position Pfeiffer rejected.  The CIA released only the Taylor critique, but Pfeiffer never circulated it.

According to Kornbluh, Pfeiffer saw as his mission to spread the blame for the debacle of “JMATE”—the codename for the operation—beyond the CIA headquarters at Langley, VA.  Kornbluh characterized the study as “not only the official history, but the official defense of the CIA’s legacy that was so badly damaged on the shores of Cuba;” and he predicted its declassification “would revive the ‘who-lost-Cuba’ blame game” that has accompanied the historical debate over the failed invasion for fifty years.

The Archive is posting all four volumes today.  They are described below:

Volume 1: Air Operations, March 1960 to April 1961 (Part 1| Part 2 | Part 3)

The opening volume examines the critical component of the invasion—the CIA-created air force, the preliminary airstrikes, and the air battle over Cuba during the three day attack.  The study forcefully addresses the central “who-lost-Cuba” debate that broke out in the aftermath of the failed invasion. It absolves the CIA of blame, and places it on the Kennedy White House and other agencies for decisions relating to the preliminary airstrikes and overt air cover that, according to the Official History, critically compromised the success of the operation.  “[I]in its attempts to meet its official obligations in support of the official, authorized policy of the U.S. government—to bring about the ouster of Fidel Castro—the agency was not well served by the Kennedy White House, Secretary of State Rusk, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the U.S. Navy,” the CIA historian concludes.  “The changes, modifications, distortions, and lack of firm, positive guidance related to air operations—the key to the success or failure of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Castro—make clear that the collapse of the beachhead at Playa Giron was a shared responsibility.  When President Kennedy [during his post-invasion press conference] proclaimed his sole responsibility for the operation there was more truth to his statement than he really believed or than his apologists will accept.”

Besides the ‘friendly fire” episode, Volume 1 contains a number of colorful revelations. Among them:

  • Only days before the invasion, the CIA tried to entice Cuba’s top diplomat, foreign minister Raul Roa, to defect. “Our contact with Raul Roa reports that this defection attempt is still alive although Roa would make no firm commitment or promise on whether he would defect in the U.N.,” operations manager, Jacob Esterline, noted in a secret April 11, 1961 progress report on invasion planning. “Roa has requested that no further contact be made at this time.” Like the invasion itself, the Agency’s effort for a dramatic propaganda victory over Cuba was unsuccessful. “The planned defection did not come off,” concedes the Official History.
  • In coordination with the preliminary airstrike on April 14, the CIA, with the support of the Pentagon, requested permission for a series of “large-scale sonic booms” over Havana—a psychological operations tactic the Agency had successfully employed in the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954.  “We were trying to create confusion, and so on,” a top-level CIA invasion planner stated. “I thought a sonic boom would be a helluva swell thing, you know. Break all the windows in downtown Havana…distract Castro.” Trying to maintain “plausible denial” of Washington’s role, the State Department rejected the request as “too obviously U.S.”  The Official History records General Curtis  Lemay demanding on the telephone to know “who was the sonofabitch who didn’t approve” the request.
  • Several damaged invasion airplanes made emergency landings on the Grand Cayman Islands, and were seized by local authorities. The situation created an awkward diplomatic situation with Great Britain; details of the negotiations between the U.S. and England are redacted but the CIA did suggest making the argument that if the planes were not released, Castro would think the Caymans were being used as a launch site for the invasion and respond aggressively.
  • As Castro’s forces gained the upper hand against the invasion, Agency planners reversed a decision against widespread use of napalm bombs “in favor of anything that might reverse the situation in Cuba in favor of the Brigade forces.”
  • Although the CIA had been admonished by both the Eisenhower and Kennedy White House to make sure that the U.S. hand did not show in the invasion, during the fighting headquarters authorized American pilots to fly planes over Cuba.  Secret instructions quoted in the Official History state that Americans could pilot planes but only over the beachhead and not inland. “American crews must not fall into hands enemy,” warned the instructions. If they did “[the] U.S. will deny any knowledge.”  Four American pilots and crew died when their planes were shot down over Cuba. The Official History contains private correspondence with family members of some of the pilots.

Volume II: “Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy” (Part 1 | Part 2)

Volume 2 provides new details on the negotiations and tensions with other countries which the CIA needed to provide logistical and infrastructure support for the invasion preparations. The volume describes Kennedy Administration efforts to sustain the cooperation of Guatemala, where the main CIA-led exile brigade force was trained, as well as the deals made with Gen. Anastacio Somoza and his brother Luis, then the President of Nicaragua. The Official History points out that CIA personnel simply took over diplomatic functions from the State Department in both countries. “In the instance of Guatemala, the U.S. Ambassador for all practical purposes became ‘inoperative’; and in Nicaragua the opposite condition prevailed—anything that the Agency suggested received ambassadorial blessing.”  Among the revelations:

  • While attending John F. Kennedy’s inauguration in Washington in January 1961, General Anastacio Somoza met secretly with CIA director Allen Dulles to discuss the creation of JMTIDE, the cryptonym for the airbase the CIA wanted to use in Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua to launch the attack on Cuba. Somoza explicitly raised Nicaragua’s need for two development loans totaling $10 million. The CIA subsequently pressed the State Department to support the loans, one of which was from the World Bank.
  • President Luis Somoza demanded assurances that the U.S. would stand behind Nicaragua once it became known that the Somozas had supported the invasion. Somoza told the CIA representative that “there are some long-haired Department of State liberals who are not in favor of Somoza and they would welcome this as a source of embarrassment for his government.”
  • Guatemalan President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes repeatedly told CIA officials that he wanted to “see Guatemalan Army and Air Force personnel participate in the air operations against Castro’s Cuba.”
  • The dictator of the Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo, offered his country’s territory in support of the invasion. His quid pro quo was a U.S. assurance to let Trujillo “live out the rest of his days in peace.” The State Department rejected the offer; Trujillo, whose repression and corruption was radicalizing the left in the Dominican Republic, was later assassinated by CIA-backed groups.

Volume III: “Evolution of CIA’s Anti-Castro Policies, 1951- January 1961”

This volume provides the most detailed available account of the decision making process in the White House, CIA and State Department during the Eisenhower administration that led to the Bay of Pigs invasion.  The CIA previously declassified this 300-page report in 1998, pursuant to the Kennedy Assassination Records Act; but it was not made public until 2005 when Villanova professor of political science David Barrett found it in an obscure file at the National Archives, and first posted it on his university’s website.

This volume contains significant new information, and a number of major revelations, particularly regarding Vice-President Richard Nixon’s role and the CIA’s own expectations for the invasion, and on CIA assassination attempts against Fidel Castro.

  • A small group of high-level CIA officials sought to use part of the budget of the invasion to finance a collaboration with the Mafia to assassinate Castro. In an interview with the CIA historian, former chief of the invasion task force, Jacob Esterline, said that he had been asked to provide money from the invasion budget by J.C. King, the head of the Western Hemisphere. “Esterline claimed that on one occasion as chief/w4, he refused to grant Col J.C. King, chief WH Division, a blank check when King refused to tell Jake the purpose for which the check was intended. Esterline reported that King nonetheless got a FAN number from the Office of Finance and that the money was used to pay the Mafia-types.”  The Official History also notes that invasion planners discussed pursuing “Operation AMHINT to set up a program of assassination”—although few details were provided.   In November 1960, Edward Lansdale, a counterinsurgency specialist in the U.S. military who later conceived of Operation Mongoose, sent the invasion task force a “MUST GO LIST” of 11 top Cuban officials, including Che Guevera, Raul Castro, Blas Roca and Carlos Raphael Rodriguez.
  • Vice-President Nixon, who portrayed himself in his memoirs as one of the original architects of the plan to overthrow Castro, proposed to the CIA that they support “goon squads and other direct action groups” inside and outside of Cuba. The Vice President repeatedly sought to interfere in the invasion planning.  Through his national security aide, Nixon demanded that William Pawley, “a big fat political cat,” as Nixon’s aide described him to the CIA, be given briefings and access to CIA officers to share ideas. Pawley pushed the CIA to support untrustworthy exiles as part of the effort to overthrow Castro. “Security already has been damaged severely,” the head of the invasion planning reported, about the communications made with one, Rubio Padilla, one of Pawley’s favorite militants.
  • In perhaps the most important revelation of the entire official history, the CIA task force in charge of the paramilitary assault did not believe it could succeed without becoming an open invasion supported by the U.S. military. On page 149 of Volume III, Pfeiffer quotes still-secret minutes of the Task Force meeting held on November 15, 1960, to prepare a briefing for the new President-elect, John F. Kennedy: “Our original concept is now seen to be unachievable in the face of the controls Castro has instituted,” the document states. “Our second concept (1,500-3000 man force to secure a beach with airstrip) is also now seen to be unachievable, except as a joint Agency/DOD action.”

This candid assessment was not shared with the President-elect then, nor later after the inauguration. As Pfeiffer points out, “what was being denied in confidence in mid-November 1960 became the fact of the Zapata Plan and the Bay of Pigs Operation in March 1961”—run only by the CIA, and with a force of 1,200 men.

Volume IV: The Taylor Committee Investigation of the Bay of Pigs

This volume, which Pfeiffer wrote in an “unclassified” form with the intention of publishing it after he left the CIA, represents his forceful rebuttal to the findings of the Presidential Commission that Kennedy appointed after the failed invasion, headed by General Maxwell Taylor.  In the introduction to the 300 pages volume, Pfeiffer noted that the CIA had been given a historical “bum rap” for “a political decision that insured the military defeat of the anti-Castro forces”—a reference to President Kennedy’s decision not to provide overt air cover and invade Cuba after Castro’s forces overwhelmed the CIA-trained exile Brigade. The Taylor Commission, which included Attorney General Robert Kennedy, he implied, was biased to defend the President at the expense of the CIA. General Taylor’s “strongest tilts were toward deflecting criticism of the White House,” according to the CIA historian.

According to Pfeiffer, this volume would present “the first and only detailed examination of the work of, and findings of, the Taylor Commission to be based on the complete record.”  His objective was to offer “a better understanding of where the responsibility for the fiasco truly lies.” To make sure the reader fully understood his point, Pfeiffer ended the study with an “epilogue” consisting of a one paragraph quote from an interview that Raul Castro gave to a Mexican journalist in 1975. “Kennedy vacillated,” Castro stated. “If at that moment he had decided to invade us, he could have suffocated the island in a sea of blood, but he would have destroyed the revolution. Lucky for us, he vacillated.”

After leaving the CIA in the mid 1980s, Pfeiffer filed a freedom of information act suit to obtain the declassification of this volume, and volume V, of his study, which he intended to publish as a book, defending the CIA. The CIA did eventually declassify volume IV, but withheld volume V in its entirety. Pfeiffer never published the book and this volume never really circulated publicly.

Volume V: The Internal Investigation Report [Still Classified]

Like his forceful critique of the Taylor Commission, Pfeiffer also wrote a critique of the CIA’s own Inspector General’s report on the Bay of Pigs—“Inspector General’s Survey of Cuban Operation”–written by a top CIA officer, Lyman Kirkpatrick in 1961. Much to the surprise and chagrin of top CIA officers at the time, Kirkpatrick laid the blame for the failure squarely at the feet of his own agency, and particularly the chief architect of the operation, Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell. The operation was characterized by “bad planning,” “poor” staffing, faulty intelligence and assumptions, and “a failure to advise the President that success had become dubious.” Moreover, “plausible denial was a pathetic illusion,” the report concluded. “The Agency failed to recognize that when the project advanced beyond the stage of plausible denial it was going beyond the area of Agency responsibility as well as Agency capability.” In his cover letter to the new CIA director, John McCone, Kirkpatrick identified what he called “a tendency in the Agency to gloss over CIA inadequacies and to attempt to fix all of the blame for the failure of the invasion upon other elements of the Government, rather than to recognize the Agency’s weaknesses.”

Pfeiffer’s final volume contains a forceful rebuttal of Kirkpatrick’s focus on the CIA’s own culpability for the events at the Bay of Pigs.  Like the rest of the Official History, the CIA historian defends the CIA against criticism from its own Inspector General and seeks to spread the “Who Lost Cuba” blame to other agencies and authorities of the U.S. government, most notably the Kennedy White House.

When Pfeiffer first sought to obtain declassification of his critique, the Kirkpatrick report was still secret.  The CIA was able to convince a judge that national security would be compromised by the declassification of Pfeiffer’s critique which called attention to this extremely sensitive Top Secret report.  But in 1998, Peter Kornbluh and the National Security Archive used the FOIA to force the CIA to declassify the Inspector General’s report. (Kornbluh subsequently published it as a book: Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba.) Since the Kirkpatrick report has been declassified for over 13 years, it is unclear why the CIA continues to refuse to declassify a single word of Pfeiffer’s final volume.

The National Security Archive remains committed to using all means of legal persuasion to obtain the complete declassification of the final volume of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation.


TOP-SECRET FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVES: Did NATO Win the Cold War?

Documentary supplement to the article “Did NATO Win the Cold War? Looking over the Wall,” by Vojtech Mastny, Foreign Affairs 78, no. 3 (May-June 1999): 176-89
April 23, 1999


This documentary supplement to the article, “Did NATO Win the Cold War? Looking over the Wall,” has been prepared on the occasion of the Washington summit marking the 50th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is intended to provide the reader with the most important sources referred to in the text of the article that are relevant to the view of NATO “from the other side.”

Some of the sources have been obtained as a result of the project on the “Parallel History of the Cold War Alliances,” conducted by the National Security Archive in cooperation with the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. More information about the project can be found on the websites of the two institutions.

Other sources were made available through the National Security Archive’s partner organization, the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, and have been published in its Bulletin. More information about the Project can be found on its website.

The documents refer to the text of the article according to the numbers that appear on its margins. They are published in full or in part, as indicated, and are preceded by brief introductions explaining their origins. In some cases, reproductions of the original documents are included as samples.

Catherine Nielsen and John Martinez, both of the National Security Archive, assisted in the preparation of the texts for online publication.

Vojtech Mastny

Document 1.

George F. Kennan, the architect of America’s policy of containment and a frequent critic of its execution, was U.S. ambassador to Moscow in one of the darkest years of the Cold War, 1952. On September 8, 1952, shortly before he was expelled from the Soviet Union as a persona non grata, he sent a dispatch to Washington in which he tried to assess NATO from the Soviet point of view. In retrospect, he regarded this assessment so important that he included it as the only appendix to his volume of memoirs published in 1971. While some of Kennan’s conclusions may not have withstood the test of time, his warning against being “fascinated and enmeshed by the relentless and deceptive logic of the military equation” remained topical throughout the Cold War.

[George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1950-1963 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971, pp. 327-51]

Document 2.

A confidential information bulletin provided by Soviet intelligence to top eastern European party leaders has been preserved in the files of the Czechoslovak communist party central committee in Prague. As shown on the sample, the reports sometimes quoted verbatim statements made by high Western officials at top secret meetings.

The bulletin included the following passage referring to the alleged American disclosure at a secret NATO meeting in December 1950:

“In connection with their failures in Korea the Americans apparently intend to provoke in the summer of 1951 a military conflict in eastern Europe with the goal of seizing the eastern zone of Austria. To realize this goal, the Americans intend to utilize Yugoslavia.”

[“O deiatelnosti organov Severo-atlanticheskogo Soiuza v sviazi s sozdaniem atlanticheskoi armii i remilitarizatsiei zapadnoi Germanii,” February 1951, 92/1093, 100/24, Central State Archives, Prague; translated by Svetlana Savranskaya, National Security Archive]
Document 3.

Karel Kaplan, an official researcher who had enjoyed unlimited access to the Czechoslovak communist party archives prior to his defection to the West, learned about a meeting with Stalin on January 9-12, 1951, from one of its participants, the country’s minister of defense Alexej Cepicka. In 1978, Kaplan created a stir by publishing his findings, suggesting that Stalin had told his eastern European followers to prepare for an offensive war against Western Europe:  “After a report by representatives of the bloc about the condition of their respective armies, Stalin took the floor to elaborate on the idea of the military occupation of the whole of Wurope, insisting on the necessity of preparing it very well.

Since the Korean War had demonstrated the military weakness of the United States, despite its use of highly advanced technology, it seemed appropriate to Stalin to take advantage of this in Europe. He developed arguments in support of the following thesis: `No European army is in a position to seriously oppose the Soviet army and it can even be anticipated that there will be no resistance at all. The current military power of the United States is not very great. For the time being, the Soviet camp therefore enjoys a distinct superiority. But this is merely temporary, for some three or four years. Afterward, the United States will have at its disposal means for transporting reinforcements to Europe and will also be able to take advantage of its atomic superiority. Consequently, it will be necessary to make use of this brief interval to systematically prepare our armies by mobilizing all our economic, political, and human resources. During the forthcoming three or four years, all of our domestic and international policies will be subordinated to this goal. Only the total mobilization of our resources will allow us to grasp this unique opportunity to extend socialism throughout the whole of Europe.'”

[Karel Kaplan, Dans les Archives du comité central: Trente ans de secrets du bloc soviétique, Paris: Michel, 1978, pp. 165-66; translated by Vojtech Mastny]

Another record of the Moscow meeting, written shortly afterward by its Romanian participant, Minister of the Armed Forces Emil Bodnaras, has been preserved in Bucharest and was published there in 1995. According to this document, Stalin urged a buildup of the eastern European armies to deter an American attack rather than to prepare them for an attack on western Europe. But his insistence on exploiting what he regarded as current American weakness to achieve combat readiness within three years could be interpreted as a call for offensive action at the right time. The three-year framework he mentioned corresponded to the period of “maximum danger” that also underlay NATO’s contemporary plans for the development of its armed forces –another indication that those secret plans were no secret to Stalin.

[C. Cristescu, “Ianuarie 1951: Stalin decide înarmarea Romanei,” Magazin Istoric, 1995, no. 10, pp. 15-23; translated by Vladimir Socor]
Document 4.

This description of presumed Soviet military capabilities is from one of the annual estimates compiled by NATO from 1950 onward and is preserved in its archives in Brussels.

[“Estimate of the Relative Strength and Capabilities of NATO and Soviet Bloc Forces at Present and in the Immediate Future,” November 23, 1951, C8-D/4 (M.C. 33), International Staff, NATO Archives, Brussels]

Document 5.

The excerpt from the record of the 99th meeting of NATO’s Military Representatives Committee shows some of the doubts that spread by 1955 about the accuracy of the alliance’s estimates of Soviet capabilities:

[Record of 99th meeting of the Military Representatives Committee with the North Atlantic Council in Washington, 18 May 1955, International Military Staff, NATO Archives, Brussels]

Document 6.

The conclusive answer to the question of who started the Korean War and why could finally be given in 1995, following the release of the Soviet documents proving Kim Il Sung’s initiative and Stalin’s indispensable support. Some of the relevant documents were given by Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin to South Korean President Kim Young-Sam during his state visit to Moscow, others were subsequently made available from Russian archives. They were translated into English and published with commentaries for the first time by American historian Kathryn Weathersby in the Cold War International History Project Bulletin, nos. 5 and 6-7.

Go to Documents 7-10

OPERATIVE PSYCHOLOGIE DER STASI: DAS BEISPIEL – Wie die Stasi Strauß diffamierte

Der frühere CSU-Chef war der Lieblingsfeind der DDR. Er wurde sogar als “Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter mit Arbeitsakte” geführt. Mit allen Mitteln versuchte die Stasi ihn zu verunglimpfen//

Die Anweisung des “Genossen Minister” ist unmissverständlich: “Die Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung X benötigt für operative Zwecke die folgenden Materialien: dokumentarische Unterlagen über die Militär- und Studienzeit von Strauß sowie über Hitler- und Bundeswehr-Generale, Offiziere und andere Personen, mit denen Strauß nach 1945 bis heute eng zusammenarbeitete bzw. die mit Strauß, seiner Politik und seinen Machenschaften in Verbindung standen oder stehen.”

So wichtig war Erich Mielke dieser Auftrag, dass der Chef des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit (MfS) am 1. Juli 1970 außerdem befahl: “In jedem Falle bin ich über den Wert und den Inhalt des Materials zu informieren.”

Die Causa Strauß war also Chefsache. Das ist kein Wunder. Der Bayer Franz Josef Strauß, seinerzeit der eigentliche Oppositionsführer im Bundestag und von 1978 bis zu seinem Tod 1988 bayerischer Ministerpräsident, war als Wortführer der Entspannungskritiker ein Todfeind der DDR. Im Stasi-Deutsch bedeutete “operative Zwecke” nichts anderes, als den CSU-Vorsitzenden zu diffamieren. Dem sich selbst “antifaschistisch” nennenden SED-Regime galt dies als eine “normale” Art der Auseinandersetzung.

Vergangenen Mittwoch hat die Stasiunterlagen-Behörde in Berlin erstmals die Einträge von 16 Bundespolitikern in den geheimnisumwitterten “Rosenholz”-Akten veröffentlicht, der zufällig erhaltenen Sicherheitskopie jener Kartei, in der die DDR-Auslandsspionage ihre “Kontaktpersonen” verzeichnet hatte. In der Legislaturperiode 1969 bis 1972 hatte der DDR-Auslandsgeheimdienst Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HV A) die Akten angelegt. Fünf bundesdeutsche Parlamentarier waren der Stasi zu Diensten. Elf, darunter auch der frühere Kanzler Willy Brandt und SPD-Fraktionschef Herbert Wehner, hingegen wurden ohne ihr Wissen “abgeschöpft”.

Strauß war bei der Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung unter der Nummer XV / 19816 / 60 als “IM-Vorgang mit Arbeitsakte” registriert. Doch die HV A unterschied nicht zwischen aktiven und abgeschöpften Personen – alle wurden gleichermaßen als “Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter mit Arbeitsakte” geführt. Natürlich war Strauß nie ein Spitzel der Stasi – diese Erkenntnis ist wenig überraschend, wenn man an seinen rabiaten Antikommunismus denkt, der erst an Schärfe verlor, als er 1983 einen “Milliardenkredit” westdeutscher Banken an die DDR eingefädelt hatte.

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Die jetzt freigegebenen “Rosenholz”-Unterlagen hat die Birthler-Behörde ergänzt um Papiere aus anderen Teilen der Stasiunterlagen. Sie belegen, wie das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit gegen Franz Josef Strauß gearbeitet hat.

Seine Akte beginnt mit Mielkes Befehl vom 1. Juli 1970. Die nächsten 27 Blatt hat die Birthler-Behörde nicht veröffentlicht, sondern erst wieder einen handgeschriebenen “Maßnahmeplan zum Forschungsvorgang “Michel”” – so lautete der Tarnname für die Operation. Der nicht namentlich gezeichnete Entwurf stellte fest: “Das Ziel der Bearbeitung des Vorganges ist einmal die allseitige Aufklärung der Person des Strauß’ und dessen Tätigkeit in der Zeit des Faschismus.” Dazu zählten für die Stasi seine Mitgliedschaft in NS-Organisationen wie dem “Nationalsozialistischen Kraftfahrerkorps” und dem “NS-Studentenbund” sowie sein Dienst in der Wehrmacht von 1939 bis 1942. “Hier interessieren besonders Einheiten und deren Einsätze, Hinweise auf begangene Kriegsverbrechen und seine Verbindung zum US-Geheimdienst.”

Einiges einfallen ließ sich die Stasi, um die Staatsfeinde zu diffamieren. Echte oder angebliche Verbrechen, die Personen ähnlichen Namens begangen hatten, wurden der Zielperson zugeordnet. Das schlug auch der “Maßnahmeplan” vor. Da ein Leutnant namens Strauß im September 1939 “in der polnischen Ortschaft Kolbuszowa Häuser niedergebrannt und polnische Kriegsgefangene bzw. Zivilpersonen ermordet” hatte, versuchte die Stasi, dieses Verbrechen dem CSU-Chef anzuhängen. Auch Verbrechen in der Sowjetunion versuchte die Stasi dem Bayer anzuhängen: “Ein Leutnant Strauß soll … beim Ausbruch aus dem Kessel von Stalingrad die Erschießung von 250 sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen angeordnet haben.”

Mielkes Auftrag ging an die Abteilung IX / 11 der Stasi, das sogenannte NS-Archiv. Die hier beschäftigten Geheimdienstler verfügten über Erfahrung mit solchen Aufträgen. So hatten sie Materialien zusammengestellt, die in den 60er-Jahren Bundespräsidenten Heinrich Lübke als “KZ-Baumeister” brandmarken sollten. Da die vorhandenen Unterlagen diesen Vorwurf eben nicht stützten, war so lange “verbessert” worden, bis der erwünschte Eindruck entstand.

Auch den einstigen Vertriebenenminister Theodor Oberländer und Adenauers Kanzleramtschef Hans Globke, Mitherausgeber des ersten amtlichen Kommentars zu den Nürnberger Rassengesetzen, bekämpfte die Stasi. Beide verurteilte die DDR mit manipulierten Dokumenten bei Schauprozessen in Abwesenheit zu lebenslanger Haft.

Am 6. August 1971 meldete Walter Heinitz, der Chef der Hauptabteilung IX, seinem Minister Erich Mielke Vollzug: “Auf der Grundlage des erteilten Auftrages wurden zur Vergangenheit des Franz Joseph Strauß … umfangreiche Überprüfungen durchgeführt.” Heinitz führte aus, was seine Mitarbeiter gefunden hatten, und resümierte dann: “Diese Materialien sind geeignet, unmittelbar in die von der HV A X geplanten Maßnahmen zur Person Strauß einbezogen zu werden.”

Das war eine wagemutige Übertreibung. Denn die in Strauß’ Vergangenheit schnüffelnden Stasi-Offiziere hatten eben nichts Belastendes über den CSU-Vorsitzenden ans Licht gebracht. Die von Heinitz weitergereichten Unterlagen enthielten nur sehr allgemeine Angaben zu den NS-Organisationen, in denen Strauß unstreitig Mitglied gewesen war. Doch konkrete Hinweise auf seine Beteiligung an Kriegsverbrechen gab es nicht.

In den gerade einmal elf freigegebenen von insgesamt 164 Seiten dieser Anti-Strauß-Akte finden sich keine Hinweise auf die weitere Verwendung des Berichts. In den zahlreichen in der Bundesrepublik veröffentlichten kritischen Büchern über ihn, die oft von der DDR bezahlt wurden, spielte die NS-Zeit kaum eine Rolle. Die Diffamierung von Strauß als “Nazi” ist der Stasi misslungen. In anderen Fällen hatte die Stasi Erfolg. Nur die Birthler-Behörde kann über den Umfang aufklären, wenn sie die Akten endlich vollständig offenlegt.

http://www.welt.de/print-wams/article145822/Wie_die_Stasi_Strauss_diffamierte.html

STASI-METHODE: ZERSETZUNG DURCH OPERATIVE PSYCHOLOGIE A LA “GoMoPa”

In der Sprache der Stasi, die gewollte und bewusste Zerstörung von Persönlichkeiten, und deren Isolation aus ihrem sozialen Umfeld mit Hilfe psychologischer und psychiatrischer Kenntnisse. Um die Anerkennung durch die Weltöffentlichkeit und lukrative Geschäftsbeziehungen nicht zu gefährden, hat die DDR ab den 70er Jahren ihren offenen Terror gegen ihre Bürger durch subtile Methoden ersetzt. „Operative Psychologie“ war Pflichtfach in der Ausbildung der Stasi- Offiziere an der juristischen Hochschule des MfS. Auch wenn es sich um “um aufgeblasenen Dilletantismus auf dem Niveau geheimpolizeilicher Ratgeber-Literatur handelte”, so konnte der Schaden für einzelne Opfer enorm sein. Ein Schwerpunkt war dabei die „ fürsorglich freundschaftliche Führung der Inoffiziellen Mitarbeiter“ (IM), der andere das systematische „Zersetzen“ Andersdenkender. Die Stasi war ja auch eine militärische Organisation, damit ist die Herleitung vom Begriff der „Wehrkraftzersetzung “ aus der NS- Zeit nicht ungewöhnlich. Auf der MfS Hochschule lernte man, dass bei richtiger Anwendung der Zersetzungsmaßnahmen, diese in der Regel den Gegner hart treffen. Zugleich werde erreicht, dass er für längere Zeit über die tatsächlichen Ursachen seiner Misserfolge und Niederlagen in Unkenntnis bleibt. Es handelt sich um eine systematische und beabsichtigte Zerstörung der Person der politischen Gegner, bei der unter Mithilfe psychologischer Methoden Angst, Panik, Isolation, Zweifel an der eigenen geistigen Verfassung…, hervorgerufen wurden. Gemeint war dabei mit Zersetzung nach der Literatur, jedes denkbare Mittel die persönliche Integrität der Verfolgten zu untergraben. Der offene Terror war einer leisen Zerstörung von Menschen mit Mitteln der Psychologie, Diskreditierung, Verunglimpfung, direkter Verleumdung, Fotomontagen, Vortäuschen eines unmoralischen Lebenswandels der zu zersetzenden Person oder deren Partners, Verbreiten von Gerüchten, Telefonterror, Kriminalisierung durch fingierte Delikte der Betroffenen, heimliche Wohnungseinbrüche, Verunsicherung, … gewichen. Mit zum Zeitpunkt der Wende 91.000 hauptamtlichen und rund 175.000 IM war immerhin etwa 1% der Bevölkerung der ehemaligen DDR- Bevölkerung nebenberuflich und 0,5% hauptberuflich für die Stasi tätig. Auch war der Stasi für einen IM wohl nicht jeder recht, das Anforderungsprofil (Pingel- Schliemann Seite 166ff) für eine IM- Tätigkeit liest sich wie die Suche nach den besonders intelligenten, charmanten und beliebten Mitbürgern. Absagen der fürsorglich angeworbenen waren wohl eher selten, obwohl diese abgesehen von den seltenen Fällen in denen beispielweise Gefängnisinsassen erpresst wurden, ohne wesentliche Konsequenz geblieben sind. Dieser „Nebentätigkeit“ gingen Menschen aller Berufsgruppen nach, darunter auch bekannte Anwälte, Ärzte und Oberkirchenräte. In manchem Oberkirchenrat sollen die IMs zumindest zeitweise die Mehrheit gestellt haben. IMs gab es auch unter Psychologen, Psychiatern und sonstigen Therapeuten. Sie verieten ihre Patienten ebenso wie manche Anwälte oder Kirchenobere die dafür sorgten, dass die Friedensbewegung unterstüzende Pfarrer versetzt und degradiert wurden. In den letzten Jahren der DDR wurden ca 19000 Personen/Jahr von Zersetzungsmaßnahmen betroffen.

Im Rahmen dieser Zersetzungsmaßnahmen trugen die Stasimitarbeiter mit dazu bei systematisch und geplant Eltern von ihren Kinder zu entfremden, Ehen zu zerstören, Karrieren und das Ansehen von Betroffenen zu zerstören. In regelhaft unterwanderten oppositionellen Gruppen wurde gegenseitiges Misstrauen und Rivalitäten erzeugt, ihre Mitglieder systematisch diskreditiert, deren berufliche Karriere zerstört. Ein nebenberuflich als IM tätiger Chefarzt bezeichnete systematisch die Diagnosen einer Assistenzärztin sowohl in der Röntgenbesprechung als auch bei den Visiten falsch, bis sich kein Patient mehr von ihr behandeln lassen wollte, gemeinsam mit anderen IM-Ärzten warf er ihr vor Dienstpläne nicht einzuhalten. (Pingel- Schliemann Seite 224ff) Ärzte sollen im Auftrag der Stasi einer schwangeren Frau absichtlich ein gefälschtes Gutachten ausgestellt haben, sie habe Krebs. Es gab heimlich Wohnungseinbrüche, bei denen einfach nur Gegenstände verrückt wurden, oder ganz bestimmte (unbedeutende) Gegenstände entwendet wurden oder Bilder umgehängt wurden um die Person zu verunsichern. Fingierte Briefe an Freunde und Familienmitglieder, die die Illoyalität der „feindlichen Person“ gegenüber Freunden und Familienmitgliedern beweisen sollten. Oft wurde eine Vielzahl von „Maßnahmen der Zersetzung“ gegen einzelne Personen eingesetzt.

Diese Zersetzung galt auch nach der Wende als überwiegend nicht strafwürdig. Es handelte sich auch um einen schwerwiegenden Missbrauch psychologischer Methoden. Die Einweisung von Dissidenten in psychiatrische Kliniken war nur eine Methode Psychiatrie und Psychologie im Sinne einer Diktatur zu missbrauchen. Diese Methode löste damals unter Chruschtschow in der Sowjetunion die Schauprozesse Stalins ab . Zersetzen, im Sinne eines hochsystematischen Mobbings durch eine allmächtige Institution gehört zu den unmenschlichsten Arten der Folter einer terroristischen Diktatur. Erschreckend ist nicht nur, dass es fast unbemerkt und wenig beachtet vor unserer Westdeutschen Haustür stattgefunden hat, sondern auch, dass die systematische Aufarbeitung nur unzureichend langsam erfolgt. Ähnlich wie in der Nazizeit haben auch bei dieser Diktatur sehr viele sonst brave Bürger als IM bei der geplanten Zerstörung ihrer Freunde, Eltern, Kinder, Nachbarn, Arbeitskollegen, Lehrer, Patienten, Klienten oder Vorgesetzten ohne schlechtes Gewissen einfach mitgemacht.

Quelel: Karl C. Mayer, Facharzt für Neurologie, Psychiatrie und Facharzt für Psychotherapeutische Medizin

TOP-SECRET: CIA Declassifies Oldest Documents in U.S. Government Collection

The Central Intelligence Agency today declassified the United States Government’s six oldest classified documents, dating from 1917 and 1918. These documents, which describe secret writing techniques and are housed at the National Archives, are believed to be the only remaining classified documents from the World War I era. Documents describing secret writing fall under the CIA’s purview to declassify.

“These documents remained classified for nearly a century until recent advancements in technology made it possible to release them,” CIA Director Leon E. Panetta said. “When historical information is no longer sensitive, we take seriously our responsibility to share it with the American people.”

One document outlines the chemicals and techniques necessary for developing certain types of secret writing ink and a method for opening sealed letters without detection. Another memorandum dated June 14, 1918 – written in French – reveals the formula used for German secret ink.

“The CIA recognizes the importance of opening these historical documents to the public,” said Joseph Lambert, the Agency’s Director of Information Management Services. “In fiscal year 2010 alone, the Agency declassified and released over 1.1 million pages of documents.”

The documents will be available on CIA.gov and in the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST) at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. CREST currently houses over 10 million pages of declassified Agency documents. Since 1995, the Agency has released over 30 million pages as a result of Executive Orders, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Privacy Act, and mandatory declassification reviews.

Secret-writing-document-one

Secret-writing-document-two

Secret-writing-document-three

Secret-writing-document-four

Secret-writing-document-five

Secret-writing-document-six

 

SECRET: PEACE COMMISSIONER TELLS AMBASSADOR ABOUT PENDING PROBLEMS WITH DEMOBILIZED PARAMILITARIES

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FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 004988 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2015
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER TELLS AMBASSADOR ABOUT PENDING
PROBLEMS WITH DEMOBILIZED PARAMILITARIES 

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) 

-------
SUMMARY
------- 

1.  (C) Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo said in a May
26 meeting with Ambassador Wood that he expects dissident
factions of the paramilitary groups to demobilize soon.  The
GOC expects to confront the few remaining paramilitary groups
who refused to lay down their arms.  Restrepo said the GOC is
concerned about the emergence of a new generation of criminal
organizations, and called on the Prosecutor General's Office
(Fiscalia) to begin Justice and Peace legal processing as
soon possible.  End summary. 

---------------------------------
LAST TWO DEMOBILIZATIONS EXPECTED
--------------------------------- 

2.  (C) Restrepo noted that the last two groups to demobilize
are the final faction of the Elmer Cardenas Bloc and the
Cacique Pipinta.  The Constitutional Court's press release on
the Justice and Peace (J&P) Law on May 18, however, had
persuaded them to postpone their demobilization until after
the presidential election.  This 800-strong faction of the
Elmer Cardenas Bloc, which was a dissident AUC bloc in Choco
and Antioquia departments, is led by one of the founders of
the AUC and a loyal friend of former AUC leader Carlos
Castano, AKA "El Aleman."Restrepo explained that the reason
behind the delay in demobilizing is that the GOC has not been
able to supply the necessary security in this crucial
corridor that leads to Panama.  The fear by the locals is
that the FARC, which is currently located in the south of
Choco Department, would take over once the bloc demobilizes. 

3.  (C) The CaciquiPipinta Bloc, which is a dissident
faction of the Central Bolivar Bloc, is made up of some 300
men that operate in the north of Caldas Department.  Even
though this group is linked with AUC political leader Ernesto
Baez, Restrepo explained that it really does not belong to
anyone, and the group members do not accept orders from Baez.
 The faction's leaders have told Restrepo they have not
wanted to associate themselves with Baez and other more
recognized AUC leaders like "Macaco" because they did not
want to link themselves with narcotrafficking.  Restrepo
noted that this group is mainly known to be involved in
extortion. 

--------------------------------------------- --------
REMAINING AND RE-EMERGING GROUPS, A MAJOR GOC CONCERN
--------------------------------------------- -------- 

4.  (C) Restrepo warned that the GOC was not going to accept
the demobilizations of any additional groups besides Elmer
Cardenas and Cacique Pipinta.Restrepo had already
instructed the Operational Community for Laying Down Arms
(CODA), which certifies the demobilization of the individual
deserters, not to accept anymore AUC members.  He thought it
was important that the GOC demonstrate its willingness to
confront these groups. 

5.  (C) One group that has chosen not to demobilize, the
Martin Llanos Bloc, located in Casanare Department, has been
in inconclusive talks with the GOC for sometime now.
Restrepo described his talks with this group among the most
difficult and complicated.  Restrepo said he gets the
"chills" every time he talks to them.  Their philosophy is
very similar to the FARC; they want the GOC to offer them
territory to control.  According to Colombian intelligence
reports, some factions of this bloc are being regrouped into
new criminal organizations led by Hector Buitrago, who is the
father of Martin Llanos. 

6.  (C) Restrepo explained that the GOC is calling this
phenomenon the "new emerging anti-communist criminal groups," 

of which there are between 10 to 30 (reftel).  One of the
most prominent is the New Generation Group (ONG) located in
the Pacific Coast of Narino Department and led by former
paramilitary leader "Varela," who has been associated with
the North Valle drug cartel.  Other groups that are becoming
well-known around the country are the "Aguilas" (Eagles) and
"Halcones" (Falcons). 

7.  (C) In a conversation Restrepo had with former AUC
founder Carlos Castano in 2003, Castano warned he was fearful
of the possibility of new groups forming whose membership
included former members of the mafia, AUC, and FARC.  This
combination would be very dangerous and hard to detect since
they would have the know-how and experience of the three
groups and they would operate in small groups of 8 to 10 men. 

8.  (C) The Ambassador related his most recent trip to Tumaco
on the Pacific Coast and how concerned he was with the
vulnerability of this region where problems of
overpopulation, poverty, drugs, lack of infrastructure, and
ELN and FARC pressure converged.  In conversations with
locals, he heard of the growing presence of the ELN and their
gradual involvement in the drug trade.  ELN fronts in Narino
appear to be independent from the ELN's Central Command
(COCE).

--------------------------------------------- ----
JUSTICE AND PEACE LISTS ON HOLD: FISCALIA FEARFUL
--------------------------------------------- ---- 

9.  (C) Restrepo warned the Fiscalia must start processing
those on the Justice and Peace list soon to avoid the risk of
"a return to the mountains".  Restrepo expressed frustration
with the Ministry of Interior and Justice (MoIJ) and the
Fiscalia for sitting on the lists that he turned in over a
month ago.  He said it took him three months to convince over
2,284 paramilitaries to sign up for J&P and now this effort
might be in vain.  Of the 2,284, only 200 to 250 had open
cases, which meant that over 2,000 were willing to testify to
things the State was not aware of or did not have sufficient
information about.  Moreover, there were 2,400 individuals in
prisons who have included their names on the lists.  This was
a historic opportunity that could go to waste if the Fiscalia
did not act quickly.  According to Restrepo, the Fiscalia
should at least focus on the 200 paramilitary leaders who
have open cases. 

10.  (C) Restrepo understood that the Fiscalia has been
unable to process all these cases at once, but should try to
focus its resources on this endeavor.  Instead, between the
MoIJ and the Fiscalia, they have been sending messages back
and forth to his office, in his view, to obstruct movement on
the lists.  Restrepo noted that his relationship with
Minister of Interior and Justice SabasPretelt was worsening.
Pretelt was constantly meeting with paramilitary leaders and
"speaking badly about him behind his back."  Restrepo said
Pretelt and Prosecutor General Mario Iguaran are fearful of
what is to come: Pretelt, because he will have a hard time
fulfilling the behind-the-scenes promises he made to these
individuals, and Iguaran, because he is primarily responsible
for the success of this process.  Restrepo criticized Pretelt
for having a poor understanding of the reality of the former
combatants.  For example, in a Cabinet meeting, Pretelt
reported that over 70 percent of demobilized paramilitaries
are currently employed and the true figure is close to 7
percent.  (In a May 29 meeting with the Ambassador, Pretelt
said 11,675 former paramilitaries are employed in one form or
another, or about 35 percent of the total.) 

--------------------------------------
ARMS BEING TURNED OVER TO THE FISCALIA
-------------------------------------- 

11.  (C) Restrepo told the Ambassador the GOC was in the
process of handing over to the Prosecutor General's Office
(Fiscalia) 128 tons of arms turned in by the demobilized 

paramilitaries.  The GOC would like to consolidate these arms
in one location as soon as possible since they are located in
23 different cites around the country.  The GOC's
Antiterrorist Analysis Interinstitutional Group
(GIAT)--responsible for registering the trafficking of
weapons--has already recorded and identified the origin of
the arms (septel).  The Fiscalia is supposed to use GIAT
records in its investigations and help determine which are to
be deposited or destroyed.  Restrepo said, for security
reasons, all explosive material that was turned over by the
demobilized blocs had already been destroyed.  Anecdotally,
Restrepo commented that in just one of the demobilizations,
1,500 grenades were handed over in a truck as if they had
been potatoes. 

------------------------------
AMBASSADOR WILL VOICE CONCERNS
------------------------------ 

12.  (C) The Ambassador said the GOC needs to do a better job
at monitoring the demobilized paramilitaries and cracking
down on these newly formed criminal groups (septel).  This
process cannot be voluntary; the State needs to go after
those unwilling to cooperate.  If there are insufficient
resources, the GOC needs to refocus its efforts.  The USG has
authorized aid to the GOC, but the monies cannot be delivered
if the GOC does not show strong commitment to the process.
WOOD

SECRET: SHIPMENT OF UAVS FROM IRAN TO VENEZUELA

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DE RUEHC #8302 0870151
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 242145Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 7721-7722
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0298-0299
S E C R E T STATE 028302 

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - CAPTION ADDED 

SIPDIS
NOFORN 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2034
TAGS: PARM PREL MASS ETTC TU VE IR
SUBJECT: (S) SHIPMENT OF UAVS FROM IRAN TO VENEZUELA 

REF: A. ANKARA 3
B. ANKARA 126 

Classified By: EUR/PRA Dir. Anita Friedt,
Reason 1.4 (b), (c) and (d) 

----------
BACKGROUND
----------- 

1. (S//NF) Venezuelan officials expected to receive a
shipment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and related
material from Iran, via Turkey, by May 2009. As of early
March, Venezuelan officials believed that the equipment would
be repackaged and labeled as electronic equipment, then
transported overland from Iran to Turkey. Once in Turkey,
the equipment would be loaded onto a maritime vessel for
continued shipment to Venezuela. The U.S. believes this
shipment constitutes arms and related materiel, which Iran is
prohibited from transferring pursuant to UN Security Council
Resolution 1747, paragraph 5. 

2. (S) This case appears to be similar to one from January
2009 where Iran attempted to ship drums of nitrate and
sulphite chemicals and dismantled laboratory instruments,
which could possibly be used for making bombs to Venezuela
via Turkey. In response to U.S. concerns that the shipment
may have been a violation of UNSCR 1747, Turkish officials
inspected the cargo and made a decision to return it to Iran.
(REFS A and B) 

--------------
ACTION REQUEST
-------------- 

3. (S) Drawing from the points in paragraph 5, which may be
left as a nonpaper, post is instructed to approach
appropriate-level Turkish officials and request that they
investigate this activity, and if the cargo is found to be in
violation of UNSCR 1747 that the GOT use all available means
to prevent the transshipment of this cargo and detain it. 

----------
OBJECTIVES
---------- 

4. (S) Post should seek to achieve the following:
-- Provide Turkish officials with information regarding
Iran,s attempt to ship unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and
related material to Venezuela via Turkey; 

-- Emphasize to the Turkish officials that UN Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, paragraph 5, prohibits Iran
from transferring any arms or related materiel; 

-- Emphasize that these goods are produced by an Iranian
entity listed in the Annex to UNSCR 1747. 

-- Urge the Government of Turkey (GOT) to take action against
this shipment pursuant to UNSCR 1747 and possibly 1737, and
in accordance with the GOT's laws and authorities; 

-- Thank the GOT for its willingness to interdict and take
positive action with regards to a similar shipment in
January. As a NATO Ally, we try to provide Turkey with as
much info as possible on these issues, which could help lead
them to take action in detaining shipments; and
-- Emphasized that, should we receive additional information
regarding this shipment, we will provide it as expeditiously
as possible. 

------------------------
TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER
------------------------ 

5. (S//REL Turkey) Begin talking points/non-paper: 

--We would like to share some information with you in an
effort to highlight a transfer of proliferation concern and
to ensure that Iran does not make use of your territory to
transfer items proscribed by UN Security Council resolutions
1737, 1747, and 1803. 

-- The U.S. has information indicating that Venezuelan
officials expected to receive a shipment of UAV and
UAV-related equipment from Iran by May 2009. 

-- As of early March, Venezuelan officials believed that the
equipment would be repackaged and labeled as electronic
equipment, then transported overland from Iran to Turkey.
Once in Turkey, the equipment would be loaded onto a maritime
vessel for continued shipment to Venezuela. 

--Venezuelan officials assessed that a shipment of
electronics coming from Turkey to Venezuela would be less
alerting than a shipment directly from Iran. 

--We believe these items are military UAVs and related items,
constituting arms and related materials and are thus captured
by UNSCR 1747 and subject to the asset freeze called for in
UNSCR 1737. 

-- UN Security Council Resolution 1747, paragraph 5,
prohibits Iran from supplying, selling or transferring any
arms or related materiel. It also requires all states to
prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their
nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and
whether or not such transfers originated in the territory of
Iran. 

--This system is produced by the Qods Aviation Industries. 

-- Qods Aeronautics Industries (aka Qods Aviations
Industries) is designated in the Annex to UNSCR 1747 and as
such these items would be subject to the asset freeze
provision of UNSCR 1737 regardless of whether the item is
MTCR- controlled or otherwise prohibited in paragraphs 3 or 4
of the resolution. 

-- As such, we request your assistance in preventing the
transfer of goods in violation of UNSCR 1747 and 1737. 

-- Additionally, it is possible that some UAV-related
equipment may be MTCR-controlled, per MTCR Item 12.A.1., if
the equipment is designed or modified to support other
Iranian UAVs that meet the Item 1.A.2. or 19.A.2. criteria.
Such items are included in document S/2006/815, the list of
items, materials, equipment, goods and technology related to
ballistic missile programs. Transfer of these items would be
a violation of UNSCR 1737 per paragraph 3. 

-- We deeply appreciate the Government of Turkey's continued
cooperation, support and willingness to enact prompt and
thorough efforts in promoting interdictions designed to
prevent the transfer of sensitive materials by Iran. 

END POINTS. 

---------------------
REPORTING REQUIREMENT
--------------------- 

6. (U) Post is instructed to report results of its efforts
as soon as possible. 

-----------------
POINTS OF CONTACT
----------------- 

7. (U) Washington points of contact for follow-up are and
Margaret Mitchell, ISN/CATR (mitchellmt2@state.gov) and Matt
Hardiman, EUR/PRA. 

8. (U) Department thanks post for its assistance. Please
slug all responses for ISN, EUR, NEA, IO, WHA, and T.
CLINTON

STATEMENT: Peter Ehlers and “GoMoPa”‘s “Shithousefly Blog”

Dear Readers,

I do not like to bother you at all with “Shithouse  Blogs”  but I represent a silent and fast growing  majority of honest people and companies who have been blackmailed by the serial fraudsters and cyberstalkers of the criminal East-Berlin  “GoMoPa” organisation.

These people asked me to report about the newest facts.

Therefore I unveil here new facts about these criminals to protect and to serve these people, their families, friends and companies:

It came to our attention that “GoMoPa” seems to be a very close ally of Peter Ehlers from Hamburg.

Meanwhile a lot of people doubt this identity is true.

The so-called “Peter Ehlers” has accused the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the German Minister of Finance, Wolfgang Schäuble and their processors, former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and former Minister of Finance, Peer Steibrück to be large scale criminals,  fraudsters and concealers.

Furthermore they distribute in Peter Ehlers and Klaus Maurischats  “Shithousefly Blog” real shitty news which just copy the real facts from Meridian Capital’s press release about the “Super-Shithousefly Klaus Maurischat detention and fake my name into it.

As you all are aware the German Criminal Police is investigating these and many many more dirty deeds of these “Super-Shithouseflies.”

The case numbers are numerous. The last one is: ST/0148943/2011

We keep you informed.

Sincerely yours

Magister Bernd Pulch

P.S. You all know what happens with “Super-Shitflies”…

SECRET: ITALY: FM D’ALEMA ON KOSOVO, AFGHAN NGO DETAINEE,

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7637
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0550
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RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0430
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 8544
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 2462
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0733
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0393
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000710 

SIPDIS 

NOFORN
SIPDIS 

DEPT. FOR EUR 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: PREL NATO UNSC EUN IT
SUBJECT: ITALY: FM D'ALEMA ON KOSOVO, AFGHAN NGO DETAINEE,
MEPP, LEBANON, IRAN SANCTIONS, GUANTANAMO AND ABU OMAR

REF: A. STATE 36991
     B. STATE 37005
     C. STATE 41871
     D. STATE 42573
     E. ROME 625
     F. ROME 702 

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD SPOGLI, REASONS 1.4 B AND D. 

SUMMARY
------- 

1. (C/NF) Amb. Spogli got FM D'Alema's agreement to make a
clear statement in support of the Athisaari plan for Kosovo
and was told that the FM did not think he could or should
control an Italian NGO threatening to close its hospitals in
Afghanistan unless one of its employees was released by the
Afghan Government.  During an April 5 tour d'horizon, the
Ambassador and FM also discussed Iran sanctions (D'Alema said
Italy was applying the rules thoroughly), the Middle East
peace process (D'Alema worried the Israelis and Palestinians
would miss an opportunity for progress), Lebanon (where
everything but UNIFIL is at an impasse, according to the FM),
and the Abu Omar case.  The Ambassador briefed D'Alema on the
request that Italy consider taking some Guantanamo detainees
to help speed the closure of the facility.  D'Alema said
trying to close Guantanamo was a noble step and that if Italy
could help, it would try to do so (see also septel on
Guantanamo).  End Summary. 

Afghanistan and Emergency Now
----------------------------- 

2. (C/NF) On April 5, Ambassador Spogli and Foreign Minister
D'Alema discussed key issues on the foreign policy agenda.
The Ambassador raised concerns about the statements of Gino
Strada, head of the Italian NGO Emergency Now, who was
threatening to close his hospitals in Afghanistan unless the
Afghan Government released one of his staff being held for
possible terrorist affiliations.  The Amb. said such an
unwelcome step would be punishing the Afghan people and asked
if D'Alema could help get Strada to stop making threats.
D'Alema replied that he had spoken with Strada, who told him
that if his employees are going to be arrested in
Afghanistan, he would move his operations to a country that
doesn't arrest his staff.  D'Alema told the Amb. that all
sides needed to show flexibility and that if the Afghan
Government had evidence against the individual being held, it
should be shared. D'Alema noted that Italy was grateful to
the U.S. Embassy in Kabul for helping secure Red Cross access
to the detained individual.  Then, somewhat exasperated, he
said, "Strada is who he is.  He runs an NGO. He is not part
of the Italian Government.  He says they cannot work in
Helmand without having contact with the Taliban.  He thinks
the Taliban have the legitimate support of the people there.
We have urged him to be prudent.  But we do not control him
and he feels threatened."  D'Alema then said that during the
Mastrogiacomo kidnapping the Taliban cell phones that were
traced all had Pakistani numbers, and that if terror bosses
could live carefree in a Pakistan that could not be
reproached because of its alliance with the U.S., we would
not win this war. 

Kosovo - Firm Support for Status
-------------------------------- 

3. (C/NF) The Ambassador noted that the Italian position on
the Athisaari plan for Kosovo had generated some confusion
and that a clear statement of support would be very helpful.
D'Alema emphatically insisted that Italy supported the
Athisaari plan's core status provisions ("they should not be
touched").  Italy continued to believe that some non-status
issues, like protection of religious sites and minority
rights, however, could still be improved.  He said there were
two unacceptable outcomes: continuing the status quo and a
unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. The latter
would tear Europe apart and pull the legal legs out from
under the European mission to Kosovo.  He argued that a UNSCR
was needed that would help soften the Russian position, and a
proposal needed to be crafted for Serbia - something
conditional with flexible rewards - that could be offered to
Belgrade when Serbia inevitably rejects Kosovar independence.
 Without these elements, the region could be destabilized, he
said.  He added that Italy had been clear in its talks with
Russia and everywhere else that it would absolutely support
Athisaari's core status proposal without prolonging talks and
without new negotiations.  The Ambassador asked if D'Alema
could make a public statement to that effect.  D'Alema agreed
to do so. 

Iran Sanctions - Italy in Compliance
------------------------------------  

4. (C/NF) The Ambassador asked how Iran sanctions were
proceeding for Italy, and noted our disappointment that when
action was taken against Bank Sepah in Italy all funds had
already been moved.  D'Alema said the Iranians knew it was
coming and were a step ahead, as they had been elsewhere.  He
added that when he had spoken with Larijani early in the week
to urge the release of the UK sailors, Larijani had protested
vigorously about the action against Bank Sepah.  D'Alema
asserted "we are applying the sanctions rules.  We are in
compliance.  But Italy is also the victim of the sanctions
and is excluded from negotiations with Iran and from the
group with primary responsibility for decisions on Iran,
despite being a UNSC member." 

Israel-Palestine: About to Miss an Opportunity?
--------------------------------------------- -- 

5. (C/NF) The Ambassador thanked D'Alema for his recent
helpful comments insisting that Palestinian leaders accept
the three Quartet conditions before Italian officials would
meet with them.  The FM said he feared a moment of
opportunity was being lost.  Abu Mazen was stronger than
before but needed to find a way to get results out of his
dialogue with Olmert.  Both sides, he said, need to be pushed
and encouraged.  Without progress the risk of violence would
increase.  He suggested what was needed now was a confidence
building phase with limited ambition focusing on releasing
prisoners, improving Palestinian quality of life, granting
more freedom of access/movement and getting credible security
assurances for Israel.  The Palestinians, he said, would
never accept an independent state within provisional borders,
because they believe this means they will never get final
status issues resolved.  He envisions an eventual regional
final status conference, but not until the open final status
questions have been resolved by the two sides.  He said with
both sides weak and lacking strategies to reach solutions,
the international community needed to step in and offer hope
for positive movement.  Europe should press the Palestinians
and the U.S. should press the Israelis in a coordinated
division of labor, he suggested, adding that the Palestinians
needed to hear the message that when the time comes, the U.S.
would be willing to push Israel to resolve the final status
issues.  He informed the Amb. that Abu Mazen would be in Rome
in the coming weeks. 

Lebanon - D'Alema Concerned
--------------------------- 

6. (C/NF) Turning to Lebanon, D'Alema said he was very
concerned because the only thing working there was UNIFIL.
Everything else was totally blocked.  Parliament was not
meeting.  Reconstruction was at a standstill.  The economy
was in danger.  There was no progress on the arms embargo or
Sheba Farms.  He said the Lebanon Contact Group meeting in
London had been a good step and hoped that the group would
meet at the political level to help bolster UN action.  He
also said some way had to be found to get Syrian buy-in or
the embargo would never work. 

Guantanamo Detainees - Closure a Noble Idea
------------------------------------------- 

7. (C/NF) The Ambassador briefed D'Alema on the request for
Italy to consider taking some of the 25 releasable Guantanamo
detainees who could not be returned to their countries of
origin.  D'Alema said it was a delicate issue, but the idea
of trying to close Guantanamo was noble, and if Italy could
find a way to help, it would.  The devil would be in
practicalities of whether Italy could take any of the
detainees. (See septel for PM and Min. of Interior views on
taking Guantanamo detainees.) 

Abu Omar - Pre-emptive Letters
------------------------------ 

8. (S/NF) D'Alema closed the hour-long meeting by noting that
he had asked the Secretary if the Department could send
something in writing to him explaining that the U.S. would
not act on extradition requests in the Abu Omar case if
tendered.  This, he explained, could be used pre-emptively by
the GOI to fend off action by Italian magistrates to seek the
extradition of the implicated Americans.  D'Alema said he
understood that L had discussed this with the Italian
Ambassador in Washington.Amb. Spogli explained that we were
waiting for the constitutional court to decide on the merits
of the case before deciding on our next steps, because Min.
of Justice Mastella had suspended action until that court
rendered a decision.  The FM noted that there was still the
risk of action by the magistrates at any time.  The
Ambassador agreed that we should work to avoid having
extradition requests forwarded.
SPOGLI

DIE STASI-“GoMoPa-“WARNLISTE 2010 ” ALS VORLAGE FÜR ERPRESSUNG, STALKING UND rufMORD

gomopa-warnliste-10-2010

Der Beweis: Magisterarbeit Bernd Pulch – http://www.kepplinger.de/node/50 – HOMEPAGE DES DOZENTEN

Liebe Leser,

hier der Beweis für meine Magisterarbeit auf der Webseite meines betreuenden Dozenten, Noelle-Neumann-Nachfolgers und LeiterS des

Institutes für Publizistik an der Universität Mainz, Dr. Hans Mathias Kepplinger:

Webseite:

http://www.kepplinger.de/node/50

Dr. Hans Mathias Kepplinger

Professor für Empirische Kommunikationsforschung
am Institut für Publizistik der Universität Mainz

Magisterarbeiten N-Z

Neubauer, Frank Richard
Die Presse- und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit der Bundesvereinigung der deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Bereichs Lobbying
Oktober 1995

Neumann, Barbara
Welche Selektionsmöglichkeiten gibt es zu bestimmten Zeiten im Hörfunk? Eine Inhaltsanalyse des in Köln empfangbaren Hörfunkprogramms vom 15. bis 31. März 1983
Aug. 1984

Nickels, Margret
Zeit und Raum im Film
April 1981

Nicolai, Axel
Herkunftsprofile von Mitarbeitern in Werbeagenturen
Juni 1995

Nies, Ulrich
Die optische Darstellung von Helmut Schmidt und Hans-Dietrich Genscher in der Bildberichterstattung des STERN während der Bundestagswahlkämpfe 1980 und 1982/83
Oktober 1985

Nuppeney, Burkhard
Arbeitsplatzbeschreibung einer Zeitungsredaktion
1978

Obergethmann, Jörg
Die Darstellung von Sieg und Niederlage in der Sportberichterstattung deutscher und österreichischer Tageszeitungen
März 1986

Oechsner, Sibylle
Die Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle Fernsehen (FSF)
März 1994

Oess, Markus
Public Relations für Banken
November 1995

Ohl, Gabriela
Selbstdarstellung und Fremddarstellung von Politikern in Tageszei-tungen. Eine Inhaltsanalyse der Presseberichterstattung während des Bundestagswahlkampfes 1976
März 1980

Ohliger, Angelika
Berufswege von Studienabbrechern – Befragung ehemaliger Studenten der Publizistik
März 1980

Pankowski, Holger
Medien im Meinungsstreit – Die erste Frankfurter Oberbürgermeister-Direktwahl im Spiegel der lokalen Presse und des hessischen Fernsehens
1997

Patzer, Karl-Heinz
Theorien der Nachrichtenauswahl. Systematische Darstellung empirischer Studien
Dezember 1985

Peter, Susanne
Expertenurteile über ausgewählte Print- und TV-Medien
Juni 1998

Peterhanwahr, Ralf
Jockel Fuchs als Chefredakteur der rheinland-pfälzischen SPD-Zeitung “Die Freiheit” während der Jahre 1957-1962
Februar 1995

Peters, Elke
Die Presseberichterstattung vor dem Rücktritt von Ministerpräsident Filbinger
April 1983

Pfeifer, Andreas
Funktion und Wirkung der Typographie, Herkunft, Lesbarkeit und Anmutung lateinischer Druckschriften
Februar 1993

Piella, Wulf
Der Einfluß von Erwartungen auf die Berichterstattung nach einem Ereignis – Am Beispiel der Fußballberichterstattung regionaler Zeitungen
1996

Pleines, Harald
Qualifikation von Ratsmitgliedern – Am Beispiel von Rüsselsheim
Oktober 1982

Pohlmann, Dirk
Begriff des Intellektuellen
Januar 1990

Pöttgens, Stephanie
Franz Alt. Biographie eines Journalisten
Juni 1989

Preikschat, Alfred
Die aktuelle Berichterstattung über die Friedensbewegung. Eine Untersuchung der Tagespresse und des Hörfunks zur Validierung eines inhaltsanalytischen Verfahrens
April 1988

Pulch, Bernd
Dolf Zillmanns Studien zur ‘Emotional-Arousal-Theory’
Januar 1987

Puschatzky, Yvonne
Prominentenprofile. Eine Analyse des FAZ-Fragebogens
September 1996

Püttmann, Jürgen
Deutschsprachige Hörfunksendungen ausländischer Sender. Eine Inhaltsanalyse
Oktober 1988

Quoos, Swantje
Die Leser des Spiegel 1949-1994
September 1995

Rausch, Astrid
Lifestyle als Mittel der Zielgruppensegmentierung in der Werbung
August 1995

Reigber, Dieter
Die regionale/lokale Berichterstattung des ERSTEN PRIVATEN FERNSEHENS und der Tageszeitungen im Bereich des Kabelpilotprojekts Ludwigshafen/Vorderpfalz – Ein inter-/ intramedialer Vergleich
Mai 1989

Rethelford, Peter
Blockwerbung oder Einzelspotstreuung? Experimentelle Untersuchung zur Wirkungsweise alternativer TV-Publikationsweisen
März 1987

Riedl, Peter
Problemlösungskompetenz der Parteien und Thematisierung von Problemen im Landtagswahlkampf in Baden-Württemberg 1988
September 1990

Rindsfüsser, Karsten
Die Darstellung des Journalismus in Heinrich Bölls “Die verlorene Ehre der Katharina Blum”
Oktober 1993

Rode, Utta
Pressekonzentration und journalistische Qualität
März 1984

Rofalski, Peter
Die Umstrukturierung der Unternehmenskommunikation bei Hoechst
Februar 2000

Rosenthal, Matthias
Der Einfluß von Sympathie oder Antipathie auf das journalistische Verhalten von Tageszeitungsredakteuren bei Konflikten um Politiker
April 1987

Rössler, Bernhard
Product Placement oder Unterbrecherwerbung? Der Einfluß der Präsentationsform eines Werbereizes auf Erinnerung und Beurteilung
März 1994

Sauer, Heike
Geschäftsberichte von Kommunikationsmedium zur Unternehmensdarstellung
August 1992

Schäfer, Markus
Komik im Fernsehen – Entwicklung eines Analyseinstrumentes
September 1995

Schäfer-Talanga, Gudrun
Der Journalist Werner Holzer
April 1990

Schaus, Anabel
Selbstkritik von Journalisten und Wissenschaftlern
Juli 1992

Schermuly, Gabi
Die Gesundheitsreform in der Presse
Oktober 1993

Scheufele, Bertram
Die Skandalierung von Günter Krause
November 1996

Schilling, Rainer
Die internationale Diskussion um den “free flow of information”
Juli 1982

Schindler, Winfried
Fotografien von Ronald Reagan und Leonid Breschnew im STERN und TIME-MAGAZINE
Dezember 1985

Schlarb, Armin
Politische Instrumentalisierung der Medien. Literaturstudie zum Wandel der politischen Kommunikation in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Juni 1988

Schlüter, Elmar
Darstellung von Sexualmoral in den Massenmedien
Oktober 1985

Schmitt, Christiane
Die Entwicklung des “AIDS-Blut-Skandals” 1993
Dezember 1994

Schmitt, Iris
Motive für den Konsum von Horrorvideos bei Jugendlichen
Juli 1989

Schmitt-Egenolf, Andreas
Individualkommunikation in neuen Netzen – Technische und historische Entwicklung der Telematik sowie Überlegungen zu deren Stand und Perspektive in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Juli 1988

Schmitz, Lothar
Der Einfluß von Massenmedien auf die Relevanz von Urteilskriterien (Priming)
Februar 1993

Schneider, Hans-Jürgen
Der optische Eindruck von Politikern. Experimenteller Vergleich zwischen Fernseh- und Hörfunkauftritten von Schmidt, Genscher, Strauß und Kohl
Dezember 1983

Schraewer, Claudia
Rhetorische Mittel bei der Skandalierung von Linda Reisch
Juli 2000

Schreck, Jutta
Einzelfallstudien zur Pressekonzentration
August 1986

Schriefers, Annette
Ansichten der Bevölkerung zur Rolle und zur Arbeitsweise von Journalisten
März 1992

Schröter, Frauke
Die Nachrüstungsdebatte in der Prawda
Oktober 1985

Schuck, Petra
Mißbrauch von Pressefotos – Literaturbericht
Oktober 1985

Schué, Severin
Die Darstellung von Medizin im Fernsehen
Mai 1995

Schug, Markus
Vergleichende Untersuchung der Lokalberichterstattung der beiden Mainzer Tageszeitungen
Juni 1993

Schulze, Andreas
Kultursponsoring in Deutschland
Februar 1995

Schwarz, Michael
Das Fernsehen in Jamaica
August 1990

Schweizer, Marie-Theres
Die Jugendfilmarbeit im Dritten Reich
Juli 1982

Selbka, Iwona
Beiträge polnischer Wissenschaftler zur Kommunikationsforschung
August 1984

Semela, Eva
Welche ökonomischen Auswirkungen auf die öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten besitzt die Einführung privaten Fernsehens?
September 1991

Sempert, Petra
Frageverhalten und Publikumsreaktion in Talkshows
Mai 1986

Severin, Petra
Geschlechterrollen und Lebensstile in der Werbung in Stern und Bunte von 1965 bis 1990. Eine Inhaltsanalyse der Werbeanzeigen in den beiden Zeitschriften Stern und Bunte
März 1991

Sidenstein, Ute
Gottfried Sello als Kunstkritiker in ‘Die Zeit’ von 1958 bis 1985
Oktober 1989

Siehl, Carsten
Virtuelle Realität. Grundlagen, Anwendungsbereiche und Kommunikationsaspekte einer neuen Medientechnologie
Juni 1995

Simons, Christian
Profil und Funktion der On-Air-Promotion. Eine Strukturanalyse der Programmwerbungen im deutschen Fernsehen
Juni 1996

Sinning, Hilka
Nachrichtenwerte – Die historische Entwicklung eines Forschungskonzeptes
Juli 1980

Spanier, Julia
Ausstrahlungseffekte von emotionalisierenden Werbespots
September 1993

Spiel, Ralph
Die Entwicklung der Filmtheater in der BRD seit 1970
Februar 1993

Staab, Christina
Der Bildungskandidat. Eine Analyse der Bewerbungsunterlagen zur Sendung ‘Der große Preis’
Dezember 1994

Staab, Joachim Friedrich
Der Einfluß der Pressestruktur auf die Berichterstattung über die Bundestagswahlen 1969-1983 aus der Sicht der Kandidaten
März 1985

Stein, Dorothee
Die Darstellung von Konrad Adenauer in der BRD während seiner Kanzlerzeit. Dargestellt am Beispiel der Berichterstattung der FAZ und des Nachrichtenmagazins Der Spiegel
Januar 1981

Stein, Simone
Horst Keller – Europa als Auftrag für einen Journalisten
Oktober 1994

Steinbach, Alexander
Präsentationselemente und Nachrichtenrezeption – Framing von Medieninhalten
September 1998

Steinborn, Annette
Die Bedeutung der Attributions-theorie für die Kommunikationswissenschaft
August 1986

Stienert, Heike
Vergleichende Analyse der Haus- und Kundenzeitschriften öffentlich-rechtlicher Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
November 1991

Stolz, Hans-Georg
Die redaktionelle Linie ausgewählter Publikationsorgane
August 1987

Storz, Sigrid
Der Einfluß von Bild und Text auf die Problemwahrnehmung und Ursachenzuschreibung von Fernsehzuschauern – Am Beispiel eines Beitrags über Umweltverschmutzung
Februar 1992

Strampe, Karsten
Gewerkschaftsarbeit im Rundfunk (Hörfunk und Fernsehen)
April 1980

Streicher, Jürgen
Der Stern und sein Gründer
März 1986

Streit, Achim
Gründe für Kommunikationskontrolle in Deutschland zwischen Reformation und Restauration
November 1986

Sturny, Dirk
Einfluß von Krisen-Typen auf Publikationsweisen. Eine Input-Output-Analyse anhand von zwei Beispielen
August 1997

Swoboda, Thilo
Der Einfluß von Medien auf politische Entscheidungen. Eine Befragung ehemaliger Bundestagsabgeordneter
August 1995

Szadzik, Carmen
Der Computer als Befragungsinstrument im persönlichen Interview und bei Selbstausfüllersystemen
Oktober 1993

Tesch, Roland
Die Wahrnehmung von Vergewaltigungsszenen im Fernsehen
Mai 1994

Topp, Elisabeth
Schemageleitete Rezeption von Hörfunk- und Zeitungsnachrichten
November 1991

Trares, Simone
Das “Luder” – eine Charaterfiktion der Boulevardpresse
April 2003

Tronsgard, Derek
Der Einfluss von Frames auf die Wirkung von Meldungen über die Gewalt gegen Ausländer
April 2003

Tscherner, Christine
Bedingungen von Thematisierungseffekten
September 1998

Tschullik, Astrid
Der publizistische Umgang von Journalisten mit Sozio- und Kultursponsoring
1994

Tullius, Christiane
Validierung von Inhaltsanalyse durch Tendenzeinschätzung
Oktober 1991

Unold, Michaela
Die Wirkung von Gewaltdarstellungen: Der relative Einfluß des Ereignisses – real vs. fiktional – bzw. der Darstellungsform – künstlich vs. natürlich – auf die Rezipienten
November 1989

Volb, Andrea
Journalisten-Preise in Deutschland
März 2000

Vollbracht, Matthias
Die Entwicklung der Werbeerlöse der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten in der Konkurrenz zu den privaten Anbietern
September 1993

Vondano, Ursula
Die kommunikationspolitischen Konzepte von CDU/CSU, SPD und FDP
Juli 1982

Wang, Yuquan
Entwicklung des chinesischen Fernsehens seit der Öffnungspolitik 1978
Januar 1999

Weiß, Christina
Image und Unternehmenskommunikation. Eine Image-Untersuchung über den Caritas-Verband Wiesbaden e.V.
Juli 1995

Weißbecker, Helga
Die Veränderungen der Themenschwerpunkte in den Hörfunk-Nachrichten des HR von 1955 bis 1985
Juni 1989

Wenderoth, Axel
Die wissenschaftliche Begleitforschung zu den Kabelpilotprojekten in Ludwigshafen, München, Dortmund und Berlin
Mai 1988

Weyand, Hans Arno
Redakteure von Anzeigenblättern
Dezember 1989

Winckler, Stefan
Der Journalist Gerhard Löwenthal
November 1994

Winkel, Julia
Von den Alternativzeitungen der 70er zu den Stadtmagazinen der 90er Jahre
März 1999

Winning, Karin
Konflikt zwischen Bild und Text. Experimentelle Untersuchung der Urteilsbildung
Januar 1985

Wolf, Marion
Die Mediennutzung in Deutschland seit 1945 – Eine Zusammenstellung von Literatur zu diesem Thema
April 1980

Wolf, Stefanie
Formale Gestaltung und inhaltliche Ausrichtung der FAZ, Welt, SZ 1951-1996
November 2001

Wolter, Renate
Zum Einfluß der bild- oder textorientierten Mediennutzung auf das Wissen und Verhalten von Vorschulkindern
November 1990

Wright, Claudia Sophie
Die Darstellung der Gentechnik in der Presse der USA. Eine vergleichende Analyse
März 1992

Zech, Stefan
Berufsverständnis von Motor-Journalisten
Juni 1993

Ziesemer, Dominique
Gründe für TV-Umschaltverhalten
April 1996

Zock, Peter
Planung und Realisierung der Unterhaltungssendung “Showfenster”
Mai 1991

Zwiebelberg, Martin
Die Darstellung von Rudolf Scharping in der Tagespresse
1997

DAS “HANDELSBLATT” ÜBER DIE FINGIERTEN “GoMoPa” – MUTMASSLICHE PARTNER VON PETER EHLERS UND GERD BENNEWIRTZ

http://www.handelsblatt.com/finanzen/boerse-maerkte/boerse-inside/finanzaufsicht-untersucht-kursachterbahn-bei-wirecard/3406252.html

TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE NSA: THE CUBA CRISIS 1962 UNVEILLED PART 2

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25_september_further_info

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TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE NSA: THE CUBA CRISIS 1962 UNVEILLED PART 1


january_handwritten_summary

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TOP-SECRET-CIA: Archives: Directors and Deputy Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency

Preface

On 17 December 2004, President George W. Bush signed into law the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, setting in motion the largest restructuring of American intelligence in almost 60 years. Among the changes (effective on 21 April 2005) were the abolishment of the positions of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) that had been established under the National Security Act of 1947, and the creation of the positions of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA). The responsibilities for Intelligence Community management that the DCI used to have were given to the DNI, and the DCIA is charged with running all activities of the CIA. The DCIA is nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate.

The position of Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DDCIA) was established by Agency regulation after the passage of the Intelligence Reform Act in 2004. The DDCIA assists the DCIA in carrying out the duties of that position and as necessary serves as Acting DCIA. The DDCIA is selected by the DCIA.

Porter Johnston Goss

TENURE AS DIRECTOR:
21 April 2005-5 May 2006

BIRTH:
November 1938, Waterbury, Connecticut

EDUCATION:
Yale University, B.A., 1960

APPOINTED:
Served as Director of Central Intelligence before transitioning into DCIA position when it came into existence and DCI position was abolished on 21 April 2005.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR:
Vice Admiral Albert M. Calland III, 21 July 2005-5 May 2006

EARLIER CAREER:

  • U.S. Army intelligence officer, 1960-62
  • Clandestine Service Officer, Central Intelligence Agency, 1962-1972
  • Small business owner, newspaper founder; member of the city council and mayor, Sanibel, Florida, 1974-1983
  • Commissioner, Lee County (Florida) Commission, 1983-1988; chairman, 1985-1986
  • Member of Congress, 14th District, Florida, 1989-2004
  • Chair, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 1997-2004
  • Co-chair, joint congressional inquiry into the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001

Michael Vincent Hayden

TENURE AS DIRECTOR:
30 May 2006-12 February 2009

BIRTH:
17 March 1945, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

EDUCATION:
Duquesne University, B.A., 1967, M.A., 1969

APPOINTED:
8 May 2006 by President George W. Bush; confirmed by Senate, 26 May 2006; sworn in, 30 May 2006

DEPUTY DIRECTORS:
Albert M. Calland III, until 23 July 2006; Stephen R. Kappes, 24 July 2006-12 February 2009

EARLIER CAREER:

  • Air Force intelligence officer, 1970-1984
  • Air Attaché in Bulgaria, 1984-1986
  • Political-Military Affairs Officer, Air Force Headquarters, 1986-1989
  • Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council, 1989-1991
  • Chief, Secretary of the Air Force Staff Group, 1991-1993
  • Director of Intelligence, US European Command, 1993-1995
  • Commander, Air Intelligence Agency, and Director, Joint Command and Control Warfare Center, 1996-1997
  • Deputy Chief of Staff, UN Command and US Forces Korea, 1997-1999
  • Director, National Security Agency, 1999-2005
  • Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence, 2005-2006

LATER CAREER:

  • Distinguished Visiting Professor at George Mason University
  • Member of Georgetown University’s cyber security team
  • Member of numerous corporate boards and advisory panels
  • Co-founder and principal of national security consulting firm
  • Writer, speaker

Leon Edward Panetta

TENURE AS DIRECTOR:
13 February 2009 to present

BIRTH:
28 June 1938, Monterey, California

EDUCATION:
Santa Clara University, B.A., 1960; Santa Clara University Law School, LL.B., 1963

APPOINTED:
9 January 2009 by President Barack Obama; confirmed by Senate, 12 February 2009; sworn in 13 February 2009

DEPUTY DIRECTOR:
Stephen R. Kappes, 13 February 2009 to 5 May 2010; Michael J. Morell, 6 May 2010 to present

EARLIER CAREER:

  • US Army, 1964-1966
  • Legislative assistant, US Senate, 1966-1969
  • Special Assistant to Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, and Director of Office of Civil Rights, 1969-1970
  • Executive Assitant, New York City Mayor John Lindsay, 1970-1971
  • Private law practice, 1971-1977
  • Member of Congress, 16th District, California, 1977-1993
  • Director, Office of Management and Budget, 1993-1994
  • White House Chief of Staff, 1994-1997
  • Co-director, Panetta Institute for Public Policy, 1998-2009

Deputy Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency

Albert Melrose Calland III

TENURE AS DEPUTY DIRECTOR:
15 July 2005-23 July 2006

BIRTH:
30 July 1952, Columbus, Ohio

EDUCATION:
US Naval Academy, B.S., 1974; Industrial College of the Armed Forces, M.S., 1996

APPOINTED:
29 April 2005 by Director of CIA Porter Goss; confirmed by Senate, 15 July 2005; sworn in, 15 July 2005

EARLIER CAREER:

  • Active duty, US Navy, 1974-1992
  • Commander, Seal Team one, 1995-1997
  • Commander, Naval Special Warfare Development Group, 1997-1999
  • Commander, Special Operations Command, CENTCOM, 2000-2002
  • Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command, 2002-2004
  • Associate Director for Military Support, Central Intelligence Agency, 2004-2005

Stephen Robert Kappes

TENURE AS DEPUTY DIRECTOR:
24 July 2006 to 5 May 2010

BIRTH:
22 August 1951, Cincinnati, Ohio

EDUCATION:
Ohio University, B.S., 1973; Ohio State University, M.S., 1975

APPOINTED:
30 May 2006 by Director of CIA Michael Hayden; confirmed by Senate, 23 July 2006; sworn in, 24 July 2006

EARLIER CAREER:

  • US Marine Corps, 1976-1981
  • Operations Officer, Central Intelligence Agency, 1981-2000
  • Associated Deputy Director of Operations for Counterintelligence, 2000-2002
  • Associate Deputy Director for Operations, 2002-2004
  • Deputy Director for Operations, 2004-2005
  • Private business, 2005-2006

Michael Joseph Morell

TENURE AS DEPUTY DIRECTOR:
6 May 2010 to present

BIRTH:
4 September 1958, Akron, Ohio

EDUCATION:
University of Akron, B.A., 1980; Georgetown University, M.A., 1984

APPOINTED:
14 April 2010 by Director of CIA Leon Panetta; sworn in, 7 May 2010

EARLIER CAREER:

  • Analyst and Analytic Unit Manager, Central Intelligence Agency, 1980-1996
  • Chief of President’s Daily Brief Staff, 1996-1998
  • Executive Assistant to Director of Central Intelligence, 1998-1999
  • Senior Executive, Director of Intelligence, 1999-2006
  • Deputy Director for Intelligence, National Counterterrorism Center, 2006
  • Associate Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 2006-2008
  • Director of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2008-2010

TOP-SECRET:Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the US Intelligence Community-CIA Archives

dci_leaders

CONFIDENTIAL. DEMARCHE RESPONSE: RELEASE OF TALIBAN PRISONERS

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INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0349
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0117
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0534
RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA PRIORITY 4415
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 6244
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY 2371
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0185
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0464
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 0273
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 0857
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0305
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0563
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0383
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA PRIORITY 1095
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0171
RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY 0774
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0598
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0536
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0446
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0272
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 3939
RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK PRIORITY 0038
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA PRIORITY 7088
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0511
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 3282
RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 2339
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0754
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN PRIORITY 6984
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0880
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 4418
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0358
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS PRIORITY 7230
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 4039
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0051
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 5390
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000186 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2017
TAGS: NATO PREF PTER PREL AF IT
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE RESPONSE: RELEASE OF TALIBAN PRISONERS 

REF: A. SECSTATE 36204 B. USNATO 183 

Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 

1.  (C) SUMMARY.  Anticipating reftel A, Ambassador Nuland,
during the March 21 North Atlantic Council meeting, joined
the UK in criticizing the evident Taliban-for-hostage
exchange in the release of kidnapped Italian journalist
Mastrogiacomo.  She also raised the issue separately with SYG
de Hoop Scheffer, who will address it with PermReps in a more
restricted forum, but is leaning toward pushing for an
Alliance-wide hostage policy.  USNATO believes NATO consensus
on a common policy will be hard to achieve, but the subject
is worth discussing to raise awareness.  END SUMMARY. 

2.  (C) During the March 21 NAC meeting, Ambassador Nuland
reinforced criticism by the UK Charge and noted strongly the
intrinsic dangers of bargaining with terrorists, plus concern
for all Allies if the Taliban thought that hostage taking was
a route to future prisoner exchanges (ref B).  She and the UK
Charge also asked the Secretary General and Chairman of the
Military Committee if ISAF had been consulted over the
process of Mastrogiacomo's release.  Both committed to
investigate.  The Italian Charge declined to comment on how
the journalist was freed without more details from capital,
but expressed the Italian government's gratitude to Karzai
for his help. 

3.  (C) SYG de Hoop Scheffer told PermReps during the March
21 NAC that he intends to raise this issue at an informal
lunch or coffee gathering of PermReps in the near future.  In
a separate conversation with Ambassador Nuland, he said he is
leaning toward pushing for an Alliance-wide hostage policy. 

4.  (C) COMMENT: Raising awareness on this issue among NATO
Allies is important and necessary, with the goal of reaching
agreed guidelines.  However, achieving consensus on a binding
NATO hostage policy, similar to NSPD 12, for example, will be
very difficult.  Few Allies are likely to want a discussion
like this which they consider sovereign to be collectively
decided.  END COMMENT.
NULAND

SECRET: REQUEST FOR 212(F) VISA REVOCATION FOR CORRUPT DOMINICAN CONSUL IN HONG KONG

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8758
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0094
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 0131
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 0079
S E C R E T SANTO DOMINGO 001692

SIPDIS

SIPDIS 

DEPARTMENT FOR P, WHA, WHA/CAR, CA/VO/L/C ANDREW KOTUAL,

ALSO FOR CA/VO/L/A BRIAN HUNT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2027
TAGS: CVIS OPRC PHUM KCRM KCOR CH DR
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR 212(F) VISA REVOCATION FOR CORRUPT DOMINICAN CONSUL IN HONG KONG

REF: A. TD-314/30639-06
B. SANTO DOMINGO 0733

Classified By: ECOPOL COUNSELOR MICHAEL MEIGS.  Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (SBU) This is an advisory opinion requesting the revocation of the B1/B2 nonimmigrant visas issued to Casilda Teonilde CASADO DE CHEUNG; her husband, Pak Shing CHEUNG; her brother, Roger CASADO ALCANTARA; and her children, Yin Mey,
Yin Ney, Sheung Leung, and Jean Ney CHEUNG CASADO, under the
Presidential Proclamation under section 212(f) of the INA suspending "the entry into the United States, as immigrants or nonimmigrants, of certain persons who have committed, participated in, or are the beneficiaries of corruption in the performance of public functions where that corruption has serious adverse effects on" (...) "U.S. foreign assistance goals (or) the security of the United States against transnational crime and terrorism."

2. (SBU) Casilda Teonilde CASADO DE CHEUNG is the Director of the Dominican Trade and Development Office in Hong Kong, which is the Dominican Republic's diplomatic mission to the People's Republic of China (PRC) (the Dominican government recognizes Taiwan, rather than the PRC). Cheung was appointed to this position by the Fernandez administration. Her brother, Roger CASADO ALCANTARA, serves as the mission's deputy director, and her daughter, Jean Ney CHEUNG CASADO, is the assistant director, according to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) sources.  Cheung is married to a Chinese national by the name of Pak Shing CHEUNG.

3. (S//NF) According to SAA sources, prior to traveling to Hong Kong to take up her new position, Cheung commented that she intended to become extremely wealthy in her new job. As noted in Ref B, she has followed through on this pledge primarily through the corrupt sale of visas to intending migrants.  According to sources in the local Chinese community who have given reliable information on this issue in the past, Cheung's husband works directly with Chinese human smuggling organizations to identify potential migrants.

In many cases these migrants seek to use the Dominican Republic as a stepping stone in efforts to reach U.S. territory (refs A and B).

4. (S//NF) Once the migrants are identified, Cheung works to issue them with valid Dominican visas. The going rate for these visas is reported by various sources in the Foreign Ministry (Dominican Embassy to France), Chinese community and SAA to be approximately USD 10,000. The visa recipients almost never qualify for these visas; they lack the skills and/or resources that are prerequisites for investor classification, for example, or they have no family members in the Dominican Republic to justify classification under "family reunification." This means that those visas are issued in violation of Dominican law. Payments for this service are made in cash either directly at the Trade and Development Office in Hong Kong or at a nail salon in Santo Domingo that is owned by the brother of Cheung's husband, according to sources in the local Chinese community.

5. (S//NF) SAA has estimated the number of Chinese nationals smuggled through this arrangement at "roughly 4-20 (...) almost every week (since at least 2004)" (Ref A). As of early 2006 most all of these individuals traveled using visas that had been personally signed by Mrs. Cheung (Ref A). According to media reports and SAA contacts, these Chinese migrants are able to bypass regular processing at the airport and the scrutiny it entails because they travel with both their valid visas and with letters personally signed by Migration Director Amarante Baret. These letters are not issued to travelers from other countries, according to investigative reporting by independent newspaper Clave Digital. SAA is in possession of scores of such letters signed by Amarante Baret confirming the issuance of valid Dominican visas to hundreds (if not thousands) of Chinese nationals.  In addition, Dominican authorities determined that the addresses declared by some of the arriving Chinese were incorrect and were not the actual destinations of those individuals.

6. (S//NF) Few of these travelers ever return to their country of origin. As noted in Ref B, investigative reporting by Clave Digital asserted that of 2,948 Chinese nationals who
had entered the Dominican Republic over the last two years using temporary business visas, only 432 had returned to China. The Foreign Ministry has gone on record disputing  these numbers.

7. (C) Embassy requests a finding of ineligibility under section 212(f) in order revoke the nonimmigrant visas issued to Casilda Teonilde CASADO DE CHEUNG; her husband, Pak Shing CHEUNG; her brother, Roger CASADO ALCANTARA; and their daughter, Jean Ney CHEUNG CASADO as individuals who have "committed or participated in" (...) "corruption in the performance of public functions." Casilda CASADO DE CHEUNG
manages the mission and is in charge of the issuance of  Dominican visas to intending migrants in violation of Dominican law. Her husband, Pak Shing CHEUNG, works directly
with the smuggling organizations to identify migrants, and works with his brother in Santo Domingo to arrange for the transfer of funds supporting this scheme. Roger CASADO
ALCANTARA and Jean Ney CHEUNG CASADO both work in upper management positions at the mission in Hong Kong, and are involved or, at the least, are the "beneficiaries of" the corruption that goes on at the mission. Embassy requests the
revocation of the visas issued to the minor children of Cheung -- Yin Mey, Yin Ney, and Sheung Leung CHEUNG CASADO -- because they are "beneficiaries of corruption in the performance of public functions."

8. (C) Cheung's corruption has "serious adverse effects on" (...) "U.S. foreign assistance goals." Many of the Chinese nationals smuggled under this scheme appear to be victims of trafficking in persons, the eradication of which is a major U.S. foreign policy objective. For example, upon arrival in the Dominican Republic, many of these migrants are forced to work in conditions of involuntary servitude (ref A). It is possible that others are trafficked to work as "mistresses for some men from the Dominican elite" (ref B). These credible allegations of high-level official complicity in trafficking were a major factor in the Department's decision to return the Dominican Republic to the Tier 2 Watch List this year, as noted in the 2006 trafficking report's text.

Revoking Cheung and her family's visas would send a powerful message to Dominican authorities that the U.S. Government takes these allegations seriously. It could encourage Dominican authorities to investigate and prosecute these and other corrupt officials who have conspired in trafficking, something authorities have declined to do thus far despite specific accusations in the trafficking report.

9. (C) Cheung's corruption also has "serious adverse effects on" (...) "the security of the United States against transnational crime and terrorism." The Caribbean is often  referred to as the "third border" of the United States. Ref B outlines credible allegations that significant numbers of Chinese migrants smuggled under this system are using the  Dominican Republic as a stepping stone in efforts to migrate illegally to the United States. This network could conceivably be exploited by organized criminals and terrorists, who would threaten the security of the United States if they were allowed to reach U.S. territory.
BULLEN

TOP-SECRET:The Revolutions of 1989: New Documents from Soviet/East Europe Archives Reveal Why There Was No Crackdown

WASHINGTON, D.C. — Ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the National Security Archive and its research partners in East and Central Europe today released previously secret documents from behind the Iron Curtain detailing the ultimately futile scramble by the Communist parties of the region to stay in power in 1989 — evidence which explains in the actual words of Communist leaders now for the first time in English how the system imposed by Stalin’s armies gave way in the face of popular protest, largely without violent repression.

The documents include verbatim transcripts of such historic meetings as the Polish Communist party’s leadership on the day after Solidarity swept the June 1989 elections, Solidarity leader Walesa’s talk in Warsaw with German chancellor Kohl on the day the Berlin Wall was to fall, Soviet leader Gorbachev’s meetings with Hungarian communist reformers, and the Czechoslovak Communist Party’s central committee’s rationale for not calling in the troops in the face of mass protests in November 1989.

The documents are the product of a five-year multinational research project organized by George Washington University’s National Security Archive, in collaboration with scholars, journalists and activists in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Russia, Germany, Romania and Bulgaria, focused on the collapse of Communism in 1989. The project organized four landmark “critical oral history” conferences in which former adversaries, divided by ideology and the struggle for power, sat at the same tables and discussed the end of the Cold War, face to face with each other and their own documents. (Similar gatherings co-organized by the Archive in recent years focused on the crisis years of 1953, 1956, 1968, and 1980-81 in Eastern Europe.) The 1989 conferences began last year with a May 1998 meeting on St. Simons Island, Georgia, and continued this year in Budapest on June 9-11, in Prague on October 14-16, and in Warsaw on October 21-23. Participants included Czech president Vaclav Havel, former Polish prime minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, current Polish foreign minister Bronislaw Geremek, Gorbachev aide Gyorgy Shakhnazarov, former U.S. ambassador to Moscow Jack Matlock, and top communist party officials and dissidents.

Research partners of the National Security Archive include:

Cold War History Research Center, BudapestInstitute for the Study of the 1956 Revolution

Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Cold War International History Project, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.

The Czechoslovak Documentation Center, Prague (Dobrichovice)

The Institute of Contemporary History, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic

Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences

Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow

Institute of Universal History, Moscow

Memorial, Moscow

Cold War Research Group, Sofia

Civic Academy Foundation, Bucharest

DOCUMENTS

Click on a document number to view the transcription.Document 1. Memorandum of Conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and Karoly Grosz, General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Moscow, March 23-24, 1989. This document from Hungarian Archives reveals Gorbachev’s contradictions, as the Soviet leader proclaims again that the Brezhnev doctrine is dead and military interventions should be “precluded in the future, yet at the same time, tries to set “boundaries” for the changes in Eastern Europe as “the safekeeping of socialism and assurance of stability.” As it turned out, the boundaries crumbled along with the Wall.

Document 2. Transcript of the Central Committee secretariat meeting of the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR), Warsaw, June 5, 1989. On the day after Solidarity had swept Poland’s first open elections, ultimately winning 99 of 100 Senate seats, the Polish Communists vent their shock and dismay (“a bitter lesson,” “the party are not connected with the masses,” “We trusted the Church and they turned out to be Jesuits” were typical comments). Comrade Kwasniewski (who now serves as the elected President of Poland) remarks that “It’s well known that also party members were crossing out our candidates” (only two out of 35 Party candidates survived the epidemic of X’s). But they see no choice but to negotiate a coalition government, and specifically “[w]arn against attempts at destabilization, pointing at the situation in China” — since the Tienanmien massacre occurred the same day as the Polish elections, the road not taken.

Document 3. Transcript of the Opening Full Session of the National Roundtable Negotiations, June 13, 1989. This remarkable document (transcribed from previously unpublished video recordings) points to the unwritten “rules” of mutual civility that arose in the nonviolent dissident movements and found an echo among the Communist reformers during the negotiated revolutions of 1989. For example, Dr. Istvan Kukorelli from the Patriotic People’s Front proposes to “refrain from questioning the legitimacy of each other, since the legitimacy of all of us is debatable. It is a question which belongs to the future – who will be given credit by history and who will be forgotten.”

Document 4. Report of the President of People’s Republic of Hungary Rezso Nyers and Karoly Grosz, General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party on their talks with Gorbachev in Moscow, 24-25 July, 1989. The excerpt translated into English contains economic reformer Nyers’ assessment of the political situation in Hungary, and first among the factors that “can defeat the party,” he lists “the past, if we let ourselves [be] smeared with it.” The memory of the revolution of 1956 and its bloody repression by the Soviets was Banquo’s ghost, destroying the legitimacy of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, just as 1968 in Prague and 1981’s martial law in Poland and all the other Communist “blank spots” of history came back in 1989 to crumble Communist ideology. For their part, the Communist reformers (including Gorbachev) did not quite know how to respond as events accelerated in 1989, except not to repeat 1956.

Document 5. Record of conversation between West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the leader of Polish Solidarity Lech Walesa, Warsaw, November 9, 1989. In this extraordinary conversation (available previously only in German), Solidarity’s leader fears the collapse of the Wall would distract West Germany’s attention – and money – to the GDR, at the time when Poland, the trail-blazer to the post-communist era in Eastern Europe, desperately needed both. “Events are moving too fast,” Walesa said, and only hours later, the Wall fell, and Kohl had to cut his Poland visit short to scramble back to Berlin, thus proving Walesa’s fear correct.

Document 6. Entry from the Diary of Gorbachev’s Foreign Policy Assistant Anatoly Chernyaev, 10 November 1989. This extraordinary diary entry from inside the Kremlin, the day after the Wall fell, documents in the form of a “snapshot” reaction the revolutionary mood of one of the closest and most loyal of Gorbachev’s assistants. Chernyaev realized that this event meant “the end of Yalta” and of “the Stalinist legacy” in Europe, and in a striking statement, he welcomed this change, saying the key was Gorbachev’s decision not to stand in the way.

Document 7. Speech by Premier Ladislav Adamec at the extraordinary session of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee, 24 November 1989. This remarkable previously secret transcript shows the party elites choosing against violent repression of the mass protests in Wenceslas Square. More clearly than in almost any other Party document, the reasons for nonviolence are spelled out: such a solution would only temporarily “return calm,” it would radicalize the youth, “the international support of the socialist countries can no longer be counted on,” and “the capitalist states” might react with a “political and economic boycott.”

TOP-SECRET: U.S. Planning for War in Europe, 1963-64

The release of Cold War-era Soviet and East European documents on war plans and nuclear planning raises questions about U.S. war planning during the same period.  A central issue is the degree to which U.S. and NATO planning posited early or initial use of nuclear weapons like the 1964 Warsaw Pact plan from the Czech archives.  Certainly, by the 1950s, NATO war plans assumed early use of nuclear weapons, even immediate use under some circumstances.[1]  By the 1960s, however, the situation began to change as the Kennedy and Johnson administrations began to push for contingency planning for conventional and limited nuclear war.  Moreover, U.S. presidents would make final decisions on nuclear weapons use (unless the president was out of action and predelegation arrangements kicked in).  Nevertheless, as shown by the documents that follow, high-level U.S. officials assumed that a Warsaw Pact conventional or nuclear attack on NATO Europe would invite a U.S. nuclear response (unless the Soviets agreed to limit fighting to conventional weapons).  Rejecting the idea of “no first use,” senior U.S. officials took it for granted that a massive Warsaw Pact conventional attack on Western Europe would prompt a nuclear response from outnumbered Western forces.
    The following documents, a sampling from the 1963-64 period, were selected to invite comparison and contrast with the 1964 Warsaw Pact war plan and related documents that are now available on the website of the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact.  The U.S. documents suggest how senior civilian and military officials in the Kennedy-Johnson administrations thought about nuclear war and nuclear weapons use in European and intercontinental military operations.  The theater and strategic war plans that they approved, however, remain classified.  Yet, basic planning concepts and nuclear targeting options in U.S. war plans come across as does the political context that shaped military planning.
    Not surprisingly, just as the Soviet and Czech documents imputed the most aggressive purposes to NATO, the U.S. documents ascribed comparable aggressive purposes to the Warsaw Pact side.  Interestingly, however, some of the U.S. material partially validates Soviet fears of first strikes and surprise nuclear attack.  Yet, when American war planners thought about striking first, they believed that it would be in response to certain information that the Soviet military was planning to strike American and European targets.  In this way, American leaders thought it possible to preempt a Soviet attack.
    One wonders if comparable Soviet-era material exists, whether in Politburo, Party, or Defense Ministry archives.  The new documents were produced by the military but given that “politics was in command” during the Soviet era, one wonders how military and civilian leaders thought about and discussed the problem of nuclear weapons use in private.  Is there a record of a comparable Politburo or high command discussion where top officials argue that they have deterred the Americans from undertaking rash actions in Central Europe?  Is there a record of Communist party leaders suggesting that they had any doubts about first use of nuclear weapons?  In this connection, documents that elucidate Soviet-era procedures and policies for nuclear weapons use would be especially significant.

Document One: U.S. National Security Council, Net Evaluation Subcommittee, “The Management and Termination of War With the Soviet Union,” 15 November 1963

Location of original: National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Records of Policy Planning Council, 1963-64, box 280, file “War Aims”

This 79-page document is divided into sections below for easier navigation:

Location of Original: National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Maxwell Taylor Papers, Box 25, file “Net Evaluation” also available as document 395 in National Security Archive published microfiche collection, U.S. Nuclear History: Nuclear Weapons and Politics in the Missile Era, 1955-68, Washington, D.C., 1998)
The Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NESC) was a highly secret National Security Council Subcommittee that was active between the mid-50s and the mid-60s.[2]  Its original purpose was to prepare annual studies analyzing the net effects–in terms of overall damage, human losses, and politico-military outcomes–of a U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear war.  When preparing these analyses, the NESC would factor in different circumstances for the outbreak of war, e.g., a Soviet or U.S. first strike.  None of these analyses have been declassified but they presented a uniformly grim and disturbing picture of the destructiveness of nuclear war.  When, following a presentation on the effects of nuclear war, President Kennedy said “and we call ourselves the human race!”, it may have been after receiving a NESC briefing.[3]
    During its last few years, the NESC prepared special studies that supplemented the annual net analysis.  The document that follows was one of those studies, the first U.S. government effort to study systematically the problem of nuclear war termination.  Worried about the danger of nuclear war and the inflexibility of U.S. nuclear strategy, the Kennedy administration had begun to look closely at “flexible response” and “controlled response” strategies for fighting non-nuclear conflicts in Europe and controlling nuclear warfare.  Consistent with that, the NESC took up the chilling task of considering whether it was possible to fight a nuclear war in a “discriminating manner” so that it ended on “acceptable terms” to the United States while avoiding “unnecessary damage” to adversaries.  To illustrate the problem of war termination, the NESC presented several scenarios of U.S.-Soviet nuclear war, drawing conclusions and recommendations from them.  Comments on a nearly final draft of this study by Col. William Y. Smith, then assistant to JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor, summarized this complex study.
    The scenarios that the NESC presented drew upon major targeting options in the still-secret U.S. strategic nuclear war plan, the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) that went into effect in fiscal year 1963.  For example, SIOP-63 included a counterforce option designed to limit a major nuclear attack to Soviet bloc nuclear weapons targets only–virtually a first strike option–which senior officials wanted available when a Soviet attack seemed imminent.  At several points in the scenarios in this report the decisionmakers ordered counterforce attacks; for example in the one for a European conflict, they ordered a “limited counterforce attack” that would supposedly have been “carefully constrained to reduce urban-industrial damage.”  Other options in SIOP 63 were for attacks on cities/industrial targets only, attacks on non-nuclear military targets, combinations of those target categories, as well as “withholds” for China and Eastern European countries.  Even though the Kennedy administration was looking for alternatives to Truman-Eisenhower era “massive retaliation”, SIOP options nevertheless stipulated enormous nuclear attacks.[4]

Document Two: “USAFE”, 26 May 1964, possibly prepared by Seymour Weiss, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

Location of original: Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Records of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, Subject Files, 1961-63, box 3, Johnson-European Trip May 1964 (also available as document 992 in National Security Archive published microfiche collection, U.S. Nuclear History: Nuclear Weapons and Politics in the Missile Era, 1955-68, Washington, D.C., 1998)

This document records a briefing at headquarters United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE) directed by CINCUSAFE General Gabriel P. Disosway to Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson who was completing a tour of U.S. bases and embassies in Western Europe.  The briefing disclosed the Air Force’s assumptions that the United States could only win a nuclear war in Europe because the “side that hits first will win”; moreover, the Soviets were “not thinking in terms of conventional war.”  Significantly, Johnson raised a central problem: “the understandable reluctance of responsible officials to agree to a general release of nuclear weapons.”  This is a reference to what became known as the “nuclear taboo”–the idea that because of their disproportionate effects nuclear weapons were virtually unusable.[5]
Document Three:  Memorandum for the Secretary from Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson, “Meetings in Paris with Bohlen, Finletter, Lemnitzer, and McConnell,” 27 May 1964, with cover memo and detailed report attached

Location of original: Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Records of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, Subject Files, 1961-63, box 1, Memoranda (file 1 of 5) (also available as document 993 in National Security Archive published microfiche collection, U.S. Nuclear History: Nuclear Weapons and Politics in the Missile Era, 1955-68, Washington, D.C., 1998)

Also prepared by Seymour Weiss, this document records discussions during April 1964 between Deputy Under Secretary Johnson and key U.S. officials based in, or then visiting, Paris, including Ambassador to France Charles E. Bohlen, U.S. ambassador to the NATO Council Thomas Finletter, Commander-in-Chief Europe (CINCEUR)/Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Lyman Lemnitzer, and Deputy Commander-in-Chief USAFE John P. McConnell.  Their conversations focused on a variety of problems, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons, command-and-control of nuclear weapons, threat assessments, and proposed force withdrawals from Europe.

    The discussions on tactical nuclear weapons and threat assessment raised important questions.  While Lemnitzer assumed early use for nuclear weapons, especially anti-demolition weapons (ADMs), his State Department interlocutors questioned that assumption in part because a decision to use nuclear weapons “would be the most crucial one any president could make” and might not be made “quickly or easily.”  The discussion of threats revealed interesting differences between Lemnitzer and McConnell over whether Warsaw pact forces could “easily overrun” NATO forces, as the latter believed.  Johnson, however, argued that the probability of a large Communist invasion” was a “rapidly diminishing” one, arguing that it was more important to plan for more likely contingencies such as an East German revolt or Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus.
Document Four: Department of State Airgram enclosing “Secretary McNamara’s Remarks to NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 15-17, 1964,” 23 December 1964

Location of original: Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Formerly Top Secret Foreign Policy Files, 1964-66, box 22, NATO

Beginning with his famous May 1962 “Athens Speech”, Secretary of Defense McNamara began an effort to “educate” European NATO leaders on the realities of nuclear warfare and the necessity for a flexible response military strategy.  This speech, delivered at one of the semi-annual NATO defense and foreign ministers meeting, represented another step in that effort.  As in other speeches, he emphasized the high costs of nuclear war, the problem of escalation control, and the need to plan for contingencies other than a massive invasion.  What is especially striking about this speech, however, is McNamara’s confidence that NATO nuclear and conventional forces had deterred the Soviets from strategic and theater nuclear attacks as well as from massive conventional attack.  Interestingly, McNamara treats the latter as a “substantial” threat although he may have privately agreed with State Department officials that the risk was diminishing.
Document Five: Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn Thompson to Seymour Weiss, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, “Implications of a Major Soviet Conventional Attack in Central Europe,” 29 December 1964

Location of original: National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Records of Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn Thompson, 1961-70, box 21, Chron-July 1964

The State Department’s most influential Soviet expert of the 1960s, Llewellyn Thompson was then chairing a special State-Defense committee on politico-military planning (the “Thompson Committee”).  In this paper, Thompson joins U.A. Johnson in agreement that the chances of a Soviet conventional attack in Central Europe were “remote.”  If, however, the Soviets did make a “grab for Europe,” Thompson argued that Washington should reply with a strategic first strike against the Soviet Union.  Admitting that the United States “might also lose”, Thompson argued that a first strike, including immediate use of tactical nukes, would be necessary because the Soviets would otherwise take the same course.

    Many historians have described Thompson as a voice of sanity on U.S.-Soviet relations during the 1960s; for example, he played a key role in encouraging President Kennedy to take a moderate course during the Cuban missile crisis.  His willingness, at least on paper, to support first strikes and first nuclear use suggests that a nuclear taboo was then far from pervasive.  If Thompson had the responsibility, however, one wonders if he would have readily ordered a first strike in an “ambiguous situation”?
Glossary

ACE – Allied Command Europe

ADM – atomic demolition munitions

ASW – antisubmariine weapons

ECM – electronic countermeasures

LOC – lines of communications

MAAG – military assistance advisory group

MLF – multilateral force

MRBM – medium range ballistic missile

PAL – permissive action links (safety locks on nuclear weapons)

POLAD – political advisers

special ammunition – possibly a reference to depleted uranium ammunition


Notes

1.  See, for example, Robert A. Wampler, NATO Strategic Planning and Nuclear Weapons 1950-57, Nuclear History Program Occasional Paper 6 (College Park, Center for International Security Studies, 1990).
2.  A history of the NESC would be most useful but difficult to write until its major studies have been declassified.  Some materials on NESC, including its charter, and summaries of some of its reports can be found in the volumes on national security in the State Department’s Foreign Relations series.  Some writes have argued that the NESC had war planning responsibilities but its role was strictly analytical, although no doubt war planners studied its reports closely.
3.  Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York, 1990), 247.
4.  For a discussion of SIOP-63, see Desmond Ball, “Development of the SIOP, 1960-1983,” Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1986), 62-70.
5.  For thoughtful explorations of the notion of “nuclear taboo” see Thomas Schelling, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons,” in L. Benjamin Ederington and Michael J. Mazar, Turning Point: The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy (Boulder, Westview Press,1994), 105-115; Peter Gizewski, “From Winning Weapon to Destroyer of Worlds: The Nuclear Taboo in International Politics,” International Journal LI (Summer 1996):397-418; and Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, “Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York, Columbia University Press, 1996), 116-152.

SECRET: WHY WE NEED CONTINUING MINUSTAH PRESENCE IN HAITI

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SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR, DRL, S/CRS, INR/IAA
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
TREASURY FOR MAUREEN WAFER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL HA
SUBJECT: WHY WE NEED CONTINUING MINUSTAH PRESENCE IN HAITI

PORT AU PR 00001381 001.2 OF 004

Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson. Reason: E.O. 12958 1.4
(b), (d)

1. (U) This report responds to recommendation number 2 of the
Embassy Port au Prince OIG inspection report.

Summary
--------

2. (C) The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti is an
indispensable tool in realizing core USG policy interests in
Haiti. Security vulnerabilities and fundamental
institutional weaknesses mean that Haiti will require a
continuing - albeit eventually shrinking - MINUSTAH presence
for at least three and more likely five years. Haiti needs
the UN presence to fill the security gap caused by Haiti's
fledgling police force's lack of numbers and capabilities.
It needs MINUSTAH to partner with the USG and other donors in
institution-building. A premature departure of MINUSTAH
would leave the Preval government or his successor vulnerable
to resurgent kidnapping and international drug trafficking,
revived gangs, greater political violence, an exodus of
seaborne migrants, a sharp drop in foreign and domestic
investment, and resurgent populist and anti-market economy
political forces - reversing gains of the last two years.

3. (C) Summary Continued: MINUSTAH is a remarkable product
and symbol of hemispheric cooperation in a country with
little going for it. There is no feasible substitute for
this UN presence. It is a financial and regional security
bargain for the USG. USG civilian and military assistance
under current domestic and international conditions, alone or
in combination with our closest partners, could never fill
the gap left by a premature MINUSTAH pullout. The U.S. will
reap benefits from this hemispheric security cooperation for
years to come - but only if its success is not endangered by
early withdrawal. We must work to preserve MINUSTAH by
continuing to partner with it at all levels in coordination
with other major donor and MINUSTAH contributor countries
from the hemisphere. That partnering will also help counter
perceptions in Latin contributing countries that Haitians see
their presence in Haiti as unwanted. The Department and
Embassies in Latin countries contributing troops should work
to ensure th
ese countries' continuing support for MINUSTAH. End summary.

Haiti Needs MINUSTAH to Become Viable State
-------------------------------------------

4. (C) The fundamental USG policy goal in Haiti is to make
it a viable state that does not post a threat to the region
through domestic political turmoil or an exodus of illegal
migrants. To reach that point, Haiti must be able to assure
its own domestic security, govern itself with stable
democratic institutions, and create a business climate that
will get the economy moving. Haiti has made progress but is
still a long way from these goals. The United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is the largest and
most effective external institution pursuing them. Haiti's
progress toward viability hinges on a large international
security presence and continued injections of assistance to
consolidate its institutions and ease human misery. MINUSTAH
is the implementing instrument of the security goal, and
MINUSTAH elements are key players in the goal of
consolidating institutions and providing critical disaster
relief.

MINUSTAH a Security Linchpin
----------------------------

5. (C) MINUSTAH's core stabilization function is security:
filling the gap left by inadequate force levels and
capabilities of the Haitian National Police (HNP). The HNP
currently has approximately 9,000 officers. MINUSTAH in 2006
set a five-year target of training and fielding 14,000
officers - although the police reform report to the UN
Security Council says 20,000 are needed to adequately police
the country. At current training and vetting rates, Haiti

PORT AU PR 00001381 002.2 OF 004

will reach this goal by 2012 at the earliest, provided the
GOH is willing to fund and staff this level. (Note: This
projection rests on HNP plans to expand the capacity of the
Police Academy beginning with the summer class of 2008. End
note.) This gain in force will be reduced if the HNP acts
on the results of the ongoing UN vetting process and weeds
out officers found to be linked to crime, corruption, and
other misconduct. Normal attrition will also push the 2012
target date further out. Deficient capabilities - in
experience, investigative skills, and management, all
exacerbated by corruption -- limit the HNP's security clout.

6. (C) Given HNP's lack of capability, MINUSTAH's backup
security and police training functions are needed to fill the
resulting gap in security. MINUSTAH troops continue to
provide security in areas such as the Cite Soleil slum,
liberated from overt gang rule in early 2007. They are also
the country's ultimate riot control force which in times of
unrest protects strategic government installations, including
the National Palace and the airport. In MINUSTAH's UN police
operations pillar, Formed Police Units (FPU -
gendarmerie-type police units from individual contributor
countries) aid the HNP with security operations, such as
helping put down the mutiny at the national penitentiary last
November, and performing riot control during the April
disturbances. UNPOL officers provide support to HNP
operations, down to helping the anti-kidnapping unit and
beginning to assist the HNP's counter narcotics unit. The
UNPOL development pillar works with the HNP to develop its
capabilities. UNPOL officers guide and monitor the training
of the HNP at the Police Academy and in the field. The
MINUSTAH apparatus is also conducting the vetting of the
entire HNP, an essential aspect of HNP reform.

7. (C) The April food riots threw into stark relief
MINUSTAH's role as a security force of last resort. MIUSTAH
troops, FPU's and UNPOL provided the criticl extra security
capability that prevented riotes from overrunning the
Presidential Palace and pobably chasing President Preval
from office.

INUSTAH Role in Institution Building
------------------------------------

8. (C) MINUSTAH contibutes to building up Haiti's
political and judiial institutions and supporting them
day-to-day n the ground. It has a civilian presence
througout the country: its civil affairs division has tams
of advisers deployed in larger towns in all tn departments.
These units advise and train oficials at a level of
government that is just getting off the ground. At the
national level, MINUSTAH is a key partner of the U.S. and
other donor countries in building up and reforming Haiti's
judicial system. The dimensions of the UN's civilian
technical assistance and training for Haiti's national and
local institutions exceed that of all other diplomatic
missions in Haiti put together.

MINUSTAH Post-Hurricane Role
----------------------------

9. (C) The August-September series of hurricanes and floods
have put MINUSTAH's disaster relief role in the spotlight.
Cut roads and fallen bridges meant that Prime Minister
Michele Pierre-Louis' visits to flooded regions were possible
only in MINUSTAH helicopters. Their rotary wing aircraft
have also flown emergency aid to areas cut off from ground
transport, supplementing the air assets of the USS Kearsarge
and the World Food Program. MINUSTAH troops rescued flood
victims trapped in their homes, and continue to provide
security for food convoys and distribution points, assuring
that emergency aid commodities reach their destination and
are distributed in an orderly manner. MINUSTAH serves as the
coordinating body among donors and between donors and the
Government of Haiti.

Bottom Line on Continuing MINUSTAH Presence
-------------------------------------------

PORT AU PR 00001381 003.2 OF 004

10. (C) The U.S. has a strong interest in maintaining
MINUSTAH's presence in Haiti until Haiti's security, judicial
and political institutions are can maintain a minimal level
of domestic security and political stability on their own.
Embassy therefore believes that MINUSTAH's presence here is
needed until the HNP reaches at least 14,000 officers and
Haiti has installed a new President after the 2011
Presidential transition. A UN civilian advisory presence
will be needed for an additional period after the MINUSTAH
military and police are drawn down to help along Haiti's
institution-building. MINUSTAH already envisions gradually
transitioning the current force structure from predominantly
infantry to more military police and engineering units,
provided the UNSC agrees. It will reduce its civilian
presence as Haiti's institutions become more solid. However,
a significant withdrawal of the MINUSTAH security forces and
civilian advisers is not advisable for a minimum of three
years, and we believe that a fu
ll withdrawal of MINUSTAH should not be considered before
five years.

Scenario of a Premature MINUSTAH Departure
------------------------------------------

11. (C) A precipitous withdrawal of or premature drawdown
of MINUSTAH's security component could open the door to
elements that threaten Haiti's political stability and the
consolidation of its democratic institutions. These are
goals which we and our hemispheric and European allies since
2004 have devoted over two billion USD in resources to
achieve. Increased security and other assistance from the
U.S. and other large donors individually could not
immediately make up for the loss of MINUSTAH boots on the
ground.

12. (C) We could see a rollback of stabilization and
security gains made since MINUSTAH began to serious confront
security problems in 2006. Kidnappings, now reduced through
effective police work, might spike upward again. Drug
trafficking networks, a large threat even with the current
MINUSTAH presence, could ramp up shipments through Haiti and
further their penetration of police, the judiciary,
parliament -- where we estimate perhaps a score of deputies
and senators are linked to the drug trade. Gang structures,
weakened but not eliminated from Port-au-Prince, Cap Haitien
and Gonaives, could flex their muscles again. If gangs
resurface, we could see the revival of politically-linked
armed groups that during the Aristide era engaged in targeted
violence including murder against regime critics. If these
factors produced greater general instability, larger numbers
of Haitians would likely to take to the boats and attempt to
reach the U.S., as they did in the unstable 1990s. An upward
trend of the above factors would cause a deterioration of the
economic environment and a drop in domestic and foreign
investment.

MINUSTAH a Good Deal for the U.S.
---------------------------------

13. (C) MINUSTAH's presence produces real regional security
dividends for the U.S. Paying one-quarter of MINUSTAH's
budget through our DPKO assessment, the U.S. reaps the
security and stabilization benefits of a 9,000-person
international military and civilian stabilization mission in
the hemisphere's most troubled country. The security
dividend the U.S. reaps from this hemispheric cooperation not
only benefits the immediate Caribbean, but also is developing
habits of security cooperation in the hemisphere that will
serve our interests for years to come. In the current
context of our military commitments elsewhere, the U.S. alone
could not replace this mission. This regionally-coordinated
Latin American commitment to Haiti would not be possible
without the UN umbrella. That same umbrella helps other
major donors -- led by Canada and followed up by the EU,
France, Spain, Japan and others -- justify their bilateral
assistance domestically. Without a UN-sanctioned
peacekeeping and stabilization force, we

PORT AU PR 00001381 004 OF 004

would be getting far less help from our hemispheric and
European partners in managing Haiti.

But We Must Short Up Support
----------------------------

14. (C) The U.S. will continue to reap these security
benefits only if MINUSTAH's mission succeeds and enables
Haiti to carry itself as a country. The USG thus has a
strong interest that contributing countries continue their
commitment until Haiti's stability is self-sustained. The
USG should work to shore up support for MINUSTAH in Haiti and
in hemispheric troop-contributing countries. We should take
emphasize in UN venues and bilaterally to our Latin partners
that the Haitian people and their legitimate government
support MINUSTAH's presence, and that the UN is here at the
express request of the Government of Haiti. We must be
sensitive to Latin fears that any Haitian opposition to the
UN presence undermines their domestic support for deployments
in Haiti. During the April riots, the Brazilian MINUSTAH
Force Commander told Ambassador and others that his greatest
fear was that his troops would be forced to fire on
demonstrators. He understood that this could ignite
opposition in Haiti, Brazil, and other contributing countries
to his troops' presence in Haiti. The Brazilian Embassy's
national day celebration in Port au Prince September 8 was an
exercise aimed at the Brazilian domestic audience. Attended
by several Brazilian senators, it featured slide paels
extolling the humanitarian work of Brazil's army at home and
in Haiti, and a pathos-filled speech by the Ambassador about
the history and culture Brazil shares with Haiti.

15. (C) The Port au Prince embassies of Latin countries
contributing to MINUSTAH look to the strength of the U.S.
commitment to the UN presence as a bellwether. Any slippage
of U.S. commitment would embolden domestic elements who
oppose these countries' participation in in the UN mission
here. We sense that the strong U.S. embrace of the UN
presence in Haiti helps their case at home for continuing
deployments in Haiti. The Embassy uses every opportunity to
partner publicly with and support MINUSTAH. The current
post-hurricane relief effort, however disordered, is proving
an opportunity for U.S., Canadian, and other bilateral donors
to partner with MINUSTAH in disaster assistance and
reconstruction. We sense that the humanitarian focus of
these crisis-response efforts -- in contrast to riot-control
efforts in April -- is helping the case in Latin countries
for continuing their peacekeeping contributions in Haiti.

16. (C) The USG in Washington, New York, and in Latin
capitals must also do their part to buck up support for
MINUSTAH. In UN Security Council discussions of
Haiti-related items, U.S. rhetorical appreciation for the UN
presence here helps reassure contributor countries that their
deployments are justified. Similar expressions of support to
Latin representatives in Washington and Latin capitals are
also helpful.

17. (C) In the end, what will maintain MINISTAH
participants' support for deployments in Haiti is progress
toward Haitian stabilization and state viability. Continuing
the UN presence at projected levels for three to five years
will not guarantee that result, but abruptly downsizing or
prematurely withdrawing it will make more likely a result in
Haiti we do not want, and would make future hemispheric
peacekeeping efforts more difficult to justify.
SANDERSON

SECRET: ANWAR IBRAHIM’S SODOMY TRIAL II – A PRIMER

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SIPDIS 

FOR EAP/MTS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM KJUS MY
SUBJECT: ANWAR IBRAHIM'S SODOMY TRIAL II - A PRIMER 

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARK D. CLARK, REASON 1.4 (B AND D). 

Summary and Comment
------------------- 

1.    (C) Malaysian Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim will go
on trial beginning July 8 on charges of sodomy -- a criminal
offense in Malaysia -- with a former aide.  Anwar was
previously tried and convicted of sodomy in 2000 in a heavily
manipulated trial that the U.S. concluded "was marred by deep
flaws in the judicial process."  The verdict was overturned
on appeal in 2004.  Senior Malaysian authorities were very
aggressive in handling the present case during the initial
period of June-September 2008, but, coinciding with the
passing of Anwar's deadline to bring down the government
through Parliamentary cross-overs, have since taken a more
measured "rule-of-law" approach in public.  Authorities have
not taken all the legal and extra-legal measures available to
them, for example, to challenge Anwar's bail provisions or
resolve an earlier impasse regarding the court venue.
Anwar's conviction in this trial, which may last many months,
could end his political career; the judge would decide
whether Anwar would remain free pending an appeal.  This
cable provides a primer for the Department's reference,
including background on the 2000 conviction and the present
case, a synopsis of the specific legal charges and penalties,
a summary of likely evidence to be presented in court, and
three possible scenarios for the trial. 

2.  (C) Comment:  The issue of the specific actions between
Anwar and his aide will play out in court and, we suspect, in
a very sensationalistic fashion.  The facts surrounding the
case, however, make a compelling argument that the
government's prosecution of the case is foremost a political
act against the Opposition leader.  Whether the incident in
question was wholly concocted or has some basis in fact, the
case is not part of a morals campaign or a normal criminal
matter and has been the subject of extensive political
interference and manipulation.  As one consequence, much of
the Malaysian public remains deeply sceptical about the
government's prosecution of Anwar Ibrahim.  Anwar's flawed
trials in 1998-2000 produced a public uproar and attracted
international condemnation; in today's information-intensive
environment, such effects may be exacerbated depending on
events in court.  Embassy will provide draft press guidance
for the Department's consideration prior to the July 8 trial
date.  End Summary and Comment. 

Sodomy Case I, 1998-2000
------------------------ 

3.  (SBU) Under the government of former Prime Minister
Mahathir, Anwar Ibrahim was charged and convicted of sodomy
(and abuse of power) in a sensationalistic trials in
1998-2000, directed and heavily manipulated by Mahathir
against his former deputy.  Anwar was charged with sodomizing
his wife's driver.  During his pre-trial detention, Anwar was
beaten by the then Inspector General of Police.  The High
Court convicted Anwar of sodomy in August 2000 and sentenced
him to nine years imprisonment.  The U.S. expressed deep
concern with the first sodomy trial, noting "that the trial
and (Anwar's) resulting conviction and nine-year jail
sentence were marred by deep flaws in the judicial process."
After Mahathir stepped down in favor of Abdullah Badawi, the
Federal Court overturned the conviction in September 2004 and
released Anwar from prison (Anwar's separate conviction for
abuse of power remained in place).  The Federal Court found
there were "many unusual things that happened regarding the
arrest and confession" of certain prosecution witnesses,
including the fact that Anwar's driver stated that he was
paid to make the allegations against Anwar.  In an unusual
move and possible political compromise, the Federal Court
judges included in their judgment the conclusion that there
was evidence to confirm "the appellants were involved in
homosexual activities," but added that the prosecution failed
to prove the alleged offenses beyond reasonable doubt.
Because Anwar's conviction on the separate charge of abuse of
power was not overturned, he was barred from political office
until April 2008. 

Sodomy Case II, 2008
-------------------- 

4.  (SBU) Less than four months after Anwar Ibrahim's
People's Justice Party (PKR) and its opposition partners made
significant advances in the March 2008 national elections,
and three months after Anwar became eligible for political
office, an aide to Anwar, Mohd Saiful Bukhari Azlan, filed a
police report on June 28, 2008, alleging that he had been
forcibly sodomized by Anwar on several occasions.  The
following day, Anwar took refuge in the Turkish ambassador's
residence, claiming that he feared a repetition of his 1998
arrest and for his personal safety.  He remained with the
Turkish ambassador for only one day, departing after public
assurances of his safety from the Foreign Minister and Home
Minister.  In the midst of a highly charged political
atmosphere, which included Anwar's claims that he could bring
down the government through Parliamentary defections by
September 16, 2008, and new allegations linking then DPM
Najib with the Altantuya murder case, the police
investigation proceeded.  It came to light that Saiful had
had contact with the office of then DPM Najib prior to
working with Anwar, and more significantly Saiful had met
with Najib (and allegedly his wife Rosmah) at Najib's home
just prior to filing his police complaint.  Najib first
denied publicly he had any connection with the case, and then
acknowledged meeting Saiful, an admission that preempted
internet reports about to be released by blogger Raja Petra
(who is now a fugitive from sedition charges). 

5.  (SBU) As authorities made known their intention to arrest
and charge Anwar for sodomy, Anwar's lawyers arranged for his
voluntary appearance before police for questioning and
charging.  Contrary to the agreement, on July 16, police in
commando-style outfits waylaid Anwar's convoy en route to the
police station and arrested him on the street.  Police
questioned Anwar, took him to a hospital to provide a DNA
sample (which Anwar refused, citing lawyers' advice and fear
of "manipulation"), and held him overnight.  Anwar was
released on police bail by a magistrate on July 17. 

The Charges
----------- 

6.  (SBU) On August 7, 2008, prosecutors charged Anwar
Ibrahim before a Sessions Court under Section 377B of the
Penal Code, which reads:  "Whoever voluntarily commits carnal
intercourse against the order of nature shall be punished
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to twenty years
and shall be liable to whipping."  Section 377A of the Penal
Code defines "carnal intercourse against the order of nature"
as including sodomy.  Prosecutors specifically charged Anwar
with the sodomizing of Saiful Bukhari Azlan at a Kuala Lumpur
condominium (owned by Anwar's friend) on June 26, 2008.
Although Saiful originally claimed he was forcibly sodomized
on several occasions, the prosecutors chose not to pursue
charges against Anwar under a separate Penal Code section
(377C), which pertains to non-consensual sodomy (with a
higher burden of proof), and also to focus on only one
alleged incident.  It is important to note that under
Malaysia's legal system, prosecutors may amend the charges
during the course of the trial.  Saiful himself does not face
charges for the alleged acts.  The Court ordered Anwar to
remain free on a personal bond of US $5,700 RM 20,000 and did
not impose other restrictions (for example, Anwar has been
free to travel abroad and has done so on many occasions since
August 2008).  The government did not attempt to dispute or
revoke the bail provisions. 

Wrangle and Delay over Court Venue
---------------------------------- 

7.  (SBU) Following Anwar's formal charging, and with Anwar's
9/16 deadline looming in the background, prosecutors quickly
moved to transfer the case from the Sessions Court to the
High Court.  The prosecution argued on September 10, 2008,
that such an important case with possibly complicated legal
issues should be dealt with at the High Court and produced a
certificate signed by the Attorney General to move the case,
which under normal circumstances automatically results in a
transfer.  However, Anwar's lawyers objected to the transfer
out of concern that the more politicized High Court level
would result in a pro-prosecution judge hearing the case, as
happened during the first sodomy trial in 1999-2000.  In
November 2008, independent-minded Sessions Court judge
Komathy Suppiah rejected the certificate of transfer, noting
that Attorney General Gani Patail faced allegations of
evidence tampering in Anwar's 1998 case and the transfer
order signed by the AG would "undermine the public perception
of the judiciary." 

8.  (C) Judge Komathy was overruled in March 2009 by High
Court judge Mohamad Zabidin Md Diah who decided the Sessions
Court has no authority to refuse the Attorney General's
transfer order; Zabidin himself was then assigned to preside
over the sodomy trial.  Anwar's lawyers filed an appeal
against the transfer; the Court of Appeals only began to hear
the appeal on June 30; based on precedent, Anwar's camp
admits the appeal has little chance of success.  Zabidin
initially attempted to schedule the trial to begin in May
2009; defense lawyers argued they needed more time and hoped
their appeal would be heard prior to the trial.  (Note:  The
High Court often takes one to two years before setting trial
dates in normal criminal cases.  End Note.)  Zabidin
subsequently set the trial to begin on July 1.  Anwar's
lawyers filed an application to compel the prosecution to
provide them with full documentation and evidence that will
be introduced at the trial, which the prosecution has thus
far failed to do in apparent violation of the Criminal
Procedure Code.  With the hearing on the disclosure of
evidence set for July 1 (now pushed back to July 3), Judge
Zabidin postponed the trial start to July 8.  The judge
originally specified a three-week duration for the trial, but
lawyers assume that the trial will take many months to
conclude. 

The High Court Judge
-------------------- 

9.  (C) High Court Judge Mohamad Zabidin Md Diah is a lawyer
by training.  After private law practice, he joined the
judicial service as a Sessions Court judge and was elevated
to judicial commissioner in 2004.  After two years on
contract, Zabidin was promoted to become a permanent High
Court judge in 2006.  Zabidin is not a well-known judge and
is not associated with high profile or controversial
judgments, according to our senior legal contacts.  Anwar's
lawyers allege that Zabidin is beholden to the government and
will favor the prosecution; the judge's unusual rush to bring
the case to trial is viewed by the defense as an early
indication of his bias. 

Government Switches Gears
------------------------- 

10.  (C) Senior government and UMNO party officials adopted a
very aggressive public and private approach to the Anwar case
during the June-September 2008 period.  This included
frequent, prejudicial statements in public, and strong claims
in private to other politicians and diplomats regarding
Anwar's guilt.  This intensive phase encompassed the initial
news of the allegations and Anwar's formal charging, but also
Anwar's own aggressive political posturing and claims that he
could bring down the government by September 2008 through
Parliamentary crossovers.  After Anwar's deadline passed in
September, and after resolution of the UMNO leadership battle
in favor of Najib's succession in October 2008, we observed a
definite toning down of the Government's approach, and a
shifting to a lower gear.  For example, we did not hear
reports of government intervention to quickly resolve the
matter of the court venue, which effectively delayed the
prosecution by some seven months.  Anwar's bail provisions
remained in place and unchallenged.  Public statements by
senior government officials, outside of by-election
campaigns, became infrequent.  This toned down approach has
continued through the present; it would fit within a
hypothetical decision to demonstrate that the trial is a law
enforcement matter, rather than a political battle.
Regardless, it is clear that the government has not taken all
the legal and extra-legal steps against Anwar that it could
have since September 2008. 

GOM Confidence:  Waning or Recalculating?
----------------------------------------- 

11.  (C) Many of our government and UMNO contacts have
insisted to us, emphatically so in the early months of the
case, that the evidence against Anwar is very conclusive,
often hinting at video footage and physical evidence like DNA
(see below).  Recently, some contacts sympathetic to Anwar
but not part of his team claimed the government over time had
become less certain it had sufficient evidence to convict
Anwar.  According to one unconfirmed account, in June several
key aides to PM Najib advised him to drop the case against
Anwar because the evidence was not strong enough for an easy
conviction and the political cost of forcing through a guilty
verdict would be too high.  It is also possible that the
toned down rhetoric from the government has been
misinterpreted as uncertainty on the authorities' part. 

Evidence at the Trial
--------------------- 

12.  (C) Based on available information, we believe the
following evidentiary aspects will feature in Anwar's trial: 

Saiful's complaint:  The testimony of Saiful is central to
the government's case, and he is expected to take the stand.
Saiful has continued to assert that he was forcibly
sodomized, although the charges under Section 377B do not
require proof of a non-consensual act; given his youth (age
23) and physical size, Saiful will need to explain specific
circumstances of the incident to support his assertion of
rape. 

Medical reports:  As publicly revealed by defense lawyers,
Saiful underwent two medical examinations on June 28, 2008,
just prior to lodging a police report.  The first examination
by a Burmese doctor at a local hospital concluded there was
"no conclusive clinical findings" suggestive of sodomy, and
the doctor recommended he be examined at a government
hospital in line with police procedures in such cases.
(Note:  The Burmese doctor briefly left Malaysia after being
held for questioning by police.  End Note.)  The second
examination at the police-approved government hospital also
failed to uncover medical evidence of sodomy, according to
copies of hospital reports released by the defense. 

DNA:  The defense team believes prosecutors will introduce
DNA evidence, based on DNA samples held by the police since
1998, and are preparing expert witnesses.  The government's
hurried passage in Parliament of a DNA bill, approved by the
lower house on June 23, is widely seen as tied to the Anwar
trial and will permit the government to utilize the 11-year
old samples.  The defense could claim the samples were
planted, as is widely believed to be the case in Anwar's
earlier prosecution. 

Anwar's alibi:  Anwar's lawyers claim that five persons will
testify that Anwar was with them at the time of the alleged
incident.  They also claim that police attempted but failed
to intimidate some of these defense witnesses to change their
accounts. 

CCTV:  The prosecution may use CCTV footage from the
condominium where the alleged incident took place to confirm
Anwar's presence at a specific date and time. 

Character witnesses:  As happened in the 1999 case, it is
very possible that prosecutors introduce witnesses to attack
Anwar's character and actions aside from the alleged 2008
sodomy incident.  There are unconfirmed reports that the
prosecution will call 30 witnesses to the stand. 

Defense witnesses (PM Najib and wife Rosmah?):  In an effort
to demonstrate the political motivation in the government's
case, defense lawyers could call PM Najib, his wife Rosmah,
and other senior officials such as Najib's aide Khairil Anas
Yusof who appear connected to the case (Najib and Rosmah
because they met Saiful and discussed his reporting to the
police).  While this will make for momentary drama, we expect
the judge to disallow such moves. 

Bail and other Conditions during the Trial
------------------------------------------ 

13.  (C) Anwar's legal team has expressed concern that the
prosecution may apply to revoke the personal bond that allows
Anwar to be free pending the trial or seek to impose other
conditions, such as impounding his passport or restricting
his movement to within Kuala Lumpur.  The lawyers acknowledge
that there is not a strong precedent for overturning the
existing bail decision.  In several recent
politically-charged court cases, however, Malaysian judges
have ignored precedent decisions.  (Note:  We have no
information on the prosecution's intentions in this matter.
End Note.) 

What if Anwar is Convicted?
--------------------------- 

14.  (C) Most observers conclude that a conviction in Anwar's
case, one upheld on appeal, would essentially end Anwar's
political career given the legal penalties and Anwar's age
(62).  According to the Federal Constitution, a member of
Parliament will be disqualified from holding his seat if he
is convicted of an offense and sentenced to imprisonment for
a term of not less than one year or to a fine of not less
than US $570 RM 2,000 and has not received a free pardon.
This stipulation comes into effect after all appeals are
exhausted (at the Court of Appeals and Federal Court).  The
constitution also provides that a convicted person can only
be active in politics after five years from the date of his
release from prison.  At age 62, a second conviction could
effectively bar Anwar permanently from political life.  In
the event of a conviction, Anwar will certainly appeal.  The
judge will decide whether Anwar remains free pending appeal
or immediately goes to jail.  While officially remaining a
Member of Parliament pending the final outcome, he would be
unable to operate from prison as the Opposition leader. 

Political Interference and Manipulation
--------------------------------------- 

15.  (C) The issue of the alleged actions between Anwar and
Saiful will play out in court, and sodomy, even a consensual
act, is a crime under Malaysian law.  The facts surrounding
the case, however, make it clear that the government's
prosecution of the case is foremost a political act against
the Opposition leader.  The Malaysian government does not
aggressively prosecute cases of sodomy; we find record of
some 55 cases since 1991, or an average of 3 per year.  The
vast majority of such cases involve adults assaulting minors.
 Anwar's prosecution is not part of a morals campaign.  The
GOM does not aggressively target non-heterosexual behavior;
if it did so, a recent cabinet minister, senior staff
associated with PM Najib and other prominent citizens linked
to the government also would find themselves under
investigation. 

16.  (C) Aside from the immediate comparison with Anwar's
previous prosecution for sodomy, which was grossly
manipulated by former Prime Minister Mahathir, the
indications of political interference and manipulation in the
present case are compelling; much of the information is in
the public realm.  Collateral reporting, not addressed here,
provides further substantiation. 

Najib connection:  Keeping in mind that Najib and Anwar
remain bitter enemies, it is striking that Najib met
personally with the complainant Saiful prior to the police
report, and allegedly arranged for Saiful to have intensive
contact with senior police officials in the days before he
filed the complaint. 

Senior officials' involvement:  From the very early stages,
the senior-most officials in the government, including then
PM Abdullah, current PM Najib, cabinet ministers, the AGO and
national police chief (the latter two having played important
roles in Anwar's 1998-1999 flawed trials) and officials of
the ruling UMNO party have been intimately involved in
decisions regarding the case, according to Embassy contacts
and publicly available sources.  Despite the current
toned-down government approach, and emphasis that the Anwar
trial is a normal law enforcement matter, senior-most
executive and UMNO party officials continue such a directing
role. 

Leakage of information:  Senior government leaders provided
law enforcement information on the case to leaders of Anwar's
coalition partner, the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), in an
unsuccessful attempt to split PAS from the opposition.  A
recent internet report claims that the government has
provided some government-directed press editors with a "sneak
preview" of evidence against Anwar. 

Public statements:  From the initial public reports of the
complaint against Anwar in June 2008 to Anwar's election to
Parliament in August 2008, PM Abdullah and other senior
leaders spoke publicly and frequently about Anwar's alleged
crime and the need for justice, and the case featured
prominently in the parliamentary campaign against Anwar.
There have been far fewer statements since September 2008,
except during by-election campaigns. 

Press:  The Government-directed mainstream press, which
includes all major dailies and all TV stations, provided
extensive coverage of Saiful's allegations while severely
limiting reporting on Anwar's response during the heated
period of June-August 2008. 

Alleged intimidation:  The police detained for questioning
the doctor who first examined Saiful, causing him to leave
Malaysia temporarily out of concern for his safety.  Police
also pressured the hospital in question to hold a press
conference to state that the doctor was not qualified to
conduct such an examination, according to our sources.
According to defence lawyers, several of their witnesses have
been threatened by police in an effort to change their
testimony.  The Imam for the Federal Territories (including
Kuala Lumpur and the administrative capital Putra Jaya)
claimed publicly that he was forced to witness an "improper"
Islamic oath taken by Saiful; he was subsequently sacked by
the Prime Minister's Department. 

Customized Legislation, the DNA bill:  The government
hurriedly prepared a bill on DNA evidence, following shortly
after Anwar's refusal to provide a DNA sample at the time of
his arrest, which compels suspects to provide samples and
allows authorities to utilize previously stored samples in
new criminal cases.  The government originally introduced the
bill in August 2008 and voted it through the lower house only
on June 23, 2009; several steps remain before it becomes law. 

Public Scepticism
----------------- 

17.  (C) In the run-up to Anwar's August 2008 arraignment,
public opinion polling conducted by the Merdeka Center,
Malaysia's most respected opinion survey group, revealed that
a preponderance of Malaysians believed the charges against
Anwar were unjust, indicating a deep public scepticism
regarding the government's case.  We understand that new
polling on this question will be released before the July 8
trial date.  Pollsters have informed us that the new data
continues to reflect widespread public suspicions.
Reportedly, only 15 percent of ethnic Malays and 10 percent
of Malaysians overall believe Anwar's prosecution to be
justified.  Outside of government circles, many Embassy
contacts, including those who give credence to rumors of
Anwar's personal life, take it as a matter of fact that the
government is prosecuting Anwar for political reasons.  In a
public statement made on June 24, former Bar Council
president (and U.S. Woman of Courage awardee in 2009) Ambiga
Sreenvasan urged the government to drop the charges against
Anwar in order to restore credibility to PM Najib's ruling
coalition. 

Scenarios
--------- 

18.  (C) When viewed as a political matter, a number of
potential scenarios for the Anwar prosecution present
themselves; below we review three that are most apparent.  In
these scenarios we assume that Najib will exercise the
deciding voice on how and whether to proceed, though he also
will need to weigh the opinions of other UMNO ruling party
elites. 

-- Conviction at all costs:  Based on an assessment that
Anwar is a threat to UMNO's continued rule at least at the
time of the next national elections, Najib and UMNO elites
decide that the political costs of prosecuting Anwar are
acceptable and pursue the matter aggressively inside and
outside the courtroom with the overriding goal of convicting
Anwar and removing him permanently from politics.  While
asserting that this is purely a law enforcement matter, the
government exerts political pressure as necessary, accepting
reputational risks in the process, and achieves a conviction
after months of high-profile drama in the courtroom.  The
courts hear and reject Anwar's appeals in an expedited
manner, well ahead of the next national elections in 2012 or
2013.  This scenario appeared to be in play during the
initial months of the case and in the lead up to Anwar's
September 2008 deadline to overturn the ruling coalition's
majority; it has been less apparent since then.  Recalling
the deep personal animosity between Najib and Anwar, and the
singular importance of Anwar to the opposition coalition,
this scenario remains plausible, even though Anwar's
immediate threat to UMNO's rule has passed. 

-- Merits of the case, reputational damage:  In a second
scenario, the government proceeds with the prosecution but
refrains from exerting undue pressure to achieve conviction,
believing that the evidence presented and/or the court
proceedings themselves will sufficiently damage Anwar's
reputation and this will outweigh harm to the Najib
administration's credibility.  Conviction remains the desired
outcome, supported by sufficient evidence, but the government
accepts some risk of a final verdict of innocence after all
appeals are heard.  This scenario rests on the assumption of
sufficiently clear evidence against Anwar that will swing
public opinion in favor of the government even in the event
of an eventual acquittal.  Absent greater information on the
government's evidence against Anwar, it is difficult to judge
the prospects for this scenario. 

-- Withdrawal:  In a third scenario, Najib and UMNO elites
decide that the government's case is not strong enough to
pursue, entails unacceptable political costs, or is no longer
necessary because of the diminished threat from Anwar.  The
government withdraws the charges prior to the trial start of
July 8, or shortly after the trial begins, possibly under
conditions of "discharge not amounting to acquittal."
(Lawyers tell us that such a discharge in theory would allow
the government to reactivate the case at a future time, thus
maintaining this as a lever over Anwar.)  Najib, confident
that he can beat back an opposition challenge in the next
election, attributes the original decision to prosecute to
the previous administration of Abdullah Badawi and takes
credit for respecting the rule of law in this high profile
case involving his determined political nemesis.  In contrast
to 2008, Najib's currently secure position as UMNO leader and
Prime Minister, along with Anwar's diminished threat, make
this scenario a political possibility, though some UMNO
elites and perhaps Najib himself may not want to give up the
opportunity to remove Anwar Ibrahim from politics once and
for all. 

KEITH

SECRET: CHECK PLEASE! GOVERNMENT OF CUBA MAY ACCEPT U.S. OFFER

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RHMFISS/NAVINTELOFC GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY
RUEHKG/USDAO KINGSTON JM PRIORITY
S E C R E T HAVANA 000559 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2029
TAGS: SNAR PREL SMIG PGOV CU ASEC
SUBJECT: CHECK PLEASE! GOVERNMENT OF CUBA MAY ACCEPT U.S.
OFFER OF POST-HURRICANE ASSISTANCE 

REF: HAVANA 500 & 511 

Classified By: CDA JAMES WILLIAMS FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D) 

1. (S/NF) Summary: On 3 September 2009, the U.S. Coast Guard
Drug Interdiction Specialist (DIS) assigned to the U.S.
Interests Section (USINT) in Havana, Cuba, engaged in a
candid conversation with a Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MINREX) official who provided insight into the possible
Government of Cuba (GOC) response to any USG offers of
post-hurricane assistance to the GOC. End Summary. 

2. (S/NF) A MINREX officer ("officer") in the Ministry's
North American Division, Rodney, who attends repatriations
somewhat infrequently (DIS has had contact with this official
on approximately 5 occasions- USINT consular officers have
also met this officer on other occasions while attending
repatriations), exchanged pleasantries with the DIS at the
outset of the repatriation. During the boat ride to the
receiving pier, the officer almost immediately directed the
conversation towards what seemed to be a pre-planned
discussion. Offering up the usual &in my personal opinion8
while placing a firm hand on his chest and gesturing towards
himself, the officer stated: "I have been reading a lot of
U.S. press reports about possible U.S. hurricane assistance
and I think the GOC would be willing to accept that
assistance." DIS stated to the officer that that approach
would be different than last year's GOC response to the
multiple USG offers of post-hurricane assistance. The
officer went on to say that "(political) conditions this year
are very different than they were last year this time," an
apparent reference to the recent re-establishment of USINT
access to MINREX (reftels). 

3. (S/NF) DIS stated to the officer that it was common and
prudent practice to offer a disaster assistance response team
(DART) to locations following natural disasters to assess the
damage and the necessary level and type of assistance. The
officer responded by saying that: "the level of damage to
Cuba during last year's hurricane season was evident and the
team was a precondition to providing post-hurricane
assistance to Cuba; the U.S. should not impose preconditions
and should allow the GOC to determine how assistance is
used." In turn, the DIS responded that the USG is not in the
business of writing blank checks to foreign governments to
which the officer seemed to be at a loss for words. The
officer and the DIS cordially agreed that this was an
ideological difference between both nations, and agreed that
while neither of us wanted to see any hurricane affect Cuba,
should the opportunity arise for the USG to offer hurricane
assistance to the GOC, it would be interesting to see how the
scenario unfolds. 

4. (S/NF) This officer is a young (29 years old), cordial,
well-spoken MINREX officer who utilizes repatriations as an
opportunity to practice what might already be considered
polished English. He studied economics, is well versed in
international political ideology, and appears to be a
voracious reader. Like his more senior MINREX counterparts,
he makes a point during each repatriation to discuss recent
U.S. press reporting relative to U.S.-Cuba relations, and
uses each repatriation as an opportunity to elicit a response
from the DIS on a wide scope of U.S.-Cuban matters, always
under the guise of being a personal opinion or interest. He
does not balk when given the chance to prop-up and support
the tenets of the Cuban revolution, and especially, in his
government's opinion, the harsh treatment the USG has
afforded the Cuban people throughout the course of the
revolution. He is able to support and speak to the major GOC
talking points (i.e. the embargo, Cuban-Americans, etc.), and
is likely to rise in the GOC. 

5. (S/NF) Comment: Yet again, MINREX has utilized the DIS and
the repatriation process as a forum to air out a current GOC 

focus, and float the idea by a U.S. officer who the GOC is
aware works in the political-economic section at USINT. The
typical "this is my opinion" approach from this MINREX
officer is an opening gesture, whereafter he and each MINREX
officer then communicates a willingness, need, or current
focus of the GOC that they have decided to communicate to the
Mission and USG at large. This may well be a concerted
effort on the part of MINREX to engage in one-on-one
communication, at a relatively low-level, as a circuitous
approach to GOC-U.S. communications in lieu of direct or
over-publicized talks. By communicating in this manner, the
GOC can communicate with the USG, in this case over the issue
of hurricane assistance, and still maintain its public image
and propaganda campaign that lambaste the USG for its
approach towards Cuba. Interestingly, DIS cannot recall any
recent press reporting having to do with possible
post-hurricane assistance to Cuba. 

(S/NF) Further Comment: DIS was extremely surprised by the
hurricane assistance-related comments made by the MINREX
officer. Having spent a significant amount of time working
and traveling with Cuban MININT and MINREX officers over the
past year, Cubans are extremely proud people, and almost
never admit that there is a flaw in their system, even when
the flaw is a glaring one. For a MINREX officer to admit
that his country may be willing to accept assistance from the
U.S. should a hurricane ravage this island again, ventures
well beyond the perceived pride level of GOC officials. More
than anything, the GOC does not like to be embarrassed, and
taking handouts from the USG may well be a point of
embarrassment for the GOC should they choose to accept. As
such, any genuine post-hurricane assistance offer should be
extended quietly; however, the USG should be wary that the
GOC may be expecting a blank check, not a calculated offer of
pragmatic post-hurricane assistance. End Comment.
WILLIAMS

CONFIDENTIAL – THE WORLD IN 2050 – A STUDY BY PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS

world2050carbon

ELECTION UPDATE: CAMPAIGNS HOLD FINAL RALLIES; NOW IT IS UP TO THE VOTERS

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SENSITIVE
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PINR PE
SUBJECT: ELECTION UPDATE: CAMPAIGNS HOLD FINAL RALLIES; NOW IT IS UP TO THE VOTERS

REF: A. LIMA 1277 B. LIMA 1199

----------
SUMMARY
---------- 

1.  (U)  Presidential hopefuls ended their campaigns with a
flourish, holding massive closing rallies on 4/6, the final
day for campaigning before the 4/9 general elections.  Two of
the three leading candidates, Unidad Nacional's Lourdes
Flores and APRA's Alan Garcia, addressed their supporters in
Lima, while ultra-nationalist "outsider" Union por el Peru's
(UPP) Ollanta Humala stayed true to his southern power base
by staging his extravaganza in Arequipa.  The final two weeks
of the campaign saw the mud start to fly, albeit in moderate
quantities, with most of the dirt aimed at Humala.  Two
"private" polls leaked to international news organizatins
had contradictory results, raising uncertainty over the
electorate's volatility as it heads for the ballot boxes.
END SUMMARY. 

--------------
LOURDES FLORES
-------------- 

2.  (U)  Flores' raly attracted what the National Police
estimated as 19,000 followers to the Campo de Marte park just
off central Lima.  Her speech concentrated on the positive
message that her campaign focused on for the last two weeks:
that Unidad Nacional stands for a change with "serenity,"
offering a "certain path and a sure destination," vowing to
combat the marginalization of a large part of the population,
provide honest and efficient government, and promote growth
through enhancement of opportunities for small businesses.
Flores also took swipes at her principle opponents, warning
voters not to "hand over the country to adventurers and
improvisers" (an allusion to Humala), nor "to repeat the old
political, economic and social failures that only brought
more hunger and desperation and fewer illusions" (a reference
to Garcia's disastrous 1985-90 Government). 

-----------
ALAN GARCIA
----------- 

3.  (U)  Garcia's rally attracted what the National Police
estimated as 15,000 supporters to the Naval Heroes Plaza that
fronts the Sheraton Hotel and Palace of Justice in downtown
Lima.  He sought to position APRA as the principle political
force representing the center, between "the right wing of the
great capitalists, although it is dressing itself up
differently and assuming phrases at the last minute" (Flores)
and "a mendacious agitator and demagogue who recently, at age
45, discovered nationalism" (Humala).  He also sought to
reassure non-Apristas that his government would be an
inclusive one, open to working with other parties and
staffing the bureaucracy with qualified technocrats.  At
previous stops in Puno, Tumbes and Trujillo during the last
week of campaigning, Garcia delivered much the same message,
but added local riffs.  In Trujillo, an APRA stronghold, he
paid homage to the party's martyrs.  In Puno and Tumbes he
promised to create free trade zones and expand agricultural
credits. 

--------------
OLLANTA HUMALA
-------------- 

4.  (U)  Humala closed out his campaign in the central plaza
in Arequipa before a crowd estimated by the National Police
at 4,500.  The day before he held a rally at the Naval Heroes
Plaza in Lima, drawing an audience similar to Garcia's.  The
UPP candidate was clearly on the defensive, dedicating a
major portion of his speech to address the numerous questions
and accusations raised against him and his followers over the
past two weeks, damning his accusers and claiming that the
mass media is engaged in an anti-Humala campaign on behalf of
the traditional parties and great business interests. 

5. (U) Humala, his family and his entourage were the main focus of attention over the past two weeks of the campaign, with his political opponents and the media making hay over:

--  UPP spokesman Daniel Abugattas calling First Lady Eliane
Karp a "daughter of a whore," and accusing her of intervening
with the Israeli Embassy to prevent Peruvians of Palestinian
descent (Abugattas is one) from traveling to the West Bank
and Gaza.  Humala removed Abugattas as his spokesman, but
rejected calls to kick him off the UPP's congressional list
for Lima. 

--  Television commentator, renowned novelist, and
self-professed bi-sexual Jaime Bayly's claim that when one of
his staff asked Humala's father Isaac to appear on his TV
program, the latter responded, "Tell that faggot that we are
not going to go on his program and that when we are in the
government we will have him shot."  This followed on Humala's
mother's comments in March that homosexuals should be
executed (Ref B). 

--  Humala's claims that electoral authorities are conspiring
to commit fraud to prevent his election, pointing to the
latters' failure to provide a mechanism that would enable
on-duty military and police personnel to vote, and his threat
to have his supporters take to the street if this occurs.
Election authorities and OAS Observer Mission head Lloyd
Axworthy responded by dismissing the possibility of fraud.
Axworthy also minimized the importance of the affected
personnel not being able to cast ballots, noting that they
represent less than one percent of the national vote, and
that their dedication to security duties will enable the rest
of the Peruvian population to vote in safety. 

--  Media reports published on 3/31 that at least three
retired military officers serving important functions in
Humala's campaign (Colonels Adrian Villafuerte, Estuardo
Loyola, and Luis Pinto) served in positions of confidence for
generals linked closely to imprisoned former National
Security Advisor Vladimiro Montesinos. 

--  Humala's Second Vice President running mate Carlos Torres
having lunch on 4/2 with TV magnate (Channel 5) Genaro
Delgado Parker only a few hours after Humala vowed that
"shameless" media owners who owe the government millions of
dollars (Delgado Parker reportedly has debts to the GOP of
some USD 10 million) will be called on to pay up under his
administration.  Humala claimed that Torres met with Delgado
Parker without his knowledge, and subsequently issued
instructions that UPP candidates and officials may not/not
meet with media owners or business tycoons without his prior
approval. 

--  Humala's interview with Argentine daily "Pagina 12,"
which the Lima media picked up on 4/5, that if Lourdes Flores
wins, "What would happen is what happened to presidents of
other Latin American countries who were removed by the
people.  I think that it will be very difficult for Lourdes
Flores to manage to complete one year of government."
Flores, Garcia and media commentators leapt on this quote as
signifying that Humala was prepared employ non-democratic
means to obtain power should he be defeated at the ballot
box.  His critics generally ignored his qualification later
in the interview that any candidate "who represents
continuity" would last a year in office if they did not
address social demands. 

--  Humala's involvement in criminal investigations.  He has
been summoned to testify on 4/24 in the criminal trial of his
brother Antauro for the latter's leadership of the 1/1/05
Andahuaylas uprising.  In addition, Tocache prosecutor Arturo
Campos has said he intends to call Humala to testify in
mid-April in connection with the allegations that he
committed human rights violations when commanding an Army
base in the Huallaga Valley in 1992. 

--  Humala's admission that he was planning to visit a
factory belonging to Samuel and Mendel Winter, two media
owners who were convicted and sentenced to jail terms for
accepting bribes from Montesinos, and whose parole status is
being reviewed by a criminal court over their failure to pay
a multi-million dollar fine.

--  News that Salomon Lerner Ghitis, Humala's liaison to the
business community, recently met with the newly appointed
Chilean Ambassador to Peru, Christian Barros, in Santiago
raised speculation as to possible dealings between the
ultra-nationalist Humala and the country's southern neighbor.
 Humala dismissed the importance of these reports, stating
that Lerner's trip and meetings were related to the latter's
business and had nothing to do with the UPP campaign. 

--  Allegations that first surfaced on 4/5, charging that
retired Major Italo Ponce, a senior Humala campaign advisor,
visited imprisoned Montesinos crony Oscar Lopez Meneses in
jail to negotiate the conformation of UPP's congressional
list.  The weekly "Caretas" published an expose on 4/7, in
which a witness, businessman Augusto Vega, claimed to have
participated in these discussions.  Vega had been involved in
the UPP campaign until January of this year when he left, he
says, because of the Montesinos connection (NOTE:  We have
also heard that Vega broke with Humala after being passed
over as a congressional candidate.  END NOTE). 

--  A 4/6 report by the news magazine "La Ventana Indiscreta"
in which retired National Police Colonel Cesar Mojorovich,
who was in charge of the local police station when Humala
staged his 10/27/2000 "uprising" in Locumba, claimed that
Humala's action was a sham designed to distract the
government's and public's attention from Montesinos, who
chose that same day to make his escape from Peru on a boat.
Mojorovich's account does not/not appear to add anything new
to these allegations, which have been aired ever since
Humala's "uprising" took place, but it does have the effect
of bringing this issue to the fore again at a critical moment
of the campaign.  Perhaps not coincidentally, Mojorovich is
being accompanied by leading members of the Independent
Moralizing Front (FIM) party, which has been an outspoken
critic of Humala. 

-----------------
THE PRIVATE POLLS
----------------- 

6.  (U)  The Organic Election Law prohibits the public
diffusion of poll results for a week before the election.
This prevents the local media from publishing polls during
this period, but it does not/not prevent the polling
organizations or their private clients from leaking the
results to the international press so that the news gets back
to a Peruvian audience.  Such has occurred with respect to
two polls carried out by the Apoyo and CPI consultancies.
The Apoyo poll was based on interviews in Lima and urban
areas taken on 4/3 and combined with rural results from the
poll published on 4/2 (Ref A), has Humala at 31 percent with
Flores and Garcia tied at 23 percent.  The CPI poll, taken
nationally on 4/4, found a technical tie, with the top three
candidates within a range of less than three percent:  Flores
27.6 percent, Humala 25.9 percent and Garcia 24.9 percent. 

----------
COMMENT
---------- 

7.  (SBU)  With active campaigning at an end, it now is up to
the electorate to judge the candidates at the ballot box.
One unanswered question is whether the constant political and
media assaults on Humala will penetrate his Teflon shield and
wear away at his support (as the CPI poll reports and as the
previous Apoyo poll hinted was starting to occur - Ref A), or
whether his base of committed followers will remain unchanged
(as the latest Apoyo poll suggests).  The other major issues
in play are whether Flores has managed to arrest or reverse
her steady decline, and whether Garcia can maintain his final
sprint for the finish line and make it into the second round.
 The answers will come on 4/9.  END COMMENT.
STRUBLE

CONFIDENTIAL: PROMINENT BLOGGER FLEES SEDITION TRIAL

VZCZCXRO3036
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHKL #0323 1200954
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 300954Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2661
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0613
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L KUALA LUMPUR 000323 

SIPDIS 

FOR EAP/MTS AND DRL 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2019
TAGS: PHUM PINS PGOV KJUS KDEM UK MY
SUBJECT: PROMINENT BLOGGER FLEES SEDITION TRIAL 

REF: A. 08 KL 990 - RAJA PETRA RELEASED FROM ISA
     B. 08 KL 846 - UPDATE ON RAJA PETRA DETENTION
     C. 08 KL 806 - JOURNALIST DETAINED UNDER ISA 

Classified By: Political Counselor Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b and
 d). 

Summary and Comment
------------------- 

1.  (C) Prominent blogger and government critic Raja Petra
Kamarudin, who was jailed for two months in 2008 under the
Internal Security Act (ISA), failed to appear for his
sedition trail on April 23, and the court subsequently issued
a warrant for his arrest.  A member of his defense team
informed poloff that Raja Petra, along with his wife, fled to
the United Kingdom about two months ago on the belief that he
would face eventual imprisonment for sedition. 

2.  (SBU) Comment: Raja Petra, Malaysia's most controversial
on-line voice, will continue to be a nuisance to Prime
Minister Najib's administration.  Not expecting to return to
Malaysia anytime soon, we can expect Raja Petra to ratchet up
his criticism and purported exposes during his self-imposed
exile.  End Summary and Comment. 

Where is Raja Petra?
-------------------- 

3.  (SBU) Raja Petra Kamarudin, an outspoken blogger and
member of the Selangor state royal family failed to appear at
Sessions Court for the continuation of his sedition trial on
April 23.  The court subsequently issued a warrant for his
arrest.  Raja Petra faced charges under the Sedition Act for
articles he posted on his website, Malaysia Today, regarding
the high-profile Altantuya murder case and the victim's
alleged ties to Prime Minister Najib and his wife.  If
convicted of sedition, he faces a maximum sentence of three
years in jail. 

4.  (U) On April 23, Raja Petra posted on his website his
reasons for not appearing in court.  He claimed Malaysian
authorities intended to detain him under the ISA, as the
Government had done in September 2008 (ref A-C).  He also
stated the courts were unable to provide him with a fair
trial and noted the government was using sedition charges and
criminal defamation charges, in addition to detaining him
under ISA, for linking the Prime Minister to the murdered
Mongolian national Altantuya.  Raja Petra also mentioned that
he had angered the Selangor royal family with his criticism
of the Sultan of Perak related to the ruling coalition's
takeover of Perak state government from the opposition, and
therefore could not return to Selangor. 

Lawyer Confirms Departure for UK
-------------------------------- 

5.  (C) Poloff met with one of Raja Petra's lead lawyers on
April 23.  The lawyer disclosed that following Raja Petra's
last appearance in court in February Raja Petra's legal team
concluded their client would be found guilty and imprisoned
under the sedition charges, and informed Raja Petra
accordingly.  The lawyer claimed that the ruling coalition's
political influence over the court proceedings precluded a
fair trail.  He said that Raja Petra, who holds both
Malaysian and British passports, along with his wife had left
for the UK some two months ago and remained there.  His
departure was kept closely guarded with Raja Petra's closest
friends remaining in the dark.  The lawyer said it was
unclear if the Attorney General's Office realized Raja Petra
had left Malaysia, as the prosecutor's public statements
indicated he was still in the country.  After the court's
issuance of an arrest warrant for Raja Petra, and a "show
cause notice" for his wife as bail guarantor, some on-line
articles suggested Raja Petra was in the UK. 

KEITH

TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY: POLANDS REVOLUTION

Vote with us

On April 5 Poland celebrates the twelfth anniversary of the signing of the Round Table Agreements — a landmark power-sharing agreement negotiated by representatives of the Communist Polish government, leaders of the long-outlawed union Solidarity, and leaders of the Catholic Church that allowed for the first free elections in Eastern Europe in nearly 50 years.  To mark the anniversary, the National Security Archive is publishing a new electronic briefing book, featuring recently declassified Department of State documents detailing the U.S. embassy’s analysis of and participation in events during Poland’s revolution.     The year 1989 began with a contentious Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) Plenum in January that led directly to the Round Table Negotiations from February 6 to April 5.  Later, on June 4 and 18, Solidarity candidates won landslide victories in elections to the Sejm (the lower house of the Polish Parliament) and the Senate.  These elections were followed by a presidential crisis, then a presidential visit by George Bush on July 10-11.  In a year of surprises, the Solidarity leadership would pull off their most daring coup when in mid-August they orchestrated a Solidarity-led coalition in the Sejm, electing Tadeusz Mazowiecki — a leading member of Solidarity — as prime minister and forming Poland’s and the Eastern Bloc’s first non-Communist government since World War II. Ultimately, Poland would be overshadowed by events in Budapest, Prague, and Berlin; however, it was the Poles that led the way for Eastern Europe’s revolutions of 1989.

From the American perspective, President George Bush has characterized American policy toward Eastern Europe during 1989 as that of a “responsible catalyst.”2  Presumably this meant that the U.S. worked to support Solidarity in its drive to become part of the Polish government, while pushing the Communists to give up their monopoly on power.  This characterization seems correct for the first half of the year.  However, shortly before the first round of elections on June 4, the U.S. switched gears from pushing for change to restricting the pace of that change.  Concerned that a radicalizing public and an increasingly anxious Communist Party could plunge an unstable Poland into chaos, Washington metamorphosed from a “responsible catalyst” to a “reluctant inhibitor.”  Thus during the crisis months of mid-1989, as Solidarity jousted with the PZPR for control of the office of president and then prime minister, Washington aired on the side of caution, working to restrict Solidarity’s push for power and attempting to insure that the Communists were not left behind.  When Solidarity made their final push for prime minister, the American’s were reluctant to take such a drastic step.  However, by that point in time there was little the U.S. could do as Solidarity took its destiny into its own hands.


Contemporary observers, as well as scholars, have tended to be critical of the Bush administration’s first six months in office, during which most foreign policy decisions were put on hold until a comprehensive policy review was completed.3  Outside of President Bush’s April 17 speech in Hamtramck, which pledged to make the process of self-determination in Eastern Europe the central test of Mikhail Gorbachev’s “new thinking,” as well as to give economic aid and moral support for the reforms occurring in Eastern Europe, America took no new or striking policy initiatives — prompting U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Jack Matlock and Anatoly Chernaev, Gorbachev’s chief foreign policy aide, to entitle the chapters in their memoirs on the first half of 1989 “Washington Fumbles” and “The Lost Year,” respectively.4  In contrast to this perspective, the U.S. Ambassador to Poland during 1989, John R. Davis, Jr., jokingly admits that he enjoyed the extra freedom of movement a lack of interest from Washington afforded him.5  However, this greater freedom did not translate into any new or proactive policy on the ground in Poland, either.     What the recently declassified cables below show is that during the first half of the year no radical policy changes were made in large measure because the Poles and Solidarity were making significant progress on their own toward fulfilling American goals. Since the declaration of martial law in December 1981, the United States had three simple and publicly acknowledged goals:  to obtain the lifting of martial law, to gain the release of all political prisoners, and to realize the resumption of an open dialogue between the Communist government, Solidarity, and the Catholic Church.  Martial law was lifted rather quickly.  But throughout the 1980’s the U.S. government worked both publicly and covertly to fund, equip, and morally support Solidarity to insure its continuing viability as a dissident voice.  The Reagan administration also utilized economic sanctions and leverage over international lending institutions as both carrot and stick to pressure the Polish government toward negotiations and compromise.  In mid-1986, the Polish government passed a resolution calling for the release of the last political prisoners in a mass amnesty, fulfilling the U.S.’s second goal.  Following miners’ strikes in the summer of 1988, Lech Walesa and Interior Minister Czeslaw Kiszczak met secretly throughout the fall and winter of 1988 opening a Solidarity-government dialogue.  During a heated PZPR Plenum in January 1989, the Communist Party finally acquiesced to the last prerequisite for further dialogue—the willingness to discuss the re-legalization of Solidarity. Most importantly, beginning on February 6, 1989, representatives of the Communist coalition,6 the Catholic Church, and Solidarity sat down around a donut-shaped, round table to negotiate Poland’s future.  In the minds of American policy-makers in both Washington and Warsaw,7 events were progressing better than could be expected.  For the first six months of 1989, there was no need for the U.S. to change directions or push harder on the ground in Poland.

This is not to say that the embassy staff was sitting on their hands; on the contrary, they were sending some absolutely spectacular bits of reporting back to Foggy Bottom, keeping Washington extremely well informed.  Throughout the Reagan years, in spite of political roadblocks set by the Communists, John Davis and his staff worked to maintain contact and at least limited discussion with his Communist counterparts, so that by 1989 he had a healthy working relationship with the PZPR.8  More importantly, the American embassy worked to create and nurture intimate ties with the Solidarity leadership.  Throughout his tenure in Warsaw, Ambassador Davis held frequent informal gatherings—evenings ostensibly spent socializing, watching recent American movies, and eating large batches of beef stroganoff or lasagna in the ambassador’s residence—allowing members of Solidarity to meet with each other and to talk with the ambassador.  By 1989 Ambassador Davis had assumed the role of a close confidant and advisor to Solidarity’s leadership, allowing the dissidents to act as they saw fit but nonetheless offering his support and input on the most important issues when it was requested.9  More importantly, the embassy’s relationship with Solidarity’s inner circle gave American diplomats an unusually deep understanding of the situation.

This depth of understanding is evident in most of the cables from the first half of 1989, but it is perhaps best exemplified by Davis’s analysis following the signing of the Round Table Agreements.  The embassy understood what the Round Table agreements and impending free elections meant:  an overwhelming victory for Solidarity.  As Davis wrote on April 19 after returning from a 10-day trip to the U.S., “[The Communist authorities] are more likely to meet total defeat and great embarrassment.”  Surveying the mood of the PZPR, the public, and Solidarity, Davis sent back word to Washington that Solidarity would win, and win big.  While few others were openly predicting a “Solidarity sweep in the Senate,” Davis clearly saw that June 4 would be nothing but an outright victory for Solidarity.  (Document No. 1)  In retrospect, the U.S. embassy’s analysis of events in this instance, as in many others, was first rate and dead on.

In the two months between the signing of the Round Table Agreement and the first round of elections, American satisfaction was replaced with concern.  On the eve of the first round of elections, Solidarity’s impending electoral victory was no longer a cause for celebration—it became a threat to the stability of the Round Table framework.  Until this point, Washington and the embassy assumed that the elections would lead to a situation in which Solidarity and the Communists would lead jointly over the next six years with Solidarity gaining a full voice in the government only after subsequent elections—a slow transition toward political liberalization.10  In a June 2 cable, Ambassador Davis predicted a “nearly-total Solidarity victory” with the Party only winning 2 or 3 Senate seats.  For the first time since the Agreements were signed, Davis even wrote about a possible “rejection of the National List.”11  In the embassy’s analysis this type of complete victory for Solidarity was not a positive development; instead, it “threaten[ed] a sharp defensive reaction from the regime.” A Solidarity victory was now a “specter of utter catastrophe” in which the reform wing of the communist Party could be humiliated and lose its hold on power within the Party, plunging Poland into uncertainty, a military coup d’etat, or even civil war. (Document No. 2)

By the evening of June 5, even the Party had acknowledged their overwhelming defeat.  Solidarity had won 160 out of 161 Sejm seats it was eligible for, as well as, 92 seats in the Senate.  More surprisingly, only 2 of a possible 35 Party candidates on the National List received the necessary 50% of votes to be elected to the Sejm.  The specter of utter catastrophe still loomed large on the horizon, and the American embassy quickly became concerned that a crisis might ensue over the election of the new Polish president.  According to American calculations the Communist coalition would have only a two-vote majority in the National Assembly.  With expected defections by at least 10 Communist or Communist-coalition deputies, this gave Solidarity a majority.  So, “the assumed election of Wojciech Jaruzelski as president will be re-examined by many” and that “if Jaruzelski is still to be elected president, it will only be with Solidarity acquiescence if not more active support.”  Because the election of Jaruzelski as president was an unwritten assumption of the Round Table Agreements, the embassy, Washington, and many Solidarity activists correctly felt that if Solidarity reneged on this part of the deal, the whole framework of the agreement might fall apart.  Amid other signs of possible radicalization in the public sphere—Davis was particularly concerned with the low voter turn out and the public’s decision to disregard Lech Walesa’s pleas to accept the National List—it now became imperative to insure that General Jaruzelski be elected president.  In a stunning shift of policy, the Americans were now campaigning for the Communist incumbent. (Document No. 3)

In the next round of elections two weeks later, Solidarity candidates won the only Sejm seat they had not yet taken and 7 of the last 8 remaining seats in the Senate they were allowed to compete for, only strengthening the specter of a presidential crisis.  Publicly, tension continued to rise with demonstrations occurring in Krakow calling for Jaruzelski to resign from the government.  Privately, members of the PZPR leadership began to pressure American diplomats by stating that if Jaruzelski was not elected president it would effect the upcoming visit of President Bush.  Still other communist officials made it clear that “military and militia officers indicated that they would feel personally threatened if Jaruzelski were not president and would move to overturn the Round-Table and election results.”12  In direct communications between the PZPR and the Church, Kiszczak said that if Jaruzelski “was not elected president then we would be facing a further destabilization and the whole process of political transformation would have to end.  No other president would be [listened to] in the security forces and in the army.”13

In this increasingly tense situation, Ambassador Davis met over dinner on June 22 with “some leading Solidarity legislators, who had better remain nameless.”14  According to a secret cable sent the following day most Solidarity leaders felt that “if Jaruzelski is not elected president, there is a genuine danger of civil war ending . . . with a reluctant but brutal Soviet intervention.”  However, most Solidarity leaders had also pledged publicly not to vote for Jaruzelski, so they found themselves in a jam and came to Ambassador Davis looking for advice.  In a rather stunning example of the type of close, advisory position the ambassador had earned within Solidarity, Davis jotted a few numbers on the back of an embassy matchbook to explain the “arcane western political practice known as head-counting” whereby a large number of Solidarity delegates might not attend the election session.  The Solidarity delegates in attendance could then abstain from voting because the Party delegates would have such an overwhelming majority. (Document No. 4)  The U.S. embassy had moved beyond a policy of concern toward the situation and was now actively advising Solidarity on how to elect General Jaruzelski.

By the end of June with President Bush’s visit rapidly approaching, the newly elected government had not yet settled the presidential crisis.  In fact, General Jaruzelski began to show signs that he was not willing to run for election, further endangering the precarious balance.  As Davis noted in his June 23 Cable:

the General is determined that he will not ‘creep’ into the presidency.  He is understandably reluctant to face another public humiliation after the defeat of Party reformers on the National List in round one of the elections.  Consequently, Jaruzelski is doing his own head-counting and, if the numbers don’t come out right, might well decline the nomination.15

Privately, Jaruzelski voiced his reluctance to run for president during the 13th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee on June 30,16confirming Davis’s fears.     On the evening of July 9, President Bush landed in Warsaw for a two-day visit which included private meetings with General Jaruzelski and Lech Walesa, a reception at the Ambassador’s residence, and the historic opportunity to speak before the Polish parliament.  In the words of the embassy, President Bush would “find himself in the center of the world’s most pro-American country,” nearly guaranteeing that Washington’s goal of utilizing the trip to show moral support for the reform process in Poland would be a success.  On a less positive note, Davis also notes the Poles’ “hopes [for economic assistance that are] certain to exceed our capacity to deliver.” (Document No. 5)17  In the private conversation between Bush and Jaruzelski at Belwedere Palace on the morning of July 10, however, a main purpose of his trip seems to have been to push General Jaruzelski to run for president.  As President Bush recalls:

Jaruzelski opened his heart and asked me what role I thought he should now play.  He told me of his reluctance to run for president and his desire to avoid a political tug-of-war that Poland did not need.  I told him his refusal to run might inadvertently lead to serious instability and I urged him to reconsider.  It was ironic:  Here was an American president trying to persuade a senior Communist leader to run for office.18

According to others present during the meeting, President Bush may have overstated the degree to which Jaruzelski “opened up his heart,” and the actual affects this conversation had on Jaruzelski’s thoughts are a matter of interpretation.19  But, with these recently declassified documents, Bush’s motivation for pushing a senior Communist leader to run for office becomes clear — Jaruzelski was an absolutely necessary part of any new government if Poland were to remain stable.  Similarly, when in public with General Jaruzelski, Bush’s body language was very open and positive towards Jaruzelski.  Some observers have commented that Bush seemed more comfortable with Jaruzelski than he did with Walesa.  In light of the fact that the U.S. embassy had been reporting for months on the increasing radicalization of the Polish public and the fear and concern anti-Jaruzelski demonstrations caused amongst Party members, it was completely consistent for President Bush to demonstrate America’s support for Jaruzelski — anything less would have only increased criticism and upped the tension.  A week after President Bush departed Poland for Hungary, General Jaruzelski became President Jaruzelski, narrowly winning victory in the National Assembly by one vote.     Unfortunately, before President Jaruzelski was even elected, Poland was already in another crisis situation, this time surrounding the question of a prime minister and the creation of a government.  From the beginning, the U.S. embassy had assumed that the PZPR and its coalition partners would utilize their mandated majority to create a communist coalition government.  On July 3 in the midst of the presidential crisis, Adam Michnik, a leading Solidarity intellectual, proposed an agreement that would allow the PZPR to retain the presidency while a member of Solidarity would become prime minister.20  The Communists countered this offer with their own compromise to create a “grand coalition” in which PZPR delegates would maintain control over key power ministries such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  In return, Solidarity delegates would receive key positions in economic and social ministries, as well as a deputy prime minister position.

At the beginning of August, however, Walesa openly rejected the idea of a “grand coalition” government, and Bronislaw Geremek (another leading Solidarity figure) stated that the Solidarity delegates would not support Czeslaw Kiszczak for prime minister.  Moreover, Lech Walesa and Solidarity leaders began to court members of the Communist Party’s coalition partners to join a Solidarity-led coalition.  Although a few U.S. cables had mentioned the possibility of members of the Communist coalition — particularly the SD and ZSL — breaking ranks with the PZPR and voting with Solidarity,21 the reality of the situation seems to have taken Ambassador Davis by surprise.  As he recalls:

What I didn’t predict, what I couldn’t predict was that the two satellite parties would be willing to break away and form a government with Solidarity.  …  It was an item of doctrine with [the Solidarity leadership] that these were contemptible satellites that had no independent views of any kind and should never be treated as anything separate from the Party itself.  That was the general view that prevailed for many, many years.  And it misled us in the end, because [the ZSL and SD] turned out to have their own interests.  Walesa and some of his people saw this and knew how to exploit it…  It was a brilliant political maneuver.22

Walesa’s coup was effective, and by August 7 Walesa’s work had paralyzed General Kiszczak’s efforts to create a government.     Four days later on August 11, Davis met with Kiszczak as the crisis came near a breaking point.  According to the cable, Kiszczak “explained that Solidarity’s latest proposal that it take over the government in coalition with the Peasant party and Democratic Party … was unacceptable to the senior officers of the army and police and to the Czechs, East Germans, and Soviets.”  The interior minister continued, explaining that a Solidarity coalition was “regarded as breaking the deal made at the Round Table” — something the U.S. had attempted to keep alive and viable at all costs.  Kiszczak even alluded to the recent events in Tiananmen Square, but he was not worried about a Soviet military intervention, only the drastic effects Soviet economic measures could have in Poland. Later in the meeting, Ambassador Davis strongly defended the U.S. against charges that the West was behind Solidarity’s push to take control of the government; however, he seems to have taken Kiszczak’s warning about the crisis very seriously.  As the cable concluded:

The clear message conveyed was that a Solidarity government is not acceptable at this time although they are more than welcome to take over a number of ministries.  There was also the very thinly-veiled appeal to the U.S. to restrain the opposition’s thrust for power, something which is probably beyond our capacity now even if we chose to try.  I fear that food shortages and price increases here have taken the situation right to the brink and it will take all the efforts of cooler heads of both sides to avoid a crisis with unpredictable consequences. (Document No. 6)

America could no longer act as the “inhibitor,” and this worried the embassy.     As events continued on their own momentum, the embassy continued to report back to Washington but received no guidance other than “to keep all lines of communication open” between Solidarity and the PZPR. (Document No. 7)  However, Washington did take Kiszczak’s warnings23 seriously, and requested analysis from the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jack Matlock, regarding the probable Soviet reaction to a Solidarity-led government in Poland.  Matlock’s response was really quite remarkable.  As the cable concluded:

The Soviet response to the Polish political crisis has thus far been restrained, and barring a major misstep by Solidarity is likely to remain so.  In keeping with Soviet “new thinking” in foreign policy, a strong reaction to Polish events does not seem to be appropriate. …in the final analysis, although Solidarity may be a bitter pill to swallow, our best guess is that the Soviets will do so, if it comes to that, after much gagging and gulping.  Their essential interests in Poland will be satisfied by any regime, Solidarity-led or not, that can promote domestic stability and avoid anti-Soviet outbursts.(Document No. 8)

By Matlock’s analysis, Mikhail Gorbachev’s “new thinking” had superceded “fraternal assistance.”  He now believed that the Soviets were willing to accept a non-Communist government in Eastern Europe, so long as that government was not anti-Soviet.  Fortunately, Lech Walesa and Solidarity had played their cards perfectly up to this point to sooth Soviet fears by publicly stating that they would not leave the Warsaw Pact, and by recognizing the importance of a continued, positive Polish-Soviet relationship.  Most importantly, in this August 16, 1989 cable, the embassy in Moscow realized that the Soviet’s trump card in Eastern Europe — military intervention — would no longer be used.  Matlock understood that the Brezhnev Doctrine was dead, and the Cold War would not last much longer.     With reassurances from Moscow that the situation was not as dire as Kiszczak had made it out to be, the embassy in Warsaw took no new action.  They continued to worry about the outcome; however, it is clear that the Solidarity leadership was now exclusively in control of its own destiny and was no longer turning towards their friends in the American embassy for advice.  By August 19 an agreement had been reached for a Solidarity prime minister to create a coalition government with ministers from Solidarity, the SD, the ZSL, and the PZPR.24  (Document No. 9)  The crisis officially ended on August 24 when Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a long-time Solidarity leader, was confirmed by the Sejm as prime minister and charged to create a government.  With that, Poland peacefully ended nearly a half-century of Communist rule.

In terms of American policy, Ambassador Davis had successfully fulfilled the political tasks assigned to him and he requested new orders. (Document No. 10a) Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger responded, “Your next task is to promote and ensure the realization of economic prosperity in Poland, to include stable growth, full employment, low inflation, high productivity and a Mercedes (or equivalent) in every garage.” (Document No. 10b)  Although Eagleberger’s comments do not lack sarcasm, they are indicative of a fundamental change in American policy.  For the entirety of the Cold War, the U.S. sought to promote free elections in Eastern Europe and see a popularly elected, democratic government take control.  Poland succeeded first, and a major—if not the major—prerequisite condition of the Cold War in Europe ceased to exist.  American policy was no longer to end Soviet domination and Communist control of Poland, but to take the next step to promote its economic growth and reintroduce Poland into Europe.  On August 24, the Cold War ended in Poland — the rest of Eastern Europe would not be far off.


Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.

Document 1
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “Election ’89:  The Year of Solidarity,” April 19, 1989.

Document 2
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “Election ’89: Solidarity’s Coming Victory:  Big or Too Big?,” June 2, 1989.

Document 3
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “Election ’89:  Solidarity’s Victory Raises Questions,” June 6, 1989.

Document 4
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “How to Elect Jaruzelski without Voting for Him, and Will He Run?,” June 23, 1989.

Document 5
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “Poland Looks to President Bush,” June 27, 1989.

Document 6
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “Conversation with General Kiszczak,” August 11, 1989.

Document 7
Cable from Secstate to Warsaw, “Solidarity-Government Dialogue,” August 12, 1989.

Document 8
Cable from Moscow to Secstate, “If Solidarity Takes Charge, What Will the Soviets Do?,” August 16, 1989.

Document 9
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “Bronislaw Geremek Explains Next Steps Toward a Solidarity Government,” August 19, 1989.

Documents 10a & 10b
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “Request for Instructions,” August 24, 1989; and Cable from Secstate to Warsaw, “Ambassador’s Instructions,” August 24, 1989.

Notes

1.  Source Note:  Tom Blanton, director of the National Security Archive, filed the original Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request that the cables referred to in this essay were declassified in response to, as part of a larger, international study of the end of the Cold War.  These studies culminated in three critical oral history conferences held in Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw in the summer and fall of 1999.  Context for analyzing these documents comes from the conference sponsored by the Institute of Political Studies (Warsaw), the National Security Archive, and the Cold War International History Project, and held in Miedzezyn-Warsaw, Poland in October 1999.  A compendium of documents compiled for that conference was also essential in the author’s analysis:  Tom Blanton and Malcolm Byrne, ed., Poland 1986-1989:  The End of the System (Washington, D.C.:  The National Security Archive, 1999); hereafter referred to as Compendium.
This electronic briefing book is also part of a larger Master’s thesis project on U.S. policy toward Poland from 1986-1989.

2.  George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), p. 117.

3.  Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War (Washington, D.C.:  Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997).

4.  Anatoly Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, trans. by Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker (State College, P.A.:  Penn State Press, 2000), pp. 201-232; Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Autopsy of an Empire (New York:  Random House, 1995), pp. 177-200.

5.  Author’s interview with John R. Davis, Jr. (U.S. Charge d’Affaires ad interim to Poland 1983-1987, U.S. Charge d’Affaires to Poland 1987-1988, U.S. Ambassador to Poland 1988-1990), November 23, 1999.

6.  The government in Poland consisted of politicians from a number of parties including the PZPR, the Democratic Party (SD), and the United Peasants’ Party (ZSL).  These parties worked together in a PZPR-dominated coalition.

7.  Davis interview, November 23, 1999; and author’s interview with Thomas W. Simons (Assistant Secretary of State for the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Yugoslavia, 1986-1989), July 7, 2000.

8.  See Document No. 8.

9.  See Document No. 6.

10.  Hutchings, p. 64.

11.  The “National List” was a grouping of leading Party officials who ran unopposed on the ballot.  In order to be elected, these candidates need only receive 50% of the vote.

12.  Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, ” Politburo Member Warns that U.S. has been ‘Dragged into the War’ over Election of Jaruzelski as President,” June 16, 1989. (Not reproduced here.)

13.  Compendium, “Chronology,” p. 20.

14.  Unfortunately, Ambassador Davis does not recall which legislators these were.  Author’s interview with Davis, October 5, 2000.

15.  See Document No. 6.

16.  Compendium, “Chronology,” p. 21.

17.  Unfortunately, the cable traffic from July 1989 has not yet been declassified, so this document offers the best, however incomplete, analysis of the build-up for the President’s trip.  A FOIA request is pending for these July cables.

18.  A World Transformed, p. 117.

19.  Author’s interview with Davis, November 23, 1999.

20.  See Adam Michnik, “Your President, Our Prime Minister,” Gazetta Wyborcza, July 5, 1989.

21.  See Document No. 5; and cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “Peasants’ Party Loosening Its Bonds with PZPR,” June 16, 1989. (Not reproduced here.)

22.  Author’s interview with Davis, November 23, 1999.

23.  It should be noted that on August 12, the Polish charge in Washington met with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Curtis W. Kamman to pass on a similar message of impending crisis. Cable from Secstate to Warsaw, “Polish Charge Krystosik’s 812 Call on EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Kamman,” August 12, 1989.

24.  In Document 9, it is interesting to note the emphasis put on the positive role President Jaruzelski played in the process and the fact that the Mazowiecki government was basically a grand coalition.  The “cooler heads of both sides” did prevail.

TOP-SECRET FROM THE NATION SECURITY ARCHIVES: UPRISING IN EASTERN GERMANY

Forty-eight years ago, on June 17, 1953, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) erupted in a series of workers’ riots and demonstrations that threatened the very existence of the communist regime.  The outburst, entirely spontaneous, shocked the GDR’s ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) and their Kremlin sponsors, who were still reeling from the death of Joseph Stalin three months earlier.  Now, a new National Security Archive document volume based on recently obtained and translated records from archival sources throughout the former Soviet bloc and the United States sheds light on this landmark Cold War event, which exposed some of the deep political and economic rifts that led to the collapse of the communist system in 1989.    Uprising in East Germany, 1953: The Cold War, the German Question, and the First Major Upheaval behind the Iron Curtain is edited by Christian F. Ostermann, a National Security Archive Fellow and currently the Director of the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.  The volume is the second in the “National Security Archive Cold War Reader” series to appear through Central European University Press.  (The first was Prague Spring ’68, edited by Jaromír Navrátil et al with a preface by Václav Havel.)

Long overlooked by historians, the 1953 worker uprising was the first outbreak of violent discord within the communist bloc — the so-called “workers’ paradise” — and helped to set the stage for more celebrated rounds of civil unrest in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), Poland (1970, 1976, 1980) and ultimately the demise of communism itself in Central and Eastern Europe.

The uprising began as a demonstration against unreasonable production quotas on June 17, but it soon spread from Berlin to more than 400 cities, towns and villages throughout East Germany, according to top-level SED and Soviet reports and CIA analyses, and embraced a broad cross-section of society.  As it spread, it also took on a more expansive political character.  Beyond calls for labor reform, demonstrators began to demand more fundamental changes such as free elections.  Chants were heard calling for “Death to Communism” and even “Long live Eisenhower!”  As Christian Ostermann writes in his introduction, for the first time ever “the ‘proletariat’ had risen against the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’.”

The protests, which soon turned violent, were not only more extensive and long-lasting than originally believed, but their impact was significant.  In revealing the depth and breadth of social discontent, they shook the confidence of the SED leadership, and especially the authority placed in party boss Walter Ulbricht.  The Kremlin, too, was stunned by the riots.  While reacting swiftly — sending in tanks and ordering Red Army troops to open fire on the protestors — the Soviet leadership found its policy debates tied up in the ongoing domestic political struggle to replace Stalin.  The arrest of secret police chief Lavrentii Beria, for example, was partly explained (at least for official consumption) as a result of his policy stance on Germany.

The West, too, was divided on how to respond.  In Washington, the reaction by proponents of “roll back” in Eastern Europe was to press the psychological advantage against international communism as aggressively as possible.  Documents in the collection show that some officials wanted to go as far as to “encourage elimination of key puppet officials.”  But Eisenhower himself balked at pushing the Soviets too far in an area of such critical importance for fear of touching off another world war.  The cautious compromise was to initiate a food distribution program to East Berlin as a way to help those who needed immediate aid while simultaneously scoring major propaganda points against the East.  The program turned out to be a stunning success, with more than 5.5 million parcels distributed in the course of roughly two months’ of operations.

The summer crisis had several important consequences.  It demonstrated that Soviet-style communism had not made any significant dent in East German political attitudes.  Neighboring communist party leaders implicitly understood this point, worrying that the spill-over from the GDR might touch off similar outbreaks in their own countries.  For Moscow, the lesson was to abandon, at least temporarily, any thought of liberalizing East Germany’s internal policies, a process that had been underway until the crisis erupted.  Ulbricht was able to regain Kremlin support after convincing the Soviets that rather than unseating him (for trying to be as good a Stalinist as Stalin) they needed his authoritarian approach to keep the lid on political and social unrest.  The crisis also confirmed for the Kremlin the need to bolster the GDR diplomatically and economically as a separate entity from West Germany.  On the American side, the uprising proved, ironically, that Republican verbiage about “liberation” of the “captive nations”, so prominent in the 1952 presidential campaign, was largely empty — at least as far as near-term prospects for action.

For more than three decades, the Soviet Union stuck to the pattern set by its reaction to the events of 1953 — responding with force or the threat of it to keep not only East Germany but the rest of the Soviet bloc under firm control.  Only when Mikhail Gorbachev repudiated violence as a means of suppressing dissent in the latter 1980s did the structural weaknesses of the communist system revealed in 1953 finally break loose and seal the fate of the Soviet empire.

In presenting this new volume, our hope is that this under-studied flashpoint of the Cold War will receive more needed public and scholarly attention.  The 1953 crisis has been a focus of the National Security Archive for the past several years as part of a multi-year, multi-archival international collaborative research effort conducted under the auspices of the Archive’s “Openness in Russia and East Europe Project,” in collaboration with CWIHP and our Russian and Eastern European partners.  From November 10-12, 1996, the uprising was a featured subject at an international conference which the Archive, CWIHP and the Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung organized in Potsdam on “The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe.”

Uprising in East Germany, 1953 comprises 95 of the most important recently released records from Russian, German, Czech, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish, British and American archives.  Each record contains a headnote to provide context for the reader.  The volume also contains introductory chapter essays as well as a detailed chronology, lists of main actors and organizations, a bibliography, maps and photos.  The following sampling provides a flavor of the documents that are in the published volume.  They are numbered as they appear there.  To view the samples and their headnotes, just click on each of the links below.

SAMPLE DOCUMENTS:

DOCUMENT No. 23: Letter from Lavrentii Beria to Georgii Malenkov Reflecting on the Events of Spring 1953, 1 July 1953
DOCUMENT No. 28: Radio Telegram from Vladimir Semyonov Providing Situation Reports to Vyacheslav Molotov and Nikolai Bulganin, 17 June 1953, as of 2:00 p.m. CET
DOCUMENT No. 38: Psychological Strategy Board Memorandum from John M. Anspacher to George A. Morgan, 17 June 1953
DOCUMENT No. 67: Otto Grotewohl’s Handwritten Notes of a SED CC Politburo Meeting, 8 July 1953
DOCUMENT No. 74:  NSC 158, “United States Objectives and Actions to Exploit the Unrest in the Satellite States,” 29 June 1953
DOCUMENT No. 87: Conclusions from Reports of the SED District Leaderships, 8 August 1953

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TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE FBI – THE FBI HISTORY

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Click on FBI files above

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Common name Federal Bureau of Investigation
Abbreviation FBI
US-FBI-ShadedSeal.svg
Seal of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Motto Fidelity, Bravery, Integrity
Agency overview
Formed 1908
Employees 35,437[1] (May 31, 2011)
Annual budget 7.9 billion USD (2010)[1]
Legal personality Governmental: Government agency
Jurisdictional structure
Federal agency
(Operations jurisdiction)
United States
Legal jurisdiction As per operations jurisdiction.
Governing body United States Congress
Constituting instrument United States Code Title 28 Part II Chapter 33
General nature
Operational structure
Headquarters J. Edgar Hoover Building,Washington, D.C.
Sworn members 13,963 (May 31, 2011)[1]
Unsworn members 21,474 (May 31, 2011)[1]
Agency executives
Child agencies
Major units
Field offices 56 (List of FBI Field Offices)
Notables
Website
fbi.gov
view · talk · edit
this information

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is an agency of the United States Department of Justice that serves as both a federal criminal investigative body and an internal intelligence agency (counterintelligence). The FBI has investigative jurisdiction over violations of more than 200 categories of federal crime.[2] Its mottois a backronym of FBI, “Fidelity, Bravery, Integrity”.

The FBI’s headquarters, the J. Edgar Hoover Building, is located in Washington, D.C. Fifty-six field offices are located in major cities throughout the United States as well as over 400 resident agencies in smaller cities and towns across the country. More than 50 international offices called “legal attachés” are in U.S. embassies worldwide.

Mission and priorities

In the fiscal year 2010, the FBI’s minimum budget was approximately $7.9 billion, including $618 million in program increases to counter-terrorism andsurveillance, fighting cyber crime, white-collar crime, and training programs.[3]

The FBI was established in 1908 as the Bureau of Investigation (BOI). Its name was changed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1935.

The FBI’s main goal is to protect and defend the United States, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners.[2]

Currently, the FBI’s top investigative priorities are:[4]

  1. Protect the United States from terrorist attacks (see counter-terrorism);
  2. Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage (see counter-intelligence);
  3. Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes (see cyber-warfare);
  4. Combat public corruption at all levels;
  5. Protect civil rights;
  6. Combat transnational/national criminal organizations and enterprises (see organized crime);
  7. Combat major white-collar crime;
  8. Combat significant violent crime;
  9. Support federal, state, local and international partners;
  10. Upgrade technology for successful performance of the FBI’s mission.

In August 2007, the top categories of lead criminal charges resulting from FBI investigations were:[5]

  1. Bank robbery and incidental crimes (107 charges)
  2. Drugs (104 charges)
  3. Attempt and conspiracy (81 charges)
  4. Material involving sexual exploitation of minors (53 charges)
  5. Mail fraud – frauds and swindles (51 charges)
  6. Bank fraud (31 charges)
  7. Prohibition of illegal gambling businesses (22 charges)
  8. Fraud by wire, radio, or television (20 charges)
  9. Hobbs Act (Robbery and extortion affecting interstate commerce) (17 charges)
  10. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)-prohibited activities (17 charges)

Indian reservations

The federal government has the primary responsibility for investigating[6] and prosecuting serious crime on Indian reservations.[7]

The FBI has criminal jurisdiction in “Indian Country” (the official name for the program) for major crimes under the “Indian Country” Crimes Act (Title 18, United States Code, Section 1152), the Indian Country Major Crimes Act (Title 18, United States Code, Section 1153), and the Assimilative Crimes Act (Title 18, United States Code, Section 13). The 1994 Crime Act expanded federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country in such areas as guns, violent juveniles, drugs, and domestic violence. Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the FBI has jurisdiction over any criminal act directly related to casino gaming. The FBI also investigates civil rights violations, environmental crimes, public corruption, and government fraud occurring in “Indian Country.”[8]

The FBI does not specifically list crimes in Native American land as one of its priorities.[9] Often serious crimes have been either poorly investigated or prosecution has been declined. Tribal courts can only impose sentences of up to three years, and even then under certain restrictions.[10][11]

Indian reservations often use their own investigative agency for crimes within its reservations, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which is an agency of the U.S. Department of the Interior.

Legal authority

FBI badge and gun

The FBI’s mandate is established in Title 28 of the United States Code (U.S. Code), Section 533, which authorizes the Attorney General to “appoint officials to detect… crimes against the United States.”[12] Other federal statutes give the FBI the authority and responsibility to investigate specific crimes.

J. Edgar Hoover began using wiretapping in the 1920s during Prohibition to arrest bootleggers.[13] A 1927 case in which a bootlegger was caught through telephone tapping went to the United States Supreme Court, which ruled that the FBI could use wiretaps in its investigations and did not violate the Fourth Amendment as unlawful search and seizure as long as the FBI did not break in to a person’s home to complete the tapping.[13] After Prohibition’s repeal,Congress passed the Communications Act of 1934, which outlawed non-consensual phone tapping, but allowed bugging.[13] In another Supreme Court case, the court ruled in 1939 that due to the 1934 law, evidence the FBI obtained by phone tapping was inadmissible in court.[13] A 1967 Supreme Court decision overturned the 1927 case allowing bugging, after which Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, allowing public authorities to tap telephones during investigations, as long as they obtain a warrant beforehand.[13]

The FBI’s chief tool against organized crime is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. The FBI is also charged with the responsibility of enforcing compliance of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 and investigating violations of the act in addition to prosecuting such violations with the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). The FBI also shares concurrent jurisdiction with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970.

The USA PATRIOT Act increased the powers allotted to the FBI, especially in wiretapping and monitoring of Internet activity. One of the most controversial provisions of the act is the so-called sneak and peekprovision, granting the FBI powers to search a house while the residents are away, and not requiring them to notify the residents for several weeks afterwards. Under the PATRIOT Act’s provisions the FBI also resumed inquiring into the library records[14] of those who are suspected of terrorism (something it had supposedly not done since the 1970s).

In the early 1980s, Senate hearings were held to examine FBI undercover operations in the wake of the Abscam controversy, which had allegations of entrapment of elected officials. As a result in following years a number of guidelines were issued to constrain FBI activities.

A March 2007 report by the inspector general of the Justice Department described the FBI’s “widespread and serious misuse” of national security letters, a form of administrative subpoena used to demand records and data pertaining to individuals. The report said that between 2003 and 2005 the FBI had issued more than 140,000 national security letters, many involving people with no obvious connections to terrorism.[15]

Information obtained through an FBI investigation is presented to the appropriate U.S. Attorney or Department of Justice official, who decides if prosecution or other action is warranted.

The FBI often works in conjunction with other Federal agencies, including the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in seaport and airport security,[16] and the National Transportation Safety Board in investigating airplane crashes and other critical incidents. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the only other agency with the closest amount of investigative power. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the FBI maintains a role in most federal criminal investigations.

History

Beginnings: The Bureau of Investigation

In 1886, the Supreme Court, in Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company v. Illinois, found that the states had no power to regulate interstate commerce. The resulting Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 created a Federal responsibility for interstate law enforcement. The Justice Department made little effort to relieve its staff shortage until the turn of the century, when Attorney General Charles Joseph Bonaparte reached out to other agencies, including the Secret Service, for investigators. But the Congress forbade this use of Treasury employees by Justice, passing a law to that effect in 1908. So the Attorney General moved to organize a formal Bureau of Investigation (BOI or BI), complete with its own staff of special agents. The Secret Service provided the Department of Justice 12 Special Agents and these agents became the first Agents in the new BOI. Thus, the first FBI agents were actually Secret Service agents. Its jurisdiction derived from the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.[17][18] The FBI grew out of this force of special agents created on July 26, 1908 during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. Its first official task was visiting and making surveys of the houses of prostitution in preparation for enforcing the “White Slave Traffic Act,” orMann Act, passed on June 25, 1910. In 1932, it was renamed the United States Bureau of Investigation. The following year it was linked to the Bureau of Prohibition and rechristened the Division of Investigation (DOI) before finally becoming an independent service within the Department of Justice in 1935.[17] In the same year, its name was officially changed from the Division of Investigation to the present-day Federal Bureau of Investigation, or FBI.

The J. Edgar Hoover Directorship

J. Edgar Hoover, FBI Director from 1924 to 1972.

Lester J. Gillis, also known as “Baby Face” Nelson.

The Director of the BOI, J. Edgar Hoover, became the first FBI Director and served for 48 years combined with the BOI, DOI, and FBI. After Hoover’s death, legislation was passed limiting the tenure of future FBI Directors to a maximum of ten years. The Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory, or the FBI Laboratory, officially opened in 1932, largely as a result of Hoover’s efforts. Hoover had substantial involvement in most cases and projects the FBI handled during his tenure.

During the “War on Crime” of the 1930s, FBI agents apprehended or killed a number of notorious criminals who carried out kidnappings, robberies, and murders throughout the nation, including John Dillinger“Baby Face” NelsonKate “Ma” BarkerAlvin “Creepy” Karpis, and George “Machine Gun” Kelly.

Other activities of its early decades included a decisive role in reducing the scope and influence of the Ku Klux Klan. Additionally, through the work of Edwin Atherton, the FBI claimed success in apprehending an entire army of Mexican neo-revolutionaries along the California border in the 1920s.

The FBI and national security

Beginning in the 1940s and continuing into the 1970s, the Bureau investigated cases of espionage against the United States and its allies. Eight Nazi agents who had planned sabotage operations against American targets were arrested, six of whom were executed (Ex parte Quirin). Also during this time, a joint US/UK code breaking effort (Venona)—with which the FBI was heavily involved—broke Soviet diplomatic and intelligence communications codes, allowing the US and British governments to read Soviet communications. This effort confirmed the existence of Americans working in the United States for Soviet intelligence.[19] Hoover was administering this project but failed to notify the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) until 1952. Another notable case is the arrest of Soviet spy Rudolf Abel in 1957.[20] The discovery of Soviet spies operating in the US allowed Hoover to pursue his longstanding obsession with the threat he perceived from the American Left, ranging from Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) union organizers to American liberals with no revolutionary aspirations whatsoever.

The FBI and the civil-rights movement

During the 1950s and 1960s, FBI officials became increasingly concerned about the influence of civil rights leaders. In 1956, for example, Hoover took the rare step of sending an open letter denouncing Dr. T.R.M. Howard, a civil rights leader, surgeon, and wealthy entrepreneur in Mississippi who had criticized FBI inaction in solving recent murders of George W. LeeEmmett Till, and other blacks in the South.[21] The FBI carried out controversial domestic surveillance in an operation it called theCOINTELPRO, which was short for “COunter-INTELligence PROgram.”[22] It aimed at investigating and disrupting dissident political organizations within the United States, including both militant and non-violent organizations, including the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, a leading civil rights organization.[23]

Martin Luther King, Jr. was a frequent target of investigation. In his 1991 memoirs, Washington Post journalist Carl Rowan asserted that the FBI had sent at least one anonymous letter to King encouraging him to commit suicide.[24]

In March 1971, a Media, Pennsylvania FBI resident office was robbed; the thieves took secret files and distributed them to a range of newspapers including the Harvard Crimson.[25] The files detailed the FBI’s extensive COINTELPRO program, which included investigations into lives of ordinary citizens—including a black student group at a Pennsylvania military college and the daughter of Congressman Henry Reuss of Wisconsin.[25] The country was “jolted” by the revelations, and the actions were denounced by members of Congress including House Majority Leader Hale Boggs.[25] The phones of some members of Congress, including Boggs, had allegedly been tapped.[25]

The FBI and Kennedy’s assassination

When President John F. Kennedy was shot and killed, the jurisdiction fell to the local police departments until President Lyndon B. Johnson directed the FBI to take over the investigation.[26] To ensure that there would never be any more confusion over who would handle homicides at the federal level, Congress passed a law that put investigations of deaths of federal officials within FBI jurisdiction.

The FBI and organized crime

In response to organized crime, on August 25, 1953, the Top Hoodlum Program was created. It asked all field offices to gather information on mobsters in their territories and to report it regularly to Washington for a centralized collection of intelligence on racketeers.[27] After the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, or RICO Act, took effect, the FBI began investigating the former Prohibition-organized groups, which had become fronts for crime in major cities and even small towns. All of the FBI work was done undercover and from within these organizations using the provisions provided in the RICO Act and these groups were dismantled. Although Hoover initially denied the existence of a National Crime Syndicate in the United States, the Bureau later conducted operations against known organized crime syndicates and families, including those headed by Sam Giancana and John Gotti. The RICO Act is still used today for all organized crime and any individuals that might fall under the Act.

However, in 2003 a congressional committee called the FBI’s organized crime informant program “one of the greatest failures in the history of federal law enforcement.” The FBI allowed four innocent men to be convicted of murder while protecting an informant in March 1965. Three of the men were sentenced to death (which was later reduced to life in prison). The fourth defendant was sentenced to life in prison, where he spent three decades.[28] In July 2007, U.S. District Judge Nancy Gertner in Boston found the bureau helped convict the four men of the March 1965 gangland murder of Edward “Teddy” Deegan. The U.S. Government was ordered to pay $100 million in damages to the four defendants.[29]

Notable post-Hoover reorganizations

Special FBI teams

In 1984, the FBI formed an elite unit[30] to help with problems that might arise at the 1984 Summer Olympics, particularly terrorism and major-crime. The formation of the team arose from the 1972 Summer Olympics at Munich, Germany when terrorists murdered Israeli Athletes. The team was named Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and acts as the FBI lead for a national SWAT team in related procedures and all counter terrorism cases. Also formed in 1984 was the Computer Analysis and Response Team (CART).[31] The end of the 1980s and the early part of the 1990s saw the reassignment of over 300 agents from foreign counter intelligence duties to violent crime, and the designation of violent crime as the sixth national priority. But with reduced cuts to other well-established departments, and because terrorism was no longer considered a threat after the end of the Cold War,[31] the FBI became a tool of local police forces for tracking fugitives who had crossed state lines, a felony. The FBI Laboratory also helped develop DNA testing, continuing the pioneering role in identification that began with its fingerprinting system in 1924.

Notable efforts in the 1990s

An FBI Agent tags the cockpit voice recorder from EgyptAir Flight 990 on the deck of the USS Grapple (ARS 53) at the crash site on November 13, 1999.

Between 1993 and 1996, the FBI increased its counter-terrorism role in the wake of the first 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York, New York and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, and the arrest of the Unabomber in 1996. Technological innovation and the skills of FBI Laboratory analysts helped ensure that all three of these cases were successfully prosecuted, but the FBI was also confronted by a public outcry in this period, which still haunts it today.[32] In the early and late 1990s, the FBI role in the Ruby Ridge and Waco incidents caused an uproar over the killings. During the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta, Georgia, the FBI was also criticized for its investigation on the Centennial Olympic Park bombing. It has settled a dispute with Richard Jewell, who was a private security guard at the venue, along with some media organizations,[33] in regards to the leaking of his name during the investigation. After Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA, 1994), the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA, 1996), and the Economic Espionage Act (EEA, 1996), the FBI followed suit and underwent a technological upgrade in 1998, just as it did with its CART team in 1991. Computer Investigations and Infrastructure Threat Assessment Center (CITAC) and the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) were created to deal with the increase in Internet-related problems, such as computer viruses, worms, and other malicious programs that might unleash havoc in the US. With these developments, the FBI increased its electronic surveillance in public safety and national security investigations, adapting to how telecommunications advancements changed the nature of such problems.

September 11th attacks

Within months of the September 11 attacks in 2001, FBI Director Robert Mueller, who had only been sworn in one week before the attacks, called for a re-engineering of FBI structure and operations. In turn, he made countering every federal crime a top priority, including the prevention of terrorism, countering foreign intelligence operations, addressing cyber security threats, other high-tech crimes, protecting civil rights, combating public corruption, organized crime, white-collar crime, and major acts of violent crime.[34]

In February 2001, Robert Hanssen was caught selling information to the Russian government. It was later learned that Hanssen, who had reached a high position within the FBI, had been selling intelligence since as early as 1979. He pleaded guilty to treason and received a life sentence in 2002, but the incident led many to question the security practices employed by the FBI. There was also a claim that Robert Hanssen might have contributed information that led to the September 11, 2001 attacks.[35]

The 9/11 Commission‘s final report on July 22, 2004 stated that the FBI and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were both partially to blame for not pursuing intelligence reports which could have prevented the September 11, 2001 attacks. In its most damning assessment, the report concluded that the country had “not been well served” by either agency and listed numerous recommendations for changes within the FBI.[36] While the FBI has acceded to most of the recommendations, including oversight by the new Director of National Intelligence, some former members of the 9/11 Commission publicly criticized the FBI in October 2005, claiming it was resisting any meaningful changes.[37]

On July 8, 2007 the Washington Post published excerpts from UCLA Professor Amy Zegart’s book Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11.[38] The article reported that government documents show the CIA and FBI missed 23 potential chances to disrupt the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The primary reasons for these failures included: agency cultures resistant to change and new ideas; inappropriate incentives for promotion; and a lack of cooperation between the FBI, CIA and the rest of the United States Intelligence Community. The article went on to also blame the FBI’s decentralized structure which prevented effective communication and cooperation between different FBI offices. The article also claimed that the FBI has still not evolved into an effective counterterrorism or counterintelligence agency, due in large part to deeply ingrained cultural resistance to change within the FBI. For example, FBI personnel practices continue to treat all staff other than Special Agents as support staff, categorizing Intelligence Analysts alongside the FBI’s auto mechanics and janitors.[39]Organization and Rank structure

The FBI is organized into five functional branches and the Office of the Director, which contains most administrative offices. Each branch is managed by an Executive Assistant Director. Each office and division within the branch is managed by an Assistant Director.

  • Office of the Director
    • Office of Congressional Affairs
    • Office of Equal Employment Opportunity Affairs
    • Office of the General Counsel
    • Office of Integrity and Compliance
    • Office of the Ombudsman
    • Office of Professional Responsibility
    • Office of Public Affairs
    • Inspection Division
    • Facilities and Logistics Services Division
    • Finance Division
    • Records Management Division
    • Resource Planning Office
    • Security Division
  • National Security Branch
  • Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch
  • Human Resources Branch
    • Training Division
    • Human Resources Division
  • Science and Technology Branch
  • Information and Technology Branch
    • Information Technology Operations Division
    • Office of IT Policy & Planning
    • Office of IT Program Management
    • Office of IT Systems Development
    • Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer

The following is a complete listing of the rank structure found within the FBI;[40]

  • Probationary Agent
  • Special Agent
  • Senior Special Agent
  • Supervisory Special Agent
  • Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge (ASAC)
  • Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC)
  • Assistant Director
  • Associate Executive Assistant Director
  • Executive Assistant Director
  • Deputy Chief of Staff
  • Chief of Staff & Senior Counsel to the Director
  • Associate Deputy Director
  • Deputy Director
  • Director

Infrastructure

J. Edgar Hoover Building, FBI Headquarters

FBI Mobile Command Center, Washington Field Office

The FBI is headquartered at the J. Edgar Hoover Building in Washington, D.C., with 56 field offices[41] in major cities across the United States. The FBI also maintains over 400 resident agencies across the United States, as well as over 50 legal attachés at United States embassies and consulates. Many specialized FBI functions are located at facilities in Quantico, Virginia, as well as a “data campus” in Clarksburg, West Virginia, where 96 million sets of fingerprints “from across the United States are stored, along with others collected by American authorities from prisoners in Saudi Arabia and YemenIraq and Afghanistan.”[42] The FBI is in process of moving its Records Management Division, which processes Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, to Winchester, Virginia.[43]

According to the Washington Post, the FBI “is building a vast repository controlled by people who work in a top-secret vault on the fourth floor of the J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building in Washington. This one stores the profiles of tens of thousands of Americans and legal residents who are not accused of any crime. What they have done is appear to be acting suspiciously to a town sheriff, a traffic cop or even a neighbor.”[42]

The FBI Laboratory, established with the formation of the BOI,[44] did not appear in the J. Edgar Hoover Building until its completion in 1974. The lab serves as the primary lab for most DNA, biological, and physical work. Public tours of FBI headquarters ran through the FBI laboratory workspace before the move to the J. Edgar Hoover Building. The services the lab conducts include ChemistryCombined DNA Index System (CODIS), Computer Analysis and ResponseDNA AnalysisEvidence ResponseExplosivesFirearms and Tool marksForensic AudioForensic VideoImage AnalysisForensic Science ResearchForensic Science TrainingHazardous Materials ResponseInvestigative and Prospective GraphicsLatent PrintsMaterials AnalysisQuestioned DocumentsRacketeering RecordsSpecial Photographic AnalysisStructural Design, and Trace Evidence.[45] The services of the FBI Laboratory are used by many state, local, and international agencies free of charge. The lab also maintains a second lab at the FBI Academy.

The FBI Academy, located in Quantico, Virginia, is home to the communications and computer laboratory the FBI utilizes. It is also where new agents are sent for training to become FBI Special Agents. Going through the twenty-one week course is required for every Special Agent.[46] It was first opened for use in 1972 on 385 acres (1.6 km2) of woodland. The Academy also serves as a classroom for state and local law enforcement agencies who are invited onto the premiere law enforcement training center. The FBI units that reside at Quantico are the Field and Police Training UnitFirearms Training UnitForensic Science Research and Training CenterTechnology Services Unit (TSU), Investigative Training UnitLaw Enforcement Communication UnitLeadership and Management Science Units (LSMU), Physical Training UnitNew Agents’ Training Unit (NATU), Practical Applications Unit (PAU), the Investigative Computer Training Unit and the “College of Analytical Studies.”

In 2000, the FBI began the Trilogy project to upgrade its outdated information technology (IT) infrastructure. This project, originally scheduled to take three years and cost around $380 million, ended up going far over budget and behind schedule.[47] Efforts to deploy modern computers and networking equipment were generally successful, but attempts to develop new investigation software, outsourced to Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), were a disaster. Virtual Case File, or VCF, as the software was known, was plagued by poorly defined goals, and repeated changes in management.[48] In January 2005, more than two years after the software was originally planned for completion, the FBI officially abandoned the project. At least $100 million (and much more by some estimates) was spent on the project, which was never operational. The FBI has been forced to continue using its decade-old Automated Case Support system, which is considered woefully inadequate by IT experts. In March 2005, the FBI announced it is beginning a new, more ambitious software project code-named Sentinel expected for completion by 2009.[49]

Carnivore was an electronic eavesdropping software system implemented by the Federal Bureau of Investigation during the Clinton administration that was designed to monitor email and electronic communications. After prolonged negative coverage in the press, the FBI changed the name of its system from “Carnivore” to the more benign-sounding “DCS1000.” DCS is reported to stand for “Digital Collection System”; the system has the same functions as before. The Associated Press reported in mid-January 2005 that the FBI essentially abandoned the use of Carnivore in 2001, in favor of commercially available software, such as NarusInsight.

The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division,[50] located in Clarksburg, West Virginia. It is the youngest division of the FBI only being formed in 1991 and opening in 1995. The complex itself is the length of three football fields. Its purpose is to provide a main repository for information. Under the roof of the CJIS are the programs for the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR),Fingerprint IdentificationIntegrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), NCIC 2000, and the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS). Many state and local agencies use these systems as a source for their own investigations and contribute to the database using secure communications. FBI provides these tools of sophisticated identification and information services to local, state, federal, and international law enforcement agencies.

FBI is in charge of National Virtual Translation Center which provides “timely and accurate translations of foreign intelligence for all elements of the Intelligence Community.”

FBI agents from the Washington Field Office with a tactical vehicle standing by for the 2009 Presidential Inauguration

Faulty bullet lead analysis testimony

For over 40 years, the FBI crime lab in Quantico believed lead in bullets had unique chemical signatures, and that by breaking them down and analyzing them, it was possible to match bullets, not only to a single batch of ammunition coming out of a factory, but to a single box of bullets. The National Academy of Sciences conducted an 18-month independent review of comparative bullet-lead analysis. In 2003, its National Research Council published a report calling into question 30 years of FBI testimony. It found the model the FBI used for interpreting results was deeply flawed and that the conclusion that bullet fragments could be matched to a box of ammunition so overstated, that it was misleading under the rules of evidence. One year later, the FBI decided to stop doing bullet lead analysis.

After a 60 Minutes/Washington Post investigation in November 2007, (two years later) the bureau agreed to identify, review, and release all of the pertinent cases, and notify prosecutors about cases in which faulty testimony was given.[51]

Personnel

As of December 31, 2009, the FBI had a total of 33,852 employees. That includes 13,412 special agents and 20,420 support professionals, such as intelligence analysts, language specialists, scientists, information technology specialists, and other professionals.[52]

The Officer Down Memorial Page provides the biographies of 58 FBI officers killed in the line of duty from 1925 to 2011.[53]

Hiring process

Agents in training on the FBI Academyfiring range

In order to apply to become an FBI agent, an applicant must be between the ages of 23 and 37. However, due to the decision in Robert P. Isabella v. Department of State and Office of Personnel Management, 2008 M.S.P.B. 146, preference eligible veterans may apply after age 37. In 2009, the Office of Personnel Management issued implementation guidance on the Isabella decision: OPM Letter The applicant must also hold American citizenship, have a clean record, and hold a four-year bachelors degree. All FBI employees require a Top Secret (TS) security clearance, and in many instances, employees need a higher level, TS/SCI(Top Secret/SensitiveCompartmented Information) clearance.[54] In order to get a security clearance, all potential FBI personnel must pass a series of Single Scope Background Investigations(SSBI), which are conducted by the Office of Personnel Management.[55] Special Agents candidates also have to pass a Physical Fitness Test (PFT) that includes a 300-meter run, one-minute sit-ups, maximum push-ups, and a 1.5-mile (2.4 km) run. There is also a polygraph test personnel have to pass, with questions including possible drug use.

After potential special agent candidates are cleared with TS clearance and the Form SF-312 non-disclosure agreement is signed, they attend the FBI training facility located on Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia. Candidates spend approximately 21 weeks at the FBI Academy, where they receive over 500 classroom hours and over 1,000 simulated law enforcement hours to train. Upon graduation, new FBI Special Agents are placed all around the country and the world, depending on their areas of expertise. Professional support staff works out of one of the many support buildings the FBI maintains. However, any Agent or Support staff member can be transferred to any location for any length of time if their skills are deemed necessary at one of the FBI field offices or one of the 400 resident agencies the FBI maintains.

BOI and FBI directors

FBI Directors are appointed by the President of the United States. They must be confirmed by the United States Senate and serve ten-year terms unless they resign or are fired by the President before their term is up. J. Edgar Hoover, appointed by Calvin Coolidge in 1924, was by far the longest-serving FBI Director, serving until his death in 1972. In 1968, Congress passed legislation as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act Pub.L. 90-351, June 19, 1968, 82 Stat. 197 that specified a 10-year term limit for future FBI Directors, as well as requiring Senate confirmation of appointees. As the incumbent, this legislation did not apply to Hoover, only to his successors. The current FBI Director is Robert Mueller, who was appointed in 2001 by George W. Bush.

The FBI director is responsible for the day-to-day operations at the FBI. Along with his deputies, the director makes sure cases and operations are handled correctly. The director also is in charge of making sure the leadership in any one of the FBI field offices are manned with qualified agents. Before the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was passed in the wake of the September 11 attacks, the FBI director would brief the President of the United States on any issues that arise from within the FBI. Since then, the director now reports to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) who in turn reports to the President.

Weapons

An FBI Special Agent is issued a Glock Model 22 pistol in .40 S&W caliber upon successful completion of their training at the FBI Academy. Glock Models 17, 19 and 26 in 9mm Luger, Models 23, and 27 in .40 S&W caliber are authorized as a secondary weapon. Special Agents are authorized to purchase and qualify with the Glock Model 21 in .45 ACP for duty carry. Special Agents of the FBI HRT (Hostage Rescue Team), and regional SWAT teams are issued the Springfield Model 1911A1 .45 ACP Pistol. (See article FBI Special Weapons and Tactics Teams)

Publications

The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin is published monthly by the FBI Law Enforcement Communication Unit,[56] with articles of interest to state and local law enforcement personnel. First published in 1932 asFugitives Wanted by Police,[57] the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin covers topics including law enforcement technology and issues, such as crime mapping and use of force, as well as recent criminal justiceresearch, and Vi-CAP alerts, on wanted suspects and key cases.

The FBI also publishes some reports for both law enforcement personnel as well as regular citizens covering topics including law enforcement, terrorismcybercrimewhite-collar crimeviolent crime, and statistics.[58] However, the vast majority of Federal government publications covering these topics are published by the Office of Justice Programs agencies of the United States Department of Justice, and disseminated through the National Criminal Justice Reference Service.

Crime statistics

In the 1920s, the FBI began issuing crime reports by gathering numbers from local police departments.[59] Due to limitations of this system found during the 1960s and 1970s—victims often simply did not report crimes to the police in the first place—the Department of Justice developed an alternate method of tallying crime, the victimization survey.[59]

Uniform Crime Reports

The Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) compile data from over 17,000 law enforcement agencies across the country. They provide detailed data regarding the volume of crimes to include arrest, clearance (or closing a case), and law enforcement officer information. The UCR focuses its data collection on violent crimes, hate crimes, and property crimes.[58] Created in the 1920s, the UCR system has not proven to be as uniformas its name implies. The UCR data only reflect the most serious offense in the case of connected crimes and has a very restrictive definition of rape. Since about 93% of the data submitted to the FBI is in this format, the UCR stands out as the publication of choice as most states require law enforcement agencies to submit this data.

Preliminary Annual Uniform Crime Report for 2006 was released on June 4, 2006. The report shows violent crime offenses rose 1.3%, but the number of property crime offenses decreased 2.9% compared to 2005.[60]

National Incident Based Reporting System

The National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) crime statistics system aims to address limitations inherent in UCR data. The system used by law enforcement agencies in the United States for collecting and reporting data on crimes. Local, state, and federal agencies generate NIBRS data from their records management systems. Data is collected on every incident and arrest in the Group A offense category. The Group A offenses are 46 specific crimes grouped in 22 offense categories. Specific facts about these offenses are gathered and reported in the NIBRS system. In addition to the Group A offenses, eleven Group B offenses are reported with only the arrest information. The NIBRS system is in greater detail than the summary-based UCR system. As of 2004, 5,271 law enforcement agencies submitted NIBRS data. That amount represents 20% of the United States population and 16% of the crime statistics data collected by the FBI.

FBI files on specific persons

It is possible to obtain a copy of an FBI file on oneself, on a living person who gives you permission to do so, or on a deceased individual, through the U.S. Freedom of Information Act. The FBI has generated files on numerous celebrities including Elvis PresleyFrank SinatraJohn DenverJohn LennonJane FondaGroucho MarxCharlie ChaplinMC5Lou CostelloSonny BonoBob DylanMichael JacksonMickey Mantle, and Gene Autry.[61] The FBI also profiled Jack the Ripper in 1988 but his identity still remains unproven today.[62] To quote Howard Zinn, “if I found that the FBI did not have any dossier on me, it would have been tremendously embarrassing and I wouldn’t have been able to face my friends.”[63]

[edit]

TOP-SECRET: The Velvet Revolution Declassified

Washington, D.C., August 20,  2011 – Fifteen years ago today, a modest, officially sanctioned student demonstration in Prague spontaneously grew into a major outburst of popular revulsion toward the ruling Communist regime. At that point the largest protest in 20 years, the demonstrations helped to spark the Velvet Revolution that brought down communism in Czechoslovakia and put dissident playwright Václav Havel in the Presidential Palace.

The November 17, 1989 march commemorated a student leader, Jan Opletal, who was killed by Nazi occupiers 50 years before, but quickly took on a starkly anti-regime character with calls of “Jakeš into the wastebasket,” referring to the communist party general secretary, and demands for free elections. The authorities used blunt force to disperse the students, injuring scores of people including several foreign journalists. Hundreds were arrested.

The result was more demonstrations over the next three days that completely exposed the bankruptcy of the regime. Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution soon joined the historic chain of events begun with Poland’s roundtable talks and elections, Hungary’s reintroduction of a multi-party system, and just a week before the Prague protests, the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

Now a new joint English-Czech edition volume has been published in Prague which tells the extraordinary tale of the revolution. The volume is entitled Prague-Washington-Prague: Reports from the United States Embassy in Czechoslovakia, November-December 1989. What sets this volume apart from other accounts is that it is a compilation of recently declassified U.S. State Department cable traffic from the period. Released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by the non-governmental National Security Archive, the cables not only provide quite accurate reporting of the unfolding events but offer insights into U.S. thinking at the time, including how the first demonstrations on this date in 1989 completely surprised American officials and forced them to dramatically revise their estimates on the survivability of the Communist regime in Prague.

Of particular note, this new volume is the first publication of the Václav Havel Library, which is still in the process of being formed. (Its website, currently being developed, offers further information about the book.)

The book’s editor, Vilém Precan, is a long-time partner of the National Security Archive who has been instrumental in bringing new documentation to light and organizing international conferences on the hidden history of Czechoslovakia and the Cold War. As indicated by Radio Prague, the international service of Czech Radio, Dr. Precan “worked untiringly with the National Security Archive … to have the documents released.”

From the book’s Introduction: “It is unusual for documents related to diplomacy to be published so soon after their having been written … That the set of documents published in this volume got into the hands of independent historians so soon after their having originated is thanks to an American nongovernmental institution with a name that will probably mean little to the layman and might even be confusing. That institution is the National Security Archive. It was established to gather and publish documents that have been declassified on the basis of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) …. The [Archive] has been more than successful in achieving this aim.”

From Vilém Precan’s Acknowledgements: “This volume is the result of the work of many people, whom I as Editor now wish to thank. First and foremost I express my gratitude to my friends and colleagues at the National Security Archive in Washington D.C.: Tom Blanton, Catherine Nielsen, Svetlana Savranskaya, and Sue Bechtel, owing to whose efforts the telegrams were made available to independent researchers and were passed on to Prague, and who were of great assistance to me while I was working in Washington. ”

Note about the book cover: Václav Bartuska, the director of the Havel Library, made the following comment: The photograph “is from the meeting where the transition of power from commies to Civic Forum was discussed … The back of the man you see at the bottom of the picture belongs to … guess whom … I liked this idea of having Václav Havel there right at the centre of all things, yet not visible at first. I think this had been his place for a long time.”

Why was the revolution non-violent? One of the many subplots of the new compilation is the fact that, despite the authorities’ initial use of force to break up the November demonstrations, the Velvet Revolution and similar events in other East European states (with the notable exception of Romania) were allowed to take place without Moscow resorting to bloody repression to keep its clients in power. An earlier National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book from 1999 also explores this topic in some detail, drawing on declassified records from a range of Russian and East European archives.

The spontaneous eruption of student protests in Prague instantly recalled to the minds of U.S. embassy staff (as indicated in cables included in this briefing book) earlier demonstrations in Eastern Europe, such as in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia on the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion of 1968. In that context, readers should note that some of the materials in the new Havel Library volume are also to become part of an acclaimed book series published by Central European University Press under the rubric, The National Security Archive Cold War Reader Series. This series comprises volumes of once-secret documentation from the former Soviet bloc and the West on each of the major upheavals in Eastern Europe during the Cold War. The series will feature a special emphasis on the revolutions of 1989 with separate volumes on Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Titles already in print or at the publishers include:

The Prague Spring 1968, edited by Járomír Navrátil et al (1998)
“I am happy that the cooperation between the National Security Archive in Washington and the Czech foundation, Prague Spring 1968, has resulted in this voluminous collection of documents.” Václav Havel

Uprising in East Germany, 1953, edited by Christian Ostermann (2001)
“This excellent collection of documents pulls together what’s been learned about [the uprising] since the Cold War … It is an indispensable new source for the study of Cold War history.”John Lewis Gaddis

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956, edited by Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne and János Rainer (2002)
“There is no publication, in any language, that would even approach the thoroughness, reliability, and novelty of this monumental work.”István Deák

A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991, edited by Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (Forthcoming, 2005)


Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free
Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Document No. 1: Confidential Cable #08082 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Brutal Suppression of Czech Students’ Demonstration,” November 18, 1989, 14:18Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 2: Unclassified Cable #08087 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Embassy Protest of Attack on American Journalists during November 17-19 Demonstrations in Prague,” November 20, 1989, 12:20Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 3: Confidential Cable #08097 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Demonstrations Continue Over Weekend in Prague,” November 20, 1989, 12:42Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 4: Unclassified Cable #08106 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Czechoslovak Press Coverage of Demonstration Aftermath Shows Contradictory Lines,” November 20, 1989, 16:48Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 5: Limited Official Use Cable from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Czechoslovak Independents Establish New Organization and List Agenda of Demands,” November 20, 1989, 16:52Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 6: Confidential Cable #08109 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “American Woman’s Account of November 17 Demonstration and the Death of a Czech Student,” November 20, 1989, 16:54Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 7: Confidential Cable #08110 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Popular and Soviet Pressure for Reform Converge on the Jakes Leadership,” November 20, 1989, 16:57Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 8: Confidential Cable #08144 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Demonstrations in Prague and Other Czechoslovak Cities November 20,” November 21, 1989, 15:20Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 9: Confidential Cable #08153 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Student Strike Situation Report,” November 21, 1989, 18:59Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 10: Confidential Cable #08155 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Morning Demonstration at Wenceslas Square: Overheard Conversations,” November 21, 1989, 19:01Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Contents of this website Copyright 1995-2004 National Security Archive. All rights r

TOP-SECRET: Soviets Planned Nuclear First Strike to Preempt West, Documents Show


Washington D.C. August 20, 2011 – The Soviet-led Warsaw Pact had a long-standing strategy to attack Western Europe that included being the first to use nuclear weapons, according to a new book of previously Secret Warsaw Pact documents published tomorrow. Although the aim was apparently to preempt NATO “aggression,” the Soviets clearly expected that nuclear war was likely and planned specifically to fight and win such a conflict.

The documents show that Moscow’s allies went along with these plans but the alliance was weakened by resentment over Soviet domination and the belief that nuclear planning was sometimes highly unrealistic. Just the opposite of Western views at the time, Pact members saw themselves increasingly at a disadvantage compared to the West in the military balance, especially with NATO’s ability to incorporate high-technology weaponry and organize more effectively, beginning in the late 1970s.

These and other findings appear in a new volume published tomorrow on the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Warsaw Pact. Consisting of 193 documents originating from all eight original member-states, the volume, A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991, provides significant new evidence of the intentions and capabilities of one of the most feared military machines in history.

Highlights of the 726-page volume include highly confidential internal reports, military assessments, minutes of Warsaw Pact leadership meetings, and Politburo discussions on topics such as:

  • The shift beginning in the 1960s from defensive operations to plans to launch attacks deep into Western Europe. (Documents Nos. 16, 20a-b, 21)
  • Plans to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, ostensibly to preempt Western first-use. (Documents Nos. 81, 83)
  • Soviet expectations that conventional conflicts would go nuclear, and plans to fight and win such conflicts. (Documents Nos. 81, 83)
  • The deep resentment of alliance members, behind the façade of solidarity, of Soviet dominance and the unequal share of the military burden that was imposed on them. (Documents Nos. 4-6, 33-37, 47, 52)
  • East European views on the futility of plans for nuclear war and the realization that their countries, far more than the Soviet Union, would suffer the most devastating consequences of such a conflict. (Documents Nos. 22b, 38, 50, 52)
  • The “nuclear romanticism,” primarily of Soviet planners, concerning the viability of unconventional warfare, including a memorable retort by the Polish leader that “no one should have the idea that in a nuclear war one could enjoy a cup of coffee in Paris in five or six days.” (Documents Nos. 31, 115)
  • Ideologically warped notions of Warsaw Pact planners about the West’s presumed propensity to initiate hostilities and the prospects for defeating it. (Documents Nos. 50, 73, 79, 81)
  • The impact of Chernobyl as a reality check for Soviet officials on the effects of nuclear weapons. (Document No. 115)
  • The pervasiveness and efficacy of East bloc spying on NATO, mainly by East Germans (Documents Nos. 11, 28, 80, 97, 109, 112)
  • Warsaw Pact shortcomings in resisting hostile military action, including difficulties in firing nuclear weapons. (Documents Nos. 44, 143)
  • Data on the often disputed East-West military balance, seen from the Soviet bloc side as much more favorable to the West than the West itself saw it, with the technological edge increasingly in Western favor since the time of the Carter administration (Documents Nos. 47, 79, 81, 82, 130, 131, 135, 136)

The motives accounting for the Warsaw Pact’s offensive military culture included not only the obsessive Soviet memory of having been taken by surprise by the nearly fatal Nazi attack in June 1941 but primarily the ideological militancy of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine that posited irreconcilable hostility of the capitalist adversaries. The influence of the doctrine explains, for example, the distorted interpretation of secret Western planning documents that were unequivocally defensive documents to which Warsaw Pact spies had extensive access. So integral was the offensive strategy to the Soviet system that its replacement by a defensive strategy under Gorbachev proved impossible to implement before the system itself disintegrated.

The Soviet military, as the ideologically most devoted and disciplined part of the Soviet establishment, were given extensive leeway by the political leadership in designing the Warsaw Pact’s plans for war and preparing for their implementation. Although the leadership reserved the authority to decide under what circumstances they would be implemented and never actually tried to act on them, the chances of a crisis spiraling out of control may have been greater than imagined at the time. The plans had dynamics of their own and the grip of the aging leadership continued to diminish with the passage of time.

The new collection of documents published today is the first of its kind in examining the Warsaw Pact from the inside, with the benefit of materials once thought to be sealed from public scrutiny in perpetuity. It was prepared by the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), an international scholarly network formed to explore and disseminate documentation on the military and security aspects of contemporary history. The book appears as part of the “National Security Archive Cold War Reader Series” through Central European University Press.

The PHP’s founders and partners are the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research organization based at The George Washington University; the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich; the Institute for Strategy and Security Policy at the Austrian Defense Academy in Vienna; the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies in Florence; and the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies in Oslo.

In addition to documents, the volume features a major original essay by Vojtech Mastny, a leading historian of the Warsaw Pact, and contextual headnotes for each document by co-editor Malcolm Byrne. A detailed chronology, glossaries and bibliography are also included.

The documents in the collection were obtained by numerous scholars and archivists, many of them associated with PHP and its partners, including the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington D.C.

The vast majority of the documents were translated especially for this volume and have never previously appeared in English.

Attached to this notice are ten representative documents taken from the list above. They appear as they do in the volume, i.e. with explanatory headnotes at the top of each item.

The documents in their original languages can be found in their entirety on the Center for Security Studies website.

On Saturday, May 14, a book launch for A Cardboard Castle? will take place in Warsaw at the Military Office of Historical Research. The address is: 2, ul. Stefana Banacha, Room 218. It will begin at 11:30 a.m. Speakers include:

  • Gen. William E. Odom, former Director, U.S. National Security Agency
  • Gen. Tadeusz Pioro, senior Polish representative to the Warsaw Pact
  • Brig. Gen. Leslaw Dudek, Polish representative to the alliance
  • Prof. dr. hab. Andrzej Paczkowski, Polish Academy of Sciences
  • Dr hab. Krzysztof Komorowski, Military Office of Historical Research
  • Prof. dr hab. Wojciech Materski, Polish Academy of Sciences

Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Below are ten representative documents from A Cardboard Castle?. They are numbered as they are in the volume and include explanatory headnotes at the top of each item. Links to the original documents — in their orginal languages — appear at the end of each entry.

Document No. 16: Speech by Marshal Malinovskii Describing the Need for Warsaw Pact Offensive Operations, May 1961 – original language

Document No. 21: Organizational Principles of the Czechoslovak Army, November 22, 1962 – original language

Document No. 50: Memorandum of the Academic Staff of the Czechoslovak Military Academies on Czechoslovakia’s Defense Doctrine, June 4, 1968 – original language

Document No. 64: Report by Ceaus,escu to the Romanian Politburo on the PCC Meeting in Budapest, March 18, 1969 – original language

Document No. 81: Marshal Ogarkov Analysis of the ?Zapad? Exercise, May 30-June 9, 1977original language

Document No. 83: Soviet Statement at the Chiefs of General Staff Meeting in Sofia,
June 12-14, 1978 – original language

Document No. 109: East German Intelligence Assessment of NATO?s Intelligence on the Warsaw Pact, December 16, 1985 – original language

Document No. 115: Minutes of the Political Consultative Committee Party Secretaries? Meeting in Budapest, June 11, 1986 – original language (part 1part 2part 3)

Document No. 136: Summary of Discussion among Defense Ministers at the Political Consultative Committee Meeting in Warsaw, July 15, 1988 – original language (part 1part 2)

Document No. 143: Czechoslovak Description of ?Vltava-89? Exercise, May 23, 1989 – original language

TOP-SECRET: Alexander Yakovlev and the Roots of the Soviet Reforms

Alexander Yakovlev and the
Roots of the Soviet Reforms

Washington D.C. August 20, 2011 – Alexander Nikolaevich Yakovlev, who died in Moscow last week at the age of 81, was probably the best known “architect of perestroika.” Soviet ambassador to Canada, then member of the Politburo and Mikhail Gorbachev’s closest adviser, he could rightfully be called the “Father of Glasnost.”

Alexander Yakovlev rose through the Communist Party ranks to become one of the most vocal critics of the Stalinist past and a passionate advocate of democratization in the second half of the 1980s. He was one of the people history will credit for his role in helping to end the Cold War.

Yakovlev was born in a peasant family in the Yaroslavl oblast, fought in World War II, and was badly wounded in 1943. In the same year he joined the Communist Party and became a professional “apparatchik.” In 1972, during the Brezhnev years, after publishing an article in Literaturnaya Gazeta (on a dispute within the Writers’ Union) that was considered “unpatriotic,” he was sent to Canada as ambassador. In 1983, he was allowed to return to Moscow to assume the position of director of the prestigious Institute of World Economy and International Relations, which soon became a bastion of reformist intellectuals and one of the springboards of perestroika.

Soon after becoming general secretary in 1985, Gorbachev quickly recognized Yakovlev’s potential and promoted him to head the Central Committee’s Propaganda Department. In 1986, Yakovlev became secretary of the Central Committee in charge of ideology and in 1987 a full member of the Politburo. His role in promoting freedom of the press, political openness and democratization has been widely noted by observers of the Soviet political process of the late 1980s.

Recently released documents from the Yakovlev Collection of the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) show the unprecedented scope of issues on which Alexander Yakovlev exerted influence within Soviet decision-making circles under Gorbachev. Although we usually associate Yakovlev with glasnost and democratization, it becomes clear from the record that he was also a key reformer when it came to arms control (“untying” the Soviet “package” position on nuclear arms control negotiations), and the Soviet economy. The documents also show that Yakovlev’s position was quite developed and consistent very early on, when the rest of the Soviet reformers, including Gorbachev himself, were not yet willing to look beyond the existing one-party system.

The following selection of materials are part of a much larger collection of documents from the former Soviet bloc available for research at the National Security Archive.


Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Document 1: Alexander Yakovlev. On Reagan. Memorandum prepared on request from M.S. Gorbachev and handed to him on March 12, 1985

In this memorandum, which Gorbachev requested and Yakovlev prepared the day after Gorbachev’s election as general secretary, Yakovlev analyzed President Ronald Reagan’s positions on a variety of issues. The analysis is notable for its non-ideological tone, suggesting that meeting with the U.S. president was in the Soviet Union’s national interest, and that Reagan’s positions were far from clear-cut, indicating some potential for improving U.S.-Soviet relations.

Document 2: Memorandum to Mikhail Gorbachev, “The Imperative of Political Development,” December 25, 1985

In this memorandum to Gorbachev, Yakovlev outlines his view of the needed transformation of the political system of the Soviet Union. Yakovlev writes in his memoir that he prepared this document in several drafts earlier in the year but hesitated to present it to Gorbachev because he believed his own official standing at the time was still too junior. Yakovlev’s approach here is thoroughly based on a perceived need for democratization, starting with intra-party democratization. The memo suggests introducing several truly ground-breaking reforms, including genuine multi-candidate elections, free discussion of political positions, a division of power between the legislative and executive branches, independence of the judicial branch, and real guarantees of human rights and freedoms.

Document 3: Memorandum for Gorbachev, “To the Analysis of the Fact of the Visit of Prominent American Political Leaders to the USSR (Kissinger, Vance, Kirkpatrick, Brown, and others), circa December 1986

In this memorandum, devoted to U.S.-Soviet relations and the issues of arms control, Yakovlev proposes a radical breakthrough in Soviet foreign policy. Until now, the Soviet negotiating position on nuclear arms control was based on a ” package ” approach-tying together progress on strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range weapons and forward-based systems in Europe, and the issue of anti-ballistic missile defense. Gorbachev’s insistence on the package approach and Reagan’s commitment to SDI made a breakthrough at the U.S.-Soviet summit in Reykjavik impossible. Here, Yakovlev proposes ” untying ” the package and signing separate agreements on each of its elements, arguing that this would be in the Soviet interest. Gorbachev agreed to ” untie the package ” as early as March 1987.

Document 4: Text of Presentation at the CC CPSU Politburo Session, September 28, 1987

This presentation to the Politburo comes after the January and June Plenums of the Central Committee, which outlined comprehensive programs of reform of the political (January) and economic (June) system, and after Yakovlev himself was promoted to the full Politburo membership (in charge of ideology). This is the first time he unveils his views on democratization–which he considered at the time to be the most important task of perestroika–to the Politburo.

Document 5: Notes for Presentation at the Politburo session, December 27, 1988

These notes represent a summary of Yakovlev’s thinking about the most important developments of 1988. His presentation follows Gorbachev’s seminal speech at the United Nations on December 7. The notes reflect his first disappointments with the slow pace of perestroika, bureacratic intertia, and the general apathy of the population. Yakovlev argues for more systematic implementation of the principles and reforms of the ” new thinking ” and gives special emphasis to the U.N. speech, which he calls a ” watershed .”

Document 6: Anatoly Chernyaev, Personal Memorandum to Mikhail Gorbachev, November 11, 1989

In this personal handwritten memorandum, Gorbachev’s foreign policy adviser, Anatoly Chernyaev, expresses his discomfort with the way Gorbachev treated Yakovlev at a recent party Plenum. The memo reflects a recent rift between Gorbachev and Yakovlev, which was precipitated by a disinformation campaign initiated by KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov. Chernayev defends Yakovlev, emphasizing his intellectual potential and his importance for continuing perestroika’s reforms.


From the National Security Archive: The Secret History of Dayton

Map depicting post-Dayton political alignment of the Balkans

The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft
by Derek Chollet

Washington, D.C., August 20, 2011 – Every work of history is not just a statement about the past, but a reflection of the era — if not the precise year — during which it was written. This is certainly the case with the now-declassified 1997 U.S. State Department studyof the American effort to end the Bosnian war, the original version of which is now available.

On November 21, 1995, the world witnessed an event that for years many believed impossible: on a secluded, wind-swept U.S. Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, the leaders of Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia agreed to end a war. The signing of the Dayton Peace Accords concluded one of the most challenging diplomatic undertakings the United States had pursued since the end of the Cold War — eighteen weeks of whirlwind shuttle diplomacy, followed by twenty-one intensive days of negotiations in Dayton. The agreement brought peace to a troubled corner of Europe, and established an ambitious blueprint to build a new Bosnia — an effort that the international community remains deeply engaged in today.

Dayton also capped a dramatic reversal not only of U.S. policy, but of the credibility of American leadership of the Atlantic Alliance in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. For three years, the American approach toward the Bosnia problem had been one of disengagement, hoping that the Europeans — who had high hopes for their fledgling political union — would take the lead to solve the problem. Yet Europe’s response proved feckless, and the United States proved no better. More than any other foreign policy issue, the problem of Bosnia’s defined — and plagued — the early years of Bill Clinton’s presidency. Despite some significant successes during his first term — such as the Middle East peace process, the 1994 Framework Agreement with North Korea, the passage of NAFTA — Clinton’s early years were in many ways defined by the inability to bring peace to Bosnia.

Dayton’s core accomplishment is that it ended a war and gave hope to millions who have suffered immense hardship. But it did more than that. Dayton brought to an end one of the most difficult periods in the history of U.S.-European relations, helping to define a new role for NATO and restore confidence in American leadership after a period during which it been cast into doubt.

This achievement mattered for America’s global standing; it mattered for President Bill Clinton’s Administration and the President’s leadership. John Harris, a leading historian of the Clinton presidency and author of the recent book The Survivor: Bill Clinton in the White House, explains that Clinton “emerged from the fall of 1995 as a vastly more self-confident and commanding leader.” In less than six months during 1995, he had taken charge of the Transatlantic Alliance, pushed NATO to use overwhelming military force, risked America’s prestige on a bold diplomatic gamble, and placed 20,000 American military men and women on the ground in a dangerous environment. That the President and his Administration ran such risks successfully gave them confidence going forward. Richard Holbrooke, Dayton’s architect, recalls that after Dayton, “American foreign policy seemed more assertive, more muscular… Washington was now praised for its firm leadership — or even chided by some Europeans for too much leadership.”

It was in this context that in early 1996 the U.S. State Department launched a unique historical effort to capture the record of this achievement. In conversations with Thomas Donilon (then Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s Chief of Staff and Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs) and William J. Burns (then the Executive Secretary of the Department), Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Bennett Freeman began to put together the initiative. In his capacity overseeing the State Department’s Office of the Historian as well as serving as Chief Speechwriter for Secretary Christopher, Freeman worked with that office and the Bureau of European Affairs to assemble a team to begin collecting documents and conduct interviews with all the key American participants in the Dayton process. The interviews were no less important than the documents themselves, in order to capture the fresh recollections of those participants in an unusual almost “real-time” historical exercise. They worked with the full cooperation and authority of the Secretary of State. After the initial research effort was underway and an archive of these materials had been created, Freeman then asked Derek Chollet to draft the study based on this research, which he completed in the spring of 1997.

There were two core goals of the creation of this archive and the writing of the study: first, to collect the documents and create an oral history of this fast-moving negotiating process for the benefit of future historians and to supplement the State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States series; and second, to use the study to outline the bureaucratic and diplomatic mechanics of this complex negotiation, so that the lessons of the “Dayton model” could be studied and applied by future diplomats and policymakers as they worked to tackle similar problems (a fuller explanation can be found in the foreword to the original study). It has also proved invaluable to the many American diplomats who have been responsible for implementing the Dayton Accords or shaping U.S. policy toward Balkans generally.

Declassified in 2003, the original study is now available to scholars. And it is our hope that in the near future, as many of the documents on which much of this study is based — which are contained and organized in the special archive — are released as possible. Their release will prove valuable to other scholars of this period as well as those interested in the making of American foreign policy — especially when it concerns the process behind difficult diplomatic negotiations.

It is important to point out that at the time this historical initiative began, no one knew whether the Dayton peace plan would succeed. Twenty-thousand American troops were on the ground in Bosnia as part of a 60,000-strong NATO force. At the time, American diplomats were hopeful — and proud that they had achieved a diplomatic success — but few dared imagine that their efforts would prove to be as successful as they have been ten years later. Despite the fears by many that implementing Dayton would be a quagmire, not a single American soldier has been killed by hostile fire. And while Bosnia still has a way to go to fulfill Dayton’s vision of a single, multi-ethic, tolerant state with a functional government, the war is over.


The Road to Dayton
U.S. Diplomacy and the Bosnia Peace Process, May-December 1995
U.S. Department of State, Dayton History Project, May 1997

Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.

Cover page, Foreward, Table of Contents, Acknowledgements and Maps

Chapter 1 – The Summer Crisis: June-July 1995

Chapter 2 – Through the Window of Opportunity: The Endgame Strategy

Chapter 3 – Tragedy as Turning Point: The First Shuttle, Mt. Igman, and Operation Deliberate Force

Chapter 4 – The Road to Geneva: The Patriarch Letter and NATO Bombing

Chapter 5 – Force and Diplomacy: NATO Bombing Ends, The Western Offensive Heats Up

Chapter 6 – The New York Agreement, Negotiating a Cease-fire, and Approaching a Settlement

Chapter 7 – Preparing for Proximity Talks

Chapter 8 – Opening Talks and Clearing Away the Underbrush: Dayton, November 1-10

Chapter 9 – Endgame: Dayton, November 11-21

Epilogue – Implementation Begins

CONFIDENTIAL: PLD LEADER MEDINA KEEPS DISTANCE FROM FERNANDEZ

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDG #1340/01 2381957
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251957Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1330
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHWN/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PRIORITY 2182
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0920
RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN PRIORITY 1094
RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON PRIORITY 2885
RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO PRIORITY 1219
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE PRIORITY 4848
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN PRIORITY 1920
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0199
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMISTA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTO DOMINGO 001340

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2028
TAGS: PGOV PBIO SNAR ECON DR
SUBJECT: PLD LEADER MEDINA KEEPS DISTANCE FROM FERNANDEZ

REF: A. SANTO DOMINGO 01327
B. SANTO DOMINGO 01167
C. SANTO DOMINGO 01296

Classified By: P. Robert Fannin, Ambassador, Reasons 1.4(b), (d)

1. (C) BACKGROUND:  Danilo Medina is the second-most powerful leader in the PLD party, after President Fernandez himself, and is seen as the strategic brains behind the organization's rise from third-party status in the 1980s to control of the presidency and both houses of congress by 2006.

Medina served as Fernandez's Minister of the Presidency until late-2006.  He then left the administration to challenge the President for the PLD's 2008 nomination after Fernandez, according to Medina, broke a pledge to support his candidacy and instead ran for re-election.  Medina lost the 2008 PLD primary by a large margin, but later allowed his supporters to join the Fernandez campaign.  On August 11, he attended his first party meeting since the break with the President.

2. (C) POLCHIEF met with Danilo Medina on August 20 and inquired about the prospects for constitutional reform.

Medina said that Fernandez called a meeting of the PLD's Political Committee on August 11 and that the President pressed for his proposed constitutional amendments to be endorsed quickly, citing a need for an agreement prior to his August 16 inauguration speech.  A key proposed amendment would maintain the two-term limit on the presidency, but would permit the head of state to run again four years after leaving office.  Medina said that he voted against the amendment, even though it would allow him to run in 2012, because he is against re-election in any form; however, the proposed constitutional change was approved by the party.

Medina was critical of the fact that Fernandez -- after calling the meeting on the 11th knowing the party would want to please him before cabinet appointments were made on August 16 -- did not introduce the proposed amendments during his inauguration speech.

3. (C) Medina was critical of Fernandez's inauguration speech, sharing the view of other commentators that the address proposed more public works projects than the Government can afford (Ref A).  Medina argued that the Government will simply go into more debt to finance the President's projects.  He was also critical of what he
considers the excessive defense of the peso, which has caused interests rates to rise, as well as of Finance Minister Bengoa, who he described as a "yes man."

4. (C) POLCHIEF praised the recent success of the Dominican justice system in achieving convictions in the Baninter bank fraud (Ref B) and inquired about the prospects for prosecution of public-sector corruption.  Medina replied that
the fight against corruption should start within political parties, where the problem is serious.  He said that many politicians accept campaign contributions from narcotics
traffickers.  These types of contributions range, according to Medina, from officials who do not know (or fail to investigate whether) they are receiving narco money, to those
who proactively approach narcos in their districts to essentially shake them down.  Regarding the recent drug-related multiple murder case in Bani, Medina praised
Sen. Wilton Guerrero (PLD-Peravia), who has made allegations of official complicity in the drug trade in that area (Ref C).

5. (C) In a review of opposition parties, Medina contradicted prevailing wisdom by saying that the PRD party is doing well. He argued that the PRD lost the presidential election not because of the party's reputation, but because their candidate, Miguel Vargas Maldonado, was widely seen as having been deeply corrupt during his prior government service. Medina noted that, if the votes of allied parties are not
counted, the PRD beat the PLD in a majority of the country's provinces.  Regarding the PRSC, which received less than five percent of the vote, Medina said that the party does not have a clear future.

6. (C) COMMENT:  Medina has always kept his criticism of Fernandez out of the press; however, this meeting showed that behind closed doors he has the dagger out for the President. At times, Medina sounded more like a member of the opposition than a fellow PLD leader.  He is very powerful within the party, particularly in the congress, where the vote on constitutional reform will be an opportunity for him to flex his muscles.  With Fernandez likely to be barred from running again in 2012, all indications are that Medina will be the front-runner for the PLD nomination.

(U) Please visit us at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/santodomingo/
FANNIN

UNTOUCHABLE ! TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE FBI – THE ELLIOT NESS FILES

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Click on FBI files above

Eliot Ness

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
  (Redirected from Elliot Ness)
Eliot Ness
Bureau of Prohibition
Cleveland Division of Police
April 19, 1903 – May 16, 1957
Place of birth Chicago, Illinois
Rank Chief Investigator of the Prohibition Bureau for Chicago in 1934
Director for Public Safety for Cleveland, Ohio

Eliot Ness (April 19, 1903 – May 16, 1957) was an American Prohibition agent, famous for his efforts to enforce Prohibition in Chicago, Illinois, and the leader of a legendary team of law enforcement agents nicknamed The Untouchables.[1]

Early life

Eliot Ness was born April 19, 1903 in Chicago, Illinois. He was the youngest of five siblings born to Norwegian immigrants, Peter and Emma Ness. Ness attended Christian Fenger High School in Chicago. He was educated at the University of Chicago, where he was a member of the Sigma Alpha Epsilonfraternity, graduating in 1925 with a degree in economics. He began his career as an investigator for the Retail Credit Company of Atlanta. He was assigned to the Chicago territory, where he conducted background investigations for the purpose of credit information. He returned to the University to take a course incriminology, eventually earning a Master’s Degree in the field.[2][3]

Capone’s conviction

In 1926, Ness’s brother-in-law, Alexander Jamie, a Bureau of Investigation agent (this became the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or FBI, in 1935), influenced Ness to enter law enforcement. He joined the U.S. Treasury Department in 1927, working with the 300-strong Bureau of Prohibition, in Chicago.[4]

Following the election of President Herbert HooverU.S. Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon was specifically charged with bringing down gangster Al Capone. The federal government approached the problem from two directions: income tax evasion and the Volstead Act. Ness was chosen to head the operations under the Volstead Act, targeting the illegal breweries and supply routes of Capone.

With Chicago’s corrupted law-enforcement agents endemic, Ness went through the records of all Prohibition agents to create a reliable team, initially of 50, later reduced to 15 and finally to just eleven men called, “The Untouchables“. Raids against illegal stills and breweries began immediately; within six months Ness claimed to have seized breweries worth over one million dollars. The main source of information for the raids was an extensive wire-tapping operation. An attempt by Capone to bribe Ness’s agents was seized on by Ness for publicity, leading to the media nickname, “The Untouchables.” There were a number of assassination attempts on Ness, and one close friend of his was killed.

The efforts of Ness and his team had a serious impact on Capone’s operations, but it was the income tax evasion which was the key weapon. In a number of federal grand jury cases in 1931, Capone was charged with 22 counts of tax evasion and also 5,000 violations of the Volstead Act.[5] On October 17, 1931, Capone was sentenced to 11 years in prison, and following a failed appeal, he began his sentence in 1932.[6][7]

Career

Marker at Lake View Cemetery

Ness was promoted to Chief Investigator of the Prohibition Bureau for Chicago and in 1934 for Ohio. Following the end of Prohibition in 1933, he was assigned as an alcohol tax agent in the “Moonshine Mountains” of southern Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee; and, in 1934, he was transferred to Cleveland, Ohio. In December 1935, Cleveland mayor Harold Burton hired him as the city’s Safety Director, which put him in charge of both the police and fire departments. He headed a campaign to clean out police corruption and to modernize the fire department.[8]

By 1938, Ness’s personal life was completely transformed, while his career began to have some ups and downs. Ness concentrated heavily on his work, which may have been a contributing factor in his divorce from his first wife, Edna. He declared war on the mob, and his primary targets included “Big” Angelo Lonardo, “Little” Angelo Scirrca, Moe Dalitz, John Angerola and George Angersola and Charles Pollizi. Ness was also Safety Director at the time of several grisly murders that occurred in the Cleveland area from 1935 to 1938. Unfortunately, what was otherwise a remarkably successful career in Cleveland, withered gradually. Ness’s critics at the time pointed to his divorces, his high-profile social drinking and his conduct in a 1942 car accident.[9]

Ness moved to Washington, D.C., in 1942, and worked for the federal government in directing the battle against prostitution in communities surrounding military bases, where venereal disease was a serious problem. In 1944, he left to become chairman of the Diebold Corporation, a security safe company based in Ohio. He ran unsuccessfully for mayor of Cleveland, in 1947. He later came to work for North Ridge Industrial Corporation, in CoudersportPennsylvania. Collaborating with Oscar Fraleyin his last years, he co-wrote the book, The Untouchables, which was published in 1957, a month after his death at age 54, following a heart attack.[10]

Personal life

Ness was married to Edna Staley from 1929 to 1938, illustrator Evaline Ness from 1939 to 1945, and artist Elisabeth Andersen Seaver from 1946 until his death by heart attack. He had one son, Robert, adopted in 1947.[9] Ness’ ashes were scattered in one of the small ponds on the grounds of Lake View Cemetery, in Cleveland.[11][12]

Legacy

A number of television programs and feature films have been made (loosely) based on his life. Some of the best-known of these include the 1950s/1960s TV series titled The Untouchables, which starred Robert Stack as Ness and which Walter Winchell narrated, and Brian De Palma‘s Oscar-winning film of the same title, The Untouchables, which starred Kevin Costner as Ness. Tom Amandes portrayed Ness in the short-lived TV remake of The Untouchables, which ran from 1993 to 1994.[13][14]

TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE FBI: THE ST. VALENTINES MASSACRE

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stvalen2

Click on FBI files above

Saint Valentine’s Day massacre

St.Valentine’s Day Massacre

Aftermath of the St.Valentine’s Day Massacre. Top to bottom: Peter Gusenberg; Albert Weinshank; Adam Heyer; John May; Reinhardt Schwimmer (lying almost out of picture at bottom). At right against wall is James Clark.

Victims

  • Peter Gusenberg, a frontline enforcer for the Moran organization.
  • Frank Gusenberg, the brother of Peter Gusenberg and also an enforcer. Frank was still alive when police first arrived on the scene, despite reportedly having fourteen bullets in his body. When questioned by the police about the shooting his only response was “nobody shot me”. He died three hours later.
  • Albert Kachellek (alias “James Clark”), Moran’s second-in-command, a retired man at the time, he was not a member of the gang himself but happened to be there at the time the killing happened.
  • Adam Heyer, the bookkeeper and business manager of the Moran gang.
  • Reinhart Schwimmer, an optician who had abandoned his practice to gamble on horse racing (unsuccessfully) and associate with the Moran gang. Though Schwimmer called himself an “optometrist” he was actually an optician (an eyeglass fitter) and he had no medical training.
  • Albert Weinshank, who managed several cleaning and dyeing operations for Moran. His resemblance to Moran, including the clothes he was wearing, is what allegedly set the massacre in motion before Moran actually arrived.
  • John May, an occasional car mechanic for the Moran gang, though not a gang member himself. May had had two earlier arrests (no convictions) but was attempting to work legally. However, his desperate need of cash, with a wife and seven children, caused him to accept jobs with the Moran gang as a mechanic.

Events

On the morning of Thursday, February 14, 1929, St. Valentine’s Day, five members of the North Side Gang, plus gang collaborators Reinhardt H. Schwimmer and John May, were lined up against the rear inside wall of the garage at 2122 North Clark Street, in the Lincoln Park neighborhood of Chicago’s North Side, and executed. The murders were committed by gangsters allegedly hired from outside the city by the Al Capone mob so they would not be recognized by their victims.

Two of the shooters were dressed as uniformed police officers, while the others wore suits, ties, overcoats and hats, according to witnesses who saw the “police” leading the other men at gunpoint out of the garage after the shooting. John May’s German Shepherd, Highball, who was leashed to a truck, began howling and barking, attracting the attention of two women who operated boarding houses across the street. One of them, Mrs. Landesman, sensed that something was dreadfully wrong and sent one of her roomers to the garage to see what was upsetting the dog. The man ran out, sickened at the sight. Frank Gusenberg was still alive after the killers left the scene and was rushed to the hospital shortly after police arrived at the scene. When the doctors had Gusenberg stabilized, police tried to question him but when asked who shot him, he replied “Nobody shot me”, despite having sustained 14 bullet wounds. It is believed that the St. Valentine’s Day Massacre resulted from a plan devised by members of the Capone gang to eliminate George ‘Bugs’ Moran due to the rivalry between the two gangs. However, years later, Deidre Capone, the only living blood relative to Capone, wrote the novel Uncle Al Capone, in an effort to deny her uncle’s involvement in the massacre. One chapter outlines a conversation her grandfather shared with Al Capone via telephone, shortly after the execution. Deidre Capone claimed this telephone conversation to be proof of Al Capone’s innocence; apparently, she was the only one who believed this.

George Moran was the boss of the long-established North Side Gang, formerly headed up by Dion O’Banion, who was murdered by four gunmen five years earlier in his flower shop on North State Street. Everyone who had taken command of the North Siders since O’Banion’s rule had been murdered, supposedly by various members or associates of the Capone organization. This massacre was allegedly planned by the Capone mob for a number of reasons: in retaliation for an unsuccessful attempt by Frank Gusenberg and his brother, Peter, to murder Jack McGurn earlier in the year; the North Side Gang’s complicity in the murders of Pasqualino “Patsy” Lolordo and Antonio “The Scourge” Lombardo – both had been presidents of the Unione Siciliane, the local Mafia, and close associates of Capone. Bugs Moran’s muscling in on a Capone-run dog track in the Chicago suburbs, his takeover of several Capone-owned saloons that he insisted were in his territory, and the general rivalry between Moran and Capone for complete control of the lucrative Chicago bootlegging business were probable contributing factors to this incident.

The plan was to lure Bugs Moran to the SMC Cartage warehouse on North Clark Street. Contrary to common belief, this plan did not intend to eliminate the entire North Side gang – just Moran, and perhaps two or three of his lieutenants. It is usually assumed that they were lured to the garage with the promise of a stolen, cut-rate shipment of whiskey, supplied by Detroit’s Purple Gang, also associates of Capone’s. However, some recent studies dispute this, although there seems to have been hardly any other good reason for so many of the North Siders to be there. One of these theories states that all of the victims (with the exception of John May) were dressed in their best clothes, which would not have been suitable for unloading a large shipment of whiskey crates and driving it away – even though this is how they, and other gangsters, were usually dressed at the time. The Gusenberg brothers were also supposed to drive two empty trucks to Detroit that day to pick up two loads of stolen Canadian whiskey.

On St. Valentine’s Day, most of the Moran gang had already arrived at the warehouse by approximately 10:30 AM. However, Moran himself was not there, having left his Parkway Hotel apartment late. As Moran and one of his men, Ted Newberry, approached the rear of the warehouse from a side street they saw the police car pull up. They immediately turned and retraced their steps, going to a nearby coffee shop. On the way, they ran into another gang member, Henry Gusenberg, and warned him away from the place. A fourth gang member, Willie Marks, was also on his way to the garage when he spotted the police car. Ducking into a doorway, he jotted down the license number before leaving the neighborhood.

Capone’s lookouts likely mistook one of Moran’s men for Moran himself – probably Albert Weinshank, who was the same height and build. That morning the physical similarity between the two men was enhanced by their dress: both happened to be wearing the same color overcoats and hats. Witnesses outside the garage saw a Cadillac sedan pull to a stop in front of the garage. Four men, two dressed in police uniform, emerged and walked inside. The two fake police officers, carrying shotguns, entered the rear portion of the garage and found members of Moran’s gang and two gang collaborators, Reinhart Schwimmer and John May, who was fixing one of the trucks.

The two “police officers” then signaled to the pair in civilian clothes who had accompanied them. Two of the killers opened fire with Thompson sub-machine guns, one containing a 20-round box magazine and the other a 50-round drum. They were efficient, spraying their victims left and right, even continuing to fire after all seven had hit the floor. The seven men were ripped apart in the volley, and two shotgun blasts afterward all but obliterated the faces of John May and James Clark, according to the coroner’s report.

To give the appearance that everything was under control, the men in street clothes came out with their hands up, prodded by the two uniformed police officers. Inside the garage, the only survivors in the warehouse were Highball, May’s German Shepherd, and Frank Gusenberg. Despite fourteen bullet wounds, he was still conscious, but died three hours later, refusing to utter a word about the identities of the killers.

Investigation

Since it was common knowledge that Moran was hijacking Capone’s Detroit-based liquor shipments, police focused their attention on the Purple Gang. Mug shots of Purple members George Lewis, Eddie Fletcher, Phil Keywell and his younger brother Harry, were picked out by landladies Mrs. Doody and Mrs. Orvidson, who had taken in three men as roomers ten days before the massacre; their rooming houses were directly across the street from the Clark Street garage. Later, these women wavered in their identification, and Fletcher, Lewis, and Harry Keywell were all questioned and cleared by Chicago Police. Nevertheless, the Keywell brothers (and by extension the Purple Gang) would remain ensnared in the massacre case for all time. Many also believed what the killers wanted them to believe – that the police had done it.

On 22 February, police were called to the scene of a garage fire on Wood Street where a 1927 Cadillac Sedan was found disassembled and partially burned. It was determined that the car had been used by the killers. The engine number was traced to a Michigan Avenue dealer, who had sold the car to a James Morton of Los Angeles, California. The garage had been rented by a man calling himself Frank Rogers, who gave his address as 1859 West North Avenue – which happened to be the address of the Circus Café, operated by Claude Maddox, a former St. Louis gangster with ties to the Capone organization, the Purple Gang, and a St. Louis gang called Egan’s Rats. Police could turn up no information about anyone named James Morton or Frank Rogers. But they had a definite lead on one of the killers.

Just minutes before the killings, a truck driver named Elmer Lewis had turned a corner only a block away from 2122 North Clark and sideswiped what he took to be a police car. He told police later that he stopped immediately but was waved away by the uniformed driver, whom he noticed was missing a front tooth. The same description of the car’s driver was also given by the president of the Board of Education, H. Wallace Caldwell, who had also witnessed the accident. Police knew that this description could be none other than a former member of Egan’s Rats, Fred ‘Killer’ Burke; Burke and a close companion, James Ray, were well known to wear police uniforms whenever on a robbery spree. Burke was also a fugitive, under indictment for robbery and murder in Ohio. Police also suggested that Joseph Lolordo could have been one of the killers, because of his brother, Pasqualino’s, recent murder by the North Side Gang.

Police then announced that they suspected Capone gunmen John Scalise and Albert Anselmi, as well as Jack McGurn himself, and Frank Rio, a Capone bodyguard. Police eventually charged McGurn and Scalise with the massacre. John Scalise, along with Anselmi and Joseph ‘Hop Toad’ Giunta, were murdered by Al Capone in May, 1929, after Capone learned about their plan to kill him, and before he went to trial. The murder charges against Jack McGurn were finally dropped because of a lack of evidence and he was just charged with a violation of the Mann Act: he took his girlfriend, Louise Rolfe, who was also the main witness against him and became known as the “Blonde Alibi”, across state lines to marry.

The case stagnated until December 14, 1929, when the Berrien County, Michigan Sheriff’s Department raided the St. Joseph, Michigan bungalow of “Frederick Dane”. Dane had been the registered owner of a vehicle driven by Fred “Killer” Burke. Burke had been drinking that night, rear-ended another vehicle and drove off. Patrolman Charles Skelly pursued, finally forcing Burke off the road. As Skelly hopped on the running board he was shot three times and died of his wounds later that night. The car was found wrecked and abandoned just outside of St. Joseph and traced to Fred Dane. By this time police photos confirmed that Dane was in fact Fred Burke, wanted by the Chicago Police for his participation in the St. Valentine’s Day Massacre.

When police raided Burke’s bungalow, they found a large trunk containing a bulletproof vest, almost $320,000 in bonds recently stolen from a Wisconsin bank, two Thompson submachine guns, pistols, two shotguns, and thousands of rounds of ammunition. St. Joseph authorities immediately notified the Chicago police, who requested that both machine guns be brought there at once. Through the then relatively new science of forensic ballistics, both weapons were determined to have been used in the massacre – and that one of Burke’s Tommy guns had also been used to murder New York mobster Frankie Yale a year and a half earlier. Unfortunately, no further concrete evidence would surface in the massacre case. Burke would be captured over a year later on a Missouri farm. As the case against him in the murder of Officer Skelly was strongest, he was tried in Michigan and subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment. Fred Burke died in prison in 1940.

Aftermath

Public outrage over The St. Valentine’s Day Massacre marked the beginning of the end to Capone’s influence in Chicago. Although Moran suffered a heavy blow, he still managed to keep control of his territory until the early 1930s, when control passed to the Chicago Outfit under Frank Nitti, who had taken control of the Capone organization after Capone’s conviction of income tax evasion. The massacre also brought the belated attention of the federal government to bear on Capone and his criminal activities.

In 1931, Capone was convicted of income tax evasion and was sentenced to ten years in a Federal institution, plus one year in the Cook County Jail for attempted jury tampering. The massacre ultimately affected both Moran and Capone and left the war they had with each other at a stalemate. It was a blow from which the North Side Gang never fully recovered. But the most serious blows to both gangs, as well as most others around the country, was the Stock Market Crash in October, 1929, which heralded the Great Depression, and the repeal of the 18th Amendment (Prohibition) in 1933, which had given rise to most of the lawlessness in the first place.

Though Jack McGurn would beat the massacre charges, he would be murdered in a Chicago bowling alley on February 15, 1936. The two most widely accepted theories blame either Bugs Moran or the Chicago Outfit itself under Frank Nitti with the killing, as McGurn had become a public relations liability to the Outfit.

Bolton revelations

On January 8, 1935, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents surrounded a Chicago apartment building at 3920 North Pine Grove, looking for the remaining members of the Barker Gang. A brief shootout erupted, resulting in the death of bank robber Russell Gibson. Also taken into custody were Doc Barker, Byron Bolton, and two women. While interrogating agents got nothing out of Barker, Bolton (a hitherto obscure criminal) proved to be a “geyser of information”, as one crime historian called him. Bolton, a former Navy machine-gunner and associate of Egan’s Rats, had been the valet and sidekick of a slick Chicago hit man named Fred Goetz aka Shotgun George Ziegler. Bolton was privy to many of the Barker Gang’s crimes and even pinpointed the Florida hideout of Ma and Freddie Barker (both of whom were killed in a shootout with the FBI a week later.) To the agents’ surprise, Bolton kept on talking and claimed to have taken part in the St. Valentine’s Day Massacre with Goetz, Fred Burke, and several others.

Because the FBI had no jurisdiction in a state murder case, they attempted to keep Bolton’s revelations confidential, until the Chicago American newspaper somehow got their hands on a second-hand version of the bank robber’s confession. The newspaper declared that the crime had been “solved”, despite being stonewalled by J. Edgar Hoover and the Bureau, who did not want any part of the massacre case. Garbled versions of Bolton’s story went out in the national media. Pieced together, his tale went like this: Bolton claimed that the murder of Bugs Moran had been plotted in “October or November” 1928 at a Couderay, Wisconsin resort owned by Fred Goetz. Present at this meet were Goetz, Al Capone, Frank Nitti, Fred Burke, Gus WinkelerLouis CampagnaDaniel SerritellaWilliam Pacelli, and Bolton himself. The men stayed two or three weeks, hunting and fishing when they were not planning the murder of their enemies.

Byron Bolton claimed he and Jimmy Moran (or Morand) were charged with watching the S.M.C. Cartage garage and phoning the signal to the killers at the Circus Café when Bugs Moran arrived at the meeting. Police had indeed found a letter addressed to Bolton in the lookout nest (and possibly a vial of prescription medicine). Bolton guessed that the actual killers had been Burke, Winkeler, Goetz, Bob Carey, Raymond “Crane Neck” Nugent,[1] and Claude Maddox (four shooters and two getaway drivers). Bolton gave an account of the massacre different from the one generally told by historians. He claimed that he saw only “plainclothes” men exit the Cadillac and go into the garage. This indicates that a second car was used by the killers. One witness, George Brichet, claimed to have seen at least two uniformed men exiting a car in the alley and entering the garage through its rear doors. A Peerless sedan had been found near a Maywood house owned by Claude Maddox in the days after the massacre, and in one of the pockets was an address book belonging to victim Albert Weinshank.

Bolton further indicated he had mistaken one of Moran’s men to be Moran, after which he telephoned the signal to the Circus Café. When the killers (who had expected to kill Moran and maybe two or three of his men) were unexpectedly confronted with seven men, they simply decided to kill them all and get out fast. Bolton claimed that Capone was furious with him for his mistake (and the resulting police pressure) and threatened to kill him, only to be dissuaded by Fred Goetz.

His claims were corroborated by Gus Winkeler’s widow Georgette, in both an official FBI statement and her memoirs, which were published in a four-part series in a true detective magazine during the winter of 1935-36. Mrs. Winkeler revealed that her husband and his friends had formed a special crew used by Capone for high-risk jobs. The mob boss was said to have trusted them implicitly and nicknamed them the “American Boys”. Byron Bolton’s statements were also backed up by William Drury, a maverick Chicago detective who had stayed on the massacre case long after everyone else had given up. Bank robber Alvin Karpis later claimed to have heard secondhand from Ray Nugent about the massacre and that the “American Boys” were paid a collective salary of $2,000 a week plus bonuses. Karpis also claimed that Capone himself had told him while they were in Alcatraz together that Goetz had been the actual planner of the massacre.

Despite Byron Bolton’s statements, no action was taken by the FBI. All the men he named, with the exceptions of Burke and Maddox, were all dead by 1935. Bank robber Harvey Bailey would later complain in his 1973 autobiography that he and Fred Burke had been drinking beer in Calumet City at the time of the massacre, and the resulting heat forced them to abandon their bank robbing ventures. Claude Maddox was questioned fruitlessly by Chicago Police, and there the matter lay. Crime historians are still divided on whether or not the “American Boys” committed the St. Valentine’s Day Massacree.

Other suspects

Over the years, many mobsters, in and out of Chicago, would be named as part of the Valentine’s Day hit team. Two prime suspects are Cosa Nostra hit men John Scalise and Albert Anselmi; both men were effective killers and are frequently mentioned as possibilities for two of the shooters. In the days after the massacre, Scalise was heard to brag, “I am the most powerful man in Chicago.” He had recently been elevated to the position of vice-president in the Unione Siciliana by its president, Joseph Guinta. Nevertheless, Scalise, Anselmi, and Guinta would be found dead on a lonely road near Hammond, Indiana on May 8, 1929. Gangland lore has it that Al Capone had discovered that the pair was planning to betray him. At the climax of a dinner party thrown in their honor, Capone produced a baseball bat and beat the trio to death.

Murder weapons

The two Thompson submachine guns (serial numbers 2347 and 7580) found in Fred Dane’s (an alias for Fred Burke) Michigan bungalow were personally driven to the Chicago coroner’s office by the Berrien County District Attorney. Ballistic expert Calvin Goddard tested the weapons and determined that both had been used in the massacre. One of them had also been used in the murder of Brooklyn mob boss Frankie Yale, which confirmed the New York Police Department’s long-held theory that Burke, and by extension Al Capone, had been responsible for Yale’s death.

Gun No. 2347 had been originally purchased on November 12, 1924 by Les Farmer, a deputy sheriff in Marion, Illinois, which happened to be the seat of Williamson County. Marion and the surrounding area were then overrun by the warring bootleg factions of the Shelton Brothers and Charlie Birger. Deputy Farmer was documented as having ties with Egan’s Rats, based 100 miles (160 km) away in St. Louis. By the beginning of 1927 at the very latest, the weapon had wound up in Fred Burke’s possession. It is possible he had used this same Tommygun in Detroit’s Milaflores Massacre on March 28, 1927.

Gun No. 7580 had been sold by Chicago sporting goods owner Peter von Frantzius to a Victor Thompson (also known as Frank V. Thompson) in the care of the Fox Hotel of Elgin, Illinois. Some time after the purchase the machine gun wound up with James “Bozo” Shupe, a small-time hood from Chicago’s West Side who had ties to various members of Capone’s Outfit.

Both submachine guns are still in the possession of the Berrien County Sheriff’s Department in St. Joseph, Michigan.

Crime scene and bricks from the murder wall

2122 N. Clark St., former site of the SMC Cartage Company, now the parking lot of a nursing home.

The garage, which stood at 2122 N. Clark Street, was demolished in 1967; the site is now a landscaped parking lot for a nursing home . There is still controversy over the actual bricks used to build the north inside wall of the building where the mobsters were lined up and shot. They were claimed to be responsible, according to stories, for bringing financial ruin, illness, bad luck and death to anyone who bought them.[2]

The bricks from the bullet-marked inside North wall were purchased and saved by Canadian businessman George Patey in 1967.[citation needed] His original intention was to use them in a restaurant that he represented, but the restaurant’s owner did not like the idea. Patey ended up buying the bricks himself, outbidding three or four others. Patey had the wall painstakingly taken apart and had each of the 414 bricks numbered, then shipped them back to Canada.

There are different reports about what George Patey did with the bricks after he got them. In 1978, Time Magazine reported that Patey reassembled the wall and put it on display in a wax museum with gun-wielding gangsters shooting each other in front of it to the accompaniment of recorded bangs. The wax museum later went bankrupt. Another source, an independent newspaper in the United Kingdom, reported in February 2000 that the wall toured shopping malls and exhibitions in the United States for a couple of decades. In 1968 Patey stopped exhibiting the bricks and put them into retirement.

Patey opened a nightclub called the Banjo Palace in 1971. It had a Roaring Twenties theme. The famous bricks were installed inside the men’s washroom with Plexiglasplaced right in front of them to shield them, so that patrons could urinate and try to hit the targets painted on the Plexiglas. In a 2001 interview with an Argentinian journalist, Patey said, “I had the most popular club in the city. People came from high society and entertainment, Jimmy StewartRobert Mitchum.”

The bricks were placed in storage until 1997 when Patey tried to auction them off on a website called Jet Set On The Net. The deal fell through after a hard time with the auction company. The last known substantial offer for the entire wall was made by a Las Vegas casino but Patey refused the $175,000 offer.[citation needed] In 1999, Patey tried to sell them brick by brick on his own website and sold about a hundred to gangsterbuffs. These came with signed certificates by Patey. Patey died on December 26, 2004, having never revealed how much he paid to buy the bricks at auction. The remaining bricks of his massacre wall was given as an inheritance to his niece. She ended up selling it to the soon to open Las Vegas mob museum. While the wall is no longer complete because of Patey selling a few dozen from it, it still remains the original massacre wall in which the seven men were lined up against and killed by Capone hired killers. The trail of the authentic St.Valentine’s day massacre bricks

TOP-SECRET: Cuban Missile Crisis Document Archive – from the NSA Archives unveiled

Download the NSA DOCUMENTS BY CLICKING ON THE FILES HERE:cuban_missile_crisispilot_training_june_19

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Cuban Missile Crisis

Part of the Cold War
Soviet-R-12-nuclear-ballistic missile.jpg
CIA reference photograph of Soviet R-12 intermediate-range nuclear ballistic missile (NATO designation SS-4) in Red SquareMoscow
Date October 14 – November 20, 1962
Location Cuba
Result
Belligerents
 United States Turkey  Soviet Union Cuba
Commanders and leaders
United States John F. KennedyTurkey Cemal Gürsel Soviet Union Nikita KhrushchevCuba Fidel Castro
Casualties and losses
1 aircraft shot down
1 aircraft damaged
1 pilot killed

The Cuban Missile Crisis (known as the October Crisis in Cuba or Caribbean Crisis (Russ: Kарибский кризис) in the USSR) was a confrontation among the Soviet Union, Cuba and the United States in October 1962, during the Cold War. In August 1962, after some unsuccessful operations by the U.S. to overthrow the Cuban regime (Bay of PigsOperation Mongoose), the Cuban and Soviet governments secretly began to build bases in Cuba for a number ofmedium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) with the ability to strike most of the continental United States. This action followed the 1958 deployment of Thor IRBMs in the UK (Project Emily) and Jupiter IRBMs to Italy and Turkey in 1961 – more than 100 U.S.-built missiles having the capability to strike Moscow with nuclear warheads. On October 14, 1962, a United States Air Force U-2 plane on a photoreconnaissancemission captured photographic proof of Soviet missile bases under construction in Cuba.

The ensuing crisis ranks with the Berlin Blockade as one of the major confrontations of the Cold War and is generally regarded as the moment in which the Cold War came closest to turning into a nuclear conflict.[1] It also marks the first documented instance of the threat of mutual assured destruction (MAD) being discussed as a determining factor in a major international arms agreement.[2][3]

The United States considered attacking Cuba via air and sea, and settled on a military “quarantine” of Cuba. The U.S. announced that it would not permit offensive weapons to be delivered to Cuba and demanded that the Soviets dismantle the missile bases already under construction or completed in Cuba and remove all offensive weapons. The Kennedy administration held only a slim hope that the Kremlin would agree to their demands, and expected a military confrontation. On the Soviet side, Premier Nikita Khrushchev wrote in a letter to Kennedy that his quarantine of “navigation in international waters and air space” constituted “an act of aggression propelling humankind into the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war.”

The Soviets publicly balked at the U.S. demands, but in secret back-channel communications initiated a proposal to resolve the crisis. The confrontation ended on October 28, 1962, when President John F. Kennedy and United Nations Secretary-General U Thant reached a public and secret agreement with Khrushchev. Publicly, the Soviets would dismantle their offensive weapons in Cuba and return them to the Soviet Union, subject to United Nations verification, in exchange for a U.S. public declaration and agreement never to invade Cuba. Secretly, the U.S. agreed that it would dismantle all U.S.-built Thor and Jupiter IRBMs deployed in Europe and Turkey.

Only two weeks after the agreement, the Soviets had removed the missile systems and their support equipment, loading them onto eight Soviet ships from November 5–9. A month later, on December 5 and 6, the Soviet Il-28 bombers were loaded onto three Soviet ships and shipped back to Russia. The quarantine was formally ended at 6:45 pm EDT on November 20, 1962. Eleven months after the agreement, all American weapons were deactivated (by September 1963). An additional outcome of the negotiations was the creation of the Hotline Agreement and the Moscow–Washington hotline, a direct communications link between Moscow and Washington, D.C.

Earlier actions by the United States

In 1959 US PGM-19 Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missiles targeting the USSR were deployed in Italy and Turkey.

In 1959 Cuban revolution took place and under the new government of Fidel Castro Cuba allied with the USSR. However, for a Latin American country to ally openly with the USSR was regarded by the US government as unacceptable. Such an involvement would also directly defy the Monroe Doctrine; a United States policy which, originally conceived to limit European power’s involvement in the Western Hemisphere, expanded to include all other major powers. The aim of the doctrine is to make sure the United States is the only hegemonic power in the Americas and keeping all others out of its “backyard”.

Bay of Pigs Invasion was launched in April 1961 under President John F. Kennedy by Central Intelligence Agency-trained forces of Cuban exiles but the invasion failed and the United States were embarrassed publicly. Afterward, former President Dwight D. Eisenhower told Kennedy that “the failure of the Bay of Pigs will embolden the Soviets to do something that they would otherwise not do.”[4]:10 The half-hearted invasion left Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev and his advisers with the impression that Kennedy was indecisive and, as one Soviet adviser wrote, “too young, intellectual, not prepared well for decision making in crisis situations … too intelligent and too weak.”[4] U.S. covert operations continued in 1961 with the unsuccessful Operation Mongoose.[5]

In addition, Khrushchev’s impression of Kennedy’s weakness was confirmed by the President’s soft response during the Berlin Crisis of 1961, particularly the building of the Berlin Wall. Speaking to Soviet officials in the aftermath of the crisis, Khrushchev asserted, “I know for certain that Kennedy doesn’t have a strong background, nor, generally speaking, does he have the courage to stand up to a serious challenge.” He also told his son Sergei that on Cuba, Kennedy “would make a fuss, make more of a fuss, and then agree.”[6]

In January 1962, General Edward Lansdale described plans to overthrow the Cuban Government in a top-secret report (partially declassified 1989), addressed to President Kennedy and officials involved withOperation Mongoose.[5] CIA agents or “pathfinders” from the Special Activities Division were to be infiltrated into Cuba to carry out sabotage and organization, including radio broadcasts.[7] In February 1962, the United States launched an embargo against Cuba,[8] and Lansdale presented a 26-page, top-secret timetable for implementation of the overthrow of the Cuban Government, mandating that guerrilla operations begin in August and September, and in the first two weeks of October: “Open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime.”[5]

[edit]Balance of power

When Kennedy ran for president in 1960, one of his key election issues was an alleged “missile gap“, with the Soviets leading.

In fact, the United States led the Soviets. In 1961, the Soviets had only four intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). By October 1962, they may have had a few dozen, although some intelligence estimates were as high as 75.[9]

The United States, on the other hand, had 170 ICBMs and was quickly building more. It also had eight George Washington and Ethan Allen class ballistic missile submarines with the capability to launch 16 Polarismissiles each with a range of 2,200 kilometres (1,400 mi).

Khrushchev increased the perception of a missile gap when he loudly boasted that the USSR was building missiles “like sausages” whose numbers and capabilities actually were nowhere close to his assertion. However, the Soviets did have medium-range ballistic missiles in quantity, about 700 of them.[9]

In his memoirs published in 1970, Khrushchev wrote, “In addition to protecting Cuba, our missiles would have equalized what the West likes to call ‘the balance of massive nuclear missiles around the globe.’” [9]

[edit]Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev conceived in May 1962 the idea of countering the United States’ growing lead in developing and deploying strategic missiles by placing Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba. Khrushchev was also reacting in part to the Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles which the United States had installed in Turkey during April 1962.[9]

From the very beginning, the Soviet’s operation entailed elaborate denial and deception, known in the USSR as Maskirovka.[10] All of the planning and preparation for transporting and deploying the missiles were carried out in the utmost secrecy, with only a very few told the exact nature of the mission. Even the troops detailed for the mission were given misdirection, told they were headed for a cold region and outfitted with ski boots, fleece-lined parkas, and other winter equipment.[10] The Soviet code name, Operation Anadyr, was also the name of a river flowing into the Bering Sea, the name of the capital of Chukotsky District, and a bomber base in the far eastern region. All these were meant to conceal the program from both internal and external audiences.[10]

In early 1962, a group of Soviet military and missile construction specialists accompanied an agricultural delegation to Havana. They obtained a meeting with Cuban leader Fidel Castro. The Cuban leadership had a strong expectation that the U.S. would invade Cuba again and they enthusiastically approved the idea of installing nuclear missiles in Cuba. Specialists in missile construction under the guise of “machine operators,” “irrigation specialists,” and “agricultural specialists” arrived in July.[10] Marshal Sergei Biryuzov, chief of the Soviet Rocket Forces, led a survey team that visited Cuba. He told Khrushchev that the missiles would be concealed and camouflaged by the palm trees.[9]

The Cuban leadership was further upset when in September Congress approved U.S. Joint Resolution 230, which authorized the use of military force in Cuba if American interests were threatened.[11] On the same day, the U.S. announced a major military exercise in the Caribbean, PHIBRIGLEX-62, which Cuba denounced as a deliberate provocation and proof that the U.S. planned to invade Cuba.[11][12]

Khrushchev and Castro agreed to place strategic nuclear missiles secretly in Cuba. Like Castro, Khrushchev felt that a U.S. invasion of Cuba was imminent, and that to lose Cuba would do great harm to the communist cause, especially in Latin America. He said he wanted to confront the Americans “with more than words… the logical answer was missiles.”[13]:29 The Soviets maintained their tight secrecy, writing their plans longhand, which were approved by Rodion Malinovsky on July 4 and Khrushchev on July 7.

The Soviet leadership believed, based on their perception of Kennedy’s lack of confidence during the Bay of Pigs Invasion, that he would avoid confrontation and accept the missiles as a fait accompli.[4]:1 On September 11, the Soviet Union publicly warned that a U.S. attack on Cuba or on Soviet ships carrying supplies to the island would mean war.[5] The Soviets continued their Maskirovka program to conceal their actions in Cuba. They repeatedly denied that the weapons being brought into Cuba were offensive in nature. On September 7, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin assured U.S. Ambassador to the United NationsAdlai Stevenson that the USSR was supplying only defensive weapons to Cuba. On September 11, the Soviet News Agency TASS announced that the Soviet Union has no need or intention to introduce offensive nuclear missiles into Cuba. On October 13, Dobrynin was questioned by former Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles about whether the Soviets plan to put offensive weapons in Cuba. He denied any such plans.[11] And again on October 17, Soviet embassy official Georgy Bolshakov brought President Kennedy a “personal message” from Khrushchev reassuring him that “under no circumstances would surface-to-surface missiles be sent to Cuba.[11]:494

As early as August 1962, the United States suspected the Soviets of building missile facilities in Cuba. During that month, its intelligence services gathered information about sightings by ground observers of Russian-built MiG-21 fighters and Il-28 light bombers. U-2 spyplanes found S-75 Dvina (NATO designation SA-2) surface-to-air missile sites at eight different locations. CIA director John A. McCone was suspicious. On August 10, he wrote a memo to President Kennedy in which he guessed that the Soviets were preparing to introduce ballistic missiles into Cuba.[9] On August 31, Senator Kenneth Keating (R-New York), who probably received his information from Cuban exiles in Florida,[9] warned on the Senate floor that the Soviet Union may be constructing a missile base in Cuba.[5]

Air Force General Curtis LeMay presented a pre-invasion bombing plan to Kennedy in September, while spy flights and minor military harassment from U.S. forces at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base were the subject of continual Cuban diplomatic complaints to the U.S. government.[5]

The first consignment of R-12 missiles arrived on the night of September 8, followed by a second on September 16. The R-12 was the first operational intermediate-range ballistic missile, the first missile ever mass-produced, and the first Soviet missile deployed with a thermonuclear warhead. It was a single-stage, road-transportable, surface-launched, storable propellant fueled missile that could deliver a megaton-classnuclear weapon.[14] The Soviets were building nine sites—six for R-12 medium-range missiles (NATO designation SS-4 Sandal) with an effective range of 2,000 kilometres (1,200 mi) and three for R-14 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (NATO designation SS-5 Skean) with a maximum range of 4,500 kilometres (2,800 mi).[15]

[edit]Cuba positioning

On October 7, Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós spoke at the UN General Assembly: “If … we are attacked, we will defend ourselves. I repeat, we have sufficient means with which to defend ourselves; we have indeed our inevitable weapons, the weapons, which we would have preferred not to acquire, and which we do not wish to employ.”

[edit]Missiles reported

The missiles in Cuba allowed the Soviets to effectively target almost the entire continental United States. The planned arsenal was forty launchers. The Cuban populace readily noticed the arrival and deployment of the missiles and hundreds of reports reached Miami. U.S. intelligence received countless reports, many of dubious quality or even laughable, and most of which could be dismissed as describing defensive missiles. Only five reports bothered the analysts. They described large trucks passing through towns at night carrying very long canvas-covered cylindrical objects that could not make turns through towns without backing up and maneuvering. Defensive missiles could make these turns. These reports could not be satisfactorily dismissed.[16]

U-2 reconnaissance photograph of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Missile transports and tents for fueling and maintenance are visible. Courtesy of CIA

[edit]U-2 flights find missiles

Despite the increasing evidence of a military build-up on Cuba, no U-2 flights were made over Cuba from September 5 to October 14. The first problem that caused the pause in reconnaissance flights took place on August 30, an Air Force Strategic Air Command U-2 flew over Sakhalin Island in the Far East by mistake. The Soviets lodged a protest and the U.S. apologized. Nine days later, a Taiwanese-operated U-2 [17][18] was lost over western China, probably to a SAM. U.S. officials worried that one of the Cuban or Soviet SAMs in Cuba might shoot down a CIA U-2, initiating another international incident. At the end of September, Navy reconnaissance aircraft photographed the Soviet ship Kasimov with large crates on its deck the size and shape of Il-28 light bombers.[9]

On October 12, the administration decided to transfer the Cuban U-2 reconnaissance missions to the Air Force. In the event another U-2 was shot down, they thought a cover story involving Air Force flights would be easier to explain than CIA flights. There was also some evidence that the Department of Defense and the Air Force lobbied to get responsibility for the Cuban flights.[9] When the reconnaissance missions were re-authorized on October 8, weather kept the planes from flying. The U.S. first obtained photographic evidence of the missiles on October 14 when a U-2 flight piloted by Major Richard Heyser took 928 pictures, capturing images of what turned out to be an SS-4 construction site at San CristóbalPinar del Río Province, in western Cuba.[19]

[edit]President notified

On October 15, the CIA’s National Photographic Intelligence Center reviewed the U-2 photographs and identified objects that they interpreted as medium range ballistic missiles. That evening, the CIA notified the Department of State and at 8:30 pm EDT National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy elected to wait until morning to tell the President. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was briefed at midnight. The next morning, Bundy met with Kennedy and showed him the U-2 photographs and briefed him on the CIA’s analysis of the images.[20] At 6:30 pm EDT Kennedy convened a meeting of the nine members of the National Security Council and five other key advisers[21] in a group he formally named the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM) after the fact on October 22 by National Security Action Memorandum 196.[22]

[edit]Responses considered

The U.S. had no plan in place because U.S. intelligence had been convinced that the Soviets would never install nuclear missiles in Cuba. The EXCOMM quickly discussed several possible courses of action, including:[12][23]

  1. No action.
  2. Diplomacy: Use diplomatic pressure to get the Soviet Union to remove the missiles.
  3. Warning: Send a message to Castro to warn him of the grave danger he, and Cuba were in.
  4. Blockade: Use the U.S. Navy to block any missiles from arriving in Cuba.
  5. Air strike: Use the U.S. Air Force to attack all known missile sites.
  6. Invasion: Full force invasion of Cuba and overthrow of Castro.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously agreed that a full-scale attack and invasion was the only solution. They believed that the Soviets would not attempt to stop the U.S. from conquering Cuba. Kennedy was skeptical.

They, no more than we, can not let these things go by without doing something. They can’t, after all their statements, permit us to take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians, and then do nothing. If they don’t take action in Cuba, they certainly will in Berlin.[24]

Kennedy concluded that attacking Cuba by air would signal the Soviets to presume “a clear line” to conquer Berlin. Kennedy also believed that United States’ allies would think of the U.S. as “trigger-happy cowboys” who lost Berlin because they could not peacefully resolve the Cuban situation.[25]:332

President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara in an EXCOMM meeting.

The EXCOMM then discussed the effect on the strategic balance of power, both political and military. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the missiles would seriously alter the military balance, but Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara disagreed. He was convinced that the missiles would not affect the strategic balance at all. An extra forty, he reasoned, would make little difference to the overall strategic balance. The U.S. already had approximately 5,000 strategic warheads,[26]:261 while the Soviet Union had only 300. He concluded that the Soviets having 340 would not therefore substantially alter the strategic balance. In 1990, he reiterated that “it made nodifference…The military balance wasn’t changed. I didn’t believe it then, and I don’t believe it now.”[27]

The EXCOMM agreed that the missiles would affect the political balance. First, Kennedy had explicitly promised the American people less than a month before the crisis that “if Cuba should possess a capacity to carry out offensive actions against the United States…the United States would act.”[28]:674-681 Second, U.S. credibility amongst their allies, and amongst the American people, would be damaged if they allowed the Soviet Union to appear to redress the strategic balance by placing missiles in Cuba. Kennedy explained after the crisis that “it would have politically changed the balance of power. It would have appeared to, and appearances contribute to reality.”[29]

President Kennedy meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in the Oval Office (October 18, 1962)

On October 18, President Kennedy met with Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, who claimed the weapons were for defensive purposes only. Not wanting to expose what he already knew, and wanting to avoid panicking the American public,[30] the President did not reveal that he was already aware of the missile build-up.[31]

By October 19, frequent U-2 spy flights showed four operational sites. As part of the blockade, the U.S. military was put on high alert to enforce the blockade and to be ready to invade Cuba at a moment’s notice. The 1st Armored Division was sent to Georgia, and five army divisions were alerted for maximal action. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) distributed its shorter-ranged B-47 Stratojet medium bombers to civilian airports and sent aloft its B-52 Stratofortress heavy bombers.[32]

[edit]Operational Plans

Two Operational Plans (OPLAN) were considered. OPLAN 316 envisioned a full invasion of Cuba by Army and Marine units supported by the Navy following Air Force and naval airstrikes. However, Army units in the United States would have had trouble fielding mechanized and logistical assets, while the U.S. Navy could not supply sufficient amphibious shipping to transport even a modest armored contingent from the Army. OPLAN 312, primarily an Air Force and Navy carrier operation, was designed with enough flexibility to do anything from engaging individual missile sites to providing air support for OPLAN 316’s ground forces.[33]

[edit]Quarantine

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Kennedy addressing the nation on October 22, 1962 about the buildup of arms on Cuba

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A U.S. Navy P-2H Neptune of VP-18 flying over a Soviet cargo ship with crated Il-28s on deck during the Cuban Crisis.[34]

Kennedy met with members of EXCOMM and other top advisers throughout October 21, considering two remaining options: an air strike primarily against the Cuban missile bases, or a naval blockade of Cuba.[31] A full-scale invasion was not the administration’s first option, but something had to be done. Robert McNamara supported the naval blockade as a strong but limited military action that left the U.S. in control. According to international law a blockade is an act of war, but the Kennedy administration did not think that the USSR would be provoked to attack by a mere blockade.[35]

Admiral AndersonChief of Naval Operations wrote a position paper that helped Kennedy to differentiate between a quarantine of offensive weapons and a blockade of all materials, indicating that a classic blockade was not the original intention. Since it would take place in international waters, Kennedy obtained the approval of the OAS for military action under the hemispheric defense provisions of the Rio Treaty.

Latin American participation in the quarantine now involved two Argentine destroyers which were to report to the U.S. Commander South Atlantic [COMSOLANT] at Trinidad on November 9. An Argentine submarine and a Marine battalion with lift were available if required. In addition, two Venezuelan destroyers and one submarine had reported to COMSOLANT, ready for sea by November 2. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago offered the use of Chaguaramas Naval Base to warships of any OAS nation for the duration of the quarantine. The Dominican Republic had made available one escort ship. Colombia was reported ready to furnish units and had sent military officers to the U.S. to discuss this assistance. The Argentine Air Force informally offered three SA-16 aircraft in addition to forces already committed to the quarantine operation.[36]

This initially was to involve a naval blockade against offensive weapons within the framework of the Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty. Such a blockade might be expanded to cover all types of goods and air transport. The action was to be backed up by surveillance of Cuba. The CNO’s scenario was followed closely in later implementing the quarantine.

On October 19, the EXCOMM formed separate working groups to examine the air strike and blockade options, and by the afternoon most support in the EXCOMM shifted to the blockade option.

President Kennedy signs the Proclamation for Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba at the Oval Office on October 23, 1962.

At 3:00 pm EDT on October 22, President Kennedy formally established the Executive Committee (EXCOMM) with National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 196. At 5:00 pm, he met with Congressional leaders who contentiously opposed a blockade and demanded a stronger response. In Moscow, Ambassador Kohler briefed Chairman Khrushchev on the pending blockade and Kennedy’s speech to the nation. Ambassadors around the world gave advance notice to non-Eastern Bloc leaders. Before the speech, U.S. delegations met with Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, and French President Charles de Gaulle to brief them on the U.S. intelligence and their proposed response. All were supportive of the U.S. position.[37]

On October 22 at 7:00 pm EDT, President Kennedy delivered a nation-wide televised address on all of the major networks announcing the discovery of the missiles.

It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.[38]

Kennedy described the administration’s plan:

To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba, from whatever nation or port, will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers. We are not at this time, however, denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948.[38]

During the speech a directive went out to all U.S. forces worldwide placing them on DEFCON 3. The heavy cruiser USS Newport News (CA-148) was designated flagship for the quarantine, with the USS Leary (DD-879) as Newport News’ destroyer escort.[39]

[edit]Crisis deepens

Khrushchev’s October 24, 1962 letter to President Kennedy stating that the Cuban Missile Crisis quarantine “constitute[s] an act of aggression…”

On October 23 at 11:24 am EDT a cable drafted by George Ball to the U.S. Ambassador in Turkey and the U.S. Ambassador toNATO notified them that they were considering making an offer to withdraw what the U.S knew to be nearly obsolete missiles from Italy and Turkey in exchange for the Soviet withdrawal from Cuba. Turkish officials replied that they would “deeply resent” any trade for the U.S. missile’s presence in their country.[40] Two days later, on the morning of October 25, journalist Walter Lippmann proposed the same thing in his syndicated column. Castro reaffirmed Cuba’s right to self-defense and said that all of its weapons were defensive and Cuba will not allow an inspection.[5]

[edit]International response

Kennedy’s speech was not well liked in Britain. The day after the speech, the British press, recalling previous CIA missteps, was unconvinced about the existence of Soviet bases in Cuba, and guessed that Kennedy’s actions might be related to his re-election.[41]

Three days after Kennedy’s speech, the Chinese People’s Daily announced that “650,000,000 Chinese men and women were standing by the Cuban people”.[37]

In Germany, newspapers supported the United States’ response, contrasting it with the weak-kneed American actions in the region during the preceding months. They also expressed some fear that the Soviets might retaliate in Berlin.[41] In France on October 23, the crisis made the front page of all the daily newspapers. The next day, an editorial in Le Monde expressed doubt about the authenticity of the CIA’s photographic evidence. Two days later, after a visit by a high-ranking CIA agent, they accepted the validity of the photographs. Also in France, in the October 29 issue of Le Figaro, Raymond Aron wrote in support of the American response.[41]

[edit]Soviet broadcast

At the time, the crisis continued unabated, and on the evening of October 24, the Soviet news agency Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza (TASS) broadcast a telegram from Khrushchev to President Kennedy, in which Khrushchev warned that the United States’ “pirate action” would lead to war. However, this was followed at 9:24 pm by a telegram from Khrushchev to Kennedy which was received at 10:52 pm EDT, in which Khrushchev stated, “If you coolly weigh the situation which has developed, not giving way to passions, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot fail to reject the arbitrary demands of the United States,” and that the Soviet Union views the blockade as “an act of aggression” and their ships will be instructed to ignore it.

[edit]U.S. alert level raised

Adlai Stevenson shows aerial photos of Cuban missiles to the United Nations. (October 25, 1962)

The United States requested an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council on October 25. In a loud, demanding tone, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin in an emergency meeting of the SC challenging him to admit the existence of the missiles. Ambassador Zorin refused to answer. The next day at 10:00 pm EDT, the U.S. raised the readiness level of SAC forces to DEFCON 2. For the only confirmed time in U.S. history, the B-52bombers were dispersed to various locations and made ready to take off, fully equipped, on 15 minutes notice.[42] One-eighth of SAC’s 1,436 bombers were on airborne alert, some 145 intercontinental ballistic missiles stood on ready alert, while Air Defense Command (ADC) redeployed 161 nuclear-armed interceptors to 16 dispersal fields within nine hours with one-third maintaining 15-minute alert status.[33]

“By October 22, Tactical Air Command (TAC) had 511 fighters plus supporting tankers and reconnaissance aircraft deployed to face Cuba on one-hour alert status. However, TAC and the Military Air Transport Service had problems. The concentration of aircraft in Florida strained command and support echelons; we faced critical undermanning in security, armaments, and communications; the absence of initial authorization for war-reserve stocks of conventional munitions forced TAC to scrounge; and the lack of airlift assets to support a major airborne drop necessitated the call-up of 24 Reserve squadrons.”[33]

On October 25 at 1:45 am EDT, Kennedy responded to Khrushchev’s telegram, stating that the U.S. was forced into action after receiving repeated assurances that no offensive missiles were being placed in Cuba, and that when these assurances proved to be false, the deployment “required the responses I have announced… I hope that your government will take necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation.”

A recently declassified map used by the U.S. Navy’s Atlantic Fleet showing the position of American and Soviet ships at the height of the crisis.

[edit]Quarantine challenged

At 7:15 am EDT on October 25, the USS Essex and USS Gearing attempted to intercept the Bucharest but failed to do so. Fairly certain the tanker did not contain any military material, they allowed it through the blockade. Later that day, at 5:43 pm, the commander of the blockade effort ordered the USS Kennedy to intercept and board the Lebanese freighter Marucla. This took place the next day, and the Marucla was cleared through the blockade after its cargo was checked.[43]

At 5:00 pm EDT on October 25, William Clements announced that the missiles in Cuba were still actively being worked on. This report was later verified by a CIA report that suggested there had been no slow-down at all. In response, Kennedy issued Security Action Memorandum 199, authorizing the loading of nuclear weapons onto aircraft under the command of SACEUR (which had the duty of carrying out first air strikes on the Soviet Union). During the day, the Soviets responded to the quarantine by turning back 14 ships presumably carrying offensive weapons.[42]

[edit]Crisis stalemated

The next morning, October 26, Kennedy informed the EXCOMM that he believed only an invasion would remove the missiles from Cuba. However, he was persuaded to give the matter time and continue with both military and diplomatic pressure. He agreed and ordered the low-level flights over the island to be increased from two per day to once every two hours. He also ordered a crash program to institute a new civil government in Cuba if an invasion went ahead.

At this point, the crisis was ostensibly at a stalemate. The USSR had shown no indication that they would back down and had made several comments to the contrary. The U.S. had no reason to believe otherwise and was in the early stages of preparing for an invasion, along with a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union in case it responded militarily, which was assumed.[44]

[edit]Secret negotiations

At 1:00 pm EDT on October 26, John A. Scali of ABC News had lunch with Aleksandr Fomin at Fomin’s request. Fomin noted, “War seems about to break out,” and asked Scali to use his contacts to talk to his “high-level friends” at the State Department to see if the U.S. would be interested in a diplomatic solution. He suggested that the language of the deal would contain an assurance from the Soviet Union to remove the weapons under UN supervision and that Castro would publicly announce that he would not accept such weapons in the future, in exchange for a public statement by the U.S. that it would never invade Cuba.[45]The U.S. responded by asking the Brazilian government to pass a message to Castro that the U.S. would be “unlikely to invade” if the missiles were removed.[40]

Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot, and what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.

Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.

Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 26, 1962[46]

On October 26 at 6:00 pm EDT, the State Department started receiving a message that appeared to be written personally by Khrushchev. It was Saturday at 2:00 am in Moscow. The long letter took several minutes to arrive, and it took translators additional time to translate and transcribe the long letter.[40]

Robert Kennedy described the letter as “very long and emotional.” Khrushchev reiterated the basic outline that had been stated to John Scali earlier in the day, “I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships bound for Cuba are not carrying any armaments. You will declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any other forces which might intend to invade Cuba. Then the necessity of the presence of our military specialists in Cuba will disappear.” At 6:45 pm EDT, news of Fomin’s offer to Scali was finally heard and was interpreted as a “set up” for the arrival of Khrushchev’s letter. The letter was then considered official and accurate, although it was later learned that Fomin was almost certainly operating of his own accord without official backing. Additional study of the letter was ordered and continued into the night.[40]

[edit]Crisis continues

Direct aggression against Cuba would mean nuclear war. The Americans speak about such aggression as if they did not know or did not want to accept this fact. I have no doubt they would lose such a war. —Ernesto “Che” Guevara, October 1962[47]

S-75 Dvina with V-750V 1D missile on a launcher. An installation similar to this one shot down Major Anderson’s U-2 over Cuba.

Castro, on the other hand, was convinced that an invasion was soon at hand, and he dictated a letter to Khrushchev that appeared to call for a preemptive strike on the U.S. However, in a 2010 interview, Castro said of his recommendation for the Soviets to bomb America “After I’ve seen what I’ve seen, and knowing what I know now, it wasn’t worth it at all.”[48] Castro also ordered all anti-aircraft weapons in Cuba to fire on any U.S. aircraft,[49] whereas in the past they had been ordered only to fire on groups of two or more. At 6:00 am EDT on October 27, the CIA delivered a memo reporting that three of the four missile sites at San Cristobal and the two sites at Sagua la Grande appeared to be fully operational. They also noted that the Cuban military continued to organize for action, although they were under order not to initiate action unless attacked.[citation needed]

At 9:00 am EDT on October 27, Radio Moscow began broadcasting a message from Khrushchev. Contrary to the letter of the night before, the message offered a new trade, that the missiles on Cuba would be removed in exchange for the removal of the Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey. At 10:00 am EDT, the executive committee met again to discuss the situation and came to the conclusion that the change in the message was due to internal debate between Khrushchev and other party officials in the Kremlin.[50]:300 McNamara noted that another tanker, the Grozny, was about 600 miles (970 km) out and should be intercepted. He also noted that they had not made the USSR aware of the quarantine line and suggested relaying this information to them via U Thant at the United Nations.

Lockheed U-2F, the high altitude reconnaissance type shot down over Cuba, being refueled by a Boeing KC-135Q. The aircraft in 1962 was painted overall gray and carried USAF military markings and national insignia.

While the meeting progressed, at 11:03 am EDT a new message began to arrive from Khrushchev. The message stated, in part,

You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is ninety-nine miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America. But… you have placed destructive missile weapons, which you call offensive, in Italy and Turkey, literally next to us… I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive… Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States … will remove its analogous means from Turkey … and after that, persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges made.

The executive committee continued to meet through the day.

Throughout the crisis, Turkey had repeatedly stated that it would be upset if the Jupiter missiles were removed. Italy’s Prime Minister Fanfani, who was also Foreign Minister ad interim, offered to allow withdrawal of the missiles deployed in Apulia as a bargaining chip. He gave the message to one of his most trusted friends, Ettore Bernabei, the general manager of RAI-TV, to convey to Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.. Bernabei was in New York to attend an international conference on satellite TV broadcasting. Unknown to the Soviets, the U.S regarded the Jupiter missiles as obsolete and already supplanted by the Polaris nuclear ballistic submarine missiles.[9]

The engine of the Lockheed U-2 shot down over Cuba on display at Museum of the Revolution in Havana.

On the morning of October 27, a U-2F (the third CIA U-2A, modified for air-to-air refueling) piloted by USAF Major Rudolf Anderson,[51] departed its forward operating location at McCoy AFB, Florida, and at approximately 12:00 pm EDT, the aircraft was struck by a S-75 Dvina (NATOdesignation SA-2 GuidelineSAM missile launched from Cuba. The aircraft was shot down and Anderson was killed. The stress in negotiations between the USSR and the U.S. intensified, and only much later was it learned that the decision to fire the missile was made locally by an undetermined Soviet commander acting on his own authority. Later that day, at about 3:41 pm EDT, several U.S. Navy RF-8A Crusader aircraft on low-level photoreconnaissance missions were fired upon, and one was hit by a 37 mm shell but managed to return to base.

At 4:00 pm EDT, Kennedy recalled members of EXCOMM to the White House and ordered that a message immediately be sent to U Thant asking the Soviets to “suspend” work on the missiles while negotiations were carried out. During this meeting, Maxwell Taylor delivered the news that the U-2 had been shot down. Kennedy had earlier claimed he would order an attack on such sites if fired upon, but he decided to not act unless another attack was made. In an interview 40 years later, McNamara said:

We had to send a U-2 over to gain reconnaissance information on whether the Soviet missiles were becoming operational. We believed that if the U-2 was shot down that—the Cubans didn’t have capabilities to shoot it down, the Soviets did—we believed if it was shot down, it would be shot down by a Soviet surface-to-air-missile unit, and that it would represent a decision by the Soviets to escalate the conflict. And therefore, before we sent the U-2 out, we agreed that if it was shot down we wouldn’t meet, we’d simply attack. It was shot down on Friday […]. Fortunately, we changed our mind, we thought “Well, it might have been an accident, we won’t attack.” Later we learned that Khrushchev had reasoned just as we did: we send over the U-2, if it was shot down, he reasoned we would believe it was an intentional escalation. And therefore, he issued orders to Pliyev, the Soviet commander in Cuba, to instruct all of his batteries not to shoot down the U-2.[note 1][52]

[edit]Drafting the response

Emissaries sent by both Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev agreed to meet at the Yenching Palace Chinese restaurant in the Cleveland Park neighborhood of Washington D.C. on the evening of October 27.[53]Kennedy suggested that they take Khrushchev’s offer to trade away the missiles. Unknown to most members of the EXCOMM, Robert Kennedy had been meeting with the Soviet Ambassador in Washington to discover whether these intentions were genuine. The EXCOMM was generally against the proposal because it would undermine NATO‘s authority, and the Turkish government had repeatedly stated it was against any such trade.

As the meeting progressed, a new plan emerged and Kennedy was slowly persuaded. The new plan called for the President to ignore the latest message and instead to return to Khrushchev’s earlier one. Kennedy was initially hesitant, feeling that Khrushchev would no longer accept the deal because a new one had been offered, but Llewellyn Thompson argued that he might accept it anyway. White House Special Counsel and Adviser Ted Sorensen and Robert Kennedy left the meeting and returned 45 minutes later with a draft letter to this effect. The President made several changes, had it typed, and sent it.

After the EXCOMM meeting, a smaller meeting continued in the Oval Office. The group argued that the letter should be underscored with an oral message to Ambassador Dobrynin stating that if the missiles were not withdrawn, military action would be used to remove them. Dean Rusk added one proviso, that no part of the language of the deal would mention Turkey, but there would be an understanding that the missiles would be removed “voluntarily” in the immediate aftermath. The President agreed, and the message was sent.

An EXCOMM meeting on October 29, 1962 held in the White House Cabinet Room during the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Kennedy is to the left of the American flag; on his left is Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his right is Secretary of StateDean Rusk.

At Juan Brito’s request, Fomin and Scali met again. Scali asked why the two letters from Khrushchev were so different, and Fomin claimed it was because of “poor communications”. Scali replied that the claim was not credible and shouted that he thought it was a “stinking double cross”. He went on to claim that an invasion was only hours away, at which point Fomin stated that a response to the U.S. message was expected from Khrushchev shortly, and he urged Scali to tell the State Department that no treachery was intended. Scali said that he did not think anyone would believe him, but he agreed to deliver the message. The two went their separate ways, and Scali immediately typed out a memo for the EXCOMM.[citation needed]

Within the U.S. establishment, it was well understood that ignoring the second offer and returning to the first put Khrushchev in a terrible position. Military preparations continued, and all active duty Air Force personnel were recalled to their bases for possible action. Robert Kennedy later recalled the mood, “We had not abandoned all hope, but what hope there was now rested with Khrushchev’s revising his course within the next few hours. It was a hope, not an expectation. The expectation was military confrontation by Tuesday, and possibly tomorrow…”[citation needed]

At 8:05 pm EDT, the letter drafted earlier in the day was delivered. The message read, “As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals—which seem generally acceptable as I understand them—are as follows: 1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safe-guards, to halt the further introduction of such weapon systems into Cuba. 2) We, on our part, would agree—upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations, to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against the invasion of Cuba.” The letter was also released directly to the press to ensure it could not be “delayed.”[citation needed]

With the letter delivered, a deal was on the table. However, as Robert Kennedy noted, there was little expectation it would be accepted. At 9:00 pm EDT, the EXCOMM met again to review the actions for the following day. Plans were drawn up for air strikes on the missile sites as well as other economic targets, notably petroleum storage. McNamara stated that they had to “have two things ready: a government for Cuba, because we’re going to need one; and secondly, plans for how to respond to the Soviet Union in Europe, because sure as hell they’re going to do something there”.[citation needed]

At 12:12 am EDT, on October 27, the U.S. informed its NATO allies that “the situation is growing shorter… the United States may find it necessary within a very short time in its interest and that of its fellow nations in the Western Hemisphere to take whatever military action may be necessary.” To add to the concern, at 6 am the CIA reported that all missiles in Cuba were ready for action.

Later on that same day, what the White House later called “Black Saturday,” the U.S. Navy dropped a series of “signaling depth charges” (practice depth charges the size of hand grenades[54]) on a Soviet submarine (B-59) at the quarantine line, unaware that it was armed with a nuclear-tipped torpedo with orders that allowed it to be used if the submarine was “holed” (a hole in the hull from depth charges or surface fire).[55] On the same day, a U.S. U-2 spy plane made an accidental, unauthorized ninety-minute overflight of the Soviet Union’s far eastern coast.[56] The Soviets scrambled MiG fighters from Wrangel Island and in response the American sent aloft F-102 fighters armed with nuclear air-to-air missiles over the Bering Sea.[57]

[edit]Crisis ends

After much deliberation between the Soviet Union and Kennedy’s cabinet, Kennedy secretly agreed to remove all missiles set in southern Italy and in Turkey, the latter on the border of the Soviet Union, in exchange for Khrushchev removing all missiles in Cuba.

At 9:00 am EDT, on October 28, a new message from Khrushchev was broadcast on Radio Moscow. Khrushchev stated that, “the Soviet government, in addition to previously issued instructions on the cessation of further work at the building sites for the weapons, has issued a new order on the dismantling of the weapons which you describe as ‘offensive’ and their crating and return to the Soviet Union.”

Kennedy immediately responded, issuing a statement calling the letter “an important and constructive contribution to peace”. He continued this with a formal letter: “I consider my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out… The U.S. will make a statement in the framework of the Security Council in reference to Cuba as follows: it will declare that the United States of America will respect the inviolability of Cuban borders, its sovereignty, that it take the pledge not to interfere in internal affairs, not to intrude themselves and not to permit our territory to be used as a bridgehead for the invasion of Cuba, and will restrain those who would plan to carry an aggression against Cuba, either from U.S. territory or from the territory of other countries neighboring to Cuba.”[58]:103

The U.S continued the quarantine, and in the following days, aerial reconnaissance proved that the Soviets were making progress in removing the missile systems. The 42 missiles and their support equipment were loaded onto eight Soviet ships. The ships left Cuba from November 5–9. The U.S. made a final visual check as each of the ships passed the quarantine line. Further diplomatic efforts were required to remove the Soviet IL-28 bombers, and they were loaded on three Soviet ships on December 5 and 6. Concurrent with the Soviet commitment on the IL-28’s, the U.S. Government announced the end of the quarantine effective at 6:45 pm EDT on November 20, 1962.[32]

In his negotiations with the Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy informally proposed that the Jupiter missiles in Turkey would be removed “within a short time after this crisis was over.”[59]:222 The last U.S. missiles were disassembled by April 24, 1963, and were flown out of Turkey soon after.[60]

The practical effect of this Kennedy-Khrushchev Pact was that it effectively strengthened Castro’s position in Cuba, guaranteeing that the U.S. would not invade Cuba. It is possible that Khrushchev only placed the missiles in Cuba to get Kennedy to remove the missiles from Italy and Turkey and that the Soviets had no intention of resorting to nuclear war if they were out-gunned by the Americans.[61] Because the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles from NATO bases in Southern Italy and Turkey was not made public at the time, Khrushchev appeared to have lost the conflict and become weakened. The perception was that Kennedy had won the contest between the superpowers and Khrushchev had been humiliated. This is not entirely the case as both Kennedy and Khrushchev took every step to avoid full conflict despite the pressures of their governments. Khrushchev held power for another two years.[58]:102-105

[edit]Aftermath

The Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missile. The U.S. secretly agreed to withdraw these missiles from Italy and Turkey.

Ibrahim-2 Jupiter Missile in Turkey.

The compromise was a particularly sharp embarrassment for Khrushchev and the Soviet Union because the withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Italy and Turkey was not made public—it was a secret deal between Kennedy and Khrushchev. The Soviets were seen as retreating from circumstances that they had started—though if played well, it could have looked just the opposite. Khrushchev’s fall from power two years later can be partially linked to Politburo embarrassment at both Khrushchev’s eventual concessions to the U.S. and his ineptitude in precipitating the crisis in the first place.

Cuba perceived it as a partial betrayal by the Soviets, given that decisions on how to resolve the crisis had been made exclusively by Kennedy and Khrushchev. Castro was especially upset that certain issues of interest to Cuba, such as the status of Guantanamo, were not addressed. This caused Cuban-Soviet relations to deteriorate for years to come.[62]:278 On the other hand, Cuba continued to be protected from invasion.

One U.S. military commander was not happy with the result either. General LeMay told the President that it was “the greatest defeat in our history” and that the U.S. should have immediately invaded Cuba.

The Cuban Missile Crisis spurred the Hotline Agreement, which created the Moscow–Washington hotline, a direct communications link between Moscow and Washington, D.C. The purpose was to have a way that the leaders of the two Cold War countries could communicate directly to solve such a crisis. The world-wide U.S. Forces DEFCON 3 status was returned to DEFCON 4 on November 20, 1962. U-2 pilot Major Anderson’s body was returned to the United States and he was buried with full military honors in South Carolina. He was the first recipient of the newly-created Air Force Cross, which was awarded posthumously.

Although Anderson was the only combat fatality during the crisis, eleven crew members of three reconnaissance Boeing RB-47 Stratojets of the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing were also killed in crashes during the period between September 27 and November 11, 1962.[63]

Critics including Seymour Melman[64] and Seymour Hersh[65] suggested that the Cuban Missile Crisis encouraged U.S. use of military means, such as in the Vietnam War. This Soviet-American confrontation was synchronous with the Sino-Indian War, dating from the U.S.’s military quarantine of Cuba; historians[who?] speculate that the Chinese attack against India for disputed land was meant to coincide with the Cuban Missile Crisis.[66]

[edit]Post-crisis history

A U.S. Navy HSS-1 Seabat helicopter hovers over Soviet submarine B-59, forced to the surface by U.S. Naval forces in the Caribbean near Cuba (October 28–29, 1962)

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., a historian and adviser to John F. Kennedy, told National Public Radio in an interview on October 16, 2002 that Castro did not want the missiles, but that Khrushchev had pressured Castro to accept them. Castro was not completely happy with the idea but the Cuban National Directorate of the Revolution accepted them to protect Cuba against U.S. attack, and to aid its ally, the Soviet Union.[62]:272 Schlesinger believed that when the missiles were withdrawn, Castro was angrier with Khrushchev than he was with Kennedy because Khrushchev had not consulted Castro before deciding to remove them.[note 2]

In early 1992, it was confirmed that Soviet forces in Cuba had, by the time the crisis broke, received tactical nuclear warheads for their artillery rockets and Il-28 bombers.[67] Castro stated that he would have recommended their use if the U.S. invaded despite knowing Cuba would be destroyed.[67]

Arguably the most dangerous moment in the crisis was only recognized during the Cuban Missile Crisis Havana conference in October 2002. Attended by many of the veterans of the crisis, they all learned that on October 26, 1962 the USS Beale had tracked and dropped signaling depth charges (the size of hand grenades) on the B-59, a Soviet Project 641 (NATO designation Foxtrot) submarine which, unknown to the U.S., was armed with a 15 kiloton nuclear torpedo. Running out of air, the Soviet submarine was surrounded by American warships and desperately needed to surface. An argument broke out among three officers on the B-59, including submarine captain Valentin Savitsky, political officer Ivan Semonovich Maslennikov, and Deputy brigade commander Captain 2nd rank (US Navy Commander rank equivalent) Vasili Arkhipov. An exhausted Savitsky became furious and ordered that the nuclear torpedo on board be made combat ready. Accounts differ about whether Commander Arkhipov convinced Savitsky not to make the attack, or whether Savitsky himself finally concluded that the only reasonable choice left open to him was to come to the surface.[68]:303, 317 During the conference Robert McNamara stated that nuclear war had come much closer than people had thought. Thomas Blanton, director of the National Security Archive, said, “A guy called Vasili Arkhipov saved the world.”

The crisis was a substantial focus of the 2003 documentary, The Fog of War, which won the Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature.

SECRET FROM CUBA: FROM THE MOUTH OF MINREX: POSSIBLE INSIGHT

VZCZCXYZ0000
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P 091953Z JUN 09
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RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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RUCOWCV/MARINCEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/NAVINTELOFC GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY
RUCOGCA/NAVSTA GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY
RUWDHDP/OBLA LOS ANGELES CA PRIORITY
RUEHKG/USDAO KINGSTON JM PRIORITY
S E C R E T HAVANA 000341 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2029
TAGS: SNAR PREL SMIG PGOV CU ASEC
SUBJECT: FROM THE MOUTH OF MINREX: POSSIBLE INSIGHT INTO
US-CU MIGRATION TALKS 

REF: (A) HAVANA 172 (B) HAVANA 187 

Classified By: COM JONATHAN FARRAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D) 

1. (S//NF) Summary: On 5 June, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Drug
Interdiction Specialist (DIS) assigned to the United States
Interests Section (USINT) in Havana, Cuba attended a
repatriation of sixteen Cuban migrants at Bahia de Cabanas.
During the transit to and from the pier, a Cuban Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MINREX) official offered subtle insights on
the possible GOC approach to the upcoming migration talks
between the USG and GOC, and reiterated past statements
regarding issues that he believes are of mutual concern
between both nations. The conversation occurred immediately
following 2 incidents involving the commandeering of a Cuban
Border Guard (CBG) go-fast (gf) by 2 CBG recruits, and the
appearance of 7 migrants in a raft in front of the USINT
building. End Summary. 

2. (S//NF) The 5 June repatriation was the second in a
week, with the first taking place on 30 May. Armando Bencomo
(Bencomo), the MINREX official in attendance, was
uncharacteristically quiet on 30 May, choosing not to
initiate conversation regarding policy issues as he normally
does. On 30 May, DIS mentioned to Bencomo the prospect for
re-initiation of migrant talks, to which Bencomo responded
that his government was mulling over the offer. Bencomo, in
typical fashion, made a point to reiterate that the former
Bush administration had quashed the talks in 2004, and stated
that the talks had previously been one of the only forms of
productive candor between both parties. 

3. (S//NF) Conversely, on 5 June, immediately upon
embarking on the short gf trip to the migrant receiving pier
at Cabanas, the conversation between DIS and Bencomo turned
to the subject of the migration talks. However, the topic
was brushed over, and Bencomo reiterated his past message
that the GOC is also interested in engaging in talks on 3
additional topics: counterdrug, counterterrorism, and natural
disaster response and preparation. These 3 items are common
themes in conversations with Bencomo, and DIS believes, based
on his repeated statements, and their recent offer to include
these three topics as a way ahead between both sides, that
the GOC's interest in these three items may be greater than
migration-related issues. 

4. (S//NF) Immediately following the repatriation, DIS and
Bencomo boarded the gf for the ten minute trip back to the
parking lot in the town of Cabanas. While boarding, in
nonchalant fashion, Bencomo asked about the status of 2 CBG
recruits who commandeered a CBG gf on the evening of 31 May.
The 2 were ultimately rescued by the USCG when the gf they
commandeered was located broken down fifty nautical miles
northwest of Cuba. DIS informed Bencomo that the 2 were
being treated per normal migrant processing protocols, and at
the time of the conversation, disposition had not been
determined- the issue was dropped immediately thereafter. 

5. (S//NF) A more detailed conversation regarding the
migrant talks ensued during the gf ride back to the parking
area at Cabanas. Adding the disclaimer "in my opinion,"
Bencomo said he thought the talks will be a positive thing.
DIS asked why, and Bencomo continued that the venue would be
a good opportunity to discuss why Cubans choose to leave
Cuba; specifically, Bencomo stated he believes the talks will
help identify which factors motivate Cubans to depart the
island to pursue a life in the United States. Bencomo,
without naming the policy, alluded to the "wet-foot,
dry-foot" policy currently in place that permits Cubans who
reach U.S. soil to remain there legally; Bencomo expressed
rather subtly his disapproval of this policy. Further, he
asserted that the talks would be a good venue where both
sides might develop or agree to joint measures that would 

help curtail a mass migration scenario from Cuba. In
addition, he stated that the talks would help both sides to
develop a response to a potential mass migration scenario.
Finally, Bencomo alluded to the Cuban mass migration events
in 1980 and 1994, and stated that in 1994 the U.S. encouraged
the behavior of Cubans who chose to steal boats and depart
the island by not returning those boats or treating said
Cubans as criminals. 

6. (S//NF) Recollecting an earlier conversation in which he
stated that, although the U.S. had made some recent overtures
towards the GOC, Bencomo stated that the U.S. could take
"heavier" steps to change the nature of the relationship. DIS
asked Bencomo why he believed migration talks and the other
three topics mentioned above were so important if the GOC was
so interested in seeing "heavier" changes. He stated that
the aforementioned forums for engagement are a launching
point, or segue, to further talks on larger issues, which we
believe include the embargo, Guantanamo Bay, and the five
Cuban spies. Bencomo summed up the Cuban outlook on the
current USG-GOC relationship when he stated that "everything
is in your (U.S.) hands." Note: This is a consistent theme
heard from all of the DIS's Cuban contacts; GOC
representatives persistently reiterate in their dialogue that
the status of the USG-GOC is the fault of the U.S., and the
road ahead lies entirely in the hands of the U.S. This line
of conversation is usually accompanied by an unsolicited
statement by the representatives that eschews the notion of
human rights and pre-conditions asserted by the U.S. in any
dealings with the GOC; both of these issues are so far beyond
the consideration of GOC officials that merely mentioning
them normally turns off a conversation in its entirety. 

7. (S//NF) Summary: DIS assesses that the GOC will attempt
to place the wet-foot, dry-foot issue at the center of the
upcoming migrant talks, and perhaps hammer the policy as the
prime reason for illicit Cuban migration departures from
Cuba. The mention of a mass migration scenario by a Cuban
official, especially one at the relatively high level that
Bencomo currently holds, is unusual. 

8. (S//NF) Further Summary: While the DIS has significant,
regular contact during repatriations with Bencomo, DIS also
has significant contact with Ministry of Interior (MININT)
officials while carrying out counternarcotic and
countermigration duties. As such, DIS has and continues to
gather unique insight into the demeanor and consistent party
line of these elements of the GOC. GOC officials tend to tow
the same line; however, DIS has noticed a recent up-tick in
anti-U.S. policy candor from the various GOC officials. DIS
estimates this is a sign that Cuban officials are
uncomfortable with the shifting U.S. approach to dealing with
Cuba demonstrated in recent months. In short, GOC is
developing a defensive posture, and is utilizing their
relationship with the DIS as one of an interlocutor to
verbally state their interest in discussing issues of mutual
cooperation; however, their actions, or lack thereof in some
cases, suggest otherwise. For instance, in the aftermath of
a large drug bust facilitated by US-Cuban-Bahamian
information exchange, wherein the CBG recovered a large
amount of marijuana and 3 traffickers, the Cuban
representative from the Anti Drug Directorate utilized a
follow-up meeting with the DIS to chastise U.S. authorities
in the U.S. for not detecting trace amounts of marijuana
concealed in ink markers and carried onto the island by Cuban
American visitors. The GOC mentality that they are never in
the wrong, and the U.S. has fostered the current poor state
of relations between the two states, is more prevalent now
than in the past year the DIS has spent on the island. End
Summary.
FARRAR

CONFIDENTIAL: BRAZIL GRANTS ASYLUM TO FARC TERRORIST

O 271830Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6146
INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
AMCONSUL RECIFE
AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
SECDEF WASHDC
NSC WASHDC
CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001511 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2016
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV MARR BR CO
SUBJECT: BRAZIL GRANTS ASYLUM TO FARC TERRORIST 

REF: BRASILIA 719 

Classified By: PolCouns Dennis Hearne, 1.4 (B) and (D) 

1.  This is an action cable.  Please see paragraph 10 for
action request. 

2.  (C)  Summary: The Colombian government has called on
Brazil to reverse a July 14  decision to grant asylum to
wanted FARC terrorist Francisco Antonio Cadena.  Some media
in Brazil greeted the decision with speculation that the
judicial asylum process was subverted by President Lula da
Silva and elements of his Workers Party, who maintained close
ties with FARC leader Cadena, who lived in Brazil before his
arrest last year and who has a minor child with his Brazilian
wife.  The Colombian Embassy in Brasilia will meet July 28
with the head of the Brazilian refugee committee which
granted the asylum request, apparently on the strength of a
written statement by Cadena promising to sever all ties with
the Colombian terrorist group, the FARC.  The granting of
asylum to a known terrorist flies in the face of Brazilian
claims to oppose international terrorism.  Particularly
troubling are the allegations of the Presidency subverting
the judicial process and pressuring the refugee committee to
take a decision contrary to its own guidelines, allegations
we find credible.  We, like the Colombians, will try to
discover the official rationale for the decision and how the
GOB reconciles it with its public opposition to international
terrorism.  We would also appreciate instructions on other
actions, if any, we should be taking.  End Summary. 

3.  (C) In a decision taken and kept in secret, the Brazilian
National Committee on Refuges (CONARE) July 14 granted
political refugee status to Francisco Antonio Cadena Collazos
(known in Brazil as Olivera Medina), the so-called Ambassador
to Brazil of the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia), who was arrested in Brazil in August 2005 at the
request of Interpol, based on a Colombian arrest warrant
which included charges of murder for terrorist purposes,
kidnapping, extortion and terrorism.  The decision will make
it impossible for Cadena to be extradited to Colombia as the
Colombian government requested on August 24, 2005 (reftel). 

4.  (C) In a statement issued July 19 in Bogota, the
Colombian government requested the Brazilian government to
reconsider the decision to grant asylum to Cadena and
reiterated its previous request for his extradition.  The
Political Counselor of the Colombian Embassy in Brasilia,
Juan Manuel Gonzalez Ayerbe, pointed out to poloff July 27
that CONARE guidelines preclude the granting of asylum to
persons who have committed war crimes or crimes against peace
or humanity, heinous crimes or acts of terrorism or drug
trafficking.  Gonzalez added that, aside from providing an
official notification of the decision through its Embassy in
Bogota, the GOB had made no comment on the case to the
Colombians and had not provided an official explanation of
the decision.  Gonzalez said that one of his contacts at the
Brazilian Foreign Ministry had told him unofficially that
Cadena had signed a statement saying he would cut all ties
with the FARC, and that CONARE had made its decision on that
basis. 

5.  (C) Gonzalez said the Colombia Embassy would meet July 28
with Luis Paulo Barreto, the General Secretary of the
Ministry of Justice, who serves as the chair of CONARE, to
seek a full explanation and to reiterate its request that
asylum be revoked and extradition proceed.  CONARE's other
members include the Ministries of Foreign Affairs
(Vice-Chair), Labor, Health, Education, the Federal Police,
UNHCR and NGO's from Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.  The press
spokesman of the CONARE told the Embassy July 27 that all
CONARE documents are confidential; there are no public
records or press releases concerning decisions, neither are
decisions published in the official government gazette.  The
rationale behind the secrecy is that persons requesting
refugee status are assumed to be in danger, so their names
cannot be released to the public. 

6.  (C) An article in the July 27 edition of the daily
newspaper Correio Brasiliense repeated the claim made to the
Colombian Embassy that the decision by CONARE was taken on
account of Cadena's commitment to cease terrorist activities
and quotes him as saying he will devote all his efforts from
now on to taking care of his Brazilian family.  The article
notes that the Justice Ministry had denied there had been
political pressure concerning the decision and gave
assurances that the decision was taken for technical reasons.
That claim is at variance with what Correio reported in
April (reftel). 

7.  (C) At that time, the daily reported that CONARE members
were complaining that the Office of the Presidency had
usurped the role of CONARE in assessing Cadena's asylum
request, calling the action a dangerous precedent that
politicized an issue that should be handled on its legal and
technical merits.  CONARE members accused Presidential
International Affairs Advisor Marcos Aurelio Garcia of being
behind the transfer of authority over the extradition request
from the Foreign Ministry to the Office of the Presidency
(The Colombian Ambassador echoed that view to the Charge,
adding that Garcia was known to have "sympathy" for the
FARC).  An advisor to Garcia rejected the charge, saying
Garcia was not involved in the issue. 

8.  (C) Counselor Gonzalez raised Garcia's name during our
July 27 meeting as a key player in the decision-making
process.  He added that, during the many years Cadena spent
in Brazil prior to his arrest last year, he had cultivated
close ties with President Lula's Labor Party (PT) and had met
with leaders of the PT in a house just outside of Brasilia
(called the Red Heart Mansion) owned by a PT member of
Congress .  He also echoed press and other public accounts
that PT leaders had met with Cadena in prison.  While
pointing out that claims of FARC donations to PT campaigns
had never been proven, he insisted there was ample proof of
Cadena's ties with PT leaders. 

9.  (C) Comment:  The decision by the Brazilian committee is
audacious but not necessarily surprising, as is the near
silence surrounding it.  Aside from a few articles in the
Brazilian press, there has been little notice of the decision
and no statements from Brazilian leftists (including those
who have run a web site in support of his asylum claim) or
the FARC itself.  Of course,  the GOB's silence on the issue
is not surprising.  Granting refugee status to a man accused
of terrorism against a friendly, democratically elected
government of a neighboring country is hardly the thing
President Lula or his associates would be eager to defend
publicly, especially since it would inevitably result during
this election period in a new airing  of the claims of FARC
support for PT 2002 campaigns, possibly including Lula's.
Embassy believes that high level political pressure resulted
in this decision. 

10.  (C) Action Request:  We, like the Colombians, will be
trying to find out what the official rationale for the asylum
decision was and how that can be reconciled with the GOB's
supposed opposition to international terrorism.  We would
also appreciate instructions from Washington regarding other
actions we should be taking. 

Chicola

TOP-SECRET: THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION UNVEILED

Forty-six years ago, at 4:15 a.m. on November 4, 1956, Soviet forces launched a major attack on Hungary aimed at crushing, once and for all, the spontaneous national uprising that had begun 12 days earlier. At 5:20 a.m., Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy announced the invasion to the nation in a grim, 35-second broadcast, declaring: “Our troops are fighting. The Government is in its place.” However, within hours Nagy himself would seek asylum at the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest while his former colleague and imminent replacement, János Kádár, who had been flown secretly from Moscow to the city of Szolnok, 60 miles southeast of the capital, prepared to take power with Moscow’s backing. On November 22, after receiving assurances of safe passage from Kádár and the Soviets, Nagy finally agreed to leave the Yugoslav Embassy. But he was immediately arrested by Soviet security officers and flown to a secret location in Romania. By then, the fighting had mostly ended, the Hungarian resistance had essentially been destroyed, and Kádár was entering the next phase of his strategy to neutralize dissent for the long term.

The defeat of the Hungarian revolution was one of the darkest moments of the Cold War. At certain points since its outbreak on October 23 the revolt looked like it was on the verge of an amazing triumph. The entire nation appeared to have taken up arms against the regime. Rebels, often armed with nothing more than kitchen implements and gasoline, were disabling Soviet tanks and achieving other — sometimes small but meaningful — victories throughout the country. On October 31, the tide seemed to turn overwhelmingly in the revolution’s favor when Pravda published a declaration promising greater equality in relations between the USSR and its East European satellites. One sentence was of particular interest. It read: “[T]he Soviet Government is prepared to enter into the appropriate negotiations with the government of the Hungarian People’s Republic and other members of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary.” To outside observers, the Kremlin statement came as a total surprise. CIA Director Allen Dulles called it a “miracle.” The crisis seemed on the verge of being resolved in a way no-one in Hungary or the West had dared to hope.

But tragically, and unbeknownst to anyone outside the Kremlin, the very day the declaration appeared in Pravda the Soviet leadership completely reversed itself and decided to put a final, violent end to the rebellion. From declassified documents, it is now clear that several factors influenced their decision, including: the belief that the rebellion directly threatened Communist rule in Hungary (unlike the challenge posed by Wladyslaw Gomulka and the Polish Communists just days before, which had targeted Kremlin rule but not the Communist system); that the West would see a lack of response by Moscow as a sign of weakness, especially after the British, French and Israeli strike against Suez that had begun on October 29; that the spread of anti-Communist feelings in Hungary threatened the rule of neighboring satellite leaders; and that members of the Soviet party would not understand a failure to respond with force in Hungary.

Developments within the Hungarian leadership also undoubtedly played a part in Moscow’s decision. Imre Nagy, who had suddently been thrust into the leadership role after it became clear that the old Stalinist leaders had been completely discredited, had stumbled at first. He failed to connect with the crowds that had massed in front of the Parliament building beginning on October 23 and seemed himself to be on the verge of being swept aside by popular currents that were entirely beyond the authorities’ control. But over the course of the next week, Nagy apparently underwent a remarkable transformation, from a more or less dutiful pro-Moscow Communist to a politician willing to sanction unprecedented political, economic and social reform, including the establishment of a multi-party state in Hungary, and insistent on the withdrawal of all Soviet forces from the country. By November 1, Nagy took the dramatic step of declaring Hungary’s rejection of the Warsaw Pact and appealing to the United Nations for help in establishing the country’s neutrality.

Meanwhile, in Washington, U.S. officials observed the tidal wave of events with shock and no small degree of ambivalence as to how to respond. The main line of President Eisenhower’s policy was to promote the independence of the so-called captive nations, but only over the longer-term. There is little doubt that he was deeply upset by the crushing of the revolt, and he was not deaf to public pressure or the emotional lobbying of activists within his own administration. But he had also determined, and internal studies backed him up, that there was little the United States could do short of risking global war to help the rebels. And he was not prepared to go that far, nor even, for that matter, to jeopardize the atmosphere of improving relations with Moscow that had characterized the previous period.

Yet Washington’s role in the Hungarian revolution soon became mired in controversy. One of the most successful weapons in the East-West battle for the hearts and minds of Eastern Europe was the CIA-administered Radio Free Europe. But in the wake of the uprising, RFE’s broadcasts into Hungary sometimes took on a much more aggressive tone, encouraging the rebels to believe that Western support was imminent, and even giving tactical advice on how to fight the Soviets. The hopes that were raised, then dashed, by these broadcasts cast an even darker shadow over the Hungarian tragedy that leaves many Hungarians embittered to this day.

Once the Soviets made up their minds to eliminate the revolution, it took only a few days to complete the main military phase of the operation. By November 7 — coincidentally, the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution — Soviet forces were firmly enough in control of the country that Kádár could take the oath of office in the Parliament building (even though the Nagy government had never formally resigned). Pockets of resistance remained, but Kádár was able to begin the long process of “normalization” that featured suppressing dissent of any meaningful kind and otherwise coopting Hungarian society into going along with the new regime.

For the next three decades, as a consequence of the crushing of the revolution, the history of the events of 1956 was effectively sealed to Hungarians. Even to mention the name of Imre Nagy in public was to risk punishment. Only after the collapse of the Communist regimes in Hungary and the region in 1989 did it become possible to begin to excavate the archival records and bring out the facts. Since then, previously inaccessible records of the Soviet leadership as well as of other Warsaw Pact member states has beome available that give a much clearer picture than was ever imagined possible of what happened in the corridors of power in Moscow, Budapest and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Even in the United States, government records have recently been re-reviewed and released in more complete form, and personal archives have produced documentation on RFE and other topics that help throw light on the U.S. response and the role of Hungary in the superpower conflict.

Now, through the collaboration of scholars and archivists operating under the umbrella of the Openness in Russia and Eastern Europe Project, many of the most important of these new records have been collected for the first time into one, English-language publication. Some of these materials were introduced by scholars at the 40th anniversary conference “Hungary and the World 1956: The New Archival Evidence,” organized in Budapest by the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution (Budapest), the National Security Archive and others. Other materials were published in their original languages in various Hungarian, Russian and other scholarly volumes and journals. In the United States, The Cold War International History Project Bulletin has reproduced a substantial number of items for a specialized English-language audience.

But The 1956 Hungarian Revolution is the first attempt to put together a major collection of these new materials, in addition to the significant number of items that appear here for the first time in any language, in a single volume. In all, the book consists of 120 documents and totals 598 pages. Each item is introduced by a brief “headnote” that describes its context and significance. In addition, the editors have written introductory essays for each of the three main chapters that give readers a narrative account of the events leading up to, during and after the uprising. A detailed chronology, glossaries, a bibliography and hundreds of footnotes flesh out the materials even further.

The 1956 Hungarian Revolution is the third in the “National Security Archive Cold War Reader” series published by Central European University Press. The first two titles were Prague Spring ’68, edited by Jaromír Navrátil et al (1998), and Uprising in East Germany, 1953, edited by Christian Ostermann (2001). Future volumes will focus on the Solidarity crisis in Poland in 1980-1981, and the collapse of Communism in 1989, with separate volumes on the U.S. and Soviet response and the specific experiences of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Those collections are expected in 2003-2004.

Generous funding for the Openness Project, of which this publication is one outcome, has come from the Open Society Institute, the John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the German Marshal Fund of the United States.

Readers are encouraged to visit the National Security Archive’s reading room at George Washington University’s Gelman Library (Suite 701) to view the original versions of these documents, and the many related materials that are also available. Questions about the series or any of the materials included in the volumes may be addressed to Malcolm Byrne. Publication or sales inquiries may be made directly to CEU Press.
Documents in the Briefing Book

[Note: these documents were transcribed for the book for space reasons. Although they are numbered here from 1 – 12, the headnotes often refer to other documents by number. Those numbers are the ones used in the book, not in this selection.]

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1) Study Prepared for U.S. Army Intelligence, “Hungary: Resistance Activities and Potentials,” January 1956 (24 pages)

2) Minutes of 290th NSC meeting, July 12, 1956 (5 pages)

3) Report from Anastas Mikoyan on the Situation in the Hungarian Workers’ Party, July 14, 1956 (6 pages)

4) National Security Council Report NSC 5608/1, “U.S. Policy toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe,” July 18, 1956 (2 pages)

5) Jan Svoboda’s Notes on the CPSU CC Presidium Meeting with Satellite Leaders, October 24, 1956 (6 pages)

6) Working Notes and Attached Extract from the Minutes of the CPSU CC Presidium Meeting, October 31, 1956 (4 pages)

7) Minutes of the Nagy Government’s Fourth Cabinet Meeting, November 1, 1956 (2 pages)

8) Report by Soviet Deputy Interior Minister M. N. Holodkov to Interior Minister N. P. Dudorov, November 15, 1956 (4 pages)

9) Situation Report from Malenkov-Suslov-Aristov, November 22, 1956 (8 pages)

10) “Policy Review of Voice for Free Hungary Programming, October 23-November 23, 1956,” December 5, 1956 (28 pages)

11) Romanian and Czech Minutes on the Meeting of Five East European States’ Leaders in Budapest (with Attached Final Communiqué), January 1-4, 1957 (9 pages)

12) Minutes of the Meeting between the Hungarian and Chinese Delegations in Budapest, January 16, 1957 (9 pages)

TOP-SECRET: The Velvet Revolution Declassified

Washington, D.C., August 18, 2011 – Fifteen years ago today, a modest, officially sanctioned student demonstration in Prague spontaneously grew into a major outburst of popular revulsion toward the ruling Communist regime. At that point the largest protest in 20 years, the demonstrations helped to spark the Velvet Revolution that brought down communism in Czechoslovakia and put dissident playwright Václav Havel in the Presidential Palace.

The November 17, 1989 march commemorated a student leader, Jan Opletal, who was killed by Nazi occupiers 50 years before, but quickly took on a starkly anti-regime character with calls of “Jakeš into the wastebasket,” referring to the communist party general secretary, and demands for free elections. The authorities used blunt force to disperse the students, injuring scores of people including several foreign journalists. Hundreds were arrested.

The result was more demonstrations over the next three days that completely exposed the bankruptcy of the regime. Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution soon joined the historic chain of events begun with Poland’s roundtable talks and elections, Hungary’s reintroduction of a multi-party system, and just a week before the Prague protests, the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

Now a new joint English-Czech edition volume has been published in Prague which tells the extraordinary tale of the revolution. The volume is entitled Prague-Washington-Prague: Reports from the United States Embassy in Czechoslovakia, November-December 1989. What sets this volume apart from other accounts is that it is a compilation of recently declassified U.S. State Department cable traffic from the period. Released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by the non-governmental National Security Archive, the cables not only provide quite accurate reporting of the unfolding events but offer insights into U.S. thinking at the time, including how the first demonstrations on this date in 1989 completely surprised American officials and forced them to dramatically revise their estimates on the survivability of the Communist regime in Prague.

Of particular note, this new volume is the first publication of the Václav Havel Library, which is still in the process of being formed. (Its website, currently being developed, offers further information about the book.)

The book’s editor, Vilém Precan, is a long-time partner of the National Security Archive who has been instrumental in bringing new documentation to light and organizing international conferences on the hidden history of Czechoslovakia and the Cold War. As indicated by Radio Prague, the international service of Czech Radio, Dr. Precan “worked untiringly with the National Security Archive … to have the documents released.”

From the book’s Introduction: “It is unusual for documents related to diplomacy to be published so soon after their having been written … That the set of documents published in this volume got into the hands of independent historians so soon after their having originated is thanks to an American nongovernmental institution with a name that will probably mean little to the layman and might even be confusing. That institution is the National Security Archive. It was established to gather and publish documents that have been declassified on the basis of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) …. The [Archive] has been more than successful in achieving this aim.”

From Vilém Precan’s Acknowledgements: “This volume is the result of the work of many people, whom I as Editor now wish to thank. First and foremost I express my gratitude to my friends and colleagues at the National Security Archive in Washington D.C.: Tom Blanton, Catherine Nielsen, Svetlana Savranskaya, and Sue Bechtel, owing to whose efforts the telegrams were made available to independent researchers and were passed on to Prague, and who were of great assistance to me while I was working in Washington. ”

Note about the book cover: Václav Bartuska, the director of the Havel Library, made the following comment: The photograph “is from the meeting where the transition of power from commies to Civic Forum was discussed … The back of the man you see at the bottom of the picture belongs to … guess whom … I liked this idea of having Václav Havel there right at the centre of all things, yet not visible at first. I think this had been his place for a long time.”

Why was the revolution non-violent? One of the many subplots of the new compilation is the fact that, despite the authorities’ initial use of force to break up the November demonstrations, the Velvet Revolution and similar events in other East European states (with the notable exception of Romania) were allowed to take place without Moscow resorting to bloody repression to keep its clients in power. An earlier National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book from 1999 also explores this topic in some detail, drawing on declassified records from a range of Russian and East European archives.

The spontaneous eruption of student protests in Prague instantly recalled to the minds of U.S. embassy staff (as indicated in cables included in this briefing book) earlier demonstrations in Eastern Europe, such as in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia on the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion of 1968. In that context, readers should note that some of the materials in the new Havel Library volume are also to become part of an acclaimed book series published by Central European University Press under the rubric, The National Security Archive Cold War Reader Series. This series comprises volumes of once-secret documentation from the former Soviet bloc and the West on each of the major upheavals in Eastern Europe during the Cold War. The series will feature a special emphasis on the revolutions of 1989 with separate volumes on Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Titles already in print or at the publishers include:

The Prague Spring 1968, edited by Járomír Navrátil et al (1998)
“I am happy that the cooperation between the National Security Archive in Washington and the Czech foundation, Prague Spring 1968, has resulted in this voluminous collection of documents.” Václav Havel

Uprising in East Germany, 1953, edited by Christian Ostermann (2001)
“This excellent collection of documents pulls together what’s been learned about [the uprising] since the Cold War … It is an indispensable new source for the study of Cold War history.”John Lewis Gaddis

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956, edited by Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne and János Rainer (2002)
“There is no publication, in any language, that would even approach the thoroughness, reliability, and novelty of this monumental work.”István Deák

A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991, edited by Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (Forthcoming, 2005)


Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Document No. 1: Confidential Cable #08082 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Brutal Suppression of Czech Students’ Demonstration,” November 18, 1989, 14:18Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 2: Unclassified Cable #08087 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Embassy Protest of Attack on American Journalists during November 17-19 Demonstrations in Prague,” November 20, 1989, 12:20Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 3: Confidential Cable #08097 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Demonstrations Continue Over Weekend in Prague,” November 20, 1989, 12:42Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 4: Unclassified Cable #08106 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Czechoslovak Press Coverage of Demonstration Aftermath Shows Contradictory Lines,” November 20, 1989, 16:48Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 5: Limited Official Use Cable from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Czechoslovak Independents Establish New Organization and List Agenda of Demands,” November 20, 1989, 16:52Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 6: Confidential Cable #08109 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “American Woman’s Account of November 17 Demonstration and the Death of a Czech Student,” November 20, 1989, 16:54Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 7: Confidential Cable #08110 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Popular and Soviet Pressure for Reform Converge on the Jakes Leadership,” November 20, 1989, 16:57Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 8: Confidential Cable #08144 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Demonstrations in Prague and Other Czechoslovak Cities November 20,” November 21, 1989, 15:20Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 9: Confidential Cable #08153 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Student Strike Situation Report,” November 21, 1989, 18:59Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

Document No. 10: Confidential Cable #08155 from U.S. Embassy Prague to the Department, “Morning Demonstration at Wenceslas Square: Overheard Conversations,” November 21, 1989, 19:01Z
Source: Freedom of Information Act

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TOP-SECRET:Perestroika and the Transformation of U.S.-Soviet Relations

President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at the first Summit in Geneva, November 19, 1985 (Photo – Ronald Reagan Library)

Washington D.C. August 17, 2011 – Twenty years ago this week the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union concluded their Geneva Summit, which became the first step on the road to transforming the entire system of international relations. Unlike the summits of the 1970s, it did not produce any major treaties, and was not seen as a breakthrough at the time, but as President Ronald Reagan himself stated at its conclusion, “The real report card will not come in for months or even years.” The movement toward the summit became possible as a result of change in the leadership in the Soviet Union. On March 11, 1985, the Politburo of the USSR Communist Party Central Committee elected Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev as its new General Secretary. This event symbolized the beginning of the internal transformation of the Soviet Union.

Today, twenty years after those seminal events, the National Security Archive is posting a series of newly declassified Soviet and U.S. documents which allow one to appreciate the depth and the speed of change occurring both inside the Soviet Union and in U.S.-Soviet relations in the pivotal year of 1985. Most documents below are being published for the first time.

Upon coming to power, the new Soviet leader initiated a series of reforms, beginning with acceleration of the economy, the anti-alcohol campaign, and the new policy of glasnost (openness), which became known later as perestroika. Although unnoticed by most Western observers, early significant changes were taking place in the internal political discourse of the Communist party with less ceremony and more open discussion at the sessions of the Politburo and the Central Committee Plenums. In the hierarchical Soviet system, the power of appointment allowed the top leader to build an effective political coalition to implement his new ideas. Gorbachev used his position as General Secretary to bring in officials who shared his worldview as key advisers and promoted them to the Central Committee and the Politburo. In 1985, two of the most important figures Gorbachev brought into the inner circle were Alexander Yakovlev and Eduard Shevardnadze. Already by the end of the year, in a memorandum to Gorbachev, Yakovlev proposed democratization of the party, genuine multi-candidate elections to the Supreme Soviet, and even the need to split the party into two parts to introduce competition into the political system.

In the sphere of U.S.-Soviet relations, the first year of perestroika was one of building trust and of intense learning for both Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. Although public rhetoric did not change to any significant degree, the unprecedented exchange of letters between the two leaders gave them an opportunity to engage in a serious dialog about the issues each saw as the most important ones, and prepared the ground for their face-to-face meeting in Geneva. One of the most important issues that came up repeatedly in the letters was the need to prevent nuclear war by way of reducing the level of armaments to reasonable sufficiency, where each side would enjoy equal security without striving for superiority. In this still tentative journey to find the right approach to each other, both leaders relied on the advice and good offices of another world leader for whom they had great respect and trust-Margaret Thatcher. (See memoranda of Margaret Thatcher’s Conversations with Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan as well as their correspondence at the Archive of the Margaret Thatcher Foundation).

Both sides had relatively low expectations going into the Geneva Summit. No draft of a final statement was prepared, partly due to the very different agendas each leader had. Both, however, believed that they would be able to persuade the other during the course of their personal encounter. Gorbachev was hoping to convince Reagan to reaffirm Washington’s commitment to the SALT II treaty, which had never been ratified, and to return to the traditional interpretation of the ABM treaty, which in essence would have meant abandoning SDI. He succeeded in neither of those efforts, but he did obtain a joint statement in which both sides pledged that they would not seek strategic superiority, and most importantly, stated that “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Upon returning home, the Soviet leader repeatedly emphasized this anti-war aspect of the joint statement and played down the sharp disagreements on SDI and space weapons which transpired during the discussions. Reagan, upon returning to the United States, presented the summit as his victory, in which he did not give in to Gorbachev’s pressure to abandon SDI, but in turn was able to pressure the Soviet leader on human rights.

In reality, in addition to agreeing in principle to the idea of a 50 percent reduction in strategic arms and an “interim” agreement on INF, the main significance of the Geneva Summit was that it served as a fundamental learning experience for both sides. Gorbachev realized that strategic defense was a matter of Reagan’s personal conviction and that most likely it was rooted not in the needs of the military-industrial complex but in the President’s deepest abhorrence of nuclear war. Reagan, on the other hand, had a chance to appreciate the genuine, repeatedly expressed concern of the Soviet leader about the possibility of putting nuclear weapons in space, which was the essence of Gorbachev’s fears over SDI. Reagan also could sense Gorbachev’s sincere eagerness to proceed with very deep arms reductions on the basis of equal security, not superiority. Reagan also sensed in Gorbachev a willingness to make concessions in order to move forward on arms control.

In view of Reagan’s insistence on developing the SDI, and his suggestions that the United States would share it when it was completed, and to open the laboratories in the process, many observers felt that Gorbachev had missed a crucial opportunity to take Reagan at his word and to press him for a written commitment on this issue. Ambassador Jack Matlock believes that was a “strategic error” on Gorbachev’s part. (Note 1) Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin also felt that Gorbachev missed an opportunity by getting “unreasonably fixated” on space weapons, and making it a “precondition for summit success.” (Note 2)

Both leaders came out of the summit with a new appreciation of each other as a partner. They succeeded in building trust and opening a dialog, which in very short order made possible such breakthroughs as Gorbachev’s Program on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons by the Year 2000 (January 15, 1986) and the INF and the START Treaties.


Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
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Document 1: Politburo Session March 11, 1985 Gorbachev Election

Mikhail Gorbachev was elected General Secretary at a special Politburo session convened less than 24 hours after Konstantin Chernenko’s death. According to most Russian sources, the election was pre-decided the day before when he was named the head of the funeral commission. At the Politburo itself, Gorbachev’s name was proposed by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who was at the moment the most senior Politburo member and one the core members of the Brezhnev inner circle. Gromyko’s speech praised Gorbachev’s human and of business qualities, and his experience of work in the party apparatus, in terms that were less formal than similar speeches at the elections of previous general secretaries. There were no dissenting voices at the session, partly because of Gromyko’s firm endorsement, and partly because three potential opponents–First Secretary of Kazakhstan Dinmukhamed Kunaev, First Secretary of Ukraine Vladimir Shcherbitsky, and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Russia Vitaly Vorotnikov–were abroad and could not make it to Moscow on such a short notice.

Document 2: Reagan Letter to Gorbachev, March 11, 1985

In his first letter to the new leader of the Soviet Union, President Reagan states his hope for the improvement of bilateral relations and extends an invitation for Mikhail Gorbachev to visit him in Washington. He also expresses his hope that the arms control negotiations “provide us with a genuine chance to make progress toward our common ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.”

Document 3: Alexander Yakovlev, On Reagan. Memorandum prepared on request from M.S. Gorbachev and handed to him on March 12, 1985

In this memorandum, which Gorbachev requested and Yakovlev prepared the day after Gorbachev’s election as general secretary, Yakovlev analyzed President Ronald Reagan’s positions on a variety of issues. The analysis is notable for its non-ideological tone, suggesting that meeting with the U.S. president was in the Soviet Union’s national interest, and that Reagan’s positions were far from clear-cut, indicating some potential for improving U.S.-Soviet relations.

Document 4: Memorandum of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Conversation with Babrak Karmal, March 14, 1985

In his first conversation with the leader of Afghanistan, who was brought in by the Soviet troops in December of 1979, Gorbachev underscored two main points: first that “the Soviet troops cannot stay in Afghanistan forever,” and second, that the Afghan revolution was presently in its “national-democratic” stage, whereas its socialist stage was only “a course of the future.” He also encouraged the Afghan leader to expand the base of the regime to unite all the “progressive forces.” In no uncertain terms, Karmal was told that the Soviet troops would be leaving soon and that his government would have to rely on its own forces.

Document 5: Minutes of Gorbachev’s Meeting with CC CPSU Secretaries, March 15, 1985

Gorbachev discusses the results of his meetings with foreign leaders during Konstantin Chernenko’s funeral at the conference of the Central Committee Secretaries. He notes the speeches made by the socialist allies, especially Gustav Husak, Jaruzelski’s suggestion to meet more often and informally, and Ceausescu’s opposition to the renewal of the Warsaw Pact for another 20 years. Among his meetings with Western leaders, Gorbachev speaks very highly about his meeting with Margaret Thatcher, which had “a slightly different character” than his meetings with other Westerners. A two-hour meeting with Vice President George Bush and Secretary of State George Shultz left only a “mediocre” impression, but an invitation to visit the United States was noted. Describing his meeting with President of Pakistan Zia Ul Hak, Gorbachev for the first time used a phrase usually dated to the XXVI party congress: he called the war in Afghanistan “a bleeding wound.”

Document 6: Gorbachev Letter to Reagan, March 24, 1985

In his first letter to the U.S. President, Gorbachev emphasizes the need to improve relations between the two countries on the basis of peaceful competition and respect for each other’s economic and social choice. He notes the responsibility of the two superpowers and their common interest “not to let things come to the outbreak of nuclear war, which would inevitably have catastrophic consequences for both sides.” Underscoring the importance of building trust, the Soviet leader accepts Reagan’s invitation in the March 11 letter to visit at the highest level and proposes that such visit should “not necessarily be concluded by signing some major documents.” Rather, “it should be a meeting to search for mutual understanding.”

Document 7: Reagan Letter to Gorbachev, April 4, 1985

In response to Gorbachev’s March 24 letter, Reagan stresses the common goal of elimination of nuclear weapons, the need to improve relations, and specifically mentions humanitarian and regional issues. He calls Gorbachev’s attention to the recent killing of Major Nicholson in East Germany and describes that as “an example of a Soviet military action which threatens to undo our best efforts to fashion a sustainable, more constructive relationship in the long term.”

Document 8: Minutes of the Politburo Session on launching the anti-alcohol campaign, April 4, 1985

The Politburo session discussed the issue of “drunkenness and alcoholism”-and adopted one of the most controversial resolutions of all the perestroika period, which when implemented became the source of great public outcry and resulted in significant losses of productivity in wine-producing areas in Southern Russia, Moldavia and Georgia. Vitaly Solomentsev made the official presentation to the Politburo producing shocking statistics of the level of alcoholism in the Soviet Union. In an unprecedented fashion, even though the main presentation was strongly supported by the General Secretary, there was opposition among the Politburo members. Notably, Deputy Finance Minister Dementsev spoke about how a radical cut in the level of production of alcoholic drinks could affect the Soviet economy, and prophetically stated that “a significant decrease in the production of vodka and alcohol products might lead to the growth of moonshine production, as well as stealing of technological alcohol, and would also cause the additional sugar consumption.” The discussion also reveals the sad state of the Soviet economy, incapable of providing goods for the money held by the population if vodka production were to be cut.

Document 9: Reagan letter to Gorbachev, April 30, 1985

In this letter, Reagan gives a detailed response to Gorbachev’s letter of March 24. After drawing Gorbachev’s attention to the situation with the use of lethal force by Soviet forces in East Germany, Reagan also touches on most difficult points in US.-Soviet relations, such as the war in Afghanistan, and issues surrounding strategic defenses. The President mentions that he was struck by Gorbachev’s characterization of the Strategic Defense Initiative as having “an offensive purpose for an attack on the Soviet Union.” The rest of the letter provides a detailed explanation of Reagan’s view of SDI as providing the means of moving to the total abolition of nuclear weapons.

Document 10: Gorbachev letter to Reagan, June 10, 1985

In his response to Reagan’s letter of April 30, the Soviet leader raises the issue of equality and reciprocity in U.S.-Soviet relations, noting that it is the Soviet Union that is “surrounded by American military bases stuffed also by nuclear weapons, rather than U.S.-by Soviet bases.” This letter shows Gorbachev’s deep apprehensions about Reagan’s position on the strategic defenses. The Soviet leader believes that a development of ABM systems would lead to a radical destabilization of the situation and the militarization of space. It is clear from this letter, that at the heart of the Soviet rejection of the SDI is the image of “attack space weapons capable of performing purely offensive missions.”

Document 11: Minutes of the Politburo session, June 29, 1985. Shevardnadze appointment

This Politburo session became the first one of many where Gorbachev used his power of appointment to quickly and decisively bring his supporters into the inner circle of the Politburo, and to retire those apparatchiks, who, in Gorbachev’s view could not be counted on to implement the new reforms. At this historic session, it was decided to promote Andrei Gromyko to the position of Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, replacing him with the relatively unknown Eduard Shevardnadze, send Grigory Romanov into retirement, and promote Boris Yeltsin to head the Construction Department of the CC CPSU in addition to many other personnel changes in the highest echelon of power. Gorbachev dealt with each promotion or replacement in a quick and business-like manner, which did not leave any space for opposing voices.

Document 12: Excerpt from Minutes of the Politburo Session, August 29, 1985

As an example of still slow and uneven progress of perestroika in its first year, the Politburo discusses a request from the exiled Academician Andrei Sakharov to allow his wife to travel abroad for medical treatment. The highly ideological discussion was dominated by KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov, who describes Yelena Bonner’s “100% influence” over Sakharov. Mikhail Zimyanin called her “a beast in a skirt, an imperialist plant.” However, the issue of whether to allow Bonner to go abroad is discussed in the framework of its potential impact on the Soviet image in the West, and especially in the light of the forthcoming Gorbachev meeting with Presidents Reagan and Mitterand.

Document 13: Gorbachev’s Economic Agenda : Promises, Potentials, and Pitfalls. An Intelligence Assessment, September 1985

This intelligence analysis presents a dire picture of the Soviet economic situation that the new Soviet leader had to face after his election, and calls his new economic agenda “the most agressive since the Khrushchev era.” Gorbachev is expected to show willingness to reduce the Soviet resource commitment to defense, legalize private-sector activity in the sphere of cunsumer services, and try to break the monopoly of foreign trade apparatus. However, the assessment is very cautious, suggesting that if Gorbachev continues to rely on “marginal tinkering,” it would mean that he “like Brezhnev before him, has succumbed to a politically expedient but economically ineffective approach.”

Document 14: CIA Assessment: Gorbachev’s Personal Agenda for the November Meeting

The analysis correctly notes that Gorbachev’s expectations going to Geneva were very low. According to the CIA, the Soviet leader would be primarily seeking to explore Reagan’s personal commitment to improving relations and arms control. Gorbachev was also expected to reaffirm commitment to SALT II and persuade Reagan to agree to a mutual reaffirmation of the ABM treaty. The analysis predicted a possibility of Gorbachev taking an aggressive posture to emphasize Soviet equality with the U.S. administration on such issues as the Soviet role in the regional disputes and human rights.

Document 15: Geneva Summit Memorandum of Conversation. November 19, 1985 10:20-11:20 a.m. First Private Meeting

In their first private meeting Reagan and Gorbachev both spoke about the mistrust and suspicions of the past and of the need to begin a new stage in U.S.-Soviet relations. Gorbachev described his view of the international situation to Reagan, stressing the need to end the arms race. Reagan expressed his concern with Soviet activity in the third world helping the socialist revolutions in the developing countries. Gorbachev did not challenge the President’s assertion actively but replied jokingly that he did not wake up “every day” thinking about “which country he would like to arrange a revolution in.”

Document 16: Geneva Summit Memorandum of Conversation. November 19, 1985 11:27 a.m.-12:15 p.m. First Plenary Session

At this session, Gorbachev gives a quite assertive and ideological performance, explaining his views of how the U.S. military-industrial complex is profiting from the arms race and indicating that the Soviet side is aware of the advice that conservative think tanks, like the Heritage Foundation, give the President-that “they had been saying that the United States should use the arms race to frustrate Gorbachev’s plans, to weaken the Soviet Union.” He also challenges Reagan on what the Soviet side viewed as a unilateral definition of U.S. national interests. Reagan’s response raises the need to build trust and rejects Gorbachev’s insistence that the interests of the military-industrial complex define the policy of the United States.

Document 17: Geneva Summit Memorandum of Conversation. November 19, 1985 2:30-3:40 p.m. Second Plenary Meeting

In response to Reagan’s discussion of the SDI, and the need for strategic defense if a madman got his hands on nuclear weapons, Gorbachev lays out a Soviet response to a U.S. effort to actually build an SDI system : there will be no reduction of strategic weapons, and the Soviet Union would respond. “This response will not be a mirror image of your program, but a simpler, more effective system.” In his response, Reagan talks about regional issues, particularly Vietnam, Cambodia and Nicaragua. On SDI, the U.S. President makes a promise that “SDI will never be used by the U.S. to improve its offensive capability or to launch a first strike.” Gorbachev seems to be so focused on the issue of strategic defenses that he is not willing to enage in serious discussion of other issues.

Document 18: Geneva Summit Memorandum of Conversation. November 19, 1985 3:34-4:40 p.m. Mrs. Reagan’s Tea for Mrs. Gorbacheva

Document 19: Geneva Summit Memorandum of Conversation. November 19, 1985 3:40-4:45 p.m. Second Private Meeting

In their private meeting the two leaders discussed the idea of a 50 percent reduction in the levels of strategic nuclear weapons. Gorbachev’s firm position is that such an agreement cannot be negotiated apart from the issues of strategic defense and that it should be tied to a reconfirmation of the traditional understanding of the 1972 ABM treaty. Reagan does not see the defensive weapons as part of the arms race and therefore does not see the need to include them in the Geneva negotiations. Reagan is surprised that Gorbachev “kept on speaking on space weapons.” Gorbachev admits that, on a human level, he could understand that the “idea of strategic defense had captivated the President’s imagination.” In this conversation both sides come close to learning the key concern of the other-Reagan’s sincere belief that a strategic defense system could prevent nuclear war, and Gorbachev’s abhorrence of putting weapons in space.

Document 20: Geneva Summit Memorandum of Conversation. November 19, 1985 8-10:30 p.m. Dinner Hosted by the Gorbachevs

During the dinner Gorbachev used a quote from the Bible that there was a time to throw stones and a time to gather stones which have been cast in the past to indicate that now the President and he should move to resolve their practical disagreements in the last day of meetings remaining. In his response, Reagan stated that “if the people of the world were to find out that there was some alien life form that was going to attack the Earth aproaching on Halley’s Comet, then that knowledge would unite all peoples of the world.”

Document 21: Geneva Summit Memorandum of Conversation. November 20, 1985 11:30 a.m.-12:40 p.m. Third Plenary Meeting

At this meeting Reagan presented a detailed U.S. program on strategic arms reductions and a notion of an interim INF agreement. Gorbachev agreed to the idea of reductions, but emphasized that the Soviet Union could not agree to proposals that would jeopardize Soviet security, meaning Reagan’s insistence on the SDI. The main focus of Gorbachev’s talk was once again on the SDI and on why Reagan should be so focused on it if the other side found it unacceptable. To that, Reagan responded with a proposal that whoever developed a feasible defense system should share it, and that way the threat would be eliminated. Gorbachev gave his agreement to a separate INF agreement and to deep cuts under the condition that the United States would not develop a strategic defense system because that would mean bulding a new class of weapons to be put in space.

Document 22: Geneva Summit Memorandum of Conversation. November 20, 1985, 2:45-3:30 p.m. Fourth Plenary Meeting

At this meeting the leaders discussed the possibility of producing a joint statement on the result of the Summit. In contrast to previous U.S.-Soviet summits, no draft of such a statement was prepared before due to U.S. objections to such a draft.

Document 23: Geneva Summit Memorandum of Conversation. November 20, 1985, 4:00-5:15 p.m. Mrs. Gorbacheva’s Tea for Mrs. Reagan

Document 24: Geneva Summit Memorandum of Conversation. November 20, 1985, 8:00-10:30 p.m. Dinner Hosted by President and Mrs. Reagan

At the final dinner both sides emphasized that here at Geneva they started something that would lead them to more significant steps in improving bilateral relations and the global situation, “with mutual understanding and a sense of responsibility.” In the conversation after dinner Reagan and Gorbachev discussed the prepared joint statement and their respective statements, which should express their strong support for the ideas expressed in that document.

Document 25: Yakovlev’s handwritten notes from Geneva

Alexander Yakovlev’s notes emphasize the main points of the Geneva discussions, the new elements of U.S.-Soviet dialog. He notes the need of improvement in all aspects of bilateral relations, Gorbachev’s statement that the USSR would be satisfied by a lower level of security for the United States, underscoring the need for equal security, and his call for both countries to show good will in bilateral relations. Yakovlev gives particular attention to the discussion of the SDI in his notes, and to the differences in the U.S. and Soviet views on strategic defense.

Document 26: Excerpt from Anatoly Chernyaev’s Diary, November 24, 1985

Anatoly Chernyaev as Deputy Head of the International Department of the CC CPSU was involved in drafting Soviet positions for the Geneva Summit. He learned about the results of the summit from Boris Ponomarev. In his diary he noted the cardinal nature of the change-nothing has changed in the military balance, and yet a turning point was noticeable, the leaders came to the understanding that nobody would start a nuclear war. He notes also that although initially Reagan was not responsive to Gorbachev’s efforts, in the end the President “did crack open after all.”

Document 27: Gorbachev Speech at the CC CPSU Conference, November 28, 1985

In his post-Geneva speech to the conference of the CC CPSU Gorbachev gives an ambivalent analysis of the summit. Noting that the U.S. main positions have not changed, and that Reagan is “maneuvering,” he also emphasized the fact that the administration could not but respond to public pressure and start making steps forward in the direction of Soviet proposals. Generally, Gorbachev’s remarks here are very cautious, because he is speaking to a wider audience than the Politburo, and still they are less ideological than might be expected in his analysis of U.S.-Soviet relations. He also touches upon the need to keep up defenses and the importance, indeed the “sacred” character, of the defense industry.

Document 28: Gorbachev letter to Reagan, December 5, 1985

In this first post-Geneva letter to the U.S. President, Gorbachev is calling for building on the spirit of Geneva with concrete actions. The Soviet leader talks about the need to stop all nuclear testing, and invites the United States to join the Soviet moratorium, which was due to expire in January 1986. As a new step, he proposes a system of international control and inspections, which in a significant break with the past would allow U.S. observers to inspect locations of “questionable” activities on a mutual basis. The tone of the letter is completely non-ideological and provides an interesting contrast with Gorbachev’s report on the summit to the Central Committee conference.

Document 29: Reagan letter to Gorbachev, early December 1985

In this letter to Gorbachev Reagan is trying to build on the spirit of Geneva, underscoring the new understanding that the two leaders found during the discussions. Importantly, Reagan notes two main differences, which left a profound impression on his thinking. First, that he was “struck by [Gorbachev’s] conviction that … [the SDI] is somehow designed to secure a strategic advantage-even to permit a first strike capability.” He tries to assuage that concern. The second issue raised in the letter is the issue of regional conflict, where the U.S. President suggests that a significant step in improving U.S.-Soviet relations would be a Soviet decision to “withdraw your forces from Afghanistan.” He suggests that the two leaders should set themselves a private goal-to find a practical way to solve the two issues he had mentioned in the letter.

Document 30: Alexander Yakovlev Memorandum to Mikhail Gorbachev, “The Imperative of Political Development,” December 25, 1985

In this memorandum to Gorbachev, Yakovlev outlines his view of the much-needed transformation of the political system of the Soviet Union. Yakovlev writes in his memoir that he prepared this document in several drafts earlier in the year but hesitated to present it to Gorbachev because he believed his own official standing at the time was still too junior. Yakovlev’s approach here is thoroughly based on a perceived need for democratization, starting with intra-party democratization. The memo suggests introducing several truly ground-breaking reforms, including genuine multi-candidate elections, free discussion of political positions, a division of power between the legislative and executive branches, independence of the judicial branch, and real guarantees of human rights and freedoms.


Notes1. Jack F. Matlock, Jr. Reagan and Gorbachev : How the Cold War Ended (New York : Random House, 2004), p. 168.

2. Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986). (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 591.

CONFIDENTIAL: LIKELIHOOD OF A CUBAN MASS MIGRATION

VZCZCXYZ0012
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUB #0781/01 2702018
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 262018Z SEP 08
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3761
RUCOWCX/CCGDEIGHT NEW ORLEANS LA PRIORITY
INFO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0547
RUEHBH/AMEMBASSY NASSAU 0034
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE 0009
RUEHDG/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO 0027
RUCOWCV/MARINCEN MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM CMD CTR MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/NAVINTELOFC GUANTANAMO BAY CU
RUESDM/JTLO MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUCOWCA/COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA 0125
RUCOWCV/COMCOGARD SECTOR KEY WEST FL
RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000781 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2018
TAGS: SNAR PGOV PREL SMIG PHUM CU
SUBJECT: LIKELIHOOD OF A CUBAN MASS MIGRATION FOLLOWING
HURRICANE DESTRUCTION 

Classified By: COM JONATHAN D. FARRAR, REASONS 1.4 B & D 

1.  (C) Summary:  Hurricane season 2008 has been especially
unkind to the island of Cuba.  Four consecutive storms,
concluding with the most recent, Hurricane IKE, left much of
the island in shambles.  Buildings and homes, tobacco and
sugar crops, and island-wide infrastructure have all been
affected, including 444,000 damaged houses, and 63,000 houses
destroyed.  The level of destruction has led many Cuba
watchers to ask whether a Cuban mass migration is likely in
the near future.  While the aforementioned events have indeed
been historic in proportion, from our vantage point we see no
indication that a mass migration from Cuba is pending.
However, U.S. Interests Section (USINT) believes this is an
issue that must be given due deference as the outcome of
post-hurricane recovery efforts will play a large role in
determining whether Cubans take to the sea or remain on the
island.  End Summary. 

2.  (C) During post-hurricane interactions with a variety of
sources in Cuba, USINT personnel have not detected any
indication a mass migration from Cuba is pending.  Further,
Cubans who have regular contact with USINT (mainly
dissidents, refugees, and religious groups), including those
from Pinar del Rio, one of the worst hit and affected Cuban
provinces, have not reported the existence of rumors or
preparations by Cubans to depart the island in increased
numbers or larger go-fast or rustica loads. 

3.  (C) In conversation with Cuban Ministry of Interior
(MININT) personnel, specifically the Cuban Border Guard
(CBG), the USINT Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist
(DIS) learned that some CBG coastal outpost units in Ciego de
Avila, Camaguey, and Las Tunas provinces were damaged during
the wave of hurricanes, and that CBG troops are busy making
repairs to infrastructure there.  However, as expected, a CBG
Colonel informed the DIS that CBG patrols have not been
scaled back.  It should be noted that during a separate
meeting with MININT/CBG personnel immediately following the
passing of IKE, the same Colonel asked the DIS whether the US
Coast Guard was planning "an operation" following that most
recent hurricane; DIS believes the Colonel's question, in the
context of the meeting and conversation, was an attempt to
gauge whether the US government was concerned about an
increase in Cuban migrant departures or mass migration, and
inadvertently suggested himself that there was a fear on the
part of the CBG that at least an increase in Cuban migration
numbers was possible. 

4.  (C) Cubans we speak with are increasingly frustrated with
the difficulties caused by the hurricanes and the GOC's
refusal to accept some foreign assistance offers.  However,
the Cuban people possess a rather high boiling point: Cubans
have adopted a wait-and-see posture, also doing the best they
can in the interim to reinstall some sense of Cuban-style
"normalcy."  Via Cuban state broadcast television and radio,
the GOC has urged Cubans to fight, be disciplined, and
exhibit solidarity following each hurricane's destructive
path, and encouraged Cubans to work harder to overcome
current conditions. 

5.  (C) While there have been no suggestions of a mass
migration event from Cuba, the ingredients necessary for the
Cuban people and/or government to cook-up such a scenario
have manifested in Cuba over the past two months- they
include: multiple natural disasters, damaged or destroyed
infrastructure, an apparent shortage of food on the island,
significantly increased fuel prices, and a Cuban government
whose post-hurricane response and recovery "expertise" are in
demand and are apparently spread dangerously thin from the
Province of Pinar del Rio in the west to Guantanamo Province
in the east, and in every province in between.  Further, as
the rise and fall of Cuban migrant flow relies heavily on
weather conditions and sea state, the chances for an
increased egress of Cuban migrants prior to the winter cold
fronts and subsequent heavy seas would be more likely.  Many
Cubans may attempt to depart the island hoping to beat the
heavy seas or reunite with family in south Florida prior to
the holiday season; this hurricane season may exacerbate that
trend. 

6.  (C) Comment:  While the international community has its
eyes fixed on Cuba's pending response to the offers of
financial and resource assistance from the US government to
the GOC, it is possible that Cuban authorities will attempt
to mitigate the departure of Cuban migrants from the island
towards the United States to avoid negative press and
embarrassment.  However, as international interest wanes,
Cuban authorities may also lose interest in curtailing the
flow of Cubans towards the United States.  End Comment.
FARRAR

SECRET: TURKEY: 2000 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

P 111147Z DEC 00
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9745
INFO AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL ADANA
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ANKARA 008112

S/CT FOR REAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/10
TAGS: PTER TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: 2000 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: STATE 217248

(U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM JAMES F. JEFFREY FOR REASONS: 1.5
(B) AND (D).

--------
OVERVIEW
--------

1. (U) COMBATTING TERRORISM IS A MAJOR PRIORITY IN TURKEY'S FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY. THE GOT APPROACHES THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISTS WITH AN OUTLOOK SIMILAR TO THE USG'S INTERNATIONAL, COORDINATED APPROACH. THE DANGER POSED TO TURKEY BY TERRORISM IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT THE THREE POSTS OF THE U.S. MISSION TO TURKEY CONSTITUTE 50 PERCENT OF THE HIGH-THREAT POSTS IN THE EUROPEAN BUREAU (EUR). MOREOVER, THE NUMBER OF TERRORIST GROUPS IN TURKEY EXCEEDS THE NUMBER IN THE REST OF THE HIGH-THREAT EUR COUNTRIES COMBINED. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC TERRORIST GROUPS IN TURKEY INCLUDE SEPARATIST, RADICAL ISLAMIST, LEFTIST, AND TRANSNATIONAL GROUPS. RIGHT-WING TERRORISM, WHICH USED TO BE AN ISSUE FOR TURKEY, IS NOW LARGELY DEFUNCT. RIGHT-WING VIOLENCE, TO THE EXTENT THAT IT EXISTS, OPERATES AT THE LEVEL OF CRIMINAL MAFIA GANGS.

U.S.-DESIGNATED TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

2. (U) THE BEST-KNOWN TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS IN TURKEY ARE THE KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK) AND THE REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTY/FRONT (DHKP/C, FORMERLY KNOWN AS DEV-SOL). ON OCTOBER 8, 1997, THE SECRETARY OF STATE DESIGNATED BOTH GROUPS AS FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS SUBJECT TO THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996. ON OCTOBER 8, 1999, THE SECRETARY RENEWED THOSE DESIGNATIONS.

LEFTIST TERROR ORGANIZATIONS

3. (U) BEYOND THE PKK AND DHKP/C, THERE ARE SEVERAL LEFTIST AND ISLAMIST TERRORIST GROUPS OPERATING IN TURKEY. MANY OF THESE GROUPS ARE SMALL AND RELATIVELY INACTIVE, THOUGH THEY HAVE TARGETED FOREIGNERS, INCLUDING AMERICANS, IN THE PAST. ONE OF THE MORE ACTIVE LEFTIST GROUPS IS THE TURKISH WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' LIBERATION ARMY (TIKKO). OTHER GROUPS INCLUDE THE TURKISH COMMUNIST LABORERS' PARTY/LENINIST (TKEP/L), THE TURKISH REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST PARTY (TDKP), THE MARXIST LENINIST COMMUNIST PARTY/LIBERATION (MLKP/K), AND THE TURKISH REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNISTS UNIT (TIKB).

ISLAMIST TERROR ORGANIZATIONS

4. (U) THE ACTIVE ISLAMIST ORGANIZATIONS IN TURKEY ARE THE ISLAMIC GREAT EASTERN RAIDERS' FRONT (IBDA/C), TURKISH HIZBULLAH, AND THE "JERUSALEM WARRIORS." IN 2000, THE IBDA/C'S TEMPO OF OPERATIONS WAS LOW. HIZBULLAH, HOWEVER, WAS IN THE SPOTLIGHT BECAUSE TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE (TNP) RAIDS EXPOSED THE ALARMING REACH OF THE ORGANIZATION AND THE SURPRISING NUMBER OF COVERT MURDERS IT HAD STAGED. THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS ALSO CAME TO PUBLIC ATTENTION IN 2000. THOUGH TURKISH HIZBULLAH AND THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS ARE NOT RELATED TO EACH OTHER, THE TNP UNCOVERED EVIDENCE FROM ITS RAIDS ON TURKISH HIZBULLAH THAT EXPOSED SOME OF THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THE ORGANIZATION IS ALLEGED TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATIONS OF SEVERAL PROMINENT TURKISH INTELLECTUALS, FOREIGN DIPLOMATS, AND A U.S. SERVICE MEMBER.

5. (U) THE CAPITALIZED TITLES BELOW CORRESPOND TO REFTEL QUESTIONS. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE "MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS" SECTION THAT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWS, THEY ARE IN THE SAME ORDER AS THE QUESTIONS IN REFTEL.

----------------------------------
MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS (E)
----------------------------------

INTERNATIONAL APPROACH

6. (U) DURING 2000, THE GOT CONTINUED TO SUPPORT EXISTING INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, PROTOCOLS, AND AGREEMENTS ON TERRORISM. THE GOT IS A SIGNATORY TO ELEVEN OF TWELVE UN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM CONVENTIONS. DURING 2000, THE "INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORIST BOMBINGS," WHICH TURKEY HAS SIGNED, WAS UNDERGOING THE PROCESS REQUIRED TO SECURE PARLIAMENTARY RATIFICATION. TURKEY HAS NOT YET SIGNED THE "INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM." 

[INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX.]

7. (C) ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS THE GOT HAS EXERCISED ITS RIGHT TO INSPECT THE CARGO OF IRANIAN FLIGHTS TRANSITING TURKISH AIRSPACE EN ROUTE TO LEBANON. IN LIGHT OF IRAN'S SUPPORT FOR LEBANESE HIZBULLAH, THIS WAS A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WITH LIMITED SUCCESS, THE TURKS ALSO CONTINUALLY USE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO URGE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE EUROPEAN FRONT ORGANIZATIONS OF THE PKK, DHKP/C AND OTHER GROUPS.

FIGHT AGAINST THE PKK

8. (U) ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT, THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES (TSK), JANDARMA (A PARAMILITARY POLICE FORCE), TNP, AND VILLAGE GUARDS (PARAMILITARY GUARD FORCES RECRUITED FROM AMONG SOUTHEASTERN VILLAGERS) CONTINUED VIGOROUS COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS TO SUPPRESS THE PKK THROUGHOUT EASTERN TURKEY AND IN NORTHERN IRAQ. CONTINUING GOT COUNTERINSURGENCY SUCCESSES AND THE PKK'S SELF-PROCLAIMED CEASE-FIRE LED TO A DECREASE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY COMPARED TO PREVIOUS YEARS. ACCORDING TO THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF (TGS), FOR THE FIRST ELEVEN MONTHS OF THIS YEAR THERE WERE 45 PKK-RELATED INCIDENTS, COMPARED TO 3,298 FOR THE FULL YEAR OF 1994. IN 2000, AS IN PREVIOUS YEARS, MORE THAN 200,000 SECURITY PERSONNEL REMAINED DEDICATED TO COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN EASTERN TURKEY AND NORTHERN IRAQ. LARGE, MULTI-UNIT COMBINED-ARMS OPERATIONS WERE NOT NECESSARY; MOST COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED BY SMALLER UNITS ON A CONTINUING BASIS.

9. (U) TURKEY'S SOUTHEASTERN EFFORTS BORE FRUIT IN THE WAKE OF OCALAN'S 1999 CAPTURE. A MEASURE OF TURKEY'S SUCCESS WAS A STEEP DECREASE IN PKK-RELATED INCIDENTS IN 2000 AS COMPARED WITH 1999. AS A RESULT OF THE DECREASE, THE TSK WAS INCREASINGLY ABLE TO HAND OVER ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS TO THE JANDARMA AND TNP. ANOTHER INDICATION OF THE GOT'S PROGRESS AGAINST THE PKK WAS PARLIAMENT'S JUNE 2000 APPROVAL OF A NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION CALLING FOR VAN PROVINCE TO BE REMOVED FROM THE STATE OF EMERGENCY REGION (OHAL). THE OHAL IS NOW REDUCED TO FOUR PROVINCES (DIYARBAKIR, HAKKARI, SIRNAK, AND TUNCELI).

10. (U) IN ADDITION TO CONDUCTING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, THE GOT CONTINUES ITS ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS ECONOMIC DISPARITIES IN SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY. THE GOT INTENDS FOR THESE EFFORTS, THE MOST PROMINENT OF WHICH IS THE SOUTHEAST ANATOLIA PROJECT (GAP), TO REDUCE THE POVERTY AND DESPERATION THAT IT BELIEVES ARE THE ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM IN THE REGION. UNFORTUNATELY, TURKEY'S ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS MEAN THAT MANY OF THESE EFFORTS ARE UNDER-FUNDED, IF FUNDED AT ALL. FROM A MORE POLITICAL APPROACH, THE GOT HAS NOT MOVED QUICKLY TO GRANT THE GREATER INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO ETHNIC KURDS THAT WOULD UNDERCUT THE SUPPORT ENJOYED IN THE REGION BY THE PKK. THE GOT AND TURKISH SOCIETY AS A WHOLE HAVE YET TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS ON HOW TO ACCOMMODATE THE DESIRE OF SOME TURKISH CITIZENS' TO EXPRESS THEIR KURDISH CULTURE.

[INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX.]

11. (C) DESPITE TURKEY'S MILITARY SUCCESS AGAINST KURDISH TERRORISM, THE PKK'S RELUCTANCE TO CHALLENGE THE GOT STEMS, TO SOME EXTENT, FROM ITS LOYALTY TO ABDULLAH OCALAN AND THE DESIRE TO AVOID CAUSING HIS EXECUTION. THE PKK'S PERSONALITY-CULT MINDSET MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION TO ABANDON OCALAN BY IGNORING HIS CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE. HOWEVER, WITH APPROXIMATELY 5,000 PKK TERRORISTS UNDER ARMS OUTSIDE OF TURKEY, THE POSSIBILITY REMAINS THAT KURDISH TERRORISM WILL RETURN TO TURKEY, PERHAPS VIA A PKK FACTION OR SPLINTER GROUP. THIS BECOMES MORE LIKELY AS THE PKK CONTINUES TO SUFFER MILITARY DEFEATS FROM NORTHERN IRAQ'S KURDISH GROUPS, IN ADDITION TO THE TSK.

ON-GOING SUPPRESSION OF DHKP/C

12. (U) DURING 2000, TURKISH SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED THEIR ON-GOING AND EFFECTIVE CAMPAIGN TO DISRUPT THE DHKP/C THROUGH RAIDS AND ARRESTS. THE TNP'S VIGILANCE CONTRIBUTED TO A YEAR IN WHICH DHKP/C INCIDENTS WERE RARE AND RELATIVELY MINOR. NOTABLE WAS THE TNP'S AUGUST ARREST OF SEVEN ALLEGED DHKP/C TERRORISTS WHO APPARENTLY WERE PLANNING AN ATTACK ON INCIRLIK AIRBASE, FROM WHICH U.S./UK/TURKISH COMBINED TASK FORCE ENFORCES THE "NO-FLY ZONE" OVER NORTHERN IRAQ.

MAJOR PUSH AGAINST HIZBULLAH

13. (U) TURKISH HIZBULLAH (HIZBULLAH), WHICH WAS FOUNDED IN THE 1980S IN SOUTHEAST TURKEY, IS A SUNNI-ISLAM KURDISH GROUP NOT RELATED TO LEBANESE HIZBULLAH. HIZBULLAH HAS GENERALLY TARGETED ETHNIC-KURDS, PARTICULARLY BUSINESS AND CULTURAL FIGURES WHO WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY ISLAMIST IN THE ORGANIZATION'S EYES. IT ALSO FOLLOWS A PATTERN OF TARGETING ITS OWN FORMER MEMBERS WHO HAVE BROKEN RANKS OR SIMPLY MOVED ON FROM THE ORGANIZATION.

14. (U) OVER THE COURSE OF 1999, HIZBULLAH INCREASED ITS OPERATIONS IN ISTANBUL, WHERE THE DISAPPEARANCES OF ETHNIC-KURDISH BUSINESSMEN EVENTUALLY ATTRACTED POLICE ATTENTION. INVESTIGATIONS LED TO THE JANUARY 17 TNP RAID ON A HIZBULLAH SAFEHOUSE THAT WAS FORTUITOUSLY ALSO SERVING AS HIZBULLAH'S HEADQUARTERS. IMMEDIATE RESULTS OF THE RAID WERE THE DEATH OF HIZBULLAH LEADER HUSEYIN VELIOGLU AND THE DISCOVERY ON THE PREMISES OF THE BODIES OF SOME OF THE MISSING BUSINESSMEN. IN THE WEEKS FOLLOWING, A TROVE OF EVIDENCE FROM THE RAID ALLOWED THE GOT TO CONDUCT A SERIES OF WIDE-RANGING RAIDS TO ROLL UP MUCH OF THE ORGANIZATION. THE TNP CAPTURED OR KILLED MUCH OF HIZBULLAH'S LEADERSHIP, SEIZED SEVERAL CACHES OF WEAPONS, AND PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT, DISCREDITED ITS EXTREMISM BY EXPOSING EVIDENCE OF 156 MURDERS.

15. (U) THOUGH SUCH RAIDS INFLICTED SEVERE DAMAGE ON HIZBULLAH, THE ORGANIZATION CONTINUES TO EXIST, AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE GOT'S UNRELENTING PURSUIT OF ITS REMNANTS AND WITH WEEKLY REPORTS OF RAIDS AND ARRESTS. VIEWING STATISTICS FOR THE OHAL ONLY, THE MAGNITUDE OF THE GOT ACTIVITY AGAINST HIZBULLAH IS CLEAR, EVEN THOUGH FULL YEAR 2000 FIGURES WERE NOT YET AVAILABLE. FOR ALL OF 1999, THERE WERE 267 ANTI-HIZBULLAH OPERATIONS, WITH 420 SUSPECTS ARRESTED OUT OF A TOTAL OF 1366 TAKEN INTO TEMPORARY CUSTODY. FIGURES FOR 2000 UNTIL THE END OF OCTOBER SHOW 723 OPERATIONS, WITH 1744 SUSPECTS ARRESTED OUT OF 2712 TAKEN INTO TEMPORARY CUSTODY.

16. (U) TURKISH HIZBULLAH HAS NOT YET ACTED AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS, PERSONNEL, OR FACILITIES, OR AGAINST THE TURKISH STATE, EXCEPT IN REACTION TO POLICE RAIDS. NONETHELESS, HIZBULLAH HARBORS EXTREME ANTI-WESTERN VIEWS AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE ORGANIZATION MAY SHIFT ITS ATTENTION TO FOREIGNERS, TO INCLUDE AMERICANS, IN THE FUTURE. DURING 2000, GOT OFFICIALS AND THE TURKISH MEDIA ALLEGED THAT HIZBULLAH HAD IRANIAN LINKS AND SUPPORT.

CAPTURE OF THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS

17. (U) THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS, WHICH REPORTEDLY IS A SUB-GROUP OF A LARGER GROUP CALLED TEVHIT ("UNITY" OR "MONOTHEISM"), IS AN ETHNIC TURKISH, EXTREME ISLAMIST GROUP. ITS MEMBERS ARE SUNNI MOSLEMS WHO SEEK TO ESTABLISH ISLAMIST RULE IN TURKEY. AS NOTED ABOVE, HIZBULLAH AND THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS ARE NOT DIRECTLY RELATED. NONETHELESS, THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS HAD SUFFICIENT CONTACT THAT THE TNP'S RAIDS AGAINST HIZBULLAH PRODUCED EVIDENCE THAT IDENTIFIED THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS AND RESULTED IN THEIR MAY CAPTURE. ACCORDING TO SOME GOT OFFICIALS AND THE SUSPECTS' MEDIA-REPORTED CONFESSIONS, THIS PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN ORGANIZATION WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE HAD IRANIAN TRAINING, SUPPORT, AND DIRECTION. THE ORGANIZATION STANDS ACCUSED OF THE PREVIOUSLY UNSOLVED MURDERS OF SECULARIST INTELLECTUALS, THE MOST PROMINENT OF WHOM WHERE UGUR MUMCU, AHMET TANER KISLALI, MUAMMER AKSOY, AND BAHRIYE UCOK. THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS ALLEGEDLY MURDERED FOREIGNERS AS WELL, INCLUDING USAF SSGT VICTOR MARVICK AND EGYPTIAN, INDIAN, ISRAELI, AND SAUDI DIPLOMATS.

------------------------------------------
JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO ACTS OF TERRORISM (A)
------------------------------------------

18. (U) TURKEY'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM TAKES A VIGOROUS APPROACH TO ENFORCING THE COUNTRY'S COUNTERTERRORISM LAWS. OF THE APPROXIMATELY 150-200 TERRORISM-RELATED CASES PROSECUTED IN TURKEY'S STATE SECURITY COURTS, THREE STOOD OUT THIS YEAR.

STATUS OF ABDULLAH OCALAN'S CASE

19. (U) ON JUNE 29, 1999, ANKARA STATE SECURITY COURT NO. 2 CONVICTED ABDULLAH OCALAN OF TREASON UNDER ARTICLE 125 OF THE TURKISH PENAL CODE AND SENTENCED HIM TO DEATH. ON NOVEMBER 25, 1999, THE NINTH COURT OF APPEALS UPHELD THE VERDICT. ON JANUARY 12, 2000, PRIME MINISTER BULENT ECEVIT ANNOUNCED HIS DECISION NOT TO FORWARD CONVICTED PKK LEADER ABDULLAH OCALAN'S DEATH PENALTY SENTENCE TO PARLIAMENT, WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED TO APPROVE HIS EXECUTION. THIS DECISION WAS MADE IN CONSIDERATION THE APPEAL OCALAN'S TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (ECHR). IN NOVEMBER 2000, THAT APPEAL WAS TAKEN UP BY THE ECHR AND IS EXPECTED TO REQUIRE AT LEAST A YEAR-AND- A-HALF TO RESOLVE.

MAIN HIZBULLAH TRIAL

20. (U) THOUGH THERE ARE MULTIPLE COURT ACTIONS ARISING FROM THE GOT'S SUCCESSES AGAINST HIZBULLAH, THE MAIN TRIAL FOR 156 MURDERS OPENED IN JULY IN DIYARBAKIR'S STATE SECURITY COURT AND CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF 2000, WITH A DECISION EXPECTED SOMETIME IN 2001. AMONG THE 15 ACCUSED WERE VELIOGLU DEPUTIES CEMAL TUTAR AND EDIP GUMUS, WHO ALLEGEDLY HANDLED THE ORGANIZATION'S "MILITARY" AND "POLITICAL" ACTIVITIES.

JERUSALEM WARRIORS TRIAL

21. (U) THE TRIAL OF THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS AND THEIR ACCOMPLICES OPENED IN ANKARA ON AUGUST 14. 17 SUSPECTS WERE CHARGED WITH VARYING DEGREES OF INVOLVEMENT IN 22 MURDERS OVER THE COURSE OF TEN YEARS. AS NOTED ABOVE, AMONG THE VICTIMS WHERE PROMINENT SECULARIST INTELLECTUALS AND JOURNALISTS, FOREIGN DIPLOMATS, AND ONE U.S. SERVICE MEMBER, USAF SSGT VICTOR MARVICK.

--------------------------------------------- --
EXTRADITIONS INVOLVING SUSPECTED TERRORISTS (B)
--------------------------------------------- --

22. (U) IN 2000 THERE WERE NO EXTRADITIONS ON TERRORISM- RELATED CHARGES FROM TURKEY TO THE UNITED STATES. LIKEWISE, THERE WERE NO SUCH EXTRADITIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO TURKEY, NOR WERE THERE ANY SUCH EXTRADITIONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES TO TURKEY.

---------------------------------------------
IMPEDIMENTS TO PROSECUTION OR EXTRADITION (C)
---------------------------------------------

23. (U) FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, TURKEY HAS LONG FACED DIFFICULTY IN THE EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. SYRIA, IRAQ, AND IRAN HAVE LONG HARBORED PKK TERRORISTS, WHICH THEY USE AS A TOOL IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH TURKEY. IN EUROPE THERE IS CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY FOR KURDISH POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS. THE PKK HAS FOUND PROTECTION FROM PROSECUTION OR EXTRADITION THERE DUE SOME GOVERNMENTS' INABILITY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN LEGITIMATE KURDISH POLITICAL AND CULTURAL ASPIRATIONS AND SUPPORT FOR PKK TERRORISM. THE DHKP/C AND OTHER LEFTIST TERROR GROUPS HAVE ALSO BEEN ABLE TO OPERATE IN EUROPE UNDER A SHIELD OF CONCERNS ABOUT TURKEY'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.

24. (U) A KEY IMPEDIMENT TO EXTRADITIONS OF TERRORIST SUSPECTS FROM EUROPE IS TURKEY'S LEGAL PROVISION FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, EVEN THOUGH A DE FACTO MORATORIUM EXISTS. SINCE 1984, 28 TERRORISTS, MOST NOTABLY PKK LEADER ABDULLAH OCALAN, HAVE BEEN SENTENCED TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, BUT NO EXECUTION HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT SINCE THAT TIME. NONETHELESS, AND DESPITE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON TERRORISM, SEVERAL COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO EXTRADITE SUSPECTS TO TURKEY. THROUGHOUT 2000, PUBLIC DEBATE ON THE EVENTUAL ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CONTINUED, WITH MOST OBSERVERS PREDICTING THAT TURKEY'S EU CANDIDACY STATUS WILL EVENTUALLY LEAD TO ABOLITION.

25. (U) ONE HIGH-PROFILE EXAMPLE OF A EUROPEAN REFUSAL TO EXTRADITE A SUSPECT SOUGHT BY TURKEY WAS THE CASE OF FEHRIYE ERDAL. ERDAL, A MEMBER OF THE DHKP/C, WAS ACCUSED OF DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE JANUARY 1996 MURDER OF A PROMINENT INDUSTRIALIST, OZDEMIR SABANCI, AND TWO OTHER INDIVIDUALS. THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT CITED TURKEY'S LEGAL PROVISION FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS AN OBSTACLE TO HER BEING RETURNED TO TURKEY, EVEN THOUGH TURKEY WAS WILLING TO PROMISE NOT TO EXECUTE HER. THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT ALSO CHARACTERIZED THE SPECIFIC CHARGES FOR WHICH THE GOT SOUGHT HER AS BEING "POLITICAL CRIMES." SHE REMAINS UNDER HOUSE ARREST IN BELGIUM PENDING A TRIAL ON MINOR WEAPONS CHARGES. BELGIAN (AND OTHER) AUTHORITIES HAVE ALSO COMPLAINED THAT TURKEY'S EXTRADITION REQUEST WAS NOT PRESENTED IN A MANNER TACTICALLY CALCULATED TO ACHIEVE EXTRADITION AND HAVE SUGGESTED THAT A MORE SOPHISTICATED INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO THE EXTRADITION ISSUE MAY HAVE PRODUCED A MORE WELCOME RESULT.

26. (U) TURKISH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OFFICIALS REPORT THAT THEY HAVE REQUESTED EXTRADITIONS OF SUSPECTED PKK, DHKP/C, AND OTHER TERRORISTS FROM FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, AND THE UK IN RECENT YEARS. ALL SUCH REQUESTS WERE REFUSED ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE SUSPECT MIGHT FACE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, THE CRIMES INVOLVED WERE POLITICAL, OR THE SUSPECTS MIGHT FACE PERSECUTION FOR POLITICAL BELIEFS.

------------------------------------
RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION (D)
------------------------------------

27. (U) PRESIDENT SEZER, PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT, FOREIGN MINISTER CEM, CHIEF OF THE TGS GENERAL HUSEYIN KIVRIKOGLU, AND FORMER-PRESIDENT DEMIREL HAVE ALL MADE STRONG STATEMENTS DENOUNCING TERRORISM DURING 2000. THE GOT FREQUENTLY AND VIGOROUSLY MAKES PUBLIC CONDEMNATIONS OF ALL FORMS OF TERRORISM.

------------------------------------
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM (F)
------------------------------------

28. (U) THE GOT CONSISTENTLY AND STRONGLY OPPOSES BOTH DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. TURKEY DOES NOT VIEW ITS MAINTENANCE OF DIPLOMATIC OR ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH CUBA, IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, SUDAN, AND SYRIA AS CONSTITUTING SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

--------------------------------------------- -----------
STATEMENTS SUPPORTING TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRIES (G)
--------------------------------------------- -----------

29. (U) THE GOT MADE NO PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN 2000 IN SUPPORT OF TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRIES ON TERRORISM ISSUES.

--------------------------------------------- -------
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRORISM (H)
--------------------------------------------- -------

30. (U) TURKISH OFFICIALS, IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, CONTINUE TO LABEL THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AS ONE OF THE GOT'S TOP SECURITY PRIORITIES. WHILE THE TSK CONTINUES ITS OPERATIONS AGAINST PKK TERRORISTS IN THE SOUTHEAST OF THE COUNTRY, THE TNP CARRIES ON ITS DILIGENT AND VIGOROUS WORK IN SUPPRESSING THE DHKP/C AND HIZBULLAH, WHICH PRIMARILY OPERATE IN URBAN AREAS.

--------------------------------------------- ----
U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES (I)
--------------------------------------------- ----

31. (U) CLOSE U.S.-TURKISH COOPERATION CONTINUES TO BE STRENGTHENED BY 14 YEARS OF TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE (ATA) PROGRAMS. ATA PROGRAMS INCLUDE MANDATORY HUMAN RIGHTS COMPONENTS. GOT OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD EMBASSY OFFICIALS THAT THEY VIEW ATA PROGRAMS AS A POSITIVE STEP TOWARD BRINGING TURKISH POLICE STANDARDS INTO GREATER CONFORMITY WITH EU AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS.

32. (U) TURKEY COOPERATES WITH THE UNITED STATES IN ITS EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM IN CENTRAL ASIA. IN JUNE 2000, A GOT OBSERVER ATTENDED A CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON DESIGNED TO PROMOTE COUNTERTERRORISM DIALOGUE AMONG KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN, UZBEKISTAN. TURKISH OFFICIALS HAVE REGULARLY PARTICIPATED IN COUNTER-TERRORISM CONSULTATIONS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. SUCH CONSULTATIONS ARE AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION AND COORDINATE STRATEGY.

--------------------------------------------- ----
COOPERATION - INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS (J)
--------------------------------------------- ----

33. (U) THE MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY, WHICH ENTERED INTO FORCE IN JANUARY 1981, GOVERNS INVESTIGATIVE COOPERATION. THE GOT HAS EXPEDITIOUSLY PROCESSED REQUESTS FOR INVESTIGATIVE ACCESS TO EVIDENCE UNDER THIS TREATY. HOWEVER, IN SOME CASES THE GOT HAS LEFT REQUESTS UNANSWERED FOR OVER THREE YEARS. THERE WERE NO REQUESTS MADE TO THE GOT IN 2000.

34. (U) IN 1999 THE USG REQUESTED AND RECEIVED INFORMATION RELATED TO THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE ATTEMPTED DHKP/C ROCKET ATTACK ON THE U.S. CONSULATE GENERAL IN ISTANBUL. THIS YEAR THE THREE TNP OFFICERS WHO PREVENTED THE ATTACK WERE TRIED ON CHARGES OF HAVING EXTRA-JUDICIALLY MURDERED THE DHKP/C SUSPECTS. THE CASE REMAINS ON-GOING.

35. (U) OVERALL, IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS, THE GOT HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE USG IN THE APPREHENSION, CONVICTION, AND PUNISHMENT OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS IN TURKEY. THE MOST PROMINENT EXAMPLE OF THE GOT'S AGGRESSIVE EFFORTS TO BRING TERRORISTS TO JUSTICE IS THE ARREST AND ON-GOING TRIAL OF FOUR SUSPECTS IN THE 1991 ASSASSINATION OF USAF SSGT VICTOR MARVICK IN ANKARA. THE TRIAL OF THE FOUR, WHO WERE ALLEGEDLY MEMBERS OF THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS, AN ISLAMIST TERROR GROUP, BEGAN IN AUGUST 2000. THESE INDIVIDUALS, AND THEIR 13 COHORTS, STAND ACCUSED OF ALMOST A SCORE OF OTHER MURDERS AND ATTACKS, AS NOTED ABOVE.

[INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX]

36. (S) IN 2000 THERE WAS ONE EXTRADITION FROM TURKEY TO THE UNITED STATES INVOLVING AN INDIVIDUAL WITH SUSPECTED TERRORIST CONNECTIONS WHO HAD ALSO COMMITTED A VARIETY OF NON-TERROR RELATED CRIMES IN THE UNITED STATES. THIS EXTRADITION, WHICH WAS EFFECTED IN THE SPACE OF APPROXIMATELY FIVE MONTHS, WAS AN EXAMPLE OF SUCCESSFUL U.S.-TURKISH COOPERATION. THE SMOOTH EXECUTION OF THE EXTRADITION WAS PARTICULARLY NOTABLE BECAUSE THE MOST RECENT PREVIOUS EXTRADITION, WHICH HAD NO TERRORISM ASPECT, WAS IN 1993.

----------------------------
COOPERATION - PREVENTION (K)
----------------------------

37. (U) THE GOT PROVIDES THE USG AND, IN PARTICULAR, U.S. SECURITY OFFICERS IN TURKEY WITH UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION REGARDING TERRORIST GROUP OPERATIONS. MOREOVER, THE GOT PROVIDES EXTENSIVE POLICE SUPPORT TO DETER AND PREVENT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES IN TURKEY. TURKEY PROVIDES DEDICATED TNP GUARDS WHO WORK IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH MISSION SECURITY PERSONNEL AT THE THREE DIPLOMATIC POSTS IN TURKEY (ANKARA, ISTANBUL, AND ADANA). TURKISH POLICE EXPEND LITERALLY TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PERSON-HOURS PROTECTING THE SECURITY OF MANY OFFICIAL AMERICAN RESIDENCES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THE TNP ALSO PROVIDES SECURITY MOTORCADE ESCORTS FOR MANY U.S. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY HIGH-LEVEL VISITORS EACH YEAR, INCLUDING FOR EVERY CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO VISIT TURKEY.

[INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX]

38. (S) IN THE LAST MONTHS OF 2000, U.S. FACILITIES IN TURKEY WERE SUBJECT TO ALMOST WEEKLY TERRORIST THREATS. IN PARTICULAR, INCIRLIK AIR BASE WAS SINGLED OUT AS THE SITE OF A POTENTIAL TERRORIST ATTACK. IN RESPONSE, THE TURKS UPGRADED THE THREAT LEVEL AT THE BASE, WHICH INCLUDED ERECTING BARRICADES AROUND THE AMERICAN SECTOR OF THE BASE, INCREASING VEHICLE SECURITY CHECKS, PERFORMING 100 PERCENT IDENTIFICATION CHECKS, AND INSTALLING MORE CHECK POINTS IN THE CITY OF ADANA OUTSIDE INCIRLIK. THE GOT ALSO PROVIDED ADDITIONAL PROTECTION IN DURING 6TH FLEET COMMANDER'S VISIT TO ANKARA AND DURING THE VISIT OF HIS FLAGSHIP, THE USS LASALLE, TO WESTERN TURKEY.

39. (S) IN OTHER ASPECTS OF COOPERATION AND PREVENTION, THE GOT'S COOPERATION HAS BEEN OUTSTANDING. THE GOT HAS RESPONDED IN A POSITIVE AND FORWARD-LEANING MANNER WHEN THE USG HAS REQUESTED ASSISTANCE REGARDING COUNTERTERRORISM. IN 2000, THE TURKISH NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (TNIO), TGS, AND TNP ALL WORKED CLOSELY WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE TO RENDER, DISRUPT, TRACK, AND ARREST TERRORISTS WHO WERE TRANSITING TURKEY TO CONDUCT TERRORIST OPERATIONS OR WHO WERE BENT ON CAUSING HARM WITHIN TURKEY ITSELF. WHEN ASKED, THE GOT WATCH- LISTED INDIVIDUALS WHO MIGHT HAVE ARRIVED AT ONE OF TURKEY'S PORTS ENTRY. IT HAS PROVIDED THIS ASSISTANCE DESPITE, AT TIMES, VAGUELY-WORDED THREAT REPORTS THAT REQUIRED A SUBSTANTIAL PERSONNEL COMMITMENT TO DO A JOB THAT COULD HAVE BEEN PERFORMED WITH LESS EFFORT, HAD THE USG BEEN ABLE TO PROVIDE MORE SPECIFIC INFORMATION.

40. (S) IN NOVEMBER 2000, THE TURKS PROVIDED EXCEPTIONAL ASSISTANCE TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE BY ARRESTING A USAMA BIN LADEN LIEUTENANT WHO ATTEMPTED TO TRANSIT TURKEY. AT THE REQUEST OF THE USG, THE TURKEY RENDERED HIM TO JUSTICE IN A THIRD COUNTRY. ALSO IN THE NOVEMBER/DECEMBER TIME FRAME, THE GOT AGGRESSIVELY PROVIDED COVERAGE OF THE MAJOR PORTS OF ENTRY IN AN ATTEMPT TO APPREHEND A SECOND AND EVEN MORE IMPORTANT PLAYER IN THE BIN LADIN ORGANIZATION.

PEARSON

SECRET: PRESSURE MOUNTS AGAINST INTERNAL SECURITY ACT (ISA)

VZCZCXRO3142
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHKL #1114/01 3580721
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 230721Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2163
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0552
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2711
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUALA LUMPUR 001114 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2028
TAGS: PTER PGOV PHUM KJUS KDEM
SUBJECT: PRESSURE MOUNTS AGAINST INTERNAL SECURITY ACT (ISA) 

REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 1026 - DPM NAJIB DISCUSSES ISA
     B. KUALA LUMPUR 990 - RAJA PETRA RELEASED
     C. KUALA LUMPUR 944 - MCA AND GERAKAN CRITICIZE UMNO
     D. KUALA LUMPUR 846 - UPDATE ON RAJA PETRA
     E. KUALA LUMPUR 834 - KOK RELEASED FROM ISA
     F. KUALA LUMPUR 810 - UPROAR OVER ISA
     G. KUALA LUMPUR 806 - JOURNALIST DETAINED UNDER ISA
     H. 07 KUALA LUMPUR 902 - BEYOND ISA 

Classified By: Political Counselor Mark D. Clark, reason 1.4 (b, c and
d). 

NOTE:  THIS CABLE TRANSMITS AN EDITED VERSION OF KUALA LUMPUR
1102 SENT ON 12/18/08 IN MORE RESTRICTED CHANNELS.  END NOTE. 

1.  (S) Summary:  The Malaysian government's use of the
Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows for detention
without trial and is central to the GOM's intelligence-driven
CT effort, has come under increasing political pressure over
the past three months.  The GOM's employment of the ISA in
September to carry out three politically-motivated ISA
detentions unrelated to terrorism sparked unprecedented
public criticism.  At least eight component parties from the
governing National Front (BN) coalition have since broken
ranks with the leading United Malays National Organization
(UMNO) and called for amending or abolishing the ISA.  The
opposition party alliance led by Anwar Ibrahim has made the
revocation of ISA one of its highest profile policy goals.
In November, a High Court judge delivered a legal blow to the
GOM's wide discretion in using the ISA in a ruling that freed
blogger Raja Petra, and the GOM is appealing the decision.
Prime Minister Abdullah, his deputy and successor Najib and
Home Minister Syed Hamid have defended the ISA as essential
to national security, while Najib told the Ambassador
privately ISA should be retained but used more judiciously.
The GOM released 17 ISA detainees, among them 10 previously
linked to terrorist groups, including Yazid Sufaat, from
November 5 to December 4. 

2.  (S) Comment:  The ISA is the cornerstone of Malaysia's CT
effort and has allowed Special Branch to take successful
preemptive action against suspected terrorists and their
supporters.  Given the GOM's exclusive reliance on the ISA
"crutch" and on Special Branch's role, police and prosecutors
remain ill-prepared to investigate and bring to trial
terrorist suspects (or prosecute other complex criminal
conspiracies).  The ISA also is subject to misuse for
political ends and is an important insurance policy for
maintaining UMNO in power.  For both CT and political
reasons, the GOM will not readily give up the ISA.  We doubt
that the increased political pressure and seeming swing in
public opinion against the ISA, due in part to its misuse in
September, will result in the ISA's amendment or revocation
in the near future, absent the Opposition coming to power.
These developments, however, reinforce the conclusion (ref H)
that Malaysia cannot take for granted the availability of the
ISA as a CT tool in the long run.  It remains in the U.S.
interest to encourage and assist Malaysia to develop an
approach centered on prosecutions and convictions before an
independent judiciary to combat terrorism. 

3.  (C) Comment continued:  It is unclear to what extent
outside political pressures played a direct role in the GOM's
latest release of ISA detainees.  The decisions may have more
to do with Syed Hamid's personal exercise of authority as
Home Minister.  Syed Hamid has taken a more proactive role as
Home Minister, compared to PM Abdullah who held the position
through March 2008 and tended not to become involved in
details.  End Summary and Comment. 

4.  (C) The Malaysian government's use of the Internal
Security Act (ISA), central to the GOM's intelligence-driven
counterterrorism efforts, has come under increasing political
pressure since the September ISA arrests of three persons
based on political rather security considerations.  The
September 12 ISA detentions of an ethnic Chinese journalist,
an ethnic Chinese Opposition MP (Teresa Kok), and a prominent
blogger (Raja Petra Kamaruddin) served the ruling UMNO
party's immediate political purpose of sending a warning to
opposition politicians and those considering defecting from
BN, as some UMNO politicians have told us.  This came at a
time when Anwar Ibrahim was publicly threatening to bring
down the BN government via parliamentary crossovers by
September 16.  The arrests, however, also sparked
unprecedented public criticism of the ISA, including from
UMNO's ethnic minority partners within BN.  The Malaysian
Chinese Association (MCA), the key ethnic Chinese BN
component party, reportedly threatened to leave BN unless the
GOM released the Chinese journalist; the GOM complied within
less than 24 hours (ref F).  Authorities freed MP Teresa Kok
after seven days.  Home Minister Syed Hamid ordered a
two-year ISA detention period for Raja Petra, who was freed
on appeal in November in a surprise court ruling (see below). 

5.  (C) Comment:  Unlike his predecessor Mahathir, PM
Abdullah refrained from using the ISA for political purposes
until December 2007 when police detained five leaders of the
ethnic Indian activist group HINDRAF that organized large
street protests.  The public viewed the GOM's September 2008
ISA arrests as more transparently political, in part because
of the lack of public order concerns.  End Comment. 

6.  (C) Political pressure against the ISA did not dissipate
following the release of the first two of the three recent
ISA detainees.  At least eight component parties from the
governing BN coalition of 14 parties have since broken ranks
with UMNO and called for amending or reviewing the grounds
for the ISA, while several have supported the law's
abolition.  In late September MCA, BN's second largest party,
called for "a comprehensive review of the ISA so that it will
apply strictly to cases relating to terrorism and subversive
elements," and also argued for the introduction of "checks
and balances in the use of ISA."  The leader of the Gerakan
party, Koh Tsu Koon, called on the GOM to "abolish the ISA
once and for all," and rely on the judicial system instead.
The leader of the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) also
initially called for ISA to be abolished, and on December 1
said PPP would withdraw from BN unless if the ISA were not
amended before the next election.  In response, Prime
Minister Abdullah called PPP's bluff and said the small
party, which holds no seats in Parliament, could leave BN if
it wished.  BN MPs so far have not backed up their criticism
of ISA with action.  In response to a petition circulated in
Parliament for the review or repeal of ISA, only one BN MP
signed his name. 

7.  (C) The opposition party alliance (Pakatan Rakyat, or
Pakatan) led by Anwar Ibrahim has vocally condemned ISA as
undemocratic and unjust, and made the abolishment of ISA one
of its highest profile policy goals.  A number of senior
officials from Pakatan's three parties, Anwar's Peoples
Justice Party (PKR), the Democratic Action Party (DAP), and
the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) were detained under ISA
during the era of former Prime Minister Mahathir.  Not
surprisingly, the three parties have vowed to revoke ISA if
they come to power.  "Abolish ISA" was the most prominent
theme at PKR's annual party conference on November 29, which
Polcouns observed.  The keynote event concluded with a focus
on ISA and featured large screens that scrolled through the
list of all 60-plus ISA detainees with the several thousand
attendees reciting the detainees' names as they appeared.
Well-known blogger Raja Petra, released from ISA detention
only days before, mounted the stage as the surprise guest of
the grand finale. 

8.  (SBU) On November 7, a High Court judge delivered an
unanticipated legal blow to the GOM's wide discretion in
using the ISA in a habeas corpus ruling that freed blogger
Raja Petra.  The Embassy obtained the full text of the
judge's 22-page ruling.  ISA Section 8.B states "there shall
be no judicial review in any court" of the Home Minister's
exercise of "discretionary powers in accordance with this
Act," except for compliance with procedural requirements.
The judge ruled, however, that the Home Minister decisions
could not be "unfettered and arbitrary," allowing for the
court to consider whether the Minister's ISA detention order
was "in accordance with the Act," and its focus on threats to
national security, including the national economy; threats to
maintenance of essential services; and threats to the public
emanating from a "substantial body of persons" who intend to
change the government through unlawful means. In the case of
Raja Petra, the judge concluded that the grounds for his
detention did not fall within the purview of the ISA.  The
government has appealed the ruling and as of mid-December the
appeal remains pending. 

9.  (C) Many civil society groups took the opportunity over
the past three months to highlight their standing opposition
to the ISA, as well as other emergency ordinances that allow
for detention without trial.  Both conservative and liberal
Muslim NGOs called on the GOM to abolish the ISA, as did the
inter-faith Consultative Forum that groups the leaders of all
major religions except Islam.  The National Human Rights
Commission (SUHAKAM) chairman Abu Talib restated the
commission's existing position, namely "detention without
trial is against human rights principles; that's why we
advised the Government years ago to repeal the ISA." 

10.  (C) As questions over the ISA have mounted, Prime
Minister Abdullah, his deputy and successor Najib, and other
senior UMNO leaders defended the ISA as essential to national
security.  In the wake of public criticism over the September
ISA arrests, Home Minister Syed Hamid, who has authority
under the ISA to approve detention orders, defended the Act
as essential and stated clearly that "we have no plans to do
away with ISA."  In early December, Syed Hamid waved off
criticisms, arguing that the ISA "has never been abused or
used for politics."  He also commented that, "Malaysians
sometimes don't know how lucky we are in that we have not
experienced what is happening in Mumbai (the terrorist
attack) and Bangkok (political unrest) now."  He said the
fact that there have been no post 9/11 terrors attacks in
Malaysia was in part due to the ISA.  On December 15, Syed
Hamid again publicly defended use of the ISA, stating, "More
apt, faster and better to use the ISA... detention under the
act is early action to prevent the security of the country
from being adversely affected." 

11.  (C) DPM Najib, who is anticipated to become Prime
Minister in late March 2009, told the Ambassador privately on
November 11 that the government continued to need the ISA,
"even though there are civil liberty concerns," but should
reserve ISA only for those who pose "serious threats, like
terrorists" (ref A).  On December 8, PM Abdullah publicly
rejected calls for amendments to the ISA. 

12.  (SBU) In early December, local and international press
reported that the GOM had released 17 ISA detainees from
November 5 through December 4.  Of those released, 10 had
been held for suspected links to Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah,
and/or the Darul Islam terrorist groups.  The released
terrorist suspects included Yazid Sufaat, who played an
important role in Al Qaeda's anthrax development program,
according to the 9/11 Commission.  The remaining seven
persons released consisted of suspected foreign agents (2
persons), southern Thailand separatists (2), document forgers
(2), and prominent blogger Raja Petra, according to an NGO
that consistently and accurately monitors ISA detentions.
In his public remarks, Syed Hamid said those recently
released ISA detainees had been rehabilitated and no longer
posed a security threat to Malaysia. 

13.  (S) Note:  Authorities had detained the terrorist
suspects for periods between two and (in the case of Yazid
Sufaat) seven years, for an average detention period of four
years for the ten individuals.  Special Branch relies on a
process for rehabilitating ISA detainees, and eventually
releasing them under restricted and monitored conditions when
judged necessary.  The GOM has never attempted to prosecute
any terrorist suspects, including those held under the ISA.
This is due in large part to the fact that the GOM pursues
almost exclusively an intelligence approach to CT, as opposed
to a law enforcement approach that would involve criminal
investigations, collection of legally admissible evidence,
and development of cases for prosecution in the courts.  In
2007, Malaysia amended anti-terrorism provisions in its penal
code and criminal procedures code, but authorities have not
yet utilized these provisions.  Malaysia also has a poor
track record of prosecuting other complex criminal
conspiracies, including drug trafficking cases, preferring
instead to utilize the ISA and other emergency ordinances to
detain suspects without trial.  End Note. 

14.  (S) A well-known journalist contacted us in early
December and said that officers of the Police Special Branch
had complained to him that Home Minister Syed Hamid had
ordered the recent releases of terrorist suspects without
adequate consultation and in some cases against the
recommendation of Special Branch.  Australian and British
diplomats, speaking with Polcouns December 16, stated that
Syed Hamid, who is a lawyer by training, personally reviewed
the dossiers of ISA detainees and was inclined to approve
releases absent compelling justification from the Special
Branch. 

15.  (C) The Thai embassy contacted Poloff on December 15 to
express concern over the release of two ISA detainees (Abdul
Rahman bin Ahmad and Mat Tarmizi bin Shamsudin, who
apparently are dual-citizens of Malaysia and Thailand) who
had been held for their connection to the insurgency in
southern Thailand.  The Thai diplomat said Bangkok considered
Abdul Rahman in particular to be a major player in the
insurgency.  He noted that those released are required to
remain in Malaysia and check in periodically with the police.
 The Thai diplomat said he believed the GOM released the
detainees in order to diffuse criticism of the ISA.  We
learned that the Thai embassy also has contacted other
Western embassies (UK, France, Australia) to express concern
over the recent ISA releases. 

KEITH

TOP-SECRET: KISSINGER CONSPIRED WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO KEEP SECRETARY OF STATE IN THE DARK

Henry Kissinger and Anatoly Dobrynin in the Map Room at the White House, March 17, 1972 (Source: Soviet-American Relations: the Détente Years, 1969-1972


The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top-Secret Talks With Beijing and Moscow

Edited by William Burr

Washington, DC, August 17, 2011 – Then-national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger colluded with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to keep the U.S. Secretary of State in the dark about ongoing secret discussions between the Soviets and the Nixon White House, according to newly released Soviet-era documents, released last week by the Department of State.

In February 1972, with the Moscow summit approaching, Kissinger met with Soviet ambassador Dobrynin, who was scheduled to meet with Secretary of State William Rogers, to talk about what the Secretary knew and did not know about “the state of U.S.-Soviet relations.” Commenting on the meeting in his memorandum of conversation forwarded to Moscow, Dobrynin observed that it was a “unique situation when the Special Assistant to the President secretly informs a foreign ambassador about what the Secretary of State knows and does not know.” This memorandum appears for the first time in an extraordinary State Department collection of U.S. and Soviet documents on the Dobrynin-Kissinger meetings, produced through a U.S.-Russian cooperative effort, with selections posted on-line today by the National Security Archive.

On October 22, 2007, the State Department’s Office of the Historian released Soviet-American Relations: the Détente Years, 1969-1972, edited by David C. Geyer and Douglas E. Selvage. Over a thousand pages long with 380 documents and introductions by Dobrynin and Kissinger, this volume (initially released in CD form by the office of the historian) includes the most secret and sensitive U.S.-Soviet exchanges of the superpower détente, the so-called “back channel” or “confidential channel” Dobrynin-Kissinger meetings. (Note 1) Besides Kissinger’s records of his meetings with Dobrynin, which had already been declassified, this extraordinary volume includes translations of previously secret cables and memoranda of conversations reporting on Dobrynin’s meetings with Kissinger as well as President Richard Nixon. Simultaneously, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s History and Records Department is publishing a Russian language edition of the documents under the title, Sovetsko-Amerikanskie Otnosheniia: Gody Razriadki, 1969-1976, Tom I, 1969-Mai 1972. The Foreign Ministry will release this volume in a few weeks, during a conference in Moscow. (Note 2) A successor U.S.-Russian volume, covering 1972-1976, is now in the planning stages.

What made this remarkable publication possible is the superb cooperation of the Russian Republic’s Foreign Ministry, which provided unmatched access to its formerly classified files. This cooperative effort began with a letter, shepherded by Douglas E. Selvage through the State Department bureaucracy, from former Secretary of State Colin Powell to Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov suggesting a joint historical volume on the U.S.-Soviet détente. Frustrated by the problem of access to détente-era Soviet diplomatic records, interested diplomatic historians, in particular National Security Archive fellows James Hershberg of George Washington University and Vladislav Zubok of Temple University, played a significant role in encouraging this high-level approach to the Foreign Ministry (Zubok also reviewed the translations). The volume’s detailed introduction explains how the project unfolded under the general direction of Marc J. Susser, the Historian, U.S. Department of State, and Piotr V. Stegny, Aleksandr A. Churillin, and Konstantin A. Provalov, successive directors of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs History and Records Department.

The Russian Foreign Ministry provided more documents than could be used, but the volume includes detailed annotations, completed by lead editor David C. Geyer, based on many of the unpublished documents. Scholars with Russian language skills will be interested to know that copies of all of the documents declassified by the Foreign Ministry will become available for research at the U.S. National Archives (a parallel collection will be available at the Archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry).

During a State Department conference held on October 22-23 to announce the publication of the volume, a number of the participants emphasized that what made it especially significant was 1) that is now possible to make side-by-side comparisons of records of the same Dobrynin-Kissinger meeting, and 2) that Dobrynin often prepared the only records of a number of his talks with Kissinger. Indeed, Dobrynin’s high-quality accounts of the meetings are often far more detailed, not only providing more on the context and atmosphere (which Kissinger sometimes did), but also recounting statements not mentioned in Kissinger’s versions, for example, on sensitive domestic political matters.  What explains this difference is that participating in and documenting his meetings with Kissinger and Nixon was Dobrynin’s full-time responsibility; the Foreign Ministry and the Politburo wanted the most comprehensive reports possible. By contrast, Kissinger met with Nixon almost every weekday and could brief him personally about the meetings, without providing highly-detailed reports; moreover, as he became responsible for more and more problems, Kissinger had less time to sit down and dictate his account of the meetings. (Note 3) For example, during the crucial April-May 1972 period, when North Vietnam launched a major offensive and the U.S.-Soviet summit was impending, Dobrynin prepared the only record of some of the discussions. That Dobrynin’s reports are now available makes it possible to look at the back channel meetings and superpower détente generally from an entirely fresh perspective.

Soviet-American Relations: the Détente Years, 1969-1972 is not yet available in print form yet or on-line, but the Office of the Historian released a special CD with the volume on it. To give interested readers a flavor of the material, the National Security Archive is publishing on its Web site some illuminating examples of the new documents. This sampling includes:

  • a unique record of Dobrynin’s first “one-on-one” back-channel meeting with Kissinger,
  • accounts of Kissinger’s September 1970 demarche to Kissinger on the Soviet submarine base at Cienfuegos, Cuba,
  • Nixon’s unsuccessful attempt to discourage the Soviet leadership from meeting with Democratic presidential aspirant Senator Edmund Muskie (D-Me) to preserve the White House’s political advantages,
  • Dobrynin’s initial reactions—from the notion that Beijing and Washington would exploit the “factor of U.S.-Chinese relations in order to exert pressure on us,” to the disclosure of Henry Kissinger’s secret trip to China in July 1971,
  • Kissinger’s briefing to Dobrynin on what he should and should not tell Secretary of State Rogers about more sensitive issues that only Nixon and Kissinger had discussed with the Soviets
  • initial White House and Soviet reactions to the North Vietnamese 1972 Spring Offensive,
  • and Dobrynin’s mistaken estimate that the pressures for a successful summit would hold Nixon back from approving major military action against Hanoi during the spring of 1972.

Read the Documents
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Selected Documents from Soviet-American Relations: the Détente Years, 1969-1972

 

Document 8:  Their First “One-on-One”: Dobrynin’s record of meeting with Kissinger, 21 February 1969, pp. 20-25

In an earlier meeting with Dobrynin, Nixon established arrangements for the Ambassador and Kissinger to hold private meetings, without the knowledge of the State Department (which Nixon despised) to discuss matters of mutual concern.  Flowing from Nixon’s publicly declared emphasis on the need for an “era of negotiations”, the new president wanted to find ways to mitigate, if not prevent, clashes between the nuclear-armed superpowers. This conversation, for which Dobrynin prepared the sole record, covered a wide range of issues: Middle East, European security, Berlin, Vietnam, China, arms control, signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations (including possible summit meeting). Of special interest are Kissinger’s general assurances concerning the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.  He said that Nixon “would like to assure the Soviet Government that … he does not have the slightest intention of intervening in the affairs of Eastern Europe.” Moreover, Dobrynin reported that Kissinger “intimated–although he did not say outright–that they favor maintaining the postwar borders in Europe.” Certainly, the Nixon administration never made an iron-clad pledge as to the inviolability of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, but Kissinger’s first assurance suggests that his statement in the introduction to the volume, that the White House never made assurances “with respect to the internal conditions in Eastern Europe,” needs some qualification. On possible U.S. relations with China, Kissinger mentioned that attempts to hold talks with Chinese diplomats in Warsaw had failed, but that Washington remained interested in holding talks in the future. The United States wanted to have talks with Beijing, Moscow’s major enemy, not from an “unfriendly designs” against the Soviet Union but from a “natural desire” for better relations with China.

Document 22: “A Reasonable Interval”: Dobrynin record of meeting with Kissinger and Nixon, 14 May 1969, pp. 59-62

In another unique record, Dobrynin reported on a meeting with Kissinger and Nixon in the latter’s White House living quarters.  After some brief discussion of the Middle East, the aftermath of the North Korean shoot-down of the U.S. EC-121, and arms control, Nixon turned to Vietnam, which was the subject of a TV address he was going to make that evening. During Nixon’s briefing on his speech, he argued that North Vietnamese diplomats refused to negotiate seriously because they believed that “time will work against” Nixon and “that he will ultimately have to give in, mainly owing to pressure from public opinion.” Nixon, however, believed that if the North Vietnamese did not change their tack and become more responsive to U.S. negotiating positions, he could convince the American public on the “need for ‘other measures’”, implicitly massive bombing strikes to coerce North Vietnam. Nixon’s veiled threats provide an example of the “madman theory”–the threat of disproportionate force–at work. While Nixon and Kissinger would not accept North Vietnam’s proposal for a coalition government, during the conversation before the meeting with Nixon, Kissinger showed considerable flexibility about the ultimate outcome of the war. He told Dobrynin that he was “prepared to accept any political system in South Vietnam, ‘provided there is a fairly reasonable interval between conclusion of an agreement and [the establishment of] such a system.” Implicitly, even if South Vietnam became a Communist regime, that would be acceptable as long as there was a “reasonable interval” after the U.S. military withdrawal.

Documents 31-34: “The War in Vietnam is the Main Obstacle”: Dobrynin and Kissinger records of meeting with Nixon, 20 October 1969, pp. 90-97

During the summer and fall of 1969, frustrated with the slowness of the Paris talks and convinced that Moscow was not doing enough to get Hanoi to settle, the Nixon administration continued to follow the madman approach by carrying out a campaign of threats to escalate the Vietnam War by striking North Vietnam. Not long after warning Dobrynin in late September that the “train was leaving the station,” Nixon and Kissinger ordered a low-level secret alert of strategic and conventional forces, not to “alarm” the Soviets but to “jar” them into a more cooperative frame of mind.  While the Soviets never mentioned the alert to the Nixon administration, they were also unhappy with the way that the U.S.-Soviet relationship was developing and the leadership tasked Dobrynin to convey those misgivings directly to President Nixon. Both Dobrynin and Kissinger created records of this key meeting, although the farmer’s account is substantially more detailed on Vietnam and the Middle East, but also on the atmospherics.

During the meeting, Dobrynin read a statement from the Soviet leadership, which maintained that U.S. positions on European security, the Middle East, China, and Vietnam “ran counter to [its] declarations in favor of improving relations.” According to Dobrynin, the leadership’s critique made Nixon nervous, but he “pulled himself together” and gave a calm and clear response, outlining his thinking on a number of issues.

While the Soviets had objected to U.S. implied threats against Hanoi, Nixon declared that the Soviets would not “break him” and that “if the Soviet Union does not want to provide any assistance now in settling the Vietnam conflict, the United States will go its own way, using its own methods and taking the appropriate steps.” One of Dobrynin’s conclusions was that “the fate of his predecessor, Lyndon Johnson, is beginning to really worry [Nixon].”


Documents 82-84: “A Turning Point in their Relationship”: Kissinger and Dobrynin records of meetings, 25 September 1970, pp. 191-197

During late September 1970, the Jordan crisis, the Soviet construction of a naval base in Cienfuegos, Cuba, and elections in Chile preoccupied the Nixon Administration. These documents begin with discussion of a summit meeting as well as problems raised by the Syrian invasion of Jordan, with Kissinger concerned about Moscow’s relations with Damascus and Dobrynin worried about U.S. military preparations. Later in the day, after a Pentagon press officer had mistakenly disclosed Soviet activities at Cienfuegos, the talks became more difficult when Kissinger, according to his record, declared that “we would view it with utmost gravity if construction [of the submarine base] continued” and that the “installation [had been] completed with maximum deception.” He also reportedly told Dobrynin that Moscow and Washington had “reached a turning point in their relationship” and that “it is now up to the Soviets whether to go the hard route—whether it wanted to go the route of conciliation or the route of confrontation.” Interestingly, Dobrynin’s version does not cite Kissinger’s language about “turning point” or “hard route” (or “deception”). It is difficult to believe (although not inconceivable) that Dobrynin, who appears to have been most careful about sending detailed accounts of his meetings, would not have mentioned this. Kissinger, however, may have wanted to include some tough language in the record to satisfy the more confrontational Nixon.


Documents 104 and 105: “Get Beyond the Immediate Irritations”: Kissinger and Dobrynin records of meeting, 22 December 1970, pp. 241-248

During what Kissinger called a “cordial” luncheon, Dobrynin and Kissinger discussed the recent publication of Khrushchev’s memoirs and Soviet naval activities in Cuba, and the general problem of “worsening U.S.-Soviet relations,” including continued disagreements over the Middle East and Vietnam, and what could be done to improve the situation. Both agreed that the impasse had to be broken and that a meeting in early January could be used to advance positions on SALT, the Middle East, and Vietnam. While Kissinger’s version is fuller than Dobrynin (probably one of the few instances where this is so), the latter’s account provides interesting detail on Kissinger’s mood, e.g., that he “was on the defensive during the conversation.” Thus, Kissinger became “noticeably agitated” after Dobyrnin told him that both he and the Soviet leadership believed that despite their many talks we’re not getting anywhere.” Also unmentioned in Kissinger’s account is his apparent irritation over the fact that the head of the Soviet SALT Delegation had leaked to his U.S. counterpart information on the highly secret back channel U.S.-Soviet discussions of a summit, information which Kissinger had thought was held by only a handful of people.


Documents 106 and 107: “All the More Fitting to Receive Senator Muskie in Moscow”: Kissinger and Dobrynin records of telephone conversation, 24 December 1970, pp. 248-251

A few days later, during a phone conversation Kissinger obliquely raised a very delicate matter on Nixon’s behalf: the possibility that Democratic Party aspirants for the presidency would visit the Soviet Union to advance their causes. This was a reference to Senator Edmund Muskie (D-Me), who was planning to visit the Soviet Union. Nixon did not want Muskie or other Democrats to get any advantages from such trips and Kissinger suggested that the Soviets do what they had done with Nixon in 1967, not schedule meetings with senior officials. After Dobrynin observed that Nixon had not asked to meet with Soviet leaders during his visit as a “tourist” and “went on to ask what Nixon’s reaction would have been if the President at that time had advised us not to meet with him in Moscow,” Kissinger soon changed the subject. This intervention backfired. In his reporting message, Dobrynin advised Moscow that, given Nixon’s concerns, “it would be all the more fitting to receive Senator Muskie in Moscow,” and that Moscow should not discourage such visits because they could “be a fairly important instrument for pressuring” Nixon.


Documents 109 and 110: “All that Realistically Remains is Just 1971”: Kissinger and Dobrynin records of meeting, 9 January 1971, pp. 257-263

During a meeting on 9 January 1971, Dobrynin and Kissinger began breaking the ice by taking new positions on issues that had troubled U.S-Soviet relations.  Kissinger took an important initiative by suggesting compromise proposals on Berlin and SALT; the latter would include a separate ABM agreement as well as a “freeze” of ICBM deployments. Kissinger also proposed new efforts to work with the Soviets in laying the “ground-work for a settlement” in the Middle East as well as new approaches to the Vietnam problem, for example, the U.S. would no longer insist on the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam. Dobrynin’s version includes highly significant detail not covered in Kissinger’s account, such as the latter’s presentation of Nixon’s view on the interrelationship between the election cycle and U.S.-Soviet negotiations. According to Kissinger, because of electoral preoccupations during 1972, “all that realistically remains is just 1971, which essentially will be decisive in regard to whether the two countries will manage to [resolve] major international issues.”

On Vietnam, Kissinger expressed renewed interest in the possibility of a “decent interval” solution (although he did not use the term); once Washington reached a military agreement with Hanoi, the Vietnamese would have to make their own political settlement. Then “it will no longer be [the Americans’] concern, but that of the Vietnamese themselves if some time after the U.S. troop withdrawal they start fighting with each other again.” “If a war does break out again between North and South Vietnam, it will be a lengthy affair, and … will obviously ‘spill over’ into the period after the Nixon administration has left office.”


Document 122: “The State Department has … Been Generally Sidelined”: Telegram from Dobrynin to Soviet Foreign Ministry, 14 February 1971, pp. 293-296

This fascinating cable gives Dobrynin’s appraisal of the significance of the back channel, the interrelationships of the various pending negotiations, White House strategy, and ways and means for Moscow to exert pressure on the White House to realize Soviet diplomatic objectives.  Dobrynin believed that Nixon’s chief goal was a summit meeting and SALT agreement that would be “in hand” when a summit took place, but that the White House was less interested in a Berlin agreement. Because that was a greater priority for Moscow, Nixon could not be too negative on the Berlin talks without making “it more difficult to secure our final consent to a summit meeting,” but couldn’t be too positive either because the prospect of a Berlin agreement served for the U.S. as a “kind of guarantee of a summit.” Dobrynin thought that Nixon and Kissinger wanted to use the back-channel to reach “agreement in principle” before use diplomatic channel for more detailed agreements, but until that happened they wanted to keep the talks secret before the “outcome of the dialogue is itself clear.” This meant that the State Department was “sidelined” but it also meant that the Dobrynin-Kissinger talks unfolded on a high level of generality. According to Dobrynin, Kissinger “is noticeably apprehensive about getting into a discussion of details … lest he be ‘caught flat-footed’ without professional expertise on these matters.” Over the years, historians and critics have argued that this was one of the flaws of Kissinger’s conduct of the back-channel.  While Dobrynin could rely on Foreign Ministry experts, who were aware of the secret talks, Kissinger would not discuss them with State Department officials, who could have helped him avoid some pitfalls during the SALT talks (e.g., Kissinger’s initial commitment to exclude SLBMs from the strategic forces “freeze”, which caused great complications later on).


Documents 177-180:  “The Americans and the Chinese Will Intensify their Game”: Dobrynin cable on U.S.-China rapprochement and Kissinger and Dobrynin records of meeting, 19 July 1971, pp. 401-414

One of the stunning events in Cold War history, Henry Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in July 1971 had the impact on the Soviet Union that Nixon and Kissinger, and no doubt Mao Zedong, had sought: it made the Soviets more worried than ever about the prospect and possibility that Beijing and Washington would exaggerate and exploit the “factor of U.S.-Chinese relations in order to exert pressure on us.”  Soon after Nixon’s announcement of his forthcoming trip to China, Dobrynin sent the Foreign Ministry an analysis of the new U.S.-China relationship, the strategic and political considerations that underlay the new U.S. policy, and the possible Soviet response. While Dobrynin thought it important that Moscow continue its “current policy” toward the United States, he believed it “important that we give Washington no reason to believe that … we might make concessions under the influence of the ‘Chinese’ factor.” Two days after he sent the cable, Dobrynin met with Kissinger, at the suggestion of the latter so that he could “get a feeling for Dobrynin’s attitude.”

Dobrynin’s record of the meeting is typically more detailed and at one interesting point it contradicts Kissinger’s account: according to the latter, Dobrynin “asked” for a briefing, but according to Dobrynin, Kissinger brought up China himself because he was “impatiently waiting for me to ask many questions.” Whatever Dobrynin actually said, his version shows Kissinger providing more information and observations on the substance of the discussions in Beijing. For example, Kissinger could not resist discussing Zhou En-lai who, Dobrynin observed, had “made quite a strong impression on him.”  Kissinger also discussed the difficulties raised by the U.S. relationship with Taiwan and gave his assessment of Beijing’s thinking about nuclear strategy. Kissinger believed that Chinese “backwardness” on nuclear issues was “due to the still very great shortcomings in China’s own nuclear missile capabilities.” He also suggested that Beijing was more worried about Japan than it was about the Soviet Union; Chinese leaders “are convinced there are strong undercurrents of revanchist sentiment among the Japanese and are clearly afraid Japan might decide to become a nuclear power.” To calm the Soviets about the possibility of U.S.-China collusion, Kissinger assured a skeptical Dobynin that he “had had no conversations, and was having none, with the Chinese that affected the Soviet Union’s interests in any way.”


Documents 227-228: Another “Watershed in Our Relations”: Kissinger and Vorontsov records of meeting, 5 December 1971, pp. 529-532

The South Asian Crisis of 1971—the break-up of East and West Pakistan, Pakistan’s brutal repression about the people of East Pakistan, the creation of Bangladesh, the conflict between Indian and West Pakistan, and then war–involved complex machinations by the Nixon administration, which “tilted” toward Pakistan, in part because of the latter’s crucial role in expediting rapprochement with Beijing. While India and the Soviet Union had signed a friendship treaty a few months earlier (partly to offset the U.S.-China rapprochement), local and regional concerns fueled the South Asian conflict, but Nixon and Kissinger were quick to assume that Moscow had a hidden hand in the conflict. These records of Kissinger’s conversation with Soviet diplomat Yuli Vorontsov, who filled in during Dobrynin’s absence, on 5 December 1971, illustrate the problem. To Kissinger’s claim that the Soviets encouraged the Indian “military aggression” against Pakistan,” Vorontsov reported that he “expressed surprise on a purely personal level and questioned why events between India and Pakistan are so insistently and obviously being extended to relations between our two countries.”

Kissinger’s account does not include this language or Vorontsov’s observations that Moscow also wanted to end the fighting and had called for a “political solution to the crisis.” “So what does this have to do with U.S.-Soviet relations … or even more with predictions about a ‘critical juncture.’?” In any event, Nixon quickly sent an accusatory letter condemning Moscow for “supporting [India’s] open use of force against the independence and integrity of Pakistan.”


Document 257: “A Unique Situation”: Dobrynin record of meeting with Kissinger, 4 February 1972, pp. 580-581

The tensions over the South Asian crisis notwithstanding, the plans for a U.S.-Soviet summit, announced in the fall of 1971 and scheduled for late May 1972, remained on track. While Secretary of State Rogers and the Department of State were becoming more involved in the summit planning process, Nixon and Kissinger strictly circumscribed their role.  This became a problem in early February 1972 when Dobrynin accepted Rogers’ invitation to a meeting to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations. Not wanting Rogers to know any more than was necessary, Kissinger arranged to meet with Dobrynin to update him “about what specifically the Secretary of State knows concerning the state of Soviet-U.S. relations.” Dobrynin produced the only record of this meeting, which shows Kissinger telling him that Rogers did not know about “confidential conversations on the Middle East” or Nixon’s proposal about limitations on numbers of missile-carrying nuclear submarines. Kissinger also asked Dobrynin not to discuss the summit agenda with Rogers. As Dobrynin observed, it was a “unique situation when the Special Assistant to the President secretly informs a foreign ambassador about what the Secretary of State knows and does not know.”


Document 279: “Yet Another Crisis”: Dobrynin record of meeting with Kissinger, 3 April 1972, pp. 638-641

In another unique document, Dobrynin recorded a difficult talk with Kissinger on the North Vietnamese Spring Offensive and its implications for Moscow-Washington relations. Arguing that the offensive amounted to a “large-scale armed invasion of South Vietnam” and a “flagrant violation” of the 1968 bombing-halt agreement, Kissinger suggested that Hanoi’s actions were aimed at humiliating President Nixon and “from an objective standpoint [were] unquestionably aimed at complicating the situation on the eve of the Soviet-U.S. summit. That is the only possible conclusion.” Mentioning that the North Vietnamese troops were armed with Soviet weapons, Kissinger told Dobryin that he believed that Hanoi was acting on its own and that the Soviet Union had not encouraged the offensive. Nevertheless, because North Vietnam and the Soviet Union were allies he did not want Moscow to believe that any U.S. military response to North Vietnam was “deliberately directed against the interests of the Soviet Union.” Dobrynin could only repeat what Brezhnev had already written: that the “bombing of the DRV can only complicate the situation, and consequently, the atmosphere leading up to and during the Soviet-U.S. talks in Moscow.” During the discussion that followed, Kissinger observed that “Apparently we will have to go through yet another crisis that neither of us precipitated.”


Document 323: “A Restraining Influence”: Dobrynin record of meeting with Kissinger, 5 May 1972, pp. 796-797

While Nixon and Kissinger escalated attacks on North Vietnamese forces, they held back from major air strikes on the Hanoi area or from long-standing contingency plans to mine Haiphong Harbor. By early May, however, Nixon was making decisions to move in that direction and on 8 May he gave a TV speech announcing the U.S. escalation.  Dobrynin, however, misjudged Nixon’s course of action. In another unique memcon with Kissinger, he recorded Kissinger’s assertion that the Nixon wanted the Moscow Summit to take place although he recognized that the Vietnam situation “will probably have an unfavorable impact on the meeting in some respects.”  Dobrynin’s conclusion that Nixon had made a “firm decision” to go to Moscow led him to believe that the White House desire for “productive talks [was] having a restraining influence on Nixon in terms of taking any particularly serious military measures against the DRV.”  That would remain the case, Dobrynin thought, until the summit, unless the Vietnam situation turned disastrous.  The possibility that Nixon would escalate the war, taking the chance that the Soviets would not cancel the summit (which Nixon believed was unlikely), apparently did not occur to the ambassador.  Nixon’s gamble paid off and the summit was highly successful, despite the Vietnam War escalation.


Notes

1. The Kissinger-Dobrynin talks during 1969-1973 have been characterized as “back channel” because State Department contacts with embassies and foreign offices are understood as the regular “front channel” for diplomatic communications.

2. A selection of Russian documents from the first several months of 1969 was initially published in a leading Russian journal on postwar history. See Vladimir O. Pechatnov, ed., “Sekretnyi Kanal A.F. Dobrynin-G. Kissindzher: Dokumenty Arkhiva Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia, No. 5 (September-October 2006): 108-38. Pechatnov, a professor at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), played a key role as adviser and compiler on the Russian side of the joint project.

3. This is not to say that no Kissinger records of those meetings exist; he may have recounted them in personal diaries or in hand-written records of the discussions.

TOP-SECRET: The INF Treaty and the Washington Summit

Washington D.C., August, 2011 – Previously secret Soviet Politburo records and declassified American transcripts of the Washington summit 20 years ago between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev show that Gorbachev was willing to go much further than the Americans expected or were able to reciprocate on arms cuts and resolving regional conflicts, according to documents posted today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University.

Today’s posting includes the internal Soviet deliberations leading up to the summit, full transcripts of the two leaders’ discussions, the Soviet record of negotiations with top American diplomats, and other historic records being published for the first time.

The documents show that the Soviet Union made significant changes to its initial position to accommodate the U.S. demands, beginning with “untying the package” of strategic arms, missile defense, and INF in February 1987 and then agreeing to eliminate its newly deployed OKA/SS-23 missiles, while pressing the U.S. leadership to agree on substantial reductions of strategic nuclear weapons.  Gorbachev’s goal was to prepare and sign the START Treaty on the basis of 50 percent reductions of strategic offensive weapons in 1988 before the Reagan administration left office.  In the course of negotiations, the Soviet Union also proposed cutting conventional forces in Europe by 25% and starting negotiations to eliminate chemical weapons.

The documents also detail Gorbachev’s desire for genuine collaboration with the U.S. in resolving regional conflicts, especially the Iran-Iraq War, Afghanistan, the Middle East, and Nicaragua.  However, the documents show that the U.S. side was unwilling and unable to pursue many of the Soviet initiatives at the time due to political struggles within the Reagan administration.  Reading these documents one gets a visceral sense of missed opportunities for achieving even deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals, resolving regional conflicts, and ending the Cold War even earlier.

The documents paint the fullest declassified portrait yet available of the Washington summit which ended 20 years ago today and centered on the signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty – the only treaty of its kind in actually eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons.  By eliminating mainly the missiles based in Europe, the treaty lowered the threat of nuclear war in Europe substantially and cleared the way for negotiations on tactical nuclear and chemical weapons, as well as negotiations on conventional forces in Europe.

Under the Treaty, the Soviet Union destroyed 889 of its intermediate-range missiles and 957 shorter-range missiles, and the U.S. destroyed 677 and 169 respectively.  These were the missiles with very short flight time to targets in the Soviet Union, which made them “most likely to spur escalation to general nuclear war from any local hostilities that might erupt.” (Note 1)  These weapons were perceived as most threatening by the Soviet leadership, which is why the Soviet military supported the Treaty, even though there was a significant opposition among them to including the shorter-range weapons.

The Treaty included remarkably extensive and intrusive verification inspection and monitoring arrangements, based on the “any time and place” proposal of March 1987, which was accepted by the Soviets to the Americans’ surprise; and the documents show that the Soviets were willing to go beyond the American position in the depth of verification regime.  The new Soviet position on verification not only removed the hurdle that seemed insurmountable, but according to then-U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Jack Matlock, became a symbol of the new trust developing in U.S.-Soviet relations, which made the treaty and further progress on arms control possible.

The documents published here for the first time give the reader a unique and never-previously-available opportunity to look into the process of internal deliberations on both sides and the negotiations both before and during the summit in December 1987.


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February 4, 1987
Record of Conversation of Chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeev and H. Brown, C. Vance, H. Kissinger, and D. Jones.

This meeting takes place during the visit of the Council on Foreign Relations Group, to Moscow on February 2-6.  In addition to meeting with Marshal Akhromeev, the members of the group also met with Mikhail Gorbachev and Alexander Yakovlev.  Marshal Akhromeev discusses problems of U.S.-Soviet arms control process, which has slowed down considerably after the Reykjavik summit and criticizes the U.S. side for backtracking after the summit, especially on the issue of deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons.  He expresses doubts that any progress could be achieved in the last two years of the Reagan administration in Geneva, but also emphasized the Soviet willingness to move ahead, however on the basis of “package,” i.e. linkage between INF, strategic offensive weapons and the ABM systems.  Members of the Council on Foreign Relations Group express their disagreement with the idea of elimination of offensive ballistic missiles and total elimination of nuclear weapons proposed by Reagan in Reykjavik on the grounds of security, citing Soviet superiority in conventional weapons in Europe (Kissinger and Jones) and also arguing that if the agreement was reached, the U.S. Congress would have never ratified that agreement.  The U.S. representatives suggest that further progress would be impossible on the basis of the Soviet “package” approach, and that to make it possible, negotiations should proceed on separate issues without linking them with each other.  The conversation also involves detailed discussion of Soviet objections to SDI and the balance of conventional weapons in Europe, on which Akhromeev reminds the Americans of the Soviet proposal of June 1986 to reduce conventional weapons in Europe by 25%, to which they received no response.

February 25, 1987
Alexander Yakovlev, Memorandum for Gorbachev
“Toward an Analysis of the Fact of the Visit of Prominent American Political Leaders to the USSR (Kissinger, Vance, Kirkpatrick, Brown, and others)

This long memorandum analyzes the statements and impressions of members of the group of the Council on Foreign Relations, which visited the Soviet Union earlier in the month, and provides recommendations for Gorbachev on next Soviet moves in arms control and Soviet-American relations.  The document contains the single most powerful argument for “untying the package” of INF strategic offensive weapons and ABM systems, which was the basis of the Soviet arms control position in Reykjavik. Surprisingly, Yakovlev does not argue from positions of Soviet security or linkage to the SDI. His argument concerns mainly the domestic political situation in the United States, with right-wing forces running the show in the administration and the fact that the Irangate scandal has weakened President Reagan significantly.  If the Soviet Union is to have any chance to achieve any arms control agreements in the next two years, before the end of the Reagan term, it needs major new initiatives, which would persuade the U.S. administration to engage in serious arms control. Therefore, the timing is ripe for untying the package to show the seriousness of Soviet intentions.  He implies that the Soviet side must be ready to make concessions, but that they would not affect Soviet security.  The second argument, which makes the timing even more important is that the resumption of Soviet nuclear testing (with the first test coming on February 26, 1987) would damage the image of Soviet perestroika in Europe. An announcement of a major new initiative such as untying the package would counteract the damage produced by the resumption of testing. This memorandum shows the impact of the visit of the representatives of the Council on Foreign relations on policymakers in the Soviet Union, and the attentiveness of the Soviet leaders to the perceptions of perestroika abroad.

February 26, 1987
Politburo Session [Excerpt]

At this Politburo session the historic decision to “untie the package” is made ostensibly following the proposal by Gromyko (most likely the preliminary decision had already been made in the Walnut Room before the session started).  Gorbachev argued strongly for this decision as the only way to jumpstart the negotiations that had been “stuck” in Geneva.  Here he also proposes to invite George Shultz to Moscow, and to proceed to a quick conclusion of the agreement on INF and then on strategic offensive weapons.  He shows his frustration with U.S. backtracking on arms control after Reykjavik.  All present Politburo members speak in favor “untying the package,” including Yegor Ligachev and Defense Minister Yuri Sokolov, who later criticized the treaty and concessionary.  Shevardnadze makes an argument about timing linking the decision to the need to restore trust in European public opinion after the resumption of Soviet nuclear tests.  Gorbachev and Shevardnadze’s arguments follow very closely the argument presented in the Yakovlev memo of the day before (see Document 2).

April 14, 1987
Memorandum of Conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz. Excerpt.

During this meeting with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze (joined by Marshal Akhromeev after the break), Shultz presses Gorbachev for inclusion of shorter-range nuclear missiles into the treaty, and specifically for inclusion of the new Soviet OKA/SS-23 missile, which according to the Soviet side had a range of only 400 km (as a result of the INF agreement, the USSR had to destroy 239 of these modern, newly deployed and highly mobile missiles, which allowed for the breakthrough in the negotiations but resulted in heavy criticism among the military).  Shultz also insists on the principle of “equality,” which would allow the United States to match the number of Soviet SRINF even though the U.S. did not have those at the time.  Gorbachev tries very hard to counteract this argument and persuade Shultz that since the Soviet Union was willing to eliminate all weapons of that class, the U.S. should reserve for itself the right to develop those. Gorbachev also expresses Soviet agreement with the U.S. idea of global double zero on INF and SRINF for the first time, but Shultz does not seem to grasp it most likely because his instructions did not give him a mandate to pursue that proposal. To Shultz’s expressed concern about issues of verification, Gorbachev offers the deepest and most comprehensive verification regime going beyond what the U.S. was prepared to.  In discussion of strategic offensive weapons, Shultz raises the issue of sub-ceiling for elements of the strategic triad, and Gorbachev emotionally accuses him of backtracking on the Reykjavik understandings—to cut the strategic triad by half.  Gorbachev raises the linkage between SDI and strategic offensive weapons but offers a new Soviet understanding of laboratory testing, which would be permitted in the treaty. This meeting signified a real breakthrough in INF negotiations due to three major new Soviet initiatives:  agreement to include SRINF, comprehensive verification regime, and willingness to accept the U.S. principle of “equality.”

April 10, 1987
Letter from President Reagan to General Secretary Gorbachev

April 9, 1987
Rejected Draft of Letter from President Reagan to General Secretary Gorbachev

President Reagan’s deputy national security adviser Colin Powell forwarded a 10-page draft to Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger on April 9, but the actual 2-page letter signed by President Reagan and carried by Shultz to Moscow, dated April 10, contained only a few phrases carried over from the draft.  Especially notable is the muted language in the final letter about the then-raging espionage controversy over the U.S. Embassy’s Marine guards – which led to a U.S. Senate resolution urging Shultz not to go to Moscow, but ultimately proved to be based on coerced false confessions by the guards.  The President downplayed the problems in his Los Angeles speech of April 10, when he said “If I had to characterize U.S.-Soviet relations in one word, it would be this: proceeding.  No great cause for excitement; no great cause for alarm.”  The same day, Gorbachev proposed to deal with the shorter-range INF issue by freezing and then cutting these systems.

April 16, 1987
Politburo session.

Gorbachev informs the Politburo about his conversation with Shultz.  The surprising assessment is that “conversation was good but empty—we did not move anywhere.”  He accuses Shultz as being focused on extracting concessions from the Soviet Union.  Nothing is said of specific Soviet concessions on shorter-range nuclear missiles.    Shevardnadze shares Gorbachev’s frustration with American abandonment of the Reykjavik position saying “the general tendency is hardening on all directions after Reykjavik—they want to keep 100 units and are against the global zero. However, Gorbachev makes it very clear that the treaty and more radical progress on arms control are in Soviet interests and that he would continue to press the American leaders in this direction.

May 1987
Plan of Conversation
Between M.S. Gorbachev and the President of the United States R. Reagan before the first trip to Washington. May 1987.

(A draft dictated by Gorbachev to his adviser Anatoly Chernyaev)

In this draft Gorbachev outlines his ideas for the first one-on-one conversation he will have with Reagan.  He is coming with a very ambitious agenda—not limited to the INF treaty but in fact looking far beyond it.  In the very first conversation, he is prepared to engage Reagan on START, chemical weapons, conventional weapons and regional problems.  The scope of issues mentioned in this draft and the solutions proposed on each of them show what a monumental opportunity the summit could be with the Soviet leadership willing to be flexible on practically all the issues that before represented stumbling blocks not only in U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations but in resolving regional conflicts such as the Middle East, Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq war and the situation in Central America.  Gorbachev shows unbendable optimism in his and Reagan’s ability to deal with all these issues decisively and successfully.

May 7, 1987
National Security Decision Directive Number 271: Instructions for the Eighth NST Negotiating Round

This directive signed by President Reagan two days after the beginning of the eighth round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) in Geneva provided specific instructions for each of the three U.S. negotiating teams.  The INF instructions in particular represented a holding pattern (“Washington is currently examining the Soviet proposal”) on the issue of shorter-range missiles (SRINF), even though both Gorbachev and Shultz at different points in the April discussions had embraced the idea of a “double zero” for these missiles.  In other respects, the instructions moved backward from the Reykjavik summit positions, with a seven-year as opposed to a ten-year period for non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and resurrection of the “sublimits” approach to counting nuclear weapons.

June 13, 1987
National Security Decision Directive Number 278: Establishing a U.S. Negotiating Position on SRINF Missiles

This directive essentially codified the “double zero” agreement announced formally the previous day at the semiannual NATO ministerial meeting, after a period of heated debate among NATO leaders, with West Germany’s Kohl most in favor of the approach and Britain’s Thatcher most dubious.  But the document’s second paragraph ends with what would become the sticking point to the negotiations – the status of the Pershing missiles belonging to West Germany.  Ultimately, after what President Reagan described in his memoirs as his own private plea to Kohl, the West German leader would announce on August 26 that the German Pershings would be eliminated once the U.S. and Soviet missiles were.

July 9, 1987
Politburo Session.

Gorbachev formally announces to the Politburo that the Soviet Union adopts the double global zero platform agreeing to destroy its intermediate-range missiles in Asia (formal announcement would be made on July 23).  He also formally announces the decision to add tactical missiles (like SS-23/OKA) to be covered in the INF Treaty justifying that step by saying that it would “deliver a blow” to “Pershings IB” stationed in the FRG.  He calls for a third zero—eliminating tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.  What is striking here is that he already made the exact same proposals to Shultz in April, but Shultz was not able at the time to respond to them, and only after NATO formally adopted the global double zero position on June 12, Gorbachev announces it as his new position at the Politburo.  Gorbachev is sensitive to the criticism of his own military about the Soviet disproportionate cuts under the INF treaty—therefore he raises the issue of the imbalance, but noting that even disproportionate cuts would be justified since the intention is to “clear Europe from nuclear weapons.”

August 11, 1987
Department of State Briefing Papers: Nuclear and Space Talks, START, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, Defense and Space, Nuclear Testing, Compliance Issues, ABM Treaty Interpretation, Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Documents 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d and 4e)

These State Department briefing papers provide a snapshot of U.S. negotiating positions across the range of U.S.-Soviet issues going into the fall discussions that would produce the INF Treaty and the Washington summit.  From internal evidence (repeated references to “as of August 11”), the typed text appears to date from August 11, but the handwritten notes and editing comments were added subsequent to Chancellor Kohl’s August 26 offer to eliminate the German Pershings.

September 5, 1987
GRIP 27D  [“Should the U.S. change its current stance on U.S. warheads on FRG Pershing IA missiles?”]

Written by National Security Council staff, this memorandum bears the codeword GRIP signifying the particular secrecy compartment used for NSC documents on U.S.-Soviet arms discussions in 1987 and 1988 (there would ultimately be at least 96 separate GRIP items, according to the finding aide to the Robert Linhard Papers at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library).  The issue of U.S. warheads on the German Pershings came up in June 1987 when the U.S. Defense Department responded to the “double zero” consensus by proposing the conversion of Pershing IIs into shorter range Pe-1Bs for turnover to the West Germans, much to the Soviets’ dismay.  Even after Kohl’s August 26 announcement on elimination of the German Pershings, the Soviets suspected backsliding when the U.S. would not commit in writing to destroy the Pershing warheads; but this memo outlined the position that the U.S. would take: sticking to the principle of not negotiating about an ally’s weapons, while reassuring the Soviets that the warheads would not be used in some other configuration.

September 8, 1987
Meeting with the National Security Planning Group [Briefing Memorandum for President Reagan from National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci]

This briefing memo and attached talking points were drafted by NSC staffers Linton Brooks and Will Tobey and forwarded by the national security adviser, Frank Carlucci, to President Reagan to prepare him for a key NSPG meeting on the upcoming visit by Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze to Washington.  Although the memo suggests there would be a debate over how flexible the U.S. negotiating positions should be on START and SDI, the outcome of the NSPG meeting was that President Reagan sided with defense secretary Weinberger against any change in those positions (Weinberger had separately argued for keeping some non-nuclear-tipped INF missiles, but Reagan overruled him).

September 10, 1987
Letter from General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan, Russian and English versions [Documents 7a and 7b]

Foreign minister Shevardnadze arrives in Washington on September 15 bearing this five-page letter from Gorbachev to Reagan (8 pages in the unofficial translation given to the President).  Together with a plea for progress on INF and arms reductions generally, the letter contains an interesting distinction related to the issue that had derailed the Reykjavik summit, the Strategic Defense Initiative.  Gorbachev refers to “strategic offensive weapons in space” as the problem for the Soviets – the fear that U.S. development of the SDI would create the capacity for a Hitler-style blitzkrieg from space.  Reagan had always insisted the U.S. was not seeking this capacity, but as Raymond Garthoff has noted, the President missed the opening to combine constraints on such weapons with the cooperative SDI program he always envisioned with the Soviets.  The Shultz-Shevardnadze talks during this visit ultimately produce only an agreement in principle on the INF Treaty and on a subsequent summit in Washington with a date to be determined later.

October 23, 1987
Memorandum of conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz. Excerpt.

In this long and fascinating conversation Gorbachev was trying to show the new Soviet flexibility to move closer to the U.S. position on the issues of sub-ceilings on elements of the strategic triad, including willingness to have a lower level of Soviet heavy ICBMs, laboratory testing of SDI elements, and verification.  At the same time, he notes that the U.S. side tries to “squeeze as much as possible out of us.”  Gorbachev’s main objective for the meeting is to get Shultz to agree to draft key provisions for the START treaty that could be discussed in Washington during his visit.  However, Shultz’s response to this proposal is inconclusive—he would prefer delegations in Geneva to work more on clarifying the issues under dispute and leave the “key provisions” for the principals to discuss at the summit.  Gorbachev vents his frustration calling Shultz’ position “foggy, “ complains about U.S. lack of willingness to move on arms control, and doubts U.S. support for Soviet domestic changes.  No decisions on “key provisions” were achieved and even dates of the summit were left undecided.  The document also contains a fascinating discussion of U.S.-Soviet collaboration in trying to resolve the Iran-Iraq conflict.

October 28, 1987
Gorbachev Letter to Reagan.

This letter is Gorbachev’s final call for progress in discussions of the key provisions of START treaty so that the principals could agree on those in Washington.  The last obstacle to such agreement is the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which the Soviet Union proposed to be ten years and to which Shultz did not agree in Moscow.  Gorbachev proposes to open a direct channel through the Ambassadors to discuss this issue before the summit to find a speedy solution.  Gorbachev believes that it is realistic to achieve an agreement on strategic weapons and to start discussion on banning chemical weapons.  He suggests that “we want to crown your visit to the Soviet Union with concluding an agreement on strategic offensive weapons” referring to the planned Reagan visit to Moscow in May-June 1988.  In the letter, Gorbachev also gives final dates of his visit to Washington—during the first ten days of December 1987.

October 30, 1987
Memorandum For: The President From: George P. Shultz [Secretary of State] Subject: Gorbachev’s Letter

The Secretary of State summarizes for the President the contents of Gorbachev’s “fairly positive” letter, which would be hand delivered to Reagan by Shevardnadze later that day.  Shultz remarks on the Soviet agreement for an early December summit in Washington, and notes the flexibility in various of Gorbachev’s proposals.  After formally receiving the letter from Shevardnadze, Reagan would announce the summit agreement in the White House press room, with Shultz and Shevardnadze at his side.

November 4, 1987
Letter from the Director of the United States Information Agency Charles Z. Wick to the Secretary of State George P. Shultz and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Frank Carlucci

The top U.S. public relations official proposes in this memo that Reagan fly to Europe and attend a NATO summit immediately after the one with Gorbachev in Washington – a suggestion that would not be accepted.  But the memo provides interesting inside detail about the President’s standing in European public opinion: “Our own polling of European publics continues to show by overwhelming margins that Gorbachev is viewed more favorably than President Reagan (e.g. Britain (83%), Germany (80%), Italy (76%) and France (51%), and more the advocate of peace and arms control.”

November 10, 1987
National Security Decision Directive Number 288: My Objectives at the Summit

This directive written in the first person summarizes President Reagan’s expectations for the Washington summit, and perhaps most strikingly asserts that the summit “must in no way complicate our efforts to maintain a strong defense budget and key programs like SDI” and the Reagan doctrine support to anticommunist armed forces abroad.  Frances Fitzgerald commented in her book Way Out There in the Blue (p. 434) that “Both of these policies were history in the Hollywood sense of the word, yet administration officials followed the guidance quite faithfully” to the point of missing Gorbachev’s offer on Central America for both the U.S. and the USSR to stop shipping arms there if the peace plan proposed by Costa Rica’s Oscar Arias was accepted.  Since the U.S. Congress was not going to approve more arms anyway, given the Iran-contra scandal, Gorbachev’s offer amounted to exactly the cessation of Soviet arms that the U.S. claimed it sought.

November 24, 1987
Memorandum Subject: Gorbachev’s Gameplan: The Long View [By Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency]

On the eve of the Washington summit, the top U.S. intelligence analyst on the Soviet Union – Robert M. Gates, then the deputy director of CIA – gets Gorbachev almost completely wrong.  In this memo (forwarded by the CIA director William Webster to Vice President Bush and other top officials), Gates predicts that the Soviet reforms are merely a “breathing space” before the resumption of the “further increase in Soviet military power and political influence.”  Gates misses the Soviet recognition that the Stalinist economic system had failed; he incorrectly predicts that Gorbachev will only agree to arms reductions that “protect existing Soviet advantages”; he claims the Soviets are still committed to the protection of their Third World clients – only three months later, Gorbachev would announce the pullout from Afghanistan; and Gates sees any Gorbachev force reductions as a threat to “Alliance cohesion” rather than a gain for security in Europe.  This hard-line assessment of Gorbachev is not shared by President Reagan, who would rescind his “evil empire” rhetoric while standing in Red Square in May 1988.

November 28, 1987
Information Memorandum TO: The Secretary, From: INR- Morton I. Abramowitz, Subject: Gorbachev’s Private Summit Agenda

This two-page cover memo from the head of the State Department’s intelligence and research bureau to Secretary Shultz summarizes a seven-page INR study looking at “what might be some of the ‘wild cards’ on the summit agenda.”  While generally accurate in its assessment of Gorbachev’s intentions, even the State Department analysts closest to the Shultz view of Soviet behavior do not predict several of the Gorbachev surprises during the summit such as the offer on Central America and on conventional forces in Europe.  The prediction of “something splashy on Afghanistan” would be off by a few months, but the memo’s anticipation of a possible SDI compromise would be only slightly behind Gorbachev’s own thinking.

December 7, 1987
Memo: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-290) on Arms Control Position for the US-USSR Summit

On the Friday before the Washington summit, President Reagan signs this directive setting out what journalist Don Oberdorfer later described as “seemingly impossible” negotiating goals on SDI with Gorbachev, including explicit Soviet approval of tests in space, and Soviet approval of US deployment of strategic defenses after the end of an agreed period of non-withdrawal from ABM Treaty.  Gorbachev had rejected both of these ideas repeatedly in earlier meetings, but would surprise the Americans at the Washington summit with his tactics if not his underlying posture on SDI.

December 8, 1987
Memo of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, 10:45 a.m. – 12:30 p.m.

December 8, 1987
Memo of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, 2:30 p.m. – 3:15 p.m.

December 8, 1987
Record of Conversation
Between S.F. Akhromeev and P. Nitze at the U.S. State Department

In the first conversations of military experts Marshal Akhromeev outlines the Soviet position on the strategic nuclear weapons negotiations.  The main point remained the linkage between ABM compliance and START issues.  The other remaining issue is verification, on which now Soviets were prepared to go further than the Americans in reversal of the traditional positions.  When Akhromeev offers on-site inspections to count the number of bombs deployed on each bomber, Nitze responds:  “We cannot agree to that.”  The discussion also covers issues of counting Soviet “Backfire” bomber and U.S. sea-launched cruise missiles.

December 9, 1987
Memo of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, 10:35 a.m. – 10:45 a.m.

December 9, 1987
Draft Memo of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, 10:55 a.m. – 12:35 p.m.

December 9, 1987
Record of Conversations between Sergey Fyodorovich Akhromeev and Paul Nitze at the U.S. State Department. Excerpt.

In this excerpt of a very long conversation of military experts Akhromeev shows his frustration with the Americans’ unwillingness to meet the Soviet delegation halfway even after all the flexibility shown by the Soviet side on reducing heavy ICBMs and counting heavy bombers.  When he suggests that the draft of key provisions should contain a commitment of both sides to reduce the total throw-weight of the sides’ ICBMs and SLBMs by 50%, Nitze replies that this paragraph should be recorded only as a “unilateral statement.”

December 9, 1987
Record of Conversation
Between S.F. Akhromeev and F. Carlucci at the Pentagon

Akhromeev and Carlucci discuss issues of possible cooperation on SDI research during the period of non-withdrawal and non-deployment of SDI systems.  Carlucci makes a very strong argument in defense of the SDI saying that it is widely supported in the country and that there was no chance for a strategic offensive weapons treaty to be ratified by the U.S. Congress “regardless of how great it was if only it was said that it undermined the concept of SDI.”  Akhromeev counters with questioning the SDI feasibility and suggesting that the Soviet Union was capable of producing an asymmetrical response to the program.

December 10, 1987
Draft Memo of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, 10 a.m. – 12 p.m.

December 10, 1987
Memo of Conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at a Working Luncheon, 12:40 p.m. – 2:10 p.m

December 10, 1987
Record of Conversation Between Chief of USSR General Staff Marshal Sergey Fyodorovich Akhromeev and William J. Crowe with members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon

Akhromeev and members of U.S. JCS discuss measures of cooperation between representatives of U.S. and Soviet armed forces as means of building trust between the two militaries.  Akhromeev proposes more human contacts between the officers, visits to bases, exchanges of basketball teams or military bands.  The conversation also involves the issues of reductions of conventional weapons in Europe, including dual-use weapons.  During the discussion of conventional weapons Akhromeev for the first time admits that there are “imbalances” in the European theater, including the Soviet advantage in tanks and U.S. advantage in combat aircraft.  Verification and nuclear safety centers are also discussed.

December 12, 1987
Telegram: Secretary’s 12/11 NAC Briefing on Washington Summit

This telegram summarizes Secretary of State Shultz’s briefing to the North Atlantic Council immediately after the Washington summit, and provides talking points for U.S. diplomats around the world to use when briefing their host governments on the summit.  Sent by the deputy secretary of state (acting secretary in Shultz’s absence) John Whitehead, the cable says the Washington summit “has taken us a gigantic step forward” on strategic arms, and hails the INF Treaty as a “bipartisan achievement for the U.S.”

December 16, 1987
Anatoly Chernyaev Memorandum to Gorbachev.

In this memorandum prepared for Gorbachev’s report to the Politburo on the results of the Washington summit Chernyaev lists all the accomplishments of the summit—primarily in dealing with negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons.  According to Chernyaev, there was a real danger that the summit results would have been limited to the INF treaty without progress on START issues.  He notes progress in finding solutions to the following difficult issues:  provision on compliance with the AMB treaty, limits for warheads on strategic missiles and for warheads on sea-launched cruise missiles.  Chernyaev also discusses Reagan’s negotiating style “his incompetence,” pointing that the real power “rests with the group of Bush, Carlucci and others around him”—but Gorbachev decides not to use this part of memo in his actual Politburo presentation and spoke about Reagan very favorably in his report on December 17.

December 17, 1987
Politburo Session.

At this Politburo session devoted to the results of Gorbachev’s visit to Washington, Gorbachev gives a very high assessment of the summit and the INF treaty.  He considers the Washington summit as “bigger than Geneva or Reykjavik” in terms of building mutual understanding with the U.S. leadership.  He notes the change in Reagan’s behavior and emphasizes that the principals were speaking “as equals and seriously each keeping his ideology to himself.”  Gorbachev stresses the historic nature of the INF treaty and the full Politburo support for it, because “the entire development of Soviet-American relations and the normalization of international situation in general” depended on the outcome of this issue.  He also informs members of the Politburo about his and the delegation’s meetings with Americans of all ways of life and describes strong support for perestroika in the United States.

December 29, 1987
National Security Decision Directive Number 292: Organizing for the INF Ratification Effort [Document 23]

This directive signed by President Reagan sets up the White House teams working for Senate ratification of the INF Treaty.  This was not a hard sell politically:  On December 15th the Washington Post published the first post-summit poll, showing Reagan’s approval ratings at their highest since the Iran-contra scandal broke in November 1986, up from 50 to 58%, with 61% having a “favorable impression” of Reagan.  Remarkably, 65% had a “favorable impression” of Gorbachev!  Yet a chorus of critics (including former President Nixon, former secretary of state Kissinger, and former – and future – national security adviser Scowcroft) were attacking the INF treaty for removing nuclear weapons from Europe while leaving a large Soviet conventional arms advantage.  Unbeknownst to the critics, in part because Reagan was unprepared to take up the conventional forces issue when Gorbachev raised it during the summit, the Soviets were ready to move on major cuts in non-nuclear forces as well, and Gorbachev would announce such cuts in his United Nations speech less than a year later.


Note

1. Raymond Garthoff, The Great Transition:  American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War. (The Brookings Institution:  Washington, D.C. 1994), p. 327.

The Moscow Helsinki Group 30th Anniversary: From the Secret Files

Washington DC, August 17th 2011 – Thirty years ago today, the physicist Yuri Orlov gathered a small group of human rights activists in the apartment of prominent Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov in Moscow to establish what today is the oldest functioning human rights organization in Russia – the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group (MHG) – thus serving as an inspiration for a new wave of human rights activism in the Soviet Union and around the world.

In honor of that anniversary, the National Security Archive at George Washington University today posted on the Web a series of documents from the former Soviet Union related to the Moscow Helsinki Group, including the KGB’s reports to the Central Committee of the Communist Party about the “anti-social elements” who started the group 30 years ago, and the various repressive measures the KGB took “to put an end to their hostile activities.”

After its establishment in May 1976, the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group instantly became the focus of a KGB monitoring and harassment effort, as indicated in this memorandum from KGB chief Yuri Andropov. (English translation)

Among the founding members of the group were the first chair, Yuri Orlov, Elena Bonner (who became acting chair on Orlov’s arrest), Pyotr Grigorenko, Alexandr Ginzburg, Anatoly Shcharansky, Anatoly Marchenko, and Lyudmila Alexeeva (Document 8). The group instantly became the focus of a KGB monitoring and harassment effort (Document 10). All the founding members of the Moscow Helsinki Group were either arrested or sent into exile over the next several years.

But in the mid-1970s, during a low point of stagnation and political apathy in the Soviet Union, the Moscow Helsinki Group seized the inspiration of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act – which the Soviet government of Leonid Brezhnev saw as one of its major achievements – to highlight human rights violations in the Soviet Union and bring them to world attention by reporting on Soviet performance to the nations whose leaders signed the Final Act. The group appealed to other nations to start similar monitoring groups and thus gave impetus to the emergence of the international Helsinki movement. In June 1976, the group’s appeal to Rep. Millicent Fenwick (R-New Jersey) persuaded her to lead the creation of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, which included six senators, six congressmembers, and representatives from the State, Defense, and Commerce Departments. Gradually, an international network of Helsinki monitoring groups emerged throughout Europe.

In the Soviet bloc, the founding of the Moscow Helsinki Group was followed by the formation of Helsinki Groups in Lithuania (November 1976), Ukraine (November 1976), Georgia (January 1977), and the establishment of the Committee for Social Defense in Poland (summer 1977), and Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia (January 1977). In the Soviet Union, other protest groups announced their formation at press conferences held by the MHG, such as the Working Commission to Investigate the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes, the Christian Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Religious Believers, and other associations. The MHG became the center of the new network of humanitarian protest in the USSR.

The Soviet Committee on State Security – the KGB – dealt harshly with the first wave of dissidents, which emerged in the Soviet Union around 1965 and reached its peak in 1968 with the emergence of the “Chronicle of Current Events,” and protests against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. In 1967, the new head of the KGB (and later General Secretary of the Party) Yuri Andropov created a new division within the organization – the V or Fifth Directorate – charged specifically with monitoring the political opposition. The first two cases undertaken by the V Directorate were the cases of Andrei Sakharov and Alexander Solzhenitsyn. In turn, the directorate opened case files on virtually all Soviet dissidents.

The KGB used various methods to instill fear in the hearts and minds of the population, ranging from prison sentences, to psychiatric hospitals, to the “prophylactics,” where a person could be called in for any questionable activity, and his file would remain “dormant” until the next slightest expression of dissent (Document 2). The regime kept careful count of anti-Soviet activities, and the KGB reported frequently to the Central Committee.

Most of the documents relating to the monitoring and persecution of dissidents during the Soviet era remain classified in the KGB archives in Russia. However, some of the reports sent to the Central Committee became available as part of extensive declassifications under President Yeltsin in the early 1990s. Most of the reports posted today by the National Security Archive come from the Volkogonov Collection, which the late General Volkogonov donated to the Library of Congress in Washington D.C. These reports, documenting the regime’s efforts to suppress dissent, are published here for the first time in Russian and in English translation.

The historical record shows that Brezhnev himself was deeply committed to the Helsinki process (known as the CSCE), but did not fully appreciate the possible consequences of the humanitarian provisions, or the Third Basket of the Final Act, for the development of protest movements in the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc (Document 1). The Soviet leader believed he had an understanding with the U.S. administration that the Final Act meant inviolability of the post-war borders in Europe and non-interference in internal affairs.

Early Soviet attempts to claim that the Soviet Union needed no further implementation of the human rights provisions of the Final Act and counterattacks directed at the West for their human rights practices did not bear fruit (Document 3). Beginning in 1977, the Carter administration made the issue of human rights a primary focus of its relations with the USSR, thus creating a constant source of concern for the Politburo (Document 12).

In 1975, the regime felt that the dissident problem was under control, and the KGB reported that the number of protests had decreased, mostly due to the success of the prophylactic work (Document 2). However, by the end of the year protests had picked up again, and the dissidents were using the Final Act as their main instrument to invite international pressure on the Soviet government. Politburo discussions of individual cases and the “anti-Soviet activities” in general illuminate the centrality of the issue to the security of the Soviet state itself, as pointed out by Andropov in his 1975 report to the Central Committee (Document 4).

Documents show that initially the KGB was cautious about suppressing the growing human rights movement out of concern for détente and the position of the Eurocommunist parties. The years 1975-1976 show unusually low figures of arrests and harassment of human rights activists. By 1977, however, as the regime started perceiving real danger from the human rights movement and diminishing payoffs from the disintegrating détente, the decision was made to crack down on the Helsinki groups and across the spectrum of dissent (Document 11). The number of arrests and the harshness of sentences increased significantly in 1979 and grew steadily to reach their peak in 1983.

Although the early 1980s became the worst years for the Soviet human rights movement, the ground prepared by the Helsinki groups became the fertile soil for Gorbachev’s perestroika after 1985. Thus the story of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act and the founding of the Moscow Helsinki Group becomes a story of unintended consequences for the Soviet regime, which links the events of the mid-1970s with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Today, the Moscow Helsinki Group continues its work in defense of human rights and basic freedoms and remains a focal point of humanitarian non-governmental organizations in Russia.


Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Selection of Translated Documents (in English)
The complete list of Russian language documents is available below.

1. March 18, 1975. Leonid Brezhnev Speech to Leaders of Socialist Countries Regarding Economic Cooperation and Preparations for the European Conference

2. October 31, 1975. KGB Memorandum to the CC CPSU, “About Some Results of the Preventive-Prophylactic Work of the State Security Organs.”

3. November 11, 1975. Memorandum of Georgy Kornienko Conversation with U.S. Attaché Jack Matlock.

4. December 29, 1975. Yuri Andropov Report to the CC CPSU.

5. January 3, 1976. Excerpt from Anatoly S. Chernayev’s Diary.

6. March 13, 1976. Memo from Andropov to CC of CPSU, “On the Results of Search for Authors of Anti-Soviet Anonymous Documents in 1975.”

7. March 30, 1976. Excerpt from KGB annual report for 1975.

8. November 15, 1976. KGB Memorandum to the CC CPSU, “About the Hostile Actions of the So-called Group for Assistance of Implementation of the Helsinki Agreements in the USSR.”

9. December 6, 1976. KGB Memorandum to the CC CPSU, “About the Subversive Gathering of Anti-Social Elements in the Pushkin Square in Moscow and Near the Pushkin Monument in Leningrad.”

10. January 5, 1977. Memo from Andropov to CC CPSU, “On Measures for Stopping Hostile Activities of the So-called Group for Assistance of Implementation of the Helsinki Agreements in the USSR.”

11. January 20, 1977. Resolution of secretariat of CC of CPSU, “On Measures for Stopping Criminal Activities of Orlov, Ginsburg, Rudenko, and Ventslova”

12. February 18, 1977. Extract from CC CPSU Politburo Meeting ,”On Instructions to Soviet Ambassador in Washington, DC for Conversation with Vance on ‘Human Rights’ Issue.”

13. March 1, 1977. Resolution of the CC CPSU on Draft Press Release in Connection with Reception of Bukovski by Jimmy Carter.

14. June 8, 1978. Extract from Minutes of CC CPSU Politburo Session on Sakharov

15. June 22, 1978. Extract from Minutes of CC CPSU Politburo Session on Scharansky.

16. June 25, 1980. Extract from Protocol 206 of the CC CPSU Politburo on Amnesty International

Complete List of Documents (in Russian)

1. October 23, 1970. CC CPSU Propaganda Department Report on Measures in Connection with Awarding Alexander Solzhenytsin the Nobel Prize.

2. May 6, 1971. Letter from Zamiatin to Brezhnev.

3. June 18, 1971. Memo from Yuri Andropov to CC CPSU on Bukovsky.

4. January 7, 1972. KGB Report to CC CPSU on Bukovsky Trial.

5. April 3, 1973. Extract from CC CPSU Secretariat Session on Publication of the Second Volume of History of the CPSU.

6. January 7, 1974. Extract from CC CPSU Politburo Meeting on Alexander Solzhenytsin.

7. March 18, 1975. Leonid Brezhnev Speech to Leaders of Socialist Countries Regarding Economic Cooperation and Preparations for the European Conference.

8. October 31, 1975. KGB Memorandum to the CC CPSU about Some Results of the Preventive-Prophylactic Work of the State Security Organs.

9. November 12, 1975. Memorandum of Georgy Kornienko Conversation with U.S. Attaché Jack Matlock.

10. December 18, 1975. Extract from Protocol 198 of CC CPSU Politburo Session about the Appeal to the FCP Leadership.

11. December 29, 1975.Yuri Andropov Report to the CC CPSU.

12. January 3, 1976. Excerpt from Anatoly S. Chernayev’s Diary.

13. March 13, 1976. Memo from Andropov to CC CPSU on the Results of Search for Authors of Anti-Soviet Anonymous Documents in 1975.

14. March 30, 1976. KGB annual report for 1975.

15. September 13, 1976. KGB Memorandum to CC CPSU about the Subversive Idea of the West to Award the Nobel Prize to Ginzburg and Others.

16. October 25, 1976. Extract from CC CPSU Resolution about Instructions for Soviet Ambassadors in Some Countries in Connection with the Anti-Soviet Campaign in the West.

17. November 15, 1976. KGB Memorandum to CC CPSU about the Hostile Actions of the So-Called Group for Assistance of Implementation of the Helsinki Agreements in the USSR.

18. December 6, 1976. KGB Memorandum to CC CPSU about the Subversive Gathering of Anti-Social Elements in the Pushkin Square in Moscow and Near the Pushkin Monument in Leningrad.

19. January 5, 1977. Memo from Andropov to CC CPSU on Measures for Stopping Hostile Activities of the So-Called Group for Assistance of Implementation of the Helsinki Agreements in the USSR.

20. January 20, 1977. Resolution of secretariat of CC CPSU on Measures for Stopping Criminal Activities of Orlov, Ginsburg, Rudenko, and…

21. February 18, 1977. Extract from CC CPSU Politburo Meeting on instructions to Soviet Ambassador in Washington, DC for Conversation with Vance on “Human Rights” Issue.

22. February 18, 1977. Memo from Andropov to CC CPSU on Measures for Cutting Off Intelligence and Subversive Activities of the Special Services of the US among “Dissidents” and Nationalists.

23. February 28, 1977. KGB Annual Report for 1976.

24. March 1, 1977. Draft Press Release in Connection with Reception of Bukovski by Jimmy Carter.

25. March 2, 1977. Memo from Andropov to CC CPSU on the Results of Search for Authors of Anti-Soviet Anonymous Documents in 1976.

26. March 24, 1977. Extract from Politburo Meeting of CC CPSU on Further Measures to Discredit US Special Services Role in Anti-Soviet “Human Rights” Campaign.

27. March 29, 1977. Memo from Andropov to CC CPSU on the Reaction of the US Embassy in Moscow and Foreign Journalists to Soviet Measures toward “Dissidents.”

28. May 19, 1977. Extract from Protocol 56 of CC CPSU Politburo Session about Instructions to Soviet Ambassadors in Connection with the Noise in the West on the Issue of Human Rights.

29. June 10, 1977. Extract from Politburo Meeting of CC CPSU on the Measures Against Anti-Soviet Activities of “Amnesty International.”

30. February 9, 1978. Extract from Politburo Meeting of CC CPSU on Deprivation of Citizenship of P. G. Grigorenko.

31. February 27, 1978. Memo from Andropov to CC CPSU on the Results of Search for Authors of Anti-Soviet Anonymous Documents in 1977.

32. March 27, 1978. KGB annual report for 1977.

33. March 27, 1978. Memo from Andropov to CC CPSU on the Results of KGB Work against Terrorist Activities.

34. April 1978. KGB Memorandum to the CC CPSU about the Forthcoming Trials of Anti-Social Elements.

35. April 5, 1978. KGB Report to CC CPSU to the Question of the So-Called Independent Trade Union.

36. May 30, 1978. Resolution of Secretariat of CC CPSU on the Letter to CC of the Belgian Communist Party.

37. July 3, 1978. Resolution of the Secretariat of CC CPSU on Telegram to Soviet Ambassador in Norway.

38. March 6, 1979. Memo from Andropov to CC CPSU on the Results of Search for Authors of Anti-Soviet Anonymous Documents in 1978.

39. April 2, 1979. KGB annual report for 1978.

40. April 24, 1979. Extract from Politburo Meeting of CC CPSU on the Deprivation of Citizenship and the Eviction from the USSR of G. P. Vins, E. S. Kuznetsov, M. U. Dimschitsa, V. I. Moroza, and A. I. Ginsburg.

41. May 31, 1979. Extract from Politburo Meeting of CC CPSU on the Departure from the USSR of the Family Members of A. Ginsburg, and G. Vins.

42. July 30, 1979. KGB Memorandum to the CC CPSU about Hostile Activities of the Enemy in Connection with Olympics-1980.

43. January 3, 1980. Extract from Politburo Meeting of CC CPSU on Measures for Stopping the Hostile Activities of A. D. Sakharov.

44. January 31, 1980. Memo from Andropov to CC CPSU on the Results of Search for Authors of Anti-Soviet Anonymous Documents in 1979.

45. July 25, 1980. Extract from Protocol 206 of CC CPSU Politburo Session about Measures Regarding Organization Amnesty International.

46. March 31, 1981. Report on Work of the USSR Committee for State Security in 1980.

47. March 7, 1982. Memo from Andropov to CC CPSU on the Results of Search for Authors of Anti-Soviet Anonymous Documents in 1981.

48. April 10, 1982. Report on Work of the USSR Committee for State Security in 1981.

49. August 31, 1982. KGB Report to CC CPSU about Production by Sakharov of a New Anti-Soviet “Address” to the West and its Use by Americans for Purposes Hostile to the Soviet Union.

50. October 3, 1983. KGB Memorandum to the CC CPSU about Measures for Perfecting the Prophylactic Work Conducted by the State Security Organs.

TOP-SECRET: Characterization of Darfur violence as “genocide” had no “legal consequences” for U.S., according to 2004 State Department Memo

 

Different Conclusions
The State Department’s June 25, 2004 memo, “Genocide and Darfur,” found that the use of the term “genocide” by the U.S. carried no “legal consequences.”
A May 1994 State Department discussion paper on violence in Rwanda expressed concernt that use of the term “genocide” might obligate the Clinton administration “to actually ‘do something.'”

Washington, DC, August 17, 2011 – A secret June 25, 2004 Department of State memo entitled “Genocide and Darfur” written by William Taft IV, the legal advisor to Secretary of State Colin Powell, stated that “a determination that genocide has occurred in Darfur would have no immediate legal–as opposed to moral, political or policy–consequences for the United States.”

Writing for The Atlantic, National Security Archive Fellow Rebecca Hamilton argues that the memo’s determination that calling the conflict in Darfur genocide would yield no “legal consequences” influenced Secretary of State Colin Powell’s “judgment call” to become the first member of any US administration to apply the label genocide to an ongoing conflict.

The June 25, 2004 memo stands in stark contrast to a secret May 1994 State Department discussion paper on Rwanda–also declassified in response to a National Security Archive request–which warned that a finding of genocide in Rwanda might obligate the Clinton administration “to actually ‘do something.’” The briefing paper helps explain why, with clear evidence to the contrary, U.S. officials refused to label the massacres of over 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu in Rwanda as genocide.

In her book, Fighting for Darfur, Hamilton interviewed Assistant Secretary of State Lorne Craner, who crafted the State Department’s investigation into whether genocide was occurring in Darfur. He recounted that the Department of State was heavily influenced by massacres in Rwanda a decade earlier. He remembers Powell instructing him, “There is not going to be another Rwanda.”

In addition to advising Powell that terming the events in Darfur genocide had no “legal consequences,” the 2004 memo also stated that “a finding of genocide can act as a spur to the international community to take more forceful and immediate actions to respond to ongoing atrocities.”

On September 9, 2004, free from the “legal implications” of the term and hoping to “spur” the international community into action, Secretary of State Colin Powell sat before Senate Foreign Relations Committee and testified that the Department of State had “concluded that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the jinjaweid bear responsibility —and that genocide may still be occurring.”
Read Rebecca Hamilton’s article at The Atlantic.

TOP SECRET CIA ‘OFFICIAL HISTORY’ OF THE BAY OF PIGS: REVELATIONS


Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba

Washington, D.C., August 17, 2011 – In the heat of the battle at the Bay of Pigs, the lead CIA field operative aboard one of the transport boats fired 75mm recoilless rifles and .50-caliber machine guns on aircraft his own agency had supplied to the exile invasion force, striking some of them.  With the CIA-provided B-26 aircraft configured to match those in the Cuban air force, “we couldn’t tell them from the Castro planes,” according to the operative, Grayston Lynch. “We ended up shooting at two or three of them. We hit some of them there because when they came at us…it was a silhouette, that was all you could see.”

This episode of ‘friendly fire’ is one of many revelations contained in the Top Secret multi-volume, internal CIA report, “The Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation.”  Pursuant to a Freedom of Information lawsuit (FOIA) filed by the National Security Archive on the 50th anniversary of the invasion last April, the CIA has now declassified four volumes of the massive, detailed, study–over 1200 pages of comprehensive narrative and documentary appendices.

Archive Cuba specialist Peter Kornbluh, who filed the lawsuit, hailed the release as “a major advance in obtaining the fullest possible record of the most infamous debacle in the history of the CIA’s covert operations.” The Bay of Pigs, he noted, “remains fundamentally relevant to the history of the CIA, of U.S. foreign policy, and of U.S. intervention in Cuba and Latin America. It is a clandestine history that must be understood in all its inglorious detail.”

In an article published today in the “Daily Beast,” Kornbluh described the ongoing “FOIA wars” with the CIA to obtain the declassification of historical documents the CIA continues to keep secret. He characterized the process of pressing the CIA to release the Official History and other historically significant documents as “the bureaucratic equivalent of passing a kidney stone.”

The “Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operations” was written between 1974 and 1984 by Jack Pfeiffer, a member of the Agency’s staff who rose to become the CIA’s Chief Historian. After he retired in the mid 1980s, Pfeiffer attempted to obtain the declassification of Volumes 4 and 5 of his study, which contained his lengthy and harsh critiques of two previous official investigations of the Bay of Pigs: the report of the Presidential Commission led by Gen. Maxwell Taylor; and the CIA’s own Inspector General’s report written in the aftermath of the failed assault. Both the Taylor Commission and the IG report held the CIA primarily responsible for the failure of the invasion—a position Pfeiffer rejected.  The CIA released only the Taylor critique, but Pfeiffer never circulated it.

According to Kornbluh, Pfeiffer saw as his mission to spread the blame for the debacle of “JMATE”—the codename for the operation—beyond the CIA headquarters at Langley, VA.  Kornbluh characterized the study as “not only the official history, but the official defense of the CIA’s legacy that was so badly damaged on the shores of Cuba;” and he predicted its declassification “would revive the ‘who-lost-Cuba’ blame game” that has accompanied the historical debate over the failed invasion for fifty years.

The Archive is posting all four volumes today.  They are described below:

Volume 1: Air Operations, March 1960 to April 1961 (Part 1| Part 2 | Part 3)

The opening volume examines the critical component of the invasion—the CIA-created air force, the preliminary airstrikes, and the air battle over Cuba during the three day attack.  The study forcefully addresses the central “who-lost-Cuba” debate that broke out in the aftermath of the failed invasion. It absolves the CIA of blame, and places it on the Kennedy White House and other agencies for decisions relating to the preliminary airstrikes and overt air cover that, according to the Official History, critically compromised the success of the operation.  “[I]in its attempts to meet its official obligations in support of the official, authorized policy of the U.S. government—to bring about the ouster of Fidel Castro—the agency was not well served by the Kennedy White House, Secretary of State Rusk, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the U.S. Navy,” the CIA historian concludes.  “The changes, modifications, distortions, and lack of firm, positive guidance related to air operations—the key to the success or failure of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Castro—make clear that the collapse of the beachhead at Playa Giron was a shared responsibility.  When President Kennedy [during his post-invasion press conference] proclaimed his sole responsibility for the operation there was more truth to his statement than he really believed or than his apologists will accept.”

Besides the ‘friendly fire” episode, Volume 1 contains a number of colorful revelations. Among them:

  • Only days before the invasion, the CIA tried to entice Cuba’s top diplomat, foreign minister Raul Roa, to defect. “Our contact with Raul Roa reports that this defection attempt is still alive although Roa would make no firm commitment or promise on whether he would defect in the U.N.,” operations manager, Jacob Esterline, noted in a secret April 11, 1961 progress report on invasion planning. “Roa has requested that no further contact be made at this time.” Like the invasion itself, the Agency’s effort for a dramatic propaganda victory over Cuba was unsuccessful. “The planned defection did not come off,” concedes the Official History.
  • In coordination with the preliminary airstrike on April 14, the CIA, with the support of the Pentagon, requested permission for a series of “large-scale sonic booms” over Havana—a psychological operations tactic the Agency had successfully employed in the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954.  “We were trying to create confusion, and so on,” a top-level CIA invasion planner stated. “I thought a sonic boom would be a helluva swell thing, you know. Break all the windows in downtown Havana…distract Castro.” Trying to maintain “plausible denial” of Washington’s role, the State Department rejected the request as “too obviously U.S.”  The Official History records General Curtis  Lemay demanding on the telephone to know “who was the sonofabitch who didn’t approve” the request.
  • Several damaged invasion airplanes made emergency landings on the Grand Cayman Islands, and were seized by local authorities. The situation created an awkward diplomatic situation with Great Britain; details of the negotiations between the U.S. and England are redacted but the CIA did suggest making the argument that if the planes were not released, Castro would think the Caymans were being used as a launch site for the invasion and respond aggressively.
  • As Castro’s forces gained the upper hand against the invasion, Agency planners reversed a decision against widespread use of napalm bombs “in favor of anything that might reverse the situation in Cuba in favor of the Brigade forces.”
  • Although the CIA had been admonished by both the Eisenhower and Kennedy White House to make sure that the U.S. hand did not show in the invasion, during the fighting headquarters authorized American pilots to fly planes over Cuba.  Secret instructions quoted in the Official History state that Americans could pilot planes but only over the beachhead and not inland. “American crews must not fall into hands enemy,” warned the instructions. If they did “[the] U.S. will deny any knowledge.”  Four American pilots and crew died when their planes were shot down over Cuba. The Official History contains private correspondence with family members of some of the pilots.

Volume II: “Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy” (Part 1 | Part 2)

Volume 2 provides new details on the negotiations and tensions with other countries which the CIA needed to provide logistical and infrastructure support for the invasion preparations. The volume describes Kennedy Administration efforts to sustain the cooperation of Guatemala, where the main CIA-led exile brigade force was trained, as well as the deals made with Gen. Anastacio Somoza and his brother Luis, then the President of Nicaragua. The Official History points out that CIA personnel simply took over diplomatic functions from the State Department in both countries. “In the instance of Guatemala, the U.S. Ambassador for all practical purposes became ‘inoperative’; and in Nicaragua the opposite condition prevailed—anything that the Agency suggested received ambassadorial blessing.”  Among the revelations:

  • While attending John F. Kennedy’s inauguration in Washington in January 1961, General Anastacio Somoza met secretly with CIA director Allen Dulles to discuss the creation of JMTIDE, the cryptonym for the airbase the CIA wanted to use in Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua to launch the attack on Cuba. Somoza explicitly raised Nicaragua’s need for two development loans totaling $10 million. The CIA subsequently pressed the State Department to support the loans, one of which was from the World Bank.
  • President Luis Somoza demanded assurances that the U.S. would stand behind Nicaragua once it became known that the Somozas had supported the invasion. Somoza told the CIA representative that “there are some long-haired Department of State liberals who are not in favor of Somoza and they would welcome this as a source of embarrassment for his government.”
  • Guatemalan President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes repeatedly told CIA officials that he wanted to “see Guatemalan Army and Air Force personnel participate in the air operations against Castro’s Cuba.”
  • The dictator of the Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo, offered his country’s territory in support of the invasion. His quid pro quo was a U.S. assurance to let Trujillo “live out the rest of his days in peace.” The State Department rejected the offer; Trujillo, whose repression and corruption was radicalizing the left in the Dominican Republic, was later assassinated by CIA-backed groups.

Volume III: “Evolution of CIA’s Anti-Castro Policies, 1951- January 1961”

This volume provides the most detailed available account of the decision making process in the White House, CIA and State Department during the Eisenhower administration that led to the Bay of Pigs invasion.  The CIA previously declassified this 300-page report in 1998, pursuant to the Kennedy Assassination Records Act; but it was not made public until 2005 when Villanova professor of political science David Barrett found it in an obscure file at the National Archives, and first posted it on his university’s website.

This volume contains significant new information, and a number of major revelations, particularly regarding Vice-President Richard Nixon’s role and the CIA’s own expectations for the invasion, and on CIA assassination attempts against Fidel Castro.

  • A small group of high-level CIA officials sought to use part of the budget of the invasion to finance a collaboration with the Mafia to assassinate Castro. In an interview with the CIA historian, former chief of the invasion task force, Jacob Esterline, said that he had been asked to provide money from the invasion budget by J.C. King, the head of the Western Hemisphere. “Esterline claimed that on one occasion as chief/w4, he refused to grant Col J.C. King, chief WH Division, a blank check when King refused to tell Jake the purpose for which the check was intended. Esterline reported that King nonetheless got a FAN number from the Office of Finance and that the money was used to pay the Mafia-types.”  The Official History also notes that invasion planners discussed pursuing “Operation AMHINT to set up a program of assassination”—although few details were provided.   In November 1960, Edward Lansdale, a counterinsurgency specialist in the U.S. military who later conceived of Operation Mongoose, sent the invasion task force a “MUST GO LIST” of 11 top Cuban officials, including Che Guevera, Raul Castro, Blas Roca and Carlos Raphael Rodriguez.
  • Vice-President Nixon, who portrayed himself in his memoirs as one of the original architects of the plan to overthrow Castro, proposed to the CIA that they support “goon squads and other direct action groups” inside and outside of Cuba. The Vice President repeatedly sought to interfere in the invasion planning.  Through his national security aide, Nixon demanded that William Pawley, “a big fat political cat,” as Nixon’s aide described him to the CIA, be given briefings and access to CIA officers to share ideas. Pawley pushed the CIA to support untrustworthy exiles as part of the effort to overthrow Castro. “Security already has been damaged severely,” the head of the invasion planning reported, about the communications made with one, Rubio Padilla, one of Pawley’s favorite militants.
  • In perhaps the most important revelation of the entire official history, the CIA task force in charge of the paramilitary assault did not believe it could succeed without becoming an open invasion supported by the U.S. military. On page 149 of Volume III, Pfeiffer quotes still-secret minutes of the Task Force meeting held on November 15, 1960, to prepare a briefing for the new President-elect, John F. Kennedy: “Our original concept is now seen to be unachievable in the face of the controls Castro has instituted,” the document states. “Our second concept (1,500-3000 man force to secure a beach with airstrip) is also now seen to be unachievable, except as a joint Agency/DOD action.”

This candid assessment was not shared with the President-elect then, nor later after the inauguration. As Pfeiffer points out, “what was being denied in confidence in mid-November 1960 became the fact of the Zapata Plan and the Bay of Pigs Operation in March 1961”—run only by the CIA, and with a force of 1,200 men.

Volume IV: The Taylor Committee Investigation of the Bay of Pigs

This volume, which Pfeiffer wrote in an “unclassified” form with the intention of publishing it after he left the CIA, represents his forceful rebuttal to the findings of the Presidential Commission that Kennedy appointed after the failed invasion, headed by General Maxwell Taylor.  In the introduction to the 300 pages volume, Pfeiffer noted that the CIA had been given a historical “bum rap” for “a political decision that insured the military defeat of the anti-Castro forces”—a reference to President Kennedy’s decision not to provide overt air cover and invade Cuba after Castro’s forces overwhelmed the CIA-trained exile Brigade. The Taylor Commission, which included Attorney General Robert Kennedy, he implied, was biased to defend the President at the expense of the CIA. General Taylor’s “strongest tilts were toward deflecting criticism of the White House,” according to the CIA historian.

According to Pfeiffer, this volume would present “the first and only detailed examination of the work of, and findings of, the Taylor Commission to be based on the complete record.”  His objective was to offer “a better understanding of where the responsibility for the fiasco truly lies.” To make sure the reader fully understood his point, Pfeiffer ended the study with an “epilogue” consisting of a one paragraph quote from an interview that Raul Castro gave to a Mexican journalist in 1975. “Kennedy vacillated,” Castro stated. “If at that moment he had decided to invade us, he could have suffocated the island in a sea of blood, but he would have destroyed the revolution. Lucky for us, he vacillated.”

After leaving the CIA in the mid 1980s, Pfeiffer filed a freedom of information act suit to obtain the declassification of this volume, and volume V, of his study, which he intended to publish as a book, defending the CIA. The CIA did eventually declassify volume IV, but withheld volume V in its entirety. Pfeiffer never published the book and this volume never really circulated publicly.

Volume V: The Internal Investigation Report [Still Classified]

Like his forceful critique of the Taylor Commission, Pfeiffer also wrote a critique of the CIA’s own Inspector General’s report on the Bay of Pigs—“Inspector General’s Survey of Cuban Operation”–written by a top CIA officer, Lyman Kirkpatrick in 1961. Much to the surprise and chagrin of top CIA officers at the time, Kirkpatrick laid the blame for the failure squarely at the feet of his own agency, and particularly the chief architect of the operation, Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell. The operation was characterized by “bad planning,” “poor” staffing, faulty intelligence and assumptions, and “a failure to advise the President that success had become dubious.” Moreover, “plausible denial was a pathetic illusion,” the report concluded. “The Agency failed to recognize that when the project advanced beyond the stage of plausible denial it was going beyond the area of Agency responsibility as well as Agency capability.” In his cover letter to the new CIA director, John McCone, Kirkpatrick identified what he called “a tendency in the Agency to gloss over CIA inadequacies and to attempt to fix all of the blame for the failure of the invasion upon other elements of the Government, rather than to recognize the Agency’s weaknesses.”

Pfeiffer’s final volume contains a forceful rebuttal of Kirkpatrick’s focus on the CIA’s own culpability for the events at the Bay of Pigs.  Like the rest of the Official History, the CIA historian defends the CIA against criticism from its own Inspector General and seeks to spread the “Who Lost Cuba” blame to other agencies and authorities of the U.S. government, most notably the Kennedy White House.

When Pfeiffer first sought to obtain declassification of his critique, the Kirkpatrick report was still secret.  The CIA was able to convince a judge that national security would be compromised by the declassification of Pfeiffer’s critique which called attention to this extremely sensitive Top Secret report.  But in 1998, Peter Kornbluh and the National Security Archive used the FOIA to force the CIA to declassify the Inspector General’s report. (Kornbluh subsequently published it as a book: Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba.) Since the Kirkpatrick report has been declassified for over 13 years, it is unclear why the CIA continues to refuse to declassify a single word of Pfeiffer’s final volume.

The National Security Archive remains committed to using all means of legal persuasion to obtain the complete declassification of the final volume of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation.

TOP-SECRET: The Berlin Wall, Fifty Years Ago-U.S. Officials Saw “Long Term Advantage” if Potential Refugees Stayed in East Germany

While Condemning Wall in Public, U.S. Officials Saw “Long Term Advantage” if Potential Refugees Stayed in East Germany

Three Days Before Wall Went Up, CIA Expected East Germany Would Take “Harsher Measures” to Solve Refugee Crisis

Disturbed By Lack of Warning, JFK Asked Intelligence Advisers to Review CIA Performance

Washington, D.C., August 17, 2011 – Fifty years ago, when leaders of the former East Germany (German Democratic Republic) implemented their dramatic decision to seal off East Berlin from the western part of the city, senior Kennedy administration officials publicly condemned them.  Nevertheless, those same officials, including Secretary of State Dean Rusk, secretly saw the Wall as potentially contributing to the stability of East Germany and thereby easing the festering crisis over West Berlin.  Indeed, U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewellyn Thompson had written that “both we and West Germans consider it to our long-range advantage that potential refugees remain [in] East Germany.”  This surprising viewpoint from Thompson and Rusk, among others, is one of a number of points of interest in declassified documents posted today by the National Security Archive.

“Forming a human chain, West Berlin police force hundreds of angry, jeering West Berliners, past the Soviet War Memorial and away from the Brandenberg Gate, 14 August 1961. East German forces held off the surging crow with water cannon before West Berlin police pushed them back to prevent a major incident” [from the USIA caption]

The previously secret documents also reveal new information about one of the remaining unknowns from the period—how well (or poorly) U.S. intelligence agencies carried out their responsibility.  In one record, President John F. Kennedy’s frustration shows through over the fact that he did not receive adequate advance warning of the East German move.

Some of the documents posted today were released by the CIA through its CREST database at the National Archives, College Park.   As a few of them are heavily excised, the National Security Archive has requested further declassification review. Other relevant documents–CIA daily reports to President Kennedy during the Wall crisis–remain classified because of agency insistence that sources and methods are at risk.  The Archive has appealed these denials.

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On 13 August 1961, East German security officials imposed harsh controls at the East-West borders in Berlin designed to stop the flow of thousands of refugees, mostly fleeing through West Berlin.  Implausibly justifying the measures as a defense against West German aggression, the fundamental concern was the threat of economic disaster for the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). To stop its citizens from escaping, the GDR put up barbed-wire fences which soon turned into concrete barriers. A wall was being constructed (although it became a taboo in the GDR to call it a “Wall” (Note 1)).  Declassified documents posted today by the National Security Archive shed light on how U.S. diplomats and intelligence analysts understood the East German refugee crisis and the sector border closings.

For nearly thirty years, the Berlin Wall was the symbol of a tyrannical regime that had virtually imprisoned its population.  When the Wall went up, however, the Western Allies with occupation zones in West Berlin—France, the United Kingdom, and the United States–were already at loggerheads with the Soviet Union over the status of West Berlin.  Since November 1958, when Khrushchev issued his first ultimatum, many worried that Khrushchev and Ulbricht might sign a peace treaty that could threaten Allied and West German access to West Berlin. (Note 2)  For those reasons, key U.S. government officials did not see the Wall as a threat to vital interests; they had even thought it better if potential East German refugees stayed at home. While seeing the sector border closing as a “serious matter,” Secretary of State Dean Rusk probably breathed a sigh of relief when he observed that it “would make a Berlin settlement easier.”

The decision taken in early July 1961 by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and East German president Walter Ulbricht to close the border was a deep secret. While no one on the U.S. side predicted a “wall”, diplomats and intelligence analysts saw the possibility of harsh steps to stop the refugee traffic.  Nevertheless, East Germany’s draconian moves to close the sector borders came as a surprise to President Kennedy.  Declassified documents shed light on what some saw as an intelligence failure or at least a failure by intelligence agencies to warn President Kennedy and his advisers of the possibility of GDR action.

“An East Berliner pleads with members of the East German People’s Police as he tried to cross the closed border between East and West Berlin, 8-14-1961” [from the USIA caption]

Among the other disclosures in this release:

  • According to a State Department report, the CIA Station in West Berlin attributed the GDR refugee crisis to the larger crisis over West Berlin.  East German citizens worried that if Khrushchev and Ulbricht signed a treaty separating East from West Berlin, their “last chance to escape” would end.
  • State Department officials recommended that if the East Germans and the Soviets took severe action to halt the flow of refugees, Washington should protest and “advertise it to the world,” but avoid any action that exacerbated the problem. A revolt in East Germany was not in the U.S. interests “at this time.”
  • During the weeks before the Wall crisis, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewellyn Thompson observed rather pitilessly that “except for the danger of building up pressure for explosion [in the GDR] both we and West Germans consider it to our long-range advantage that potential refugees remain [in] East Germany.”  The implication was that the refugee crisis was destabilizing East Germany and that if East Germans stayed home this could ease Soviet pressure on West Berlin.
  • Officials at the U.S. mission in West Berlin reported on 7 August that if the daily rate (during July 1961) of over 1,100 refugees continued, it would have an “unquestionably disastrous” impact on the GDR economy.  East German security police were already removing from trains to East Berlin “almost all males between the ages of 12 and 35.”
  • The CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence reported on 10 August that the regime is considering “harsher measures to reduce the flow” of refugees, although it did not list any possibilities.
  • In a speech on 10 August, Ulbricht declared that “We have discussed the (refugee) matter with our Soviet friends and with representatives of the Warsaw Pact states and we have agreed that the time has come when one must say ‘so far and no further.'”  Several months later, the U.S. President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) saw this statement as the “best indicator” that action was about to take place.
  • Washington and other Allied governments did not take significant countermeasures against the sector border closings because basic allied rights were not at stake.  Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressed prevailing sentiment when he declared that the wall was not a “shooting issue.”
  • Allied inaction and the shock of the border closing caused a significant morale problem in Germany, especially West Berlin, which the Kennedy administration tried to remedy. Within a few days, a U.S. Army combat brigade arrived in West Berlin and so did Vice President Lyndon Johnson.
  • President Kennedy’s feeling that he was not adequately warned about the imminent of East German action to close down the sector borders led him to ask the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board for a report on what “advance information” the intelligence agencies had.”  According to PFIAB, intelligence agencies had not provided top policymakers with “adequate and timely appraisals of the advance information which had been collected.”
  • A year after the Wall went up, State Department officials learned from British diplomats that Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan had agreed with British Labor Party Leader Harold Wilson’s statement that the Wall was a “scandal and a blot on Communism.”

As noted, one of the few remaining puzzles about the U.S. reaction to the Wall concerns the performance of U.S. intelligence during the lead-up to the sector border closing.  The CIA provided Kennedy with a daily report, the “President’s Intelligence Checklist” [PICL] (the forerunner to the President’s Daily Brief), but what it had sent Kennedy during the previous several days remains a secret. So far the CIA has refused to declassify any of the PICLS produced during 10-14 August 1961 (and a PFIAB report on the CIA’s conduct remains heavily excised).  But the National Security Archive’s mandatory review appeal for the PICLS is before the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel which may decide that CIA secrecy claims are inflated and declassify information.


Read the Documents

Monitored by East German police, a mason builds a concrete wall at the sector border, mid-August 1961. East Berliner pleads with members of the East German People’s Police as he tried to cross the closed border between East and West Berlin, 8-14-1961

Document 1: John C. Ausland, Berlin Desk, Office of German Affairs, to Mr. Hillenbrand, “Discontent in East Germany,” 18 July 1961, Secret
Source: William Burr, ed., The Berlin Crisis 1958-1062  (Digital National Security Archive)

With thousands of refugees fleeing East Germany, mostly through West Berlin–more than 100,000 during January-June 1961–Ulbricht importuned Khrushchev to let him close the sector borders at the East-West line in Berlin.  The Soviets understood that such action would have a adverse impact on East and West German opinion, but, as Hope Harrison has shown, in early July 1961 Khrushchev secretly approved Ulbricht’s request. (Note 3)

The Khrushchev-Ulbricht decision was closely held, but the options available to Communist leaders could be deduced.  Looking closely at developments in East Germany, John C. Ausland saw a highly unstable situation, with the refugee flow stemming directly, according to the CIA, from Moscow’s tough policy on West Berlin:  What inspired East Germans to flee was their apprehension that  if the Soviets signed a treaty with the GDR, a “last chance to escape” would end.  While the odds for an internal revolt in East Germany were low at the moment, if the Ulbricht regime took harsh measures to stop the flow of refugees, a “deep deterioration” and a domestic explosion could transpire.

Ausland commented on a recent comment by U.S. Ambassador to West Germany John Dowling that if another revolt in East Germany broke out, the United States should not “stay on the sidelines” as it had during the 1953 uprising. (Note 4) Noting that the U.S. did not want to see another revolt in East Germany as in 1953 at “this time,” Ausland also argued that Washington did it want to exacerbate the situation. He may have been concerned about the anticipated violence of Soviet and East German repression and the risk that an uprising in East Germany could lead to wider conflict, even East-West warfare, in Central Europe.  Yet if Moscow and East Berlin took action to halt the flow of refugees, Washington should “help advertise it to the world.”  The U.S. could consider economic countermeasures if the GDR clamped down on the borders to stop refugees.

Document 2: State Department cable to Bonn Embassy, 22 July 1961, Secret
Source: The Berlin Crisis

In a cable drafted by Ausland and summarizing the analysis in his memorandum, the State Department informed U.S. diplomats in Bonn that, in light of the refugee flow, two possibilities existed:  East German action to tighten control of the movement of people between East and West Berlin or serious economic problems leading to “serious disorders.” While the Soviets wanted to reach a settlement on the West Berlin problem, they were sitting on “top of a volcano” and would support “restrictive measures” if the flow of refugees continued.   In the short term, however, the Department estimated that the Soviets would “tolerate” the refugee problem while pressing for a Berlin situation, unless the refugee problem worsened.  The U.S. would benefit from some social instability in East Germany because it could force the Soviets to relax pressure on West Berlin, but “we would not like to see revolt at this time.”

Document 3: West Berlin mission cable 87 to State Department, 24 July 1961
Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, National Security Files, box 91, Germany, Berlin, Cables 7/16/61-7/25/61

Responding to the Department’s cable (document 2) on the East German refugee crisis, West Berlin mission chief Allen Lightner did not pick up on the State Department’s references to the possibility of security measures to close the sector borders.  Instead, he suggested that continued refugee flow or adverse East German internal reaction to an East German-Soviet peace treaty might hold back Khrushchev from initiating a “showdown” over West Berlin. Believing that more was needed than “advertising the facts,” Lightner suggested “intensifying doubts and fears” among Soviet leaders about the possibility of an East German uprising through a program of overt and covert political and diplomatic operations.  Noting that so far West Germany had not encouraged refugees to head West, but had actually discouraged them (possibly to minimize East-West tensions and perhaps to minimize the costs of absorbing the refugees), Lightner suggested that Bonn and Washington could threaten to reverse that policy.

Document 4: Moscow Embassy Cable 258 to Department of State, July 24, 1961, Secret,
Source: RG 59, Decimal Files 1960-1963, 762.00/7-2461 (from microfilm)

Commenting on the State Department cable (document 2), Ambassador Thompson argued that one of the chief Soviet objectives in the Berlin crisis was the “cessation of refugee flow” from East Germany. Noting that both Washington and Bonn believed it “to our long-range advantage that potential refugees remain in East Germany” (probably to reduce Soviet pressure on West Berlin), Thompson nevertheless conceded that unilateral GDR action would have “many advantages for us” by demonstrating the weaknesses of the Soviet and East German position.  He advised against giving the impression that Washington would take “strong countermeasures” if the GDR “closed the hatch” to avoid possible threats to Western access to Berlin.

Document 5: West Berlin mission cable 127 to State Department, 2 August 1961
Source: RG 59, Decimal Files 1960-1963, 762.00/7-2461 (from microfilm)

The Berlin mission cited report on a growing number of “border crossers”–East Berliners who had day jobs in West Berlin–among the refugees but the West Berlin Senate was not sure whether a “trend” had begun or not.  It was also not clear whether the East Germans had begun a targeted crack-down on the “border-crossers” although there were reports of an “intimidation campaign.”

“West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt welcomes Colonel Glover S. Johns. Jr. Commanding Officer of the1st Battle Group, 18th U.S. Infantry, as the unit arrived in the city 8-20-1961 to reinforce the defense garrison there. At center is Vice President Lyndon B.  Johnson,  who was in Germany as personal representative of the President of the United States. The troops came to West Berlin via the autobahn corridor across East Germany” [from the USIA caption]

Document 6: Bonn Embassy Airgram A-135 to State Department, 3 August 1961, Limited Official Use
Source: The Berlin Crisis

On July 30, 1961, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark) made a television statement suggesting that closing the Berlin escape hatch could be a subject for negotiations over West Berlin.  He said further that the “truth of the matter is that …the Russians have the power to close it in any case. I mean you are not giving up very much because I believe that next week if they chose to close their borders, they could without violating any treaty.” Further, the East Germans “have a right to close their borders.” (Note 5)  As the U.S. Embassy in Bonn reported, Fulbright’s comments created a furor in West Germany and West Berlin. For example, at first West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt could not believe that Fulbright had said it.  Certainly, East German and Soviet authorities must have seen it as a signal that the West would tolerate the closing of the sector borders.

Document 7: West Berlin Mission Despatch 72 to State Department, “Soviet Zone of Germany – Refugees, Border Crossers (Grenzaengers), East German Police Controls, and Recent East German Legal-Judicial Actions,” 7 August 1961, Official Use Only
Source: The Berlin Crisis

The U.S. mission in West Berlin provided a full account of the ins and outs of the “second Berlin access problem,” the right of entry into West Berlin of the 16 million residents of East Germany and East Berlin.  While the “first Berlin access problem”—Allied and West German access to West Berlin—was in a “pre-crisis” or “potential crisis stage,” the “second access problem” was “nearer to a ‘crisis’ stage as a result of recent repressive actions by the Soviet Zone regime.”  With over 1,100 refugees arriving in West Berlin and West Germany daily, a rate which had “unquestionably disastrous” implications for GDR, East German security police were tightening up controls on roads, railroads, commuter trains, and the Berlin subway.  Receiving close scrutiny by police and courts were younger men and “border crossers,” East Berliners who worked in West Berlin and were fleeing in larger numbers.  Sent by diplomatic pouch, this report did not reach the State Department Berlin Desk until 14 August, the day after the sector border closing.
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Document 8: “Daily Brief” and “East German Security Measures Against the Refugees,” Central Intelligence Bulletin, 9 August 1961, Top Secret, Excised copy
Source: CIA Research Tool (CREST), National Archives II

While “morale” in West Berlin was fluctuating, partly because of apprehension about possible Western diplomatic compromises with Moscow, refugees were entering the West in record numbers. The East German government was “faced with the dilemma that actions necessary to halt the refugee flow would in all likelihood cause a sharp and dangerous rise in popular discontent.”  So far refraining from adopting “special internal security measures,” the regime was using normal police controls and propaganda techniques to “stem the flow.”   The most coercive measure taken so far was forcing “border crossers” to register with GDR authorities, an action that had also been coordinated with the Soviets. (Note 6)

Document 9: Memorandum of conversation, “Secretary’s Meeting with European Ambassadors,” Paris, 9 August 1961, Secret
Source: State Department Freedom of Information Act release to National Security Archive

While in Paris for meetings with French, British and West German foreign ministers, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other senior officials held a lengthy discussion with U.S. ambassadors on the Berlin crisis and its implications.  The East German refugee problem did not get a mention, which suggests its low salience for the Kennedy administration’s Berlin policy. As Rusk emphasized it was important to “draw a line between what was vital to our interests and [what was] important but not worth risking the precipitation of armed conflict.”  As Kennedy had stressed in a televised address on 24 July, Rusk argued that what was vital was “the Western presence in West Berlin” and “our physical access to the city.” Rusk was hopeful that the Soviets did not intend to threaten those interests and would be amenable to negotiations over non-vital interests. A “peaceful settlement” was essential because in the nuclear age, war could no “longer be a deliberate instrument of national policy.”

Document 10: “The East German Refugees,” Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 10 August 1961, excised copy [full version undergoing declassification review at request of National Security Archive)
Source: CREST

As the refugee crisis intensified, the CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence prepared a fairly detailed analysis, including numbers of refugees, their motives, the impact on East Germany, countermeasures, and the effect on Ulbricht and Khrushchev. The volume of refugees was the highest since the crisis year of 1953 and as already noted, fear that the Soviets would sign a treaty with the GDR affecting the status of West Berlin provided a significant motivation to flee.  The report cited “evidence that the regime is considering harsher measures to reduce the flow” but the evidence is excised from this release except for a reference to decrees that would soon be emanating from the East German Peoples Chamber.  Most likely this report went to middle-level officials at other intelligence agencies, the State Department, and the Pentagon.  While the CIA could not predict when or how the GDR would act, anyone who read it could not have been too surprised by what took place a few days later. (Note 7)

Document 11: “Daily Brief and “Marshall Konev,” Central Intelligence Bulletin, 11 August 1961, Top Secret, Excised copy, excerpts
Source: CREST

On 9 August, over 1,600 refugees from East Germany and East Berlin registered at the refugee reception center at Marienfelde.  The appointment of the former Warsaw Pact commander, Marshall Ivan Konev, as commander of Soviet forces in East Germany was a sign of Khrushchev’s “efforts to impress the West with his determination to conclude a German treaty before the end of this year.”

Document 12: West Berlin mission cable 176 to State Department, 13 August 1961, Confidential
Source: The Berlin Crisis

Early in the morning of 13 August 1961, the East German regime enacted decrees mandating “drastic control measures” at the sector borders to prevent East Germans from going into West Berlin. The East Germans had planned to take this action early on a Sunday morning to catch East and West Berliners by surprise, when most were distracted by weekend holiday plans or were otherwise not up and about. (Note 8) Panic in East Berlin and shock in West Berlin and elsewhere quickly followed the border closing.

Mission chief Allen Lightner speculated that the decision may have been taken at a recent Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow, a view that would soon be held by many scholars.  As Hope Harrison has demonstrated, the basic decision had already been taken but the Warsaw Pact meeting during 3-5 August was important for consensus-building purposes in the Eastern bloc, but also as a deterrent so that the West did not see the GDR action as “only its plan.” (Note 9)

Document 13: West Berlin mission cable 186 to State Department, 13 August 1961, Confidential
Source: The Berlin Crisis

The mission provided the State Department with an update of the controls over the East German population. Subway cars heading into the West failed to show up and control measures were being implemented “everywhere” with East German police stringing up barbed wire at border points. The flow of refugees had not stopped entirely, because people were fleeing through the canals and fields.  The mission interpreted Soviet troop deployments on the periphery of Berlin as a “show of strength” to “intimidate” East Berliners and disabuse them of any notion of initiating resistance as in 1953.   So far East German officials had not interfered with the movement of Western observers.

Document 14: State Department cable 340 to Embassy Bonn, 13 August 1961, unclassified
Source: The Berlin Crisis

Secretary of Dean Rusk quickly issued a statement condemning the sector border closings as a “flagrant violation of the right of free circulation throughout the city.”  “Communist authorities are now denying the right of individuals to elect a world of free choice rather than a world of coercion.”  Rusk noted that the actions taken by the East Germans violated Berlin’s four power status but they were not aimed at “the allied position in West Berlin or access thereto.”  That is, they did not touch on the “vital interests” which Rusk had discussed with U.S. diplomats on 9 August.  A few days later, during a meeting of the Berlin Steering Group, Rusk underlined the point when he observed that the sector border closing was a “non-shooting” issue. At the same time, he speculated that the Berlin Wall might help solve the crisis, implying that a more stable GDR might make the Soviets more relaxed about the West Berlin problem (see document 21 at page 86).  Nevertheless, serious tensions over West Berlin persisted during the months that followed. (Note 10)

Document 15: Analysis by Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, cable to White House/Hyannis[port], circa 13-14 August 1961, Secret
Source: CIA FOIA Web site

The CIA kept the White House informed of current developments in Berlin with memoranda like this, but President Kennedy was not satisfied that he had been given adequate warning of the possibility of imminent GDR action to close the sector borders.  Apparently, when the news reached Kennedy at Hyannisport at about 1 p.m., he reacted with some irritation, “How come we didn’t know anything about this?” (Note 11) As noted earlier, what the CIA had reported to President Kennedy in the PICL during the days before the Wall Crisis remains classified.

Document 16: Central Intelligence Agency, “Berlin Situation Report (As of 1630 Hours),” 15 August 1961, excised copy
Source: CIA Research Tool (CREST), National Archives II

CIA had conflicting reports, but the indications were that the East Germans had extended the crackdown to West Berliners and West Germans, who now would be required to get a permit if they wished to enter (or drive into) East Berlin.

Document 17: “Conclusion of Special USIB [U.S. Intelligence Board] Subcommittee on Berlin Situation,”
Central Intelligence Bulletin, 16 August 1961, Top Secret, Excised copy, excerpts
Source:  CREST

The USIB Subcommittee believed that a “critical stage” had been reached that could lead to “severe local demonstrations,” but downplayed the possibility of an uprising: “In contrast to the situation in June 1953, the regime has taken the initiative” and has made “an all-out effort to intimidate the population.”

Document 18: Bonn Embassy cable 354 to State Department, 17 August 1961, Secret
Source: The Berlin Crisis

Assessing the German reaction to the sector border closing, Ambassador Dowling was not overly concerned about the situation in West Germany, but he did see a “crisis of confidence” in West Berlin.  Washington needed to take “dramatic steps” steps to improve the “psychological climate” there.  Martin Hillenbrand, director of the Office of German Affairs later observed that “the volatility of Berlin sentiment, either in the direction of courage or panic, has frequently caught the Western powers by surprise, and this was to provide another good example.” (Note 12)

Document 19: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, “Current Intelligence Weekly Summary,” 17 August 1961, Secret, excised and incomplete copy
Source: The Berlin Crisis

This report summarized the status of border controls, refugee movements, communications, Soviet and Eastern bloc positions, and reactions in West Berlin and West Germany.  The report refers to concerns about a “crisis of confidence” in West Berlin, where the population is becoming “increasingly restive over the lack of prompt Western countermeasures.”` The unrest depicted in photo 2 conveys some of the agitation.

Document 20: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, “Current Intelligence Weekly Summary,” 24 August 1961, Secret, excised copy, excerpts
Source: CREST

This CIA report provides an update on the new GDR controls at the sector border, the construction of concrete barriers to replace barbed-wire fences, tightened regulation of passage by West Berliners and West Germans into East Berlin, interference with Allied military traffic into the East, and security measures.  Despite the controls, “significant” numbers were still escaping from the East.  The morale problem cited in earlier reports and cables had become less severe owing to the deployment of a U.S. Army battle group and a visit by Vice President Lyndon Johnson. While the Soviets had protested the visits by Johnson and Chancellor Adenauer and accused the West of “provocative” activities” in Berlin, they “sought to minimize the prospect of an imminent crisis,” by playing down immediate threats to Western access to the city.

Document 21: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, “Current Intelligence Weekly Summary,” 31 August 1961, Secret, excised copy, excerpts
Source: CREST

According to the CIA, Moscow’s decision to resume nuclear testing suggested that Khrushchev had resorted to “nuclear intimidation” to offset his weakened bargaining position in the Berlin crisis. The sector border closing “severely damaged their efforts to present the East German regime as a sovereign and respectable negotiating partner.” The situation in West Berlin remained difficult; whatever positive impact Vice President Johnson’s visit had on morale had been weakened by East German threats against Western air access to West Berlin. “[A] feeling of frustration and hopeless is already beginning to spread through the West Berlin population.”

Document 22: Executive Secretary, U.S. Intelligence Board, “Review of Advance Intelligence Pertaining to the Berlin Wall and Syrian Coup Incidents,” 12 February 1962, enclosing memorandum from McGeorge Bundy  to Director of Central Intelligence, 22 January 1962,  with report by President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Top Secret, excised copy (full version undergoing declassification review at request of National Security Archive)
Source: CREST

President Kennedy’s feeling that he was not adequately warned about the imminent East German action and a coup in Syria on 28 September led him to ask the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) for a report on what “advance information” the intelligence agencies had before the events and “what lessons might be learned.” According to PFIAB, in both incidents “indications of imminent significant developments were apparently lost sight of in the mass of intelligence reports.”  With respect to Berlin, no one knew when the “Berlin Wall” was going up, but “our intelligence collectors did obtain information which pointed to the possible imminence of drastic action by the East German regime.”  The problem was the intelligence agencies had not provided top policymakers with “adequate and timely appraisals of the advance information which had been collected.”  Case studies of the incidents are heavily excised, but PFIAB declared that a comment by Ulbricht in a public speech on 10 August was the “best indicator” of imminent action.  It would be interesting to know how the CIA responded to the PFIAB appraisal, but such information is not available.

Document 23: State Department cable 430 to Bonn Embassy, 14 August 1962, Secret
Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, State Department Decimal Files, 1960-1963, 641.61/8-1462 

About a year after the Wall started going up, British Labor Party leader, and future Prime Minister, Harold Wilson met with Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan. According to British diplomats in Washington, Wilson began the conversation by asking “whether Mikoyan did not think Wall was a scandal and blot on Communism.”  Mikoyan agreed but “said Wall was necessary to prevent clashes between two halves of Berlin.” This is probably a reference to Soviet claims about provocative actions by West Berlin around the time the sector borders were closed.  In any event, Mikoyan assured Wilson that Moscow was keeping a “tight hold on Ulbricht and would not let matters go out of hand.”

Document 24: U.S Department of State, Historical Studies Division, Crisis over Berlin: American Policy concerning the Soviet Threats to Berlin, November 1958-December 1962; Part VI: Deepening Crisis over Berlin–Communist Challenges and Western Responses, June-September 1961, April 1970, Top Secret, Excerpts
Source: Berlin Crisis

During the late 1960s, Department of State historians produced a major study of the 1958-1962 Berlin Crisis, although they did not get the opportunity to complete it. This excerpt provides a useful overview of the refugee crisis and the Kennedy administration’s policy response, including countermeasures and steps to raise morale in West Berlin.  Many of the documents cited and summarized were later published in the Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States volumes on the Berlin Crisis.


Notes

1. Patrick Major, Behind the Berlin Wall: East Germany and the Frontiers of Power (Oxford,: Oxford University Press, 2010), 143.  The official term was “Anti-Fascist Defense Rampart” or antifaschistischer Shutzwall).

2. For recent accounts of the 1961 crisis, see Frederick Kempe, Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth ( G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2011); Pertti Ahonen. Death at the Berlin Wall (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011); W.R. Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall : “a hell of a lot better than a war” (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), and Patrick Major, Behind the Berlin Wall: East Germany and the Frontiers of Power.  For an influential study of East German-Soviet relations during the 1950s through the Berlin crisis, see Hope Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations,1953-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003),

3. Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall. 184-187.

4. For a full account of the 1953 East German revolt, see Christian F. Ostermann, Uprising in East Germany 1953: The Cold War, the German Question, and the First Major Upheaval behind the Iron Curtain (Budapest; New York : Central European University Press, 2001).

5. “Senator’s Remarks on TV, “The New York Times, 3 August 1961.

6. Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall, 188-189.

7. Apparently a few intelligence officers in West Berlin predicted a “Wall”. See Peter Wyden, Wall: Inside Story of Divided Berlin (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1989), at 91-93.

8. Ibid.,189.

9. Ibid., 192.
10. See for example, Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam (New York: Oxford, 2000), 79-91, and Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall.
11. Peter Wyden, Wall: Inside Story of Divided Berlin (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1989), 26.
12. Martin Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time: Memoirs of a Diplomat (Athens: University of Georgia, 1998), 190.

CONFIDENTIAL: GALILEO/M-CODE: INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL ITALIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 004746 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2013
TAGS: ECPS ETRD IT TSPA TSPL PREL EUN

SUBJECT: GALILEO/M-CODE: INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL ITALIAN
ATTENTION -- BUT NO ANSWERS 

    CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR MEL SEMBLER FOR REASONS 1.5 (B)(D) 

1. (C)  AT THE END OF AN OCTOBER 9 MEETING ON ANOTHER SUBJECT
WITH PM BERLUSCONI'S CLOSEST ADVISOR, PRIME MINISTRY
UNDERSECRETARY GIANNI LETTA, AMBASSADOR SEMBLER TOOK THE
OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THE USG'S CONTINUED GREAT CONCERN OVER
LACK OF PROGRESS ON RESOLVING THE GALILEO/M-CODE OVERLAY
DISAGREEMENT WITH THE EU.  THE AMBASSADOR TOLD LETTA BLUNTLY
THAT THE DISPUTE RISKS BECOMING A TRAIN WRECK ON ITALY'S EU
WATCH UNLESS MORE CONCERTED POLITICAL-LEVEL ATTENTION IS
GIVEN TO THE ISSUE.  THE USG FELT THAT THAT AMERICAN
TECHNICAL EXPERTS HAD PROVIDED COMMISSION EXPERTS WITH
EXHAUSTIVE CLASSIFIED TECHNICAL BRIEFINGS, WHICH HAD
DEMONSTRATED PERSUASIVELY THAT NON-OVERLAY SPECTRAL OPTIONS
EXIST, WHICH WILL NOT DEGRADE GALILEO CAPABILITIES.
NEVERTHELESS, THE COMMISSION AND EU GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN
UNWILLING TO TAKE THE POLITICAL STEP TO DRAW THE OBVIOUS
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS.

2. (C)  LETTA RESPONDED THAT SENIOR LEVELS OF THE ITALIAN
GOVERNMENT WERE IN FACT PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION TO GALILEO.
IN THE PRIME MINISTRY, DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR GIOVANNI
CASTELANETTA HAD BEEN BRIEFING PM BERLUSCONI REGULARLY.
LETTA ALSO NOTED THAT DURING CABINET MEETINGS DEFENSE
MINISTER MARTINO HAD SPOKEN OPENLY IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S.
POSITION.  NEVERTHELESS, LETTA OFFERED NO CLEAR INDICATION OF
WHAT FURTHER ACTIONS, IF ANY, THE GOI PLANNED TO TAKE WITHIN
THE EU. 

3. (C)  IN A SEPARATE MEETING OCTOBER 14 WITH ECMIN, AGAIN ON
ANOTHER SUBJECT, GENERAL LEONARDO TRICARICO (THE PRIME
    MINISTER'S MILITARY AND SECURITY ADVISOR) TOOK THE INITIATIVE
TO RAISE THE MATTER OF GALILEO.  ECMIN REVIEWED USG CONCERNS
FOR TRICARICO, AS WELL AS THE AMBASSADOR'S EXCHANGE WITH
LETTA.  ALTHOUGH HE ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RECENT
MEETINGS IN LONDON AND WASHINGTON, AND WAS CLEARLY ANXIOUS
ABOUT THE LACK OF FORWARD MOVEMENT IN U.S.-EU DISCUSSIONS,
TRICARICO WAS AT A LOSS TO SUGGEST WHAT ACTIONS ITALY SHOULD
OR COULD TAKE. 

4. (C)  COMMENT:  LETTA'S ACCOUNT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION
ITALIAN MINISTERS -- INCLUDING THE PM -- ARE GIVING THE
GALILEO/M-CODE DISPUTE IS WELCOME NEWS.  REPORTS OF DEFMIN
MARTINO'S UNAMBIGUOUS SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. POSITION IS
WELCOME, AND CONFIRMS WHAT HE HAS TOLD US.  (BUT MARTINO HAS
ALSO BEEN QUICK TO POINT OUT THAT HE NEEDS KEY ALLIES, SUCH
AS LETTA, IN ORDER TO SUCCEED IN THE INTERMINISTERIAL
PROCESS.)  NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS LITTLE INDICATION THAT THE
GOI HAS ANY GAME PLAN ON HOW TO PREVENT THE WRONG OUTCOME AT
THE IMPORTANT DECEMBER MEETING OF EU TRANSPORT MINISTERS.
EMBASSY STANDS READY TO CONTINUE TO ENGAGE THE GOI AT THE
HIGHEST LEVELS ON GALILEO AS WASHINGTON AGENCIES WORK OUT THE
NEXT STEPS IN OUR STRATEGY.  END COMMENT.
SEMBLER 

NNNN
 2003ROME04746 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL

TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCIVES OF THE FBI: THE FRANK SINATRA DOCUMENTS PART 1


Francis “Frank” Albert Sinatra (1915-1998), singer and actor, appears in many FBI files. He was the target of many extortion attempts that the FBI investigated. Sinatra also appeared in FBI files in connection with his contacts with racketeering investigation subjects and his early involvement with the Communist Party in Hollywood. The dates of these files fall between 1943 and 1985.

Download the files below by mouseclick

sinatr1a

sinatr1b

sinatr2a

sinatr2b

sinatr2c

sinatr2d

sinatr3a

TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE CIA: TERRORISM REVIEW – ANTI-US TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA

TERRORISM REVIEW – ANTI-US TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA

TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE CIA: US INTELLIGENCE AND VIETNAM

US INTELLIGENCE AND VIETNAM

CONFIDENTIAL: GALILEO/M-CODE: INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL ITALIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 004746 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2013
TAGS: ECPS ETRD IT TSPA TSPL PREL EUN

SUBJECT: GALILEO/M-CODE: INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL ITALIAN
ATTENTION -- BUT NO ANSWERS 

    CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR MEL SEMBLER FOR REASONS 1.5 (B)(D) 

1. (C)  AT THE END OF AN OCTOBER 9 MEETING ON ANOTHER SUBJECT
WITH PM BERLUSCONI'S CLOSEST ADVISOR, PRIME MINISTRY
UNDERSECRETARY GIANNI LETTA, AMBASSADOR SEMBLER TOOK THE
OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THE USG'S CONTINUED GREAT CONCERN OVER
LACK OF PROGRESS ON RESOLVING THE GALILEO/M-CODE OVERLAY
DISAGREEMENT WITH THE EU.  THE AMBASSADOR TOLD LETTA BLUNTLY
THAT THE DISPUTE RISKS BECOMING A TRAIN WRECK ON ITALY'S EU
WATCH UNLESS MORE CONCERTED POLITICAL-LEVEL ATTENTION IS
GIVEN TO THE ISSUE.  THE USG FELT THAT THAT AMERICAN
TECHNICAL EXPERTS HAD PROVIDED COMMISSION EXPERTS WITH
EXHAUSTIVE CLASSIFIED TECHNICAL BRIEFINGS, WHICH HAD
DEMONSTRATED PERSUASIVELY THAT NON-OVERLAY SPECTRAL OPTIONS
EXIST, WHICH WILL NOT DEGRADE GALILEO CAPABILITIES.
NEVERTHELESS, THE COMMISSION AND EU GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN
UNWILLING TO TAKE THE POLITICAL STEP TO DRAW THE OBVIOUS
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS.

2. (C)  LETTA RESPONDED THAT SENIOR LEVELS OF THE ITALIAN
GOVERNMENT WERE IN FACT PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION TO GALILEO.
IN THE PRIME MINISTRY, DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR GIOVANNI
CASTELANETTA HAD BEEN BRIEFING PM BERLUSCONI REGULARLY.
LETTA ALSO NOTED THAT DURING CABINET MEETINGS DEFENSE
MINISTER MARTINO HAD SPOKEN OPENLY IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S.
POSITION.  NEVERTHELESS, LETTA OFFERED NO CLEAR INDICATION OF
WHAT FURTHER ACTIONS, IF ANY, THE GOI PLANNED TO TAKE WITHIN
THE EU. 

3. (C)  IN A SEPARATE MEETING OCTOBER 14 WITH ECMIN, AGAIN ON
ANOTHER SUBJECT, GENERAL LEONARDO TRICARICO (THE PRIME
    MINISTER'S MILITARY AND SECURITY ADVISOR) TOOK THE INITIATIVE
TO RAISE THE MATTER OF GALILEO.  ECMIN REVIEWED USG CONCERNS
FOR TRICARICO, AS WELL AS THE AMBASSADOR'S EXCHANGE WITH
LETTA.  ALTHOUGH HE ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RECENT
MEETINGS IN LONDON AND WASHINGTON, AND WAS CLEARLY ANXIOUS
ABOUT THE LACK OF FORWARD MOVEMENT IN U.S.-EU DISCUSSIONS,
TRICARICO WAS AT A LOSS TO SUGGEST WHAT ACTIONS ITALY SHOULD
OR COULD TAKE. 

4. (C)  COMMENT:  LETTA'S ACCOUNT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION
ITALIAN MINISTERS -- INCLUDING THE PM -- ARE GIVING THE
GALILEO/M-CODE DISPUTE IS WELCOME NEWS.  REPORTS OF DEFMIN
MARTINO'S UNAMBIGUOUS SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. POSITION IS
WELCOME, AND CONFIRMS WHAT HE HAS TOLD US.  (BUT MARTINO HAS
ALSO BEEN QUICK TO POINT OUT THAT HE NEEDS KEY ALLIES, SUCH
AS LETTA, IN ORDER TO SUCCEED IN THE INTERMINISTERIAL
PROCESS.)  NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS LITTLE INDICATION THAT THE
GOI HAS ANY GAME PLAN ON HOW TO PREVENT THE WRONG OUTCOME AT
THE IMPORTANT DECEMBER MEETING OF EU TRANSPORT MINISTERS.
EMBASSY STANDS READY TO CONTINUE TO ENGAGE THE GOI AT THE
HIGHEST LEVELS ON GALILEO AS WASHINGTON AGENCIES WORK OUT THE
NEXT STEPS IN OUR STRATEGY.  END COMMENT.
SEMBLER 

NNNN
 2003ROME04746 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL 

"

CONFIDENTIAL: GALILEO: AMBASSADOR ARAGONA ADVOCATES ADDITIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 003567 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR OES/SAT (BRAIBANTI, KARNER)
DEFENSE FOR OASD/NII (STENBIT MANNO WORMSER SWIDER CHESKY)
DEFENSE ALSO FOR OSD/P (TOWNSEND, NOVAK)
JOINT STAFF FOR J5/J6 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2013
T...

SUBJECT: GALILEO: AMBASSADOR ARAGONA ADVOCATES ADDITIONAL
TECHNICAL TALKS TO RESOLVE M-CODE OVERLAY ISSUE 

REF: USNATO 00777 

Classified By: A/ECMIN David W. Mulenex; reasons 1.5 B and D. 

1.  (C)  Summary:  Italian MFA Political Director Gianfranco
Aragona informed a U.S. delegation on July 16 that he still
believes technical solutions exist to the U.S.-EU dispute
over the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) signal
overlay of the M-code.  Aragona recognized US security
concerns regarding the overlay, but repeatedly insisted the
EU must safeguard the "Integrity and operability" of Galileo.
 The U.S. delegation insisted that an overlay would harm U.S.
and NATO NAVWAR capabilities and put lives at risk in the
event of warfare.  Aragona did not completely reject the
delegation's point that a political solution was necessary to
avoid this outcome but made it clear he does not believe the
dispute is ripe for high level political intervention.
Aragona did agree that the delegation's suggestion to merge
unclassified technical talks and plenary negotiations was a
good idea and promised to convey the idea to the Commission.
Aragona stated firmly that NATO would not be an acceptable
venue for classified discussions.  He suggested they could
take place at the US Mission to NATO, but insisted that he
participants must be limited to the U.S. and the EC.  See
Embassy comment para 16. End Summary. 

2.  (U)  On July 16 a U.S. delegation met with Italian MFA
Political Director Gianfranco Aragona to discuss the US-EC
dispute over the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS)
signal overlay of the GPS M-code.  The U.S. delegation was
led by Ralph Braibanti, Director, Space and Advanced
Technology, State Department Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Technical Affairs and
included Mel Flack, Director, Communications Electronic
Division, US Mission to NATO; Richard McKinney, Deputy
Director Space Acquisition, US Air Force; Todd Wilson, EST
Officer, US Mission to the EU; Marja Verloop EUR/ERA; and
representatives from the political and science sections of
Embassy Rome.  Those joining Aragona included Giovanni
Brauzzi, Director, Office of NATO Affairs, MFA; Sandro
Bernardin, European Correspondent, MFA; Mario Caporale,
Navigation Office, Italian Space Agency; and Umberto
Cantielli, Chief, Navigation Identification Office, Defense
General Staff, Ministry of Defense. 

U.S. Delegation Insists Political Solution is needed 

3.  (C)  Braibanti told Aragona that the U.S. believes it is
important to hold informal consultations with key EU member
States to advance U.S.-EC differences over Galileo towards a
decision.  He recalled that the President raised M-Code
overlay at the last U.S.- EU Summit.  In reviewing the USG
position on Galileo, Braibanti explained that the U.S.
accepts the EU satellite system as a reality, but the
security implications of having the Galileo Public Regulated
Service (PRS) overlay the GPS M-Code are unacceptable to both
the U.S. and NATO.  so far, the U.S. has fought a defensive
battle with the European Commission (EC).  Braibanti allowed
that some progress has been made in convincing European
officials that direct overlay of M-Code by the PRS is a bad
idea.  However, consideration being given by the EC to use
BOC 2.2 for Open Service (OS) also involves a partial overlay
of M-Code, and damages navigational warfare capabilities.
The U.S. will be unable to accept this outcome. 

4.  (C)  Braibanti assured Aragona that the USG is committed
to finding a solution, but cautioned that without some
flexibility and compromise from the EC, progress will be
difficult.  The U.S. has proposed several technical options
for Galileo PRS and OS that our experts believe meet all
stated technical and performance requirements for Galileo
services.  Braibanti underscored that, given the EC's
timetable for making design decisions on Galileo, member
states may find that the Commission has locked in technical
solutions that threaten U.S. and NATO capabilities to conduct
navigational warfare.  To avoid this eventuality, which could
put allied lives at risk, member states need to give clear
political guidance now to the EC that the Galileo signal
structure cannot undermine NAVWAR operations. 

But Aragona Puts Faith in Further Technical Talks 

5.  (C)  Aragona, signaling his reluctance to take on U.S.
concerns vis-a-vis Italy's EU partners, underscored that
Galileo negotiations had been entrusted to the EC.  He
assured the U.S. team that Italy recognized the security
issues at stake.  "Given our NATO membership it would be
crazy for us not to be sensitive to U.S. arguments," Aragona
declared.  These concerns are shared by the EC, he claimed,
but any solution must also safeguard the "integrity and
operability of Galileo for it to be a commercially viable and
reliable system (Note: Aragona came back repeatedly
throughout the course of the consultations to this theme. End
Note). 

6.  (C)  Aragona pressed claims by EC experts that technical
negotiations could lead to a solution to both protect the
integrity and operability of Galileo and address US security
concerns.  Referencing the U.S.-EU Summit, Aragona asserted
that, as an "agreement" had been reached to proceed with
technical talks, the pace of negotiations to try to reach a
"technical solution" to the overlay conundrum should be
intensified.   Italy and the EC are ready to take into
account U.S. and NATO security concerns and believe that
technical solutions, which protect them, are available. 

7.  (C)  Aragona wanted to know when the U.S. would be ready
to discuss the most recent EC proposals, which he understood
included a certain "inventiveness" and were "not so stuck in
the prejudices of the past."  The EC was ready to sit and
discuss a mutually agreeable technical solution.  As for
political input, Aragona said once more that the Commission
is well aware that U.S. security concerns must be addressed
while taking into account the "integrity" of the Galileo
system. 

8.  (C)  Braibanti countered that, with regard to EC
technical proposals, he was aware of only two to which a
formal reply had not been given: using filtering to mitigate
the navigation warfare problems posed by overlaying BOC 2.2,
and having the U.S. change the frequency for its military GPS
signals.  In the spirit of cooperation, the U.S. had not
rejected these ideas out of hand, but instead asked its
technical experts to analyze them carefully.  Now that he had
seen the results of this analysis, Braibanti could say with
some certainty that it is highly unlikely that either of
these options will work.  Summing up this portion of the
discussion, Braibanti framed the state of play for Aragona:
We may well reach a situation in September where we will have
analyzed the EC's proposals and decided they can not provide
a solution which protects U.S. and NATO capabilities to
conduct NAVWAR.  Our concern is that if EC technical experts
continue to operate within their current frame of reference,
we will arrive at a technical impasse.  To avoid this
impasse, the EC team needs clear political direction from
member States that they should focus on options that do not
negatively impact NAVWAR.  (Note: on the margins of the
meeting, Braibanti told Aragona that the USG worries the EC
negotiators may be positioning themselves to argue to the EU
member states that they had made a good faith effort to reach
a compromise, but the U.S. would not meet them halfway, so
Galileo must move ahead without an agreement to cooperate
with the U.S.  Aragona discounted this possibility,
suggesting that the EC recognizes the need for Galileo-GPS
interoperability.  (End Note) 

NATO a Non-Starter for Classified Talks 

9.  (C)  Aragona said the U.S. and EU face a practical
problem over where to hold classified discussions and that
this problem should be easily resolvable.  Italy expects the
U.S. to provide a formal answer to the letter EC negotiator
Heinz Hillbrecht sent to Braibanti on July 2 (reftel).
Aragona maintained that the EC wants further discussions in a
classified setting, but that setting can not be NATO.  He
underscored this point in uncharacteristically blunt
language.  Aragona said holding the talks at the US Mission
to NATO was perfectly acceptable as long as they were U.S.-EC
rather than NATO-EC discussions.  The issue under discussion
is between the U.S. and the EC, Aragona argued, and,
moreover, there are several non-EU members of NATO.
Braibanti took Aragona's points and assured him that the USG
was considering the issue of additional classified
discussions, including the modalities for such meetings. 

Some Agreement on Procedure, but.... 

10.  (C)  Braibanti, moving the discussion to how and when to
hold the next plenary negotiating session, said the U.S. will
work with the Commission on dates for a September meeting to
review technical and trade issues  He suggested folding the
technical discussions into the plenary negotiating session.
This could help to ensure transparency and avoid
misunderstanding among the political negotiators about the
available technical options.  Aragona acknowledged that
Braibanti's idea had merit and committed to "see what could
be done" to make a political recommendation to the EC to
proceed along these lines. 

Still Talking Past Each Other on substance 

11.  (C)  The U.S. delegation raised concerns that France
might be driving the EC toward a decision counter to the
interests of other EU member states, the U.S. and NATO.  Mel
Flack said it was difficult not to arrive at the conclusion
that France was interested in an M-Code overlay so it could
guarantee reliability for precision guided weaponry it might
seek to sell to third countries. 

12.  (C)  "I have objected to Europeans who say that U.S.
actions demonstrate an intent to undermine Galileo," Aragona
told the delegation.  "Likewise," he said, "I do not believe
that there is any maliciousness on the part of a particular
country or the EC."  Above all, he maintained, Galileo is a
commercial undertaking; the system's signal structure was
selected according to well established criteria based on the
belief that it provided the most robust, reliable service.
"I accept your arguments about the need to jam adversaries in
a NAVWAR context," he said, but the U.S. "needs to keep in
mind that Galileo service must be sold.  The problem of
selective jamming is not just political; commercial aspects
are also involved."  When Aragona stated it would not be
acceptable to expect the EU to settle for alternate, less
robust, signals, Braibanti countered it would be unacceptable
for the U.S. and its allies to risk the lives of soldiers in
order to allow the EU to have more robust signals for
Galileo. 

13.  (C)  Aragona acknowledged the point in passing, but
moved quickly to close and summarize the conversation.  He
suggested the next step would be to find a suitable venue to
hold classified discussions.  He claimed there is flexibility
and that the EU is aware of the need for a solution amenable
to both sides.  Braibanti emphasized that after the September
discussions the USG would like to hold another set of
bilateral consultations with Italy.  Aragona was
noncommittal, offering to share thoughts after the September
plenary session and then decide on a way forward.  In terms
of U.S.-Italian engagement, he said he hoped that discussions
would not lead to the "extreme" situation in which the U.S.
and EU would be negotiating on exclusively U.S. terms, by
which he meant asking the EU to accept moving PRS to another
frequency band and to only then negotiate a solution.  He
noted in closing that Italy had its own technological and
industrial interests to defend. 

Better Signals, Less Political Clout from Other GOI Ministries 

14.  (C)  Braibanti, Flack and EST Couns met with Vice
Minister for Research Guido Possa on July 15.  Possa is
responsible for the Italian Space Agency and through it for
Italian participation in ESA.  After a brief explanation of
the overlay problem and its implications for NAVWAR, Possa
immediately understood that a political, and not a technical
approach was needed to resolve outstanding problems.  Possa
suggested that the U.S. should work closely with the Germans,
and in Italy with Minister of Defense Martino, whose
commitment to NATO and to close cooperation with the U.S.
were well known.  On the margins of a July 28
representational event,  ESTCOUNS and A/POLMINCOUNS raised
briefly the overlay problem with MINDEF Martino.  Martino
said that, from his point of view, Galileo was unnecessary
and a huge waste of money -- one GPS system was enough.  He
was unaware that the USG now supported Galileo in principle.
Martino was sensitive to our arguments on the security
implications of the overlay, but observed that he was
perceived within the GOI as too pro-American to be of much
assistance.  He suggested that the Embassy's best bet for
moving the GOI closer to the USG position would be to
approach U/S to the PM Gianni Letta, who, we note, is PM
Berlusconi's closest political advisor. 

15.  (C)  ESTCOUNS, ECONCOUNS, AND USEU ECONCOUNS met July 18
with Ministry of Transport Diplomatic Advisor Maraini to
discuss the Aragona meetings and to seek the perspective of
the Ministry on the decisions to be taken concerning Galileo
at the December Transport Council.  Maraini told us that he
believed that Galileo was now principally a political
problem, and a problem beyond the competency of the Transport
Ministry and Transport Council.  In a candid appraisal of
Hillbrecht-whom Maraini admitted he did not know well--the
Diplomatic Advisor said that the decision to be taken was
beyond the competency of Hillbrecht's technical committee.
Maraini understood and agreed with our assessment that very
little time and scope remained for technical solutions, and
that an impasse requiring a major political decision by the
EU was likely.  Maraini is worried about the outcome.  He
undertook to prepare a note for Minister Lunardi to be sent
to the Prive Minister before the PM's departure for Crawford. 

16.  (C)  Embassy Comment:  The U.S. delegation made the trip
to Rome to follow up on indications from Aragona, made during
his recent trip to Washington, that he may have been willing
to carry some water for us with the EC and member states.  We
were left with the impression that Italy's PolDir had instead
decided to keep his EU hat firmly in place and stick to the
script of the EC briefing book on Galileo.  Despite
understanding within the functional ministries of the GOI,
peeling Aragona, the MFA, and Italy away from the EC position
will be difficult, judging from Aragona's assessment that
"technical solutions" still offer a way forward.  He threw us
a quarter of a bone by offering to help give political top
cover to the expert level technical discussions.  However,
Aragona's implicit insistence that Galileo's commercial
viability may depend on at least a partial M-Code overlay to
"guarantee" service is troubling for its resemblance to
French arguments. 

17.  (U)  This message has been cleared by OES/SAT Braibanti.
Sembler

TOP SECRET: THE CIA’S INTERNAL PROBE OF THE CUBABAY OF PIGS AFFAIR

THE CIA’S INTERNAL PROBE OF THE BAY OF PIGS AFFAIR

TOP-SECRET: REAGAN LIBRARY UNVEILS SPIES: SECRETS FROM THE CIA, KGB AND HOLLYWOOD EXHIBIT

HHOLLYWOOD SPIES

WEITERE BEWEISE ZU DEN DUMMDREISTEN LUEGEN DER STASI-“GoMoPa”-BEISPIEL MERIDIAN CAPITAL

Originaltexte (SIEHE AUCH ANLAGE ANBEI)

FINANZNACHRICHTEn meridian gomopa

Millionen Finanzierungen mit Widersprüchen / Die Werbemethoden der Meridian Capital Enterprises

ORIGINAL ARTIKEL GOMOPA 2

ORIGINAL ARTIKEL GOMOPA

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Berlin (ots) – Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. bietet auf ihren Webseiten weltweite Finanzierungen an. GoMoPa hat die dort gemachten Angaben analysiert und starke Widersprüche entdeckt.

Die Unternehmensstruktur

Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. behauptet “ein Finanzinstitut” zu sein, “das zu einer internationalen Finanzgruppe gehört.” Diese Gruppe setze sich aus 11 verschiedenen Mitgliedern zusammen. GoMoPa fragte alle zuständigen Handelsregister ab. Ergebnis: 5 der 11 angegebenen Finanzinstitute sind nicht eingetragen.

Mitarbeiter der KLP Group Emirates, GoMoPa-Partner und Management-Gruppe in Dubai, machten sich die Mühe, drei weitere Geschäftsadressen der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. zu überprüfen. Martin Kraeter, Prinzipal der KLP Group: “Alle 3 genannten Firmen existieren hier nicht, auch nicht in abgewandelter Form.”

Das Unternehmen will weltweit über zahlreiche Standorte verfügen. Bei denen handelt es sich allerdings lediglich um “Virtual Offices” eines Büroservice-Anbieters.

Laut Firmenhomepage hat das Unternehmen seinen “rechtlichen Geschäftssitz” in Dubai. In einem GoMoPa vorliegenden Schreiben der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. heißt es jedoch, der Firmensitz sei in London. Auf der Homepage selbst tauchen zwei Londoner Adressen auf, die das Unternehmen als “Kundenabteilung für deutschsprachige Kunden” und “Abteilung der Zusammenarbeit mit Investoren” bezeichnet.

Die Meridian Capital Enterprises ist tatsächlich als “Limited” (Ltd.) mit Sitz in England und Wales eingetragen. Eine Abfrage beim Gewerbeamt Dubais (DED) zur Firmierung jedoch bleibt ergebnislos. Bemerkenswert ist auch der vermeintliche Sitz in Israel. Auf der Webseite von Meridian Capital Enterprises heißt es: “Die Firma Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist im Register des israelischen Justizministeriums unter der Nummer 514108471 (…) angemeldet.” Martin Kraeter hierzu: ” Ein ‘britisch-arabisch-israelisches bankfremdes Finanzinstitut sein zu wollen, wie die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. es darstellt, ist mehr als zweifelhaft. Es würde keinem einzigen Emirati, geschweige denn einem ‘Scheich’, auch nur im Traum einfallen Geschäfte mit Personen oder Firmen aus Israel zu machen. ”

Eigenartig ist auch: Zwei angebliche Großinvestitionen der Meridian Capital Enterprises in Dubai sind Investmentruinen bzw. erst gar nicht realisierte Projekte.

Der Aktivitätsstatus der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist laut englischem Handelsregister als “dormant” gemeldet. Auf der Grundlage des britischen Gesellschaftsrechts können sich eingetragene Unternehmen selbst “dormant” (schlafend) melden, wenn sie keine oder nur unwesentliche buchhalterisch zu erfassende Transaktionen vorgenommen haben. Angesichts der angeblichen globalen Investitionstätigkeit der Meridian Capital Ltd. ist dieses jedoch sehr erstaunlich.

Auf ihrer Webseite gibt die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. einen Überblick über ihre größten Investitionen in Deutschland: “Dithmarschen Wind Powerplant, Waldpolenz Solar Park, AIDAdiva, Berlin Hauptbahnhof, Sony Center”. Die Eigentümer des Sony Centers am Potsdamer Platz teilten GoMoPA mit, dass ihnen sei ein solcher Investor unbekannt sei. Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. will übrigens angeblich auch in die Erweiterung des Panama-Kanals sowie in das Olympiastadion in Peking investiert haben.

Der Webauftritt

Die Internetseite der MCE ist aufwendig gestaltet. Bei näherer Betrachtung fällt jedoch auf, dass es sich bei zahlreichen Fotos der Veranstaltungen der Meridian Capital Enterprises in den meisten Fällen um Bildmaterial von Online-Zeitungen oder frei zugänglichen Medienfotos einzelner Institutionen handelt.

Auf der Homepage befinden sich Videofilme, die eine verblüffende Ähnlichkeit mit dem Werbematerial von NAKHEEL aufweisen, dem größten Bauträger der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate. Den schillernden Videos über die berühmten drei Dubai Palmen wurden offensichtlich selbstproduzierte Trailersequenzen der Meridian Capital Enterprises vorangestellt.

Ab einem Volumen von 10 Millionen Euro oder höher präsentiert sich so die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. als der passende Investitionspartner. Auf der Internetseite sind diverse Fotos mit Scheichs an Konferenztischen zu sehen. Doch diese großen Tagungen und großen Kongresse der Meridian Capital Enterprises werden in den Pressearchiven der lokalen Presse Dubais mit keinem Wort erwähnt.

Vertiefende Information unter:

http://www.presseportal.de/go2/mehr_zu_MCE_ltd

Originaltext: GoMoPa GmbH Digitale Pressemappe: http://www.presseportal.de/pm/72697 Pressemappe via RSS : http://www.presseportal.de/rss/pm_72697.rss2

Pressekontakt: Herr Friedrich Wasserburg Telefon: +49 (30) 51060992 Fax: +49 (30) 51060994 Zuständigkeitsbereich: Presse

Firmeninfo Goldman Morgenstern & Partners LLC 575 Madison Avenue USA-10022 – 2511 New York http://www.gomopa.net

Über Goldman Morgenstern & Partners LLC: Ein Zusammenschluss aus Unternehmens-, Steuer-, Anlageberatern und Rechtsanwälten.
© 2008 news aktuell

DANN GING DIe ERPRESSUNG LOS UND MERIDIAN CAPITAL REAGIERTE – STATT DIES ABER ZUZUGEBEN SETZEN DIE STASI-VERBRECHER EINE GEFÄLSCHTE PRESSE-MITTEILUNG IN NETZ, DIE MICH BELASTEN SOLL

BITTE KONTAKTIEREN SIE AUCH MERIDIAN CAPITAL

sales@meridiancapital.com

1 Battery Park Plaza
New York, NY 10004
TEL: 212-972-3600
FAX: 212-612-0100

TOP SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE FBI: INVESTIGATION OF ADOLF HITLER AND HIS POSSIBLE ESCAPE

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SECRET//NOFORN: RE-ENGAGING SYRIA: DEALING WITH SARG DIPLOMACY

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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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NOFORN
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2018
TAGS: PREL SY
SUBJECT: RE-ENGAGING SYRIA:  DEALING WITH SARG DIPLOMACY 

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 

1.  (S/NF) Summary:  As the U.S. continues its re-engagement
with Syria, it may help us achieve our goals if we understand
how SARG officials pursue diplomatic goals. Syrian President
Bashar al-Asad is neither as shrewd nor as long-winded as his
father but he, too, prefers to engage diplomatically on a
level of abstraction that seems designed to frustrate any
direct challenge to Syria's behavior and, by extension, his
judgment.  Bashar's vanity represents another Achilles heel:
the degree to which USG visitors add to his consequence to
some degree affects the prospects for a successful meeting.
The SARG foreign policy apparatus suffers from apparent
dysfunctionality and weaknesses in terms of depth and
resources but the SARG punches above its weight because of
the talents of key individuals.  SARG officials generally
have clear, if tactical, guidance from Bashar and they are
sufficiently professional to translate those instructions
into recognizable diplomatic practice.  But in a diplomatic
world that is generally oiled by courtesy and euphemism, the
Syrians don't hesitate to be nasty in order to achieve their
objectives.  The behaviors they employ as diplomatic
"force-multipliers" are the hallmarks of a Syrian diplomatic
style that is at best abrasive and, at its worst, brutal.
End Summary. 

-------------------
Gaming Out the SARG
------------------- 

2.  (S/NF) As the U.S. moves forward to re-engage Syria, we
are well aware that Syrian officials have long been famous
for their abilities as tough negotiators.  The late President
Hafiz al-Asad could wear down his interlocutors through sheer
staying power in 10-hour meetings without breaks; the wealth
of detail and historical perspective he brought to those
discussions also tested the mettle of those who were
attempting to persuade him to a course of action he
questioned.  His son Bashar is neither as shrewd nor as
long-winded as his father but he, too, prefers to engage
diplomatically on a level of abstraction that seems designed
to frustrate any direct challenge to Syria's behavior and, by
extension, his judgment.  Bashar's presentations on world
affairs suggest that he would prefer to see himself as a sort
of philosopher-king, the Pericles of Damascus.  Playing to
Bashar's intellectual pretentions is one stratagem for
gaining his confidence and acquiescence; it may be
time-consuming but could well produce results.  Bashar's
vanity represents another Achilles heel:  the degree to which
USG visitors add to his consequence to some degree affects
the prospects for achieving our goals.  Every interaction we
have with the SARG is, in fact, a transaction and the better
equipped we are to understand the dynamics of our
negotiations the better able we will be to achieve our
objectives.  Post has assembled the compendium below in an
attempt to reflect our experience in dealing with the SARG in
the hope that Washington-based interlocutors will find it
useful. 

------------------------------------
A Compendium of Diplomatic Behaviors
------------------------------------ 

3. (S/NF) Capacity:  SARG scope of action is limited the
President's span of control.  He is generally able to monitor
 the activities of his foreign minister, political/media
advisor, intelligence chiefs, and brother Maher.  At various
times, his vice president and national security advisor are
also active and therefore under his direct supervision.
While communication flows between him and his subordinates,
it appears not to be formalized and information is highly
compartmented.  Subordinates' portfolios are not clearly
delineated; overlapping areas create tension and competition.
 There is no "interagency" policy development process that
lays out advantages and disadvantages of policy choices.
There are, as far as we know, no briefing or decision memos.
The bench is not deep; beyond the principals lie only a few
trusted staffers.  Bashar and his team also find it difficult
to juggle more than one major foreign policy issue at a time. 

4. (S/NF) Protocol:  SARG officials are sticklers for
diplomatic protocol, although they are not experts on the
international conventions from which it is derived.   The
SARG places a high value on protocolary forms that ensure
respectful treatment of state officials (despite bilateral
differences) because such forms guarantee that the President
and his representatives are shown proper courtesies by a
world that is often at odds with Syria.  (This focus on
protocol underlies the continuing Syrian unhappiness over the
absence of a U.S. ambassador.)  Protocol conventions also
reinforce the notion of equal relations between sovereign
states and the SARG insists that communications between it
and foreign embassies comply with traditional diplomatic
practice.  The MFA receives a flood of diplomatic notes from
Damascus-based foreign missions daily which are apportioned
out to various offices for action.  The diplomatic notes,
translated into Arabic by the senders, become the paper trail
for SARG decisions.  The MFA bureaucracy does not appear to
generate cover memoranda that provide background to requests
or recommendations for decisions.  Many such notes, possibly
all notes from the U.S. Embassy, are sent to the Minister
himself for review.  The MFA does not have internal email,
only fax and phone.  Instructions to Syrian missions abroad
are often sent by fax; sometimes the MFA fails to provide
instructions at all. 

5. (S/NF) The Suq:  In dealing with the U.S., the Syrians see
every encounter as a transaction.  The level and composition
of the Syrian side of any meeting is carefully calculated in
terms of protocol and the political message being sent; a
lunch invitation must be interpreted as more than just the
Arab compulsion to hospitality ) who hosts the lunch is as
important as who attends the meetings.  When it comes to
content, the Syrians seek to gain the highest value
deliverable for the lowest price or no price at all.  During
the re-engagement process, the SARG has attempted to extract
high profile USG gestures in exchange for relief of
operational constraints on the Embassy.  The SARG has been
uncharacteristically forward-leaning in allowing discussions
on a New Embassy Compound site to develop as far as they
have; actual closure on a land deal, however, is probably
contingent on U.S. delivery of a SARG desirable, e.g., the
announcement that a U.S. ambassador will be sent to Damascus.
 The SARG's focus on embassy operations is in part rooted in
their paranoia over USG intelligence collection and
penetration of Syrian society but the imposition of
constraints on mission activities has also conveniently
created an embassy list of desiderata that the SARG seeks to
use as cost-free concessions.  FM Muallim candidly
acknowledged this approach when he commented in February to
Charge that he had not yet decided what he needed in exchange
for permission to reopen the American School in Damascus. 

6.  (S/NF) Vanity and Self-preservation:  The President's
self-image plays a disproportionate role in policy
formulation and diplomatic activity.   Meetings, visits,
trips abroad that enhance his respectability and prestige are
pursued; encounters that may involve negotiations or
difficult debate are declined or delegated to subordinates.
The President responds with anger if he finds himself
challenged by visitors, but not until after the meeting.  He
seems to avoid direct confrontation.  When engaged in summit
diplomacy, he often seeks to include allies to bolster his
confidence (e.g., Quadripartite Summit in September 2008,
Riyadh Summit in April 2009).   His foreign policy
subordinates are all "employees" without constituencies or
influence independent of the President's favor.  Their
overriding concern when engaging foreigners is to avoid the
appearance of overstepping or violating their instructions.
They are particularly cautious in the presence of other
Syrians; requests to meet one-on-one often yield more
expansive and candid responses. 

7. (S/NF) Deceit:  SARG officials at every level lie.  They
persist in a lie even in the face of evidence to the
contrary.  They are not embarrassed to be caught in a lie.
While lower level officials often lie to avoid potential
punitive action from their own government, senior level
officials generally lie when they deem a topic too
"dangerous" to discuss (e.g., Al-Kibar, IAEA) or when they
have not yet determined whether or how to respond (FFN,
Hezbollah arms supplies, etc).  When a senior SARG official
is lying, the key challenge is not demonstrating  the lack of
veracity but discovering the true reasons for it. 

8. (S/NF) Passivity:  SARG foreign policy is formulated in
response to external developments (changes in regional
leadership, initiatives from the West, etc).  The SARG does
not launch initiatives and generally seeks cover from allies
when exploring new courses of action.  The SARG is much more
confident on the Arab level than on the international level.
SARG policy responses are generally tactical and operational,
exploratory rather than decisive, oblique instead of direct.
Strategy, to the extent it exists, emerges from a series of
tactical choices.  The lack of initiative appears rooted in
an underlying sense of diplomatic powerlessness.  Every
foreign policy embarrassment in Syria's history lies under
the surface of a generally false projection of assertiveness.
 That assertiveness is sometimes read as arrogance. 

9.  (S/NF) Antagonism:  Every Syrian diplomatic relationship
contains an element of friction.  There is some current
friction, for example, in the Syrians' relations with the
Turks and the French.  The Syrians are not troubled by
discord; they seek an upper hand in any relationship by
relying on foreign diplomats' instinctive desire to resolve
problems. By withholding a solution, the SARG seeks to
control the pace and temperature of the relationship.  SARG
officials artificially restrict their availability  and can
engage in harsh verbal attacks to intimidate and rattle
foreign diplomats.  SARG officials delight in disparaging
their interlocutors behind their backs for allowing
themselves to be cowed.  On the international level, the
President has indulged in personal criticisms of foreign
leaders; unlike his father, he deliberately makes enemies
when he doesn't necessarily have to.  FM Muallim can behave
similarly but he probably does so on the President's
instructions. 

10. (S/NF) Complacency:  SARG leadership genuinely believes
that SARG foreign policy has been, is being, and will be
vindicated by events.  They also genuinely believe their
foreign policy is based on morally defensible and
intellectually solid principles, although it is usually
reactive and opportunistic.  Existing policy choices are
immutable unless the President decides to change them, in
which case, his new policies, despite any appearances to the
contrary, are consistent with "traditional" principles.
Baathism infuses foreign policy principles (Pan-Arabism) but
pragmatism is more important.  More recently, Bashar's like
or dislike of other leaders plays a role in policy
formulation. 

11. (S/NF) The Non Sequitur:  When Syrian officials don't
like a point that has been made to them, they frequently
resort to an awkward changes in subject to deflect perceived
criticism.  Syrian officials seem to think they've scored a
verbal hit by employing a facile non sequitur, usually in the
form of a counter-accusation.  When the SARG's human rights
record is raised with Muallim, for example, he often raises
Israel's December-January Gaza operation or, more recently,
asks if the U.S. will accept the 1300 Al Qaeda sympathizers
in Syrian jails.   The non sequitur is intended to stop
discussion of the unwelcome topic while subtly intimidating
the interlocutor with the threat of raising a subject that is
putatively embarrassing to him or her.  When the non sequitur
is deployed, it is clear that the SARG official is on the
defensive. 

12.  (S/NF) Comment:  Given the apparent dysfunctionality of
the SARG foreign policy apparatus and its weaknesses in terms
of depth and resources, the SARG's ability to punch above its
weight internationally is noteworthy.  Much of its strength
appears to lie in the talents of key individuals and their
ability to collaborate with each other, despite tensions and
rivalries.  SARG officials generally have clear, if tactical,
guidance from Bashar and they are sufficiently professional
to translate those instructions into recognizable diplomatic
practice.  But the behaviors they employ as diplomatic
"force-multipliers" are the hallmarks of a Syrian diplomatic
style that is at best abrasive and, at its worst, brutal.  At
the end of the day, there are few who really like to deal
with the Syrians.  The SARG, well aware of its reputation,
however,  spends much of its energy ensuring that we have to. 

CONNELLY

SECRET: CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION RATTLES BUSINESS COMMUNITY

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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000274 

SIPDIS 

DEPT FOR NEA/ELA; NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT; PARIS FOR
WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2019
TAGS: ETRD EFIN ETTC PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION RATTLES BUSINESS COMMUNITY 

REF: A. DAMASCUS 168
     B. DAMASCUS 218
     C. 08 DAMASCUS 541 

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4(b,d) 

-------
Summary
------- 

1. (S) The recent imprisonment of a prominent businessman
thought to be close to President Asad has rattled the Syrian
business community.  Although the high-profile arrest was not
reported by Syrian media, Prime Minister Utri made a veiled
reference to it in a daily newspaper, saying, "we will cut
off the hand of any who dare to abuse the public funds."
Business contacts report that two other business elites are
currently under investigation for corruption charges linked
to the February arrest of Customs Directorate Chief Brigadier
General Hasan Makhlouf, including the current Chairman of the
Damascus Chamber of Industry.  Adding to their concern, a
popular local business magazine recently published profiles
of "The Top 100 Syrian Businessmen," which many feared would
raise their profile to the regime.  Conspicuously absent from
the article was Syria's most famous tycoon, Rami Makhlouf.
End summary. 

---------------------------
Computer Magnate Imprisoned
--------------------------- 

2. (C) Syrian business elites are abuzz with the news that
SARG security officials jailed Engineer Firas Bakour (DOB:
01/30/1966) in late March, along with former Minister of
Communication and Technology Amro Salem and two unnamed
employees of Syria Telecommunications Establishment (STE).
Contacts report that Bakour's arrest stemmed from a USD 65
million SARG tender that he was awarded to provide a Voice
Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) service to STE.  According to
the reports, SARG officials were angered at the slow pace of
Bakour's progress in fulfilling the contract -- particularly
when his "winning" bid for the tender had been over twice as
high as those of several foreign companies.  A close friend
of Bakour's offered a different take, claiming that the Sunni
Bakour's Alawi enemies had grown jealous of the virtual
monopoly his company enjoyed over IT in Syria and the USD 10
million that he was reportedly earning each month. 

3. (C) The President and CEO of INANA Group -- an umbrella of
eight subsidiary companies that offer a variety of
information technology, telecommunications, marketing,
entertainment and business development lines -- Bakour was
close to President Bashar al-Asad in the mid-1990s when Asad
headed the then-nascent Syrian Computer Society (SCS).  A
longtime Embassy contact with a sister living in Florida,
Bakour's presence at Embassy rep events in 2007 had a
chilling effect on other guests due to his alleged ties to
SARG security services.  While Syrian media has not reported
the high-profile arrest, Prime Minister Utri made a
thinly-veiled reference to it in the March 31 edition of
daily Tishreen, saying, "we will cut off the hand of any who
dare to abuse the public funds." 

4. (C) In 2008, former Minister of Communications and
Technology Amro Salem told us that he was asked to resign
from his ministerial post in December 2007 because he had
launched an investigation into Bakour's suspicious business
activities.  He claimed then that President Asad had
personally cleared him of any wrongdoing and had ordered the
investigation of Bakour to proceed.  (Note: It would not be
unusual for Syrian security forces to arrest all suspects
while sorting out individual stories.  End note.) 

------------------------
Known By the Company You Keep
------------------------ 

5. (C) Adding to the business community's case of the
jitters, the locally popular Syrian business magazine
al-Iqtissadi (the Economist) dedicated this week's edition to
profiling "The Top 100 Syrian Businessmen."  Listing the
businessmen alphabetically, the 55-page article contained
photographs and 3-5 paragraph corporate biographies of each
prominent businessman and his family.  Firas Bakour was
featured in the magazine, as was one-time SyriaTel Chief
Operating Officer Nader Qa'lai, who is reportedly himself
under investigation for embezzlement.  Syria's most infamous
tycoon -- Rami Makhlouf -- was conspicuously absent, as were
Muhammad and Abdulsalam al-Haykal, who own the media company
that publishes al-Iqtissadi.  The website "Syrian Informer,"
which is blocked in Syria, commented disparagingly on the
list as largely comprising nouveaux riches who have acquired
wealth through opportunism and corruption, presumably in
contrast to the more "virtuous" Damascenes who inherited
their fortunes. 

6. (C) Embassy contacts who were listed in the article
expressed nervousness at having their profiles publicly
elevated, while others were relieved to have not been
mentioned.  The head of one featured family lamented that the
article was probably already in the hands of the SARG's
equivalent to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which he
claimed would be examining the tax returns of each listed
family over the last several years.  (Note: The only Syrians
who consistently pay the correct amount of income tax seem to
be public servants, whose taxes are withheld automatically
from their government salaries.  End note.) 

-----------------------------
Wider SARG Campaign Underway?
----------------------------- 

7. (S) Bakour's arrest is the latest event in what contacts
report is a wide-ranging SARG crackdown on "corruption" that
began with the January sacking of Political Security
Department Chief Major General Muhammad Mansurah and
mid-February arrest of Chief Customs official Brigadier
General Hasan Makhlouf (refs A,B).  (Note: By all accounts,
Hasan is not close to his more famous cousins Muhammad, Rami
and Hafiz Makhlouf.  End note.)  The oft-heard rumor on the
Damascus streets is that Hasan Makhlouf attracted the ire of
Maher Asad after the President's brother learned from a real
estate agent that the Customs Director's driver had tried to
purchase a multi-million dollar property in Lattakia.
Investigators allegedly discovered some USD 50 million hidden
in the driver's home, which -- according to the story --
enraged Maher and prompted the Palace to act. 

8. (S) The rumor of Hasan Makhlouf's millions is strikingly
similar to another story that circulated around Damascus
following the August 2008 assassination of Brigadier General
Muhammad Sulayman (ref C).  Sulayman, who was Asad's top
security aide and reportedly managed several sensitive
military projects, was killed by sniper fire in the coastal
city of Tartous while Asad was visiting Tehran.  The
subsequent investigation into Sulayman's slaying reportedly
uncovered USD 80 million cash in a basement room of the
general's home in the mountains between Damascus and the
Lebanese border.  Asad was said to be devastated by the
discovery, and, fearing Sulayman had betrayed him, redirected
the investigation from solving his murder to finding out how
the general had acquired so much money. 

-------------------
Car Importers Under Suspicion
------------------- 

9. (S) Embassy contacts report that two prominent businessmen
are under suspicion in the Makhlouf/Mansurah investigation --
Ammar Karkour and Chairman of the Damascus Chamber of
Industry Imad Ghreiwati.  Karkour, the Syrian agent for
Audi/VW, and Ghreiwati, who owns the Ford dealership and
represents LG electronics, are both suspected of bribing the
Customs Director to accept grossly reduced invoices on their
imported cars and electronics in order to avoid paying
customs duties on the goods' actual value.  The Ghreiwati
family may have had a falling out with the Asad clan in fall
2008, as Imad's brother Issam then complained bitterly to us
about the President, the SARG's decision to close Damascus
Community School -- where the Ghreiwati children studied --
and revealed that the entire family was considering
emigrating to the U.S.  (Note: Ghreiwati's fall from grace
would be cheered by many of his class-conscious peers, who
resent his family's meteoric ascent to social prominence and
his once-favored status among the Alawis.  End note.) 

-------
Comment
------- 

10. (S) While there does not yet appear to be a direct link
between Bakour's arrest and the Makhlouf/Mansurah
investigation, our contacts believe that his incarceration is
part of a broader "anti-corruption" campaign ordered by the
Palace to re-assert Asad's authority and to shake-up the
status quo.  The Palace has probably already chosen the
eventual winners and losers in this investigation, the timing
of which may coincide with a long-anticipated cabinet
reshuffle.  Regardless of the SARG's motivation, the business
community's concern is illustrative of their tenuous
relationship with the Syrian government. While Bakour's and
Ghreiwati's situations demonstrate that proximity to the
regime is no guarantee of long-term security, other
businessmen equate Syria's byzantine legal and tax codes --
and not their lack of compliance to them -- to a sword of
Damocles the regime dangles over their heads to keep them in
line. 

CONNELLY

SECRET: FRENCH BELIEVE THAT ASSASSINATION OF SYRIAN GENERAL WAS AN INSIDE JOB

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NOFORN 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS PINR FR SY LE
SUBJECT: FRENCH BELIEVE THAT ASSASSINATION OF SYRIAN
GENERAL SLEIMAN WAS AN INSIDE JOB 

REF: PARIS 1703 

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Kathy Allegrone
for reasons 1.4. (b), (d). 

1.  (S/NF)  As Washington readers and others ponder French
policy toward Syria, and as an expansion of para 3 in reftel,
we pass along the previously unreported views of two of our
GOF interlocutors from meetings in late August on the
mysterious assassination earlier in the month of Syrian
brigadier general Muhammad Sleiman and its potential
significance for the regime of Syrian President Asad.  NEA
adviser at the French presidency Boris Boillon, on August 20,
asserted that the killing seemed to be some sort of inside
job.  He flatly rejected the notion that the Israelis had
taken out Sleiman, particularly the theory that a sniper had
shot him on a boat situated somewhere off the coast of the
Syrian coastal city of Tartus.  Boillon claimed that French
information was that the hit was more "classic" and
"mafia-like" with police stopping traffic in the immediate
vicinity, bodyguards looking the other way, and the assailant
pumping a slug into Sleiman's head. 

2.  (S/NF)  When asked how he interpreted the killing,
Boillon said that several theories presented themselves, the
only common denominator of which was internecine rivalry in
the entourage close to Bashar al-Asad.  Although Bashar's
disgruntled brother-in-law and sidelined head of Syrian
Military Intelligence 'Asif Shawkat seems to have the most
compelling motive for knocking off someone he might have
regarded as a rival and source of his reputed downfall in
recent months, Boillon thought Bashar's brother Mahir was a
more likely suspect.  Boillon described Mahir as ambitious, a
bit of a wild man, and determined to increase his power and
influence within the inner circle.  Inasmuch as Mahir might
have contrived to bring down Shawkat, he might also have
decided to take out his next key rival, Sleiman, in a more
permanent way. 

3.  (S/NF)  Boillon further referred  the related possibility
that Mahir had rubbed out Sleiman in the same way he might
have rubbed out Hizballah leader 'Imad Mughniyah ) possibly
even on Bashar's orders.  The latter explanation would tie in
with the notion of cleaning house as Syria needed to present
a more respectable image while it pursued its rapprochement
with France and/or needed to remove those who "knew too much"
(in the case of Sleiman, about the clandestine nuclear
program).  Of course, Boillon added, one could never rule out
the notion that Sleiman's death was related to a bloody
struggle over control of lucrative criminal activities. 

4.  (S/NF)  Pouille on August 28, meanwhile, was less
forthcoming than Boillon in terms of offering interpretations
of Sleiman's death, but he was equally categorical in
disputing the theory that the Israelis were responsible.  He
cited the French ambassador in Damascus as his source for the
contention that the killing was an inside job to "settle old
scores" as well as conveniently get rid of someone who might
have information of value to the UNIIIC on Lebanon or to the
IAEA on Syria's nuclear program. 

5.  (S/NF)  Comment:  We offer these insights, some of which
have appeared in abridged form in the French press, less for
the light they may shed on Sleiman's assassination than they
do about the French perception of the Asad regime.  Indeed,
Boillon's rundown of the various theories sounded like he had
recently read a finished French intelligence assessment of
the situation.  Both Boillon and Pouille sought, in these
conversations, to stress that France does not judge the Asad
regime dangerously unstable or Asad's grip on power slipping.
 Nonetheless, they believe that the internal situation is
fragile enough to warrant concern and a nuanced approach.  We
believe this could partly account for Sarkozy's decision to
move so quickly to cultivate his personal relationship with
Bashar and to "gamble" (as the French media have put it) on
Bashar's willingness to change course on Lebanon, peace with
Israel, and even Syria's relationship with Iran.  For what it
may be worth, former Lebanese military intelligence chief
Johnny Abdo recently contended the assassination was an
inside job and pointed to the absence of the sort of mass
arrests inside Syria that would normally accompany this type
of killing by criminal or non-regime elements.  End comment 

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Fran ce 

STAPLETON

SECRET: PREMATURE RUMORS OF ASIF SHAWKAT’S DEMISE

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SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

PARIS FOR JORDAN; LONDON FOR TSOU 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV SY IZ
SUBJECT: PREMATURE RUMORS OF ASIF SHAWKAT'S DEMISE 

REF: DAMASCUS 142 

Classified By: CDA Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d. 

1.  (S) Summary:  Widespread reports that Syrian Military
Intelligence Chief Asif Shawkat is under house arrest and
that Shawkat's wife (and Bashar Asad's sister) Bushra al-Asad
is trying to flee the country likely reflect Bashar's
successful moves to limit Shawkat's influence.  While our
sources suspect both stories are untrue and blame the
external opposition for stirring the rumor mill to weaken
Bashar, Shawkat's star definitely appears to be on the wane.
End Summary 

-------------------------------
The Rumor Mill Working Overtime
------------------------------- 

2.  (SBU)  Many Embassy contacts point to a report published
by opposition website "Free Syria"  as the original source of
a number of news stories reporting Shawkat's house arrest.
Sources here also contend that former Syrian VP (and now
leader of the expat opposition group National Salvation
Front) Abdel Halim Khaddam has attempted to weaken Bashar by
repeating this rumor during recent anti-SARG interviews on
SkyTV and Lebanese TV station al Moustaqbal in which he
alleged Shawkat's house arrest and predicted Shawkat would
suffer the same fate as now deceased head of Syrian
intelligence operations in Lebanon, Ghazi Kanaan. 

3.  (SBU)  Opposition website "al Haqiqa" published an April
6 story reporting that President Asad would replace Shawkat
with SMI deputy Ali Yunis, a story similar to a "Debka"
website report on Bashar's decision to fire Shawkat.  Saudi
daily "Sharq al Awsaat" reported Shawkat's house arrest;
according to this version, Shawkat overstepped his authority
in negotiating (via the Turks) with the USG about withdrawing
Syria's support for Hizballah in exchange for agreement that
the International Tribunal would not indict senior Syrian
officials.  Another version reported by the French-based
opposition website "Ihraar Suriya" (the Free People of Syria)
alleged that Shawkat had been implicated in the assassination
plot against Hizballah leader Imad Mugniyah and that
Hizballah and Iran were demanding his prosecution. 

4.  (C) Another rumor circulating in diplomatic circles
(perhaps reflecting wishful thinking) is that Bashar has
decided to turn Shawkat over to the International Tribunal
for the murder for former Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri in
exchange for immunity. 

-----------------------------------
Bushra al-Asad to Flee the Country?
----------------------------------- 

5.  (C)  Different stories regarding Shawkat's arrest also
allege that his wife (and Bashar older sister) has or is
attempting to leave the country and seek political asylum in
possibly France or a Gulf country such as the UAE.  The
Kuwaiti daily "al-Siyasiya," for example,  reported that
Shawkat allegedly told his wife, Busra, to leave Syria with
the couple's children, and she had applied for asylum in
France (later denied by the French government, according to
an April 13 story in "al Hayat.")  According to a few
contacts here, however, Bushra remains in Syria and her
children are still attending school.  A French Embassy
contact told us that Bushra had been to Paris earlier in the
year on a routine shopping excursion but there was no truth
to stories that she had sought political asylum. 

----------------------
Rumors Discounted Here
---------------------- 

6.  (SBU)  In what many are viewing as a SARG response to the
growing wave of rumors, an April 10 Syrian TV evening
newscast showed footage of Shawkat attending a military
academy graduation ceremony. The footage highlighted Shawkat
wearing his military uniform and appearing with Minister of
Defense Hasan Turkumani, who delivered the key note address.
Meanwhile, pro-government Syrian website "Shafaf al-Sham" ran
a story describing Shawkat as the "most powerful man in
Syria" and reporting government plans to appoint Shawkat as
Vice President for National Security Affairs.  (Note:  This
position was a job briefly held by Bashar's paternal uncle
Rifa't al-Asad before being exiled by the late Hafez al
Asad.) 

7.  (S)  Most of our contacts heavily discount reports of
Shawkat's dismissal and house arrest.  Well connected
As-Safir correspondent Ziad Haydar called the reports
"rubbish."   Ihsan Sanker, a longtime Embassy contact who
claims occassional access to Asad family members, reported
April 10 seeing Shawkat at the funeral of a mutual friend a
week earlier.  According to Sanker, mutual acquaintances say
they have seen Shawkat "regularly" over the last month. 

-----------------------------
Shawkat's Star on the Decline?
----------------------------- 

8.  (S) Describing Shawkat as "dejected and withdrawn,"
Sanker said Shawkat was "not even trying to hide" his
unhappiness over his continuing loss of influence.  The
assassination of Hizballah luminary Imad Mugniyeh led to a
series of accusations between SMI and GID, with the outcome
coming out in GID's favor, Sanker reported.  Additionally,
Sanker said he had heard Shawkat's portfolio had been pared
down to military issues, while Bashar's cousin Hafez Makhluf
had all but taken over the national security portfolio.
As-Safir correspondent Haydar reported he had heard the same
thing, saying Bashar had recently further marginalized
Shawkat's national security role. 

9.  (S)  Orient Center Director and MFA Advisor Samir al-Taki
told us recently that Shawkat and  GID chief Ali Mamluk had
exchanged mutual recriminations of blame and negligence in
the wake of the Mugniyeh assassination (reftel).  In an
attempt to discredit GID, Shawkat ordered SMI to question a
number of Syrians with ties to France and the U.S. (including
al-Taki) under possible suspicion of involvement in the
Mugniyeh affair.  In the meantime, al-Taqi added, the GID had
assumed primary responsibility for investigating the Mugniyeh
killing, under the overall direction of Bashar's cousin,
Hafez Makhluf, a prominent GID officer.  Against the backdrop
of these recent events, an ongoing reorganization of security
organizations has made it difficult to determine who was up
and who was down, al-Taqi explained.  Separate reporting and
diplomatic circles point to Mamluk's rise and Shawkat's
relative retreat. But Al-Taqi cast doubt on reports of
Shawkat's removal, saying "we've heard such reports before,"
only to see Shawkat maintain his position as a key insider. 

-------------------------
Shawkat in the Dog House?
------------------------- 

10.  (S)  A UK-Syrian business contact with low level regime
ties told us April 13 that Shawkat's problems with Bashar had
come to head before the Arab League Summit.  According to
this source, SMI arrested a Saudi national suspected of
involvement in the Mugniyeh assassination.  This Saudi died
in SMI custody, complicating Bashar's already strained
relations with the Saudi royal family.  A variant of this
rumor which has appeared in the press was that the deceased
Saudi was a diplomat working in the Saudi Embassy.  Our
contact discounted this rumor because "not even Shawkat would
be stupid enough" to apprehend someone with diplomatic
immunity. 

11.  (S)  Comment:  It seems highly unlikely that Bashar
would arrest Shawkat unless he perceived a direct challenge
to his authority, especially at a time when Syrians are
openly talking about the possibility of war with Israel and
worsening economic conditions that require greater regime
cohesion.  Moreover, we strongly doubt Bashar feels pressured
enough on Lebanon to be preparing to turn over Shawkat to the
Tribunal.  Rather, we believe Bashar's continuing efforts to
erode Shawkat's influence reflect his perception of Shawkat
as a potential threat that must be managed.  Separately, we
assess that Bashar is most comfortable with Bushra here in
Syria under his thumb and that he would not cause her to
flee.  We also believe that unless family matters worsen,
Bushra prefers to reside in Syria, particularly given her
desire to stay close to her elderly mother. 

CORBIN

SECRET: HIZBALLAH’S IMAD MUGNIYAH KILLED BY CAR BOMB

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SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV PTER SY LE
SUBJECT: HIZBALLAH'S IMAD MUGNIYAH KILLED BY CAR BOMB IN
DAMASCUS 

Classified By: CDA Michael Corbin, reasons 1.5 b and d. 

1.  (SBU)  Syria's tightly controlled press remained silent
on reports of Imad Mugniyah's death in a car bomb that
exploded near Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) headquarters
in the neighborhood of Kafr Sousa at approximately 10:00 pm
local February 12.  According to contacts who were on the
scene, SMI secured and cleared the area and kept other police
services away.  Tow trucks removed several vehicles within 45
minutes after the explosion which jarred surrounding
buildings and could be felt at the American Ambassador's
residence three miles away.  Syrian officials reported the
blast had been the result of a butane gas leak and that one
unidentified person (later two) had been killed. 

2.  (C) Media and other contacts reported mid-morning
February 13 that unknown assailants had launched a car bomb
attack against notorious Hizballah military operative Imad
Mugniyah.  The story broke simultaneously on wire services
and Arab satellite television stations al Jazeera, al
Arabyia, and al Manar.  Western press was also reporting that
the second victim was Hizballah MP al Hajj Hussein, although
Hizballah denied this.  As of COB local, Syrian authorities
had yet to provide any further comment on the incident.  (A
Fox News affiliate told us MFA officials seemed "shocked" by
reports of Mugniyah's death but offered no comment.) 

3.  (C)  The most frequent theory suggested by media and
diplomatic contacts was that Israel conducted the attack to
embarrass Syria on the eve of a previously scheduled visit by
Iranian FM Manuchehr Mottaki.  Going to the other extreme,
others were unwilling to rule out that Hizballah itself had
conducted the assassination to neutralize Mugniyah's
challenge to Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.
One contact even suggested that Syria could have undertaken
the operation as a sign of its desire to engage Israel and
the West. 

4.  (S)  Saudi XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect)
told us Mugniyah's presence in Damascus might have been
related to a possible February 13 meeting in Damascus among
Lebanese March 8 MPs with SARG officials.  He also noted that
SMI Director Assaf Shawkat's offices were close to where the
explosion occurred, and Mugniyah could have been going to or
coming from the meeting.  British and Egyptian Embassy
sources suggested Iranian FM Mottaki planned to meet with
Hizballah and March 8 representatives during his February
13-14 visit to Damascus as a counter to March 14's planned
public demonstration to mark the third anniversary of the
February 14 assassination of former Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri. 

5.  (C)  Comment: This apparent targeted assassination of one
of Hizballah's most notorious operatives coincides with a
busy week of official visits meant to refute suggestions that
Syria's Lebanon policy is resulting in a new period of
Western and Arab diplomatic isolation.  Syria's ongoing
silence regarding the attack is a characteristic regime
response, most recently observed (and still in effect) after
Israel's September 6 air strike near Deir az-Zur.  This
silence likely reflects a deep sense of regime embarrassment
from the acknowledged assassination of a wanted-terrorist
whose presence in Syria it denied for years.  The event also
impacts Syrian-Iranian-Hizballah cooperation on the eve of FM
Mottaki's visit likely meant to bolster Syria's position in
the face of escalating March 14 rhetoric and growing Western
impatience with Syria's Lebanon policy.
CORBIN

TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE CIA: MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES, 1958-63 (NIE 11-4-58)

MAIN TRENDS IN THE SOVIET

TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE CIA: TERRORISM REVIEW

Terorism Review

TOP-SECRET: ORIGINAL DOCUMENT OF PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN: U.S. Recognition of the State of Israel

The choice for our people, Mr. President, is between statehood and extermination.”
Chaim Weizmann
president of Jewish Agency for Palestine
to President Harry S. Truman,
April 9, 1948

The creation of a Jewish state in Palestine was one of the most divisive issues of the Truman administration. On November 29, 1947, the United Nations agreed that Palestine, which had been a British mandate since 1922, would be divided into two new states: one Jewish, one Arab. The British would withdraw on May 14, 1948, when this partition plan would take effect.

As the deadline approached, U.S. policy on this question appeared to be in disarray. President Truman secretly assured the Jewish Agency for Palestine of U.S. support for the plan, while the State Department announced support of an alternative plan. As the violence between Jews and Arabs in Palestine escalated and as the British prepared to withdraw, President Truman, subjected to intense pressures, made his choice. On May 14, 1948, just 11 minutes after the State of Israel was proclaimed in Tel Aviv, President Truman released a statement recognizing the new Jewish state.

The statement recognizing the State of Israel is at the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence, Missouri.

The U.S. announces recognition of the State of Israel in a statement released, May 14, 1948.

The U.S. announces recognition of the State of  Israel in a statement released, May 14, 1948

TOP-SECRET: ORGINAL DOCUMENTS FROM PRESIDENT JOHN F KENNEDY “ICH BIN EIN BERLINER” SPEECH

“There are some who say that Communism is the wave of the future.
Let them come to Berlin.”
–President John F. Kennedy, Berlin, Germany, June 26, 1963

The cold war is the term for the rivalry between the two blocs of contending states that emerged following World War II. It was a series of confrontations and tests of wills between the non-Communist states, led by the United States and Great Britain, and the Communist bloc, led by the Soviet Union, that lasted 45 years and, at one point, drew the world to the brink of nuclear war.

In August 1961 the Soviets erected the Berlin Wall to stop the mass exodus of people fleeing Soviet East Berlin for West Berlin and the non-Communist world. The wall was a mass of concrete, barbed wire, and stone that cut into the heart of the city, separating families and friends. For 28 years, it stood as a grim symbol of the gulf between the Communist East and the non-Communist West. In 1989 the Berlin Wall fell, signalling the end of the cold war.

National Archives,
John F. Kennedy Library
(NLK-29248)

On June 26, 1963, President John F. Kennedy delivered a speech that electrified an adoring crowd gathered in the shadow of the Berlin Wall. As he paid tribute to the spirit of Berliners and to their quest for freedom, the crowd roared with approval upon hearing the the President’s dramatic pronouncement, “Ich bin ein Berliner” (I am a Berliner).

AU Format (297K)


One of President Kennedy’s speech card from his remarks in Berlin

The speech was peppered with German and one sentence in Latin, written phonetically on one of the speech cards here.
National Archives, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts

Twenty-four years after President John F. Kennedy’s visit to Berlin, as tensions between the two superpowers eased, President Ronald Reagan made a historic appearance at the Berlin Wall. He spoke passionately about the advance of human liberty and challenged Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to “tear down this wall” the ultimate symbol of Communist suppression and thus demonstrate a commitment to profound change.

SECRET: MAXIMIZING THE IMPACT OF RAMI’S DESIGNATION

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 000070 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR NEA/ELA, EEB/TFS; TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY; NSC FOR
ABRAMS/SINGH 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2018
TAGS: ECON EINV EPET ETTC PGOV PINR KCOR SY
SUBJECT: MAXIMIZING THE IMPACT OF RAMI'S DESIGNATION 

REF: A. DAMASCUS 54
     B. 05 DAMASCUS 2364
     C. 06 DAMASCUS 03 

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4(b,d) 

-------
SUMMARY
------- 

1. (S/NF) As Washington moves towards designating Rami
Makhlouf, Embassy Damascus recommends that the Department's
roll-out strategy focus on linking his corrupt activities to
consequences suffered by the Syrian people (see para 11).  In
some of the largest economic sectors -- electricity,
petroleum, and telecommunications -- Makhlouf has used
government instruments to squeeze out legitimate businessmen,
receive lucrative public contracts, establish cash cows and
then milk them with impunity from oversight or competition.
Significantly, several of his ventures exploit weaknesses in
the Syrian economy and undermine reform efforts while
increasing the burden on Syria's lower classes.  Embassy
contacts report that Makhlouf is anticipating his eventual
designation, and that he has taken steps to lower his profile
and mitigate risk to his personal fortune.  End summary. 

------------------
MAKING THE CASE...
------------------ 

2. (C) In one well-known example, Makhlouf used his regime
ties to muscle-out the local agent for Iberdrola, just before
the Spanish company was awarded a 430 million-euro contract
to build a new power plant.  Having previously obtained
exclusive rights to represent Siemens, Rami profited again
when additional power infrastructure projects were awarded to
the German company.  Currently, both the Iberdrola (Iberinco)
and Siemens projects are behind schedule and over-budget.
Over the same period, the Syrian public suffered from rolling
blackouts and increased electrical bills.  During last
summer's August heatwave, poorer neighborhoods went without
power up to ten hours per day while Prime Minister Utri
blamed Syria's electrical woes on "international pressure"
rather than insufficient SARG investment in infrastructure.
Blackouts have recently returned to Syria and Rami's avarice
(reportedly demanding a USD 30 million "commission" in
Iberdrola's case) is a key contributing factor. 

3. (U) Rami is suspected of delaying the SARG's anticipated
licensing of a third GSM service provider in Syria until he
closes a deal to sell SyriaTel, which reportedly earned USD
692 million in 2007 alone.  Since GSM service was first
introduced in 2000, Syrians have been forced to choose
between two providers, Makhlouf's SyriaTel and Areeba (now
MTN), which was reportedly owned by First Lady Asma
al-Akhras' family.  Syrians widely resent the duopoly's
ability to set prices for the entire country.  With market
forces unable to compete, regime corruption elevated the
price of basic GSM service on which the average Syrian relies
as his primary means of communication. (There are six million
mobile subscribers to roughly three million land-line
connections.) 

4. (C) At a time when Syria's petroleum exports are
contracting and the Syrian people are increasingly suffering
from fuel shortages, Rami's presence in the petroleum sector
is exacerbating the problem.  The French company Total
proposed a venture that would have brought additional Syrian
gas reserves on-line in time to avert recent shortages, but
the deal has inexplicably floundered facing SARG bureaucratic
inaction.  Similarly, a Shell offer to upgrade and increase
capacity of Syrian refineries remains mired in SARG
bureaucracy at a time of acute shortages in refined product.
Interestingly, the only petroleum project currently
proceeding at full-speed in Syria is the Gulfsands (35
percent) "strategic partnership" with the Rami-led Cham
Holding Company (65 percent) to develop the recent oil and
gas discovery in the Khurbet East region (Northeastern
Syria).  According to a Gulfsands' statement, the joint
venture soon expects to bring 10,000 bpd of new oil
production on-line. 

5. (U) In a particularly brazen venture, Makhlouf also seems
intent on profiting from the impact of US sanctions on Syrian
Arab Airlines.  Rami's Cham Holding Company (40 percent) has
joined with Syrian Air (25 percent) and the Kuwaiti company
Al Aqeelah (35 percent) to create the first "private airline"
in Syria, dubbed the Cham Pearl.  The Kuwaiti company's
subsidiary, Aqeeq Aviation Holding, is apparently exploring
ways to circumvent US sanctions and provide commercial
aircraft.  Once operational, Cham Pearl intends to take over
Syrian Air's most profitable routes of three hours or less --
75 percent of Syrian Air's business -- from Damascus to major
regional airports, leaving Syrian Air with the less
profitable long-haul routes. (See "Syria: Opening Skies,"
Oxford Business Group, January 29, 2008) 

6. (U) Makhlouf remains unabashed about employing SARG muscle
when necessary.  In one oft-repeated example on the Damascus
street in 2007, a Syrian businessman purchased a prime piece
of real estate along the Mezzeh autostrade and received a
permit from the city to construct a large apartment building.
 As the project progressed, the SARG security services
informed the building's owner that he could not complete his
project as it would allow future occupants to have direct
line-of-sight to the Damascus airport.  Rami's agents then
visited the distraught owner and offered to buy the
unfinished building for a fraction of the property's actual
value.  Rebuffing Makhlouf's initial offer, the owner sought
recourse in the local courts for weeks to no avail.  In late
2007, Cham Holding announced that it had acquired the
property and would be developing a five-star Marriott hotel
on the site at a cost of USD 70 million. 

7. (C) Note: A hospitality-industry contact told Econoff that
Rami and Nabil Kuzbari (ref A) had traveled to the US and met
with senior Marriott executives in December to present a
potential business proposal and discuss design options for
the site.  According to the contact, the Syrians left the US
believing they had closed the deal and upon returning,
prematurely leaked their success to the local media.  In late
December, Marriott reportedly informed Cham Holding that it
was no longer interested in the proposal due to "political
reasons." End note. 

8. (U) Although difficult to prove, various internet-based
newsletters claim that Makhlouf is the political patron of
many high-ranking public SARG officials, including Minister
of Construction Hamud al-Hussein, Minister of Petroleum
Sufian Allaw, Minister of Electricity Ahmad Khalid al-Ali,
Central Bank Governor Adib Mayaleh and former Minister of
Telecommunications Amro Salem.  As officials with these
portfolios would be in position to wield substantial
influence over industry regulation and lucrative tenders, it
is doubtful that Rami would have enjoyed such uncanny
business successes without government collusion. 

------------------------
DIFFUSING RESPONSIBILITY
------------------------ 

9. (U) Since returning from his brief exile in Dubai (ref B),
Rami has taken several measures to try to both lower his
profile and insulate his personal fortune.  In 2006, Makhlouf
founded the Al Mashrek Fund, a holding company with a
reported capitalization of SYP 4 billion (USD 80 million),
including SYP 1 billion (USD 20 million) in cash deposited
with Banque Bemo Saudi Fransi.  Later that year, Makhlouf and
69 prominent Syrian businessmen formed the Cham Holding
Company with an initial capitalization of USD 200 million,
now estimated to be worth USD 350 million.  Representing
Makhlouf, the Al Mashrek Fund is the majority shareholder in
Cham Holding, which currently has 65 partners and a
ten-member board of directors.  By mid-2007, Cham Holding was
pursuing six "landmark" development projects valued at USD
1.3 billion, primarily in energy, transportation and real
estate.  (See The Syria Report, April 30 and Sept 12, 2007) 

-----------------------------------------
USING CUT-OUTS AND PRIVATE BANKING SECTOR
----------------------------------------- 

10. (S/NF) In addition to his public financial activities,
Makhlouf has undertaken several behind-the-scenes
machinations to mitigate his financial risk.  Possibly
concerned by the vulnerability of UAE banks to US pressure --
or frustrated by Emirati laws limiting foreign investment to
real estate and the stock market -- Rami reportedly brought a
part of his fortune back into Syria in 2006.  According to a
well-informed contact, Rami befriended then-expatriate Syrian
Morthada al-Dandashi in Dubai and hired him to manage many of
Makhlouf's "parallel" financial activities in Syria.  The
contact said that Rami paid Dandashi's USD 2 million "ante"
to become a partner in Cham Holding, and deposited
significant sums under Dandashi's name in the Damascus branch
of the Lebanese Byblos Bank -- where Dandashi subsequently
became a partner.  Syrian-Austrian citizen and Cham Holding
director Nabil Kuzbari is also reported to have deposited
money for Rami in Austrian banks.  Finally, contacts say
Makhlouf has also opened accounts under different names in
Lebanon, Greece, Turkey, and possibly Cyprus -- where Post
has learned that Rami once explored obtaining citizenship. 

-------------------------
SUGGESTED ROLL-OUT THEMES
------------------------- 

11. (U) Post recommends the following themes for public
statements regarding the designation of Rami Makhlouf: 

-- Electricity: Rami Makhlouf used his influence with the
regime to gain lucrative contracts in the power sector.
Yet, as the Syrian people continue to suffer from chronic
power outages and higher electrical bills, Rami has already
been paid for projects that are behind schedule and well
over-budget. 

-- Petroleum: Although several Western petroleum companies
are interested in helping Syria develop its gas and oil
sector, the only new project to be proceeding without SARG
impediment is Rami's.  As a result, Syria has become a net
importer of petroleum products.  In the midst of an unusually
severe winter, severe fuel shortages are forcing the Syrian
public to wait in long lines for, and frequently go without,
heating fuel for their homes. 

-- GSM service: Rami Makhlouf has made millions of dollars
from his ownership of SyriaTel, one of only two GSM service
providers in Syria.  Currently, Rami is said to be blocking
the licensing of a third GSM provider until he completes a
deal to sell SyriaTel.  Until free market forces are allowed
to compete, Makhlouf will continue to subject the Syrian
public to artificially elevated prices for basic
telecommunications services. 

-- Aviation: The Syrian national air carrier, Syrian Arab
Airlines (Syrian Air), has an aging fleet that is in need of
replacement.  Rather than addressing any of Syrian Air's
needs, the Assad regime instead awarded Rami Makhlouf a
license to operate a private airline that intends to assume
the most profitable of Syrian Air's routes. 

-- Tourism/Hospitality: The Syrian people are known for their
hospitality and entrepreneurial expertise.  Unfortunately,
legitimate Syrian businessmen hoping to invest in the
emerging tourism sector have again been muscled-out by Rami
Makhlouf and regime thugs who wish to monopolize every
opening in the Syrian economy for their own profit, rather
than share the country's potential with the hard-working
Syrian people. 

-------
COMMENT
------- 

12. (S/NF) Makhlouf's efforts to divest and diversify suggest
that he is expecting eventual USG action against him,
particularly since the November 2007 designation of his
brother, Hafiz.  Although his countermeasures will likely
mitigate the impact of his designation, we believe that it
will still send a strong signal to the regime and to his
current and potential future business partners.  Corruption
is a theme that resonates here, as every Syrian has been a
victim of it.  Rami has long been Syria's poster-boy for
corruption, so making the charge stick is not difficult.
Citing examples that impact the daily lives of Syrians should
help to amplify the designation's roll-out and ensure that it
receives the widest possible coverage.
HOLMSTROM

SECRET: TREASURY TEAM’S DAMASCUS CONSULTATIONS ON

VZCZCXRO6583
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #0269/01 0741541
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 151541Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3157
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000269 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

NEA/ELA;TREASURY FOR LEBENSON/GLASER/SZUBIN; NSC FOR
MARCHESE 

EO 12958 DECL: 03/06/2017
TAGS EFIN, ECON, ETTC, SY, SANC
SUBJECT: TREASURY TEAM’S DAMASCUS CONSULTATIONS ON
FINANCIAL SANCTIONS

REF: A. DAMASCUS 0108  B. 05 DAMASCUS 6224

Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Michael Corbin, reasons 1.4 b/d

1. (S/NF) Summary: Treasury representatives recently visited Post to discuss options for using financial sanctions to apply pressure to the Syrian regime. We discussed:
-- Treasury’s requirements for finalizing the pending designations of Mohammad Sulayman and Ali Mamluk, and Treasury’s information requirements for a public statement;
-- Treasury’s need to maintain the legal thread between the classified designation packet and the public statement announcing the designation;
-- Post’s support for designating Mohammad Nassif Kheirbek, SARG pointman for its relationship with Iran;
-- How designating regime financiers like Rami and Mohammad Mahlouf could be problematic without a new Executive Order on corruption. End Summary.

2. (S/NF) PENDING DESIGNATIONS: Post understands the designations for Mohammad Sulieman, Syrian Special Presidential Advisor for Arms Procurement and Strategic Weapons and Ali Mamluk, Chief of the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate, are pending due to a lack of unclassified material necessary for Treasury’s public
SIPDIS designation statement. In post’s estimate, Mohammad Sulayman is a relatively low-payoff target. His activities are not widely known, which will make it difficult to obtain unclassified information for a public statement and,
SIPDIS likewise, make it unlikely that his designation would resonate inside Syria. Ali Mamluk, on the other hand, is more well-known within Syria, especially for involvement in his objectionable activities regarding Lebanon, and his suppressing Syrian civil society and the internal opposition.  Therefore, Mamluk’s designation will likely have a larger impact with local and regional audiences if the public statement announcing his designation also discusses his oppression of Syrian society.

3. (S/NF) We understood from our visit with Treasury representatives that although we are limited to designating regime members under the existing Executive Orders, there is some flexibility in Treasury,s public statement announcing the designation. Post has advocated that no matter the legal basis of the designation, any public designation should focus on themes that resonate inside Syria: corruption, suppression of civil society, and denial of basic human rights (ref A). The need to maintain the “legal thread” between the designation packet and the public announcement could be challenging on cases like Mohamad Sulieman whose links to corruption are less clear. In cases like Ali Mamluk, however, the role of the organization he heads in suppressing internal dissent is publicly known in Syria and stating as much in our statement would resonate well here.

4. (S/NF) Post also supports moving forward with the designation packet on Mohammad Nasif Kheirbek, Syrian Deputy Vice-President for Security and lead Syrian liaison to Iran. Keirbek’s designation could play to a SARG vulnerability, in this case, the SARG’s relationship with Iran, which worries the Sunni majority. Designation of regime pillars involved with the SARG’s partnership with Iran could heighten Syrian and regional concerns about the SARG’s willingness to accomodate an expansionary Iranian agenda.

5. (S/NF) REGIEME FINANCIERS: We also discussed the possibility of targeting high-profile inner circle members and regime financiers like Rami Mahklouf (Asad’s first cousin) and Mohammad Makhlouf (Rami’s father) in the next phase of targeted financial sanctions. Based on our consultation with the Treasury representatives, it seemed apparent that without an Executive Order on corruption it would be difficult to compile enough information to designate this group under the current executive orders. The other option for pursuing this group would be to show how these individuals provided financial support to previously designated individuals such as Asif Shawkat. This course of action could prove highly problematic given the regime’s proficiency at obfuscating its financial transactions (ref B).
DAMASCUS 00000269 002 OF 002

6. (S) Comment. Post thanks Treasury for its team’s February 25-27 visit and welcomes any additional feedback that Washington agencies may have on our recommendations covered in ref A. Post continues to believe targeted financial sanctions are a tool appropriate for the Syrian setting but this tool requires further work to fully develop. ROEBUCK

Der Beweis: Erpressungsversuch des „NACHRICHTENDIENSTES“ GoMoPa“ an Meridian Capital

Der Beweis: Erpressungsversuch des „NACHRICHTENDIENSTES“ GoMoPa“ an Meridian Capital (DAS INVESTMENT MAGAZIN – DAS ORIGINAL – IMMOBILIEN VERTRAULICH) DAS ORIGINAL) – Nachfolgend bringen wir eine Original-Pressemeldung von „GoMoPa“, dem „NACHRICHTENDIENST“ mit dem Meridian Capital, London, erpresst werden sollte.Der Artikel strotzt nur von Fehlern. Damit ist deutlich, dass „GoMoPa“ tatsäch Meridian Capital erpresst hat und die Aktionen von Meridian Capital sich gegen „GoMoPa“ gerichtet haben.
Die gefälschte Pressemitteilung von Meridian Capital in Bezug auf unser Haus soll von dem „NACHRICHTENDIENST“ „GoMoPa“ ablenken.

„GoMopa“ schreibt:

08.09.2008
Weltweite Finanzierungen mit Widersprüchen

Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. gibt an, weltweite Finanzierungen anbieten zu können und präsentiert sich hierbei auf aufwendig kreierten Webseiten. GOMOPA hat die dort gemachten Angaben analysiert und Widersprüche entdeckt.

Der Firmensitz

Der Firmensitz befindet sich laut eigener Aussage in Dubai, Vereinigte Arabische Emirate. In einem GOMOPA vorliegenden Schreiben der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. heißt es jedoch, der Firmensitz sei in London. Auf der Homepage des Unternehmens taucht die Geschäftsadresse in der Londoner Old Broad Street nur als „Kundenabteilung für deutschsprachige Kunden“ auf. Eine weitere Adresse in der englischen Hauptstadt, diesmal in der Windsor Avenue, sei die „Abteilung der Zusammenarbeit mit Investoren“.

Die Meridian Capital Enterprises ist tatsächlich als „Limited“ (Ltd.) mit Sitz in England und Wales eingetragen. Aber laut Firmenhomepage hat das Unternehmen seinen „rechtlichen Geschäftssitz“ in Dubai. Eine Abfrage beim Gewerbeamt Dubais (DED) zu dieser Firmierung bleibt ergebnislos.

Bemerkenswert ist auch der vermeintliche Sitz in Israel. Auf der Webseite von Meridian Capital Enterprises heißt es: „Die Firma Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist im Register des israelischen Justizministeriums unter der Nummer 514108471, gemäß dem Gesellschaftsrecht von 1999, angemeldet.“ Hierzu Martin Kraeter, Gomopa-Partner und Prinzipal der KLP Group Emirates in Dubai: „Es würde keinem einzigen Emirati – geschweige denn einem Scheich auch nur im Traum einfallen, direkte Geschäfte mit Personen oder Firmen aus Israel zu tätigen. Und schon gar nicht würde er zustimmen, dass sein Konterfei auch noch mit vollem Namen auf der Webseite eines Israelischen Unternehmens prangt.“

Auf der Internetseite sind diverse Fotos mit Scheichs an Konferenztischen zu sehen. Doch diese großen Tagungen und großen Kongresse der Meridian Capital Enterprises werden in den Pressearchiven der lokalen Presse Dubais mit keinem Wort erwähnt.
Martin Kraeter: „ Ein ‚britisch-arabisch-israelisches bankfremdes Finanzinstitut sein zu wollen, wie die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. es darstellt, ist mehr als zweifelhaft. So etwas gibt es schlicht und ergreifend nicht! Der Nahostkonflikt schwelt schon seit mehr als 50 Jahren. Hier in den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten (VAE) werden Israelis erst gar nicht ins Land gelassen. Israelische Produkte sind gebannt. Es gibt nicht einmal direkte Telefonverbindungen. Die VAE haben fast 70% der Wiederaufbaukosten des Libanon geschultert, nachdem Israel dort einmarschiert ist.“

Zwei angebliche Großinvestitionen der Meridian Capital Enterprises in Dubai sind Investmentruinen bzw. erst gar nicht realisierte Projekte. Das Unternehmen wirbt mit ihrer finanziellen Beteiligung an dem Dubai Hydropolis Hotel und dem Dubai Snowdome.

Der Aktivitätsstatus der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist laut englischen Handelsregister (UK Companies House) „dormant“ gemeldet. Auf der Grundlage des englischen Gesellschaftsrechts können sich eingetragene Unternehmen selbst „dormant“ (schlafend) melden, wenn sie keine oder nur unwesentliche buchhalterisch zu erfassende Transaktionen vorgenommen haben. Dies ist angesichts der angeblichen globalen Investitionstätigkeit der Meridian Capital Ltd. sehr erstaunlich.

Der Webauftritt

Die Internetseite der MCE ist sehr aufwendig gestaltet, die Investitionen angeblich in Millionen- und Milliardenhöhe. Bei näherer Betrachtung der Präsentationselemente fällt jedoch auf, dass es sich bei zahlreichen veröffentlichen Fotos, die Veranstaltungen der Meridian Capital Enterprises dokumentieren sollen, meist um Fotos von Online-Zeitungen oder frei zugänglichen Medienfotos einzelner Institutionen handelt wie z.B. der Börse Dubai.

Auf der Internetpräsenz befinden sich Videofilmchen, die eine frappierende Ähnlichkeit mit dem Werbematerial von NAKHEEL aufweisen, dem größten Bauträger der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate. Doch den schillernden Videos über die berühmten drei Dubai Palmen „Jumeirah, Jebel Ali und Deira“ oder das Archipel „The World“ wurden offensichtlich selbstproduzierte Trailersequenzen der Meridian Capital Enterprises vorangestellt. Doch könnte es sich bei den Werbevideos um Fremdmaterial handeln.

Auch die auf der Webseite wahllos platzierten Fotos von bekannten Sehenswürdigkeiten Dubais fungieren als Augenfang für den interessierten Surfer mit eigenem Finanzierungswunsch. Bei einem Volumen von 10 Millionen Euro oder höher präsentiert sich die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. als der passende Investitionspartner. Das Unternehmen verfügt weltweit über zahlreiche Standorte: Berlin, London, Barcelona, Warschau, Moskau, Dubai, Riad, Tel Aviv, Hong Kong und New York. Aber nahezu alle Standorte sind lediglich Virtual Offices eines global arbeitenden Büroservice-Anbieters. „Virtual Office“ heißt im Deutschen schlicht „Briefkastenfirma“. Unter solchen Büroadressen sollen laut Meridian Capital Enterprises ganze Kommissionen ansässig sein, alles zum Wohle des Kunden.“

Zitatende

Dies ist das altbekannte Muster des „NACHRCHTENDIENSTES“ „GoMoPa“ und seiner Berliner und Hamburger Komplizen Falschmeldungen zu verbreiten, um Firmen und Personen erpressen oder ausschalten zu können.

Roland Jahn, Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives | Journal Interview

Beweis: Wie “GoMoPa” Meridian Capital erpresst hat und Maurischat von Interpol und BKA festgenommen wurde – Verwirrspiele nach STASI-Muster

Nachfolgend bringen wir eine Original-Pressemeldung von „GoMoPa“, dem „NACHRICHTENDIENST“ mit dem Meridian Capital, London, erpresst werden sollte. Der Artikel strotzt nur von Fehlern. Damit ist deutlich, dass „GoMoPa“ tatsäch Meridian Capital erpresst hat und die Aktionen von Meridian Capital sich gegen „GoMoPa“ gerichtet haben.
Die gefälschte Pressemitteilung von Meridian Capital in Bezug auf unser Haus soll von dem „NACHRICHTENDIENST“ „GoMoPa“ ablenken.

„GoMopa“ schreibt:

08.09.2008
Weltweite Finanzierungen mit Widersprüchen

Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. gibt an, weltweite Finanzierungen anbieten zu können und präsentiert sich hierbei auf aufwendig kreierten Webseiten. GOMOPA hat die dort gemachten Angaben analysiert und Widersprüche entdeckt.

Der Firmensitz

Der Firmensitz befindet sich laut eigener Aussage in Dubai, Vereinigte Arabische Emirate. In einem GOMOPA vorliegenden Schreiben der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. heißt es jedoch, der Firmensitz sei in London. Auf der Homepage des Unternehmens taucht die Geschäftsadresse in der Londoner Old Broad Street nur als „Kundenabteilung für deutschsprachige Kunden“ auf. Eine weitere Adresse in der englischen Hauptstadt, diesmal in der Windsor Avenue, sei die „Abteilung der Zusammenarbeit mit Investoren“.

Die Meridian Capital Enterprises ist tatsächlich als „Limited“ (Ltd.) mit Sitz in England und Wales eingetragen. Aber laut Firmenhomepage hat das Unternehmen seinen „rechtlichen Geschäftssitz“ in Dubai. Eine Abfrage beim Gewerbeamt Dubais (DED) zu dieser Firmierung bleibt ergebnislos.

Bemerkenswert ist auch der vermeintliche Sitz in Israel. Auf der Webseite von Meridian Capital Enterprises heißt es: „Die Firma Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist im Register des israelischen Justizministeriums unter der Nummer 514108471, gemäß dem Gesellschaftsrecht von 1999, angemeldet.“ Hierzu Martin Kraeter, Gomopa-Partner und Prinzipal der KLP Group Emirates in Dubai: „Es würde keinem einzigen Emirati – geschweige denn einem Scheich auch nur im Traum einfallen, direkte Geschäfte mit Personen oder Firmen aus Israel zu tätigen. Und schon gar nicht würde er zustimmen, dass sein Konterfei auch noch mit vollem Namen auf der Webseite eines Israelischen Unternehmens prangt.“

Auf der Internetseite sind diverse Fotos mit Scheichs an Konferenztischen zu sehen. Doch diese großen Tagungen und großen Kongresse der Meridian Capital Enterprises werden in den Pressearchiven der lokalen Presse Dubais mit keinem Wort erwähnt.
Martin Kraeter: „ Ein ‚britisch-arabisch-israelisches bankfremdes Finanzinstitut sein zu wollen, wie die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. es darstellt, ist mehr als zweifelhaft. So etwas gibt es schlicht und ergreifend nicht! Der Nahostkonflikt schwelt schon seit mehr als 50 Jahren. Hier in den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten (VAE) werden Israelis erst gar nicht ins Land gelassen. Israelische Produkte sind gebannt. Es gibt nicht einmal direkte Telefonverbindungen. Die VAE haben fast 70% der Wiederaufbaukosten des Libanon geschultert, nachdem Israel dort einmarschiert ist.“

Zwei angebliche Großinvestitionen der Meridian Capital Enterprises in Dubai sind Investmentruinen bzw. erst gar nicht realisierte Projekte. Das Unternehmen wirbt mit ihrer finanziellen Beteiligung an dem Dubai Hydropolis Hotel und dem Dubai Snowdome.

Der Aktivitätsstatus der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist laut englischen Handelsregister (UK Companies House) „dormant“ gemeldet. Auf der Grundlage des englischen Gesellschaftsrechts können sich eingetragene Unternehmen selbst „dormant“ (schlafend) melden, wenn sie keine oder nur unwesentliche buchhalterisch zu erfassende Transaktionen vorgenommen haben. Dies ist angesichts der angeblichen globalen Investitionstätigkeit der Meridian Capital Ltd. sehr erstaunlich.

Der Webauftritt

Die Internetseite der MCE ist sehr aufwendig gestaltet, die Investitionen angeblich in Millionen- und Milliardenhöhe. Bei näherer Betrachtung der Präsentationselemente fällt jedoch auf, dass es sich bei zahlreichen veröffentlichen Fotos, die Veranstaltungen der Meridian Capital Enterprises dokumentieren sollen, meist um Fotos von Online-Zeitungen oder frei zugänglichen Medienfotos einzelner Institutionen handelt wie z.B. der Börse Dubai.

Auf der Internetpräsenz befinden sich Videofilmchen, die eine frappierende Ähnlichkeit mit dem Werbematerial von NAKHEEL aufweisen, dem größten Bauträger der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate. Doch den schillernden Videos über die berühmten drei Dubai Palmen „Jumeirah, Jebel Ali und Deira“ oder das Archipel „The World“ wurden offensichtlich selbstproduzierte Trailersequenzen der Meridian Capital Enterprises vorangestellt. Doch könnte es sich bei den Werbevideos um Fremdmaterial handeln.

Auch die auf der Webseite wahllos platzierten Fotos von bekannten Sehenswürdigkeiten Dubais fungieren als Augenfang für den interessierten Surfer mit eigenem Finanzierungswunsch. Bei einem Volumen von 10 Millionen Euro oder höher präsentiert sich die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. als der passende Investitionspartner. Das Unternehmen verfügt weltweit über zahlreiche Standorte: Berlin, London, Barcelona, Warschau, Moskau, Dubai, Riad, Tel Aviv, Hong Kong und New York. Aber nahezu alle Standorte sind lediglich Virtual Offices eines global arbeitenden Büroservice-Anbieters. „Virtual Office“ heißt im Deutschen schlicht „Briefkastenfirma“. Unter solchen Büroadressen sollen laut Meridian Capital Enterprises ganze Kommissionen ansässig sein, alles zum Wohle des Kunden.“

Zitatende

Dies ist das altbekannte Muster des „NACHRCHTENDIENSTES“ „GoMoPa“ und seiner Berliner und Hamburger Komplizen Falschmeldungen zu verbreiten, um Firmen und Personen erpressen oder ausschalten zu können.


Aktenzeichen ST/0148943/2011: Immer wieder verfremden die vorbestraften Serienbetrüger Pressemeldungen von uns und der SJB-GoMoPa-Opfer (http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com) und verfälschen sie, um Verwirrung zu stiften und von ihren eigenen Taten abzulenken. Die persönlichen Angriffe gegen mich und andere Personen aus meinem Umfeld, sollen uns dazu bewegen, die kritischen Berichte über die Cyber-Stasi des 21. Jahrhunderts und deren Hintermänner einzustellen, sowie sie zuvor viele andere Journalisten eingeschüchtert haben, so dass deren Beiträge dann gelöscht wurden. Im Interesse aller Marktteilnehmer werden wir das ganz gewiss NICHT tun. Dies ist uns vielmehr ein Ansporn und eine Verpflichtung, die Öffentlichkeit über das Treiben der Cybermörder und wohl auch realen Mörder aufzuklären, damit diesen Stasi-Verbrechern, das Handwerk gelegt wird und sie nicht noch mehr rechtschaffene Menschen mit ihrem hahnebüchernen Unsinn verleumden, erpressen, betrügen und sie dann sogar ermorden können. Deshalb hier noch einmal zur Klarstellung: Der vorbestrafte Erpresser, Betrüger und wohl auch mutmassliche Mörder Heinz Gerlachs Klaus-Dieter Maurischat ist auf der Flucht.

Bereits einmal, im Dezember 2008, wurde er in Berlin auf Betreiben von Meridian Capital festgenommen. Zuvor sind er und sein mutmasslicher Komplize laut Meridian Capital bereits 23 verurteilt worden. Dokumente hierzu unter: http://sjb-fonds-opfer.com/?page_id=11764 Näheres zu Maurischat: Über eine selbstgebaute Blogseite verbreiten die GoMoPa-Gangster eine gefälschte Stellung von Meridian Capital, um Verwirrung zu stiften. Diese Blogseite existiert erst seit Deztember 2010. Beweis: http://www.hypestat.com/pressreleaser.org Die Meridian Capital-Seite, das Original, http://othergomopa.blogspot.com/ ist dagegen bereits seit 2009 online Beweis: Aussage Meridian Capital und KLAUS DIETER MAURISCHAT IN DETENTION

Source: http://klaus-dieter-maurischat.blogspot.com/2009/01/klaus-dieter-maurischat-in-haft.html Hinzu kommt Verurteilung wegen Betruges am eigenen Anleger sowie die Kursmanipulation in Sachen Wirecard etc pp.- Hier exemplarisch die Verurteilung wegen Betruges am eigenen Anleger: Klaus Maurischat und Mark Vornkahl, Betreiber vonwww.gomopa.net: Am 24. April 2006 war die Verhandlung am Amtsgericht Krefeld in der Betrugssache: Mark Vornkahl / Klaus Maurischat ./. Dehnfeld. Aktenzeichen: 28 Ls 85/05 Klaus MaurischatLange Straße 3827313 Dörverden.Das in diesem Verfahren ausschließlich diese Betrugsache verhandelt wurde, ist das Urteil gegen Klaus Maurischat recht mäßig ausgefallen.

SATURDAY, JULY 11, 2009

KLAUS DIETER MAURISCHAT IN DETENTION

Source: http://klaus-dieter-maurischat.blogspot.com/2009/01/klaus-dieter-maurischat-in-haft.html
KLAUS DIETER MAURISCHAT IN HAFT – DownloadGerman VersionHere is a Google Translation (German -> English)

Sunday 18 Januar 2009 January 2009

KLAUS DIETER MAURISCHAT IN DETENTIONMeridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. unveils new criminal phenomena in network I. SachverhaltIn recently appeared on the net more often at the same time a new a very worrying phenomenon of criminal nature. Professional criminals groups in the network are taking part, to extortion, fraud, Erschwindeln relating to certain specifically selected companies and businesses are capable of. These criminals developed new methods and means, simply and in a short time to bereichern.Strategien and manifestations, which underlie this process are fairly simple. A criminal is looking to “carefully” on the Internet specific companies and corporations (victims of crime) and informed them in the next step, that of the business activities of such companies and corporations in the near future – first on the Internet then in other available mass media – numerous and very unfavorable information appears. At the same time, the criminals beat their future victims an effective means of reducing unnecessary difficulties and problems to escape the loss of good name and image of the company and corporate sector. These offenders are aware of that reputation, name and appearance of each company is a value in itself. It was therefore a value of what each company is prepared to pay any price. But the reason for difficulties and problems arising from the loss of good name and reputation result. The criminals and their victims are already aware that this loss is devastating consequences might have been the closing down of a particular business can enforce. It takes both to No as well as at large companies regard. The company is concerned that in virtually every industry in each country and cross-border activities sind.Das criminal procedure in the form of a blackmail on money, a fraud is becoming rapidly and globally, ie led cross-border and internationally. Among the victims of extortion, fraud is now looking both at home (domestic) and international corporations, the major emphasis on conservation, keeping and maintaining their reputation in the business according to their credibility lay. The criminals in the network have understood that maintaining an unassailable reputation and name of a company the unique ability to provide fast and easy enrichment forms. The above-mentioned criminal procedure is difficult to track because it is international in nature, and by overlapping or even nonexistent (fictional) professional and judicial persons in various countries and operated company wird.Diese offenders in the network publish it and disseminate false information about your victims on remote servers, which are not uncommon in many exotic countries. There are those countries in which serious gaps in the legal system, investigative and prosecution procedures are visible. As an example, at this point mention India werden. Mit criminals working in the network grid portals known leader of blogs with your seat-consciously or unconsciously, even in highly developed countries. For example, at this point, countries such as Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the United States, Britain, Spain or Portugal are mentioned. The below listed criminals were able to act unpunished today. As a symptom of such action appears here the activity and “effectiveness” of the company GOMOPA, which is on countries such as Germany, Switzerland, Austria, the United States, Britain, Spain and India. A good example of such an action is Mr. Klaus Mauri Chat – the leader and “brain” of the company GOMOPA with many already in force and criminal judgments “on his account”, which in this way for years and funded its maintenance in the industry almost unlimited activity. This status will change dramatically, however, including far and wide thanks to discontinued operations of the firm Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. who would oppose such offenses addressed in the network. Other companies and corporations, in which the crime network and outside of this medium have fallen victim to contribute to combating such crimes bei.Die situation is changing, thanks to effective steps and the successful cooperation of the firm Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. with the international police Interpol, with the federal agency (FBI) in the U.S., the Federal Criminal Police in Germany, with Scotland Yard in Britain, as well as with the Russian secret service FSB.Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. – Together with other companies and cooperations, the victim of criminal activities of the network of crime have fallen – has undeniably already started to yield results. The fact that in recent weeks (November 2008) on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany of the above-mentioned leaders and “brain” of the company GOMOPA, Mr Klaus Maurishat was arrested should not be ignored. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. information available results clearly show that the next arrests of persons participating in this process in such countries as: Austria, Switzerland, Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Spain, Mexico, Portugal, Brazil, the USA, Canada, UK, Ireland , Australia, New Zealand and made in a.. The ultimate goal of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. and the other victims of crime in the network is to provide all participants in this criminal procedure before the competent court to lead. All professional and judicial persons, regardless of the seat and out of the business, which the above-described criminal action (fraud, extortion) to have fallen victim can of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. led company to join the goal set at all at this point the procedure described those associated in the public and the economic life out. II blacklist blackmail and with international fraudsters and their methods (opus operandi) in the following countries: 1 The Federal Republic Deutschland2. Dubai 3rd Russia 1st The Federal Republic of Germany GmbH GOMOPA, Goldman Morgenstern & Partners LLC., Goldman Morgenstern & Partners Consulting LLC, Wottle collection. In these firms are quite active following persons: – Klaus Mauri Chat ( “Father” and “brain” of the criminal organization responsible for countless final judgments have been achieved (arrested in Germany in November 2008) – Josef Rudolf Heckel ( “right hand “when Mr Klaus Mauri chat, denounced former banker who is excessive in many Bankschmuggeleien was involved.(Today, persona non grata in the German banking industry); – Peter Reski (responsible for Finance, known for fraud, tax fraud and embezzlement, which is already behind the judgments are final) – Mark Vornkahl (responsible for organizational and administrative tasks in GOMOPA, a former police officer dismissed because of numerous expectations in the service, already has a few final judgments “on his account”); – Claus i Ulrike Wottle (married couple, for the so-called “unconventional” enforcement of the debt for the benefit GOMOPA. This execution was imposing, with extortion violence based on both real and fictitious debts references? How does the system of GOMOPADie above-mentioned persons in Brief, as well as with the service GOMOPA cooperating, so-called “experts GOMOPA” Bloggers and all other professional and legal persons choose from all possible sources of information about large, rich companies and corporations coming in various domestic and international sectors of the economy. GOMOPA The service is particularly keen that those aussucht, the “in itself visible.” Those companies corporations and, therefore, against the relatively easy and without much effort himself, inconsistencies, etc. can be done in terms of the even crimes such as cheating and Erschwindeln Others can easily perform. It is well known that every company especially good at their presence and her name is inviolable. Each company will do everything according to their good presence also retain its credibility to be. But if the victim of GOMOPA and his “partner” and a large range of businesses, so it is possible to call such companies a quick, easy, and even considerably enriched. It appears at this point the question: Which clever criminals in the network and outside the network to me is success, it does not wish to benefit? The criminals in the network know that without business credibility there is no confidence that any business is essential. GOMOPA and all are cooperating with the security of all possible methods and measures mastered how to credibility and confidence of a company, a company, corporation (crime victims) in question. This moves just the attention of the user, so that the homepage of the GOMOPA http://www.gomopa.net in search engines like Google, Yahoo is easy to find. This, in turn, means nothing other than additional profits for the service GOMOPA because of its activity around a media discourse created wird.Ein at first glance commonplace and easy victims of extortion, for example, can a public governmental body, which, based on the credibility of public works, such as a bank or a foreign bank financial institution. So it was with the foreign banks, international financial institution Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. the case. A simple and easy victims of illicit profits and material may include insurance companies, where – as it is from our search results, much to the criminal activities of the GOMOPA especially in the area of the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland and Austria was due. Among the known and identifiable victims is certainly German, Austrian and Swiss banks, insurance companies such as Allianz of Germany, German and Austrian companies such as HDI and DKV visible. This is what the service GOMOPA trust and what with the cooperating services, blogs nowadays practice is the so-called cyber-stalking, which rapidly spread in the network. The method is criminal at this point and others in the threat that the business of an enterprise (Ofer blackmail, threats and forcible ) fictitious, even non-existent information (lies, rumors, stories, statements, insults) on the net first then in other mass media. This is only used to a potential victim to move a considerable sum of money for the so-called “peace “the blackmailer available. The” quiet “here means the promise of access lock with respect to the fictitious publication of any information on the net and in all other mass media, the victims of extortion in extremely negative light showing. Such threats are, as already above the goal of companies – potential victims of cyber-stalking to do likewise, that they themselves “buy.” In short, GOMOPA and his peers, and cooperating with those services, and blogs, create a “virtual reality”, or otherwise said publishing fictitious information on potential victims of a crime. firms and corporations, against which threats and extortion by GOMOPA are not due, ie those who for so-called “peace” does not want to pay, to be victims of serious lies, insults, and Insinuationen other criminal misappropriations, the appearance and presence of a firm with certainty. One is a target of GOMOPA, namely as fast and as easy as it goes, money abzukassieren, and if a company refuses, and the “peace” do not buy wishes, it is unexpectedly and quickly become an object of extortion and defamation on the net. At this point the following question arises: How is it possible that the leader of the firm GOMOPA, Mr Klaus Mauri chat, only in the Federal Republic of Germany on his account “23 court rulings, has for many years as an honest citizen to create, while other persons, firms, corporations criminal acts, offenses memorize, in addition to substantial sums of money could earn? This complex process can only be explained as follows: GOMOPA creates his appearance, his presence in the eyes of public opinion as an honest subject, against which pathological phenomena in the public and economic life einschreitet. GOMOPA and his partner (services, blogs) present themselves as followers of any Verbrechensart that promise so the fight against criminals in each virtual network ( especially against any cheaters, blackmailers). GOMOPA used in this respect a kind of “Merketingsvorhang” as a method of seduction, a result which is his true “face” and his true intentions than that of a fraudster and blackmail on money can hide. The true intentions of the GOMOPA, of working together GOMOPA Services and blogs were until today no doubt with success before the public opinion will remain hidden, especially thanks to the so-called “smoke curtain”, which reflects the fact that man himself as a “winner” of any abuse and any pathological appearance of the public and economic life in Aland German, Austria, Switzerland, the United States, Britain, Russia, Spain created. Next appears the GOMOPA forward by the person on which companies and corporations – the future victims of the crime that is – against the possibility of the release of extremely poor and the company concerned in a negative light visual information on the Internet and other mass media warns. The person from whom the speech is also informed that they are successful against such a procedure for a “fee” can be used. The GOMOPA is at this point up to the extortion of money for so-called “peace” to the company and corporation (the victim of a crime) around. Most of the companies concerned to such threats did not respond, because it’s everyday life and their agenda. It finally barely missing on the web of blackmail and outside of the medium. Normally so seldom so-called “understanding”, while on the one hand, the crime victim, on the other hand, the GOMOPA occurs. It is understandable that the price for such an “understanding” means the provision of the requested funds would GOMOPA. The financial blackmail in this stage is rarely enforced. The situation changes little, however, if the firms and corporations (crime victims) find that the threat was fulfilled. In Brief will appear on the homepage http://www.gomopa.net numerous newspaper articles, reports and bogus pseudo market analysis, both by GOMOPA as well as so-called “independent experts” and the company will be represented, with formal or fictitious GOMOPA together. Information published here, correspond to the contents of a threat and make the operations of firms and corporations in an extremely negative light dar. There is no doubt that such actions and methods only to harm the good name and good presence of these firms and corporations prerogatives. The activity of GOMOPA is certainly not exhausted. GOMOPA disseminated (published accommodates) the above information in the network by the credible, and popular opinion-operated services. Moreover, GOMOPA threatens the companies and corporations (its victims), that “from the finger-drawn” information not only on the network, but also on television and on radio and in the press landscape erscheinen.Wie the experience and expertise of the former Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. show that the services are usually not aware that they are for the purpose of a criminal action by the GOMOPA used. They agree with the corresponding fictitious publications, reports and analysis on what specifically GOMOPA through and through “independent” experts are prepared. It also states that the services, and blogs such cooperation with the GOMOPA approval, although they know that the information transmitted by GOMOPA are fictitious and the credibility of companies and corporations affect. They take so aware of the criminal procedure part. The explanation of this situation is quite simple. GOMOPA pays namely the services, and blogs related remuneration that the publication of false information on the companies and corporations (crime victims) agree. Some services, and blogs seem to know nothing about it to have that on their pages available information “fictitious” and “pulled out of the fingers are. Are you looking for in this way their conduct to justify, because they want the legal consequences of participating in the abuse of the good name and appearance of a company or corporation to escape. The activity system of GOMOPA of collaborating services and blogs was also the example of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. tested. Beginning in October 2008 was one of the workers of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. a message from an anonymous sender, in the near future – first on the Internet, then on television, radio and in the German press – information published by the functioning and activities of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. in an extremely negative light show. The employee of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. was then informed that these reports / news undoubtedly significantly the appearance and the reputation of the firm Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. affect. The place mentioned in this “conversation partner” has the workers of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. informed that the possibility of the embarrassing situation to be avoided by Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. to the person shown by the account the sum of 100,000.00 EUR transfers. As later revealed, however, was Mr. Klaus Mauri Chat – this anonymous interlocutor – “brain” and “Leader of the GOMOPA”. The investigations have been employed by the Federal Judicial Police (tracking and identifying the body at the federal level) during the investigation for the payment of blackmail, fraud and threats because of what Mr Mauri chatting and his staff were practiced, and for participation by other (head of Internet services and moderators of blogs) on this process. These crimes have been committed to loss of many professional and judicial persons, including the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. The victims of this crime in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, the USA and Canada visible. At this moment appeared the following question: What was the reaction of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. to the demands from GOMOPA? Corresponded to the response to the expectations of GOMOPA? Has the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. the required sum of EUR 100,000.00 paid? Side of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. There was absolutely no reaction to the extortion attempt by GOMOPA. At the end of August 2008 on the Service http://www.gompa.net numerous articles / reports published by the activities of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. in a very negative light have represented. Once the information contained on http://www.gomopa.net detail and were fully analyzed, it is that they are not even the truth at one point and potential and existing customers of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. in relation to the financial institution from this discontinued business activities is misleading. Following the criminal Handlugen of GOMOPA and its cooperating services, and blogs on the network, the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. measurable and significant business losses. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. has primarily an important group of potential customers lost. But what it showed as important, the existing customers of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. little away. Those customers have used our services and continue to use the still. In view of the existing collaboration with the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.., Which will in turn be no objections. GOMOPA has such a course of events accurately predicted, which aims significant and measurable business by Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. losses were suffered. The course of events, the service GOMOPA certainly pleased. GOMOPA has to expect that the position of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. declines and the financial institution, the required sum (100.000,00 EUR) provides. Over time, as the whole procedure in the network was becoming more popular, tried GOMOPA still four times to the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. Contacts, each time by adjusting these criminal “Kompanie” has promised, although it every time his financial demands heraufsetzte. The last of the set of “company” against Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. ratio was even planned EUR 5,000,000.00 (in words: EURO fünfmilionen). The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. could but before the ever-increasing demands from the Service GOMOPA claim. In October 2008 met the management of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. Decision on the notification of the INTERPOL International Police and the appropriate law enforcement institutions of the FRG (the police and the prosecutor) about the existing situation. In the meantime, reported at the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. numerous companies and corporations, and even professional person such as doctors, judges, priests, actors and other people from different countries of the world, the extortion of GOMOPA relented and the required amounts of money it had. These people already gave statements that they have done so, so they finally just “be in peace” and unnecessary problems, difficulties, and a reasonable conclusion hardly avoid them. The victims of this criminal action, the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. using different amounts of money which were requested, informed. In one case, there were relatively small (a few thousand EURO), in another case it has to deliver significant amounts (around few million EURO). Additionally turned to Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. Companies which have not yet GOMOPA the “fee” on out and have already considered whether they should do or not. These firms anticipated by Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. a clear opinion as well as a practical professional advice on how to be in such a situation should behave and how they can avoid debt. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. has invariably victims of all crimes, which are at our company have made a cooperation proposed. The top task is to this cooperation, jointly determined and effective measures against GOMOPA against other services in the network, and against all Bloggers to meet in the here described with international criminal procedure GOMOPA leaders to participate. All these companies were known as the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. proposed “crusade” against GOMOPA, his partner. At our request to notify all participating companies the INTERPOL International Police and their pursuit of domestic institutions, including the competent public prosecutor and the police authorities about the existing situation. In view of the fact that the criminal act of GOMOPA be extended over many states and that the number of the Federal Republic of Germany because the ads reimbursed by GOMOPA, Internet Services and Bloggers crimes, grew up fast – which no doubt influenced by a far-reaching impact of criminal of GOMOPA testifies – International Business, the Police INTERPOL Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. before that its representatives in Berlin with representatives from GOMOPA true to the “payment arrangements and transfer the sum of EUR 5,000,000.00 to discuss. This step meant a well thought-out and by the Federal Criminal Police organized the event to carry out aimed at the arrest of international criminals GOMOPA acting was. The coordinated steps and measures of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. Damaged and others, led by the International Economic Police INTERPOL, the Federal Criminal Police Office and the Prosecutor of the Federal Republic of Germany for education, training and implementation of the above-described case contributed. In November 2008, the event in Berlin prepared for the apprehension and arrest of the representative of the GOMOPA, after the arrest of Mr. Klaus Mauri chat – as the main leaders and leaders of international criminal group GOMOPA recalled. The arrest and notified the Federal Criminal Police showed both the current whereabouts of Mr. Klaus Mauri chat. “Brain” and the founder of this international criminal group GOMOPA, Mr Klaus Mauri chat on the same day was also arrested and imprisoned on time, will soon put in charge state, the responsibility for their own crimes and those of the forum, before a competent GOMOPA Federal wear. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. undertook all possible steps to ensure that Mr. Klaus Mauri chatting on the dock of the competent court of the United Kingdom of Great Britain appears. Among the damaged work and justice people from United Kingdom, along with the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. There are many victims of GOMOPA: The beginning of the arrests with such a scale means for the German judiciary and a major breakthrough point. It is worth noting that the prosecution bodies of the Federal Republic, up to this stage of the long-standing criminal activity of Mr. Klaus Mauri chatting and his staff were powerless. Prolonged impunity of the criminal actions of Mr. Klaus Mauri chat, for years the “first violin” in GOMOPA played, is to end gegangen.An this point another question arises: how is it so go on? The arrest of Mr. Klaus chat Mauri is a critical moment, in other words a “turn around 180 degrees” for him personally. But it also means the beginning of the end “for its employees, for Internet Services, Bloggers, with GOMOPA so happy and had worked together without contradiction. There is no doubt that the cause of Mr Klaus Mauri chat at the top of the “iceberg” is. The above-mentioned turning point on this issue will be further arrests and detentions of members GOMOPA bring with them, and all persons from all areas involved in this transnational criminal actions have taken part. For information (reports by the end of December 2008), which of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. available, the result that the next arrests currently prepared to be associated with the Services GOMOPA cooperating persons. This is to people outside Germany – from where Mr Klaus Mauri chat coming – refer. The details may be at this point in terms of legal and course of the prosecution bodies of the BRG and the Interpol-led investigation can not be betrayed. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. currently can only illustrate information from the investigation led the public to the criminal liability not to have this moment wird.In so intense preparations for the arrest of a number of persons outside the Federal Republic of Germany. This applies particularly to countries such as the following: – Russia-Ukraine – Poland – Spain – Mexico – Portugal – Brazil – the United States of America – Canada – UK – Ireland – Australia – New Zealand – India. All professional and judicial persons, regardless of the country in which they accompany the Office, or its citizens, and until now, consciously or unconsciously with the Forum GOMOPA together, or continue to work together to arouse the suspicion of the INTERPOL International Police. This works with the police criminal investigation department in each country, to the above persons first identify and then to legally pursue them. Information about this topic, as well as on the beginning and end of the activity of the GOMOPA can be at the following addresses on the Web at: http://gomopaabzocker.wordpress.com/http://www.nepper-schlepper-bauernfaenger.comhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qNpzAu-QMuEhttp://www.korte.de/alexander/2006/01/gomopa-finanforum-kritik.html- http://evelux.de/gomopa-sam-240/- http://blog.deobald.org/archive/2007/07/01/betrugsvorwurf-gomopa-spam/ 2. Dubai KLP Group Emirates – United Arab Emirates. As head of the company is Mr Martin Kraeter, not only as the “brain” of the whole company, but also as a longstanding friend of Mr Klaus Mauri Chat (GOMOPA-wire) acts. This company wants to hide and not even officially exist, that they as a strategic partner of the GOMOPA in the area of the Middle East, according to the territory of the Persian coast operates. Official activities of the company KLP Group Emirates includes among others the following areas: financial advisory services from the offshore area (Management Services – Facilitators – OffshoreConsultants, International Tax & Legal Consultants – Fiduciaries). In the sphere of activities of the Company will include the creation of companies and enterprises in the so-called “tax havens” to the tax liability to the company activity entfliehen.Inoffizielle KLP Group Emirates includes cooperation with the Service GOMOPA in the field of “Gelwäsche”. The monies are a result of criminal activity by GOMOPA generated by advanced professional and judicial persons soon throughout the world and legalized. The illegality based on the activity of the company KLP Group Emirates, as well as the cooperation with the Services GOMOPA attracted attention even when the prosecution organs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, especially in Scotland Yard, which on this issue an intensive investigation has begun, which is in the ” development phase is located. It must be noted that all professional and judicial persons, but especially the clients of the company KLP Group Emirates, with the company KLP Group Emirates have cooperated in the past and still do, under the “Lupp” of Scotland Yard to be .3. Russlanda) The Company E-XECUTIVE by the Lord led Novosartow Vilen. On the homepage of the Company contained information comes directly from the company GOMOPA. The company e XECUTIVE leads the close cooperation not only with GOMOPA, but also with another on the Russian territory under the name of OOO UK broker functioning company. The company e XECUTIVE in connection with the company OOO UK broker is a member of a criminal group led by GOMOPA. The company e XECUTIVE GOMOPA representing interests in Russia and Central-Eastern Europe. Unofficially, the company employs E XECUTIVE-especially with the search for potential “victims” of the Erschwindelns, blackmail and forcing the funds for GOMOPA companies and corporations from the territory of Russia, Ukraine, and from all countries in Central Eastern Europe. Officially, the company e XECUTIVE one to the forum GOMOPA similar industrial activity. b) OOO “UK broker.” Head of the firm is Mr. Pavel Kokarev. This company is not concealed, that they are consistent with the Forum GOMOPA cooperates. The company OOO UK broker represents GOMOPA in Central Eastern Europe, including Russia. You shall be officially transferred to this area the GOMOPA similar activity, but unofficially it is to search for potential “victims” of racketeering, fraud and Erschwindelns for GOMOPA employed. The company has remained until now spared from any punishment, it could with “eternal impunity” because of a poorly developed, corrupt legal system in Russia expected. The situation may change after Mr. Klaus Mauri Chat arrested in Berlin and was arrested. This constant offenders, the “on his account” a set of legally enforceable judgments has, until now his freedom has unlimited recover, the do not know quite what it means to be arrested, begins gradually, according to our available information to finally “to bear witness.” This is understandable when one considers the threat of a penalty he considered. This delinquent shows growing interest in cooperation with the German tracking and identifying bodies. So there is a chance that other people he unveiled to the public by providing for reduction of prison sentence counts. It is also the only question of time INTERPOL, in cooperation with the Russian Service (FSB) of the Company OOO UK broker “at the door knocking”, which by Mr. Pavle Kokarev and represented. The company OOO UK broker has a virtual office in REGUS building in Moscow, is not even a person, forming a typical one-person company, which all business “crimes” may be the name of it, with no civil liability to pay. The Lord Pavel Kokarev seems to have forgotten or do not have sufficient knowledge about its possible responsibility fier to participate in the international crimes under the direction of Gomopa.

“The Other GoMoPa” – The Original Meridian Capital Press Release

Dear Readers,

here is on your request the Original Meridian Capital Document:

http://othergomopa.blogspot.com/

Saturday, July 11, 2009

KLAUS DIETER MAURISCHAT IN DETENTION

Source: http://klaus-dieter-maurischat.blogspot.com/2009/01/klaus-dieter-maurischat-in-haft.html
KLAUS DIETER MAURISCHAT IN HAFT — DownloadGerman VersionHere is a Google Translation (German -> English)Sunday 18 Januar 2009 January 2009

KLAUS DIETER MAURISCHAT IN DETENTIONMeridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. unveils new criminal phenomena in network I. SachverhaltIn recently appeared on the net more often at the same time a new a very worrying phenomenon of criminal nature. Professional criminals groups in the network are taking part, to extortion, fraud, Erschwindeln relating to certain specifically selected companies and businesses are capable of. These criminals developed new methods and means, simply and in a short time to bereichern.Strategien and manifestations, which underlie this process are fairly simple. A criminal is looking to “carefully” on the Internet specific companies and corporations (victims of crime) and informed them in the next step, that of the business activities of such companies and corporations in the near future – first on the Internet then in other available mass media – numerous and very unfavorable information appears. At the same time, the criminals beat their future victims an effective means of reducing unnecessary difficulties and problems to escape the loss of good name and image of the company and corporate sector. These offenders are aware of that reputation, name and appearance of each company is a value in itself. It was therefore a value of what each company is prepared to pay any price. But the reason for difficulties and problems arising from the loss of good name and reputation result. The criminals and their victims are already aware that this loss is devastating consequences might have been the closing down of a particular business can enforce. It takes both to No as well as at large companies regard. The company is concerned that in virtually every industry in each country and cross-border activities sind.Das criminal procedure in the form of a blackmail on money, a fraud is becoming rapidly and globally, ie led cross-border and internationally. Among the victims of extortion, fraud is now looking both at home (domestic) and international corporations, the major emphasis on conservation, keeping and maintaining their reputation in the business according to their credibility lay. The criminals in the network have understood that maintaining an unassailable reputation and name of a company the unique ability to provide fast and easy enrichment forms. The above-mentioned criminal procedure is difficult to track because it is international in nature, and by overlapping or even nonexistent (fictional) professional and judicial persons in various countries and operated company wird.Diese offenders in the network publish it and disseminate false information about your victims on remote servers, which are not uncommon in many exotic countries. There are those countries in which serious gaps in the legal system, investigative and prosecution procedures are visible. As an example, at this point mention India werden. Mit criminals working in the network grid portals known leader of blogs with your seat-consciously or unconsciously, even in highly developed countries. For example, at this point, countries such as Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the United States, Britain, Spain or Portugal are mentioned. The below listed criminals were able to act unpunished today. As a symptom of such action appears here the activity and “effectiveness” of the company GOMOPA, which is on countries such as Germany, Switzerland, Austria, the United States, Britain, Spain and India. A good example of such an action is Mr. Klaus Mauri Chat – the leader and “brain” of the company GOMOPA with many already in force and criminal judgments “on his account”, which in this way for years and funded its maintenance in the industry almost unlimited activity. This status will change dramatically, however, including far and wide thanks to discontinued operations of the firm Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. who would oppose such offenses addressed in the network. Other companies and corporations, in which the crime network and outside of this medium have fallen victim to contribute to combating such crimes bei.Die situation is changing, thanks to effective steps and the successful cooperation of the firm Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. with the international police Interpol, with the federal agency (FBI) in the U.S., the Federal Criminal Police in Germany, with Scotland Yard in Britain, as well as with the Russian secret service FSB.Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. – Together with other companies and cooperations, the victim of criminal activities of the network of crime have fallen – has undeniably already started to yield results. The fact that in recent weeks (November 2008) on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany of the above-mentioned leaders and “brain” of the company GOMOPA, Mr Klaus Maurishat was arrested should not be ignored. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. information available results clearly show that the next arrests of persons participating in this process in such countries as: Austria, Switzerland, Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Spain, Mexico, Portugal, Brazil, the USA, Canada, UK, Ireland , Australia, New Zealand and made in a.. The ultimate goal of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. and the other victims of crime in the network is to provide all participants in this criminal procedure before the competent court to lead. All professional and judicial persons, regardless of the seat and out of the business, which the above-described criminal action (fraud, extortion) to have fallen victim can of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. led company to join the goal set at all at this point the procedure described those associated in the public and the economic life out. II blacklist blackmail and with international fraudsters and their methods (opus operandi) in the following countries: 1 The Federal Republic Deutschland2. Dubai 3rd Russia 1st The Federal Republic of Germany GmbH GOMOPA, Goldman Morgenstern & Partners LLC., Goldman Morgenstern & Partners Consulting LLC, Wottle collection. In these firms are quite active following persons: – Klaus Mauri Chat ( “Father” and “brain” of the criminal organization responsible for countless final judgments have been achieved (arrested in Germany in November 2008) – Josef Rudolf Heckel ( “right hand “when Mr Klaus Mauri chat, denounced former banker who is excessive in many Bankschmuggeleien was involved.(Today, persona non grata in the German banking industry); – Peter Reski (responsible for Finance, known for fraud, tax fraud and embezzlement, which is already behind the judgments are final) – Mark Vornkahl (responsible for organizational and administrative tasks in GOMOPA, a former police officer dismissed because of numerous expectations in the service, already has a few final judgments “on his account”); – Claus i Ulrike Wottle (married couple, for the so-called “unconventional” enforcement of the debt for the benefit GOMOPA. This execution was imposing, with extortion violence based on both real and fictitious debts references? How does the system of GOMOPADie above-mentioned persons in Brief, as well as with the service GOMOPA cooperating, so-called “experts GOMOPA” Bloggers and all other professional and legal persons choose from all possible sources of information about large, rich companies and corporations coming in various domestic and international sectors of the economy. GOMOPA The service is particularly keen that those aussucht, the “in itself visible.” Those companies corporations and, therefore, against the relatively easy and without much effort himself, inconsistencies, etc. can be done in terms of the even crimes such as cheating and Erschwindeln Others can easily perform. It is well known that every company especially good at their presence and her name is inviolable. Each company will do everything according to their good presence also retain its credibility to be. But if the victim of GOMOPA and his “partner” and a large range of businesses, so it is possible to call such companies a quick, easy, and even considerably enriched. It appears at this point the question: Which clever criminals in the network and outside the network to me is success, it does not wish to benefit? The criminals in the network know that without business credibility there is no confidence that any business is essential. GOMOPA and all are cooperating with the security of all possible methods and measures mastered how to credibility and confidence of a company, a company, corporation (crime victims) in question. This moves just the attention of the user, so that the homepage of the GOMOPA http://www.gomopa.net in search engines like Google, Yahoo is easy to find. This, in turn, means nothing other than additional profits for the service GOMOPA because of its activity around a media discourse created wird.Ein at first glance commonplace and easy victims of extortion, for example, can a public governmental body, which, based on the credibility of public works, such as a bank or a foreign bank financial institution. So it was with the foreign banks, international financial institution Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. the case. A simple and easy victims of illicit profits and material may include insurance companies, where – as it is from our search results, much to the criminal activities of the GOMOPA especially in the area of the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland and Austria was due. Among the known and identifiable victims is certainly German, Austrian and Swiss banks, insurance companies such as Allianz of Germany, German and Austrian companies such as HDI and DKV visible. This is what the service GOMOPA trust and what with the cooperating services, blogs nowadays practice is the so-called cyber-stalking, which rapidly spread in the network. The method is criminal at this point and others in the threat that the business of an enterprise (Ofer blackmail, threats and forcible ) fictitious, even non-existent information (lies, rumors, stories, statements, insults) on the net first then in other mass media. This is only used to a potential victim to move a considerable sum of money for the so-called “peace “the blackmailer available. The” quiet “here means the promise of access lock with respect to the fictitious publication of any information on the net and in all other mass media, the victims of extortion in extremely negative light showing. Such threats are, as already above the goal of companies – potential victims of cyber-stalking to do likewise, that they themselves “buy.” In short, GOMOPA and his peers, and cooperating with those services, and blogs, create a “virtual reality”, or otherwise said publishing fictitious information on potential victims of a crime. firms and corporations, against which threats and extortion by GOMOPA are not due, ie those who for so-called “peace” does not want to pay, to be victims of serious lies, insults, and Insinuationen other criminal misappropriations, the appearance and presence of a firm with certainty. One is a target of GOMOPA, namely as fast and as easy as it goes, money abzukassieren, and if a company refuses, and the “peace” do not buy wishes, it is unexpectedly and quickly become an object of extortion and defamation on the net. At this point the following question arises: How is it possible that the leader of the firm GOMOPA, Mr Klaus Mauri chat, only in the Federal Republic of Germany on his account “23 court rulings, has for many years as an honest citizen to create, while other persons, firms, corporations criminal acts, offenses memorize, in addition to substantial sums of money could earn? This complex process can only be explained as follows: GOMOPA creates his appearance, his presence in the eyes of public opinion as an honest subject, against which pathological phenomena in the public and economic life einschreitet. GOMOPA and his partner (services, blogs) present themselves as followers of any Verbrechensart that promise so the fight against criminals in each virtual network ( especially against any cheaters, blackmailers). GOMOPA used in this respect a kind of “Merketingsvorhang” as a method of seduction, a result which is his true “face” and his true intentions than that of a fraudster and blackmail on money can hide. The true intentions of the GOMOPA, of working together GOMOPA Services and blogs were until today no doubt with success before the public opinion will remain hidden, especially thanks to the so-called “smoke curtain”, which reflects the fact that man himself as a “winner” of any abuse and any pathological appearance of the public and economic life in Aland German, Austria, Switzerland, the United States, Britain, Russia, Spain created. Next appears the GOMOPA forward by the person on which companies and corporations – the future victims of the crime that is – against the possibility of the release of extremely poor and the company concerned in a negative light visual information on the Internet and other mass media warns. The person from whom the speech is also informed that they are successful against such a procedure for a “fee” can be used. The GOMOPA is at this point up to the extortion of money for so-called “peace” to the company and corporation (the victim of a crime) around. Most of the companies concerned to such threats did not respond, because it’s everyday life and their agenda. It finally barely missing on the web of blackmail and outside of the medium. Normally so seldom so-called “understanding”, while on the one hand, the crime victim, on the other hand, the GOMOPA occurs. It is understandable that the price for such an “understanding” means the provision of the requested funds would GOMOPA. The financial blackmail in this stage is rarely enforced. The situation changes little, however, if the firms and corporations (crime victims) find that the threat was fulfilled. In Brief will appear on the homepage http://www.gomopa.net numerous newspaper articles, reports and bogus pseudo market analysis, both by GOMOPA as well as so-called “independent experts” and the company will be represented, with formal or fictitious GOMOPA together. Information published here, correspond to the contents of a threat and make the operations of firms and corporations in an extremely negative light dar. There is no doubt that such actions and methods only to harm the good name and good presence of these firms and corporations prerogatives. The activity of GOMOPA is certainly not exhausted. GOMOPA disseminated (published accommodates) the above information in the network by the credible, and popular opinion-operated services. Moreover, GOMOPA threatens the companies and corporations (its victims), that “from the finger-drawn” information not only on the network, but also on television and on radio and in the press landscape erscheinen.Wie the experience and expertise of the former Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. show that the services are usually not aware that they are for the purpose of a criminal action by the GOMOPA used. They agree with the corresponding fictitious publications, reports and analysis on what specifically GOMOPA through and through “independent” experts are prepared. It also states that the services, and blogs such cooperation with the GOMOPA approval, although they know that the information transmitted by GOMOPA are fictitious and the credibility of companies and corporations affect. They take so aware of the criminal procedure part. The explanation of this situation is quite simple. GOMOPA pays namely the services, and blogs related remuneration that the publication of false information on the companies and corporations (crime victims) agree. Some services, and blogs seem to know nothing about it to have that on their pages available information “fictitious” and “pulled out of the fingers are. Are you looking for in this way their conduct to justify, because they want the legal consequences of participating in the abuse of the good name and appearance of a company or corporation to escape. The activity system of GOMOPA of collaborating services and blogs was also the example of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. tested. Beginning in October 2008 was one of the workers of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. a message from an anonymous sender, in the near future – first on the Internet, then on television, radio and in the German press – information published by the functioning and activities of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. in an extremely negative light show. The employee of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. was then informed that these reports / news undoubtedly significantly the appearance and the reputation of the firm Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. affect. The place mentioned in this “conversation partner” has the workers of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. informed that the possibility of the embarrassing situation to be avoided by Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. to the person shown by the account the sum of 100,000.00 EUR transfers. As later revealed, however, was Mr. Klaus Mauri Chat – this anonymous interlocutor – “brain” and “Leader of the GOMOPA”. The investigations have been employed by the Federal Judicial Police (tracking and identifying the body at the federal level) during the investigation for the payment of blackmail, fraud and threats because of what Mr Mauri chatting and his staff were practiced, and for participation by other (head of Internet services and moderators of blogs) on this process. These crimes have been committed to loss of many professional and judicial persons, including the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. The victims of this crime in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, the USA and Canada visible. At this moment appeared the following question: What was the reaction of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. to the demands from GOMOPA? Corresponded to the response to the expectations of GOMOPA? Has the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. the required sum of EUR 100,000.00 paid? Side of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. There was absolutely no reaction to the extortion attempt by GOMOPA. At the end of August 2008 on the Service http://www.gompa.net numerous articles / reports published by the activities of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. in a very negative light have represented. Once the information contained on http://www.gomopa.net detail and were fully analyzed, it is that they are not even the truth at one point and potential and existing customers of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. in relation to the financial institution from this discontinued business activities is misleading. Following the criminal Handlugen of GOMOPA and its cooperating services, and blogs on the network, the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. measurable and significant business losses. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. has primarily an important group of potential customers lost. But what it showed as important, the existing customers of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. little away. Those customers have used our services and continue to use the still. In view of the existing collaboration with the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.., Which will in turn be no objections. GOMOPA has such a course of events accurately predicted, which aims significant and measurable business by Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. losses were suffered. The course of events, the service GOMOPA certainly pleased. GOMOPA has to expect that the position of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. declines and the financial institution, the required sum (100.000,00 EUR) provides. Over time, as the whole procedure in the network was becoming more popular, tried GOMOPA still four times to the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. Contacts, each time by adjusting these criminal “Kompanie” has promised, although it every time his financial demands heraufsetzte. The last of the set of “company” against Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. ratio was even planned EUR 5,000,000.00 (in words: EURO fünfmilionen). The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. could but before the ever-increasing demands from the Service GOMOPA claim. In October 2008 met the management of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. Decision on the notification of the INTERPOL International Police and the appropriate law enforcement institutions of the FRG (the police and the prosecutor) about the existing situation. In the meantime, reported at the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. numerous companies and corporations, and even professional person such as doctors, judges, priests, actors and other people from different countries of the world, the extortion of GOMOPA relented and the required amounts of money it had. These people already gave statements that they have done so, so they finally just “be in peace” and unnecessary problems, difficulties, and a reasonable conclusion hardly avoid them. The victims of this criminal action, the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. using different amounts of money which were requested, informed. In one case, there were relatively small (a few thousand EURO), in another case it has to deliver significant amounts (around few million EURO). Additionally turned to Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. Companies which have not yet GOMOPA the “fee” on out and have already considered whether they should do or not. These firms anticipated by Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. a clear opinion as well as a practical professional advice on how to be in such a situation should behave and how they can avoid debt. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. has invariably victims of all crimes, which are at our company have made a cooperation proposed. The top task is to this cooperation, jointly determined and effective measures against GOMOPA against other services in the network, and against all Bloggers to meet in the here described with international criminal procedure GOMOPA leaders to participate. All these companies were known as the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. proposed “crusade” against GOMOPA, his partner. At our request to notify all participating companies the INTERPOL International Police and their pursuit of domestic institutions, including the competent public prosecutor and the police authorities about the existing situation. In view of the fact that the criminal act of GOMOPA be extended over many states and that the number of the Federal Republic of Germany because the ads reimbursed by GOMOPA, Internet Services and Bloggers crimes, grew up fast – which no doubt influenced by a far-reaching impact of criminal of GOMOPA testifies – International Business, the Police INTERPOL Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. before that its representatives in Berlin with representatives from GOMOPA true to the “payment arrangements and transfer the sum of EUR 5,000,000.00 to discuss. This step meant a well thought-out and by the Federal Criminal Police organized the event to carry out aimed at the arrest of international criminals GOMOPA acting was. The coordinated steps and measures of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. Damaged and others, led by the International Economic Police INTERPOL, the Federal Criminal Police Office and the Prosecutor of the Federal Republic of Germany for education, training and implementation of the above-described case contributed. In November 2008, the event in Berlin prepared for the apprehension and arrest of the representative of the GOMOPA, after the arrest of Mr. Klaus Mauri chat – as the main leaders and leaders of international criminal group GOMOPA recalled. The arrest and notified the Federal Criminal Police showed both the current whereabouts of Mr. Klaus Mauri chat. “Brain” and the founder of this international criminal group GOMOPA, Mr Klaus Mauri chat on the same day was also arrested and imprisoned on time, will soon put in charge state, the responsibility for their own crimes and those of the forum, before a competent GOMOPA Federal wear. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. undertook all possible steps to ensure that Mr. Klaus Mauri chatting on the dock of the competent court of the United Kingdom of Great Britain appears. Among the damaged work and justice people from United Kingdom, along with the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. There are many victims of GOMOPA: The beginning of the arrests with such a scale means for the German judiciary and a major breakthrough point. It is worth noting that the prosecution bodies of the Federal Republic, up to this stage of the long-standing criminal activity of Mr. Klaus Mauri chatting and his staff were powerless. Prolonged impunity of the criminal actions of Mr. Klaus Mauri chat, for years the “first violin” in GOMOPA played, is to end gegangen.An this point another question arises: how is it so go on? The arrest of Mr. Klaus chat Mauri is a critical moment, in other words a “turn around 180 degrees” for him personally. But it also means the beginning of the end “for its employees, for Internet Services, Bloggers, with GOMOPA so happy and had worked together without contradiction. There is no doubt that the cause of Mr Klaus Mauri chat at the top of the “iceberg” is. The above-mentioned turning point on this issue will be further arrests and detentions of members GOMOPA bring with them, and all persons from all areas involved in this transnational criminal actions have taken part. For information (reports by the end of December 2008), which of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. available, the result that the next arrests currently prepared to be associated with the Services GOMOPA cooperating persons. This is to people outside Germany – from where Mr Klaus Mauri chat coming – refer. The details may be at this point in terms of legal and course of the prosecution bodies of the BRG and the Interpol-led investigation can not be betrayed. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. currently can only illustrate information from the investigation led the public to the criminal liability not to have this moment wird.In so intense preparations for the arrest of a number of persons outside the Federal Republic of Germany. This applies particularly to countries such as the following: – Russia-Ukraine – Poland – Spain – Mexico – Portugal – Brazil – the United States of America – Canada – UK – Ireland – Australia – New Zealand – India. All professional and judicial persons, regardless of the country in which they accompany the Office, or its citizens, and until now, consciously or unconsciously with the Forum GOMOPA together, or continue to work together to arouse the suspicion of the INTERPOL International Police. This works with the police criminal investigation department in each country, to the above persons first identify and then to legally pursue them. Information about this topic, as well as on the beginning and end of the activity of the GOMOPA can be at the following addresses on the Web at: http://gomopaabzocker.wordpress.com/http://www.nepper-schlepper-bauernfaenger.comhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qNpzAu-QMuEhttp://www.korte.de/alexander/2006/01/gomopa-finanforum-kritik.html- http://evelux.de/gomopa-sam-240/- http://blog.deobald.org/archive/2007/07/01/betrugsvorwurf-gomopa-spam/ 2. Dubai KLP Group Emirates – United Arab Emirates. As head of the company is Mr Martin Kraeter, not only as the “brain” of the whole company, but also as a longstanding friend of Mr Klaus Mauri Chat (GOMOPA-wire) acts. This company wants to hide and not even officially exist, that they as a strategic partner of the GOMOPA in the area of the Middle East, according to the territory of the Persian coast operates. Official activities of the company KLP Group Emirates includes among others the following areas: financial advisory services from the offshore area (Management Services – Facilitators – OffshoreConsultants, International Tax & Legal Consultants – Fiduciaries). In the sphere of activities of the Company will include the creation of companies and enterprises in the so-called “tax havens” to the tax liability to the company activity entfliehen.Inoffizielle KLP Group Emirates includes cooperation with the Service GOMOPA in the field of “Gelwäsche”. The monies are a result of criminal activity by GOMOPA generated by advanced professional and judicial persons soon throughout the world and legalized. The illegality based on the activity of the company KLP Group Emirates, as well as the cooperation with the Services GOMOPA attracted attention even when the prosecution organs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, especially in Scotland Yard, which on this issue an intensive investigation has begun, which is in the ” development phase is located. It must be noted that all professional and judicial persons, but especially the clients of the company KLP Group Emirates, with the company KLP Group Emirates have cooperated in the past and still do, under the “Lupp” of Scotland Yard to be .3. Russlanda) The Company E-XECUTIVE by the Lord led Novosartow Vilen. On the homepage of the Company contained information comes directly from the company GOMOPA. The company e XECUTIVE leads the close cooperation not only with GOMOPA, but also with another on the Russian territory under the name of OOO UK broker functioning company. The company e XECUTIVE in connection with the company OOO UK broker is a member of a criminal group led by GOMOPA. The company e XECUTIVE GOMOPA representing interests in Russia and Central-Eastern Europe. Unofficially, the company employs E XECUTIVE-especially with the search for potential “victims” of the Erschwindelns, blackmail and forcing the funds for GOMOPA companies and corporations from the territory of Russia, Ukraine, and from all countries in Central Eastern Europe. Officially, the company e XECUTIVE one to the forum GOMOPA similar industrial activity. b) OOO “UK broker.” Head of the firm is Mr. Pavel Kokarev. This company is not concealed, that they are consistent with the Forum GOMOPA cooperates. The company OOO UK broker represents GOMOPA in Central Eastern Europe, including Russia. You shall be officially transferred to this area the GOMOPA similar activity, but unofficially it is to search for potential “victims” of racketeering, fraud and Erschwindelns for GOMOPA employed. The company has remained until now spared from any punishment, it could with “eternal impunity” because of a poorly developed, corrupt legal system in Russia expected. The situation may change after Mr. Klaus Mauri Chat arrested in Berlin and was arrested. This constant offenders, the “on his account” a set of legally enforceable judgments has, until now his freedom has unlimited recover, the do not know quite what it means to be arrested, begins gradually, according to our available information to finally “to bear witness.” This is understandable when one considers the threat of a penalty he considered. This delinquent shows growing interest in cooperation with the German tracking and identifying bodies. So there is a chance that other people he unveiled to the public by providing for reduction of prison sentence counts. It is also the only question of time INTERPOL, in cooperation with the Russian Service (FSB) of the Company OOO UK broker “at the door knocking”, which by Mr. Pavle Kokarev and represented. The company OOO UK broker has a virtual office in REGUS building in Moscow, is not even a person, forming a typical one-person company, which all business “crimes” may be the name of it, with no civil liability to pay. The Lord Pavel Kokarev seems to have forgotten or do not have sufficient knowledge about its possible responsibility fier to participate in the international crimes under the direction of Gomopa.

TOP-SECRET: Soviets Planned Nuclear First Strike to Preempt West, Documents Show

Soviets Planned Nuclear First Strike to
Preempt West, Documents Show

Warsaw Pact Allies Resented Soviet Dominance and “Nuclear Romanticism”

Bloc Saw Military Balance in West’s Favor from 1970s On, Especially in Technology

New Volume of Formerly Secret Records Published on 50th Anniversary of Warsaw Pact

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 154

For more information contact
Vojtech Mastny 202/415-6707
Malcolm Byrne – 202/994-7043

May 13, 2005

Read “The Warsaw Pact, gone with a whimper”
by Malcolm Byrne and Vojtech Mastny
The International Herald Tribune
May 14, 2005
“The Warsaw Pact, gone with a whimper”
by Malcolm Byrne and Vojtech Mastny, International Herald Tribune, May 14, 2005

Advance praise for new volume:

A “remarkable book … not just a story for experts or historians – it is a chronology of significance and an era we must never forget.”
The Rt. Hon. Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, NATO Secretary General ’99-’03

“A remarkable achievement … [T]his pioneer effort will be an indispensable resource for Cold War scholars.”
Lawrence S. Kaplan, Georgetown U., author of NATO Divided, NATO United

“[T]his invaluable volume illuminates not only the ‘inside history’ of the Warsaw Pact, but, as reflected in that story, the history of Soviet-East European relations.”
William Taubman, Amherst College, Pulitzer Prize-winning author of Khrushchev: The Man and His Era

“[Mastny] and Byrne are to be congratulated for producing this monumental volume, with a trove of translated documents that is a major boon to both scholars and teachers.”
William E. Odom (Lt. Gen., Ret.), former Director, U.S. National Security Agency, author of The Collapse of the Soviet Military

Washington D.C. August 13 th, 2011 – The Soviet-led Warsaw Pact had a long-standing strategy to attack Western Europe that included being the first to use nuclear weapons, according to a new book of previously Secret Warsaw Pact documents published tomorrow. Although the aim was apparently to preempt NATO “aggression,” the Soviets clearly expected that nuclear war was likely and planned specifically to fight and win such a conflict.

The documents show that Moscow’s allies went along with these plans but the alliance was weakened by resentment over Soviet domination and the belief that nuclear planning was sometimes highly unrealistic. Just the opposite of Western views at the time, Pact members saw themselves increasingly at a disadvantage compared to the West in the military balance, especially with NATO’s ability to incorporate high-technology weaponry and organize more effectively, beginning in the late 1970s.

These and other findings appear in a new volume published tomorrow on the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Warsaw Pact. Consisting of 193 documents originating from all eight original member-states, the volume, A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991, provides significant new evidence of the intentions and capabilities of one of the most feared military machines in history.

Highlights of the 726-page volume include highly confidential internal reports, military assessments, minutes of Warsaw Pact leadership meetings, and Politburo discussions on topics such as:

* The shift beginning in the 1960s from defensive operations to plans to launch attacks deep into Western Europe. (Documents Nos. 16, 20a-b, 21)

* Plans to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, ostensibly to preempt Western first-use. (Documents Nos. 81, 83)

* Soviet expectations that conventional conflicts would go nuclear, and plans to fight and win such conflicts. (Documents Nos. 81, 83)

* The deep resentment of alliance members, behind the façade of solidarity, of Soviet dominance and the unequal share of the military burden that was imposed on them. (Documents Nos. 4-6, 33-37, 47, 52)

* East European views on the futility of plans for nuclear war and the realization that their countries, far more than the Soviet Union, would suffer the most devastating consequences of such a conflict. (Documents Nos. 22b, 38, 50, 52)

* The “nuclear romanticism,” primarily of Soviet planners, concerning the viability of unconventional warfare, including a memorable retort by the Polish leader that “no one should have the idea that in a nuclear war one could enjoy a cup of coffee in Paris in five or six days.” (Documents Nos. 31, 115)

* Ideologically warped notions of Warsaw Pact planners about the West’s presumed propensity to initiate hostilities and the prospects for defeating it. (Documents Nos. 50, 73, 79, 81)

* The impact of Chernobyl as a reality check for Soviet officials on the effects of nuclear weapons. (Document No. 115)

* The pervasiveness and efficacy of East bloc spying on NATO, mainly by East Germans (Documents Nos. 11, 28, 80, 97, 109, 112)

* Warsaw Pact shortcomings in resisting hostile military action, including difficulties in firing nuclear weapons. (Documents Nos. 44, 143)

* Data on the often disputed East-West military balance, seen from the Soviet bloc side as much more favorable to the West than the West itself saw it, with the technological edge increasingly in Western favor since the time of the Carter administration (Documents Nos. 47, 79, 81, 82, 130, 131, 135, 136)

The motives accounting for the Warsaw Pact’s offensive military culture included not only the obsessive Soviet memory of having been taken by surprise by the nearly fatal Nazi attack in June 1941 but primarily the ideological militancy of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine that posited irreconcilable hostility of the capitalist adversaries. The influence of the doctrine explains, for example, the distorted interpretation of secret Western planning documents that were unequivocally defensive documents to which Warsaw Pact spies had extensive access. So integral was the offensive strategy to the Soviet system that its replacement by a defensive strategy under Gorbachev proved impossible to implement before the system itself disintegrated.

The Soviet military, as the ideologically most devoted and disciplined part of the Soviet establishment, were given extensive leeway by the political leadership in designing the Warsaw Pact’s plans for war and preparing for their implementation. Although the leadership reserved the authority to decide under what circumstances they would be implemented and never actually tried to act on them, the chances of a crisis spiraling out of control may have been greater than imagined at the time. The plans had dynamics of their own and the grip of the aging leadership continued to diminish with the passage of time.

The new collection of documents published today is the first of its kind in examining the Warsaw Pact from the inside, with the benefit of materials once thought to be sealed from public scrutiny in perpetuity. It was prepared by the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), an international scholarly network formed to explore and disseminate documentation on the military and security aspects of contemporary history. The book appears as part of the “National Security Archive Cold War Reader Series” through Central European University Press.

The PHP’s founders and partners are the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research organization based at The George Washington University; the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich; the Institute for Strategy and Security Policy at the Austrian Defense Academy in Vienna; the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies in Florence; and the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies in Oslo.

In addition to documents, the volume features a major original essay by Vojtech Mastny, a leading historian of the Warsaw Pact, and contextual headnotes for each document by co-editor Malcolm Byrne. A detailed chronology, glossaries and bibliography are also included.

The documents in the collection were obtained by numerous scholars and archivists, many of them associated with PHP and its partners, including the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington D.C.

The vast majority of the documents were translated especially for this volume and have never previously appeared in English.

Attached to this notice are ten representative documents taken from the list above. They appear as they do in the volume, i.e. with explanatory headnotes at the top of each item.

The documents in their original languages can be found in their entirety on the Center for Security Studies website.

On Saturday, May 14, a book launch for A Cardboard Castle? will take place in Warsaw at the Military Office of Historical Research. The address is: 2, ul. Stefana Banacha, Room 218. It will begin at 11:30 a.m. Speakers include:

* Gen. William E. Odom, former Director, U.S. National Security Agency
* Gen. Tadeusz Pioro, senior Polish representative to the Warsaw Pact
* Brig. Gen. Leslaw Dudek, Polish representative to the alliance
* Prof. dr. hab. Andrzej Paczkowski, Polish Academy of Sciences
* Dr hab. Krzysztof Komorowski, Military Office of Historical Research
* Prof. dr hab. Wojciech Materski, Polish Academy of Sciences

Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.

Below are ten representative documents from A Cardboard Castle?. They are numbered as they are in the volume and include explanatory headnotes at the top of each item. Links to the original documents — in their orginal languages — appear at the end of each entry.

Document No. 16: Speech by Marshal Malinovskii Describing the Need for Warsaw Pact Offensive Operations, May 1961 – original language

Document No. 21: Organizational Principles of the Czechoslovak Army, November 22, 1962 – original language

Document No. 50: Memorandum of the Academic Staff of the Czechoslovak Military Academies on Czechoslovakia’s Defense Doctrine, June 4, 1968 – original language

Document No. 64: Report by Ceaus,escu to the Romanian Politburo on the PCC Meeting in Budapest, March 18, 1969 – original language

Document No. 81: Marshal Ogarkov Analysis of the ?Zapad? Exercise, May 30-June 9, 1977 – original language

Document No. 83: Soviet Statement at the Chiefs of General Staff Meeting in Sofia,
June 12-14, 1978 – original language

Document No. 109: East German Intelligence Assessment of NATO?s Intelligence on the Warsaw Pact, December 16, 1985 – original language

Document No. 115: Minutes of the Political Consultative Committee Party Secretaries? Meeting in Budapest, June 11, 1986 – original language (part 1 – part 2 – part 3)

Document No. 136: Summary of Discussion among Defense Ministers at the Political Consultative Committee Meeting in Warsaw, July 15, 1988 – original language (part 1 – part 2)

Document No. 143: Czechoslovak Description of ?Vltava-89? Exercise, May 23, 1989 – original language

TOP-SECRET: The Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev Former Top Soviet Adviser’s Journal Chronicles Final Years of the Cold War

Washington, DC, August 13th, 2011 – Today the National Security Archive is publishing the first installment of the diary of one of the key behind-the-scenes figures of the Gorbachev era – Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev. This document is being published in English here for the first time.

It is hard to overestimate the uniqueness and importance of this diary for our understanding of the end of the Cold War – and specifically for the peaceful withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and Eastern Europe, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The document allows the reader a rare opportunity to become a fly on the wall during the heady discussions of early perestroika, and to witness such fascinating phenomena as how the dying ideology of Soviet-style communism held sway over the hearts and minds of Soviet society.

In 2004, Anatoly Chernyaev donated the originals of his diaries from 1972 to 1991 to the National Security Archive in order to ensure full and permanent public access to his notes – beyond the reach of the political uncertainties of contemporary Russia. The Archive is planning to publish the complete English translation of the diaries in regular installments.

This first installment covers the year 1985, which saw the election of Mikhail Gorbachev to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the beginning of the changes that were evident first in the “style,” and then in the practice of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. The diary gives a detailed account of Gorbachev’s election and of the political struggle associated with it. The author is observing the changes in 1985 from his position as a senior analyst in the International Department of the Central Committee (CC), where Chernyaev was in charge of relations with West European Communist parties.

The author documents all the major developments of 1985 – beginning from the first revelations about the sad state of the Soviet economy and the extent of such societal problems as alcoholism, to anguished discussions about the war in Afghanistan, to the first summit with President Ronald Reagan in Geneva. Throughout the year, the most noticeable change is the process of radical “cleansing” of the party – the great turnover of personnel designed to replace the old dogmatic Brezhnevite elite. The diary sheds light on how, gradually but persistently, Gorbachev built his reform coalition, making such fateful decisions as appointing Eduard Shevardnadze to the post of Foreign Minister, and bringing Boris Yeltsin to Moscow.

The pages of the diary provide a gallery of living portraits of all the influential figures in the highest echelons of the Soviet elite who in 1985 were engaged in a struggle for political survival under the new leadership. Chernyaev observes his colleagues in the Central Committee trying to reconcile their ingrained ideology with the new “Gorbachev style,” or “Gorbachev thinking.” He himself, as is clear from his notes, remained committed to the Leninist romanticism of communist ideology and argued for going back to Lenin in an effort to purify and reform the Soviet society.

One line of Chernyaev’s narrative follows developments in the influential International Department of the CC CPSU as its staff tried to find answers about the future of the international communist movement as the Soviet Union itself began to change. Gorbachev at that time chose to renounce Moscow’s Big Brother role with regard to socialist countries and non-ruling Communist parties, both in terms of dictating to them but also bankrolling them. Chernyaev presents us with an intimate portrait of one of the most influential figures in the Soviet leadership – the head of the International Department, Boris N. Ponomarev.

The diary gives a detailed account about one of the most important (and long poorly-understood) dynamics of foreign policy making in the Soviet Union – the interaction between the Central Committee and the Foreign Ministry in every step of the preparation of major events and decisions. From its pages, one can see the tremendous role of experts and consultants – the free-thinking intellectuals of the Soviet elite – in forming policy priorities for the leadership. The International Department was a major oasis of enlightened thinking in the Soviet nomenklatura; it provided Gorbachev with people on whom he could rely for new ideas and honest estimates of the situation after coming to power – beginning with Anatoly Chernyaev, whom Gorbachev chose as his foreign policy adviser in March 1986. One can confidently say that every bold foreign policy initiative advanced by Gorbachev in the years 1986-1991 bears Chernyaev’s mark on it. Thus, the diary gives insights into the thought processes of one of most influential new thinkers in Moscow.

Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev was born on May 25, 1921 in Moscow. He fought in World War II beginning in 1941. After the war, he returned to his studies at Moscow State University in the Department of History, which he completed in 1948. From 1950-1958, he taught contemporary history at Moscow State University. From 1958-1961, Chernyaev worked in Prague on the editorial board of the theoretical journal Problems of Peace and Socialism, joining the International Department in 1961. In 1986, he became foreign policy adviser to the General Secretary, and later to the first and the last President of the USSR. A prolific writer, Chernyaev has published five monographs in addition to numerous articles in Soviet, Russian, European and U.S. journals.

The National Security Archive takes great pleasure in wishing a happy birthday to Anatoly Sergeevich, who for years has been our partner in the mission to fight government secrecy through glasnost. Anatoly Sergeevich turns 85 today.

The Chernyaev Diary was translated by Anna Melyakova and edited by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

Wer erschoss den Treuhandchef Rohwedder? 1/5

Wer erschoss den Treuhandchef Rohwedder? 2/5

Wer erschoss den Treuhandchef Rohwedder? 3/5

Wer erschoss den Treuhandchef Rohwedder? 4/5

Wer erschoss den Treuhandchef Rohwedder? 5/5

SECRET: ATTACKING BASHAR’S MONEY

VZCZCXRO0088
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #0054/01 0241517
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 241517Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4564
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
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RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0339
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000054 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

NEA/ELA
NSC FOR SINGH
TREASURY FOR GLASER 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2027
TAGS: EFIN ETTC PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: ATTACKING BASHAR'S MONEY 

REF: A. 07 DAMASCUS 2066
     B. 07 DAMASCUS 1926
     C. 07 DAMASCUS 68 

Classified By: CDA Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.5 b/d 

1.  (S) Summary. As Washington policy makers consider ways to
pressure the regime, one possibility would be to go after
President Asad's money-men.  Four individuals Asad uses to
make and move money are Zuhair Sahloul, Nabil Kuzbari, Asad's
uncle Mohammad Makhlouf, and his father-in-law, Fawas Akhras.
 Each is important to Asad and each plays a somewhat
different role in facilitating regime graft.  End summary. 

2.  (S) Sahloul (AKA Abu Shafic) is the most important
black-market money changer in Syria.  When the Syrian Pound
(SYP) devalued precipitously in the fall of 2005, the SARG
gave Sahloul an office in the Central Bank and access to its
hard currency reserves so he could intervene in the black
market to stabilize the currency.  (Note.  Sahloul was
surprisingly effective and within weeks the SYP appreciated
20 percent, allowing Sahloul in the process a handsome profit
for both himself and a handful of regime-insiders.  End
note.)  Sahloul moves Asad's money using his own network and
his access to Hawalis worldwide.  A Sahloul intimate bragged
to us recently that Sahloul could move ten million dollars
anywhere in the world in 24-hours. 

3.  (S) In addition to being the father of Syria's poster-boy
for corruption, Rami Makhlouf, Mohammad Makhlouf has long
served as a financial advisor to the Asad family.  If Rami is
the face of corruption, Mohammad is the brain.  When Asad
agreed to open the telecom sector to cellphone providers, it
was Mohammad that some credit with conceptualizing the deal
whereby Rami took over the first provider, SyriaTel, (long
Rami's biggest cash-cow), and the second license (originally
to SpaceTel, then Areeba 94, and now MTN) went to the
first-lady's family (see para five below).  Long held in
check by his brother-in-law, the late president Hafiz Asad,
under Bashar Asad, Mohammad's avarice reportedly has no
bounds.  As a result, the Makhloufs have had an at-times
problematic relationship with Bashar and were forced to leave
the country for a number of months in 2005 following one
particularly heated exchange. 

4.  (S) Because of the Makhlouf's excesses and Asad's
inherited propensity to limit the power and influence of his
family members, Nabil Kuzbari has played an increasingly
important role for the first-family. Known locally as "the
Paper King," Kuzbari's base of operations has long been in
Vienna.  In the last two years, however, he has developed an
increasingly collaborative relationship with Rami and
Mohammed Makhlouf.  Last year he served as Rami's frontman in
establishing his holding company, Sham Holding, which brought
together 70 of Syria's most-important business families to
fund a number of Rami's most ambitious entrepreneurial
projects.  In addition to lobbying European politicians to
engage the Asad regime, Kuzbari reportedly uses his contacts
in the Austrian business and banking circles to move regime
assets abroad. 

5.  (S) In addition to being Asad's father-in-law, Fawas
Akhras has been increasingly active in business here in
Syria.  Akhras is the force behind the Syrian-British
Business Council and recently put together a visit to London
by a large group of Syrian businessmen.  Coming only lately
to business, Akhras has stepped on a number of established
business families who increasingly resent his assertiveness
and willingness to use his son-in-law's position to advance
his nascent Syria-based businesses.  Contacts in the banking
sector have commented on the large amount of funds that have
begun to move recently through his accounts.  A long-time
resident of London, he is suspected of being another avenue
used by Asad to stash funds abroad. 

6.  (S) Comment. Post has long advocated moving against
individuals, like those listed above, who are intregal to
allowing the regime to profit from its corruption.  Taking
action against those linked to corruption is a win-win
proposition: not only does it bring pressure on the regime
where it hurts most - its pocketbook, but such a move would
also be popular with the average Syrian who is the most
common victim of the regime's avarice. 

CORBIN

SECRET: TREASURY TEAM’S DAMASCUS CONSULTATIONS ON

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PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #0269/01 0741541
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FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3157
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000269 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

NEA/ELA;TREASURY FOR LEBENSON/GLASER/SZUBIN; NSC FOR
MARCHESE 

EO 12958 DECL: 03/06/2017
TAGS EFIN, ECON, ETTC, SY, SANC
SUBJECT: TREASURY TEAM’S DAMASCUS CONSULTATIONS ON
FINANCIAL SANCTIONS

REF: A. DAMASCUS 0108  B. 05 DAMASCUS 6224

Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Michael Corbin, reasons 1.4 b/d

1. (S/NF) Summary: Treasury representatives recently visited Post to discuss options for using financial sanctions to apply pressure to the Syrian regime. We discussed:
-- Treasury’s requirements for finalizing the pending designations of Mohammad Sulayman and Ali Mamluk, and Treasury’s information requirements for a public statement;
-- Treasury’s need to maintain the legal thread between the classified designation packet and the public statement announcing the designation;
-- Post’s support for designating Mohammad Nassif Kheirbek, SARG pointman for its relationship with Iran;
-- How designating regime financiers like Rami and Mohammad Mahlouf could be problematic without a new Executive Order on corruption. End Summary.

2. (S/NF) PENDING DESIGNATIONS: Post understands the designations for Mohammad Sulieman, Syrian Special Presidential Advisor for Arms Procurement and Strategic Weapons and Ali Mamluk, Chief of the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate, are pending due to a lack of unclassified material necessary for Treasury’s public
SIPDIS designation statement. In post’s estimate, Mohammad Sulayman is a relatively low-payoff target. His activities are not widely known, which will make it difficult to obtain unclassified information for a public statement and,
SIPDIS likewise, make it unlikely that his designation would resonate inside Syria. Ali Mamluk, on the other hand, is more well-known within Syria, especially for involvement in his objectionable activities regarding Lebanon, and his suppressing Syrian civil society and the internal opposition.  Therefore, Mamluk’s designation will likely have a larger impact with local and regional audiences if the public statement announcing his designation also discusses his oppression of Syrian society.

3. (S/NF) We understood from our visit with Treasury representatives that although we are limited to designating regime members under the existing Executive Orders, there is some flexibility in Treasury,s public statement announcing the designation. Post has advocated that no matter the legal basis of the designation, any public designation should focus on themes that resonate inside Syria: corruption, suppression of civil society, and denial of basic human rights (ref A). The need to maintain the “legal thread” between the designation packet and the public announcement could be challenging on cases like Mohamad Sulieman whose links to corruption are less clear. In cases like Ali Mamluk, however, the role of the organization he heads in suppressing internal dissent is publicly known in Syria and stating as much in our statement would resonate well here.

4. (S/NF) Post also supports moving forward with the designation packet on Mohammad Nasif Kheirbek, Syrian Deputy Vice-President for Security and lead Syrian liaison to Iran. Keirbek’s designation could play to a SARG vulnerability, in this case, the SARG’s relationship with Iran, which worries the Sunni majority. Designation of regime pillars involved with the SARG’s partnership with Iran could heighten Syrian and regional concerns about the SARG’s willingness to accomodate an expansionary Iranian agenda.

5. (S/NF) REGIEME FINANCIERS: We also discussed the possibility of targeting high-profile inner circle members and regime financiers like Rami Mahklouf (Asad’s first cousin) and Mohammad Makhlouf (Rami’s father) in the next phase of targeted financial sanctions. Based on our consultation with the Treasury representatives, it seemed apparent that without an Executive Order on corruption it would be difficult to compile enough information to designate this group under the current executive orders. The other option for pursuing this group would be to show how these individuals provided financial support to previously designated individuals such as Asif Shawkat. This course of action could prove highly problematic given the regime’s proficiency at obfuscating its financial transactions (ref B).
DAMASCUS 00000269 002 OF 002

6. (S) Comment. Post thanks Treasury for its team’s February 25-27 visit and welcomes any additional feedback that Washington agencies may have on our recommendations covered in ref A. Post continues to believe targeted financial sanctions are a tool appropriate for the Syrian setting but this tool requires further work to fully develop. ROEBUCK

TOP-SECRET: FBI DOCUMENTS ABOUT THE MURDER OF PRESIDENT CANDIDATE ROBERT “BOBBY” KENNEDY

rfksumm1a

rfksumm1b

rfksumm1c

Here are the FBI documents about the murder click links above

The assassination of Robert F. Kennedy, a United States Senator and brother of assassinated President John F. Kennedy, took place shortly after midnight on June 5, 1968, in Los Angeles, California. After winning the California primary election for the Democratic nomination for President of the United States, Kennedy was shot as he walked through the kitchen of the Ambassador Hotel and died in the Good Samaritan Hospital twenty-six hours later. Sirhan Sirhan, a 24-year-old Palestinian immigrant, was convicted of Kennedy’s murder and is serving a life sentence for the crime. The shooting was recorded on audio tape by a freelance newspaper reporter, and the aftermath was captured on film.

Kennedy’s body lay in repose at St. Patrick’s Cathedral in New York for two days before a funeral mass was held on June 8. His body was interred near his brother John at Arlington National Cemetery. His death prompted the protection of presidential candidates by the United States Secret Service. Hubert Humphrey went on to win the Democratic nomination for the presidency, but ultimately narrowly lost the election to Richard Nixon.

As with his brother’s death, Robert Kennedy’s assassination and the circumstances surrounding it have spawned a variety of conspiracy theories. As of 2011 Kennedy remains one of only two sitting United States Senators to be assassinated.

CONFIDENTIAL: INFLUENCING THE SARG IN THE END

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DE RUEHDM #5399/01 3471603
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O 131603Z DEC 06
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2621
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1450
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0200
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 005399 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

NEA/ELA
NSC FOR MARCHESE
TREASURY FOR GLASER/LEBENSON 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: INFLUENCING THE SARG IN THE END OF 2006 

Classified By: CDA William Roebuck, for reasons 1.5 b/d 

1.  (S) Summary.  The SARG ends 2006 in a much stronger
position domestically and internationally than it did 2005.
While there may be additional bilateral or multilateral
pressure that can impact Syria, the regime is based on a
small clique that is largely immune to such pressure.
However, Bashar Asad's growing self-confidence )- and
reliance on this small clique -- could lead him to make
mistakes and ill-judged policy decisions through trademark
emotional reactions to challenges, providing us with new
opportunities.  For example, Bashar,s reaction to the
prospect of Hariri tribunal and to publicity for Khaddam and
the National Salvation Front borders on the irrational.
Additionally, Bashar,s reported preoccupation with his image
and how he is perceived internationally is a potential
liability in his decision making process.  We believe
Bashar,s weaknesses are in how he chooses to react to
looming issues, both perceived and real, such as a the
conflict between economic reform steps (however limited) and
entrenched, corrupt forces, the Kurdish question, and the
potential threat to the regime from the increasing presence
of transiting Islamist extremists.  This cable summarizes our
assessment of these vulnerabilities and suggests that there
may be actions, statements, and signals that the USG can send
that will improve the likelihood of such opportunities
arising.  These proposals will need to be fleshed out and
converted into real actions and we need to be ready to move
quickly to take advantage of such opportunities.  Many of our
suggestions underline using Public Diplomacy and more
indirect means to send messages that influence the inner
circle.   End Summary. 

2.  (S) As the end of 2006 approaches, Bashar appears in some
ways stronger than he has in two years.  The country is
economically stable (at least for the short term), internal
opposition the regime faces is weak and intimidated, and
regional issues seem to be going Syria,s way, from
Damascus, perspective.  Nonetheless, there are some
long-standing vulnerabilities and looming issues that may
provide opportunities to up the pressure on Bashar and his
inner circle.  Regime decision-making is limited to Bashar
and an inner circle that often produces poorly thought-out
tactical decisions and sometimes emotional approaches, such
as Bashar,s universally derided August 15 speech.  Some of
these vulnerabilities, such as the regime,s near-irrational
views on Lebanon, can be exploited to put pressure on the
regime.  Actions that cause Bashar to lose balance and
increase his insecurity are in our interest because his
inexperience and his regime,s extremely small
decision-making circle make him prone to diplomatic stumbles
that can weaken him domestically and regionally.  While the
consequences of his mistakes are hard to predict and the
benefits may vary, if we are prepared to move quickly to take
advantage of the opportunities that may open up, we may
directly impact regime behavior where it matters--Bashar and
his inner circle. 

3.  (S) The following provides our summary of potential
vulnerabilities and possible means to exploit them: 

-- Vulnerability: 

-- THE HARIRI INVESTIGATION AND THE TRIBUNAL:  The Hariri
investigation ) and the prospect of a Lebanon Tribunal --
has provoked powerful SARG reactions, primarily because of
the embarrassment the investigation causes.  Rationally, the
regime should calculate that it can deal with any summons of
Syrian officials by refusing to turn any suspects over, or,
in extreme cases by engineering "suicides.8  But it seems
the real issue for Bashar is that Syria,s dignity and its
international reputation are put in question.  Fiercely-held
sentiments that Syria should continue to exercise dominant
control in Lebanon play into these sensitivities.   We should
seek to exploit this raw nerve, without waiting for formation
of the tribunal. 

-- Possible action: 

-- PUBLICITY:  Publicly highlighting the consequences of the
ongoing investigation a la Mehlis causes Bashar personal
angst and may lead him to act irrationally.  The regime has
deep-seated fears about the international scrutiny that a
tribunal -- or Brammertz accusations even against
lower-echelon figures -- would prompt.  The Mehlis
accusations of October 2005 caused the most serious strains
in Bashar's inner circle.  While the family got back
together, these splits may lie just below the surface. 

-- Vulnerability: 

-- THE ALLIANCE WITH TEHRAN: Bashar is walking a fine line in
his increasingly strong relations with Iran, seeking
necessary support while not completely alienating Syria,s
moderate Sunni Arab neighbors by being perceived as aiding
Persian and fundamentalist Shia interests.  Bashar's decision
to not attend the Talabani ) Ahmadinejad summit in Tehran
following FM Moallem,s trip to Iraq can be seen as a
manifestation of Bashar's sensitivity to the Arab optic on
his Iranian alliance. 

-- Possible action: 

-- PLAY ON SUNNI FEARS OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE:  There are fears
in Syria that the Iranians are active in both Shia
proselytizing and conversion of, mostly poor, Sunnis.  Though
often exaggerated, such fears reflect an element of the Sunni
community in Syria that is increasingly upset by and focused
on the spread of Iranian influence in their country through
activities ranging from mosque construction to business.
Both the local Egyptian and Saudi missions here, (as well as
prominent Syrian Sunni religious leaders), are giving
increasing attention to the matter and we should coordinate
more closely with their governments on ways to better
publicize and focus regional attention on the issue. 

-- Vulnerability: 

-- THE INNER CIRCLE:  At the end of the day, the regime is
dominated by the Asad family and to a lesser degree by Bashar
Asad,s maternal family, the Makhlufs, with many family
members believe to be increasingly corrupt. The family, and
hangers on, as well as the larger Alawite sect, are not
immune to feuds and anti-regime conspiracies, as was evident
last year when intimates of various regime pillars (including
the Makhloufs) approached us about post-Bashar possibilities.
 Corruption is a great divider and Bashar's inner circle is
subject to the usual feuds and squabbles related to graft and
corruption.  For example, it is generally known that Maher
Asad is particularly corrupt and incorrigible.  He has no
scruples in his feuds with family members or others.  There
is also tremendous fear in the Alawite community about
retribution if the Sunni majority ever regains power. 

-- Possible Action: 

-- ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS: Targeted sanctions against regime
members and their intimates are generally welcomed by most
elements of Syrian society.  But the way designations are
applied must exploit fissures and render the inner circle
weaker rather than drive its members closer together.  The
designation of Shawkat caused him some personal irritation
and was the subject of considerable discussion in the
business community here. While the public reaction to
corruption tends to be muted, continued reminders of
corruption in the inner circle have resonance.  We should
look for ways to remind the public of our previous
designations. 

-- Vulnerability: 

-- THE KHADDAM FACTOR:  Khaddam knows where the regime
skeletons are hidden, which provokes enormous irritation from
Bashar, vastly disproportionate to any support Khaddam has
within Syria.  Bashar Asad personally, and his regime in
general, follow every news item involving Khaddam with
tremendous emotional interest.  The regime reacts with
self-defeating anger whenever another Arab country hosts
Khaddam or allows him to make a public statement through any
of its media outlets. 

-- Possible Action: 

-- We should continue to encourage the Saudis and others to
allow Khaddam access to their media outlets, providing him
with venues for airing the SARG,s dirty laundry.  We should
anticipate an overreaction by the regime that will add to its
isolation and alienation from its Arab neighbors. 

Vulnerability: 

  -- DIVISIONS IN THE MILITARY-SECURITY SERVICES:  Bashar
constantly guards against challenges from those with ties
inside the military and security services.  He is also
nervous about any loyalties senior officers (or former senior
officers) feel toward disaffected former regime elements like
Rif,at Asad and Khaddam.  The inner circle focuses
continuously on who gets what piece of the corruption action.
 Some moves by Bashar in narrowing the circle of those who
benefit from high-level graft has increased those with ties
to the security services who have axes to grind. 

-- Possible Action: 

-- ENCOURAGE RUMORS AND SIGNALS OF EXTERNAL PLOTTING:
The regime is intensely sensitive to rumors about
coup-plotting and restlessness in the security services and
military.  Regional allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia should
be encouraged to meet with figures like Khaddam and Rif,at
Asad as a way of sending such signals, with appropriate
leaking of the meetings afterwards.  This again touches on
this insular regime,s paranoia and increases the possibility
of a self-defeating over-reaction. 

Vulnerability: 

-- REFORM FORCES VERSUS BAATHISTS-OTHER CORRUPT ELITES:
Bashar keeps unveiling a steady stream of initiatives on
economic reform and it is certainly possible he believes this
issue is his legacy to Syria.  While limited and ineffectual,
these steps have brought back Syrian expats to invest and
have created at least the illusion of increasing openness.
Finding ways to publicly call into question Bashar,s reform
efforts )- pointing, for example to the use of reform to
disguise cronyism -- would embarrass Bashar and undercut
these efforts to shore up his legitimacy.  Revealing Asad
family/inner circle corruption would have a similar effect. 

-- Possible Action: 

-- HIGHLIGHTING FAILURES OF REFORM:  Highlighting failures of
reform, especially in the run-up to the 2007 Presidential
elections, is a move that Bashar would find highly
embarrassing and de-legitimizing.  Comparing and contrasting
puny Syrian reform efforts with the rest of the Middle East
would also embarrass and irritate Bashar. 

-- Vulnerability: 

-- THE ECONOMY: Perpetually under-performing, the Syrian
economy creates jobs for less than 50 percent of the
country,s university graduates.  Oil accounts for 70 percent
of exports and 30 percent of government revenue, but
production is in steady decline.  By 2010 Syria is expected
to become a net importer of oil.  Few experts believe the
SARG is capable of managing successfully the expected
economic dislocations. 

-- DISCOURAGE FDI, ESPECIALLY FROM THE GULF:  Syria has
enjoyed a considerable up-tick in foreign direct investment
(FDI) in the last two years that appears to be picking up
steam.  The most important new FDI is undoubtedly from the
Gulf. 

-- Vulnerability: 

-- THE KURDS:  The most organized and daring political
opposition and civil society groups are among the ethnic
minority Kurds, concentrated in Syria,s northeast, as well
as in communities in Damascus and Aleppo.  This group has
been willing to protest violently in its home territory when
others would dare not.  There are few threats that loom
larger in Bashar,s mind than unrest with the Kurds.  In what
is a rare occurrence, our DATT was convoked by Syrian
Military Intelligence in May of 2006 to protest what the
Syrians believed were US efforts to provide military training
and equipment to the Kurds in Syria. 

-- Possible Action: 

-- HIGHLIGHT KURDISH COMPLAINTS: Highlighting Kurdish
complaints in public statements, including publicizing human
rights abuses will exacerbate regime,s concerns about the
Kurdish population.  Focus on economic hardship in Kurdish
areas and the SARG,s long-standing refusal to offer
citizenship to some 200,000 stateless Kurds.  This issue
would need to be handled carefully, since giving the wrong
kind of prominence to Kurdish issues in Syria could be a
liability for our efforts at uniting the opposition, given
Syrian (mostly Arab) civil society,s skepticism of Kurdish
objectives. 

-- Vulnerability: 

-- Extremist elements increasingly use Syria as a base, while
the SARG has taken some actions against groups stating links
to Al-Qaeda.  With the killing of the al-Qaida leader on the
border with Lebanon in early December and the increasing
terrorist attacks inside Syria culminating in the September
12 attack against the US embassy, the SARG,s policies in
Iraq and support for terrorists elsewhere as well can be seen
to be coming home to roost. 

-- Possible Actions: 

-- Publicize presence of transiting (or externally focused)
extremist groups in Syria, not limited to mention of Hamas
and PIJ.  Publicize Syrian efforts against extremist groups
in a way that suggests weakness, signs of instability, and
uncontrolled blowback.  The SARG,s argument (usually used
after terror attacks in Syria) that it too is a victim of
terrorism should be used against it to give greater
prominence to increasing signs of instability within Syria. 

4.  (S) CONCLUSION:  This analysis leaves out the anti-regime
Syrian Islamists because it is difficult to get an accurate
picture of the threat within Syria that such groups pose.
They are certainly a long-term threat.  While it alludes to
the vulnerabilities that Syria faces because of its alliance
with Iran, it does not elaborate fully on this topic.  The
bottom line is that Bashar is entering the new year in a
stronger position than he has been in several years, but
those strengths also carry with them -- or sometimes mask )
vulnerabilities.  If we are ready to capitalize, they will
offer us opportunities to disrupt his decision-making, keep
him off-balance, and make him pay a premium for his mistakes. 

ROEBUCK

CONFIDENTIAL: APPLYING TARGETED SANCTIONS TO SYRIA

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SIPDIS 

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NEA/ELA
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH
TREASURY FOR GLASER/LEBENSON
EB/ESC/TFS FOR SALOOM 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2015
TAGS: EAIR ECON ETTC SY SANC
SUBJECT: APPLYING TARGETED SANCTIONS TO SYRIA 

REF: A. A: DAMASCUS 5567
     B. REF B: DAMASCUS 6224 

Classified By: CDA: Stephen Seche for Reasons 1.5 

1.  (C) Summary.  As post has reported previously, the
average Syrian would welcome targeted sanctions that focus on
regressive elements within the Asad regime.  The best mix in
our judgement would be sanctions that are phased,
multi-lateral, and widely publicized.  Most of our Syrian
interlocutors concur that if done correctly, these sanctions
would delegitimize those elements within the SARG perceived
to be obstacles to change, strengthen progressive elements
both within the regime and the wider society, and increase
pressure on the SARG to substantively change its
destabilizing behavior.  End summary. 

2.  (C) Financial and travel sanctions that target
individuals remain popular with the majority of our Syrian
interlocutors (ref A, B).  They argue that targeting
individuals would make clear for the average Syrian that the
international community opposes the regime and its policies,
but does not wish to punish the Syrian people.  At the same
time, targeted sanctions would also help delegitimize those
individuals who pose the greatest internal and external
threat to progress.  Additionally, if designated individuals
could neither travel nor conduct legitimate business, they
would become an increasing liability for President Bashar
al-Asad,s regime.  Popular resentment against the sanctioned
individuals would add to the pressure to change. 

3.  (C) Syrians we speak with argue that future designations
should be multi-lateral.  Some tools for doing so already
exist.  UNSCR 1636 makes provision for designation of
individuals named under the Hariri investigation.  A case
should be made for additional designations under existing or
new UNSC resolutions.  The USG designated Dhu al Himma
as-Shaleesh and Asif Issa as-Shalesh, cousins of President
Asad, under E.O. 13315 ) a derivative of UNSCR 1483 - for
their role in procuring defense-related items for Saddam
Hussein.  We should lobby our allies to pursue similar
designations, under the umbrella of new or existing UNSC
resolutions of both the Shaleeshes and any new Syrians we
designate concerning Lebanon, Iraq, WMD, and the peace
process.  Though it is unlikely that any significant
financial resources would be frozen by these designations
(ref B), the naming and shaming of the most recalcitrant
elements within the regime would delegitimize them
internationally, which in turn, would work to undermine the
hardliners domestically. 

4.  (C) Pursuing multilateral designations would greatly
multiply the effectiveness of targeted sanctions, but a
carefully timed campaign to widely publicize the designations
is equally important.  Without media coverage and publicity
to raise the profile of designations, the effort would lose
its most effective element - &name and shame.8  The
Shaleesh case mentioned above is a case in point.  Despite
the Shaleesh family having a high profile within Syria, very
few Syrians at any level are aware the USG imposed financial
sanctions on them.  The head of one of the leading Sunni
business families in Damascus approached us recently to ask
why the USG did not aggressively pursue sanctioning criminal
elements within the regime.  When asked for examples of who
should be sanctioned, our contact pointed to Dhu al Himma
as-Shaleesh who, he asserted, took much of the 580 million
USD in Iraqi funds the Commercial Bank of Syria illegally
paid out in 2003 and has yet to reconcile with the Iraqis.
Needless to say, our contact was surprised to find out Dhu al
Himma as well as his nephew, Asif Issa Shaleesh, were already
sanctioned. 

5.  (C) Phasing in future targeted sanctions can maximize
their impact.  The first phase could start with those most
clearly the architects of objectionable SARG policies
relating to Iraq, Lebanon, WMD, and support for the
Palestinian rejectionist groups, and then extend to those
continuing to support the original group in an ever widening
circle.  In addition to all of the Mehlis suspects, the first
batch of new designees might include a core group of eight to
ten, such as Asif Shawkat (Asad,s brother-in-law and head of
Syrian Military Intelligence), Maher Asad (President Asad,s
brother and commander of the Republican Guard), Rami Makhlouf
(Asad,s first cousin and Syria,s poster boy for
corruption), Mohammad Makhlouf (Rami,s father), Riyad Issa
Shaleesh (principal director of SES International ) an
entity already designated under E.O. 13315; in addition, we
should push our allies to sanction the other two Shaleeshes
mentioned above), Hisham Ikhtiyar (chairman of the Regional
Command's National Security Bureau), Abdel Fatah Qudsia
(Presidential advisor on Palestinian issues), and Mohammad
Suleiman (Presidential advisor responsible for procurement).
A second tranch of designations could then move on to this
group's lieutenants and business partners. 

6.  (C) Most Syrians we talk to believe that President Asad
still represents their best hope for change without
instability.  It is their fear of instability that stops the
majority of Syrians from pushing harder for internal change.
For this reason, they argue that sanctions focusing on
individuals would help empower Asad to scuttle the regime,s
pariahs.  According to this school of thought, Bashar himself
should not be designated at this point as it would limit our
options and signal that the USG is intent on regime change,
greatly limiting the number of Syrians willing to join us in
pressuring the SARG for change. 

7.  (C) Comment.  Pursuing targeted sanctions would send a
powerful message to the regime and those associated with it:
"if you are perceived to be proponents of the policies
causing regional instability, you will be designated.  If you
provide aid and assistance to those designated, you risk
designation yourself."  Both internal and external pressure
on the regime to change would likewise increase incrementally
as the number of designations increased.  If conventional
Syrian wisdom is correct, the obstacles stopping Bashar from
doing the right thing would proportionally decrease as
targeted sanctions progressed.  Even if that view is wrong,
the same result will occur, as the supports of Bashar,s
failed policies are eroded.  In the end, the USG will advance
its policy objectives by undermining the regime,s ability to
pursue policies at odds with regional stability.
SECHE

CABLEGATE: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY- COCALEROS USE CONGRESS TO PUSH PRO-COCA/ANTI-U.S. MESSAGE

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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV SNAR PE
SUBJECT: COCALEROS USE CONGRESS TO PUSH PRO-COCA/ANTI-U.S. MESSAGE

REF: A. LIMA 3677 B. 05LIMA 4441 C. 03LIMA 983

Sensitive But Unclassified, Please Handle Accordingly. 

1. (SBU) Summary: Pro-cocalero congressional representatives
ranted about the benefits of coca and the costs of U.S.
imperialism disguised as counternarcotics policy at a recent
"Coca and Biodiversity" conference held in a Congressional
annex.  Cocalero leader Nelson Palomino also participated.
The well-attended event highlighted that cocaleros now have a
foothold in Congress, and are using coca as a banner for a
larger anti-system, anti-U.S. message.  End Summary. 

2. (U) On September 16 Poloff attended a "Coca and
Biodiversity" conference (9/16), at the Congressional annex
building in downtown Lima.  Huanuco Congresswoman Yaneth
Cajahuanca of the Peruvian Nationalist Party (PNP) organized
the event, which was co-sponsored by a natural medicine and
nutrition organization and the Kuska Peru political group led
by cocalero leader Nelson Palomino.  Approximately 150 people
of diverse age and gender filled the auditorium.  A handful
of people were chewing coca leaf - a rare sight in Lima. 

3. (U) Two themes dominated the discussion: the clear
difference between coca producers and narcotraffickers
(though 90 percent of coca production goes to
narcotrafficking) and coca's historical, cultural, and
nutritional value.  Vendors selling "coca flour" and coca
baked goods at the conference received much positive
attention.  (Note: The "flour" is a nutritional supplement to
be mixed with water or milk that includes 9-10 healthy
additives (e.g., soy, rice, whole wheat, etc.) in addition to
coca. End Note.) 

4. (U) Ricardo Soberon, staffer for cocalero Congresswoman
Nancy Obregon, said coca was Peru's biggest renewable natural
resource, but was a "sequestered plant" made taboo by "a dark
force" (the U.S.).  Soberon told the crowd that the U.S. uses
the drug war as a pretext for its presence in Peru to steal
the country's natural resources.  He added that the U.S. is
"like an octopus with tentacles spreading misinformation in
all the press," and that the GOP Ministries obey the orders
of the U.S. Embassy.  Soberon closed his diatribe with a
commitment by Congresswoman Obregon to present new coca
legislation recognizing coca's historical, traditional, and
cultural significance, regionalizing management of the licit
market, and protecting coca producers and including them in a
dialogue.  His speech got strong applause.  (Note: On
September 19, Obregon and other pro-coca Congressmembers
submitted a draft bill to declare coca and its traditional
use as natural patrimony. End Note.) 

5. (U) In a subsequent presentation, cocalero Congresswoman
Yaneth Cajahuanca said she, like farmers in the field, chews
coca because it energizes her and helps her work.  She said
farmers in her district have no alternative to coca for cash
income and claimed fumigation had dried up coca crops in
Huanuco. 

6. (SBU) Radical cocalero leader Nelson Palomino closed out
the event.  His discourse reportedly united indigenous rights
and pride with coca as a cultural element.  Palomino was
released from jail in June on parole after completing a third
of his 10-year sentence for kidnapping, burglary, aggravated
theft, public disturbance, and support of crime and coercion
(Refs B, C).  Since his release he has criticized the GOP's
drug policies and formed a regional pro-coca political
movement called "Kuska Peru" (Quechua for "Together for
Peru.")  Palomino's stature as a political leader has been
strengthened through the cocalero dialogue with the
government, meetings with senior GOP officials including
President Garcia, and in conferences such as this. 

7. (SBU) Comment: The conference highlights the emergence of a newly empowered leadership of pro-coca political leaders inside and outside of Congress. Some observers believe Palomino's and other cocalero leader's political stars are rising, enabled by the government's decisions to elevate them to the status of valid interlocutors. These pro-coca leaders are attempting to shape the GOP's policy through the on-going government dialogue and legislative proposals. It further suggests the consolidation of the coca leaf, and its cultivation free from the interference of outside powers, as the banner of a larger anti-systemic, anti-U.S. political movement that now has a foothold in Congress. End Comment.

STRUBLE

SECRET: CJCS ADMIRAL MULLEN’S JANUARY 17 MEETING

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TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR MOPS VZ AR BH BR CI CS
CU, ES, HO, MX, NU, PM, PA, PE, UY, CO
SUBJECT: CJCS ADMIRAL MULLEN'S JANUARY 17 MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT URIBE 

Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) 

-------
Summary
------- 

1. (S) President Uribe's overwhelming concern during a
January 17 meeting with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(CJCS) Admiral Michael Mullen, was Hugo Chavez' aggressive
remarks and proposal to grant belligerent status to the FARC.
 Uribe insisted the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) must keep their
terrorist designation, and the USG and GOC should work
together to convince Latin American countries that Chavez'
approach would harm Colombia and regional democracy.  Uribe
said Chavez has committed to bring down Uribe and his
government by using the FARC as his militia inside Colombia.
The GOC's current plan of action on hostages consists of
locating them, securing areas near the hostage groups, and
calling on the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) to negotiate their release.  Uribe would authorize
Colombian forces to cross into Venezuela to arrest FARC
leaders and bring them to justice in Colombia.  End Summary. 

2. (U) Participants 

UNITED STATES 

CJCS Admiral Michael Mullen
Ambassador William Brownfield
CJCS/EA CAPT James Foggo
Defense Attach COL Mark Wilkins (notetaker) 

COLOMBIA 

President Alvaro Uribe
Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos
Armed Forces Commander General Freddy Padilla
MFA U.S. and Canada Desk Officer Patricia Cortes 

-------------------------------
Uribe Obsessed By Chavez Blasts
------------------------------- 

3. (C) President Alvaro Uribe arrived late to the meeting,
directly from a discussion with his cabinet on how to respond
to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez' latest inflammatory
remarks, and the show of solidarity by the Venezuelan
Congress on granting "belligerent" status to the FARC.  It
was clear that he was still focused on Chavez and the GOC
response. 

-------------------------
GOC Progress, USG Support
------------------------- 

4. (C) Uribe thanked the United States for its continued
support, stressing its decisiveness in helping Colombia pull
back from the brink of becoming a failed state.  While much
work remains, Colombia has made great progress against
terrorists and the GOC feels certain they can win this
battle.  Uribe attributed a great portion of the credit for
Colombia's success to the permanent assistance of the USG and 

its armed forces.  Chairman Mullen reaffirmed the strength of
the bilateral relationship and assured Uribe of continuing
USG commitment to defeating our common adversaries.  He
admired Colombians' determination and leadership.  The
Colombian military had transformed itself remarkably and
performed the highest calling possible -- returning Colombia
to its citizens. 

---------------------------
Chavez' Endorsement of FARC
--------------------------- 

5. (C) Turning to Venezuela, Uribe said his neighbor's
actions cause Colombia great difficulty.  The FARC and ELN
must keep their terrorist designation, Uribe insisted, and
there should be negative consequences for any country
granting them belligerent status.  It was important to
counter and challenge Chavez' rhetoric, especially on this
point.  When France and Mexico granted that status to the
Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) rebels in El Salvador
in 1981, Uribe commented, they fought an unelected and brutal
dictatorship.  By contrast, the FARC waged war on a duly
elected democracy, they had no public support, and they
financed themselves through narcotrafficking and extortion. 

6. (S) Asked by the Chairman how much help Chavez gave the
FARC, Uribe replied that Chavez has a five to seven year plan
to advance his Bolivarian agenda in Colombia.  He has created
popular militias inside Venezuela (apart from the Armed
Forces) to sustain his revolution.  The GOC believes Chavez
thinks he could use the FARC as his militia inside Colombia
to combat its democratic government.  Chavez remains
committed to bring down both Uribe and his government, as the
primary obstacles to his Bolivarian expansionist dreams.
With no clear Colombian presidential successor, a well
financed candidate favoring Chavez might find space in 2010.
The best counter to Chavez, in Uribe's view, remains action
-- including use of the military. 

----------------
Regional Support
---------------- 

7. (S) Uribe urged the GOC and USG to work together to
convince Latin American countries that Chavez' approach to
the FARC was wrong and would harm Colombia and regional
democracy.  The USG, he said, ought to lead a public campaign
against Venezuela and counter Chavez' progress through
preferential oil offers.  The U.S. and Mexico, supported by
Honduras, Panama, Belize, and Costa Rica (especially Oscar
Arias in the latter) were natural leaders to counter Chavez.
Even Cuba, which felt Chavez had crossed into dangerous
territory, has exercised a restraining influence.  When the
GOC asked the Cuban government their views on Chavez' call to
roll back the FARC's terrorist designation, the Cubans stated
that it was "a difficult proposal." 

8. (S) Uribe saw mixed loyalties among other Latin American countries. Only Nicaragua had supported Chavez' FARC proposal. Argentina remains difficult, since Venezuela bought Argentine bonds and Chavez made campaign contributions to the new President. Paraguay, in the midst of an election cycle, is uncertain though the front-runner supports Chavez. Uruguay, a possible ally, is sitting on the fence. Brazil remains friendly with Colombia, but prefers neutrality lest it offend anyone. In Peru, President Alan Garcia concurs with the United States and would follow its lead. Chile remains a good friend to Colombia and its cause.

-----------------
Hostages and HVTs
----------------- 

9. (S) Uribe listed rescue of hostages held by the FARC as
one of his main goals for 2008.  He outlined a plan whereby
the military would establish a "cordon sanitaire" around
areas where hostages were held.  Then the GOC would
temporarily open the area to outside interlocutors such as
the ICRC to offer an international medical mission and
conduct negotiations.  Under this umbrella, the GOC would
focus on the 44 hostages the FARC had identified as
"exchangeable."  Chairman Mullen assured USG support for
GOC's efforts, but he cautioned that the USG wanted the
hostages returned alive.  Uribe responded with his conviction
that the FARC would not kill hostages at this stage.  The
best course of action, he advocated, remains to locate the
hostages, secure the positions, and then call in the ICRC to
negotiate their release. 

10. (S) Uribe said the GOC also placed a priority on high
value targets and that they had achieved great results in
late 2007.  Finally, he said he was prepared to authorize
Colombian forces to cross into Venezuela, arrest FARC
leaders, and bring them to justice in Colombia. 

11. (U) CJCS Admiral Mullen cleared this cable. 

Brownfield

TOP SECRET: The Reykjavik File

President Reagan greets Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev at Hofdi House during the Reykjavik Summit, Iceland (Source: Ronald Reagan Presidential Library) [Click image for larger version.]

Previously Secret Documents from U.S. and Soviet Archives on the 1986 Reagan-Gorbachev Summit

Washington, D.C. and Reykjavik, Iceland – President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev almost achieved a deal 20 years ago at the 1986 Reykjavik summit to abolish nuclear weapons, but the agreement would have required “an exceptional level of trust” that neither side had yet developed, according to previously secret U.S. and Soviet documents posted today on the Web by the National Security Archive of George Washington University and presented on October 12 in Reykjavik directly to Gorbachev and the president of Iceland.

The two leaders in conversation at Hofdi House, 11 October 1986 (Source: Ronald Reagan Presidential Library) [Click image for larger version.]

The documents include Gorbachev’s initial letter to Reagan from 15 September 1986 asking for “a quick one-on-one meeting, let us say in Iceland or in London,” newly translated Gorbachev discussions with his aides and with the Politburo preparing for the meeting, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz’s briefing book for the summit, the complete U.S. and Soviet transcripts of the Reykjavik summit, and the internal recriminations and reflections by both sides after the meeting failed to reach agreement.

Archive director Thomas Blanton, Archive director of Russia programs Dr. Svetlana Savranskaya, and Pulitzer-Prize-winning biographer Dr. William Taubman presented the documents to Gorbachev at a state dinner in the residence of President Olafur Ragnar Grimsson of Iceland on October 12 marking the 20th anniversary of the summit, which Grimsson commented had put Iceland on the map as a meeting place for international dialogue.

The documents show that U.S. analysis of Gorbachev’s goals for the summit completely missed the Soviet leader’s emphasis on “liquidation” of nuclear weapons, a dream Gorbachev shared with Reagan and which the two leaders turned to repeatedly during the intense discussions at Reykjavik in October 1986. But the epitaph for the summit came from Soviet aide Gyorgy Arbatov, who at one point during staff discussions told U.S. official Paul Nitze that the U.S. proposals (continued testing of missile defenses in the Strategic Defense Initiative or SDI while proceeding over 10 years to eliminate all ballistic missiles, leading to the ultimate abolition of all offensive nuclear weapons) would require “an exceptional level of trust” and therefore “we cannot accept your position.”

Gorbachev and Reagan during a one-on-one session at Hofdi House. U.S. Ambassador Jack Matlock is seated to Reagan’s left. (Source: Ronald Reagan Presidential Library) [Click image for larger version.]

Politburo notes from October 30, two weeks after the summit, show that Gorbachev by then had largely accepted Reagan’s formulation for further SDI research, but by that point it was too late for a deal. The Iran-Contra scandal was about to break, causing Reagan’s approval ratings to plummet and removing key Reagan aides like national security adviser John Poindexter, whose replacement was not interested in the ambitious nuclear abolition dreams the two leaders shared at Reykjavik. The documents show that even the more limited notion of abolishing ballistic missiles foundered on opposition from the U.S. military which presented huge estimates of needed additional conventional spending to make up for not having the missiles.

The U.S. documents were obtained by the Archive through Freedom of Information Act requests to the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and the U.S. Department of State. The Soviet documents came to the Archive courtesy of top Gorbachev aide Anatoly Sergeyevich Chernyaev, who has donated his diary and notes of Politburo and other Gorbachev discussions to the Archive, and from the Volkogonov collection of the U.S. Library of Congress.


Reagan and Gorbachev following a final, unscheduled session held in hopes of reaching agreement, 12 October 1986. Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin (center) and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze (far right) look on. (Source: Ronald Reagan Presidential Library) [Click image for larger version.]

The Reykjavik File: Previously Secret U.S. and Soviet Documents on the 1986 Reagan-Gorbachev SummitFrom the Collections of the National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., October 2006

[The U.S. documents were obtained by the Archive through Freedom of Information Act requests and Mandatory Declassification Review Requests to the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and the U.S. Department of State. The Soviet documents came to the Archive courtesy of top Gorbachev aide Anatoly Sergeyevich Chernyaev, who has donated his diary and notes of Politburo and other Gorbachev discussions to the Archive, and from the Volkogonov collection of the U.S. Library of Congress.]

Note: The documents cited in this Electronic Briefing Book are in PDF format. You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.

Document 1: “Dear Mr. President,” Mikhail Gorbachev letter to Ronald Reagan, 15 September 1986 (unofficial translation with signed Russian original, proposing “a quick one-on-one meeting, let us say in Iceland or in London”), 6 pp. with 4 pp. Russian original

This letter, carried by Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze to Washington, initiated the Reykjavik summit meeting when Gorbachev proposed “a quick one-on-one meeting, let us say in Iceland or in London,” in order to break out of the cycle of spy-versus-spy posturing and inconclusive diplomatic negotiations after the 1985 Geneva summit. The English translation includes underlining by Reagan himself, who marked the sentence accusing the U.S. of deliberately finding a “pretext” to “aggravate” relations, and the two sentences about making “no start” on implementing the Geneva agreements and not “an inch closer to an agreement on arms reduction.”

Document 2: USSR CC CPSU Politburo discussion of Reagan’s response to Gorbachev’s initiative to meet in Reykjavik and strategic disarmament proposals, 22 September 1986, 2 pp.

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze reports to the Politburo on his talks in Washington and informs the Soviet leadership about Reagan’s decision to accept Gorbachev’s invitation to meet in Reykjavik on the condition that 25 Soviet dissidents including Yury Orlov and Nicholas Daniloff, accused of spying, are released. Gorbachev accepts the conditions and sets forth his main ideas for the summit. The Soviet position, according to him, should be based on acceptance of U.S. security interests, otherwise negotiations would be unproductive. Gorbachev is aiming at a serious improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Document 3: Gorbachev discussion with assistants on preparations for Reykjavik, 29 September 1986, 1p.

At this Politburo meeting Gorbachev stresses once again the importance of taking U.S. interests into account and the fact that his new policy is creating a positive dynamic for disarmament in Europe. He emphasizes the need for an “offensive” and the active nature of new Soviet initiatives for Reykjavik.

Document 4: Memorandum to the President, Secretary of State George Shultz, “Subject: Reykjavik,” 2 October 1986, 4 pp.

This briefing memo from Shultz to Reagan, labeled “Super Sensitive” as well as formally classified as “Secret/Sensitive,” shows that the U.S. did not expect any actual agreement at Reykjavik, but rather, mere preparations for a future summit in the U.S. Shultz talks here about ceilings on ballistic missiles but fails to predict Gorbachev’s dramatic agreements to 50% cuts and a process leading to the abolition of nuclear weapons. Ironically, Shultz says one of the U.S. goals is to emphasize progress “without permitting the impression that Reykjavik itself was a Summit,” when history now sees Reykjavik as in many ways the most dramatic summit meeting of the Cold War.

Document 5: Gorbachev’s instructions for the group preparing for Reykjavik, 4 October 1986, 5 pp.

Gorbachev explains his top priorities and specific proposals to the group charged with preparing for Reykjavik. He calls for preparing a position with a “breakthrough potential,” which would take into account U.S. interests and put strategic weapons, not issues of nuclear testing, at the forefront. Gorbachev’s ultimate goal for Reykjavik-he reiterates it several times during the meeting-is total liquidation of nuclear weapons based on the Soviet 15 January 1986 Program of Liquidation of Nuclear Weapons by the Year 2000. Whereas Gorbachev sees the value in making concessions in hopes of achieving a breakthrough, his Politburo colleagues (including Chebrikov) warn him against using this word in the negotiations. In the evening Gorbachev gives additional instructions to Chernyaev on human rights and on the matter of Gorbachev’s wife, Raisa Maksimovna, accompanying him to Iceland.

Document 6: “Gorbachev’s Goals and Tactics at Reykjavik,” National Security Council (Stephen Sestanovich), 4 October 1986, 2 pp. (plus cover page from John M. Poindexter [National Security Adviser to the President] to Shultz)

This briefing memo prepared (on the same day as Gorbachev’s Politburo discussion above) by one of the National Security Council’s senior Soviet experts, completely mis-predicts Gorbachev’s behavior at the Reykjavik summit. Far from being “coy” or “undecided” about a future U.S. summit, Gorbachev was already planning major concessions and breakthroughs. Far from having to “smoke” Gorbachev out during the talks, Reagan would be faced with an extraordinarily ambitious set of possible agreements.

Document 7: “The President’s Trip to Reykjavik, Iceland, October 9-12, 1986 – Issues Checklist for the Secretary,” U.S. Department of State, 7 October 1986, 23 pp. (first 2 sections only, Checklist and Walk-through)

This detailed briefing book for Secretary Shultz provides a one-stop-shopping portrait of the state of U.S.-Soviet relations and negotiations on the eve of the Reykjavik summit. The complete table of contents gives the list of briefing papers and backgrounders that are also available in the collections of the National Security Archive (from FOIA requests to the State Department), but posted here are only the first two sections of the briefing book: the “Checklist” of U.S.-Soviet issues, and the “Walk-Through” of subjects for the Reykjavik agenda. Notable is the very first item on the latter, which presupposes that the best they will achieve is some agreement on a number of ballistic missile warheads between the U.S. proposal of 5500 and the Soviet proposal of 6400, rather than the radical cuts that wound up on the table at Reykjavik.

Document 8: USSR CC CPSU Politburo session on preparations for Reykjavik, 8 October 1986, 6 pp.

In this last Politburo session before the delegation departed for Reykjavik, Gorbachev goes over the final details of the Soviet proposals. He allows for the possibility that the meeting could be a failure, and suggests making “concessions on intermediate range missiles,” and French and British nuclear weapons. Gorbachev believes there should be no “intermediate” positions or agreements, driving for his maximum program even if concessions would have to be made. Shevardnadze sounds most optimistic predicting that the U.S. side could agree with the Soviet non-withdrawal period on the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and on 50% cuts of the nuclear triad (missiles, bombers, submarines) and intermediate-range missiles.

Reagan and Gorbachev depart Hofdi House after the conclusion of the summit, 12 October 1986. (Source: Ronald Reagan Presidential Library) [Click image for larger version.]

Document 9: U.S. Memorandum of Conversation, Reagan-Gorbachev, First Meeting, 11 October 1986, 10:40 a.m. – 12:30 p.m., 8 pp.

Document 10: Russian transcript of Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik, 11 October 1986 (morning), published in FBIS-USR-93-061, 17 May 1993, 5 pp.

Document 11: U.S. Memorandum of Conversation, Reagan-Gorbachev, Second Meeting, 11 October 1986, 3:30 p.m. – 5:40 p.m., 15 pp.

Document 12: Russian transcript of Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik, 11 October 1986 (afternoon), published in FBIS-USR-93-087, 12 July 1993, 6 pp.

Document 13: U.S. Memorandum of Conversation, Reagan-Gorbachev, Third Meeting, 12 October 1986, 10:00 a.m. – 1:35 p.m., 21 pp.

Document 14: Russian transcript of Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik, 12 October 1986 (morning), published in FBIS-USR-93-113, 30 August 1993, 11 pp.

Document 15: U.S. Memorandum of Conversation, Reagan-Gorbachev, Final Meeting, 12 October 1986, 3:25 p.m. – 4:30 p.m. and 5:30 p.m. – 6:50 p.m., 16 pp.

Document 16: Russian transcript of Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik, 12 October 1986 (afternoon), published in FBIS-USR-93-121, 20 September 1993, 7 pp.

This side-by-side presentation of the official U.S. transcripts of the Reykjavik summit meetings and the Soviet transcripts as published in Moscow in 1993 and translated by the U.S. government’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service puts the reader inside the bullet-proof glass over the windows of Hofdi House as Reagan, Gorbachev, their translators, and their foreign ministers discuss radical changes in both U.S. and Soviet national security thinking.

The two sets of transcripts are remarkably congruent, with each version providing slightly different wording and detail but no direct contradictions. Reagan and Gorbachev eloquently express their shared vision of nuclear abolition, and heatedly debate their widely divergent views of missile defenses. For Reagan, SDI was the ultimate insurance policy against a madman blackmailing the world with nuclear-tipped missiles in a future where all the superpowers’ missiles and nuclear weapons had been destroyed. Reagan comes back again and again to the metaphor of keeping your gas masks even after banning chemical weapons, but Gorbachev feels as if Reagan is lecturing him, and says “that’s the 10th time you talked about gas masks.”

For Gorbachev, SDI was a U.S. attempt to take the arms race into space and potentially launch a first-strike attack on the Soviet Union – the ultimate nightmare for Soviet leaders seared into their consciousnesses by Hitler’s blitzkrieg. But Gorbachev’s scientists had already told him that missile defenses could be easily and cheaply countered with multiple warheads and decoys even if the defenses ever worked (which was unlikely).

The great “what if” question suggested by the Reykjavik transcripts is what would have happened if Gorbachev had simply accepted Reagan’s apparently sincere offer to share SDI technology rather than dismissing this as ridiculous when the U.S. would not even share “milking machines.” If Gorbachev had “pocketed” Reagan’s offer, then the pressure would have been on the U.S. to deliver, in the face of a probable firestorm of opposition from the U.S. military and foreign policy establishment. Working in the opposite direction in favor of the deal would have been overwhelming public support for these dramatic changes, both in the U.S. and in the Soviet Union, and especially in Europe.

Perhaps most evocative is the Russian version’s closing words, which are not included in the U.S. transcript. This exchange comes after Reagan asks for a personal “favor” from Gorbachev of accepting the offer on SDI and ABM, and Gorbachev replies by saying this is not a favor but a matter of principle. The U.S. version has Reagan standing at that point to leave the room and a brief polite exchange about regards to Nancy Reagan. But the Russian version has Reagan saying, “I think you didn’t want to achieve an agreement anyway” and “I don’t know when we’ll ever have another chance like this and whether we will meet soon.”

Document 17: Russian transcript of Negotiations in the Working Group on Military Issues, headed by Nitze and Akhromeev, 11-12 October 1986, 52 pp.

In the all-night negotiations of Soviet and U.S. military experts during the middle of the Reykjavik summit, the Soviet delegation led by Marshal Sergei Akhromeev starts from the new Soviet program, just outlined by Gorbachev in his meeting with Reagan earlier in the day-proposing 50% cuts of strategic weapons across the board, a zero option on intermediate-range missiles in Europe, and a 10-year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM treaty. At the same time, the U.S. delegation led by Paul Nitze conducts the discussion practically disregarding the new Soviet proposals and negotiating on the basis of U.S. proposals of 18 January 1986, which by now are overtaken by the latest developments in the Reagan-Gorbachev talks. Responding to U.S. proposals on allowing development of SDI while proceeding with deep cuts in strategic weapons, member of the Soviet delegation Georgy Arbatov comments “what you are offering requires an exceptional level of trust. We cannot accept your position,” directly implying that the necessary level of trust was not there. This document, prepared as a result of the all-night discussion, outlined the disagreements but failed to integrate the understandings achieved by the two leaders on October 11 or approached again on October 12.

Document 18: “Lessons of Reykjavik,” U.S. Department of State, c. 12 October 1986, 1 p. (plus cover sheet from Shultz briefing book for media events October 17, but text seems to have been written on last day of summit, October 12)

This remarkable one-page summary of the summit’s lessons seems to have been written on the last day of Reykjavik, given the mention of “today’s” discussions, but leaves a dramatically positive view of the summit in contrast to the leaders’ faces as they left Hofdi House, as well as to Shultz’s downbeat presentation at the press briefing immediately following the summit. It is unclear who authored this document, although the text says that “I have been pointing out these advantages [of thinking big] in a theoretical sense for some time.” This document plus Gorbachev’s own very positive press briefing commentary immediately following the summit were included in Secretary Shultz’s briefing book for his subsequent media appearances.

Document 19: Gorbachev’s reflections on Reykjavik on the flight to Moscow, 12 October 1986, 2 pp.

In his remarks on the way back from Reykjavik, written down by Chernyaev, Gorbachev gives a very positive assessment of the summit. He proclaims that he is now “even more of an optimist after Reykjavik,” that he understood Reagan’s domestic problems and that the U.S. President was not completely free in making his decisions. He understands Reykjavik as signifying a new stage in the process of disarmament-from limitations to total abolition.

Document 20: “Iceland Chronology,” U.S. Department of State, 14 October 1986, 11 pp.

This blow-by-blow, minute-by-minute chronology sums up not only the discussions given in detail in the transcripts above, but also all the preparatory meetings and discussions and logistics on the U.S. side.

Document 21: USSR CC CPSU Politburo session on results of the Reykjavik Summit, 14 October 1986, 12 pp.

In the first Politburo meeting after Reykjavik, Gorbachev reports on the results, starting with a standard ideological criticism of Reagan as a class enemy who showed “extreme primitivism, a caveman outlook and intellectual impotence.” He goes on, however, to describe the summit as a breakthrough, and the attainment of a new “higher level from which now we have to begin a struggle for liquidation and complete ban on nuclear armaments.” The Politburo agrees with the assessment and approves the General Secretary’s tough posturing.

Document 22: USSR CC CPSU Politburo session on measures in connection with the expulsion of Soviet diplomats from the USA, 22 October 1986, 2 pp.

Reacting to the U.S. decision to expel Soviet diplomats, the Politburo discusses the perceived American retreat from the understandings reached at Reykjavik and decides to press Reagan to follow through with the disarmament agenda on the basis of the summit.

Document 23: USSR CC CPSU Politburo session. Reykjavik assessment and instructions for Soviet delegation for negotiations in Geneva, 30 October 1986, 5 pp.

At this Politburo session Gorbachev and Shevardnadze discuss whether and when to reveal the new Soviet position on SDI testing, which would allow “testing in the air, on the test sites on the ground, but not in space.” This is a significant step in the direction of the U.S. position and is seen as a serious concession on the Soviet part by Foreign Minister Gromyko. Gorbachev is very concerned that the U.S. administration is “perverting and revising Reykjavik, retreating from it.” He places a great deal of hope in Shevardnadze-Shultz talks in terms of returning to and expanding the Reykjavik agenda.

Document 24: Memorandum for the President, John M. Poindexter, “Subject: Guidance for Post-Reykjavik Follow-up Activities,” 1 November 1986, 1 p.

This cover memo describes the process of developing National Security Decision Directive 250 (next document) on Post-Reykjavik follow-up, led by National Security Adviser John Poindexter. The most striking aspect of this memo is Poindexter’s own claim that he has incorporated as much as he can (accounting for the President’s expressed bottom lines) of the Pentagon’s and other objections, and that he needs to brief Reagan about remaining objections on matters that simply would not fit with the President’s program.

Document 25: National Security Decision Directive Number 250, “Post-Reykjavik Follow-Up,” 3 November 1986 (signed by Ronald Reagan), 14 pp.

Largely the work of NSC staffer Robert Linhard, who participated at Reykjavik, NSDD 250 attempts to keep the U.S. national security bureaucracy focused on President Reagan’s goal of eliminating ballistic missiles while walking back from Reagan’s expressed intent at Reykjavik to eliminate all offensive nuclear weapons. In fact, the NSDD’s version of Reykjavik completely leaves out the Reagan and Shultz statements to Gorbachev about welcoming the abolition of nuclear weapons. Yet even this limited effort did not succeed in moving the U.S. bureaucracy towards realistic planning, and in fact the Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly weighed in with National Security Adviser Poindexter to the effect that eliminating missiles would require large increases in conventional military spending.

Document 26: USSR CC CPSU Politburo session. About discussions between Shevardnadze and Shultz in Vienna, 13 November 1986, 3 pp.

Here the Politburo discusses the results of the Shevardnadze-Shultz talks in Geneva, where Shultz refused to discuss new Shevardnadze’s proposals concerning what is allowed and not allowed under the ABM treaty. Shultz’s position notwithstanding, Gorbachev emphasizes the need to press the U.S. to move forward on the basis of Reykjavik. Gorbachev stresses that “we have not yet truly understood what Reykjavik means,” referring to its significance as a new level of disarmament dialogue.

Document 27: Gorbachev Conversation with Chernyaev about Reykjavik, 17 November 1986, 1 p.

In a conversation with Chernyaev, Gorbachev talks about Soviet next steps in countering the U.S. attempts to circumvent Reykjavik. He stresses that “we cannot go below Reykjavik,” and is concerned that “the Americans will not go above Reykjavik.”

Document 28: Gorbachev Conference with Politburo Members and Secretaries of the Central Committee, 1 December 1986, 4 pp.

In a Politburo discussion of the Reagan decision to abandon the SALT II treaty, Gorbachev angrily states that the Americans are not doing anything in the spirit of Reykjavik and that the recent position of the Reagan administration was related to the domestic political crisis over Iran-Contra. Yegor Ligachev agrees with Gorbachev that after Reykjavik the Soviet positions only became stronger. Gorbachev speaks about his awareness of growing opposition to his disarmament proposals among the generals, who are “hissing among themselves.”

Document 29: Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Alton G. Keel [Executive Secretary of the National Security Council], 18 December 1986 [for meeting on 19 December to discuss NSDD 250 and other topics], 7 pp. with staff attachments and talking points

This set of documents demonstrates how the proposals on the table at Reykjavik had fallen off the table in Washington after the Iran-Contra scandal and Poindexter’s departure, and as the result of the U.S. military’s opposition. NSC senior staffer Alton Keel sets up an agenda for President Reagan’s meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that includes the elimination of ballistic missiles together with routine briefings about military exercises and anti-drug efforts in Bolivia, and alerts the President to the military’s insistence on large spending increases. But he does not forward the striking talking points prepared by the NSC staff (under Poindexter) that would have expressed to the top U.S. military what Reagan had said at Reykjavik to Gorbachev.

SECRET: GERMANY WARNS THE USG ABOUT A BRAZILIAN PROCUREMENT ATTEMPT OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN

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RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP
RUCNWSN/THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000921 
 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR EUR/CE PETER SCHROEDER 
STATE FOR ISN 
STATE FOR EUR/PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2034 
TAGS: MTCRE PREL PINR MNUC ETTC KSCA KNNP IR BR GM
SUBJECT: (S) GERMANY WARNS THE USG ABOUT A BRAZILIAN 
PROCUREMENT ATTEMPT OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN 
 
Classified By: Acting Global Affairs Unit Chief David L. Fisher 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (S) On July 31, MFA Export Control Division Desk Officer 
Nancy Reck provided EconOff with a German-language non-paper 
warning US export control authorities about a potential 
Brazilian procurement attempt of proliferation concern for 
"Automatic High-Precision Heavy-Duty Necking-In-Machines with 
CNC Control" from a US vendor.  German authorities received 
an application from a German firm for the export of four 
Necking-In-Machines to Brazil, which they plan on rejecting 
for fears that these machines would be diverted to the Middle 
East -- probably Iran.  (COMMENT: The German producer of 
these machines was not mentioned or listed in the non-paper. 
END COMMENT)  The Germans based their conclusions on their 
own research and information from an unnamed "reliable 
source" (NFI).  Reck shared that Germany is confident in the 
strength of their legal position should the German producer 
challenge the rejection in court. 
 
2.  (S) Begin text of informal Embassy translation of 
German-language non-paper: 
 
In regards to our partnership in the area of 
non-proliferation and our excellent partnership in export 
control affairs, we would like to bring the following 
information to the attention of your government: 
 
A German firm placed an export application for four 
"Automatic High-Precision Heavy-Duty Necking-In-Machines with 
CNC Control" (Einziehmaschinen) with a total value of 
7,700,000 euro.  The machines are controlled by both the 
Wassenaar Arrangement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). 
The stated recipient is the firm Export Business & Consult 
located in Brazil.  This firm's address is as follows: 
 
Export Business & Consult 
Av. Osmar Cunha 183-712A 
Florianopolis, Santa Catarina, 88015-100 
Brazil 
 
The end-user is listed as Export Business & Consult, Rua Ivo 
Luchi s/n Bairro Industrial, Palhoca, Santa Catarina, Brazil. 
 (COMMENT:  Reck said the term "s/n" in this sentence refers 
to "street name."  END COMMENT)  The stated end-use 
description is for the production of gas cylinders, pressure 
containers, and CNG-cylinders for automobiles. 
 
From a reliable "source", we have obtained the following 
information: 
 
-- The Brazilian authorities are investigating the receiver 
because of suspicion connecting the firm with procurement of 
dual-use goods, listed under the Wassenaar Arrangement, for 
diversion to the Middle-East. 
 
-- The firm has already tried to procure machine tools in 
numerous European countries 
 
-- The existence of a declared end-user could not be proven 
 
-- The declared receiver has neither the physical facilities 
nor the financial means or the technical possibilities to use 
the Necking-In-Machines for themselves. 
 
-- The previous activities of both firms give cause for the 
presumption, that it has to do with a front company without 
financial movement or registered business capital. 
 
-- According to the source's assessment, this case could be 
connected with the proliferation of critical goods to the 
Middle East (presumably Iran). 
 
We will reject this application.  Due to the long 
investigation time, the export applicant's legal 
representative shared that the Brazilian end-user could 
possibly make an effort to procure the machines from the USA. 
 
 
We look forward to the continuation of our excellent 
cooperation in the affairs of non-proliferation and export 
control. 
 
BERLIN 00000921  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
End text of informal Embassy translation. 
Bradtke

CONFIDENTIAL: GERMAN SATELLITE START-UP RAPIDEYE GATHERING

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RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0310
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RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE USD FAS WASHINGTON DC 0127
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
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RUCUSTR/USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000788 

SENSITIVE 

SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CE PETER SCHROEDER
STATE FOR ISN/MDSP DICK BUENNEKE 

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TSPA EINV ETRD PGOV PREL PINR CH BR FR LH GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN SATELLITE START-UP RAPIDEYE GATHERING
CUSTOMERS; EMPHASIS ON CHINESE AND USG MARKETS 

REF: 08 BERLIN 1537 

1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  German satellite imagery provider
RapidEye AG, which began selling its imagery products in
January of this year (see ref A), has established its first
contracts with France and Lithuania.  In the next few years,
RapidEye is confident that its customer base will expand by
ten, with an eye toward markets in China, the US, and Brazil.
 Although the firm originally sought to become a niche
provider of value-added imagery products and analysis, it is
finding that its customers are only interested in raw imagery
data.  This has caused RapidEye to re-focus its business
model to be a provider of data that offers direct satellite
downlink services.  Please see ref A for previous reporting
on RapidEye AG.  END SUMMARY 

FRANCE AND LITHUANIA ARE RAPIDEYE'S FIRST CUSTOMERS
--------------------------------------------- ------ 

2.  (SBU) On June 15, 2009, Econoff and NGAoff met with
RapidEye CEO Wolfgang Biedermann and discussed RapidEye's
current and future business developments.  Biedermann said
that RapidEye had contracts with its first customers, France
and Lithuania, totaling one million euros.  Biedermann
boasted that RapidEye had beat the competing French
commercial satellite imagery system, SPOT, on a crop
monitoring project in France.  (COMMENT:  SPOT is a
high-resolution, optical imaging satellite system run by Spot
Image in Toulouse, France.  The SPOT system has been
operational since 1986 with its most recent launch in 2002.
END COMMENT)  Biedermann explained that the main reason why
RapidEye won over SPOT was that RapidEye has a superior
imagery revisit rate, a feature valued by the French customer. 

CUSTOMERS IN THE FOLD: CHINA, BRAZIL AND THE US LEAD THE PACK
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 

3.  (SBU) Biedermann said RapidEye has 10 more customers in
its sights, led by China, Brazil, and the United States.  He
estimated these would bring RapidEye's revenue up to around
10 million euro.  He emphasized that the customers would be
"operational" and not simply "pilot users."  RapidEye views
the sale of land cover data (including purchases by NGA) to
US defense and intelligence agencies to be a key component of
business success in the US market.  To support this goal,
RapidEye plans to set up a small office in Northern Virginia
to serve as a liaison to USG customers.  RapidEye views
Brazil as a large scale potential customer due to its size,
rapid development, and well-organized national use of remote
sensing data. 

CHINA MAY HAVE THE MOST POTENTIAL FOR RAPIDEYE
--------------------------------------------- - 

4.  (SBU) China appears to be the focal point of RapidEye's
current marketing strategy, with principal target areas
identified as the Chinese Ministry of Land Management (MLM)
and the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA).  Biedermann said
"other" Chinese ministries might require similar coverage,
but that RapidEye will approach each sale independently.
Noting that some Chinese ministries do not coordinate well
with each other, RapidEye envisions selling change-detection
data products to MLM on a nation-wide basis.  Biedermann said
China has three tiered priority areas related to acquiring
remote sensing data for land management: 1) China's rapidly
developing coastal region, 2) Central China, and 3) the
desert and semi-desert terrain of Western China.  For these
areas, Biedermann estimated the average cost per square
kilometer would be between 0.70 and 0.90 euro. 

5.  (SBU) RapidEye's primary competition in the Chinese
market is the French SPOT satellite system. Biedermann is
eager to demonstrate the superiority of RapidEye's products
and services to the Chinese customer.  Simply put, RapidEye's 

BERLIN 00000788  002 OF 002 

goal is to supplant SPOT as the vendor of choice in the
Chinese market. 

RAPID EYE PLUGGED INTO WORLD MARKETS; WAITING FOR CUSTOMERS
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 

6.  (SBU) As RapidEye strives to expand its worldwide
customer base, it has already established distribution
contracts covering the US, China, Russia/Eastern Europe, and
Mexico/Central America.  In January 2009, RapidEye announced
an agreement with China's Beijing Earth Observation, Inc.
(BEO) (a subsidiary of Eastdawn Group Inc.) as its Chinese
distributor.  Eastdawn Group CEO, Mr. Bing Sun said RapidEye
has great potential in the Chinese market, especially in the
agricultural, environmental, insurance, and government
sectors.  In February 2009, RapidEye announced an agreement
with the Mexican company Bufete de Ingenieria en
Telecomunicaciones y Sistemas (B.I.T.S.) to be RapidEye's
sole distributor in Mexico and Central America.  In April
2009, RapidEye announced an agreement with the Moscow-based
company Sovzond as its sole distributor for markets in
Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic
of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Krygystan, and
Turkmenistan. 

7.  (SBU) Also in April, RapidEye announced an agreement with
the US company MakaLani LLC of Honolulu, Hawaii as its sole
distributor to the US market.  MakaLani LLC, a Native
Hawaiian Organization (NHO), will focus on distribution to
the US Government market, particularly defense, the
intelligence community, and homeland security.  (COMMENT:
RapidEye may have chosen MakaLani LLC based on an earlier USG
recommendation to establish US distribution ties with a
minority-owned or disadvantaged US company in order to be
better positioned to compete for US Government contracts.
END COMMENT) 

RAPID EYE TO OFFER DIRECT DOWNLINK SERVICES
------------------------------------------- 

8.  (SBU) RapidEye signed a contract with the Canadian firm,
MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. (MDA), in April
2009, designating MDA as the sole supplier of direct downlink
solutions for RapidEye's international customers seeking
ground segments.  The contract allows international ground
station customers the ability to task, acquire, and process
RapidEye imagery in near real-time.
Koenig

CONFIDENTIAL: THE U.S.-CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE, WORKING

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2033
TAGS: PHUM PREL KOLY NK BR CH
SUBJECT: THE U.S.-CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE, WORKING
LUNCH, MAY 26, 2008: UNHRC, ICCPR, NORTH KOREA, BURMA 

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR AUBREY CARLSON. REASONS 1.4
 (B) AND (D). 

1. (U) May 26, 2008; 1:30 p.m.; Beijing, Diaoyutai State
Guesthouse 

2. (U) Participants: 

U.S.
David J. Kramer, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy,
Rights, and Labor
John V. Hanford, Ambassador at Large for International
Religious Freedom
Thomas Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Dan Picutta, Charge d'Affairs, a.i., Embassy Beijing
Robert K. Harris, Assistant Legal Advisor, Department of State
Richard W. Behrend, PRM Advisor, Department of State
Susan O'Sullivan, Senior Advisor, Bureau of Democracy,
Rights, and Labor, Department of State
Dan Kritenbrink, Internal Unit Chief, Political Section,
Embassy Beijing
Emilie L. Kao, Foreign Affairs Officer, Bureau of Democracy
Rights, and Labor, International Religious Freedom,
Department of State
Jeannette M. Windon, Special Assistant, Office of Democracy
and Global Affairs, Department of State
Andrea Goodman, Political Officer, Bureau of East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, Department of State
Steve Goldrup, Second Secretary, Embassy Beijing
Gregory May, Second Secretary, Embassy Beijing (notetaker)
James Brown, Interpreter 

PRC
Wu Hailong, Director General, International Organizations and
Conferences Department, MFA
Shen Yongxiang, Deputy Director General, International
Organizations and Conferences Department, MFA
Yao Maochen, Deputy Inspector of United Front Work
Department, CPC Central Committee
Teng Wei, Deputy Director General, Criminal Division,
Legislative Affairs Commission of the National People's
Congress Standing Committee
Wan Yonghai, Presiding Judge, Second Criminal Division,
Supreme People's Court
Sun Maoli, Deputy Director General, Legal Affairs Department,
Ministry of Public Security
Liu Guoyu, Deputy Director General, Prison Administration
Department, Ministry of Justice
Guo Wei, Director General, Foreign Affairs Department, State
Administration for Religious Affairs
Liu Zhengrong, Director General (acting), Internet
Department, State Council Information Office
Suolang Renzeng, Deputy Chief, Administration for Ethnic and
Religious Affairs, Tibetan Autonomous Region
Zhao Yubin, Director, North American and Oceanian Affairs
Department, MFA
Yan Jiarong, Director, International Organizations and
Conferences Department, MFA
Yao Shaojun, Deputy Director, International Organizations and
Conferences Department, MFA
Xu Jing, Deputy Director, International Organizations and
Conferences Department, MFA Zheng Zeguang, Director General,
North American and Oceanian Affairs
Zu Yanwei, Attache, International Organizations and
Conferences Department, MFA
Liu Lingxiao, Attache, International Organizations and
Conferences Department, MFA
Fang Qiang, Interpreter, MFA 

Summary
------- 

3. (C) China and the United States should cooperate more on
human rights issues in the United Nations, Shen Yongxiang,
Deputy Director General of the MFA's Department of
International Organizations, said during a May 26 working
lunch.  DDG Shen said the United States should reengage with
the Council in order to improve it.  DDG Shen said China
intends to invite the new UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights to visit, saying there was not enough time left in
current Commissioner Louise Arbour's term for this.  DRL
Assistant Secretary Kramer countered that Arbour would
welcome a chance to visit China.  DDG Shen said China will
continue to host visits by UN Special Rapporteurs at a rate
of one per year.  China is working toward ratification of the 

BEIJING 00002104  002 OF 004 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
but must still accomplish further legal reforms, including a
review of China's Reeducation Through Labor (RTL) system, in
order to comply with the Covenant.  On North Korean refugees,
Director General Wu Hailong repeated standard points that
North Koreans in China are "economic migrants."  However,
China has been cooperative with the UNHCR and will allow the
remaining five North Koreans under UNHCR care to depart for
third countries by the end of June.  EAP DAS Christensen
urged China to press Burma to grant access to foreign
disaster relief experts.  DG Wu said Burma continues to be
suspicious of the United States, yet the Burmese regime is
taking positive steps, including accepting U.S. material
assistance.  End Summary. 

UN Human Rights Council
----------------------- 

4. (C) DDG Shen Yongxiang began the May 26 working lunch with
an appeal that the United States and China work more closely
in the UN Human Rights Council.  Shen argued that more
cooperation in the UN between the United States and China in
the area of human rights would improve the international
image of both countries.  China is ready to work with the
United States to promote a UN body that is "fair, objective
and non-selective."  DDG Shen complained that, following the
"serious crimes" carried out by rioters in Lhasa March 14,
the United States "violated the proceedings" of the UN Human
Rights Council by unfairly accusing China of rights
violations in Tibet.  China hopes the United States will
participate in a "more productive way" in the Human Rights
Council.  China supports the current process of universal
periodic review in the Human Rights Council, and the United
States should take the review process seriously.  DDG Shen
encouraged the United States to participate in the upcoming
Durban UN World Conference Against Racism. 

5. (C) A/S Kramer responded that the United States is
extremely disappointed in the UN Human Rights Council.  The
periodic review process is a possible positive mechanism, but
it is too early to tell how successful that mechanism will
be.  On Durban, A/S Kramer said that while it will ultimately
be up to the next administration to decide whether the United
States participates, this would be "extremely difficult"
unless there is a major overhaul of the approaches to be
taken at the conference.  A/S Kramer noted that Canada has
already announced it will skip the Durban conference and
Israel has serious reservations.  DDG Shen said that while
China "respects" the views of the United States and its
disappointment with the Human Rights Council, some current
deficiencies could have been avoided had the United States
been more engaged at the start of the reform process.  DDG
Shen said the United States and other Western countries
backed the idea that the support of one-third of Human Rights
Council members is enough to hold a special session, whereas
China believes a 50-percent threshold would have been fairer.
 Assistant Legal Advisor Harris said that the United States
agreed that the Council should not have double standards or
be politicized.  The Council should be willing to address
fairly the most serious human rights abuses wherever they
occur.  However, the United States believes it is a double
standard for the Council to hold many special sessions and
adopt one-sided resolutions concerning Israel while failing
to hold special sessions on the most serious human rights
problems (for example Zimbabwe).  Meanwhile, the Council in
its first year issued only two special mechanisms mandates,
which involved Cuba and Belarus.  As a practical matter,
China's earlier proposal to require a 50-percent majority for
calling special sessions would not prevent special sessions
involving Israel.  However, a 50-percent threshold might have
proven to be a barrier to convening special sessions
regarding other countries with profound human rights problems. 

Visits by UN Commissioners, Special Rapporteurs
--------------------------------------------- -- 

6. (C) A/S Kramer urged China to host more Special
Rapporteurs and to invite UN Human Rights Commissioner Louise
Arbour to visit Tibet.  DDG Shen said China is "open and
positive" about receiving a visit by the Commissioner.
However, her term will expire this year.  China thus will
extend an invitation to the new Commissioner.  Kramer replied
that Arbour would welcome the chance to visit China before
her term expires and could easily find time on her schedule.
Harris added that the possibility of visiting Tibet is the
reason Arbour wants to make a visit during the last months of 

BEIJING 00002104  003 OF 004 

her tenure.  China, DDG Shen said, also welcomes visits by
various UN Special Rapporteurs and already has extended
invitations to the Rapporteurs on religious freedom and
education, among others.  China's goal is to host a visit by
one Special Rapporteur per year.  However, China has not
hosted such visits in the last two years while the UN Human
Rights Council structure has been under review.  Once the
review is complete, China will resume issuing invitations.
However, DDG Shen added, China must balance the timing and
sequencing of Special Rapporteur visits between the
political, cultural and social realms.  Harris commented that
the United States hosts on average three Special Rapporteurs
per year and has had several visits in the past two years. 

ICCPR
----- 

7. (C) China is "positive" about the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), DDG Shen asserted, and
since signing the Covenant has been making efforts to prepare
for ratification.  Since 2003, China has engaged in a series
of judicial reforms that will help smooth eventual
ratification.  However, China still must make additional
reforms to its criminal justice system in order to comply
with the ICCPR, and is currently reviewing its Reform Through
Labor (RTL) system.  All of these changes will create
favorable conditions for ratification of the ICCPR.  Finally,
China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs is working with the
United Nations to resolve "inconsistencies" that have been
identified in the Chinese translation of the ICCPR.  China,
DDG Shen averred, is even more "eager" to ratify the ICCPR
than the United States is to ratify the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
Harris noted that the United States has not yet announced an
intention to ratify the ICESCR because, like China, the
United States wants to be absolutely sure that it can
implement all the Covenant's provisions. 

North Korea
----------- 

8. (C) PRM Advisor Behrend urged China to stop repatriating
North Korean refugees against their will, particularly those
seeking protection from the UN High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) office i China.  China should improve access for
Nort Korean refugees to UNHCR and grant Chinese iizenship
to children of mixed Chinese-North Korean parentage, which
would allow them access to schools and other social services.
 Director General Wu Hailong responded that North Koreans in
China are not "refugees" but rather economic migrants who
have entered the country illegally.  Nevertheless, China has
cooperated in the cases of 30 North Koreans under UNHCR care.
 By June, China will approve the departure to third countries
of the remaining five North Koreans still under UNHCR care in
China.  DG Wu urged the United States not to allow U.S.
nationals to break Chinese law by becoming involved with
North Korean illegal migrants.  DG Wu noted that illegal
migrants from North Korea had in the past violated Chinese
law by storming diplomatic compounds and international
schools.  The ultimate solution to the North Korean problem
is to work toward peace and stability on the Korean
peninsula.  Once the DPRK economy develops, DG Wu predicted,
the number of illegal border crossers from North Korea will
decline. 

Burma Humanitarian Relief
------------------------- 

9. (C) EAP DAS Christensen expressed appreciation for China's
help in convincing Burma to accept U.S. cyclone relief
assistance.  Christensen urged China to push Burma to allow
foreign relief workers into the country.  Though Burma has
accepted supplies from the United States, the Burmese regime
should also agree to accept technical experts from around the
world.  Such experts are needed on the ground to ensure an
effective aid operation.  DG Wu said China appreciates the
help the USG has given to Burma.  Any international
assistance effort, however, must respect the needs and wishes
of Burma.  The United States has been hostile to Burma's
development, and this, DG Wu said, has led to suspicion on
the Burmese side.  Despite this, DG Wu continued, Burma is
now accepting U.S. aid and recently allowed a visit by U.S.
Pacific Command's Admiral Keating.  DG Wu observed that Burma
remains hesitant to admit aid workers and has not granted
entry to a team of Chinese rescue workers.  After the
devastating earthquake in Sichuan, China has been very open 

BEIJING 00002104  004 OF 004 

to offers of international assistance, DG Wu said, and
China's attitude has affected Burma.  A/S Kramer praised
China's response to the earthquake and openness to outside
help.  DG Wu said China's openness shows the progress China
has made in many areas.
PICCUTA

SECRET: TIBET: MFA ORGANIZES TIGHTLY CONTROLLED TRIP

VZCZCXRO8966
OO RUEHAG RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHROV RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #1210/01 0911303
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 311303Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6186
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0368
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 8974
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 9347
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 BEIJING 001210 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2028
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KIRF NP IN JA BR GM CA IT
SP, SI, SL, TZ, UK, AU, FR, RS, CH
SUBJECT: TIBET: MFA ORGANIZES TIGHTLY CONTROLLED TRIP TO
LHASA FOR DIPLOMATS, MARCH 28-29 

REF: BEIJING 975 

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Dan Piccuta.
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

Summary
------- 

1. (C) With less than 24-hours notice to participating
Embassies, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
together with the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR)
Government, organized an overnight trip to Lhasa March
28 to 29.  Fifteen Beijing-based diplomats, including
PolOff, participated.  Diplomats were shown destroyed
shops, a burnt school building and two hospitals
treating wounded security officers and civilians.  The
trip was tightly controlled and Chinese journalists
were present at nearly all meetings.  PolOff observed
extensive damage to shops starting two to three blocks
east of the Potala Palace and increasing in areas
closer to the Tibetan quarter.  TAR officials sought
to demonstrate that both Han and Tibetans had suffered
as a result of the violence and rioting.  While PolOff
saw a significant presence of regular police, there
was a noticeable absence of military vehicles or anti-
riot equipment.  The delegation met with TAR Chairman
Qiangba Puncog.  At the meeting with Qiangba Puncog,
diplomats pressed for details about the number of dead
and the charges against those currently under
detention.  PolOff urged China to exercise restraint
and engage in substantive dialogue with the Dalai
Lama's representatives.  PolOff also repeated to the
TAR Chairman the USG's request for unfettered access
for diplomats to all Tibetan areas. 

2. (C) Summary continued. In response to the
diplomatic delegation's collective request to visit
the Jokhang Temple and speak with monks involved in a
March 27 demonstration in front of an MFA-led group of
foreign journalists, MFA and TAR officials arranged a
hasty visit to Barkhor Square and the Jokhang on the
morning of March 29.  Diplomats met with a single
monk, who said all of his colleagues were "sleeping"
and thus "unavailable" to meet with the delegation.
The Barkhor area was almost devoid of people, save for
security attached to the delegation.  Organizers
denied PolOff's requests to venture into the city to
meet with Amcits, but PolOff was given the opportunity
to meet with one Amcit at the delegation's hotel.
Government organizers also arranged for foreign
residents of Lhasa, including two American NGO
workers, to attend a briefing with Tibetan scholars
and Buddhist figures, where PolOff was able to speak
with them.  The foreign residents were mainly chosen
by the TAR Government, however, not the participating
diplomats.  Comment:  Although some of the events on
this trip were crudely stage-managed, it is clear that
Lhasa has suffered widespread ethnic-based violence
and rioting.  A large percentage of the population,
Han and Tibetan, have suffered great economic loss,
both from the rioting itself and the cancellation of
tour groups.  Interlocutors' complete lack of candor
about the underlying social factors contributing to
the riots, while not unexpected, was disturbing
nonetheless.  End Summary. 

"We Leave For Lhasa Tomorrow"
----------------------------- 

3. (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs U.S. Affairs
Division Director An Gang told PolOff March 27 that
the MFA's Department of External Security Affairs, in
cooperation with the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)
Foreign Affairs Office (FAO), was organizing a trip for
foreign diplomats to Lhasa, leaving the next morning,
March 28.  Embassy Beijing was given one hour by the
MFA to register a participant for the trip, which
would involve a total of 25 hours on the ground in
Lhasa.  In addition to U.S. Embassy Beijing, the
Beijing Embassies/Missions of Brazil, Japan, Germany,
Canada, the European Commission, Italy, Spain,
Slovenia (as EU President), Singapore, Tanzania (as
Africa Union President), the United Kingdom,
Australia, France and Russia also sent 

BEIJING 00001210  002 OF 008 

representatives.  At 17:00 on March 27, participating
diplomats were called to a briefing presided over by
Vice Foreign Minister (VFM) Wu Dawei.  VFM Wu told the
group that the MFA was organizing the trip so that
diplomats could provide "more correct reports" on the
situation in Lhasa and Tibet to their respective
capitals.  VFM Wu offered no details about the
itinerary, other than the TAR FAO would provide the
schedule to the delegation upon arrival in Lhasa.  VFM
Wu also said that, although the situation in Lhasa was
"generally stable," for safety reasons everyone must
abide by the "arrangements" set by the MFA and the TAR
Government.  PolOff told VFM Wu that AmEmbassy Beijing
viewed the trip, and a similar trip organized the same
week for foreign journalists, as a "first step" but
reiterated the USG's request that diplomats and
journalists have free and unfettered access to all
Tibetan areas affected by recent unrest. 

Chinese Media Presence
---------------------- 

4. (C) In addition to numerous minders from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, plain-clothes security
personnel and the TAR FAO, at least two Xinhua print
journalists and a China Central Television (CCTV)
journalist and cameraman accompanied the delegation.
CCTV crews filmed most events on the trip, including
the arrival and departure at Lhasa airport.  Xinhua
News Agency quoted accurately, though selectively,
some delegation member's positive comments about the
trip, particularly a statement by Tanzanian Minister
George Manongi (representing the African Union) that
"no government would tolerate" violent protests. 

Security Presence Observed in Lhasa
----------------------------------- 

5. (C) The delegation's motorcade included both police
and People's Armed Police (PAP) escorts. (Plate
numbers for PAP vehicles seen by PolOff, including
those attached to the motorcade, all started with WJ
23.)  The airport road appeared to be open to other
traffic during the delegation's arrival and departure
from Lhasa.  PolOff saw at least two groups of
Tibetans picnicking very close to the road.  As the
motorcade neared Lhasa proper, PolOff saw numerous PRC
flags flying over Tibetan-style homes.  At nearly
every intersection where village roads met the main
airport road, a single officer was stationed with his
or her back to the motorcade, looking down the
approaching roadway.  PolOff observed no checkpoints
at any point on the trip except for one on the airport
road that appeared little different from a normal
traffic police checkpoint. 

6. (C) The security presence in Lhasa was noticeable
and significantly larger than that observed by PolOff
during a visit to Lhasa with ConGen Chengdu officers
February 26-29, 2008.  At least one police vehicle
(mainly sedans and SUVs) and one to three officers
were seen at most intersections. Police officers were
mainly sitting in, or standing next to, their vehicles
rather than walking the streets.  At one point, PolOff
saw several police poke their heads out of a police
station doorway to watch the motorcade pass by.
PolOff saw only scattered PAP vehicles other than
those attached to the delegation.  PolOff observed no
officers in riot gear, nor did he see any heavier
police vehicles such as water cannon trucks.  During a
visit to the Jokhang Temple March 29, some diplomats
reported seeing a few helmeted police in side streets
leading off Barkhor Square.  Over the course of the
trip, PolOff saw three canvas-covered military
transport trucks; one had its plates covered, the
other two were without plates entirely.  (Note: An
Amcit resident (protect) told PolOff that a large
number of security forces remained in Lhasa but they
had been confined to compounds during the Government-
organized visits that week by foreign journalists and
diplomats.  A TAR FAO minder told delegation members
that no PLA assets were used to suppress the March 14
riots.) 

BEIJING 00001210  003 OF 008 

Fewer People onStreets
----------------------- 

7. (C) At est, PolOff observed pedestrian traffic at
a tir of the level it was in late February, thoug
in some areas it was much less.  During te late
afternoon of March 28, PolOff observedfewer than ten
Tibetan pilgrims with prayer weels walking in front
of the Potala Palace.  Te next day, March 29, PolOff
observed well over a hundred pilgrims walking on the
Potala circumambulation route.  During this second
drive-by, a TAR FAO minder highlighted the presence of
the pilgrims to PolOff.  In contrast to February, when
pilgrims of various ages and dress could be seen in
Lhasa, the pilgrims observed during this visit, in
addition to being fewer in number, also appeared to be
primarily elderly Tibetans.  Also, areas in the
Tibetan quarter that were packed with pilgrims in
February looked nearly abandoned.  One street near the
Ramoche Temple was blocked by a police cordon, and
behind this barrier, PolOff could see few, if any,
people.  From the motorcade on Beijing East Road
looking into the Barkhor area, PolOff also saw streets
that were nearly devoid of people.  Diplomats who
participated in a March 29 stop at the Jokhang Temple
reported that the streets in the Barkhor district were
practically abandoned. 

Arrival and Visit to Affected Areas
----------------------------------- 

8. (C) Immediately upon arrival in Lhasa on March 28,
organizers took the delegation to a clothing store on
Beijing Middle Road where four Han and one Tibetan
shopkeeper had been killed.  As the delegation pulled
up to the store, the Han Chinese owner and a surviving
Tibetan shop assistant were kneeling before a memorial
altar set up in the burnt-out shop.  Shortly after the
delegation's arrival, they emerged to speak with
diplomats as television cameras rolled.  Next, the
delegation was led on a driving tour of Beijing Road,
Qingnian Road, and North and East Linkuo Road to view
damaged businesses and homes.  TAR FAO interpreters
pointed out damage to Xinhua News Agency offices, the
Tibet Daily and a Bank of China branch.  An FAO minder
also pointed out that a local television station and
stores carrying mobile phones, foreign-branded goods
and precious gems had been specifically target by
rioters/looters. 

Visit to Damaged School
----------------------- 

9. (C) The delegation was then taken to Lhasa Second
Middle School where an entire classroom building had
been gutted by fire.  The Tibetan principal of the
school described the efforts of staff to protect the
children on March 14 and how rioters had allegedly set
fire to the building and then blocked fire trucks from
arriving on the scene.  The fire also consumed many of
the schools' textbooks, she said.  According to the
principal, 80 percent of the school's 839 students are
ethnic Tibetan, in keeping with the population of the
surrounding neighborhood. The teaching staff was 90
percent Tibetan.  In addition to standard Mandarin
Chinese curriculum taught in China, students at Lhasa
Second Middle School receive 280 minutes of Tibetan
and 200 minutes of English instruction per week.
Diplomats then observed primary school students taking
a history lesson in a science lab that had been
converted into an ordinary classroom since the March
14 fire.  At the back of the classroom was a display
condemning the March 14 riots.  An FAO handler
remarked to a delegation member that the "lawbreakers
do not want to see good schools and the development of
society." 

Extent of Damage
---------------- 

10. (C) Judging by the very limited tour given to the
diplomats, the area of Lhasa west of the Potala Palace
seemed unaffected by the rioting.  Individual burned
out stores could be seen starting two to three blocks 

BEIJING 00001210  004 OF 008 

east of the Potala, with the ratio of damaged to
undamaged shops increasing as one neared the Ramoche
Temple/Barkhor area.  At some points along Beijing
East and Lingkhor North and East Roads, entire rows of
shops had been burned or damaged.  On Beijing East
Road, PolOff saw that the (Nepali/Tibetan operated)
Kyichu Hotel had only a single broken window while the
neighboring six shops, by contrast, including a Han-
run sunglass store visited by PolOff in February, had
been completely burned out.  Despite extensive damage
to stores, all roads were clean, and PolOff saw little
debris on sidewalks.  In the areas east of the Potala
Palace, about a third of stores remained shuttered,
making it difficult to assess whether shops were
damaged or just closed.  For every store that was
burned out, at least ten others showed signs of damage
to the metal rolling shutter or broken windows.  All
over Lhasa, PolOff saw white katas (Tibetan greeting
scarves) affixed to storefronts, an indication that
the store is Tibetan-owned (reftel). 

Meeting with TAR Chairman
------------------------- 

11. (SBU) Following the tour and check-in at the Lhasa
Hotel (in a largely unaffected area of west Lhasa) on
the evening of March 28, the delegation arrived at the
TAR Government compound for a meeting with TAR
Chairman Qiangba Puncog and a large contingent of
high-level TAR officials, including the Mayor of Lhasa
Doje Cezhug.  (Note:  As TAR Chairman, Qiangba Puncog
is equivalent to a provincial governor and is ranked
behind the top PRC official in Tibet, TAR Party
Chairman Zhang Qingli.)  After introductions and
before Qiangba Puncog could read his prepared report,
the Slovenian Counselor, Bernard Srajner asked the TAR
Chairman a series of questions prepared in advance by
the EU participants.  A summary of the EU questions
and Qiangba Puncog's answers (both in his prepared
remarks and response to follow up questions) follows: 

--What is the fate of 13 people arrested in a
demonstration on March 10?  The TAR Chairman said 15
people (13 monks and 2 lay people) had participated in
the March 10 demonstration in Lhasa, which included
raising the "snow mountain flag."  The thirteen monks
are among 303 total people detained, but Qiangba
Puncog gave no additional information on what the 13
monks were charged with.  (Note:  The figure of 303
detained appeared to be a figure for detainees related
to demonstrations prior to March 14.) 

--What happened in the first 24 hours of March 14?
Why did security forces "hold back" at first?
Qiangba Puncog repeated a standard Government version
of events, saying the March 14 "beating, smashing,
looting, and burning" incident had been "masterminded"
by the Dalai Lama clique in an attempt to sabotage the
Olypics.  Police and PAP officers had exercised
estraint.  Government forces had not used fireams,
though authorities confiscated some "lead bullet" guns
from some rioters.  (Comment:  The term "lead bullet"
guns seemed to indicate non-police, makeshift
firearms.)  The TAR Chairman said the TAR Government
had failed to protect civilians, and he apologized to
victims in the hospitals. 

--How many people were killed and injured?  The TAR
Chairman repeated published casualty figures.  He said
382 innocent civilians had been injured, 58 seriously.
Eighteen "innocent civilians" had been killed,
including an infant below the age of one.  In
addition, one police officer and three rioters were
killed.  Seven schools, 5 hospitals, 908 shops and 120
private residences had been damaged with total losses
amounting to RMB 250 million ($36 million). 

--What is the nature of charges against detainees?
Will independent observers be allowed at trials?  As a
result of the March 14 riot, 414 people had been
detained.  An additional 289 had turned themselves in,
although 111 of these people had already been released
because their crimes were "minor."  Qiangba Puncog
said PRC law prohibits splittism.  Defendants will be 

BEIJING 00001210  005 OF 008 

charged not for their views, but for their "public
actions."  All cases will be dealt with according to
law.  Some who committed "small crimes" will be
released but the more "serious" cases will go to
trial.  All defendants will have access to legal
counsel, including legal aid for those who have no
money to afford a defense attorney.  (Note:  While
Qiangba Puncog did not directly answer the question
about outside observers, the Canadian participant said
the head of the TAR Justice Department (si fa ting)
later told her at a banquet immediately afterward that
outside observers would not be possible.) 

--What has happened to monks who demonstrated at the
Jokhang Temple in front of visiting journalists?
Qiangba Puncog characterized the incident as an
example of "Government tolerance."  It was "natural"
for some people to have different views, and the monks
will not be punished, he said.  The Australian
participant, in a follow-up question, asked for a
visit to the Jokhang Temple to speak with the monks
involved in the incident.  The Chairman said TAR
authorities would consider adding a Jokhang visit to
the schedule.  (Note:  A hastily arranged visit to the
Jokhang was arranged the next morning, as reported
below.) 

"We Are Already Restrained and Non-Violent"
------------------------------------------- 

12. (C) During the meeting with the TAR Chairman,
PolOff stated USG points regarding the need for China
to exercise restraint and for all sides to refrain
from violence.  China should respect the legal rights
of peaceful protestors and enter substantive dialogue
with representatives of the Dalai Lama.  PolOff ended
by saying, while the current trip was a positive step
in the right direction, the USG still seeks unfettered
access for diplomats to all Tibetan areas, inside and
outside the TAR.  More and better access was in the
interests of all sides, PolOff said.  Qiangba Puncog
responded that he already understood the U.S. position
and that Chinese President Hu Jintao had already
discussed the Tibet situation directly with President
Bush.  China is "already exercising restraint and
refraining from violence," so such calls are unnecessary.
It was because of this restraint, including no use of
lethal weapons by security forces, that the riot took
so long to get under control.  The TAR Government places
great importance on the visit by diplomats, Qiangba
Puncog said, urging delegation members to report the
"real situation" to their respective "highest leaders." 

13. (SBU) Qiangba Puncog also defended China's economic
and religious policies in Tibet.  The TAR Governor
highlighted a string of new measures, announced the
following day in TAR newspapers, designed to provide
economic relief to victims of the rioting.  He noted
that Tibet was experiencing high growth rates and
rising income, thanks in no small part to Central
Government support.  Prices were stable in the TAR
following the unrest, he asserted.  There was no need
to adjust Government policies regarding religion, he
said.  After the meeting, Qiangba Puncog hosted a
banquet for the delegation, followed by the screening
of a documentary film on the March 14 riots. 

Meeting with U.S. Citizens
-------------------------- 

14. (C) PolOff requested that, instead of watching the
documentary on March 28, he be allowed to go out on
his own to visit with American citizens in Lhasa.
Several other diplomats also requested time to meet
with their citizens in lieu of the film.  The TAR FAO
agreed to excuse PolOff and other diplomats from the
film, but only on condition that meetings with
citizens take place at the Lhasa Hotel.  PolOff was
told he could not venture outside of the hotel "for
safety reasons."  PolOff contacted three Amcits.  Two
noted that foreigners were still instructed to stay
indoors at night, making a 21:00 meeting at the hotel
impractical.  One Amcit, a long-term Lhasa resident
who lives close to the hotel, agreed to visit with 

BEIJING 00001210  006 OF 008 

PolOff in the hotel lobby.  (Note:  The Amcit reported
that he was fine, though some money had been looted
from one of his downtown Lhasa shops, which had also
been sprayed by gunfire.  The Amcit also noted that
tension in the city between ethnic Tibetans and Han
remains.) 

15. (C) Delegation members were given a second chance
to meet with their respective citizens, though trip
organizers, not the diplomats, controlled who was
invited.  During the pre-trip briefing with VFM Wu
Dawei, several diplomats requested that they be given
a chance to meet with their respective citizens in
Lhasa.  VFM Wu said such meetings would likely be
possible but had to take place at the delegation's
hotel.  Some Embassies, but not the United States,
provided contact information for their citizens in
Lhasa to the MFA to facilitate meetings.  The TAR FAO,
in response to this request, then apparently invited
about ten foreign residents to attend the final
meeting of the trip March 29, a briefing by TAR
scholars and official religious figures.  The
delegation was not provided with any name list prior
to the meeting.  Upon arrival, PolOff learned that two
Amcit NGO workers, one of whom had declined an
invitation to meet PolOff at the hotel the previous
evening, were present.  The foreign residents mainly
sat and listened as the Tibetan scholars denounced the
Dalai Lama.  PolOff asked that the meeting be cut
short to allow time for individual discussions with
citizens.  One of the Amcits told PolOff his
organization's "local partner" had encouraged him to
attend the meeting, which he did for the sake of
maintaining cooperative relations.  The other, the
Tibet director for a multi-national environmental NGO,
indicated that his boss at the NGO had requested that
he attend.  PolOff told both that they were under no
obligation to meet with USG officials.  However, both
voluntarily met with PolOff for about 15 minutes each.
(Note:  Both Amcits reported that they were fine and
that, after being unable to venture outside for four
days following the March 14 riots, things in Lhasa
were now beginning to return to normal.)  Other
diplomats later complained that citizens whom they had
requested that the MFA/TAR FAO invite were not
contacted. 

Visit to Jokhang Temple, "Monks are Sleeping"
--------------------------------------------- 

16. (C) Around 01:00 March 29, all delegation members,
except PolOff, received calls in their hotel rooms
that the start time for the next morning had been
moved up from 08:30 to 08:00.  According to the
Australian participant, when delegation members
boarded the vans just before 08:00, organizers told
them there had been a "change in the schedule" but
offered no details.  As the motorcade departed just
prior to 08:00, several delegation members noted the
absence of some of the diplomats and requested that
the motorcade wait.  MFA/TAR FAO handlers refused.
(Note:  Three other diplomats who, unlike PolOff, knew
about the time change but arrived at the motorcade
just at 08:00, were left behind and also missed the
trip to the Jokhang.)  PolOff's request that he be
allowed to catch up to the motorcade by taxi was
refused.  The Government minders, according to those
who made it on the bus, were extremely nervous and
appeared desperate to complete the visit to Jokhang as
rapidly as possible.  The diplomats only realized that
they were being taken to the Jokhang Temple as they
pulled into Barkhor Square. 

17. (C) Upon arrival, the diplomats noticed a much
larger security contingent than at other events on the
trip.  Officials were "extremely nervous" during the
visit, several diplomats later told PolOff.  Other
than the delegation and the escorts/security, Barkhor
Square and the surrounding streets were abandoned.
Little, if any, damage to shops in the Barkhor was
noticeable, according to U.K. Political Counselor
Peter Wilson.  The MFA/TAR FAO officials escorted the
group into the temple where they met with a single
monk who is a member of the Jokhang's Democratic 

BEIJING 00001210  007 OF 008 

Management Committee.  When the group asked to see the
monks involved in the March 27 demonstration in front
of foreign journalists, the monk said they and the
other monks were all in their dorm "sleeping."  The
monk said that his colleagues who had participated in
the incident were "young and lacked understanding,"
but they would not be punished.  Wilson noted that the
Jokhang is usually packed with pilgrims.  The monk
said that the temple was closed for the day but would
reopen tomorrow.  Several diplomats left the Temple
early in disgust and then staged a mini-protest,
refusing to get back on the bus while they debated
whether to continue with the visit.  They eventually
decided to proceed with the schedule.  Australian
Political Officer Eleanor Lawson, who had requested to
TAR Chairman Qiangba Puncog that the Jokhang be added
to the schedule and later was outspokenly critical of
the poor handling of the Temple visit, told PolOff
that MFA Director General for External Security
Affairs Wang Min later pulled her aside and demanded
that she "stop causing trouble."  (Comment: PolOff's
requests on March 28 to venture out alone, as well as
his delivery of USG points on Tibet to both TAR
Chairman Qiangba and MFA VFM Wu, may have prompted
organizers to exclude PolOff from the sensitive
Jokhang trip.  While a simple administrative oversight
cannot be ruled out, when PolOff complained about
being excluded, TAR FAO officials merely insisted that
"everyone was called.") 

More Visits with Victims, Hospitals
----------------------------------- 

18. (C) Following the Jokhang Temple stop (after which
PolOff and others who had missed the Jokhang visit
rejoined the main group), the diplomats visited the
offices of the Chengguan District Government.  While
there, four Tibetans and one Han resident described
the events of March 14.  Several told of having their
stores and homes destroyed, saying they were living on
Government assistance.  Chen Xiaoxiong (a Han Chinese)
told of how her shop was destroyed, causing RMB 2.6
million ($370,000) in damage, and how ethnic Tibetans
had protected her and provided her with shelter. "With
the support of the Party and my friends, I am
confident I can start my life again," Chen said. 

19. (C) This meeting produced the most unscripted
moment of the entire trip:  In response to a question
regarding the composition of the rioters, a Tibetan
resident offered that most were "unemployed."  A
Chengguan District Government official then chimed in
saying that, actually, the rioters were "lazy" people
who refused to work despite abundant opportunities to
participate in Government job-training programs.  The
same official, in contradiction to the TAR Chairman's
comments that prices are stable, said inflation is a
problem and that the Government is providing extra
support for victims to cope with rising costs.  The
group then visited a People's Armed Police hospital
and saw injured PAP officers (both Han and Tibetan),
including some in intensive care beds.  The delegation
then proceeded to Lhasa's Regional People's Hospital.
Outside the second hospital, ambulances with smashed
windows were on display.  Hospital officials relayed a
story that a mob had attacked one ambulance, which was
carrying a small child at the time.  Diplomats later
met with a (Tibetan) doctor injured during the attack
on the ambulance. 

Living Buddhas Denounce "Splittist" Dalai Lama
--------------------------------------------- -- 

20. (C) At the final meeting of the trip (the one
mentioned above that included foreign residents),
diplomats heard a briefing by Tibetan scholars and
religious figures.   The briefing was heavy on
propaganda with an emphasis on Tibet's social and
economic progress since the "peaceful liberation" of
1951.   The primary speaker was Drubkang, the Chairman
of the Tibetan Buddhist Association.  Drupkang, in
response to a question on whether he considered the
Dalai Lama a real living Buddha, gave a lengthy
denunciation of the "unpatriotic" 14th Dalai Lama but 

BEIJING 00001210  008 OF 008 

fell short of denouncing the Dalai Lama's legitimacy
as a reincarnate.  The Dalai Lama's use of violence
runs counter to the key tenets of Buddhism, he said.
Drubkang added that the participation of monks in the
unrest shows that monasteries need to increase their
legal education of young monks.  Another living Buddha
asserted that Western countries should do more to
educate their young people about the "real" situation
in Tibet and counter widespread "prejudice" against
Tibet outside China.  The Government has spent huge
sums rebuilding monasteries and providing medical care
and other benefits to monks, he said, adding that the
only "conflict" in Tibet was the long-standing
struggle between separatists and anti-separatists.
Following this meeting, the delegation departed for
the airport and returned to Beijing. 

Comment
------- 

21. (C) Although some of the events on this trip were
crudely stage managed, it is clear that Lhasa has
suffered widespread ethnic-based violence and rioting.
A large percentage of the population, Han and Tibetan,
have suffered great economic loss, both from the
rioting itself and the cancellation of tour groups.
Despite our hosts' efforts to portray Lhasa as a city
quickly bouncing back, the frantic visit to the
Barkhor/Jokhang Temple, with its heavy security
presence, appeared to indicate that tensions remain
high in the Tibetan quarter of the city. 

22. (C) Comment continued:  Interlocutors' complete
lack of candor regarding the underlying social factors
contributing to the riots, while not unexpected, was
disturbing nonetheless.  Even the "average people"
diplomats met with resorted to stock propaganda
phrases (e.g., "Dalai Lama clique" and "beating,
smashing, looting, burning") while denying Tibetan
society had any problems other than the lingering
presence of a few "separatists."  One Amcit resident
of Lhasa (protect), however, told PolOff during the
trip that he believes the city's Tibetan youths are
becoming "radicalized."  An increasing number of young
Tibetans in Lhasa, he said, become angry when they are
addressed in Mandarin Chinese and refuse to speak
China's official language.  Nevertheless, he and the
other long-term foreign residents PolOff spoke with
appeared to believe that, even if ethnic tensions
remain, tourists will return, NGO projects will go
forward and Lhasa will continue its current path of
rapid, albeit increasingly Han-dominated, development.
RANDIT

TOP-SECRET FROM THE CIA: US INTELLIGENCE AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR CONFERENCE

US INTELLIGENCE AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR

TOP-SECRET: CIA HAD SINGLE OFFICER IN HUNGARY 1956

Washington D.C., August 9th, 2011 – Fifty years ago today the Soviet Presidium overturned its earlier decision to pull its troops out of Hungary in the face of a popular uprising, yet the CIA–with only one Hungarian-speaking officer stationed in Budapest at the time–failed to foresee either the uprising or the Soviet invasion to come, according to declassified CIA histories posted on the Web by the National Security Archive at George Washington University (www.nsarchive.org).

Describing the several days in early November 1956 when it seemed the Hungarian Revolution had succeeded (before the Soviet tanks rolled in on November 4), a CIA Clandestine Service History written in 1958 commented: “This breath-taking and undreamed-of state of affairs not only caught many Hungarians off-guard, it also caught us off-guard, for which we can hardly be blamed since we had no inside information, little outside information, and could not read the Russians’ minds.”

Through a Freedom of Information Act request and appeal, Johns Hopkins University (SAIS) professor Charles Gati obtained the heavily-censored extracts from two previously secret CIA histories in the Clandestine Service History series for his critically-praised new book Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (Stanford University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006).

The extracts come from a two-volume history of CIA operations in Hungary (dated May 1972 and only 2 copies made) and from a two-volume history titled “The Hungarian Revolution and Planning for the Future” (dated January 1958). Because of the extensive security deletions, it is impossible to determine the length of each document, but judging by the page numbers, the first pair of volumes totals at least 99 and 71 pages, and the second at least 106 pages.

The CIA histories show that the Agency had essentially only one Hungarian-speaking officer based in Hungary during the 1950-1957 period, and for several years that person spent “95 percent” of his time on “cover duties.” “He mailed letters, purchased stamps and stationery …,” among other “support tasks,” the history noted. At the time of the Revolution in fall 1956, he was preoccupied with official contacts and doing interviews with Hungarian visitors.

The name of the sole CIA officer in Budapest in 1956, Geza Katona, is censored from the CIA histories but included in Professor Gati’s book with Katona’s permission. Katona is also the subject of an extensive oral history interview in the Summer 2006 issue of Hungarian Quarterly (pp. 109-131), which repeats his cover story as a State Department official. According to the CIA histories, Katona took part in no operational activities because he had no time and was “constrained from so doing by the US policy of nonintervention.” In fact, the histories say, “At no time in the period 23 October – 4 November, if one looks at the situation realistically, did we have anything that could or should have been mistaken for an intelligence operation.”

The CIA documents admit that the bulk of the reports CIA received were from the border areas near Austria. The Agency had no steady information from Budapest (“the storm center”) or on a country-wide basis. The histories acknowledge this meant intelligence was “one-sided” and that therefore planning based on that intelligence was also “one-sided.”

On the issue of whether support from outside the country would have been useful or welcome (which may seem an obvious point, but until now the evidence has consisted only of memoir accounts and second-hand literature citing unnamed intelligence sources), the CIA histories reflect this lingering controversy, reporting with some feeling that, based on “the whole picture we now have of the mentality of the revolutionaries … almost anyone from the West, of whatever nationality, color or purpose would have been received with open arms by any of the revolutionary councils in the cities of Hungary during the period in question.”

Two related issues have remained open to debate since the revolution–whether the United States sent weapons or ammunition to the rebels or deployed specially trained émigré forces into Hungary. The CIA records appear to put both questions to rest.

A few days after the revolt broke out, Katona queried the agency on official policy regarding arms and ammunition. On October 28, Headquarters responded, “we must restrict ourselves to information collection only [and] not get involved in anything that would reveal U.S. interest or give cause to claim intervention.” The next day, Washington replied more specifically “that it was not permitted to send U.S. weapons in.” In fact, the implication in the histories is that transferring arms was never seriously contemplated: “At this date no one had checked precisely on the exact location and nature of U.S. or other weapons available to CIA. This was done finally in early December” of 1956.

Numerous published accounts have indicated the existence of secret U.S.-trained émigré groups in the 1950s identified under such rubrics as Red Sox/Red Cap or the Volunteer Freedom Corps. But it has never been officially confirmed whether any groups of this kind played a part in Hungary in 1956. From the Clandestine Service Histories, it seems clear they did not. Although the new documents confirm that small psychological warfare and paramilitary units came into being in the early 1950s, (including the Hungarian National Council headed by Bela Varga), and occasional reconnaissance missions took place at that time, the prospects for penetrating into Hungary deteriorated by 1953 when stepped up controls by Hungarian security forces and “the meager talent available” among potential agents made cross-border operations essentially untenable.

Thus, far from revealing the deployment of any organized contingents that may have existed, the new documents imply that something much more spur-of-the-moment took place: on October 31, “Headquarters seconded a scheme which had shortly before come out of [deleted] and which proposed that certain defectors [deleted] who had volunteered to go back into Hungary be allowed to go.”

The histories contain other interesting insights into CIA operations, including the complaint that another obstacle to their activities was the involvement of the U.S. military (presaging current conflicts between the two bureaucracies in Iraq). The authors sarcastically write that “If we [the CIA] were in no position to act efficiently … the military is, was, and always will be even worse off.” They recommend that in the future the CIA keep the military “at arm’s length” and only do what’s necessary “to keep them happy.”

Of course, according to Soviet documents previously published by the National Security Archive (click here for more selections from The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents, edited by Csaba Bekes, Malcolm Byrne, and Janos M. Rainer, from Central European University Press), the availability of an abundance of intelligence assets does not necessarily provide all the answers. Moscow was also taken by surprise by the Revolution despite the thousands of Soviet soldiers, KGB officers, and Party informants present in Hungary. Rather than understanding the sources of the discontent, it was easier for Soviet operatives and even the leadership to cast woefully misdirected blame on the CIA for the unrest. Klement Voroshilov remarked at the October 28 Presidium session: “The American Secret Services are more active in Hungary than Comrades Suslov and Mikoyan are,” referring to the two Party leaders sent to Budapest to negotiate a modus vivendi with the new Nagy government. At that moment, of course, the Soviet Presidium had more active members (2) in Budapest than the CIA had case officers (1).


Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.

CIA Histories

Document 1: CIA Clandestine Services History, The Hungarian Revolution and Planning for the Future, 23 October – 4 November 1956, Volume I of II, January 1958

Document 2: CIA Historical Staff, The Clandestine Service Historical Series, Hungary, Volume I, [Deleted], May 1972

Document 3: CIA Historical Staff, The Clandestine Service Historical Series, Hungary, Volume II, External Operations, 1946 – 1965, May 1972

Soviet Documents

Document 4: Working Notes from the CPSU CC Presidium Session, October 28, 1956

Document 5: Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on October 30, 1956 (Re: Point 1 of Protocol No. 49)

Document 6: Working Notes and Attached Extract from the Minutes of the CPSU CC Presidium Meeting, October 31, 1956

CONFIDENTIAL: CHANCELLOR ANGELA “TEFLON” MERKEL TAKES LIMELIGHT

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2019
TAGS: GM PREL PGOV
SUBJECT: CHANCELLOR ANGELA "TEFLON" MERKEL TAKES LIMELIGHT
AS FDP WAITS IN THE WINGS

Classified By: MINISTER COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS GEORGE GLASS FO
R REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

SUMMARY
-------

1. (C) Less than two weeks after her party suffered losses
in two state elections, CDU Chancellor Angela Merkel found
her fighting spirit before 8,000 party faithful at a
September 6 election rally in Duesseldorf launching the "hot
phase" of the CDU/CSU electoral campaign. The CDU has been
shifting party tactics after its losses in the August 30
elections in Saarland and Thuringia, where the Social
Democratic Party (SPD) may now be in a position to form
coalitions with the Left Party. Merkel -- to great applause
-- focused in on the specter of a so-called red-red
government composed of the SPD and The Left Party. She
described the SPD as suffering from an "identity crisis," and
needing a vacation from political decision-making and time in
opposition. Along with the entire CDU leadership and
incumbent CDU/CSU Ministers-president, Merkel made her case
for a CDU/CSU coalition with the pro-business but socially
liberal FDP. She repeated the CDU/CSU's election mantra: "we
have the strength" throughout her speech, aiming to convince
the German electorate that a strong CDU/CSU is required for
Germany to emerge from its worst economic recession in
post-war history. CDU views on whether the issue of
Germany's role in Afghanistan would become a more prominent
campaign theme were mixed.

2. (C) With three weeks to go before the parliamentary
elections, all signs point to Chancellor Merkel returning to
office, although she and her party recognize that they face a
difficult campaign. It remains uncertain whether the CDU and
the FDP will gain enough support to form a majority
coalition. If not, another Grand Coalition (CDU/CSU-SPD) is
very likely; other options require a three-party
constellation that would force the ill-suited Greens and FDP
to work together. But, there seems to be an almost one
hundred percent certainty -- given the SPD's chronic slump in
the polls and limited coalition options -- that SPD Foreign
Minister and Chancellor-candidate Frank Walter Steinmeier
will not become Chancellor. End summary.

MERKEL CASTS ASIDE SPD, EMBRACES FDP
------------------------------------

3. (C) Chancellor Merkel -- to rapturous cries of "Angie,
Angie" and a standing ovation -- took to the floor at her
party's September 6 rally before some 8,000 supporters
affirming that the CDU/CSU "have the best chance to win the
parliamentary elections" but also cautioning that "the
election's outcome has not yet been decided." On the one
hand, she praised her Grand Coalition government's record,
noting its success in countering Germany's economic and
financial crisis. On the other hand, she called for a new
CDU/CSU coalition with the FDP after the upcoming elections--
casting aside the SPD. She asserted that such a coalition
would anchor Germany in the "middle" of the political
spectrum and take the country out of its current economic
crisis faster. Merkel said: "Our country needs a government
that will support growth, security and work for everyone."
In a swipe at the SPD (COMMENT: Merkel never mentioned
Steinmeier by name. END COMMENT.), she said the party is
currently plagued by an "identity crisis," adding that, "The
SPD is devoid of any reality and is distraught." She asked,
"How can a party that achieved 10, 18, and 24 percent at the
recent state elections in Saxony, Thuringia, and Saarland be
taken seriously?" Dismissing SPD warnings against a
so-called "black-yellow" (CDU/CSU-FDP) coalition, Merkel said
that the country should be more worried about the SPD's plans
to form coalitions with The Left Party on the state and
federal levels. (Note: The SPD has warned that a
black-yellow coalition would represent wealthy Germany and
business interest at the expense of the middle and lower
classes.)

4. (U) CDU leaders also tried to cast the CDU at the state
level in a positive light after its poor showing in the
Saarland and Thuringia state elections on August, causing the
Minister President of the latter state to resign. Lower
Saxony's CDU Minister President Christian Wulff asserted that
the most prosperous and successful "Laender" (states) in
Germany are those ruled by the CDU/CSU and FDP. He cited
Berlin, governed by SPD Mayor Klaus Wowereit's Berlin (NOTE:
in Berlin the SPD rules with The Left Party. END NOTE), as
being the worst case. Hesse's Minister President Roland Koch
-- to great applause -- noted that he could not understand
how the SPD could possibly cooperate on a state or national
level with a Left Party that is "anti-American and
anti-European." (Note: In Saarland and Thuringia the option

BERLIN 00001106 002 OF 003 

exists for the SPD to form a governing coalition with the
Left Party. END NOTE.)

CSU Truce with FDP?
-------------------

5. (C) CSU Bavarian Minister-President Horst Seehofer threw
his party's support behind a CDU/CSU coalition with the FDP,
despite his well-publicized doubts about the FDP's real
coalition intentions after the parliamentary elections. Even
as Seehofer pronounced his support for the FDP in
Duesseldorf, however, media reports from Munich confirmed
that the CSU had decided to continue attacking the FDP. The
CSU has been buffing its economic bona fides by attacking the
FDP on its own themes while basking in the reflected glory
from popular Economics Minister zu Guttenberg, the new CSU
champion. Seehofer has publicly suspected that FDP Chairman
Guido Westerwelle -- in an attempt to enter government at all
costs -- might support a "traffic light" coalition with the
SPD and the Greens, although this political constellation
appears unlikely at present. In addition, Bavarian politics
trump national politics, especially during a time when the
CSU longs for the days when their party alone wielded
political power in Munich, rather than as it does today, in a
coalition with the FDP. Seehofer is also aware that the CSU
needs to be strong and the FDP proportionally more weak for
the CSU to win more and better ministerial posts in a
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. He did not use his appearance in
Duesseldorf to chide the FDP, to the great delight of those
pleading that recent CDU/CSU-FDP bickering had been harmful
and counter-productive during the campaign.

AFGHANISTAN - A DOMESTIC CAMPAIGN ISSUE?
----------------------------------------

6. (C) The September 4 air strike against two fuel tankers
near Kunduz, Afghanistan hit the press right before the
CDU/CSU rally. In light of the German media's frenzy, PolOff
asked the CDU's Head of International Relations Klemens
Moemkes whether Germany's ISAF commitment might emerge as a
potential domestic campaign issue. Moemkes noted that the
SPD could make Afghanistan an issue but this would be very
odd given Foreign Minister Steinmeier's support for Germany's
military role in ISAF. However, the prospect of Afghanistan
becoming a major theme clearly had the CDU's xxxxx
spooked. He told PolOff that it would be very difficult for
the Chancellor not to address Germany's role in Afghanistan
in the coming weeks. Given the German public's overwhelming
support for a withdrawal of German troops from Afghanistan,
this was not an issue the Chancellor wanted to address in the
run-up to the parliamentary elections.

COMMENT
-------

7. (C) While it is all but certain that Chancellor Merkel
will return to office as Chancellor after the next
parliamentary elections on September 27, it is too close to
call whether she will achieve a coalition with the FDP.
Bavarian MP Seehofer's attacks on the FDP in Bavaria could
weaken that party there and further undermine the chances of
a coalition. The FDP wants the same but political bickering
over future ministerial positions and CSU attacks on the FDP
in Bavaria and on FDP Chairman Guido Westerwelle suggest that
a possible CDU/CSU-FDP coalition will not be a marriage made
in heaven. Some FDP contacts admit that they harbor doubts
about the Chancellor's promise to form a coalition with the
FDP. They insinuate that in reality she may prefer another
Grand Coalition with the SPD, although Chancellor Merkel has
used every public opportunity to advertise for a CDU/CSU-FDP
coalition. Backing down on this pledge would call into
question her reputation.

8. (C) Paradoxically, however, it is the CDU/CSU's relative
weakness in the polls (35-36 percent) that threatens a
possible CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. The FDP is clearly riding on
a high with double-digit successes in the state elections of
Saarland, Saxony, and Thuringia, but this may not be enough.
The CDU refuses to engage in any self-introspection after its
defeats in Saarland and Thuringia and the party can really
only take comfort from the SPD's perennial weakness. The
fear in the CDU is acute that the Chancellor's high
popularity ratings may not be enough to ensure a comfortable
win for the CDU/CSU at the parliamentary elections.

9. (C) Merkel, once again, vehemently denies any intention
to form a Grand Coalition with the SPD but the electoral math
on September 27 may force her -- despite intense CDU/CSU
reservations, not to mention those of the German public -- to
look at the SPD as a partner. As for the SPD, Steinmeier is

BERLIN 00001106 003 OF 003 

looking desperate. The SPD has failed to reach over 25
percent in the last six elections and Steinmeier's unlikely
path to the chancellorship is only possible if he reneges on
a campaign promise not to form a coalition with The Left
Party. This will not happen in 2009 but the CDU/CSU will not
tire of raising the fear of a red-red coalition in 2009 or in
2013. The Chancellor appears to be in a win-win situation
but three weeks on the campaign trail can be an eternity.
End comment.
Murphy

TOP-SECRET: German Response U.S. National Intelligence

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INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0314
S e c r e t <> 002157

Sipdis

Noforn

Sipdis, state for p,t, nea/ir, isn, eur/ags

E.o. 12958: decl: 12/03/2017
Tags: knnp, mnuc, parm, gm, ir
Subject: german response u.s. National intelligence
estimate on iran's nuclear program

Ref: secstate 162558

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Jeff Rathke for reasons 1.4
(b)/(d)

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Post delivered demarches to senior
Chancellery and MFA officials on December 3. Both National
Security Advisor Christoph Heusgen and MFA State Secretary
Reinhard Silberberg considered the assessment to be
potentially "good news." Heusgen added that the Chancellery
will seek additional assessments from its intelligence
agency, and noted that the international community still had
reason for concern about Iranian intentions, its
unwillingness to disclose details of its nuclear programs and
its continued enrichment. Heusgen also noted some concern
about potential domestic political backlash, given the
Chancellor's recent work to persuade German companies to
withdraw from their Iran business dealings. Silberberg
detailed German agreement to EU <> against Bank Melli,
to be implemented by late January, calling the "new" policy a
signal of German willingness to go beyond
proliferation-related issues in application of <>,
coupled with continued reticence at more wide-reaching
measures for fear of harming the Iranian people. END SUMMARY.

-----------------------------
chancellery response
-----------------------------

2. (S/NF) Ambassador delivered reftel points and nonpapers
to National Security Advisor-equivalent Christoph Heusgen on
December 3. Also present was Chancellery Senior
Director-equivalent for Security Policy and Disarmament Geza
von Geyr. Heusgen noted that he had just completed a telcon
on the same subject with APNSA Hadley. (NOTE: Heusgen
appeared still to be digesting his conversation with Hadley.
He was initially negative, but his thinking became more
positive and operationally focused during the conversation.
END NOTE) Heusgen noted that German intelligence he had seen
indicated a continued weaponization program; he has asked the
BND chief for a new assessment. The BND will also conduct
its weekly briefing on December 4 and will present their
latest assessment. He added that Germany will not publicly
react to the NIE.

3. (S/NF) Heusgen expressed concern about the timing of the
information and potential political fallout, particularly in
light of Chancellor Merkel's efforts to use moral suasion to
convince German companies to end investment in Iran. In this
regard, he noted that Chancellery Chief of Staff Thomas de
Maziere is scheduled to meet on Wednesday with German
Federation of Industry (BDI) chief Juergen Thumann and
leaders of German energy giant E.ON regarding their interest
in LNG in Iran. He added that DNI McConnell's scheduled
visit to <> on December 4 is timely.

4. (S/NF) Heusgen noted that we still need to be alarmed
about the Iranian intent and unwillingness to disclose their
program, particularly given their continued enrichment and
ballistic missile programs, evidenced by Iran's unveiling of
the Ashura ballistic missile last week. He noted that the
Chancellery will have to see to it that the public reaction
to the NIE is a moderate one and to ensure that the focus is
not only on the information on the Iranian nuclear weapons
program, but also emphasizes that the IAEA sees many open
points and that Iran has not abided by IAEA requests on
enrichment and coming clean on its activities thus far.

5. (S/NF) In terms of further UNSCR <>, von Geyr
added that in light of this information it will be harder to
get Russia and China on board; Heusgen indicated that
Kislyak's absence from the P5 1 Political Directors meeting
on December 1 meant that Russia's intentions regarding a new
UNSCR remain unclear. He once again repeated that he would be
seeking assessments from other foreign intelligence agencies
(naming the French) in addition to the NIE. It is necessary
to remain vigilant on Iran because of Iran's continued
failure to meet IAEA requirements, he said, as well as
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad's public threats
against Israel. In terms of <>, Heusgen added that
with this acknowledgment from the U.S., perhaps Iran would be
willing to suspend briefly. If this information is verified,
why don't the Iranians suspend enrichment as they do not need
it, he posited, having neither a weapons program nor power
plants that could use enriched uranium.

6. (S/NF) Heusgen noted that the Chancellery would work

with the MFA to develop a joint press line. Heusgen noted
that President Bush and Chancellor Merkel are scheduled to
discuss the topic tomorrow following Merkel's return from the
CDU Party Convention being held in Hannover. Heusgen
continued by repeating the German view on potential public
statements: The Chancellery does not comment publicly on
intelligence matters. If the news is confirmed it is good
news about this aspect of the Iranian program, but it is also
another reason to urge Iran to stop enrichment. Von Geyr
added that much must still be clarified by the Iranians; the
IAEA report shows many open points.

----------------------------
foreign ministry response
----------------------------

7. (S/NF) DCM conveyed reftel points to MFA State Secretary
Silberberg, and left them as non-papers. Silberberg said it
was "good news" the US intelligence community had concluded
that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program due to
international scrutiny and <> as of fall 2003 and had
not resumed the program as of mid-2007.

8. (S/NF) With regard to further steps against Tehran's
defiance of the Security Council, Silberberg went on, the
German government has agreed to move ahead with designation
of Bank Melli, though not immediately. Germany, France, and
the UK, he said, have agreed to work now toward a quick
resolution in the Security Council, and detect some positive
signs from the Russian side. If the UNSCR effort succeeds,
the <> it contains will nonetheless be weak, and the
EU-3 will seek to supplement them with EU measures by the end
of December, including the designation of Bank Melli. Asked
about the timeline for EU autonomous <>, including
designation of Bank Melli, should the Security Council fail
to pass a third <> resolution, Silberberg said this
could come at the end of January. He described his own role,
and that of the MFA, as "active" in securing agreement to
this approach from the ministries of finance and economy and
the Chancellery. Key elements of this "new" German policy
were (1) willingness to go beyond proliferation-related
issues in application of <> and (2) judgment that it
is "not yet" time for total economic and financial isolation
of Iran, as this would harm the Iranian people
disproportionately. Silberberg noted that debate continued
in the EU on possible designation of Bank Saderat, but
Germany believed that to do so now, in conjunction with
designating Bank Melli, would move too far in the direction
of a total embargo.
Timken jr

SECRET: GERMAN RESPONSE CONCERNING EXPORT OF WELDING

VZCZCXYZ0012
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #1784 2631530
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 201530Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9336
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 0198
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 0078
S E C R E T BERLIN 001784 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN/MTR AND EUR 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2017
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC MTCRE KSCA GM IR EI
SUBJECT: (S) GERMAN RESPONSE CONCERNING EXPORT OF WELDING
MACHINE TO IRANIAN MISSILE PROCUREMENT AGENT 

REF: A. BERLIN 1468
     B. STATE 99879 

Classified By: Global Affairs Counselor Donald R. Shemanski
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

1. (S) German MFA Export Control Division Desk Officer Wiebke
Wacker delivered a German-language nonpaper to Global Affairs
officer September 19.  The nonpaper responds to ref B
demarche informing German authorities that the German firm
Trumpf GmbH & Co., working with Ireland's Mac Aviation Group,
offered a model TLC-1005 five-axis laser cutting and welding
machine to Iran's Ariasa AG.  Wacker said officials from the
German Federal Office of Economics and Export Controls (BAFA)
had sensitized Trumpf representatives to the case.  She
stated the firm subsequently stopped processing the order. 

2. (S) Begin text of informal Embassy translation of German
nonpaper: 

With reference to your nonpaper of July 19, 2007 concerning
the export of a five-axis laser cutting and welding machine
by the German firm Trumpf from Germany via Ireland and
Malaysia to Iran, we take this opportunity to bring the
following information to the attention of the U.S.
authorities: 

-- We thank you for the information in connection with the
proposed delivery of a welding machine by the German firm
Trumpf via Ireland and Malaysia to the Iranian firm Ariasa AG. 

-- The Trumpf firm was sensitized by BAFA officials.  The
firm confirmed the existence of a related inquiry, which came
from the firm IIT Trading Group, probably acting on behalf of
Mac Aviation Group.  The inquiry was presented to TGB, an
Irish subsidiary of Trumpf.  According to information
provided to Trumpf, the machine was intended for use by Mac
Aviation in Malaysia. 

-- German authorities' communication and contact records
indicate that the Trumpf firm has not to date communicated
with Iranian entities. 

-- Trumpf has stopped processing the order and assured BAFA
it will apply for an export license in the event the firm
pursues the matter further. 

We look forward to continuing our excellent cooperation in
the field of export controls. 

End text of informal Embassy translation of German nonpaper.
TIMKEN JR

TOP-SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY OF BILL CLINTON: DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL BOXES

256_DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL BOXES 39-50

JURICON ÜBER DIE VERBRECHERLAUFBAHNEN UND STASI-VERGANGENHEIT DER “GoMoPa”

anlage_8_gomopa_abzocker.com_info

anlage_9_gomopa_gesellschaftsmuell.com

anlage_10_juricon_internet_bericht_ber_gomopa

anlage_11_1983_buchner_gesichtsfoto

WIE AUCH SIE (RUF-)MORD-OPFER DER STASI-“GoMoPa” WERDEN KÖNNEN

hacker VON RUFMÖRDERN u. Serienbetrügern erfundene “GoMoPa SJB”: “Wer stoppt Google Rufmord für Resch, Bennewirtz und Ehlers ?”

Bernd Pulch, Magister Artium, der Publizistik, Germanistik und Komparatistik

Liebe Leser,

nachfolgend ein Gast-Kommentar von meinem Journalisten-Kollegen und ebenfalls “GoMoPa”-STASI-Stalking-Opfer Martin Sachs:

Liebe Leserin, lieber Leser!

Stellen Sie sich bitte kurz vor, dass Sie mit einer tollen Geschäftsidee oder einer Geschäftserweiterung zu mehr Geld kommen möchten. Beispielsweise auch Ihr Unternehmen vergrössern oder gar Ihre Waren exportieren wollen.

Sie werben damit natürlich über die Medien….

Da meldet sich bei Ihnen möglicherweise ein Beauftragter des Finanz-Nachrichtendienstes GoMoPa mit der Mitteilung, dass im GoMoPa-Forum sehr negative Forenbeiträge über Ihre Person oder Ihr Vorhaben stünden. Äusserst Schlimmes wir über Sie berichtet. Zum Beispiel, dass Sie bisher schon Ihr Geld mit betrügerischen Machenschaften verdient hätten oder Ihr Sohn als erfolgreicher Sportler nach neuesten Ermittlungen in einem Kokain-Dealer-Ring verwickelt sei.

Ein anonymer User ( Schreiberling) habe dies geschrieben, wird vom GoMoPa-Beauftragten berichtet. Man könne jetzt noch nicht feststellen, ob dies so wahr sei. Man könne aber auch nicht den Beitrag einfach rausnehmen, denn es könne ja auch was Wahres daran sein!

Falls Sie selbst an der Wahrheitsfindung interessiert seien, könnten Sie auch beim ´seriösen Nachrichtendienst` GoMoPa als Gesellschafter oder als Premium-Mitglied einsteigen, dann könne man ja…..usf. …ganz einfach den Beitrag herausnehmen!

So ähnlich könnte es geschehen und glauben Sie mir: ´Dies ist kein böser Traum,-keine Fata Morgana`, sondern schon Zigtausendmal in der fast 10-Jährigen GoMoPa- Geschichte so abgelaufen.

Wir, von der CSA-Agency, wurden selbst aus Wettbewerbsgründen seit 2002 von GoMoPa auf primitivste Weise im Forum diffamiert oder die von uns als seriöse Dienstleister empfohlenen Unternehmungen wurden per Rufmord mit schmutzigsten, unwahren Verleumdungs-Attacken von anonymen Bloggern ( bezahlte Helfershelfer vom GoMoPa) nahezu ruiniert. Nicht nur finanziell , sondern auch gesundheitlich nieder gemacht! Nicht umsonst heisst es RUFMORD.

Der Begriff ´Stalking` ist da noch eine vornehme Bezeichnung.

Auf gut deutsch passt Rufmord besser.

Geschäftlicher und gesundheitlicher RUFMORD gehört auch entsprechend bestraft.

Die Justiz tut sich sehr schwer damit. Vor allem, wenn die Rufmörder mit Ihren Machenschaften mit Gesellschaften wie z.B. ´GoMoPa` als Briefkastenfirma aus dem Ausland agieren. UND zum anderen, weil sich die Stalking-Terror-Experten von GoMoPa sich mit ihren Methoden auch der Justiz und der Medien bedienen.

Hier beschreibt “GoMoPa” – was sie tun und wie sie es tun.

GoMoPa: Wer stoppt Google-Rufmorde?


Freie Bahn für Rufmord, Stalking und Existenzvernichtung im Internet. Suchmaschinen lassen sich von Kriminellen als Mittäter missbrauchen. Beispiel Google.

Jede Nachricht kann und darf gefaked sein, denn, so erklärt Oliver Klug von der Google-Presseagentur in Hamburg: “Für den Inhalt der Internetseiten ist Google nicht verantwortlich. Jeder Eingriff, außer bei schwerwiegenden Dingen wie Holocaust-Leugnungen, wäre eine unzulässige Zensur.” Das bedeutet im Klartext: Jeder kann mit Hilfe von Google jede nur erdenkliche Lüge über einen anderen Menschen oder über eine Firma verbreiten.

Klug verteidigt das Google-System: “Sie können doch bei der Polizei Anzeige erstatten und Verleumder verklagen. Mit einem Gerichtsurteil löschen wir selbstverständlich die Seiten.” GoMoPa meint: Das klingt gut, ist aber realitätsfern. Die meisten Verleumder arbeiten anonym und melden ihre Hetzseiten unter falschen Angaben an.

Das musste und muss GoMoPa am eigenen Leib erfahren. Der Finanznachrichtendienst wird seit anderthalb Jahren auf der Seite nepper-schlepper-bauernfaenger.com oder fuer-recht-und-ordnung.com mit Lügen von Hausdurchsuchungen, Festnahmen von Verantwortlichen oder angeblicher Strafanzeigen großer Banken überzogen. Natürlich wehrte sich GoMoPa mit juristischen Schritten. Doch der Verantwortliche der Nepper-Schlepper-Seite, die Rechtsanwaltskanzlei Atle Border mit Sitz in Bangkok (Thailand), ist frei erfunden. Der Server steht in Panama. Klug: “Ohne juristische Schritte können wir da nichts machen, das wäre Zensur.”

GoMoPa konfrontierte die Google-Presseagentur daraufhin mit einer konstruierten Verleumdung gegen Google. Inhalt: “Die Verantwortliche (Admin C) der Google Germany GmbH, Frau Lena Tangerxxxx aus Hamburg, führt nicht nur ein dubioses Doppelleben als Domina in der Herbertstraße auf der Reeperbahn. Lena Tangerxxxx steht kurz vor der Verhaftung. Gegen sie wird wegen Schleusung von russischen Minderjährigen nach Deutschland und Vermittlung an einen belgischen Kinderpornoring ermittelt.”

Die Seite könnte “www.google-schmutz.com” heißen. Anmelder wäre ein erfundener Dr. Alfred Motte aus Bangkok, der Server würde in Panama sitzen. Klug: Dagegen würde Google sofort mit rechtlichen Schritten vorgehen.” GoMoPa: Wie denn, wenn Sie den Absender gar nicht finden können? Darauf Klug: “Wir wüden prüfen, inwieweit anonyme Verleumdungen im Internet gegen unsere Nutzungsbestimmungen verstoßen.” Und aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach sofort löschen?!!

Wird da mit zweierlei Maß gemessen? Google empfiehlt uns jedenfalls lapidar in einer Mitteilung zu unserem Löschantrag, eventuelle Streitigkeiten direkt mit dem Eigentümer der betreffenden Website beizulegen und teilt weiterhin mit, zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt keine Maßnahmen zur Entfernung der verleumdenden Inhalte ergreifen zu wollen. Fortsetzung folgt.

Quelle: GoMoPa (www.gomopa.net / Siegfried Siewert)

DIE ALTEN STASI-TRICK VON “GoMoPa” – FÄLSCHEN, BETRÜGEN, VERTUSCHEN UND RUFMORDEN

Beweis: Wie “GoMoPa” Meridian Capital erpresst hat und Maurischat von Interpol und BKA festgenommen wurde – Verwirrspiele nach STASI-Muster

Nachfolgend bringen wir eine Original-Pressemeldung von „GoMoPa“, dem „NACHRICHTENDIENST“ mit dem Meridian Capital, London, erpresst werden sollte. Der Artikel strotzt nur von Fehlern. Damit ist deutlich, dass „GoMoPa“ tatsäch Meridian Capital erpresst hat und die Aktionen von Meridian Capital sich gegen „GoMoPa“ gerichtet haben.
Die gefälschte Pressemitteilung von Meridian Capital in Bezug auf unser Haus soll von dem „NACHRICHTENDIENST“ „GoMoPa“ ablenken.

„GoMopa“ schreibt:

08.09.2008
Weltweite Finanzierungen mit Widersprüchen

Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. gibt an, weltweite Finanzierungen anbieten zu können und präsentiert sich hierbei auf aufwendig kreierten Webseiten. GOMOPA hat die dort gemachten Angaben analysiert und Widersprüche entdeckt.

Der Firmensitz

Der Firmensitz befindet sich laut eigener Aussage in Dubai, Vereinigte Arabische Emirate. In einem GOMOPA vorliegenden Schreiben der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. heißt es jedoch, der Firmensitz sei in London. Auf der Homepage des Unternehmens taucht die Geschäftsadresse in der Londoner Old Broad Street nur als „Kundenabteilung für deutschsprachige Kunden“ auf. Eine weitere Adresse in der englischen Hauptstadt, diesmal in der Windsor Avenue, sei die „Abteilung der Zusammenarbeit mit Investoren“.

Die Meridian Capital Enterprises ist tatsächlich als „Limited“ (Ltd.) mit Sitz in England und Wales eingetragen. Aber laut Firmenhomepage hat das Unternehmen seinen „rechtlichen Geschäftssitz“ in Dubai. Eine Abfrage beim Gewerbeamt Dubais (DED) zu dieser Firmierung bleibt ergebnislos.

Bemerkenswert ist auch der vermeintliche Sitz in Israel. Auf der Webseite von Meridian Capital Enterprises heißt es: „Die Firma Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist im Register des israelischen Justizministeriums unter der Nummer 514108471, gemäß dem Gesellschaftsrecht von 1999, angemeldet.“ Hierzu Martin Kraeter, Gomopa-Partner und Prinzipal der KLP Group Emirates in Dubai: „Es würde keinem einzigen Emirati – geschweige denn einem Scheich auch nur im Traum einfallen, direkte Geschäfte mit Personen oder Firmen aus Israel zu tätigen. Und schon gar nicht würde er zustimmen, dass sein Konterfei auch noch mit vollem Namen auf der Webseite eines Israelischen Unternehmens prangt.“

Auf der Internetseite sind diverse Fotos mit Scheichs an Konferenztischen zu sehen. Doch diese großen Tagungen und großen Kongresse der Meridian Capital Enterprises werden in den Pressearchiven der lokalen Presse Dubais mit keinem Wort erwähnt.
Martin Kraeter: „ Ein ‚britisch-arabisch-israelisches bankfremdes Finanzinstitut sein zu wollen, wie die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. es darstellt, ist mehr als zweifelhaft. So etwas gibt es schlicht und ergreifend nicht! Der Nahostkonflikt schwelt schon seit mehr als 50 Jahren. Hier in den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten (VAE) werden Israelis erst gar nicht ins Land gelassen. Israelische Produkte sind gebannt. Es gibt nicht einmal direkte Telefonverbindungen. Die VAE haben fast 70% der Wiederaufbaukosten des Libanon geschultert, nachdem Israel dort einmarschiert ist.“

Zwei angebliche Großinvestitionen der Meridian Capital Enterprises in Dubai sind Investmentruinen bzw. erst gar nicht realisierte Projekte. Das Unternehmen wirbt mit ihrer finanziellen Beteiligung an dem Dubai Hydropolis Hotel und dem Dubai Snowdome.

Der Aktivitätsstatus der Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. ist laut englischen Handelsregister (UK Companies House) „dormant“ gemeldet. Auf der Grundlage des englischen Gesellschaftsrechts können sich eingetragene Unternehmen selbst „dormant“ (schlafend) melden, wenn sie keine oder nur unwesentliche buchhalterisch zu erfassende Transaktionen vorgenommen haben. Dies ist angesichts der angeblichen globalen Investitionstätigkeit der Meridian Capital Ltd. sehr erstaunlich.

Der Webauftritt

Die Internetseite der MCE ist sehr aufwendig gestaltet, die Investitionen angeblich in Millionen- und Milliardenhöhe. Bei näherer Betrachtung der Präsentationselemente fällt jedoch auf, dass es sich bei zahlreichen veröffentlichen Fotos, die Veranstaltungen der Meridian Capital Enterprises dokumentieren sollen, meist um Fotos von Online-Zeitungen oder frei zugänglichen Medienfotos einzelner Institutionen handelt wie z.B. der Börse Dubai.

Auf der Internetpräsenz befinden sich Videofilmchen, die eine frappierende Ähnlichkeit mit dem Werbematerial von NAKHEEL aufweisen, dem größten Bauträger der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate. Doch den schillernden Videos über die berühmten drei Dubai Palmen „Jumeirah, Jebel Ali und Deira“ oder das Archipel „The World“ wurden offensichtlich selbstproduzierte Trailersequenzen der Meridian Capital Enterprises vorangestellt. Doch könnte es sich bei den Werbevideos um Fremdmaterial handeln.

Auch die auf der Webseite wahllos platzierten Fotos von bekannten Sehenswürdigkeiten Dubais fungieren als Augenfang für den interessierten Surfer mit eigenem Finanzierungswunsch. Bei einem Volumen von 10 Millionen Euro oder höher präsentiert sich die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. als der passende Investitionspartner. Das Unternehmen verfügt weltweit über zahlreiche Standorte: Berlin, London, Barcelona, Warschau, Moskau, Dubai, Riad, Tel Aviv, Hong Kong und New York. Aber nahezu alle Standorte sind lediglich Virtual Offices eines global arbeitenden Büroservice-Anbieters. „Virtual Office“ heißt im Deutschen schlicht „Briefkastenfirma“. Unter solchen Büroadressen sollen laut Meridian Capital Enterprises ganze Kommissionen ansässig sein, alles zum Wohle des Kunden.“

Zitatende

Dies ist das altbekannte Muster des „NACHRCHTENDIENSTES“ „GoMoPa“ und seiner Berliner und Hamburger Komplizen Falschmeldungen zu verbreiten, um Firmen und Personen erpressen oder ausschalten zu können.


Aktenzeichen ST/0148943/2011: Immer wieder verfremden die vorbestraften Serienbetrüger Pressemeldungen von uns und der SJB-GoMoPa-Opfer (http://www.sjb-fonds-opfer.com) und verfälschen sie, um Verwirrung zu stiften und von ihren eigenen Taten abzulenken. Die persönlichen Angriffe gegen mich und andere Personen aus meinem Umfeld, sollen uns dazu bewegen, die kritischen Berichte über die Cyber-Stasi des 21. Jahrhunderts und deren Hintermänner einzustellen, sowie sie zuvor viele andere Journalisten eingeschüchtert haben, so dass deren Beiträge dann gelöscht wurden. Im Interesse aller Marktteilnehmer werden wir das ganz gewiss NICHT tun. Dies ist uns vielmehr ein Ansporn und eine Verpflichtung, die Öffentlichkeit über das Treiben der Cybermörder und wohl auch realen Mörder aufzuklären, damit diesen Stasi-Verbrechern, das Handwerk gelegt wird und sie nicht noch mehr rechtschaffene Menschen mit ihrem hahnebüchernen Unsinn verleumden, erpressen, betrügen und sie dann sogar ermorden können. Deshalb hier noch einmal zur Klarstellung: Der vorbestrafte Erpresser, Betrüger und wohl auch mutmassliche Mörder Heinz Gerlachs Klaus-Dieter Maurischat ist auf der Flucht.

Bereits einmal, im Dezember 2008, wurde er in Berlin auf Betreiben von Meridian Capital festgenommen. Zuvor sind er und sein mutmasslicher Komplize laut Meridian Capital bereits 23 verurteilt worden. Dokumente hierzu unter: http://sjb-fonds-opfer.com/?page_id=11764 Näheres zu Maurischat: Über eine selbstgebaute Blogseite verbreiten die GoMoPa-Gangster eine gefälschte Stellung von Meridian Capital, um Verwirrung zu stiften. Diese Blogseite existiert erst seit Deztember 2010. Beweis: http://www.hypestat.com/pressreleaser.org Die Meridian Capital-Seite, das Original, http://othergomopa.blogspot.com/ ist dagegen bereits seit 2009 online Beweis: Aussage Meridian Capital und KLAUS DIETER MAURISCHAT IN DETENTION

Source: http://klaus-dieter-maurischat.blogspot.com/2009/01/klaus-dieter-maurischat-in-haft.html Hinzu kommt Verurteilung wegen Betruges am eigenen Anleger sowie die Kursmanipulation in Sachen Wirecard etc pp.- Hier exemplarisch die Verurteilung wegen Betruges am eigenen Anleger: Klaus Maurischat und Mark Vornkahl, Betreiber vonwww.gomopa.net: Am 24. April 2006 war die Verhandlung am Amtsgericht Krefeld in der Betrugssache: Mark Vornkahl / Klaus Maurischat ./. Dehnfeld. Aktenzeichen: 28 Ls 85/05 Klaus MaurischatLange Straße 3827313 Dörverden.Das in diesem Verfahren ausschließlich diese Betrugsache verhandelt wurde, ist das Urteil gegen Klaus Maurischat recht mäßig ausgefallen.

SATURDAY, JULY 11, 2009

KLAUS DIETER MAURISCHAT IN DETENTION

Source: http://klaus-dieter-maurischat.blogspot.com/2009/01/klaus-dieter-maurischat-in-haft.html
KLAUS DIETER MAURISCHAT IN HAFT – DownloadGerman VersionHere is a Google Translation (German -> English)

Sunday 18 Januar 2009 January 2009

KLAUS DIETER MAURISCHAT IN DETENTIONMeridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. unveils new criminal phenomena in network I. SachverhaltIn recently appeared on the net more often at the same time a new a very worrying phenomenon of criminal nature. Professional criminals groups in the network are taking part, to extortion, fraud, Erschwindeln relating to certain specifically selected companies and businesses are capable of. These criminals developed new methods and means, simply and in a short time to bereichern.Strategien and manifestations, which underlie this process are fairly simple. A criminal is looking to “carefully” on the Internet specific companies and corporations (victims of crime) and informed them in the next step, that of the business activities of such companies and corporations in the near future – first on the Internet then in other available mass media – numerous and very unfavorable information appears. At the same time, the criminals beat their future victims an effective means of reducing unnecessary difficulties and problems to escape the loss of good name and image of the company and corporate sector. These offenders are aware of that reputation, name and appearance of each company is a value in itself. It was therefore a value of what each company is prepared to pay any price. But the reason for difficulties and problems arising from the loss of good name and reputation result. The criminals and their victims are already aware that this loss is devastating consequences might have been the closing down of a particular business can enforce. It takes both to No as well as at large companies regard. The company is concerned that in virtually every industry in each country and cross-border activities sind.Das criminal procedure in the form of a blackmail on money, a fraud is becoming rapidly and globally, ie led cross-border and internationally. Among the victims of extortion, fraud is now looking both at home (domestic) and international corporations, the major emphasis on conservation, keeping and maintaining their reputation in the business according to their credibility lay. The criminals in the network have understood that maintaining an unassailable reputation and name of a company the unique ability to provide fast and easy enrichment forms. The above-mentioned criminal procedure is difficult to track because it is international in nature, and by overlapping or even nonexistent (fictional) professional and judicial persons in various countries and operated company wird.Diese offenders in the network publish it and disseminate false information about your victims on remote servers, which are not uncommon in many exotic countries. There are those countries in which serious gaps in the legal system, investigative and prosecution procedures are visible. As an example, at this point mention India werden. Mit criminals working in the network grid portals known leader of blogs with your seat-consciously or unconsciously, even in highly developed countries. For example, at this point, countries such as Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the United States, Britain, Spain or Portugal are mentioned. The below listed criminals were able to act unpunished today. As a symptom of such action appears here the activity and “effectiveness” of the company GOMOPA, which is on countries such as Germany, Switzerland, Austria, the United States, Britain, Spain and India. A good example of such an action is Mr. Klaus Mauri Chat – the leader and “brain” of the company GOMOPA with many already in force and criminal judgments “on his account”, which in this way for years and funded its maintenance in the industry almost unlimited activity. This status will change dramatically, however, including far and wide thanks to discontinued operations of the firm Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. who would oppose such offenses addressed in the network. Other companies and corporations, in which the crime network and outside of this medium have fallen victim to contribute to combating such crimes bei.Die situation is changing, thanks to effective steps and the successful cooperation of the firm Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. with the international police Interpol, with the federal agency (FBI) in the U.S., the Federal Criminal Police in Germany, with Scotland Yard in Britain, as well as with the Russian secret service FSB.Die Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. – Together with other companies and cooperations, the victim of criminal activities of the network of crime have fallen – has undeniably already started to yield results. The fact that in recent weeks (November 2008) on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany of the above-mentioned leaders and “brain” of the company GOMOPA, Mr Klaus Maurishat was arrested should not be ignored. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. information available results clearly show that the next arrests of persons participating in this process in such countries as: Austria, Switzerland, Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Spain, Mexico, Portugal, Brazil, the USA, Canada, UK, Ireland , Australia, New Zealand and made in a.. The ultimate goal of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. and the other victims of crime in the network is to provide all participants in this criminal procedure before the competent court to lead. All professional and judicial persons, regardless of the seat and out of the business, which the above-described criminal action (fraud, extortion) to have fallen victim can of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. led company to join the goal set at all at this point the procedure described those associated in the public and the economic life out. II blacklist blackmail and with international fraudsters and their methods (opus operandi) in the following countries: 1 The Federal Republic Deutschland2. Dubai 3rd Russia 1st The Federal Republic of Germany GmbH GOMOPA, Goldman Morgenstern & Partners LLC., Goldman Morgenstern & Partners Consulting LLC, Wottle collection. In these firms are quite active following persons: – Klaus Mauri Chat ( “Father” and “brain” of the criminal organization responsible for countless final judgments have been achieved (arrested in Germany in November 2008) – Josef Rudolf Heckel ( “right hand “when Mr Klaus Mauri chat, denounced former banker who is excessive in many Bankschmuggeleien was involved.(Today, persona non grata in the German banking industry); – Peter Reski (responsible for Finance, known for fraud, tax fraud and embezzlement, which is already behind the judgments are final) – Mark Vornkahl (responsible for organizational and administrative tasks in GOMOPA, a former police officer dismissed because of numerous expectations in the service, already has a few final judgments “on his account”); – Claus i Ulrike Wottle (married couple, for the so-called “unconventional” enforcement of the debt for the benefit GOMOPA. This execution was imposing, with extortion violence based on both real and fictitious debts references? How does the system of GOMOPADie above-mentioned persons in Brief, as well as with the service GOMOPA cooperating, so-called “experts GOMOPA” Bloggers and all other professional and legal persons choose from all possible sources of information about large, rich companies and corporations coming in various domestic and international sectors of the economy. GOMOPA The service is particularly keen that those aussucht, the “in itself visible.” Those companies corporations and, therefore, against the relatively easy and without much effort himself, inconsistencies, etc. can be done in terms of the even crimes such as cheating and Erschwindeln Others can easily perform. It is well known that every company especially good at their presence and her name is inviolable. Each company will do everything according to their good presence also retain its credibility to be. But if the victim of GOMOPA and his “partner” and a large range of businesses, so it is possible to call such companies a quick, easy, and even considerably enriched. It appears at this point the question: Which clever criminals in the network and outside the network to me is success, it does not wish to benefit? The criminals in the network know that without business credibility there is no confidence that any business is essential. GOMOPA and all are cooperating with the security of all possible methods and measures mastered how to credibility and confidence of a company, a company, corporation (crime victims) in question. This moves just the attention of the user, so that the homepage of the GOMOPA http://www.gomopa.net in search engines like Google, Yahoo is easy to find. This, in turn, means nothing other than additional profits for the service GOMOPA because of its activity around a media discourse created wird.Ein at first glance commonplace and easy victims of extortion, for example, can a public governmental body, which, based on the credibility of public works, such as a bank or a foreign bank financial institution. So it was with the foreign banks, international financial institution Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. the case. A simple and easy victims of illicit profits and material may include insurance companies, where – as it is from our search results, much to the criminal activities of the GOMOPA especially in the area of the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland and Austria was due. Among the known and identifiable victims is certainly German, Austrian and Swiss banks, insurance companies such as Allianz of Germany, German and Austrian companies such as HDI and DKV visible. This is what the service GOMOPA trust and what with the cooperating services, blogs nowadays practice is the so-called cyber-stalking, which rapidly spread in the network. The method is criminal at this point and others in the threat that the business of an enterprise (Ofer blackmail, threats and forcible ) fictitious, even non-existent information (lies, rumors, stories, statements, insults) on the net first then in other mass media. This is only used to a potential victim to move a considerable sum of money for the so-called “peace “the blackmailer available. The” quiet “here means the promise of access lock with respect to the fictitious publication of any information on the net and in all other mass media, the victims of extortion in extremely negative light showing. Such threats are, as already above the goal of companies – potential victims of cyber-stalking to do likewise, that they themselves “buy.” In short, GOMOPA and his peers, and cooperating with those services, and blogs, create a “virtual reality”, or otherwise said publishing fictitious information on potential victims of a crime. firms and corporations, against which threats and extortion by GOMOPA are not due, ie those who for so-called “peace” does not want to pay, to be victims of serious lies, insults, and Insinuationen other criminal misappropriations, the appearance and presence of a firm with certainty. One is a target of GOMOPA, namely as fast and as easy as it goes, money abzukassieren, and if a company refuses, and the “peace” do not buy wishes, it is unexpectedly and quickly become an object of extortion and defamation on the net. At this point the following question arises: How is it possible that the leader of the firm GOMOPA, Mr Klaus Mauri chat, only in the Federal Republic of Germany on his account “23 court rulings, has for many years as an honest citizen to create, while other persons, firms, corporations criminal acts, offenses memorize, in addition to substantial sums of money could earn? This complex process can only be explained as follows: GOMOPA creates his appearance, his presence in the eyes of public opinion as an honest subject, against which pathological phenomena in the public and economic life einschreitet. GOMOPA and his partner (services, blogs) present themselves as followers of any Verbrechensart that promise so the fight against criminals in each virtual network ( especially against any cheaters, blackmailers). GOMOPA used in this respect a kind of “Merketingsvorhang” as a method of seduction, a result which is his true “face” and his true intentions than that of a fraudster and blackmail on money can hide. The true intentions of the GOMOPA, of working together GOMOPA Services and blogs were until today no doubt with success before the public opinion will remain hidden, especially thanks to the so-called “smoke curtain”, which reflects the fact that man himself as a “winner” of any abuse and any pathological appearance of the public and economic life in Aland German, Austria, Switzerland, the United States, Britain, Russia, Spain created. Next appears the GOMOPA forward by the person on which companies and corporations – the future victims of the crime that is – against the possibility of the release of extremely poor and the company concerned in a negative light visual information on the Internet and other mass media warns. The person from whom the speech is also informed that they are successful against such a procedure for a “fee” can be used. The GOMOPA is at this point up to the extortion of money for so-called “peace” to the company and corporation (the victim of a crime) around. Most of the companies concerned to such threats did not respond, because it’s everyday life and their agenda. It finally barely missing on the web of blackmail and outside of the medium. Normally so seldom so-called “understanding”, while on the one hand, the crime victim, on the other hand, the GOMOPA occurs. It is understandable that the price for such an “understanding” means the provision of the requested funds would GOMOPA. The financial blackmail in this stage is rarely enforced. The situation changes little, however, if the firms and corporations (crime victims) find that the threat was fulfilled. In Brief will appear on the homepage http://www.gomopa.net numerous newspaper articles, reports and bogus pseudo market analysis, both by GOMOPA as well as so-called “independent experts” and the company will be represented, with formal or fictitious GOMOPA together. Information published here, correspond to the contents of a threat and make the operations of firms and corporations in an extremely negative light dar. There is no doubt that such actions and methods only to harm the good name and good presence of these firms and corporations prerogatives. The activity of GOMOPA is certainly not exhausted. GOMOPA disseminated (published accommodates) the above information in the network by the credible, and popular opinion-operated services. Moreover, GOMOPA threatens the companies and corporations (its victims), that “from the finger-drawn” information not only on the network, but also on television and on radio and in the press landscape erscheinen.Wie the experience and expertise of the former Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd. show that the services are usually not aware that they are for the purpose of a criminal action by the GOMOPA used. They agree with the corresponding fictitious publications, reports and analysis on what specifically GOMOPA through and through “independent” experts are prepared. It also states that the services, and blogs such cooperation with the GOMOPA approval, although they know that the information transmitted by GOMOPA are fictitious and the credibility of companies and corporations affect. They take so aware of the criminal procedure part. The explanation of this situation is quite simple. GOMOPA pays namely the services, and blogs related remuneration that the publication of false information on the companies and corporations (crime victims) agree. Some services, and blogs seem to know nothing about it to have that on their pages available information “fictitious” and “pulled out of the fingers are. Are you looking for in this way their conduct to justify, because they want the legal consequences of participating in the abuse of the good name and appearance of a company or corporation to escape. The activity system of GOMOPA of collaborating services and blogs was also the example of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. tested. Beginning in October 2008 was one of the workers of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. a message from an anonymous sender, in the near future – first on the Internet, then on television, radio and in the German press – information published by the functioning and activities of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. in an extremely negative light show. The employee of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. was then informed that these reports / news undoubtedly significantly the appearance and the reputation of the firm Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. affect. The place mentioned in this “conversation partner” has the workers of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. informed that the possibility of the embarrassing situation to be avoided by Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. to the person shown by the account the sum of 100,000.00 EUR transfers. As later revealed, however, was Mr. Klaus Mauri Chat – this anonymous interlocutor – “brain” and “Leader of the GOMOPA”. The investigations have been employed by the Federal Judicial Police (tracking and identifying the body at the federal level) during the investigation for the payment of blackmail, fraud and threats because of what Mr Mauri chatting and his staff were practiced, and for participation by other (head of Internet services and moderators of blogs) on this process. These crimes have been committed to loss of many professional and judicial persons, including the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. The victims of this crime in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, the USA and Canada visible. At this moment appeared the following question: What was the reaction of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. to the demands from GOMOPA? Corresponded to the response to the expectations of GOMOPA? Has the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. the required sum of EUR 100,000.00 paid? Side of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. There was absolutely no reaction to the extortion attempt by GOMOPA. At the end of August 2008 on the Service http://www.gompa.net numerous articles / reports published by the activities of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. in a very negative light have represented. Once the information contained on http://www.gomopa.net detail and were fully analyzed, it is that they are not even the truth at one point and potential and existing customers of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. in relation to the financial institution from this discontinued business activities is misleading. Following the criminal Handlugen of GOMOPA and its cooperating services, and blogs on the network, the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. measurable and significant business losses. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. has primarily an important group of potential customers lost. But what it showed as important, the existing customers of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. little away. Those customers have used our services and continue to use the still. In view of the existing collaboration with the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.., Which will in turn be no objections. GOMOPA has such a course of events accurately predicted, which aims significant and measurable business by Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. losses were suffered. The course of events, the service GOMOPA certainly pleased. GOMOPA has to expect that the position of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. declines and the financial institution, the required sum (100.000,00 EUR) provides. Over time, as the whole procedure in the network was becoming more popular, tried GOMOPA still four times to the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. Contacts, each time by adjusting these criminal “Kompanie” has promised, although it every time his financial demands heraufsetzte. The last of the set of “company” against Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. ratio was even planned EUR 5,000,000.00 (in words: EURO fünfmilionen). The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. could but before the ever-increasing demands from the Service GOMOPA claim. In October 2008 met the management of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. Decision on the notification of the INTERPOL International Police and the appropriate law enforcement institutions of the FRG (the police and the prosecutor) about the existing situation. In the meantime, reported at the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. numerous companies and corporations, and even professional person such as doctors, judges, priests, actors and other people from different countries of the world, the extortion of GOMOPA relented and the required amounts of money it had. These people already gave statements that they have done so, so they finally just “be in peace” and unnecessary problems, difficulties, and a reasonable conclusion hardly avoid them. The victims of this criminal action, the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. using different amounts of money which were requested, informed. In one case, there were relatively small (a few thousand EURO), in another case it has to deliver significant amounts (around few million EURO). Additionally turned to Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. Companies which have not yet GOMOPA the “fee” on out and have already considered whether they should do or not. These firms anticipated by Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. a clear opinion as well as a practical professional advice on how to be in such a situation should behave and how they can avoid debt. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. has invariably victims of all crimes, which are at our company have made a cooperation proposed. The top task is to this cooperation, jointly determined and effective measures against GOMOPA against other services in the network, and against all Bloggers to meet in the here described with international criminal procedure GOMOPA leaders to participate. All these companies were known as the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. proposed “crusade” against GOMOPA, his partner. At our request to notify all participating companies the INTERPOL International Police and their pursuit of domestic institutions, including the competent public prosecutor and the police authorities about the existing situation. In view of the fact that the criminal act of GOMOPA be extended over many states and that the number of the Federal Republic of Germany because the ads reimbursed by GOMOPA, Internet Services and Bloggers crimes, grew up fast – which no doubt influenced by a far-reaching impact of criminal of GOMOPA testifies – International Business, the Police INTERPOL Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. before that its representatives in Berlin with representatives from GOMOPA true to the “payment arrangements and transfer the sum of EUR 5,000,000.00 to discuss. This step meant a well thought-out and by the Federal Criminal Police organized the event to carry out aimed at the arrest of international criminals GOMOPA acting was. The coordinated steps and measures of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. Damaged and others, led by the International Economic Police INTERPOL, the Federal Criminal Police Office and the Prosecutor of the Federal Republic of Germany for education, training and implementation of the above-described case contributed. In November 2008, the event in Berlin prepared for the apprehension and arrest of the representative of the GOMOPA, after the arrest of Mr. Klaus Mauri chat – as the main leaders and leaders of international criminal group GOMOPA recalled. The arrest and notified the Federal Criminal Police showed both the current whereabouts of Mr. Klaus Mauri chat. “Brain” and the founder of this international criminal group GOMOPA, Mr Klaus Mauri chat on the same day was also arrested and imprisoned on time, will soon put in charge state, the responsibility for their own crimes and those of the forum, before a competent GOMOPA Federal wear. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. undertook all possible steps to ensure that Mr. Klaus Mauri chatting on the dock of the competent court of the United Kingdom of Great Britain appears. Among the damaged work and justice people from United Kingdom, along with the Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. There are many victims of GOMOPA: The beginning of the arrests with such a scale means for the German judiciary and a major breakthrough point. It is worth noting that the prosecution bodies of the Federal Republic, up to this stage of the long-standing criminal activity of Mr. Klaus Mauri chatting and his staff were powerless. Prolonged impunity of the criminal actions of Mr. Klaus Mauri chat, for years the “first violin” in GOMOPA played, is to end gegangen.An this point another question arises: how is it so go on? The arrest of Mr. Klaus chat Mauri is a critical moment, in other words a “turn around 180 degrees” for him personally. But it also means the beginning of the end “for its employees, for Internet Services, Bloggers, with GOMOPA so happy and had worked together without contradiction. There is no doubt that the cause of Mr Klaus Mauri chat at the top of the “iceberg” is. The above-mentioned turning point on this issue will be further arrests and detentions of members GOMOPA bring with them, and all persons from all areas involved in this transnational criminal actions have taken part. For information (reports by the end of December 2008), which of Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. available, the result that the next arrests currently prepared to be associated with the Services GOMOPA cooperating persons. This is to people outside Germany – from where Mr Klaus Mauri chat coming – refer. The details may be at this point in terms of legal and course of the prosecution bodies of the BRG and the Interpol-led investigation can not be betrayed. The Meridian Capital Enterprises Ltd.. currently can only illustrate information from the investigation led the public to the criminal liability not to have this moment wird.In so intense preparations for the arrest of a number of persons outside the Federal Republic of Germany. This applies particularly to countries such as the following: – Russia-Ukraine – Poland – Spain – Mexico – Portugal – Brazil – the United States of America – Canada – UK – Ireland – Australia – New Zealand – India. All professional and judicial persons, regardless of the country in which they accompany the Office, or its citizens, and until now, consciously or unconsciously with the Forum GOMOPA together, or continue to work together to arouse the suspicion of the INTERPOL International Police. This works with the police criminal investigation department in each country, to the above persons first identify and then to legally pursue them. Information about this topic, as well as on the beginning and end of the activity of the GOMOPA can be at the following addresses on the Web at: http://gomopaabzocker.wordpress.com/http://www.nepper-schlepper-bauernfaenger.comhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qNpzAu-QMuEhttp://www.korte.de/alexander/2006/01/gomopa-finanforum-kritik.html- http://evelux.de/gomopa-sam-240/- http://blog.deobald.org/archive/2007/07/01/betrugsvorwurf-gomopa-spam/ 2. Dubai KLP Group Emirates – United Arab Emirates. As head of the company is Mr Martin Kraeter, not only as the “brain” of the whole company, but also as a longstanding friend of Mr Klaus Mauri Chat (GOMOPA-wire) acts. This company wants to hide and not even officially exist, that they as a strategic partner of the GOMOPA in the area of the Middle East, according to the territory of the Persian coast operates. Official activities of the company KLP Group Emirates includes among others the following areas: financial advisory services from the offshore area (Management Services – Facilitators – OffshoreConsultants, International Tax & Legal Consultants – Fiduciaries). In the sphere of activities of the Company will include the creation of companies and enterprises in the so-called “tax havens” to the tax liability to the company activity entfliehen.Inoffizielle KLP Group Emirates includes cooperation with the Service GOMOPA in the field of “Gelwäsche”. The monies are a result of criminal activity by GOMOPA generated by advanced professional and judicial persons soon throughout the world and legalized. The illegality based on the activity of the company KLP Group Emirates, as well as the cooperation with the Services GOMOPA attracted attention even when the prosecution organs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, especially in Scotland Yard, which on this issue an intensive investigation has begun, which is in the ” development phase is located. It must be noted that all professional and judicial persons, but especially the clients of the company KLP Group Emirates, with the company KLP Group Emirates have cooperated in the past and still do, under the “Lupp” of Scotland Yard to be .3. Russlanda) The Company E-XECUTIVE by the Lord led Novosartow Vilen. On the homepage of the Company contained information comes directly from the company GOMOPA. The company e XECUTIVE leads the close cooperation not only with GOMOPA, but also with another on the Russian territory under the name of OOO UK broker functioning company. The company e XECUTIVE in connection with the company OOO UK broker is a member of a criminal group led by GOMOPA. The company e XECUTIVE GOMOPA representing interests in Russia and Central-Eastern Europe. Unofficially, the company employs E XECUTIVE-especially with the search for potential “victims” of the Erschwindelns, blackmail and forcing the funds for GOMOPA companies and corporations from the territory of Russia, Ukraine, and from all countries in Central Eastern Europe. Officially, the company e XECUTIVE one to the forum GOMOPA similar industrial activity. b) OOO “UK broker.” Head of the firm is Mr. Pavel Kokarev. This company is not concealed, that they are consistent with the Forum GOMOPA cooperates. The company OOO UK broker represents GOMOPA in Central Eastern Europe, including Russia. You shall be officially transferred to this area the GOMOPA similar activity, but unofficially it is to search for potential “victims” of racketeering, fraud and Erschwindelns for GOMOPA employed. The company has remained until now spared from any punishment, it could with “eternal impunity” because of a poorly developed, corrupt legal system in Russia expected. The situation may change after Mr. Klaus Mauri Chat arrested in Berlin and was arrested. This constant offenders, the “on his account” a set of legally enforceable judgments has, until now his freedom has unlimited recover, the do not know quite what it means to be arrested, begins gradually, according to our available information to finally “to bear witness.” This is understandable when one considers the threat of a penalty he considered. This delinquent shows growing interest in cooperation with the German tracking and identifying bodies. So there is a chance that other people he unveiled to the public by providing for reduction of prison sentence counts. It is also the only question of time INTERPOL, in cooperation with the Russian Service (FSB) of the Company OOO UK broker “at the door knocking”, which by Mr. Pavle Kokarev and represented. The company OOO UK broker has a virtual office in REGUS building in Moscow, is not even a person, forming a typical one-person company, which all business “crimes” may be the name of it, with no civil liability to pay. The Lord Pavel Kokarev seems to have forgotten or do not have sufficient knowledge about its possible responsibility fier to participate in the international crimes under the direction of Gomopa.

TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE FBI: Original Knights of the KKK – Ku-Klux-Klan

105-71809 -241- pages 1-249

105-71809 -241- pages 250-350

CONFIDENTIAL: VZCZCXYZ0005 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHRL #1542/01 3191825 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 141825Z NOV 08 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2636 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001542 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2018 TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV AF RS GG UP GM SUBJECT: GERMANY REMAINS STUBBORN ON MAP AND ADDITIONAL TROOPS FOR AFGHANISTAN Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 ( B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Top German government officials emphasized to visiting USNATO Ambassador Kurt Volker November 10-11 that Germany remains strongly opposed to granting Ukraine and Georgia member action plan (MAP) status at the December 2-3 meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers. While open to giving the applicant countries a “navigation aid” or action plan to help guide their reforms, Germany is not ready at this point to substitute this “navigation aid” for MAP — it wants to keep open the option of still requiring MAP at some later date before membership. Volker warned that adding an additional hurdle to the accession process would give the impression that the Alliance was stepping back from its Bucharest commitment and capitulating to Russian pressure. German officials also stressed that over the next year, they had little political flexibility for increasing the number of German troops in Afghanistan or for expanding their area of deployment beyond what was provided for in the ISAF parliamentary mandate approved last month. In response to MFAs view that the April 2009 NATO Strasbourg/Kehl Summit should be primarily an anniversary meeting and avoid “confrontational issues,” Volker emphasized the need to address key questions like Afghanistan and NATOs relations with Russia and the east. The Germans are disdainful of Medvedevs European security proposal, but they believe they have to “deal with it” and are hopeful that discussing it can “improve the atmosphere” with Russia. While warning against “cornering” Russia in regards to MAP and the conflict with Georgia, Germans have been very critical of Medvedevs announcement about stationing short-range missiles in Kaliningrad. END SUMMARY. INTERLOCUTORS ¶2. (U) During his November 10-11 visit to Berlin, USNATO Ambassador Volker met separately with National Security Advisor Christoph Heusgen, MFA State Secretary Reinhard Silberberg and MOD Parliamentary Secretary Christian Schmidt. He also met with a number of key parliamentarians, including Christian Democratic Union (CDU) foreign policy spokesman Eckart Von Klaeden, Christian Social Union (CSU) Secretary General Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, Social Democratic Party (SPD) defense policy spokesman Rainer Arnold, Greens defense policy spokesman Winfried Nachtwei, Free Democratic Party (FDP) foreign policy spokesman Werner Hoyer and Deputy Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Hans-Ulrich Klose (SPD). MAP FOR GEORGIA/UKRAINE ¶3. (C) Both Heusgen and Silberberg reiterated Germanys strong opposition to granting Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plan (MAP) status at the December 2-3 meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers. Silberberg said flatly that “no decision can be taken” in December, making reference to the Bucharest Summit declaration that this should be only a “first review.” Noting that both countries have “lots of deficits,” Heusgen said that Ukraine was “a nightmare” because of ongoing political turmoil and that Georgia lacked a multiparty system and was not truly a pluralistic society. Silberberg said that because of its role in the August conflict with Russia, Germany considered Georgia to be “further from MAP” than it was before. However, both agreed with Volker that the Alliance could not be seen backing away from its Bucharest commitment that both countries would one day become members of NATO. They also conceded that NATO had to avoid giving the perception that Russia, in using force against Georgia, had successfully drawn a new line across Europe and had achieved an unchallenged sphere of influence. They proposed repeating the Bucharest language at the December ministerial and “coming back to this later.” ¶4. (C) Heusgen also favored giving the two applicant countries a “clear idea” of what they needed to do. Heusgen said that when Chancellor Merkel visited Kyiv in July, she had proposed setting up a “navigation aid” or action plan to help guide Ukraine in making the necessary reforms, but had never received a response. Heusgen emphasized, however, that Germany was not ready at this point to substitute this “navigation aid” for MAP — it wanted to keep open the option of still requiring MAP at some later date before membership. He expressed concern that the applicant countries, especially Ukraine, could start clamoring immediately for membership after satisfying the technical requirements in an action plan. Along the same lines, Silberberg said the Alliance had to make clear to the applicants that the final decision on membership was political, not technical, and not automatic based on fulfilling a checklist. Volker welcomed creative thinking on the way forward, but said that adding an additional hurdle to the accession process would give the impression that the Alliance was stepping back from its Bucharest commitment and could allow Russia to claim “victory.” ¶5. (C) In separate meetings with leading parliamentarians from all the major parties, no one expressed support for moving forward with MAP for Georgia and Ukraine. Most had extremely negative opinions of Georgian President Saakashvili, variously describing him as “crazy,” “a hot head,” and “dangerous.” The general opinion was that Saakashvili was as much at fault for the outbreak of the August war as Russia. Volker challenged this view and reminded them that Russias provocative acts and pressure had set the stage for the conflict. The parliamentarians also worried that pursuing MAP would “corner the Russians” and make them less cooperative on important questions like Afghanistan, Iran, energy, etc. AFGHANISTAN ¶6. (C) Every government interlocutor, including Heusgen, Silberberg and Schmidt, emphasized that over the next year, through the Bundestag election in September 2009, Germany had little political flexibility for increasing the number of German troops in Afghanistan or for expanding their area of deployment beyond what was provided for in the ISAF parliamentary mandate approved last month. Silberberg said flatly: “Were in the north and were staying there.” With regard to getting Germany to send combat troops to the south, he advised: “Dont try it. It wont happen.” Heusgen was relaxed about possible U.S. requests to do more, asserting that when Obama visited Berlin in July, he had indicated that he was “perfectly happy” with the German contribution. Silberberg claimed that the SPD-controlled MFA was more receptive than the CDU-controlled MOD about deploying German forces outside the north. He said, for example, that the MFA had pushed for embedded German trainers (OMLTs) to be allowed to deploy outside the north with their assigned Afghan National Army (ANA) units, but that MOD had refused. ¶7. (C) While generally ruling out new military contributions to Afghanistan, Heusgen, Silberberg and Schmidt confirmed that Germany planned to support and participate in the proposed deployment of NATO AWACS aircraft to Afghanistan, which will require the government to seek a stand-alone mandate from the Bundestag. In separate meetings, parliamentarians confirmed that there was broad support for the AWACS mission. Silberberg warned, however, that any connection made between the AWACS and the controversial cross-border operations into Pakistan could be a “problem” in obtaining Bundestag approval. He indicated that he had already passed this concern on to SACEUR GEN Craddock. ¶8. (C) Volker noted that new CENTCOM Commander GEN Patreus was currently conducting a strategic review of the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan. It was possible the review might recommend to the incoming Administration the deployment of significantly more troops and other resources to meet the current challenges. In that event, the U.S. would almost certainly turn to its European Allies to help shoulder the burden and to get behind a single, unified effort. If additional combat troops were out of the question, Volker encouraged German officials to think creatively about what other military contributions Germany could make, such as deploying additional helicopters and MEDEVAC assets on a country-wide basis, or widening its deployment area by erasing the dividing line between regional commands north and west. ¶9. (C) SPD Defense Policy Spokesman Rainer Arnold gave the standard line that Germany had no more armored helicopters to deploy and probably would not have any until the next generation of NH-90 and Tiger helicopters was delivered. Schmidt revealed, however, that Germany had recently launched a program to armor eight additional C-53 helicopters. (Comment: Germany has some 80 CH-53 helicopters, but only 20 of them are armored and suitable for operating in a combat environment. Germany currently has six armored C-53s in Afghanistan and claims that it cannot afford to deploy additional ones until the inventory of armored helicopters is increased. End Comment.) Schmidt also noted that he planned to talk to the Bavarian interior minister about sending Bavarian policemen to Afghanistan to serve as trainers for the Afghan National Police. (Comment: Up to now, Bavaria has been one of the few German states that has declined to let its police officers serve in Afghanistan. End Comment.) ¶10. (C) Parliamentarians generally welcomed the prospect of greater U.S. attention and commitment to Afghanistan and agreed that Germany should increase its own efforts, especially in reconstruction and development and in the training of the Afghan national security forces. However, they echoed the view that there was little political maneuver room for Germany to increase its military contributions to Afghanistan over the next year, given the electoral season and low popular support for the mission. FDP foreign policy spokesman Hoyer pointed out that mistrust between the two Grand Coalition parties complicated matters. He thought Chancellor Merkel (CDU) would be very wary about taking an initiative to increase Germanys military contribution to Afghanistan before the Bundestag election, for fear of playing into the hands of her electoral rival, FM Steinmeier (SPD). SPD defense policy spokesman Arnold argued that deployment of German soldiers to the south and the likely resulting increase in German soldiers “killing and being killed” could put the whole deployment at risk. NATO SUMMIT ¶11. (C) Silberberg said Germany viewed next years Strasbourg/Kehl Summit as primarily a “family” anniversary meeting, largely without partners. There were no plans to invite Russian president Medvedev or to deal with “confrontational issues.” While Volker agreed that the summit offered an excellent opportunity to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Alliance and to recognize its role in Franco-German reconciliation, it could not just be a celebration. There had to be real substance. Key issues like Afghanistan and NATOs relations with Russia and the east had to be addressed. Silberberg expressed some surprise that Russia would be on the agenda, but took the point. ¶12. (C) Volker also noted that some in Washington remained to be convinced about the wisdom of launching work on a new strategic concept at the summit, believing the exercise could prove divisive and distract the Alliance from more practical cooperation. Silberberg responded that there was too much momentum behind the idea of a new strategic concept to stop it now. He said Germany favored releasing a “short, political” Declaration on Alliance Security at the Summit to launch the strategic concept review. MEDVEDEVS PROPOSAL ON A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE ¶13. (C) While acknowledging that Medvedevs proposal for a new European security architecture was hypocritical and did nothing to address current problems (like CFE and Georgia), Silberberg said that “we have to deal with it.” He noted that the proposal had come as a surprise to the Russian MFA, which had to scramble after the fact to propose some ideas for fleshing out the concept. He was disdainful of the content, but hopeful that discussing the proposal would “improve the atmosphere” with Russia. He complained that the current EU troika dialogue with Russia, where each side reads prepared statements, was not very useful. He also pressed for resumption of meetings of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and for the NRC to be improved as a political forum. He suggested that the Alliance pre-coordinate in advance of NRC meetings and not hold internal political debates in front of the Russians. ¶14. (C) On Medvedevs proposal, Volker said there was already a pan-European security organization (the OSCE), so the Russians had to answer the question: where was the value-added? From the U.S. point of view, the Medvedev proposal appeared to be nothing more than the OSCE minus the Helsinki Accords, the Paris Charter, and the United States. The Russians should be forced to be specific on the substance of their proposal, and the forum for discussing this should be the OSCE in Vienna. Regarding the NRC, Volker noted the original intention had been to treat Russia as an equal partner. Given its aggression against Georgia, the U.S. would have trouble going back to that format for now, but agreed that dialogue with Russia should continue in some form. MISSILE DEFENSE ¶15. (C) Silberberg called Medvedevs November 5 announcement about deploying short-range rockets in Kaliningrad in response to U.S. MD plans as “simply stupid.” He noted that FM Steinmeier had immediately issued a public statement criticizing the announcement. It was clear that the timing, coming right after the U.S. presidential election, was deliberate and not a mistake. Silberberg noted that while his counterparts at the Russian MFA “seem very reasonable” on this issue, they are obviously “very far” from the locus of Russian decision-making. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ¶16. (U) Volker also participated in several public diplomacy events during his November 10-11 visit. On November 10, on the margins of the opening ceremony of the annual conference of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA), he did separate interviews with Germanys two main public broadcasters, ARD and ZDF, responding to questions on NATO enlargement and the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Also on November 10, he participated in an hour-long panel discussion hosted by Deutschland Radio Kultur on the future of U.S. foreign policy following the U.S. elections. The roundtable, which included Luxembourg FM Jean Asselborn and German Deputy Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Hans-Ulrich Klose (SPD), was broadcast live over radio and was recorded for broadcast by Phoenix television on November 15. ¶17. (U) On November 11, Volker participated in a panel discussion on NATO and the challenges of the eastern dimension, hosted by the U.S. Embassy before a audience of ¶180. The panel was one of six held simultaneously in various embassies in Berlin as part of the ATA annual conference. The other panelists included former Polish NATO Ambassador Jerzy Nowak and German foreign policy spokesman Eckart Von Klaeden (CDU). In a press conference in the U.S. Embassy at the conclusion of his visit, Volker took questions from six print journalists on Afghanistan, NATO enlargement, Georgia, and the NATO C-17 strategic airlift consortium. ¶18. (U) Ambassador Volker has reviewed and cleared this cable. TIMKEN JRGERMANY REMAINS STUBBORN ON MAP AND ADDITIONAL

VZCZCXYZ0005
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #1542/01 3191825
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141825Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2636
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001542
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV AF RS GG UP GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY REMAINS STUBBORN ON MAP AND ADDITIONAL
TROOPS FOR AFGHANISTAN
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 (
B) AND (D).

1. (C) SUMMARY. Top German government officials emphasized
to visiting USNATO Ambassador Kurt Volker November 10-11 that
Germany remains strongly opposed to granting Ukraine and
Georgia member action plan (MAP) status at the December 2-3
meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers. While open to giving the
applicant countries a "navigation aid" or action plan to help
guide their reforms, Germany is not ready at this point to
substitute this "navigation aid" for MAP -- it wants to keep
open the option of still requiring MAP at some later date
before membership. Volker warned that adding an additional
hurdle to the accession process would give the impression
that the Alliance was stepping back from its Bucharest
commitment and capitulating to Russian pressure. German
officials also stressed that over the next year, they had
little political flexibility for increasing the number of
German troops in Afghanistan or for expanding their area of
deployment beyond what was provided for in the ISAF
parliamentary mandate approved last month. In response to
MFAs view that the April 2009 NATO Strasbourg/Kehl Summit
should be primarily an anniversary meeting and avoid
"confrontational issues," Volker emphasized the need to
address key questions like Afghanistan and NATOs relations
with Russia and the east. The Germans are disdainful of
Medvedevs European security proposal, but they believe they
have to "deal with it" and are hopeful that discussing it can
"improve the atmosphere" with Russia. While warning against
"cornering" Russia in regards to MAP and the conflict with
Georgia, Germans have been very critical of Medvedevs
announcement about stationing short-range missiles in
Kaliningrad. END SUMMARY.

INTERLOCUTORS

2. (U) During his November 10-11 visit to Berlin, USNATO
Ambassador Volker met separately with National Security
Advisor Christoph Heusgen, MFA State Secretary Reinhard
Silberberg and MOD Parliamentary Secretary Christian Schmidt.
He also met with a number of key parliamentarians, including
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) foreign policy spokesman
Eckart Von Klaeden, Christian Social Union (CSU) Secretary
General Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, Social Democratic Party
(SPD) defense policy spokesman Rainer Arnold, Greens defense
policy spokesman Winfried Nachtwei, Free Democratic Party
(FDP) foreign policy spokesman Werner Hoyer and Deputy
Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Hans-Ulrich Klose (SPD).

MAP FOR GEORGIA/UKRAINE

3. (C) Both Heusgen and Silberberg reiterated Germanys
strong opposition to granting Ukraine and Georgia Membership
Action Plan (MAP) status at the December 2-3 meeting of NATO
Foreign Ministers. Silberberg said flatly that "no decision
can be taken" in December, making reference to the Bucharest
Summit declaration that this should be only a "first review."
Noting that both countries have "lots of deficits," Heusgen
said that Ukraine was "a nightmare" because of ongoing
political turmoil and that Georgia lacked a multiparty system
and was not truly a pluralistic society. Silberberg said
that because of its role in the August conflict with Russia,
Germany considered Georgia to be "further from MAP" than it
was before. However, both agreed with Volker that the
Alliance could not be seen backing away from its Bucharest
commitment that both countries would one day become members
of NATO. They also conceded that NATO had to avoid giving
the perception that Russia, in using force against Georgia,
had successfully drawn a new line across Europe and had
achieved an unchallenged sphere of influence. They proposed
repeating the Bucharest language at the December ministerial
and "coming back to this later."

4. (C) Heusgen also favored giving the two applicant
countries a "clear idea" of what they needed to do. Heusgen
said that when Chancellor Merkel visited Kyiv in July, she
had proposed setting up a "navigation aid" or action plan to
help guide Ukraine in making the necessary reforms, but had
never received a response. Heusgen emphasized, however, that
Germany was not ready at this point to substitute this
"navigation aid" for MAP -- it wanted to keep open the option
of still requiring MAP at some later date before membership.
He expressed concern that the applicant countries, especially
Ukraine, could start clamoring immediately for membership
after satisfying the technical requirements in an action
plan. Along the same lines, Silberberg said the Alliance had
to make clear to the applicants that the final decision on
membership was political, not technical, and not automatic
based on fulfilling a checklist. Volker welcomed creative
thinking on the way forward, but said that adding an
additional hurdle to the accession process would give the
impression that the Alliance was stepping back from its
Bucharest commitment and could allow Russia to claim
"victory."

5. (C) In separate meetings with leading parliamentarians
from all the major parties, no one expressed support for
moving forward with MAP for Georgia and Ukraine. Most had
extremely negative opinions of Georgian President
Saakashvili, variously describing him as "crazy," "a hot
head," and "dangerous." The general opinion was that
Saakashvili was as much at fault for the outbreak of the
August war as Russia. Volker challenged this view and
reminded them that Russias provocative acts and pressure had
set the stage for the conflict. The parliamentarians also
worried that pursuing MAP would "corner the Russians" and
make them less cooperative on important questions like
Afghanistan, Iran, energy, etc.

AFGHANISTAN

6. (C) Every government interlocutor, including Heusgen,
Silberberg and Schmidt, emphasized that over the next year,
through the Bundestag election in September 2009, Germany had
little political flexibility for increasing the number of
German troops in Afghanistan or for expanding their area of
deployment beyond what was provided for in the ISAF
parliamentary mandate approved last month. Silberberg said
flatly: "Were in the north and were staying there." With
regard to getting Germany to send combat troops to the south,
he advised: "Dont try it. It wont happen." Heusgen was
relaxed about possible U.S. requests to do more, asserting
that when Obama visited Berlin in July, he had indicated that
he was "perfectly happy" with the German contribution.
Silberberg claimed that the SPD-controlled MFA was more
receptive than the CDU-controlled MOD about deploying German
forces outside the north. He said, for example, that the MFA
had pushed for embedded German trainers (OMLTs) to be allowed
to deploy outside the north with their assigned Afghan
National Army (ANA) units, but that MOD had refused.

7. (C) While generally ruling out new military contributions
to Afghanistan, Heusgen, Silberberg and Schmidt confirmed
that Germany planned to support and participate in the
proposed deployment of NATO AWACS aircraft to Afghanistan,
which will require the government to seek a stand-alone
mandate from the Bundestag. In separate meetings,
parliamentarians confirmed that there was broad support for
the AWACS mission. Silberberg warned, however, that any
connection made between the AWACS and the controversial
cross-border operations into Pakistan could be a "problem" in
obtaining Bundestag approval. He indicated that he had
already passed this concern on to SACEUR GEN Craddock.

8. (C) Volker noted that new CENTCOM Commander GEN Patreus
was currently conducting a strategic review of the U.S.
engagement in Afghanistan. It was possible the review might
recommend to the incoming Administration the deployment of
significantly more troops and other resources to meet the
current challenges. In that event, the U.S. would almost
certainly turn to its European Allies to help shoulder the
burden and to get behind a single, unified effort. If
additional combat troops were out of the question, Volker
encouraged German officials to think creatively about what
other military contributions Germany could make, such as
deploying additional helicopters and MEDEVAC assets on a
country-wide basis, or widening its deployment area by
erasing the dividing line between regional commands north and
west.

9. (C) SPD Defense Policy Spokesman Rainer Arnold gave the
standard line that Germany had no more armored helicopters to
deploy and probably would not have any until the next
generation of NH-90 and Tiger helicopters was delivered.
Schmidt revealed, however, that Germany had recently launched
a program to armor eight additional C-53 helicopters.
(Comment: Germany has some 80 CH-53 helicopters, but only 20
of them are armored and suitable for operating in a combat
environment. Germany currently has six armored C-53s in
Afghanistan and claims that it cannot afford to deploy
additional ones until the inventory of armored helicopters is
increased. End Comment.) Schmidt also noted that he
planned to talk to the Bavarian interior minister about
sending Bavarian policemen to Afghanistan to serve as
trainers for the Afghan National Police. (Comment: Up to
now, Bavaria has been one of the few German states that has
declined to let its police officers serve in Afghanistan.
End Comment.)

10. (C) Parliamentarians generally welcomed the prospect of
greater U.S. attention and commitment to Afghanistan and
agreed that Germany should increase its own efforts,
especially in reconstruction and development and in the
training of the Afghan national security forces. However,
they echoed the view that there was little political maneuver
room for Germany to increase its military contributions to
Afghanistan over the next year, given the electoral season
and low popular support for the mission. FDP foreign policy
spokesman Hoyer pointed out that mistrust between the two
Grand Coalition parties complicated matters. He thought
Chancellor Merkel (CDU) would be very wary about taking an
initiative to increase Germanys military contribution to
Afghanistan before the Bundestag election, for fear of
playing into the hands of her electoral rival, FM Steinmeier
(SPD). SPD defense policy spokesman Arnold argued that
deployment of German soldiers to the south and the likely
resulting increase in German soldiers "killing and being
killed" could put the whole deployment at risk.

NATO SUMMIT

11. (C) Silberberg said Germany viewed next years
Strasbourg/Kehl Summit as primarily a "family" anniversary
meeting, largely without partners. There were no plans to
invite Russian president Medvedev or to deal with
"confrontational issues." While Volker agreed that the
summit offered an excellent opportunity to celebrate the 60th
anniversary of the Alliance and to recognize its role in
Franco-German reconciliation, it could not just be a
celebration. There had to be real substance. Key issues
like Afghanistan and NATOs relations with Russia and the
east had to be addressed. Silberberg expressed some surprise
that Russia would be on the agenda, but took the point.

12. (C) Volker also noted that some in Washington remained to
be convinced about the wisdom of launching work on a new
strategic concept at the summit, believing the exercise could
prove divisive and distract the Alliance from more practical
cooperation. Silberberg responded that there was too much
momentum behind the idea of a new strategic concept to stop
it now. He said Germany favored releasing a "short,
political" Declaration on Alliance Security at the Summit to
launch the strategic concept review.

MEDVEDEVS PROPOSAL ON A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

13. (C) While acknowledging that Medvedevs proposal for a
new European security architecture was hypocritical and did
nothing to address current problems (like CFE and Georgia),
Silberberg said that "we have to deal with it." He noted
that the proposal had come as a surprise to the Russian MFA,
which had to scramble after the fact to propose some ideas
for fleshing out the concept. He was disdainful of the
content, but hopeful that discussing the proposal would
"improve the atmosphere" with Russia. He complained that the
current EU troika dialogue with Russia, where each side reads
prepared statements, was not very useful. He also pressed
for resumption of meetings of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC)
and for the NRC to be improved as a political forum. He
suggested that the Alliance pre-coordinate in advance of NRC
meetings and not hold internal political debates in front of
the Russians.

14. (C) On Medvedevs proposal, Volker said there was already
a pan-European security organization (the OSCE), so the
Russians had to answer the question: where was the
value-added? From the U.S. point of view, the Medvedev
proposal appeared to be nothing more than the OSCE minus the
Helsinki Accords, the Paris Charter, and the United States.
The Russians should be forced to be specific on the substance
of their proposal, and the forum for discussing this should
be the OSCE in Vienna. Regarding the NRC, Volker noted the
original intention had been to treat Russia as an equal
partner. Given its aggression against Georgia, the U.S.
would have trouble going back to that format for now, but
agreed that dialogue with Russia should continue in some form.

MISSILE DEFENSE

15. (C) Silberberg called Medvedevs November 5 announcement
about deploying short-range rockets in Kaliningrad in
response to U.S. MD plans as "simply stupid." He noted that
FM Steinmeier had immediately issued a public statement
criticizing the announcement. It was clear that the timing,
coming right after the U.S. presidential election, was
deliberate and not a mistake. Silberberg noted that while
his counterparts at the Russian MFA "seem very reasonable" on
this issue, they are obviously "very far" from the locus of
Russian decision-making.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

16. (U) Volker also participated in several public diplomacy
events during his November 10-11 visit. On November 10, on
the margins of the opening ceremony of the annual conference
of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA), he did separate
interviews with Germanys two main public broadcasters, ARD
and ZDF, responding to questions on NATO enlargement and the
NATO mission in Afghanistan. Also on November 10, he
participated in an hour-long panel discussion hosted by
Deutschland Radio Kultur on the future of U.S. foreign policy
following the U.S. elections. The roundtable, which included
Luxembourg FM Jean Asselborn and German Deputy Foreign
Relations Committee Chairman Hans-Ulrich Klose (SPD), was
broadcast live over radio and was recorded for broadcast by
Phoenix television on November 15.

17. (U) On November 11, Volker participated in a panel
discussion on NATO and the challenges of the eastern
dimension, hosted by the U.S. Embassy before a audience of
180. The panel was one of six held simultaneously in various
embassies in Berlin as part of the ATA annual conference.
The other panelists included former Polish NATO Ambassador
Jerzy Nowak and German foreign policy spokesman Eckart Von
Klaeden (CDU). In a press conference in the U.S. Embassy at
the conclusion of his visit, Volker took questions from six
print journalists on Afghanistan, NATO enlargement, Georgia,
and the NATO C-17 strategic airlift consortium.

18. (U) Ambassador Volker has reviewed and cleared this cable.
TIMKEN JR

TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE FBI: THE JOHN GOTTI FILES

gotti1

gotti2

GOTTI3

GOTTI4

GOTTI5

GOTTI6

GOTTI7

GOTTI8

GOTTI9

GOTTI10

John Joseph Gotti, Jr (October 27, 1940 – June 10, 2002) was an American mobster who became the Boss of the Gambino crime family in New York City. Gotti grew up in poverty. He and his brothers turned to a life of crime at an early age. Operating out of the Ozone Park neighborhood of Queens, Gotti quickly rose in prominence, becoming one of the crime family’s biggest earners and a protege of Gambino family underboss Aniello Dellacroce.

After the FBI indicted members of Gotti’s crew for selling narcotics, Gotti took advantage of growing dissent over the leadership of the crime family. Fearing that his men and himself would be killed by Gambino crime family Boss Paul Castellano for selling drugs, Gotti organized the murder of Castellano in December 1985 and took over the family shortly thereafter. This left Gotti as the boss of the most powerful crime family in America, which made hundreds of millions of dollars a year from construction, hijacking, loan sharking, gambling, extortion and other criminal activities. Gotti was the most powerful crime boss during his era and became widely known for his outspoken personality and flamboyant style, which eventually helped lead to his downfall. While his peers would go out of their way to shun attention, especially from the media, Gotti was known as the “The Dapper Don” for his expensive clothes and personality in front of news cameras. He was later given the nickname “The Teflon Don” because several attempts to convict him of crimes in the 1980s resulted in either a hung jury or an acquittal (i.e. the charges wouldn’t “stick”).

Gotti’s underboss Salvatore “Sammy the Bull” Gravano is credited with the FBI’s success in finally convicting Gotti. In 1991, Gravano agreed to turn state’s evidence and testify for the prosecution against Gotti after hearing Gotti on wiretap make several disparaging remarks about Gravano and questioning his loyalty. In 1992, Gotti was convicted of five murders, conspiracy to commit murder, racketeering, obstruction of justice, illegal gambling, extortion, tax evasion, and loansharking. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole and was transferred to United States Penitentiary, Marion. Gotti died of throat cancer on June 10, 2002 at the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri.

TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE FBI: THE WATERGATE FILES

watergat1summary

watergat2

TOP-SECRET FROM THE FBI-ARCHIVES:Senator Edward Moore “Ted” Kennedy

1136317-002 – 175A-WF-389 – Section 1 -942748

1136317-002 – 9-HQ-51213 – Section 1 -942755

1136317-002 – 9-HQ-51213 – Section 2 -942756

1136317-002 – 9-HQ-51213 EBF 2 – Section 1 -942759

1136317-002 – 9-HQ-51213 EBF 10 – Section 1 -942758

1136317-002 – 62-BS-4994 – Section 1 -942749

1136317-002 – 62-BS-5078 – Section 1 -942750

1136317-002 – 62-HQ-112941 – Section 1 -942752

1136317-002 – 62-HQ-112941 – Section 2 -942753

1136317-002 – 62-HQ-112941 – Section 3 -942754

1136317-002 – 62-HQ-112941 – Section 4 -942751

1136317-002 – 89-PX-250 – Section 1 -942746

1136317-002 – 94-HQ-55752 – Section 1 -942760

1136317-002 – 94-HQ-55752 – Section 2 -942761

1136317-002 – 94-HQ-55752 – Section 3 -942762

1136317-002 – 94-HQ-55752 – Section 4 -942763

1136317-002 – 94-HQ-55752 EBF 25 – Section 1 -942766

1136317-002 – 94-HQ-55752 EBF 95 – Section 1 -942767

1136317-003 – 197-BS-71824 -HQ- – Section 1 -967633- pages 250-290

1136317-003 – 197-BS-71824 -HQ- – Section 2 -967634

1136317-003 – 197-SL-178651 – Section 1 -967623- pages 1-249

1136317-003 – 197-BS-71824 -HQ- – Section 2 -967634

1136317-003 – 197-SL-178651 – Section 1 -967623- pages 1-249

1136317-003 – 197-SL-178651 – Section 2 -967624

Kennedy Part 19

kennedy23-24 pages 1-249

kennedy23-24 pages 250-396

Edward Moore “Ted” Kennedy (1932-2009) served as a U.S. senator from 1962 to 2009. The files below range from 1961 to 2001. The bulk of this material concerns FBI investigations into threats of violence and extortion claims against Senator Kennedy and other public officials. Parts 1 to 18 were previously released in 2010.

TOP-SECRET FROM THE CIA-ARCHIVES: Wartime Statutes – Instruments of Soviet Control- PART 2

1979_11_28_WARTIME_STATUTE_OF_THE_COMBINED_FORCES
1980_02_07_WARTIME_STATUTE

1980_02_08_STATUTE_ON_THE_COMBINED_FORCES_OF_THE_WARSAW_PACT

1980_02_21_TWELFTH_SESSION1980_02_25_DRAFT_STATUTE_ON_WARSAW_PACT_COMBINED_NAMED_FORCES

TOP-SECRET FROM THE CIA-ARCHIVES: Wartime Statutes – Instruments of Soviet Control

1983_10_01_THE_SOVIET_UNIONS_CONTROL_OF_THE_WARSAW_PACT_FORCES

1979_07_18_LETTER_FROM_WARSAW_PACT

1979_07_18_LETTER_FROM_WARSAW_PACT

1978_03_21_STATUTE_ON_THE_COMBINED _ARMED_FORCES

1978_03_28_OFFICIAL_REPORT

1978_06_27_STATUTE_ON_THE_COMBINED_FLEET

1978_09_06_DRAFT_STATUTE_ON_THE_WARSAW_PACT

1979_05_11_REPORT_ON_THE_WARSAW_PACT_COOPERATION

PART TWO SOON

STRENG GEHEIM: DIREKTIVE DES INNENMINISTERIUMS ZUM SPERREN KINDERPORNOGRAPHISCHER SEITEN WIE “GoMoPa4KIDS”

german-interior-ministry-internet-expertise-1009

TOP-SECRET: NEW WAZIRISTAN TERRORIST ALLIANCE

P 041421Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1740
INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY
AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY
AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 000478 

NOFORN 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2034
TAGS: PREL PTER PK
SUBJECT: NEW WAZIRISTAN TERRORIST ALLIANCE 

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

1. (S/NF) Summary: Rival Pakistani Taliban leaders Baitullah
Mehsud, Maulvi Nazir, and Hafiz Gul Bahadur formed a new
militant alliance on February 23. The new alliance
recognizes Taliban leader Mullah Omar as its leader, and its
goal is to fight the planned U.S. troop surge in Afghanistan.
The Pakistani militant leaders will maintain their
independent militants groups but will now facilitate
cooperation in cross-border attacks in Afghanistan. It is
too early to say how effective this new alliance will be in
launching cross-border attacks against U.S./NATO forces in
Afghanistan, but it does give the largest and most powerful
Pakistani Taliban leaders unfettered access across North and
South Waziristan. Formation of the alliance demonstrates
that the GOP's tribal "divide and conquer" strategy is not
working, at least not to our advantage. Civilian leaders are
concerned about the continuing loss of government writ in the
Waziristans after this agreement, but Pakistan's security
forces may see few downsides to an alliance that focuses its
attacks outside of Pakistan. End summary. 

2. (SBU) On February 23, Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) leader
Baitullah Mehsud signed a deal with two powerful rival
Taliban commanders Maulvi Nazir of South Waziristan and Hafiz
Gul Bahadur of North Waziristan. The three, according to
press reports, have formed a new group called Shura
Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen (Mujahideen Unity Council), that they
claim will unite them against external forces trying to
divide the multiple Taliban groups based in Pakistan. They
have formed a 13-member shura to run the affairs of the new
alliance. The militants named Mullah Omar as their supreme
leader, but the group did not choose a leader of its
operational shura. According to a joint public statement,
the militant leaders praised Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar
as defenders of Islam and Muslims. The spokesman for
Baitullah Mehsud, Mufti Waliullah, said that the three
Taliban commanders would now operate from a single platform
under the new alliance. Currently Baitullah Mehsud controls
the eastern portion of South Waziristan, which is populated
largely by Mehsud tribesmen. Maulvi Nazir is based out of
the Ahmedzai Wazir area of South Waziristan on the agency's
western border with Afghanistan. Hafiz Gul Bahadur leads his
Utmanzai Wazir militants from Miram Shah, North Waziristan. 

3. (C) The formation of the new alliance follows Baitullah
Mehsud's December 2007 formation of TTP as an umbrella group
to better coordinate pro-Taliban activities. The creation of
the TTP was the merger of various Pakistani militant groups
operating under disparate commands in different tribal
agencies. The TTP alliance runs as a loose federation rather
than a strictly controlled organization. Each of the
militant leaders maintains a degree of autonomy and Baitullah
Mehsud, as the strongest leader of Pakistani Taliban, lends
his support and coordination to the various TTP subcommanders
in places such as Bajaur and Swat. Nazir, who broke openly
with Mehsud in the spring of 2007 (see para 6), was not a
part of TTP. Bahadur, who had jockeyed with Mehsud for the
title of pre-eminent local militant leader in the
Waziristans, had maintained some distance from the TTP label
before now. 

4. (C) The new Mujahideen Unity Council will likely be
another loose federation with each Taliban commander
maintaining his own authority. Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) Secretariat Additional Chief Secretary
Habibullah Khan expressed concern to Peshawar Principal
Officer in a February 24 meeting that this new body provides
all three militant leaders with unfettered access to all of
South and North Waziristan. Baitullah Mehsud will be a main
beneficiary of this new access, giving his fighters easier
entry to the Afghanistan border through Maulvi Nazir's
Wazir-held territory. Before the deal, Mehsud had limited
access to the border from his portion of South Waziristan
because he was blocked either by Maulvi Nazir or Gul Bahadur.
While the alliance will not work as a tight top-down
militant organization, it will facilitate access and
coordination of various Pakistani Taliban as they cross into
Afghanistan. 

5. (C) While Khan had no hard facts, he detected the hand of
the Haqqani network in bringing these rival commanders
together. The new coordination, he feared, will allow the
Taliban to focus on sending militants across the border into
Afghanistan. Sirajuddin Haqqani also claimed in the press
that he had convinced the three rival Taliban leaders to
meet. Sirajuddin and his father Jalaluddin Haqqani lead much
of the Taliban militancy in eastern Afghanistan. Sirajuddin
often travels to the tribal areas of Pakistan, North
Waziristan in particular, and has served as a mediator
between these rival Taliban leaders. 

6. (S/NF) In the past, the Pakistani government has supported
Maulvi Nazir in an attempt to counter Baitullah Mehsud in
South Waziristan. In the spring of 2007, an open break
between Nazir and Mehsud took place over the presence of
"Uzbek" fighters in South Waziristan. The disagreement
culminated in an operation in which Pakistani security forces
fought alongside Nazir's followers to oust Uzbeks from the
area. While Nazir appeared to draw on genuine local anger
and desire to remove "Uzbeks," his activities as an al-Qaida
facilitator and promoter of cross-border attacks have always
complicated Pakistani efforts to sell this episode as a
"success" story. A South Waziristan-based contact told
Principal Officer Peshawar on February 24 that Mehsud and
Nazir are showing signs of getting past old disagreements and
that "Uzbeks" are re-appearing in growing numbers in the
area. 

7. (SBU) According to Pakistani newspapers, Ahmedzai Wazir
elders of South Waziristan, who are concerned about the new
alliance and the possibility of "Uzbeks" coming back into
their territory, questioned Maulvi Nazir about the deal with
rival Mehsud. At a meeting in Wana, South Waziristan Maulvi
Nazir assured the elders that each militant group will
continue to have its own independent status and remain
sovereign in their own territory. Nazir explained that the
alliance was formed "only to act together against the United
States" because the Taliban was concerned about the troop
surge in Afghanistan, according to Pakistan press reports.
The elders publicly cautioned Nazir that they would turn
against him if this new deal brought any harm to their areas. 

8. (C) While he did not touch on a possible ISI role in
brokering this new alliance, Habibullah Khan noted that
pressure has been building on the Pakistani military in the
Waziristans. The Pakistani military and then Northwest
Frontier Province Governor Orakzai quietly entered peace
deals with North Waziristan commanders in December 2007 and
with Baitullah Mehsud in February 2008 in order to achieve
relative peace. Those agreements came after a series of high
profile attacks on the military in the Waziristans, including
the kidnapping of over 250 security forces by Baitullah
Mehsud and Jan 2008 fighting at Ladha Fort in South
Waziristan. While violence directed at the military in the
Waziristans has been minor in the last few months, Peshawar
observers regularly note that the military remains concerned
with its ability to keep a lid on trouble in these two
agencies. Chief of Army Staff General Kayani believes the
respite offered by this latest agreement is necessary for his
stretched forces to continue fighting in Bajaur and Mohmand
agencies. However, the relative quiet in South and North
Waziristan has allowed Baitullah Mehsud to increasingly send
his fighters in other parts of the FATA and Northwest
Frontier Province, including Swat. 

9. (C) Khan also noted with deep dismay that this
announcement demonstrates that these militant commanders see
themselves in a strong enough position to form an alliance
that takes them one step closer to a formal territorial
takeover of the Waziristan as an "Islamic Emirate." South
Waziristan contacts also commented that there is an
increasing presence of Punjabi militants from Jaish-e
Muhammad in the Mehsud areas of South Waziristan. (Comment:
A development if accurate that is almost certainly of concern
to the Pakistani military. It is significant that Baitullah
Mehsud's strength and open militancy are drawing fighters
from places such as southern Punjab.) 

10. (C) As this new alliance formed, Mullah Omar ordered
militants in North and South Waziristan to immediately stop
their attacks on Pakistani security forces, according to
press reports. Omar said in a letter to the militants, "If
anybody really wants to wage jihad, they must fight the U.S.
and NATO troops inside Afghanistan." The letter also stated
that Omar was responsible for the agreement between Mehsud,
Nazir, and Bahadur, and that after this agreement "the
attacks on Pakistani security forces by the local Taliban
will decrease if not end completely." Mullah Omar continues
to exert considerable influence on the militants in South and
North Waziristan. Halting attacks against Pakistani forces
may increase the militants' safe haven space in Pakistan,
allowing the militants to cross the border to attack NATO
forces in Afghanistan. 

11. (C) Comment: It is too early to predict how effective
this new alliance will be in launching cross-border attacks
on U.S./NATO forces, but its formation will provide the group
with unfettered access to Afghanistan across North and South
Waziristan. It is another indication that the GOP's tribal
divide and conquer strategy against militants is not working,
at least not to our advantage. Pakistan's security forces,
however, may see limited downsides to an arrangement that
focuses militant attacks outside of Pakistan.

SECRET: GERMANY’S NEW INTERIOR MINISTER FACES STEEP

VZCZCXYZ0005
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RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T BERLIN 001393 

NOFORN
SIPDIS 

STATE FOR EUR, S/CT, L
DHS FOR OIA SCARDAVILLE 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL KHLS KJUS GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY'S NEW INTERIOR MINISTER FACES STEEP
LEARNING CURVE 

REF: A. BERLIN 1377
     B. BERLIN 1167
     C. BERLIN 988
     D. 2008 BERLIN 1455
     E. 2008 BERLIN 504 

Classified By: Robert A. Pollard, Minister-Counselor for Economic Affai
rs for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 

1. (C) SUMMARY: Germany's new federal interior minister,
Thomas de Maiziere, is known for being a competent
administrator who performed effectively over the past four
years as the Chancellery Chief of Staff.  De Maiziere is a
close confidant of Chancellor Merkel, their professional
relationship dates back to 1990, and he developed a
reputation as a reliable crisis manager and interagency
master over the past four years.  Although de Maiziere
previously served as a state interior minister in Saxony, he
has less direct experience dealing with the international
security issues - most prominently counterterrorism - that he
will face as federal interior minister.  Furthermore, de
Maiziere is not known for being ideological or outspoken.  In
this respect, de Maiziere represents a marked change from his
predecessor, powerhouse Wolfgang Schaeuble, who had strong
views on security policy and was willing to endure
considerable criticism to achieve his policy goals.  We do
not expect de Maiziere to push for further expanding law
enforcement powers of police and/or security services.  De
Maiziere indicates that he intends to focus on integration of
foreigners into German society and will continue the
Ministry's Islam Conference, a controversial Schaeuble
initiative that had advanced the country's discussion on
immigration and discrimination issues.  He also intends to
promote the further integration of former east and west
Germany.  END SUMMARY 

An Aristocratic Westerner Makes His Name in the East
--------------------------------------------- ------- 

2. (U) De Maiziere, 55, is a lawyer by training who was born
and raised in Bonn, but has spent nearly the last two decades
in the eastern states of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Saxony.
He is a descendent of the noble Maiziere-les-Metz family who,
as Huguenots, fled France for asylum in Prussia in the late
seventeenth century.  De Maiziere's father, Ulrich, was
Inspector General of the German Armed Forces.  His cousin,
Lothar, was the last, and only democratically elected,
Premier of the German Democratic Republic, who later served
as a minister in the Kohl government.  As a staffer in the
offices of Berlin Governing Mayor Richard von Weizsacker, and
later Eberhard Diepgen, de Maiziere participated in the
negotiations on German reunification.  After 1990, de
Maiziere worked to re-establish democratic structures in
eastern states starting first in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.
From 1998 through 2005, de Maiziere served in Saxony as head
of the State Chancery, and as Finance, Justice and Interior
Minister.  De Maiziere joined the Christian Democratic Union
(CDU) as a student in 1972.  De Maiziere won a direct mandate
in the September 27 national parliamentary election and is
now a member of the Bundestag representing the district of
Meissen in Saxony. 

3. (C) De Maiziere first met Angela Merkel in 1990 and his
recommendation of her to his cousin Lothar de Maiziere is
said to have facilitated her entry into CDU politics.
Chancellor Merkel and de Maiziere are known to have a very
close professional relationship and to share a similar sober
and analytical approach to governing.  De Maiziere is
reported to have performed well throughout his tenure as
Merkel's Chancellery Chief and Minister for Special Duties.
As Chancellery Chief of Staff, de Maiziere was known as a
consensus builder who understands and effectively works the 

interagency process, sometimes requiring competing ministers
to resolve disputes among themselves.  The Chancellor no
doubt appreciated de Maiziere's efforts to shield her from
these policy battles given her general propensity to stay
above the fray and to express an opinion on an issue only
when consensus has been reached at the cabinet level. 

De Maiziere Faces a Steep Learning Curve
---------------------------------------- 

4. (C) De Maiziere's experience in eastern Germany helped him
gain new responsibilities for the Federal Interior Ministry:
the entire Department of Eastern German affairs has been
moved from the Transportation and Urban Affairs Ministry to
the Interior Ministry.  In his remarks to ministry employees
on his first day in office, de Maiziere said that with this
move the interior ministry is now responsible for not only
immigrant integration, but also the integration of Eastern
and Western Germany and the cohesion of German society.  De
Maiziere will continue the German Islam Conference, an
initiative started by his predecessor, which seeks to improve
the integration of Germany's Muslim population and open a
dialogue between the government and Germany's Muslim
community.  The Islam Conference has met with some
controversy and came under scrutiny earlier this year when it
was discovered that some Muslim representatives were alleged
to have links with extremist groups. 

5. (S/NF) De Maiziere has some familiarity with security
issues given that his duties in the Chancellery included
overall coordination of Germany's intelligence services.  De
Maiziere was helpful in promoting cooperation between German
ministries and security services with USG counterparts both
during the 2007 Sauerland Islamic Jihad Union terrorist cell
case and following extremist threats surrounding the recent
national elections.  De Maiziere's predecessor Wolfgang
Schaeuble spent considerable time dealing with the issue of
terrorism and working to update Germany's legal frameworks
and expand the mandates of law enforcement agencies to ensure
they had the capabilities to address the phenomena.  In
contrast, de Maiziere said virtually nothing in public on the
issue of terrorism during his time in the Chancellery, and he
has not emphasized the topic since moving to Interior.
Therefore, there is some question concerning the depth of his
knowledge of the transnational character of terrorism,
radicalization pathways, and terrorists' increasing use of
the Internet and related technology to recruit, train and
organize, aspects of the issue that most affect Germany today. 

6. (C) During his first day remarks to employees, de Maiziere
made the peculiar statement that "the Interior Ministry is
responsible for internal matters, and the Foreign Ministry is
responsible for issues external to Germany."  This
characterization of the MoI's tasks contrasts sharply with EU
law enforcement integration initiatives under Schaeuble such
as the Pruem data sharing agreement.  Observers are concerned
that de Maiziere's limited perspective could result in
diminished bilateral cooperation and mark a significant
departure from former minister Schaeuble, who placed a heavy
emphasis throughout his tenure on increasing security
cooperation with European and other international partners.
De Maiziere would benefit from learning about the benefits of
international cooperation first hand from his counterparts at
the G6 meeting in London this week, which DHS Secretary
Napolitano and senior DoJ representatives will attend.
(Note: The G6 is an informal grouping of the interior
ministers of Germany, Italy, Spain, France, Poland and the
UK.  Schaeuble made a point of inviting the USG to G6
meetings that he hosted, a custom that UK Minister Jacqui
Smith is following for this week's London meeting.  Ref D.) 

Will de Maiziere be a Strong Security Partner?
--------------------------------------------- - 

7. (C) We do not expect de Maiziere to be aggressive in
pushing for expanded security powers.  However, there is less
need for this as two recent legislative packages have already
strengthened Germany's counterterrorism legal framework (Refs
C and E).  More relevant is whether de Maiziere will build on
Schaeuble's record of deepening U.S.-German security
cooperation, such as the successful negotiations of a
bilateral "Pruem-like" agreement to exchange information on
terrorism and serious crime suspects, as well as establish an
automated fingerprint checking system.  Final implementation
of our agreement is awaiting resolution of some concerns
raised by a Green Party Justice Senator from Hamburg.  We
will likely need support from de Maiziere to break this
impasse, but it is unclear whether de Maiziere is willing to
make the effort on an initiative that his predecessor
initiated and for which he received heavy criticism due to
data privacy concerns.  On the issue of resettlement of
Guantanamo detainees, de Maiziere has yet to express a
viewpoint one way or the other. 

8. (C) We anticipate that data protection and domestic
security issues will be a continuing theme that the new
coalition government of the Christian Democrats (CDU and CSU)
and Free Democrats (FDP) will struggle with.  During the
previous administration, the FDP regularly criticized former
interior minister Schaeuble for policies which the FDP
believed trampled on citizens' privacy rights (Ref B).
Germany's new Justice Minister Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger
(FDP) believes that Schaeuble went too far in giving police
new powers of investigation, and she was successful in
committing the new government to modify a number of these
powers and introducing added data protection measures in the
recently completed coalition agreement (Ref A).  The FDP has
found it politically expedient to cast personal freedoms and
security policy as mutually exclusive.  In this debate, de
Maiziere's greatest advantage is that he is not Schaeuble.
As Interior Minister, de Maiziere is expected to support
existing laws and practices initiated by his predecessor, and
his reputation for reasonableness and consensus-building
should serve him well in these discussions.
MURPHY

TAGESSPIEGEL: Die STASI kannte viele Polizei-Geheimnisse

Karl-Heinz Kurras – Foto: dpa

Einen Einfluss auf die West-Berliner Polizei hatte das MfS nicht, das haben Forscher der FU aufgedeckt. Nach dem Fall des Stasi-Agenten und Polizisten Kurras hatte Polizeipräsident Glietsch eine Untersuchung in Auftrag gegeben.

Er war einer von wenigen, dafür aber der Wichtigste. Der West-Berliner Polizist Karl-Heinz Kurras hatte als Zuträger des Ost-Berliner Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit nicht seinesgleichen. Das ist eins der Ergebnisse der Studie „Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit der DDR und die West-Berliner Polizei“. Der zur Freien Universität gehörende Forschungsverbund SED-Staat hat sie im Auftrag des Polizeipräsidenten Dieter Glietsch erstellt.

Ein weiteres Ergebnis: Kein Stasi-Mann hat es bis in die höheren Ränge der West-Berliner Polizei geschafft. Das MfS kannte viele Einzelheiten, hatte aber keine manipulative Kraft. Vor allem dieses Ergebnis nahm Glietsch mit einer Zufriedenheit hin: Die Studie habe „Sicherheit schaffen“ sollen, dass es keinen nennenswerten Einfluss der Stasi auf die Führung der Polizei im Westen gegeben hat.

Das Ergebnis habe ihn „nicht überrascht“, so der Polizeipräsident – schließlich würden Polizisten in ihrer Karriere bei vielen Gelegenheiten überprüft.

Um so eifriger versorgten Polizeibeamte der unteren Dienstgrade die Stasi – auch wenn es nie besonders viele waren. Durchschnittlich zehn bis zwanzig Polizisten standen in den untersuchten Jahren 1950 bis 1972 im Dienst und im Sold des MfS, so die Studie. Laut Jochen Staadt vom Forschungsverbund war die Stasi an allem interessiert, was sie bekommen konnte: Fotos von Polizeiwachen, Namenslisten von Polizisten, biografische Einzelheiten, etwa zu finanziellen Verhältnissen, Ausstattung der Polizei, Waffendepots. Man habe so viel wie möglich für den Fall eines militärischen Angriffs auf West-Berlin wissen wollen – das sei die Strategie hinter der Informationsbeschaffung gewesen, so Staadt. Wäre es zu einem solchen Angriff gekommen, so der Historiker, hätte Kurras wohl mit seinem Führungsoffizier direkt zusammengearbeitet: Major Werner Eiserbeck, Kurras’ Mann beim MfS, sollte Dienststellenleiter in Schöneberg werden, wenn es die Stasi bis in den Westen geschafft hätte.

180 Aktenbände gehören zu dem ausgewerteten „Objektvorgang West-Berliner Polizei“. Dass es den Vorgang bei der Stasi-Unterlagenbehörde gab, wussten bis 2009 sogar in dieser Behörde nicht viele. Eine Historikerin stieß auf Berichte eines „Otto Bohl“ – und der erwies sich bei der Durchsicht der Akten als der Polizist Karl-Heinz Kurras, bis dahin bekannt als der Mann, der am 2. Juni 1967 bei einer Demonstration den Studenten Benno Ohnesorg erschoss.

In der Debatte über Kurras und das MfS kam die Frage auf, ob die Stasi den Auftrag für die tödlichen Schüsse auf den Studenten Benno Ohnesorg gegeben hatte – nichts spricht dafür. Außerdem kam die Praxis der Stasi-Überprüfung früherer Volkspolizisten zur Sprache.

Polizeipräsident Glietsch erinnerte am Mittwoch daran: 9000 ehemalige Volkspolizisten waren 1990 in die Berliner Polizei übernommen worden. 7600 wurden damals auf eine Stasi-Belastung untersucht, mehr als 1100 deshalb entlassen. In einer weiteren Überprüfung wurden fast 3000 höhere West-Berliner Polizisten auf eine Zusammenarbeit mit der Stasi überprüft – das schien es nicht gegeben zu haben. Kurras konnte damals nicht mehr auffallen – er war bereits entlassen.

Noch immer sind nicht alle Stasi-Zuträger namentlich bekannt. Die jetzt veröffentlichte Studie enthält keine Klarnamen – die werden nur intern genannt. Glietsch zufolge soll nun die Staatsanwaltschaft prüfen, ob ehemalige West-Berliner Polizisten noch wegen Geheimnisverrat zu belangen sind.
In einer weiteren Studie solle der Forschungsverbund nun die Zeit von 1972 bis 1989 untersuchen, sagte Glietsch. Klaus Schroeder, Leiter des Forschungsverbunds, machte dem Polizeipräsidenten ein Kompliment : Die Polizei sei die erste staatliche Institution, die sich derart erforschen lasse. Und das Ergebnis der nächsten Studie sei „offen“.

http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/die-stasi-kannte-viele-kleine-polizei-geheimnisse/3981752.html

TOP-SECRET: IRAN: AHMADINEJAD’S STAR FADING IN THE ARAB WORLD?

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000316 

NOFORN
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/3/2019
TAGS: PREL PROP PGOV PINR IR
SUBJECT: IRAN: AHMADINEJAD'S STAR FADING IN THE ARAB WORLD? 

DUBAI 00000316  001.2 OF 003 

CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy Richardson, Acting Director, Iran
Regional Presence Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (U) This is a joint cable by the Iran Regional Presence
Office and the Dubai Regional Media Hub. 

2. (S/NF) Summary: Since Iran's June 12 presidential elections,
Arab media have intensely focused their coverage on the
demonstrations in Iran and the international community's
response to the government crackdown.  Whereas in recent years
the Arab media have limited their commentary to Iran's external
relations -- particularly its regional ambitions and the
international implications of its nuclear program -- during the
post-election crisis Arab commentators have, for the first time,
poked a hole in the veneer of the Islamic Republic's internal
political system and explored its underpinnings more closely,
often challenging the system's very legitimacy in on-air
commentary.  A number of these commentators have opined that
Ahmadinejad has, at least in the near term, lost standing among
some moderate Arabs, who have come to view Ahmadinejad's
administration as oppressive, unpopular, and undemocratic, much
as they criticize many Arab governments.  However, all of the
Arab media figures we spoke to emphasized that Arab criticism of
Ahmadinejad has not necessarily led to increased support for
U.S. policy in the region.  On the contrary, closer analysis
suggests that Ahmadinejad's eroding popularity in the Arab world
has created a scenario in which any U.S. effort to engage the
current Iranian government will be perceived by a wide spectrum
of Arabs as accommodation with Ahmadinejad. 

ALL EYES ON IRAN 

---------------- 

3. (S/NF) Iran's post-election crisis has dominated the Arab
media's news coverage for the past seven weeks.  The
demonstrations have garnered special coverage on Al-Arabiya and
have consistently been among the top headlines on Al-Jazeera.
The marketing director of the Middle East Broadcasting Company
(MBC), parent company of Al-Arabiya, told IRPO/DRMH that
Al-Arabiya's viewership has skyrocketed since the June 12
election.  Al-Arabiya's news website has also experienced a
dramatic increase in visits from users living in the region
between Tripoli and Amman, which the marketing director, a
native of Lebanon, attributed to the tremendous interest Sunni
Arabs have in watching the drama in Iran unfold.  Coverage of
Iran's election aftermath is not limited to straightforward news
reporting; editorial pages, media commentaries, and the Arab
blogosphere have also been abuzz with debate over the
demonstrations, the international community's response, and the
implications of these events for the Arab world.  While Iran's
elections may no longer command daily headlines in the Western
media, nearly all the Arab media commentators with whom we spoke
recognized that the Arab street remains firmly focused on the
recent unrest and continuing political drama playing out in Iran. 

THE BENEVOLENT DICTATOR'S FALL FROM GRACE? 

------------------------------------------ 

4. (S/NF) A Syrian journalist and blogger, who owns a media
consultancy firm in Dubai, believes that many in the Arab street
initially viewed Ahmadinejad when he came to power in 2005 as a
"benevolent dictator."  Citing the tradition of the Mahdi, the
media consultant argued that both Shi'a and Sunni Arabs are
taught from early childhood to await the arrival of a strong and
unimpeachable figure who will lead the Muslim world.  The media
consultant maintained that even secular Arabs view the world,
albeit unintentionally, with this ingrained mindset.  Our
contact argued that Ahmadinejad played in to this narrative, and
when Ahmadinejad arrived on the international stage many Arabs
saw him, in contrast to their own flawed leaders, as a humble
and pious man who was brave enough to stand up for his people
and the greater Muslim world by confronting Israel and the West
head on.  However,  both the intensely competitive campaign
period and the forceful reaction by the Iranian people to the
official election results have led some moderate Arabs to
rethink Ahmadinejad's  true disposition. The election, the media
consultant said, led some Arabs to understand that despite his
astutely crafted and well-marketed image in the Arab world, 

DUBAI 00000316  002.2 OF 003 

Ahmadinejad is resented by many Iranians for domestic
mismanagement, incompetence, and corruption.  Because of this
public fall from grace, so the media consultant told us,
Ahmadinejad is no longer the "untouchable, holy figure" in the
Arab world he once was -- his flaws have brought him down to the
level of the Arab world's own imperfect leaders. An Al-Arabiya
executive, speaking at a recent conference, said that the
election aftermath had destroyed the image many Arabs had of the
Islamic Revolution, and Ahmadinejad's legitimacy as a leader was
now open to question. [NOTE: The media consultant attributed
Iran's perceived "victories" over the U.S. and the West to
Ahmadinejad, as opposed to Supreme Leader Khamenei.  While
conventional wisdom in the West is that Khamenei has the final
say over Iran's most vital interests, including the nuclear
program, the consultant's comments suggest that the Arab street
views Ahmadinejad as much more influential in the Islamic
Republic's decision-making system.] 

POST-ELECTION CRISIS NOT A SILVER BULLET FOR ARAB REGIMES 

--------------------------------------------- ------------ 

5. (S/NF) Ahmadinejad's fall from grace notwithstanding, most of
the Arab media commentators with whom we spoke agreed that Arab
governments have a limited ability to capitalize on
Ahmadinejad's missteps because of the skeletons in their own
closets.   Al-Arabiya's former Tehran bureau chief observed that
Arab regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who no doubt
would like to exploit Ahmadinejad's current vulnerabilities,
have remained noticeably silent.  In his view, they realize that
any statement condemning Tehran's crackdown on peaceful
dissidents would appear untenably hypocritical in the eyes of
their own citizens.  He considers this public silence yet
another "missed opportunity" for Arab leaders to take a stand to
counter Ahmadinejad's rhetoric and further detract from his
popularity with the Arab street. 

NEW SPACE TO DISAGREE WITH AHMADINEJAD AND THE U.S. 

--------------------------------------------- ------ 

6. (S/NF)  All of the Arab commentators and news media figures
we spoke to agreed that the U.S. "played it right" throughout
the post-election crisis by staying away from detailed public
comments that could be perceived as interventionist.  However,
the Arab commentators were quick to distinguish between
criticism of Ahmadinejad in the Arab street and support for U.S.
policies.  The Syrian media consultant said that the heated
debates before the election, in which the three challengers --
Mousavi, Karroubi, and Reza'i -- publicly criticized Ahmadinejad
for corruption and economic mismanagement, made it clear to
Arabs that this election was about Iran, not the U.S.  This
distinction, coupled with the U.S.' restraint in commenting on
the election, provided an unprecedented window for Arab
commentators to criticize Ahmadinejad without appearing to side
with the U.S. 

7. (S/NF) Examples of this played out during two separate
appearances by the Dubai Regional Media Hub Acting Director on
live panel discussions on Abu Dhabi TV and Lebanese New TV
regarding regional issues, including events in Iran.  Whereas
fellow Arab panelist resolutely disagreed with her comments in
support of U.S. policy in the region, in particular the peace
process, they felt free to openly criticize Ahmadinejad's
government, which they refrained from doing in the past, for its
internal crackdown and regional ambitions.  One Saudi
commentator contrasted Turkish regional mediation, which he
described as a positive force in the region, with Iranian
regional intervention, which he called pernicious and
destabilizing.  A Lebanese commentator noted the irony of Iran
accusing outsiders of interfering in its internal affairs when
there is not "one corner of the Arab world" where Iran does not
intervene behind the scenes. 

AHMADINEJAD DOWN BUT NOT OUT 

DUBAI 00000316  003.2 OF 003 

---------------------------- 

8. (S/NF) As Al-Arabiya's Tehran bureau chief noted, while
Ahmadinejad's image may have taken a hit in the Arab street as a
result of the government's handling of domestic dissent, the
damage is not necessarily permanent.  In his view, the Arab
street is notoriously emotional and "could easily be turned to
support Ahmadinejad once again" with some trumped up slogans and
public bravado.  The bureau chief believed that, in the
perceived leadership void left by Arab leaders on regional
issues, Ahmadinejad could rally public opinion by capitalizing
on any number of sensitive issues for the Arab street, most
prominent among them Israel, at upcoming international fora.
The Syrian media consultant, too, cautioned the U.S. not to
overestimate any erosion in Ahmadinejad's popularity with Arabs.
 In his opinion, Ahmadinejad has only lost standing with a
segment of moderates in the Arab street; he believes that most
Arabs are so polarized, either for or against Ahmadinejad, that
the allegations of voter fraud and the violent post-election
crackdown on protesters will not permanently sway their
positions one way or the other. 

ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAN: NO PLEASING THE ARAB STREET 

--------------------------------------------- ---- 

9. (S/NF) Comment:  Once the dust settles on Iran's
post-election crisis, Arabs will look to see if the U.S. deals
with Ahmadinejad as it pursues its nuclear nonproliferation
agenda despite the lingering questions over the legitimacy of
his election.  If the U.S. enters negotiations with
Ahmadinejad's government, moderate Arab observers may argue that
the U.S., for the sake of its own national interest, has cut a
deal at the expense of pro-democracy advocates -- just as many
in the Arab street believe the U.S. has done with a number of
Arab regimes.  Those Arabs who continue to support Ahmadinejad,
on the other hand, may perceive negotiations as a personal
victory for a humble leader who brought the U.S. to its knees
through steadfast resistance.  Thus, Ahmadinejad's "fall from
grace" in the Arab world may have created yet another obstacle
to improved Arab perceptions of the U.S. -- in which engagement
with an Ahmadinejad-led government is now a potentially
lose-lose scenario in which Arabs at both ends of the pro- and
anti-Ahmadinejad spectrum will consider negotiations with
Teheran an accommodation with the Iranian president.
RICHARDSON

Solidarity and Martial Law in Poland: 25 Years Later

With a foreword by
Lech Walesa

Washington D.C., August 5th, 2011 – Twenty-five years ago this week, at 6:00 a.m. on December 13, 1981, Polish Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski appeared on national TV to declare that a state of martial law existed in the country. Earlier in the night, military and police forces had begun securing strategic facilities while ZOMO special police rounded up thousands of members of the Solidarity trade union, including its celebrated leader, Lech Walesa.

A quarter-century later, the George Washington University-based National Security Archive is publishing, through Central European University Press a collection of previously secret documentation entitled From Solidarity to Martial Law, edited by Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne (Walesa provided the volume’s foreword). The documents, many of which have never been published in English, are from inside Solidarity, the Polish communist party leadership, the Kremlin as well as the White House and CIA. They provide a vivid history of the Solidarity period, one of the most dramatic episodes in the Cold War.

While martial law was highly effective in suppressing the union and restoring communist party control in Poland, the authorities could not eradicate the political movement that had been awakened, and that Solidarity both led and symbolized. In 1983, Walesa would win the Nobel Peace Prize and before the end of the decade, Poles would elect Eastern Europe’s first non-communist government since World War II.

Although a crackdown of some kind against the union had long been feared and anticipated (ever since Solidarity’s founding in August 1980), when it came it nonetheless took most observers outside of Poland by surprise. For over a year, Jaruzelski’s patrons in the Kremlin had been applying extraordinary political pressure on Warsaw to crush the opposition, but Jaruzelski did not inform them that he was finally ready to act until approximately two days before.

In the United States, observers and policy-makers were also caught off-guard despite having had a highly-placed spy in the Polish Defense Ministry until just weeks before the crackdown. Part of the explanation was that senior officials focused on the possibility of a Soviet invasion, not an internal “solution.” An invasion, especially after the Red Army’s move into Afghanistan two years earlier, would have created a major international crisis.

But U.S. officials also misread the Polish leadership, including Jaruzelski, documents show. In evaluating the possibility of an outside invasion earlier in 1981, State Department and CIA analyses concluded that even the Polish communist party would resist a Soviet move, along with the rest of the population, and would use martial law as a way to “maximize deterrence” against Moscow. In fact, internal Polish and Soviet records make clear that Jaruzelski and his colleagues were intent on imposing military rule for purposes of reasserting control over society, a goal they fully shared with the Kremlin.

The documents include:

  • Internal Solidarity union records of leadership meetings and strategy sessions
  • Transcripts of Polish Politburo and Secretariat meetings
  • Transcripts of Soviet leadership discussions
  • Detailed accounts of one-on-one meetings and telephone conversations between Leonid Brezhnev and Polish leaders Stanislaw Kania and Jaruzelski
  • White House discussions of the unfolding crisis and a possible Soviet invasion
  • CIA analyses
  • Communications from CIA agent Col. Ryszard Kuklinski who fed the U.S. highly classified information on Poland’s plans for martial law
  • Materials from the Catholic Church including Pope John Paul II
  • A page from the notebook of key Soviet adjutant Gen. Viktor Anoshkin showing that Jaruzelski pleaded with Moscow to be prepared to send in troops just before martial law — shedding rare light on the unresolved historical and political question of Jaruzelski’s motives regarding a possible Soviet intervention

The new book contains 95 documents in translation, representing sources from the archives of eight countries, and thus providing a multi-dimensional, multi-national perspective on the key aspects of the Solidarity crisis. The documents are accompanied by descriptive “headnotes” explaining the significance of each item, along with a lengthy chronology of events and other research aids. A major overview by the editors describes and locates the events in their historical context.


Document samples in From Solidarity to Martial Law
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
[Note: document descriptions appear at the top of each document]

Document 1: Message from Ryszard Kuklinski on Impending Warsaw Pact Invasion, December 4, 1980

Document 2: Memorandum from Ronald I. Spiers to the Secretary of State, “Polish Resistance to Soviet Intervention,” June 15, 1981

Document 3: CIA National Intelligence Daily, “USSR-Poland: Polish Military Attitudes,” June 20, 1981

Document 4: Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs, “Supplement No. 2: Planned Activity of the Ministry of Internal Affairs,” November 25, 1981

Document 5: Solidarity NCC Presidium, “Position Taken by the Presidium of the National Coordinating Commission and Leaders of the NSZZ,” December 3, 1981

Document 6: Protocol No. 18 of PUWP CC Politburo Meeting, December 5, 1981

Document 7: Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, December 10, 1981

Document 8: Notebook Entries of Lt. Gen. Viktor Anoshkin, December 11, 1981

CONFIDENTIAL: BRAZIL: MORE OBSERVATIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY

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OO RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #2293/01 3051751
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 011751Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7162
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 5761
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 3987
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RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1003
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE PRIORITY 0158
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 2020
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 002293 

SIPDIS 

NOFORN
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016
TAGS: PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: MORE OBSERVATIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY IN
LULA'S SECOND TERM 

REF: BRASILIA 2245 

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D). 

1. (C) Introduction.  Reftel discussed Mission,s views that,
despite interesting media reports that President Lula da
Silva,s foreign policy in a second term could shift toward
closer ties with the U.S., we could not see yet concrete
evidence of such a trend.  We remain circumspect on this
question.  At the same time, candid and encouraging
conversations with top GOB officials on the day after Lula,s
strong victory at the polls left Ambassador and emboffs
wondering about the possibility that some change may be
brewing.  We report what we heard below, with the caveat that
we remain in a cautious "wait and see mode" for the time
being.  End introduction. 

2. (C) Ambassador and PolCouns visited the Planalto Palace on
30 October, and found a Presidency in an open mood of
jubilant celebration.  A steady column of VIPs streamed
through for audiences with re-elected President Lula.  A
relieved and buoyant Gilberto Carvalho, Chief of Lula,s
Personal Staff, received Ambassador and poloff for a courtesy
call, which turned into a compelling conversation about the
direction of policy in Lula,s second term.  Carvalho, who is
perhaps Lula,s closest long-time advisor, made the following
comments: 

--On foreign policy, Carvalho said that Lula,s first term
had seen a broad opening of Brazil to new alliances and
diplomatic arrangements worldwide.  Now, with this base
established, the second Lula government will re-focus
priority on "quality relationships with traditional
partners."  Specifically, for Brazil to grow with new
investment, the GOB will need to engage more intensively with
the United States, Carvalho stressed. 

--Ambassador welcomed this observation, but said he remained
concerned when he heard certain Brazilian officials speak of
the need to "counterbalance" against the U.S., and opined
that two democracies should be able to debate and work
together directly, without such contrivances.  Carvalho was
emphatic in agreeing, said there will be no further
discussion of counterbalances, and asked for the
Ambassador,s understanding if rhetoric during the election
campaign had occasionally seemed critical of the U.S.  He
again assured Ambassador that the second Lula government
wants investment and growth, and sees relations with the U.S.
as central to this. 

--At the conclusion of the meeting, Carvalho provided his
private telephone numbers to Ambassador and PolCouns and
encouraged them to contact him directly at any time if there
was problematic development in relations between the two
governments, of if they wished to present an issue directly
to President Lula.  Carvalho said he would welcome this
direct channel with the Ambassador. 

3. (S/NF) In a separate meeting at Planalto with General
Jorge Armando Felix, Lula,s Minister for Institutional
Security, Ambassador, PolCouns and Regional Affairs Chief
raised the subject of intensified U.S.-Brazil exchanges and
cooperation in intelligence and security.  Ambassador noted
that President Lula, in a brief aside at the UNGA in New
York, had encouraged continued engagement with General Felix,
presumably on such issues.  General Felix then announced that
he had, subsequent to an earlier meeting with Ambassador,
commissioned a formal paper outlining specific areas for
consultation and collaboration at the policy level with the
USG in the intelligence field.   Ambassador and Felix agreed 

BRASILIA 00002293  002 OF 002 

that the GOB could also specify in the paper specific
equipment or training they might require, and decided to plan
together for a high-level bilateral intelligence meeting
early in 2007 in Brasilia. 

4. (C) In an earlier conversation on the same day,
Development and Industry Minister Luiz Furlan told Ambassador
that Lula was pressing him to stay on in a second government,
and Furlan appeared to be considering this option.  Furlan, a
moderate with a business background who has long pressed
within Lula,s cabinet for closer cooperation with the United
States, seemed to be of the view that Lula,s second term
priorities would be shifting in the direction of closer
engagement with the U.S. and other developed nations. 

5. (C) Comment.  Our senior interlocutors were in high
spirits yesterday, with a kind word for the world, including
the U.S.   But without major changes in the foreign
ministry's senior staffing and orientation, we wonder about
the viability of a tilt toward the U.S. and developing world,
and away from the south-south priorities of the first Lula
term.  Nonetheless, it is intriguing that we have received
such a steady stream of strong signals from senior Lula
advisors on the day after his victory.  Watch this space. 

Sobel

CONFIDENTIAL: LEBANON: BELLEMARE ANXIOUS FOR MORE USG ASSISTANCE

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3034
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RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2905
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001348 

NOFORN
SIPDIS 

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, IO/FO-HOOK, WARLICK,
IO/UNP-AMORRISON, L/FO-JBELLINGER, JTHESSIN,
L/AN-LJACOBSON, L/UNA-TBUCHWALD, INR/GGI-MARGULIES,
CIA/CNC-JFINKEL, JBRODERERICK, CIA/CTC-JBEAN, DOJ-JEVY,
USUN-KHALILZAD, WOLFF, SCHEDLBAUER, NSC FOR
ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PINR UNSC LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: BELLEMARE ANXIOUS FOR MORE USG ASSISTANCE
THAN HE HAS SEEN 

REF: THE HAGUE 744 

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 

SUMMARY
------- 

1. (S/NF)  In a September 12 meeting with the Ambassador,
Daniel Bellemare, Commissioner of the UN Independent
International Investigative Commission (UNIIIC) made three
specific requests for USG assistance and additional requests
for USG action.  First, he asked that the USG provide
intelligence information that UNIIIC has formally requested.
Second, that the USG loan UNIIIC two criminal investigators
TDY.  UNIIIC needs "investigators who can question a witness"
to interview some 200 persons currently in prison who may
have some relevant information.  Third, that the USG urge the
UK to do more to help UNIIIC, particularly with intelligence
information (the UK has provided loaned personnel). 

2. (S/NF)  In addition, Bellemare asked for USG support when
the Management Committee considers the Tribunal operating
budget on September 25 -- the same day that Lebanese
President Sleiman will meet President Bush in Washington.  He
also raised the prospect of consultations among the P-5 on a
new resolution to clarify some legal issues.  Finally he
repeated earlier requests for a USG reaction to 26 sketches
of possible suspects that UNIIIC had given the USG and asked
about getting access to alleged Hizballah defectors
reportedly in the U.S. 

3. (S/NF)  On other matters, Bellemare said that the GOL has
not asked that UNIIIC investigate the latest political
assassination (the September 10 attack on opposition Druze
member Saleh Aridi).  He is concerned about a new
Telecommunication Ministry directive that may impede his
plans for using wiretaps.  End Summary. 

GOL HAS NOT ASKED THAT UNIIIC
INVESTIGATE LATEST ASSASSINATION
-------------------------------- 

4. (S/NF)  The Ambassador and DCM met on September 12 with
Daniel Bellemare, Commissioner of the UN Independent
International Investigative Commission (UNIIIC), in his
office in Monteverde.  The Ambassador asked if UNIIIC would
investigate the case of Saleh Aridi, a Druze political
official assassinated in a car bomb attack near Beirut on
September 10.  Bellemare explained that for UNIIIC to take on
a case, first the GOL must ask the UN SYG, then the SYG and
Security Council must approve.  He said that the GOL had
shown no indication that it would request that UNIIIC
investigate the Aridi killing.  UNIIIC is interested in
finding out more about the Aridi attack, since details are
similar to other cases it is investigating.  If it is not
invited to investigate but wants information about a case,
UNIIIC must submit a request to the Lebanese chief
prosecutor.  The criteria the GOL uses to decide on
requesting UNIIIC assistance is "a mystery to me" Bellemare
said.  (NOTE:  The Aridi assassination is the first of a
pro-Syrian politician.  END NOTE.) 

WIRETAPPING
----------- 

5. (S/NF)  Bellemare was concerned about something he had
learned the day before that might affect wiretapping.  The
Telecommunications Ministry had directed two private telecom
companies in Lebanon to inform the Ministry about any
requests for wiretapping.  He noted that it is well known
that the Internal Security Forces (ISF), the national police,
conduct wiretapping even though the legal basis for their
authority to do so is weak.  The Telecom Ministry's move may
have been directed against the ISF.  The order, however, also
could limit the ability of UNIIIC to conduct wiretaps if the
phone companies fear that they will have to report those
efforts to the Telecommunications Ministry. 

6. (S/NF)  The Ambassador asked if Bellemare believed the
action was targeted at UNIIIC, noting that the new
Telecommunications Minister is from the opposition.
Bellemare replied that he was not in a position to say.  At
his meeting with PM Fouad Siniora earlier in the week, on
September 8, Siniora told Bellemare to inform him if he runs
into any problems with cooperation from government officials.
 He said he might discuss this with the PM if it looks as if
this new telecom directive will be a problem, but first he
will meet with officials of the two telecom companies next
week.  The Ambassador offered to support his efforts at
resolving this issue. 

7. (S/NF)  Bellemare noted that at his August 14 meeting in
The Hague with the USG Interagency Working Group (IWG), he
had asked for USG help with wiretapping capability.  He said
that trying to work wiretapping through the Lebanese ISF or
military intelligence would be like "putting the names (of
targets) in the paper".  He explained that UN legal experts
were currently looking into the possibility that UNIIIC has
legal authority to carry out wiretaps.  Beyond legal
authority for wiretapping, though, Bellemare said he needs
technical capability. 

ASSISTANCE FROM THE USG
----------------------- 

8. (S/NF)  Bellemare expressed frustration that USG has not
provided more in response to his requests for assistance, and
noted that he has discussed this with State Department
officials.  He outlined three requests for USG assistance for
his investigation. 

-- One, provide intelligence information that UNIIIC has
formally requested, or inform him that it cannot be provided,
so that he knows not to pursue the requests. 

-- Two, provide two loaned criminal analysts on TDY.  UNIIIC
needs "investigators who can question a witness" to interview
some 200 persons currently in prison who may have some
relevant informtion. 

-- Three, using USG influence, urge the U government to
provide more to UNIIIC, particulaly regarding intelligence
information.  Bellemare said he has requests in to MI-6, but
has not received much.  On personnel, Scotland Yard has
provided a loaned investigator. 

9. (S/NF)  Bellemare showed a good understanding of the
problems associated with complying with the first two
requests from his several meetings with USG officials, but
his frustration was nonetheless evident.  "You are the key
player.  If the U.S. doesn't help me, who will?"  The USG has
"a big investment in the Tribunal" and being more forthcoming
on UNIIIC's requests is a way of making that investment pay
off, he said. 

10. (S/NF)  During the meeting, Bellemare made several other
requests for USG action: 

-- USG support when the Committee considers the Tribunal
operating budget, scheduled for September 25, the same day
that Lebanese President Sleiman will meet President Bush in
Washington.  He warned that the budget includes high travel
costs, but that these are necessary because of the need for
frequent travel between the Hague and Lebanon. Bellemare
thanked the USG for what he said was a much improved attitude
on the part of the Tribunal Management Committee.  His
requests have been more favorably received than was the case
previously. 

-- He raised the prospect of consultations among the P-5 on a
new resolution to clarify some legal issues.  He mused about
the possibility of getting Chapter VII authority for the
Tribunal via such a new resolution, but seemed to think that
was not doable in the Council. 

-- He asked for a reaction to the 26 sketches of possible
suspects that UNIIIC had given the USG. 

-- Finally, he asked about getting access to alleged
Hizballah defectors reportedly in the U.S., or a definitive
negative response to the request.  The answers the USG has
given him so far on this subject, he said, have been not
sufficiently definitive. 

INTERVIEWS IN SYRIA
------------------- 

11. (S/NF)  On this issue, Bellemare repeated what he said in
the IWG meeting (reftel): that he did not want to go to Syria
until the USG or other sources had provided names of leads he
should ask to interview and other information.  If Syria
denied his request to interview these people, then he would
have evidence of Syrian non-cooperation.  Just asking would
give some indication to others in Syria where his
investigation might be headed, which could provoke more
cooperation "if I hit the right person." 

12. (S/NF)  Bellemare emphasized the urgency for responding
to his request related to Syria, first, because UNIIIC's
mandate and with it Chapter VII authority expires at the end
of the year, and second, the importance of conducting the
interviews before the interviewees disappear by being killed
or other means. 

OTHER ISSUES: NEW MINISTER OF JUSTICE,
UNIIIC PRESS SPOKESPERSON
------------------------------ 

13. (C )  Bellemare said he had a very positive impression of
new GOL Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar, who had told
Bellemare he wanted to be helpful.  Najjar's predecessor,
Charles Rizk, was a vocal supporter of the Tribunal but also
known for public criticisms of Bellemare and the previous
Commissioner, Serge Brammertz.  Bellemare, a Canadian, noted
that Najjar had taught at McGill University in Montreal and
they had some mutual acquaintances. 

14. (SBU)  UNIIIC now has a press spokesperson who started
work the week before, Bellemare reported. The official had
good relevant experience as the spokesperson for the
Yugoslavia Tribunal and most recently for the UN Legal
Affairs office.  The new spokesperson is currently working up
a strategy for UNIIIC's press interaction. 

15. (C)  Bellemare said he had been advised by several
persons to not make statements in public that might be seen
as disrupting the current relative calm in Lebanon.  He
planned to follow that advice,  (NOTE: Bellemare traveled to
Saudi Arabia September 15, we understand.  We will seek
further information from UNIIIC contacts.  END NOTE.)
SISON

SECRET: CHINA ARMS EMBARGO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001510 

SIPDIS 

NOFORN 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2014
TAGS: PARM PHUM PREL PINR EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: APRIL 2 PSC DEBATE AND NEXT
STEPS FOR U.S. 

REF: A. USEU TODAY 04/06/04
     B. BRUSSELS 1464
     C. STATE 68263
     D. PRAGUE 390 

Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 

-------
SUMMARY
------- 

1. (S/NF) The EU Political and Security Committee (PSC)
discussed the EU arms embargo on China during a heated 90
minute exchange on April 2.  PSC Ambassadors generally agreed
that the issue -- of whether, when and how to lift the
embargo -- should be sent back down to working groups for
further study before being presented to political groups for
a decision.  France objected, however, and succeeded in
getting agreement to discuss the issue at the April 26 FMs
meeting (GAERC) -- but failed in its campaign to secure an
early decision.  The debate will likely continue well into
the Dutch EU Presidency.  This cable draws on a detailed
readout and a sensitive internal report provided to Poloff by
UK and Hungarian contacts (please protect accordingly), as
well as background provided in recent days by other
interlocutors.  It also offers a strategy for continuing US
engagement. 

--------------------------------------
PSC Reacts Badly to Latest US Demarche
-------------------------------------- 

2. (S/NF) PSC Ambassadors reportedly arrived at the April 2
meeting to find copies of ref C demarche sitting on their
otherwise empty desks.  The demarche was received badly
because it gave the impression that "big brother was
watching," and because it appeared timed as a heavyhanded and
hubristic attempt to influence the PSC, according to our UK
contact.  Some reps, led by Greek Ambassador
Paraskevoupoulos, objected to the Council Secretariat's
distribution of the demarche under Council Secretariat cover
and with a Secretariat identifying number.  He argued that
the document had no business being circulated by the
Secretariat, and insisted that it be stricken from EU 

SIPDIS
records.  Ambassadors also reacted against what they
perceived as the threatening tone of our demarche. 

3. (S/NF) The Financial Times' front page article on April 2
about the US demarche campaign also enflamed the Ambassadors
because it appeared directly aimed at Friday's PSC
discussion.  Irish Ambassador Kelleher reportedly opened the
meeting by waving the article in the air and imploring his
colleagues to protect the confidentiality of internal EU
deliberations.  Poloff pointed out that the timing of the
latest US demarche was a coincidence, as we were previously
unaware that the PSC was scheduled to discuss the issue on
that day.  (COMMENT: Our demarche was received badly not so
much because of its substance, but because of the way it was
presented.  Our UK contact faulted the Irish and the Council
Secretariat for the way the demarche was handled in the PSC, 

SIPDIS
and also the awkward timing that made it seem, along with the
FT article, tailor-made to influence the April 2 discussion.
END COMMENT). 

-----------------------------------------
National Positions: France versus Denmark
----------------------------------------- 

4. (S/NF) According to our UK contact, France staked out a
"zero flexibility" position on lifting the embargo, and is
opposed to any talk of applying conditionality (i.e. by
insisting on further human rights progress by China and/or
strengthening the Code of Conduct prior to lifting the
embargo).  The Danes are reportedly still leading the
opposition, and have circulated to EU partners a list of ten
human rights conditions that they believe China should meet
before the embargo is lifted (we have not yet obtained a copy
of this list).  Other EU Member States are lining up
somewhere in between, although "all agree in principle" that
the embargo should be lifted if certain conditions are met.
The debate from now on will focus on defining conditions and
timing. 

5. (S/NF) Following is a summary of national interventions
made at the April 2 PSC: 

-- France: The embargo is anachronistic and must go; willing
to discuss timing but not conditionality because China would
not accept human rights conditionality; likewise would be
contradictory to enhance the Code of Conduct specifically for
China while also lifting the embargo; opposed also to making
Code of Conduct legally binding; wants issue to remain
political; opposed to sending it down to working groups. 

-- Denmark: Any decision to lift the embargo must be linked
to specific Chinese steps on human rights; EU also needs to
review Code of Conduct to ensure that lifting the embargo
does not result in increased arms sales to China. 

-- Germany: EU must consider regional impact of lifting the
embargo; now is not a good time to lift embargo (COMMENT: The
Germans appear to have moved closer to the Danes in recent
weeks, and are now the largest EU member state with serious
reservations about lifting the embargo.  One report of the
discussion suggests that "the tough German position, coupled
with the strength of US views, might be tempering French
enthusiasm."  END COMMENT). 

-- UK: Should be further study by working groups to identify
implications for human rights and regional stability, and to
examine options for strengthening Code of Conduct (COMMENT:
Our Hungarian contact reports that the UK is fundamentally
closer to the French end of the spectrum than the Danish.
The UK, like France, does not favor making the Code of
Conduct legally binding.  END COMMENT). 

-- Greece: Should explore gestures China could make on human
rights without explicitly linking them to lifting the
embargo; should not link regional stability to lifting
embargo; "provocatively" proposed that the Code of Conduct be
made legally binding.  (COMMENT: Our contacts report that the
Greek position on lifting the embargo is closer to France
than any other Member State.  END COMMENT). 

-- Ireland: Supports sending the issue back to working groups
(in part to keep the EU from making any decision during its
Presidency). 

-- Netherlands: Central consideration should be possible
release of political prisoners from the 1989 Tiananmen
crackdown. 

-- Czech Republic: Supports French position that issue should
remain political; silent on other points (COMMENT: Our UK
contact said that the Czech position is generally understood
to be informed by that country's interest in selling radar
equipment to China, as described ref D.  END COMMENT). 

-- Sweden: Working groups should further study issues of
human rights, regional stability, and enhancing the Code of
Conduct. 

-- Austria: Should explore gestures on human rights that
China could make but avoid linkage to lifting the embargo;
should conduct a general (i.e. non China-specific) review of
Code of Conduct. 

-- Italy: Intervened with same points as Austria. 

-- Belgium: More discussion needed of implications, including
on human rights, of any decision to lift embargo. 

-- Commission: Took no position on lifting embargo but said
EU should remain focused on human rights. 

Other member states did not intervene in the PSC discussion. 

-------------------------------------
Timeline: Back to the Working Groups?
------------------------------------- 

6. (S/NF) The PSC will meet again on this issue on April 7,
when it is expected to approve an "issues paper" which will
then be sent through COREPER to FMs for discussion at the
April 26 GAERC.  According to our UK and Hungarian contacts,
the paper is intended as a tour d'horizon for the GAERC
discussion.  It will not contain recommendations, and FMs are
not expected to take a decision.  Instead, they will likely
send the paper back down to the PSC for re-examination.  Most
PSC Ambassadors, having satisfied the French desire for a
ministerial discussion in April, will then press France to
accept the majority preference for sending the issue back to
the working groups.  The working groups would need two to
three months, minimum, to complete their assessments and
submit their papers to the PSC (EU working groups are
comprised of capital-based experts who rarely meet more than
once per month).  The relevant working groups are COHUM
(human rights), COASI (Asia Directors), and COARM
(conventional arms exports). 

7. (S/NF) What all this means is that the debate will likely
continue well into the Dutch Presidency.  Already, Member
States are beginning to look toward the December EU-China
Summit as a possible timeframe for any decision to lift the
embargo.  We have heard they are also looking at the US
electoral calendar and quietly wondering whether it would be
worth holding off their decision until November or December
in the hopes of sneaking it past the US radar.  They have not
and will not discuss such issues openly, even amongst each
other in the PSC, but our UK contact confirms that quiet
conversations and suggestive comments are going on in the
wings. 

---------------------
Next Steps for the US
--------------------- 

8. (S/NF) Our efforts have managed to slow down the momentum
in favor of removing the arms embargo, but have not killed
this idea outright.  In addition to the ongoing diplomatic
dialogue on this issue, we recommend the following steps to
help us keep the pressure on European governments: 

-- We should coordinate closely with Japan, and perhaps also
the ROK.  According to numerous EU interlocutors, the
Japanese have become increasingly active on this issue, but
their efforts appear so far uncoordinated with our own.
While this may have served our interests in the sense that it
gave the Europeans the impression that Japan's concerns were
genuine and not dictated by Washington, it is now time to
begin coordinating our efforts, so that Europeans recognize
that other key players in the region share our regional
stability concerns. 

-- We should engage the European Parliament, and particularly
members of its Human Rights Committee.  The EP is already on
record opposing an end to the embargo.  By calling attention
to EU deliberations and ongoing Chinese human rights abuses,
the EP could increase the political heat on member state
governments against any decision to lift the embargo. 

-- We should consider increasing our public statements and
press briefings for European audiences, on the assumption
that more scrutiny by European publics would help our views
on this issue, especially as regards human rights. 

-- We should increase our engagement with institutional and
member state representatives to the COHUM, COASI and COARM
working groups.  In this way we could ensure that our views
on human rights, regional stability and the Code of Conduct
are fully understood by those experts who will be supplying
recommendations to the political groups for discussion. 

-- Additionally, as suggested ref B, we recommend the USG
begin considering options for how the EU might strengthen
controls on arms exports to China in a post-embargo scenario.
 The worst case for us would be for the EU to lift its
embargo without having in place some sort of new mechanism
for controlling the transfer of arms and sensitive
technologies to China. 

Schnabel

SECRET: VLADIVOSTOK11, RUSSKIY ISLAND — THEY WILL BUILD IT, THEY WILL COME, THEN

INFO  LOG-00   EEB-00   AID-00   AMAD-00  CA-00    CIAE-00  COME-00
      INL-00   DODE-00  DOEE-00  DOTE-00  DS-00    FAAE-00  FBIE-00
      UTED-00  VCI-00   H-00     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    LAB-01
      L-00     MOFM-00  MOF-00   VCIE-00  NSAE-00  ISN-00   OES-00
      NIMA-00  EPAU-00  MA-00    ISNE-00  SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00
      TRSE-00  NCTC-00  FMP-00   R-00     EPAE-00  SHEM-00  DSCC-00
      PRM-00   DRL-00   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00   FA-00    SWCI-00
      SNKP-00  SEEE-00  SANA-00    /001W

P 160724Z FEB 10
FM AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1260
INFO CIS COLLECTIVE
ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION
AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
UNCLAS VLADIVOSTOK 000011

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV ECON SENV RS
SUBJECT: RUSSKIY ISLAND -- THEY WILL BUILD IT, THEY WILL COME, THEN WHAT?

REF: 2009 Vladivostok 0087

1. Summary: Many were surprised when in 2007, then President Vladimir Putin announced that the 2012 APEC summit would be held on Russkiy Island, an empty, undeveloped island just South of Vladivostok. On February 5, 2010, Consular Officer and USAID Representative visited the island, taking the ferry from Vladivostok. Construction has commenced, and due to the work we saw, and the construction standards they are building to, we believe that the construction on the island will be completed in time for the APEC summit in autumn 2012 (Note that there is discussion about moving up the date of the summit two months from November to September due to the harsh winter weather).

They Will Build It and They Will Come

2. Russkiy Island was a closed, military island, little more than a place for camping or a good picnic in summer or ice fishing in winter. When it was announced that the 2012 APEC summit would be held on Russkiy Island, there was a lot of concern about the cost of the project, especially since Russkiy Island had no infrastructure. Everything for APEC would have had to have been built from scratch. The island lacked water and power, and the roads were only gravel. Actually, the roads were so treacherous and impassable at places that we were forced to turn around at one point and even assisted another car stuck in the snow.

3. On our drive around the island we were struck by the enduring aesthetic beauty of the well constructed brick and stone buildings dating from the czarist times. The island is also home to several distinctly unattractive Soviet era officers' residential apartment buildings that are the common concrete panel construction. There are two old forts and large artillery batteries that attest to the significant defensive role the island played in protecting Vladivostok during WWII. Governor Darkin maintains an impressive dacha on the island as does the President of Russia. There are no stores, gas stations, restaurants, or other amenities on the island. The few year-round residents rely on the ferry to the mainland for all their shopping needs.

4. Even though the weather was below freezing (-20 C), the construction was ongoing and a great deal of progress has already been made. The site preparations are being accomplished quickly as hundreds of hectares of forests are being or have already been clear-cut. The felled trees are being pushed aside into enormous piles by bulldozers. As there are no remaining obstacles to land leveling for foundation slabs, massive earth moving equipment is able to rapidly carve and reshape the natural rolling hills to accelerate construction. We did not see any evidence of erosion mitigation barriers in place, raising doubts about how well protected the marine environment will be around the island. Roads to and from the work sites from the dock yards have been constructed and several have already been paved with asphalt. The road substrates are typical for Russia - a mixture of course, ungraded, slate, rock, and dirt. No compression is applied to the substrates and only a thin layer of gravel is spread prior to paving.

5. The contractor is using relatively simple construction techniques for the buildings. The superstructure of all the buildings is steel I-beams with floors being poured in place on galvanized steel. Exterior walls are concrete blocks and mortar. The use of drop ceilings will permit the quick interior fit outs with ventilation and electrical wiring. This is essentially the construction form used for parking garages and shopping centers and is typical of the Tvoi Dom and Crokus City, and the Crocus-Expo International Exposition Center; Moscow facilities built, owned and operated by the billionaire Aras Agalarov, President of the Crokus Group and the general contractor for the Russkiy Island development project. This construction facades will be formed from glass, tile, metal or glass panels providing architectural detail and variety to the otherwise uninspired uniform rectangular blocks.

6. The water and sewage infrastructure seems to be being built to a higher standard than many other facets of the project. The contractor is using advanced double walled PVC pipes (not steel) and poured-in-place juncture housing for manhole access. Vladivostok itself has no sewage treatment facilities. We noticed that of the several manufacturers of excavation and land moving equipment are represented at the site; the vast majority of the equipment was Hitachi. We saw only one Caterpillar bulldozer and no Liebherr equipment so common on Sakhalin. A very large and elaborate "oceanarium" (ocean aquarium) is also under construction and should become an attractive tourist destination. Unfortunately, access to the aquarium construction site is restricted so we were unable to inspect it or get a close-up view.

7. Most of the thousands of construction workers appeared to be from Central Asia, although we heard that many nationalities are represented, including laborers from Mexico. There are several large camps for the laborers who are bussed to and from the construction sites on busses with Moscow license plates series `199 RUS', presumably because they are registered to Crocus, the Moscow based general contractor.

8. While we took a ferry, construction on the two large bridges that will connect the island to the mainland appears to be proceeding apace. Since the bridge is the most important part of the project (and at US$1.5 billion, the most expensive), the public believes that it is being constructed to international standards. As safety and quality are being taken into consideration for the bridge, this part of the project will likely pose the greatest challenge in meeting the deadline for the APEC summit. The general contractor for the bridge construction is a local company from Ussurisk that has no previous experience building bridges. We learned that the sand for the bridge's massive concrete trusses is being shipped by barges from North Korea.

9. While impressive progress is being made on the island's construction projects, it is apparent that speed is the top priority and environmental concerns, aesthetics, and perhaps quality are all to be sacrificed in order to ensure that the ambitious deadline is met.

Then What?

10. The 2012 APEC summit is meant to be the core of the greater Far East Development Program that will help develop the Russian Far East (RFE). Federal funding for numerous projects associated with APEC preparations is estimated to be $10 billion. One optimistic economist, specializing in municipal and regional strategic planning, expressed the opinion that that figure will be matched by private investment. However, a random survey of Vladivostok's taxi drivers reflected a more pessimistic belief that the project will attract no private investment and that at least half of the $10 billion from the GOR will be stolen. It is said that seven percent of all contracts will be given to the President's Office and the consensus seems to be that the entire project was conceived to facilitate the misappropriation of "budget" funds.

11. The plan is to locate a new Far Eastern Federal University (FEFU), a combination of all universities in the Vladivostok area, at the APEC site on Russkiy Island. The inconvenient location is creating a lot of concern among university students. FEFU will create a strong knowledge base and there is talk about creating an investment zone on Russkiy Island complete with business incubators for high-tech start-ups. However, while the recently adopted federal strategic plan for the development of the RFE through the year 2025 emphasizes the need to diversify the region's economy through the commercialization of innovative technologies, doubts remain about the ability of the region to compete in the technology sphere with its Asian neighbors.

12. If all goes well, preparations for the 2012 APEC summit will leave the Vladivostok area with a developed island, new bridges, an updated transportation system, renovated airport, opera house, "oceanarium", sports stadium, and many improvements to the city itself. There will be a residual effect for the citizens of Vladivostok as the city is expected to receive a new sewage treatment facility, installation of natural gas connections to residents throughout the city, and moving oil tanks from the downtown area. But the real test is whether Russia decides, and makes clear to its neighbors, that it is indeed open for business and welcomes new investment and joint ventures. That "improvement" could account for more foreign investment than all the shiny new projects combined.
ARMBRUSTER

CONFIDENTIAL: COMBATING ORGANIZED CRIME: ROUND ONE

VZCZCXRO0687
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHSF #0103/01 0411705
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 101705Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6700
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000103 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2019
TAGS: PGOV KCRM KCOR BU
SUBJECT: COMBATING ORGANIZED CRIME: ROUND ONE GOES TO THE
NEW GOVERNMENT 

REF: A. 09 SOFIA 508
     B. 09 SOFIA 548
     C. 09 SOFIA 642 

Classified By: AMB JAMES WARLICK FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 

1.  (C) Summary: Elected on an anti-corruption and organized
crime platform, the GERB government has made good on its
campaign promises and taken some positive steps.  Important
reforms, bolstered by political will from the top, have
ratcheted up the pressure against previously untouchable
organized crime figures and enabled marquee busts of a few
large well-equipped organized crime groups.  At the same
time, these arrests have highlighted weaknesses in the
judicial system as judges allow members of these groups to
make bail and delay proceedings despite prosecutors'
assurances of airtight evidence against them.  In private
meetings with the Ambassador, the government has confirmed
its commitment to fight organized crime, but this may be a
losing battle if it is unable to convince the judiciary to
make the reforms necessary to allow prosecutors to do their
jobs and keep dangerous criminals in prison.  End Summary. 

PROGRESS ON ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION
----------------------------------------- 

2.  (C) In its short time in office, the government has
completed difficult reforms and personnel changes necessary
to make law enforcement more effective.   It has revamped law
enforcement by removing 26 of the 28  regional police chiefs,
many of whom were corrupt or incompetent, established
embassy-recommended interagency counter organized crime task
forces, and passed new laws to resolve jurisdictional
conflicts between the State Agency for National Security
(DANS) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI).  As a result,
coordination between law enforcement and the prosecutor's
office has dramatically improved.  Chief Prosecutor Boris
Velchev, a Socialist appointee, confided to the Ambassador
during a February 1 meeting that he has the complete support
of the PM and the government to "declare war" on the 200 to
300 most dangerous organized crime figures, including the 20
to 50 bosses who are household names (ref A). 

3.  (C) Structural reforms and clear political will have
brought some quick and convincing results, including
impressive operations in December against two notorious
organized crime gangs known as "the Impudents" and "the
Crocodiles."  The government arrested 30 members of the
Impudent gang believed to have carried out 19 high profile
ransom kidnappings over the past several years.  Breaking up
this group was a priority from day one for the new government
due to this group's use of sophisticated technology and
techniques along with the psychological effect the
kidnappings had on the population.  Similarly, the Crocodile
gang, composed mainly of car thieves and highway robbers,
terrorized mostly Turkish citizens driving through Bulgaria
to Germany. 

4.  (C) Most recently, the police launched operation
"Octopus" in which they arrested 12 people on February 10
believed to be involved in a powerful organized crime group
that has operated for the last 10 years.  These busts were a
public relations coup for the government in that they
targeted well-known groups that previous governments had been
powerless to stop.  The government has had even more success
arresting former government officials for corruption.  To
date, two former ministers have been indicted and five other
ministers from the previous two governments will likely face
corruption-related charges.  This is on top of at least 10
high-level arrests of mayors, judges, agency heads, and MPs
for corruption since last summer. 

JUDICIAL REFORM LAGS BEHIND
--------------------------- 

5.  (C) Despite successes on the organized crime and
corruption front, the powerful "big fish" mostly remain at
large due to the serious flaws in the overly formalistic
judicial system (ref B).  No case illustrates this better
than the Marinov brothers and the January 5 assassination of
Boris "Bobby" Tsankov.  Tsankov, a self-styled journalist and
entertainment figure with extensive underworld ties, was
gunned down in typical gangland fashion in downtown Sofia.
This unsolved murder is reminiscent of the approximately 140
other Mafia hits that have taken place in Bulgaria from 1993
to 2010.  It is widely believed that Krassimir "Big Margin"
Marinov and his brother Nikolay "Small Margin" Marinov
ordered the hit to prevent Tsankov from providing evidence to
the chief prosecutor's office.  The Marinovs have been
embroiled in serious organized crime and murder cases dating
back to 2005 (ref A), but were free on bail at the time of
the shooting thanks to legal loopholes that allow the
perpetual postponement of serious cases.  After the Tsankov
killing, Little Margin's whereabouts are unknown and Big
Margin was briefly detained for the killing before being
released due to a lack of evidence (he was later arrested
again on drug-related charges). 

6.  (C) Even the successful operation against the Impudent
gang has not been brought to a satisfactory conclusion.  Of
the 30 members initially arrested, 21 have been released from
jail, including one of the ringleaders, Anton "the Hamster"
Petrov.  Petrov was released on BGN 20,000 (USD 15,000) bail
after the Appeals Court determined that the MOI and
prosecutors had failed to provide new and convincing evidence
against him.  Since Petrov's release, two witnesses who were
cooperating with the police have reneged on promises to
testify against the kidnapping group. This is a familiar
pattern that has repeated itself in many other important
organized crime cases. 

REFORM EFFORTS FACE DIFFICULT HURDLES
------------------------------------- 

7.  (C) Chief Prosecutor Velchev and Minister of Justice
Popova told the Ambassador in separate meetings that reform
of the criminal procedure code had run into fierce opposition
from the "old guard" (politicians and judges) allied with
defense lawyers and NGOs using the language of human rights
to sink necessary reform.  Changes to the criminal procedure
code would close legal loopholes and likely speed up
organized crime and corruption cases, which drag on for years
in the current system (ref A).  Reforming the code is widely
viewed as essential to shift the balance from a system overly
favorable to defendants to a more just and effective system.
Among other things, the proposed changes to the criminal
procedure code would allow police to testify in court,
provide a back-up defense lawyer and increase fines if the
defendant's attorney fails to show up at court (a common
tactic for postponements), and simplify evidence collection
procedures.  Without radical reform, Minister Popova told the
Ambassador that Bulgaria's judiciary could not cope with its
entrenched organized crime problem.  Radical reforms such as
significantly changing how judges and prosecutors are
appointed, disciplined, and promoted (ref C) would require
constitutional amendments that need 161 of the 240 votes in
parliament to pass.  GERB is a minority government with 114
MPs, making constitutional reform difficult. 

8.  (C) Comment: The GERB government has set ambitious goals
in combating organized crime and has shown it has the
political will to fight established criminal enterprises and
entrenched interests.  Still, this will not be an easy fight,
and it will be difficult to achieve convictions and
reasonable sentencing of "big fish" if the judicial system is
not recalibrated to confront Bulgaria's organized crime
problem.  Radical judicial reform advocated by the Minister
of Justice will not happen overnight given the highly
independent and conservative judicial system and the daunting
constitutional barriers preventing rapid reform.  Despite
these challenges, incremental reform is possible with the
government's strong support.  In the end, the government will
be judged not on high profile arrests, but on its ability to
speed up corruption cases, close legal loop holes, and
successfully lock up previously untouchable organized crime
figures.  End Comment. 

WARLICK

Charter 77 After 30 Years-Original Signature Cards, Secret Police Files, U.S. Intelligence Reports Published for First Time

Signature card of Václav Havel.
harter’s Call for Rule of Law Deemed “Sedition,” “Subversion,” and “Harmful to National Interests Abroad” by Czechoslovak Communist Authorities in 1977

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 213

Edited by Prof. Vilém Prečan (Czechoslovak Documentation Centre),
Dr. Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton (National Security Archive)

Translations and editorial assistance by Derek Paton

Scanning and other research assistance by Catherine Nielsen, Maria Lorena Martinez, Dr. Mary E. Curry, and Petr Blažek

Washington D.C., January 6, 2007 – The Czechoslovak human rights activists who launched the landmark Charter 77 movement secretly gathered their first 240 signatures on handwritten cards without leaving copies with the signatories, but were arrested 30 years ago today by the secret police on charges of “subversion” and “hostility to the socialist state and social system” before they could deliver the original Charter to the Federal Assembly, according to Charter 77 and Czechoslovak secret police documents published in English for the first time on the National Security Archive Web site (www.nsarchive.org).

But the Chartists had already arranged for publication of their manifesto in the Western press, where the Charter was featured in major articles on January 7, 1977 in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Corriere della Sera, The Times of London, and Le Monde. The latter featured a cartoon of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev holding up a sign labeled “Helsinki,” in which a tiny citizen is holding up his own “Helsinki” sign – neatly encapsulating the contrast between the Soviet view of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act as ratifying the boundaries of Europe as imposed by Josef Stalin and World War II, versus the civil society focus on Helsinki’s human rights commitments (that even U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had dismissed as empty rhetoric at the time).

Yugoslav dissident Milovan Djilas subsequently called Charter 77 “the most mature and accomplished program produced by Eastern Europe from the war up to today” (New York Times, April 14, 1977).

Charter 77 co-spokesperson Václav Havel, one of those arrested on January 6, 1977 and subsequently president of Czechoslovakia and then the Czech Republic from 1989 to 2003, told reporters this week that Charter 77 could serve as a model for constructive political culture, because it brought together “people of diverse opinions, but unlike present-day Czech politicians they were not always searching for what they could harm the others with, but they cooperated and pulled all together” (CTK Czech news agency, January 1, 2007). In Havel’s reminiscences about Charter 77 (prior to the 1989 “velvet revolution”) he prophetically commented that “something had taken shape here that was historically quite new: the embryo of a genuine social tolerance” that “would be impossible to wipe out of the national memory.”

“Charter 77 was a bolt from the blue in the otherwise stagnant political atmosphere of Czechoslovakia,” remarked Professor Vilém Prečan, one of the editors of today’s Web posting and head of the Czechoslovak Documentation Centre in Prague. “Together with movements for human and civil rights in other countries of the Soviet bloc, Charter 77 became a vital factor working from below in the Helsinki process and towards the democratic revolutions of 1989.”

The Web posting includes:

  • original drafts of the Charter with handwritten edits by Václav Havel and Pavel Kohout (who originally proposed the name “Charter 77”);
  • typed and handwritten agendas for the conspiratorial meetings of the nascent Chartists in December 1976 and January 1977 to organize the gathering of the first signatures;
  • the original signature cards of Václav Havel and other leading Chartists;
  • the January 5, 1977 letter to the Federal Assembly signed by Charter’s three spokespersons that was confiscated by the secret police from Havel and his companions January 6 on their way to present the Charter to the authorities;
  • the first secret police report from January 6, 1977 calling the Charter a “crude attack” by “hostile elements” who “have been winning over other anti-socialist elements”;
  • the January 14, 1977 legal opinion by the Czechoslovak Communist authorities finding Charter 77 to be “untrue and grossly slanderous… clearly pursuing the aim of evoking hatred and hostility towards, or at least distrust of, the socialist social and state system of the republic”;
  • the secret police report from April 1977 recording the decision of the Communist Party Presidium not to prosecute anyone solely on the basis of signing the Charter, but on other grounds;
  • contemporary reporting on Charter 77 in previously secret documents by the CIA, the U.S. State Department;
  • Professor Prečan’s 1978 commentary on the impact of Charter 77;
  • contemporary U.S. official statements about Charter 77 from the Congressional Record and presidential documents;
  • Václav Havel’s own reminiscences about Charter 77, courtesy of Paul Wilson, who translated (from the Czech) Havel’s answers to questions from Karel Hvíždala for the 1990 book Disturbing the Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf).


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Section I: Charter 77 – The First Publication

January 6, 1977: “The Charter 77 Declaration” was unsuccessfully presented to the Czechoslovak authorities, and the would-be presenters were detained by the secret police.

January 7, 1977: “The Charter 77 Declaration” (dated 1 January 1977) reached the public in four daily newspapers abroad – the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, The Times, Le Monde, and Corriere della Sera. (Le Monde had, as usual, already gone to press the afternoon before the date written on the newspaper, but the organizer of the simultaneous publishing of the Declaration, Hans-Peter Riese, a German journalist and friend of Pavel Kohout’s, had failed to note this. The oversight turned out, however, to be very useful, keeping publication all on the same day.)

January 8, 1977: The New York Times and The Washington Post published their first stories on Charter 77, focusing on the detention of the Chartists. The Times included the quotation from the Communist Party newspaper Rudé právo warning dissidents that “those who lie on the rails to stop the train of history” must expect to get their legs cut off.

January 27, 1977: The full text of “The Charter 77 Declaration” was published in The New York Times as well as the U.S. Congressional Record.

Vilém Prečan’s introduction to Charter 77 from The Right to Know the Right to Act: Documents of Helsinki Dissent from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Compiled and edited by the staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, D.C., May 1978.

Václav Havel’s reminiscences about Charter 77, reproduced with the kind permission of Paul Wilson, who translated (from the Czech) Havel’s answers to questions from Karel Hvížďala for the 1990 book Disturbing the Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf). This excerpt is from pages 125-145.


Section II: The Czechoslovak Documents

A. The Charter 77 Founding Documents
[Source: The Czechoslovak Documentation Centre, Prague – Note: The originals of most of the Czechoslovak documents published here are deposited in the Security Services Archive (archiv bezpečnostních složek), at the Ministry of the Interior, Prague]

Document 1. “Pavel Kohout Card.” Circa December 20, 1976
[Translation by Derek Paton]

This notecard typed by Václav Havel summarized the plan for how the organizers would proceed to organize the collection of signatures for the Charter 77 Manifesto. This “Pavel Kohout card” was prepared not later than on December 20 together with the final version of the Charter 77 Declaration. Every collector had an envelope with instructions on how to sign a signature card, and their own signed card as an example. The group of collectors was about ten people, who were instructed not to leave the statement with anybody until after the publication. After the publication the text of the Charter with all the signatures would be distributed to every person who signed it. Another provision defined how signatures would be checked at the meeting scheduled for December 29, 1976 (the deadline for collecting signatures) at 4 p.m. In the interview/memoirs Disturbing the Peace, Havel mentions how surprised he was when Mlynář came in with more than 100 signatures from former Communists.

Document 2. Original drafts of Charter 77 text

These early drafts of the Charter 77 manifesto include handwritten edits by Havel and Kohout. All the drafts were dated ten days after the actual document date—a decision made by the organizers to mislead the police. For example, the date proposed for the publication was noted as January 17, 1977, whereas it was actually set to be January 7. The draft dated December 27 was actually written on December 17. The handwritten page is by Kohout. The two drafts were discussed at meetings on December 16 and 17, and the final draft was agreed on December 18. The first draft was proposed by Havel. Kohout proposed the name Charter 77, which was adopted on December 18, 1976. Petr Uhl proposed to have three spokespersons instead of one.

Document 3. Draft agenda for January 3, 1977 meeting in Václav Havel’s apartment
[Translation by Derek Paton]

Václav Havel wrote and presented this draft agenda at the January 3, 1977 meeting at his apartment, and the document was later confiscated by the police during the house search on January 6, 1977. Fifteen people participated in the meeting (the room was overcrowded): all three spokespeople (Jan Patočka, Jiří Hájek, Václav Havel), Zdeněk Mlynář, Václav Černý, Ludvík Vaculík, Pavel Landovský, Jaroslav Šabata, Jan Tesař, Jiří Němec, and some other organizers. This was for a very long time the last quiet gathering of the Chartists undisturbed by the police.

Document 4. Original signature cards: Václav Havel, Jiří Hájek, Pavel Kohout, Zdeněk Mlynář, Jan Patočka, Rudolf Slánský, Ludvík Vaculík, and Prokop Drtina

Document 5. Charter 77 Letter to the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly signed by the three spokespersons (Jan Patočka, Jiří Hájek, Václav Havel), January 5, 1977
[Translation by Derek Paton]

This letter was meant to transmit the formal Charter 77 Declaration to the authorities, but on the morning of January 6, Czechoslovak State Security forces surrounded the car carrying Havel, Ludvík Vaculík, and Pavel Landovský, who were on their way to present the signed text to the Assembly and to the CTK news agency, as well as mail the Charter to all the signers. The police seized all the documentation, detained and interrogated not only the three but other co-signers, and searched their houses. But the process of releasing the Charter publicly, coordinated by Kohout’s friend Hans-Peter Riese with help from Czechoslovak émigrés who visited Prague for Christmas, had already put the text in the hands of journalists in Munich and elsewhere over the holidays, so the January 7 publication target was achieved despite the efforts of the state security forces.

B. The Authorities Respond to Charter 77

Document 6. Department of the National Security Corps, City of Prague. “Decision,” January 6, 1977
[Translation by Derek Paton]

This order from the Czechoslovak Secret Police (StB) began criminal proceedings of Charter 77 activists, accused of the crime of “subversion” (section 98 of the penal code) for their “hostility towards the socialist social and state system of the republic” in sending out “a crude attack” on the system. Remarkably, the document notes that these “hostile elements” actually “have been winning over other anti-socialist elements.”

Document 7. Department of Investigation, State Security Forces (StB). “Decision,” January 11, 1977
[Translation by Derek Paton]

This StB order adds yet more charges against the Chartists, now accused of damaging the interests and reputation of Czechoslovakia abroad (section 112 of the penal code) by disseminating abroad “untrue reports on conditions in the republic.”

Document 8. Statement on “The Charter 77 Declaration.” January 14, 1977
[Translation by Derek Paton]

This legal opinion by the Prosecutor General and the head of the Supreme Court of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, with their colleagues the Czech Minister of Justice and the chief prosecutor, concludes that the Charter 77 movement not only violates sections 98 and 112 of the penal code, as the StB already alleged, but also section 100 on “sedition.” These top legal authorities call Charter 77 “untrue and grossly slanderous… clearly pursuing the aim of evoking hatred and hostility towards, or at least distrust of, the socialist social and state system of the republic.”

Document 9. Information on the current results of the investigation into the case of “Charter 77,” about April 1, 1977
[Translation by Derek Paton]

This StB document notes that the criminal proceedings against the Chartists started on January 6, and by April 1, 1977, 251 persons had been interrogated. Most interestingly, the report refers to a decision made by the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee Presidium that nobody should be charged specifically on the grounds of signing the Charter, but only on other grounds. This is the only known documentary reference to that Presidium decision.

Section III: U.S. Documents

Document 1. CIA National Intelligence Daily. January 28, 1977
[Source: Carter Presidential Library, CIA CREST database]

This CIA summary of current intelligence, circulated daily to top U.S. policymakers, reports speculation that the Czechoslovak regime might try to deport dissidents who signed Charter 77, especially Václav Havel, Pavel Kohout, Jiří Hájek, Jiří Lederer, Ludvík Vaculík. The item notes that out of nearly 300 signatories, 200 were harassed by the police but it is unlikely that they would agree to leave the country voluntarily.

Document 2. CIA National Intelligence Daily. February 8, 1977
[Source: Carter Presidential Library, CIA CREST database]

The daily CIA summary mentions that the Czechoslovak authorities are reluctant to issue indictments against dissidents directly linked to Charter 77, but at the same time are maintaining pressure on the supporters and trying to downplay its significance. The CIA also notes the Charter’s potential to create serious problems for the USSR with the approach of the Belgrade Conference.

Document 3. CIA Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Memorandum. “Dissident Activity in East Europe: An Overview.” April 1, 1977
[Source: Carter Presidential Library NLC-7-17-5-4-7]

This CIA overview notes the effects of the Soviet détente policy and the Helsinki accords as new factors in Eastern Europe. It emphasizes that “the Czechoslovaks have taken center stage among East European dissident intellectuals by their direct challenge to regime practices regarding civil rights, as outlined in ‘Charter 77,’” and the surprisingly large number of the “Chartists.”

Document 4. CIA National Intelligence Daily. July 14, 1977
[Source: Carter Presidential Library, CIA CREST database]

The CIA daily notes a new release of Charter 77 documents on cultural and literary censorship in Czechoslovakia, and reports that since the original manifesto was published, many dissidents have been silenced by official harassment, but that Zdeněk Mlynář, who took asylum in Austria, continues to work on behalf of Charter 77 by helping to organize Western pressure on the Czechoslovak authorities.

Document 5. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Weekly Highlights of Developments in Human Rights. “Hajek to give up leading Charter 77 role.” April 12, 1978
[Source: FOIA release to National Security Archive]

The State Department’s intelligence bureau reports that Jiří Hájek is considering resigning from his post as spokesman for Charter 77 as a result of internal factional disagreements in the movement and because of the growing strength of the more militant wing of the movement.

Document 6. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Weekly Highlights of Developments in Human Rights. “Dissidents draft statement.” August 16, 1978
[Source: FOIA release to National Security Archive]

The report mentions the first instance of cooperation between the Czechoslovak and Polish dissidents in issuing a joint statement of Charter 77 and the Polish Workers Defense Committee (KOR) on the anniversary of the Soviet-led military intervention of 1968.

Document 7. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Weekly Highlights of Developments in Human Rights. “Polish-Czechoslovak dissident cooperation.” September 13, 1978
[Source: FOIA release to National Security Archive]

The INR weekly reports another case of cooperation between the Charter 77 and KOR, when Czechoslovak dissidents asked the Polish Committee to publish a statement on the harassment of Chartists by Prague authorities. According to information from the U.S. Embassy in Prague, as many as 50 Chartists might be considering emigrating as a result of constant police surveillance and harassment.

Document 8. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Weekly Highlights of Developments in Human Rights. “Police move to prevent contacts with Polish dissidents.” October 12, 1978
[Source: FOIA release to National Security Archive]

INR reports that Charter 77 spokesman Jaroslav Šabata was arrested in connection with his efforts to organize cooperation between the Czechoslovak and Polish dissidents. The report mentions that the Czechoslovak police might have penetrated the Charter 77 movement and decided to move against the Charter activists to prevent wider contacts between dissidents of the two countries.

Document 9. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. “The Human Rights Movement in Czechoslovakia.” October 11, 1979
[Source: FOIA release to National Security Archive]

This detailed eight-page report traces the accomplishments of Charter 77 movement and the obstacles it had to face on the eve of its third anniversary. Charter activities are said to have focused Western attention on the repressive character of the Czechoslovak regime. The latter’s crackdown on the dissidents has opened a new breach between Communist parties in the East and West, set back the regime’s attempts to gain international acceptability, and caused some embarrassment to Moscow in its attempts to pursue détente policy with the West. However, the report describes the Charter’s prospects in accomplishing its goals as “bleak,” because “the regime has all the necessary levers of power and coercion at its disposal and will not hesitate to use them if threatened,” and due to a lack of popular support outside the intelligentsia circles. “Despite these bleak prospects, the movement deserves respect, admiration, and sympathy for its ability to survive thus far and for its willingness to confront the regime in the face of overwhelming odds.”

Document 10. Office of Public Liaison Submission from the Czechoslovak National Council of America. “Czechoslovakia since Belgrade: Compliance with the Provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.” April 17, 1980
[Source: Carter Presidential Library, Office of Public Liaison Files]

The Czechoslovak émigré organization provided the Carter White House with this report documenting recent police harassment of the Charter 77 movement activists and their family members. The report describes the trial of six signatories of the Charter in October 1979 as “only a small sample of the violations by the Czechoslovak authorities of their international obligations and accepted standards of justice.” All six were found guilty of the crime of subversion of the republic and were sentenced to prison terms ranging from two to five years. The report also deals with police actions against young people, discrimination in education, and severe limitations on freedom of information.
Section IV. U.S. Official Statements on Charter 77

Document 1. Department of State Comments on Subject of Human Rights in Czechoslovakia. Department of State Bulletin, January 26, 1977

In this first official U.S. statement on Charter 77, Fredrick Brown, Director of the Office of Press Relations, reads a statement to the press noting the signing of Charter 77 – “some 300 individuals [in Czechoslovakia] have petitioned the government to guarantee the rights accorded them by the Czechoslovak Constitution, the international covenants on civil and political and on economic, social and cultural rights, and by the Helsinki Final Act.” He called on all the signatories of the Final Act to “strongly deplore the violations of such rights and freedoms wherever they occur.” The diplomatic cables from the U.S. Embassy in Prague that provided the basis for this statement are the subject of current Freedom of Information Act requests by the National Security Archive but are not yet declassified.

Document 2. The Helsinki Spark. Remarks by Hon. Dante Fascell, House of Representatives, January 26, 1977

Congressman Fascell talks about the wave of dissent in the countries of Eastern Europe and calls it “the thirst for liberty.” He notes the repressive response of the Communist authorities throughout the region and the resolve of Charter 77 signatories in Czechoslovakia. “In the context of the Helsinki agreements—whose implementation the Congress formed the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe to evaluate—the campaign against freedom and human rights amounts to a breach of a crucial promise.” He asks for the full translation of the Charter 77 Manifesto to be reprinted in the Congressional Record.

Document 3. Czechoslovakia and Charter 77. Remarks by Hon. James Blanchard, House of Representatives, February 2, 1977

Congressman Blanchard informs the House about his protest to the Czechoslovak ambassador against the harassment of the dissidents by the authorities. A full translation of the Charter 77 Manifesto is included in the remarks.

Document 4. Statement by the President of the United States Ronald Reagan. Czechoslovak Human Rights Initiative. December 31, 1986. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 22, no. 53 p. 1681

Ronald Reagan gives high praise to the accomplishments of Charter 77 movement on the eve of its tenth anniversary. He emphasizes that “Charter 77, Eastern Europe’s longest lasting human rights initiative, served for ten years as a champion of civil and human rights, a repository for national values, and a cultural and publishing network at home and abroad…. By their activities, Charter 77 signers have in countless small and large ways pushed back the gloom over Czechoslovakia’s barren political landscape.”

Document 5. The 10th Anniversary of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia. Remarks by Hon. Steny Hoyer, House of Representatives, January 7, 1987

Congressman Hoyer introduced a resolution to commend the Charter 77 human rights organization on the tenth anniversary of its establishment, and emphasized its contribution to the achievements of the Helsinki Act: “Ten years after the birth of Charter 77, the quiet, relentless push for dialog has found partners—in likeminded movements throughout Eastern Europe.”

Document 6. Human Rights and Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia. Remarks by Hon. Dante Fascell, House of Representatives, January 29, 1987

Congressman Fascell commends highly the achievements of Charter 77 as “the beacon of hope and light, not just for the people of that unfortunate country, but throughout Eastern Europe.” He informs the House that the members of the U.S. Helsinki Commission had nominated Charter 77 as a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987.

Document 7. Helsinki Commission Chairman Nominates Czechoslovak Human Rights Activist for Nobel Peace Prize. Remarks by Hon. Dennis DeConcini, U.S. Senate, February 7, 1989

Senator DeConcini notes that the whole world is watching Czechoslovakia, where Václav Havel remains in prison. “In spite of relentless harassment by the authorities, including imprisonment, repeated detentions, house searches and confiscations of property, Havel has remained active in the struggle for human rights.” Senator DeConcini and Representative Hoyer have nominated Václav Havel for the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize.

DUBIOS- STALKER UND ERPRESSER LAUT SPIEGEL, SZ, FAZ, HANDELSBLATT, BÖRSE ONLINE: “GoMoPa” UND DEREN HINTERMÄNNER – MUTMASSLICH RESCH, EHLERS UND BENNEWIRTZ

Bernd Pulch, Magister Artium

siehe

Presse-Links hier

Opfer wehren sich: “DUBIOS IST JOCHEN RESCH LAUT “SPIEGEL” WEGEN SEINER STASI-KONTAKTE

http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-65717414.html

VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ

Dubiose Doppelrolle

Eine merkwürdige Personalentscheidung des Deutschen Instituts für Anlegerschutz (DIAS) sorgt für Aufsehen: Als neuen geschäftsführenden Vorstand beriefen die Mitglieder des auf die Untersuchung unlauterer Finanzgeschäfte spezialisierten Instituts Ehrenfried Stelzer. Bis zur Wende war Stelzer Leiter der Sektion Kriminalistik an der Ost-Berliner Humboldt-Universität. Die Sektion galt als Stasi-Hochburg, Stelzer selbst diente der Stasi Jahrzehnte als “Offizier im besonderen Einsatz”. Im April war Stelzers Vorgänger Volker Pietsch, der als Finanzspezialist von der Verbraucherzentrale Berlin gekommen war, zurückgetreten. Die Hintergründe von Pietschs Abgang sind unklar, hängen aber möglicherweise mit der unsoliden Finanzsituation des DIAS zusammen. Seit der Gründung vor fünf Jahren ist der Verein wesentlich von Zuwendungen der Berliner Anlegerschutz-Kanzlei Resch abhängig. Deren geschäftsführender Gesellschafter Jochen Resch ist nicht nur DIAS-Mitglied, sondern auch Vorstand der Verbraucherzentrale Brandenburg – eine Doppelfunktion, die Resch dem Vorwurf aussetzt, sich über das DIAS Mandanten zu beschaffen. Resch bestreitet das. Das DIAS sei unabhängig konzipiert “und nie eine Mandantenschaufel” gewesen. Auch der neue DIAS-Vorstand Stelzer gilt als Resch-Mann. Man kenne sich “lange Jahre”, so Resch. Eine von Stelzers ersten Amtshandlungen war es, den gesamten zehnköpfigen Beirat, die meisten darin Juristen, abzuberufen.

und

SZ_03.09.2010_Am_virtuellen_Pranger

und

http://www.faz.net/artikel/C30857/cyberstalking-im-netz-30321544.html

und

http://www.faz.net/artikel/C30350/wirtschaftskriminalitaet-grossrazzia-wegen-verdachts-auf-insiderhandel-30309286.html

und

http://www.handelsblatt.com/finanzen/boerse-maerkte/boerse-inside/finanzaufsicht-untersucht-kursachterbahn-bei-wirecard/3406252.html

und

http://www.victims-opfer.com/?page_id=11764

ÜBER DIE ZUSAMMENHÄNGE ZWISCHEN “GoMoPa” UND GOOGLE:

DAS SYSTEM “GoMoPa”-Google

ETHIKBANK: “GoMoPa” IST TABU

SECRET: THE BRAZILIAN CONNECTION WITH IRAN AND

R 121450Z DEC 86
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1591
INFO AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE POUCH
AMCONSUL RECIFE POUCH
AMCONSUL SALVADOR DA BAHIA POUCH
BELO HORIZONTE POUCH
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 13835 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

E.O.12356: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL BR IR HO NU CE
SUBJECT:  THE BRAZILIAN CONNECTION WITH IRAN AND
THE CONTRAS 

REFS: (A)BRASILIA 13511, (B)BRASILIA 4799 

1.  (U) WITH THE UNRAVELING OF THE IRANIAN
ARMS/CONTRA AID SCANDAL, THE BRAZILIAN PRESS
CONTINUES TO POINT TO A SO-CALLED "BRAZILIAN
CONNECTION".  WEEKLY NEWS MAGAZINE "VEJA" AND
CONSERVATIVE "O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO" RAN STORIES
IN THE LAST FEW DAYS ON THE SUPPOSED BRAZILIAN
INVOLVEMENT. 

2.  "ESTADO'S" DEFENSE EDITOR ROBERTO GODOY WROTE
ABOUT ALLEGED U.S. ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN HAWK
MISSILES FROM BRAZIL IN 1986, AN UNUSUAL REQUEST,
ACCORDING TO GODOY, FOR BRAZIL DOES NOT HAVE SUCH
SYSTEM IN ITS INVENTORY.  THE FIRST CONTACT, GODOY
SAID, WAS MADE IN EARLY 1986 BY AN "ADVISOR" TO H.
ROSS PEROT TO A LOCAL ARMS PRODUCER, AND THE
SECOND IN MAY, TO A FORMER MEMBER OF THE BRAZILIAN
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INVOLVED WITH THE ARMS
INDUSTRY.  GODOY EXPLAINED THAT THE AMERICAN
PROPOSED TO TRADE HAWKS FOR THE MORE ADVANCED
SPARROW, NOT SPECIFYING WHERE THE WEAPONS WOULD
GO.  IN BOTH INSTANCES, HE CONTINUED, THE AMERICAN
WAS TURNED DOWN BECAUSE THE BRAZILIANS SUSPECTED
THE CONTRAS OR IRAN AS RECIPIENTS AND SAID
GOVERNMENT RULES WOULD NOT ALLOW SUCH "NEBULOUS"
TRANSFERS OR SALES TO A NATION AT WAR.  GODOY ALSO
REFERRED TO JAIRO IWAMASSA GUINOZA'S CONNECTION
(SEE REFTEL A) RESTATING THAT GUINOZA WAS NEVER
ABLE TO PURCHASE ANY ARMS FROM BRAZILIAN
MANUFACTURERS. 

3.  "VEJA'S" STORY CLAIMS TO PRESENT "PROOF" OF
BRAZILIAN INVOLVEMENT WITH THE CONTRAS AND IRAN,
BUT IT IS SHORT ON EVIDENCE AND SOURCES.  ONE OF
THE "PROOFS" IS A RECENT PHOTOGRAPH OF FIVE BOXES
OF HAND GRENADES MADE BY COMPANHIA DE EXPLOSIVOS
VALPARAIBA IN SAO PAULO.  ACCORDING TO THE
ARTICLE, THE GRENADES WERE SHIPPED TO SRI LANKA IN
1984 AND IT SPECULATES THAT SOME OF THEM WERE
DIVERTED TO HONDURAS FROM SOUTH AFRICA, A PORT
STOP ALONG THE WAY.  "VEJA" DOES NOT KNOW HOW MANY
CONTRABAND WEAPONS ENDED UP IN THE CONTRA'S
TRAINING CAMP, NOR THE SIZE OF THE ORIGINAL
SHIPMENT TO COLOMBO, BUT SUGGESTS THAT THE
TRANSFER WAS MADE WITH THE CONSENT OF THE BUYER,
FOR SRI LANKA DID NOT PROTEST THE INCOMPLETE
SHIPMENT.  ANOTHER "PROOF" WAS FINDING TWO
HONDURAN AIR FORCE OFFICERS TRAINING AT EMBRAER
ALSO IN 1984.  HONDURAS HAD SIGNED A US DOLS 10
MILLION CONTRACT "FINANCED BY RONALD REAGAN'S
GOVERNMENT" FOR THE PURCHASE OF TUCANOS.  IN
"VEJA'S" OPINION, NICARAGUA NOW HAS EVIDENCE TO
MAKE A CLAIM FROM ITAMARATY ON BRAZIL'S SUPPORT TO
NICARAGUA'S FOES. 

4. (U) "VEJA" ALSO REHASHES THE STORY OF U.S.
CITIZEN GEORGE PERRY'S DEATH IN 1983 IN NEW YORK.
SUPPOSEDLY PERRY WAS KILLED BECAUSE HE DIDN'T
FULFILL HIS PART ON A US DOLS 20 MILLION DEAL TO
DELIVER ARMS TO IRAN, AND THE GOB'S VISA REFUSAL
FOR THE U.S. INVESTIGATOR OF THE CRIME.  IN
ADDITION, VARIOUS ATTEMPTS AT SHADY SALES TO
AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE EARLY 80'S ARE
DESCRIBED. THE STORY ENDS WITH THE UNDOCUMENTED
ASSERTION THAT IRAN PURCHASED IN 1983 US DOLS 500
MILLION WORTH OF "EXPLOSIVES" AND THAT SINCE THEN
THE GOB HAS "TENDED TO IRAN'S REQUESTS" INCLUDING
SENDING A "PLANE LOAD OF ARMS" LAST WEEK. 

5.  (LOU) COMMENT:  THE BRAZILIAN PRESS IS
SEARCHING FOR BRAZILIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE
US/IRAN/CONTRA ARMS TRAFFIC BUT SO FAR THE
EVIDENCE IS NOT CONVINCING.  MOST OF THE INSTANCES
CITED BY THE PRESS OCCURRED A FEW YEARS BEFORE THE
U.S. BEGAN ITS SECRET CONTACTS.  ATTEMPTS AT SALES
MUST HAVE CERTAINLY BEEN MADE INDEPENDENT OF U.S.
EFFORTS.  IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, "JORNAL DO
BRASIL" REPORTED IN JUNE 1984 NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE
SALE OF ONE MILLION GRENADES TO A SUBSIDIARY OF
THE VALPARAIBA COMPANY MENTIONED ABOVE.  ENOUGH
TALES OF INTRIGUE AND POTENTIALLY EMBARRASSING
SHADY ARMS DEALS MIGHT MAKE THE GOB CONSIDER THE
ADVANTAGES OF REQUIRING A NON-TRANSFER TO THIRD
PARTIES CLAUSE IN THEIR ARMS SALES CONTRACTS, A
REQUIREMENT NOT INCLUDED IN THEIR CURRENT ARMS
SALES POLICY GUIDELINES (SEE REFTEL B). 

SHLAUDEMAN

TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE CIA: COLOMBIA’S GROWING UNDERGROUND ECONOMY

DOC_0001248385

The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev: 1987-1988

Washington D.C., August 3rd 2011 – Today, the National Security Archive publishes its third installment of the diary of one of the main supporters of Mikhail Gorbachev and strongest proponents of glasnost during the perestroika period in the Soviet Union — Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev. This section of the diary, covering two key years of history, is being published in English here for the first time.

By 1987 Chernyaev has become a member of Gorbachev’s inner circle, a close adviser the General Secretary relies on for drafting his speeches, writing his book on perestroika, and often for baring his soul and sharing doubts and concerns about the speed and the direction that the reform is taking. Even though Chernyaev’s position focuses his responsibilities on foreign policy, the diary shows how deeply involved he was in developing the ideas of perestroika in philosophical terms, and in applying them to Soviet domestic political structures and ideology. He is especially vocal in his encouragement of openness and freedom of the press.

At the start of the year, Chernyaev gives a brief overview of how the policy of glasnost has been changing the Soviet press, which becomes truly free and vibrant in this period, with many previously banned manuscripts finding their way into scholarly and literary journals. The speed of the reform process picks up with the January 1987 Central Committee Plenum focusing on “cadres” — the Communist Party’s personnel policy. In spring 1987, Chernyaev is very busy preparing materials for U.S.-Soviet negotiations on Intermediate Nuclear Forces, (resulting in the landmark treaty signed in December 1987), as well as Geneva and Reykjavik which leads to his “neglecting” his diary for a time.

The summer entries give a glimpse of Gorbachev’s uneasy reaction to the flight of Mathias Rust, the young West German pilot who landed his small plane near the Red Square after evading the vaunted Soviet air defense systems. Eventually, Gorbachev uses the Rust incident to conduct a profound purge of the military leadership, removing those who are known for their opposition to the reform, including Defense Minister Sergei Sokolov.

In fall 1987, virtually all of Chernyaev’s attention is given over to preparations for a seminal event — the Central Committee Plenum commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. These preparations involve addressing some of the most painful spots in Soviet history — Stalin’s purges beginning in the 1930s.

The year 1988 begins with another important Plenum — this time focusing on school reform. The February party gathering addresses fundamental ideological issues head-on within the framework of discussions on the teaching of history in secondary schools and in institutions of higher education. Chernyaev notes attacks on glasnost at the Plenum, which later culminate in a famous letter by Nina Andreeva, a teacher from Leningrad, published in the conservative newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya in March, which in turn provokes an intense discussion and a drawing of lines of disagreement within the Central Committee. Gorbachev openly challenges those in the leadership who side with Andreeva’s Stalinist version of Soviet history, and he later gradually removes practically all of these individuals from the Central Committee — including Vitalii Vorotnikov, Yegor Ligachev, Andrei Gromyko, Mikhail Solomentsev, Viktor Nikonov and Viktor Chebrikov.

The first half of 1988, as reflected in the diary, is devoted to preparations for the 19th Party Conference of June 28-July 1, which becomes the main turning point toward political reform and democratization in Soviet society.  Chernyaev’s diary perceptively captures all the difficult debates over these issues within the leadership and among the drafters of the theses for the conference.  Assessing Gorbachev’s performance there, Chernyaev notes his bold and consistent speeches, but also his inability to deal effectively with voices of the opposition, including Ligachev on the right and Boris Yeltsin on the left.  Afterwards, during a trip with Gorbachev to the Black Sea, Chernyaev works on implementing the decisions of the conference — primarily drafting proposals for a radical reform of the central party apparatus, which is eventually carried out at the September 1988 Plenum of the Central Committee.

Chernyaev is also involved in drafting arguably the most important Gorbachev speech of 1988 — the U.N. General Assembly address announcing drastic cuts in Soviet conventional forces in Europe, which makes it clear to the East Europeans that the new Soviet leadership is serious about not resorting to force to maintain Communist political control in the region.  In preparing the speech, Soviet reformers must overcome emerging opposition among the military brass, who make every effort to prevent deep unilateral cuts in Soviet armaments, and are especially adamant in resisting the withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe. Specific figures and other content from the speech have to be kept secret, even from other members of the Central Committee, practically until Gorbachev’s departure for the United States.

These diary entries cover the two most successful years of Soviet perestroika — the years when Gorbachev enjoyed immense popularity both at home and especially in the West, and before the conservative opposition to reform began to coalesce, leading eventually to the coup of August 1991. Beneath the surface, however, these processes were already beginning to rock the reformers’ boat, and Chernyaev, subtly but precisely, notes the first signs of this agitation in these pages.

The Chernyaev Diary was translated by Anna Melyakova and edited by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

TOP-SECRET FROM THE CIA-ARCHIVES: INTERNATIONAL CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT

DOC_0001346397

STRENG VERTRAULICH: GEHEIMREPORT DES BUNDESTAGES ZU GEHEIMGEFÄNGNISSEN IN DEUTSCHLAND

secret-prisons-report-germany

CONFIDENTIAL: DEFLATED EXPECTATIONS FOR MERKEL’S DREAM COALITION

VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #0153/01 0341656
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 031656Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6467
INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 000153

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL EFIN ECON GM
SUBJECT: DEFLATED EXPECTATIONS FOR MERKEL'S DREAM COALITION
AFTER FIRST 100 DAYS

REF: 2009 BERLIN 1528 

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Greg Delawie for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

1. (C) Summary: One hundred days after Germany's black-yellow coalition took office, a strong, unified government led by Chancellor Merkel has yet to materialize. The much anticipated “dream coalition” comprised of Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU), its Bavarian sister the Christian Social Union (CSU), and Free Democratic Party (FDP) which promised a unified conservative approach to the economy and “like minded” thinking on social welfare, the environment, and foreign policy has become bogged down in party politics with no end in sight. Recent polls show that the bickering may be at least partly to blame for the FDP's 5.6 percent fall in the polls, with it now down to 9 percent from its historic 14.6 percent election results (see septel) and the CSU plummet to an historic low of 41 percent. Indeed one minister is now threatening resignation. Sources from the three coalition parties have admitted to problems, blaming the other coalition parties, and downplaying their significance. Merkel has come under criticism within her own party for not taking strong public stands and reining in her coalition partners, instead staying above the political fray. The opposition, particularly the Social Democratic Party (SPD), is trying to capitalize on this “divided we rule” coalition with an eye toward unseating a teetering CDU-FDP coalition in North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW) in May elections, thereby tipping the CDU-FDP Bundesrat majority in its favor. Merkel is counting on better economic and political indicators after the NRW election followed by the release of the annual tax forecasts to congeal the coalition. If the CDU/FDP coalition fails in NRW, coalition divisions are likely to become more pronounced. End Summary.

Off to a Rocky Start
---------------------

2. (C) Concluding a coalition agreement in only three weeks, prior to her November 2 departure for Washington to address Congress and in time for the 9 November 20 year anniversary of German unity may have been Chancellor Merkel's first and only major success to date in marshaling coalition unity. But the feat may have had consequences. The haste to sign has left half-resolved differences on tax cuts, economic policy, Afghanistan, Turkey, health care, data protection (see reftel) and other issues that continue to gurgle to the surface. Important to recognize is that each party is operating under its own political pressures from different voting constituencies. The FDP's main goal is to deliver on campaign promises – particularly tax relief – and shore up its base, the CSU is desperate to regain its dominance in Bavaria, and the CDU is seeking to rebuild its eroded voter base. All three parties and the opposition are now gearing up for May 9 elections in NRW. This election in Germany's most populous state, referred to as a “small national election,” is regarded as a partial vote of confidence on the national coalition, and will determine the Bundesrat majority. If the NRW CDU-FDP coalition fails to return to government, the national CDU-FDP coalition will fall by six seats in the Bundesrat – from 37 to 31 seats – it will lose its majority. Such a loss could well hamper the government's ability to pass major financial or economic legislation.

3. (C) Each of the three coalition parties have pointed to the others for instigating tension. CDU party contact xxxxx accused the FDP of functioning as if it were still in the opposition. Senior SPD parliamentarian Hans-Ulrich Klose attributed the coalition strains to the FDP adjusting to being in government after 11 years in the opposition. FDP contact xxxxx accused the CDU/CSU of reacting to their own internal problems: for the CDU, its controversy over the Kunduz airstrike, and for the CSU, its involvement in a major bank scandal. The FDP also points to the CSU's strong rivalry with the FDP, with which it now governs in Bavaria. The CSU is still trying to recover from its historic low voting results in the September 2008 state elections, which forced it for the first time in 46 years to govern within a coalition. All parties, however, have downplayed the significance of the feuds, with senior CDU party operative xxxxx explaining in January that the party leaderships are just now settling in after an exhausting election campaign and intense coalition negotiations. He hoped (more than predicted) that the parties would soon settle into a more cooperative relationship. In January, Merkel called a small summit for coalition leadership with Westerwelle and Seehofer to smooth things over and commit to a new beginning. While the coalition's political edginess receded for a time, policy divisions continue to surface.

CDU/CSU vs FDP – the Economy
-----------------------------

4. (C) While CDU/CSU and FDP voters may be the most likely to cross over to the other party, their mainstay voter bases are different, with the CDU/CSU appealing to economically conservative voters who also support the social market economy, but are socially conservative. The FDP base is composed of free-market advocates, who are socially liberal and strong advocates of civil liberties. The FDP's campaign and continuing mantra has been for much larger tax cuts in 2011, worth 20-24 billion euros, apparently at the expense of both coalition unity and the better judgment of economic experts. The cuts would make getting the deficit back under the EU ceiling of 3 percent of GDP by 2013 nearly impossible. National debt will rise from 66 percent of GDP to 80 percent. There are growing public concerns over rising debt, but also about perceived disarray in the coalition's tax and budget policies. Merkel insists that a decision regarding the tax reduction plans will not be taken before May, when the overall tax revenue forecast is due. Waiting until May also means the coalition will not have to go public with unpopular consolidation measures until after the NRW elections. Finance Minister Schaeuble (CDU) appears unenthusiastic at best about further tax cuts. He has already said deficit reduction measures would have to start in 2011. The CSU has also called the FDP's call for speedy tax relief measures “unrealistic” despite the fact that it had included such a demand during its election campaign. The most recent squabble between the FDP and CSU is over FDP Health Minister Roesler's plans for health care reform which foresees more care options and the introduction of competition. Seehofer has rejected the proposal, holding fast against radical changes to the system. Roesler has indicated he might resign over this issue.

Foreign Policy
--------------

5. (C) Coalition feuding over economic and tax policy has trumped coalition divisions over foreign policy, although FM Westerwelle has managed a few disruptions in the latter. As a harbinger of hard times to come, as one of his first actions, Westerwelle opposed the naming of CDU Bundestag member Erika Steinbach to the foundation “Flight Expulsion and Reconciliation” citing possible damage to relations with Poland. As President of Germany's Federation of Expellees, Steinbach is disliked in Poland. While the numbers are disputed, the expellee community, which mainly votes CSU or CDU, has exerted influence on the issue. National and State CDU and CSU politicians came out in support of Steinbach with only Merkel keeping mum. The controversy continues, despite ongoing attempts to reach a compromise, threatening to drain coalition attention and good-will.

6. (C) Coalition strains have also surfaced on the issue of overseas deployments. Regarding a troop increase in Afghanistan, Westerwelle's position was at first muddled, as he tried to reflect his party's general negativity toward overseas military deployments while at the same time tending to his role as Germany's chief diplomat in the run-up to the London Conference. In the end, he (together with the opposition) likely played a role in achieving a lower-than-expected troop increase. Westerwelle also convinced the CDU to agree on gradually reducing German participation in UNIFIL. The CSU also rocked the coalition boat on Afghanistan, with Seehofer expressing general skepticism on a troop increase, although he later came around. In addition, CSU Secretary General Dobrindt has ridiculed the federal government's reconciliation concept in Afghanistan as a “cash for clunkers version for the Taliban.”

Comment
---------

7. (C) Chancellor Merkel may have ironically cast off the yoke of the Grand Coalition only now to be encumbered with a new FDP-CSU double yoke, restrained by an FDP bent on delivering on campaign promises and a CSU distracted over its rivalry with the FDP and internal problems. High expectations for the “dream coalition” are certainly in part to blame for the current polls, with popularity numbers for Merkel and Westerwelle both having suffered. Worried most, however, are the CDU and FDP politicians in NRW, who fear that the national coalition's squabbling could negatively impact their own chances in the May 9 elections. The leadership threesome – Merkel, Westerwelle, and Seehofer – may make an extra effort to get along, or at least appear to get along, as the NRW elections near. It is not clear that Westerwelle and the FDP, however, believe that it is the squabbling that is unhelpful, or rather its own inability to

deliver as yet on certain campaign promises. If it is the latter, more coalition tensions could ensue as Westerwelle begins to expend more energy as FDP Chairman and less as Foreign Minister, gearing up his party for its NRW campaign. Berlin is once again becoming bogged down in political squabbles as the NRW elections near.

8. (U) Consulate Munich contributed to this cable.

Murphy

CONFIDENTIAL: FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER ZU GUTTENBERG REVEALS STRUGGLE

VZCZCXRO6323
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #0157/01 0351607
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041607Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6478
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000157 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2020
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO GM AF
SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER ZU GUTTENBERG REVEALS STRUGGLE
WITH FM WESTERWELLE ON TROOP INCREASE FOR AFGHANISTAN 

REF: A. BERLIN 138
     B. BERLIN 112 

Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILIP D. MURPHY. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). 

1.  (C) SUMMARY.  Defense Minister zu Guttenberg revealed in
a February 3 meeting with Ambassador Murphy that coalition
partner FM Westerwelle -- not the opposition Social
Democratic Party (SPD) -- had been the single biggest
obstacle
to the government seeking a bigger increase in German
troops for Afghanistan.  But even with the modest planned
troop increase of 500 (with 350 more in reserve), zu
Guttenberg said a restructuring of the current Bundeswehr
presence would allow Germany to increase the number of
soldiers involved in the training of Afghan National Army
(ANA) by more than 1,000.  While Westerwelle has portrayed
his skepticism about additional troops as principled, it
was also motivated by a desire to put zu Guttenberg "in his
place."  While the size of the troop increase is settled,
the length of the new ISAF mandate remains open.  The
government is hoping to have the new mandate approved by
the Bundestag before the end of February, with significant
(if not majority) support from the opposition SPD and
Greens.  END SUMMARY. 

WESTERWELLE: BIGGEST OBSTACLE 

2. (C) In explaining the lower-than-expected planned
increase in the number of German troops for Afghanistan, zu
Guttenberg told the Ambassador that Westerwelle's opening
position in the coalition negotiations on the new mandate
had been "not one additional soldier."  In that context, it
had been difficult to get agreement on any increase at
all.  (Comment: Zu Guttenberg proposed 1,500 additional
troops at the initial January 4 mini-cabinet meeting on
this issue.  End Comment.) 

DOING A LOT MORE WITH A LITTLE MORE 

3. (C) To help justify the need for more troops, zu
Guttenberg said he had forced the Bundeswehr to do a
complete review of all the existing positions in
Afghanistan, which had confirmed that some could be
eliminated in light of the new ISAF counterinsurgency
strategy.  He said a restructuring of the current
Bundeswehr presence, combined with the troop increase,
would boost the number of soldiers involved in the training
of the Afghan National Army (ANA) from 280 to 1,400.  The
restructuring includes turning the battalion-size quick
reaction force based in Mazar into a "protection and
training" battalion.  A second such battalion will be
created in Kunduz by augmenting the existing infantry
company there with new troops.  Zu Guttenberg reiterated
that Germany strongly supports COMISAF's focus on
protection of the population and partnering with the Afghan
national security forces (ANSF), and that the German
"trainers" (i.e., the two new maneuver battalions) will
operate in the field with the ANSF. 

PUTTING ZU GUTTENBERG IN HIS PLACE 

4. (C) While zu Guttenberg said he is avoiding public
comment on whether the outcome of the coalition talks on
the new mandate is a "victory" for him or Westerwelle, FDP
Defense Policy Spokesman Elke Hoff told poloff separately
that Westerwelle's hard line against additional troops had
been motivated in part to "teach zu Guttenberg a lesson."
She claimed that zu Guttenberg had been too presumptuous
last fall in making speeches in Canada and the U.S. about
how Germany would significantly increase its troop
contribution to ISAF.  He might have been able to get
agreement on a higher ceiling had he engaged
parliamentarians first and showed "greater respect for the
political process." 

OPEN QUESTION: LENGTH OF THE MANDATE 

5. (C) Zu Guttenberg confirmed that the cabinet would
formally agree on the proposed new ISAF mandate February 9
and that the first reading in the Bundestag would be
February 10.  FM Westerwelle is scheduled to speak on
behalf of the government in introducing the proposed
mandate.  The government is aiming to hold the final
Bundestag vote on the mandate -- following two weeks of
committee hearings -- on February 26.  Zu Guttenberg was 

BERLIN 00000157  002 OF 002 

confident that a large number (if not a majority) of
opposition politicians from the SPD and Greens would vote
in favor of the new mandate. 

6. (C) A February 2 meeting of state secretaries
tentatively agreed that the new mandate should run, as is
the custom, for one year, expiring in February 2011.  Zu
Guttenberg indicated, however, that it might be preferable to
stick to the length of the current mandate, which expires
in December 2010.  He expressed concern that having the
mandate lap over into early 2011 could lead to a premature
debate on withdrawal, before the new strategy really had a
chance to work.  (Comment: Another option under
consideration -- and favored by some in the Chancellery --
is a 18-month mandate, so that any debate on the future of
the troop presence would be put off until the fall of
2011.  But the MFA objects that this would only raise the
ire of the opposition and give them an excuse to oppose the
mandate.  End Comment.) 

REASSURING THE GERMANS ON COMMAND OF THE NORTH 

7. (C) Zu Guttenberg confirmed that Germany very much
welcomed the planned inflow of U.S. forces into the north,
especially the helicopter assets, which filled a
long-standing shortfall.  He noted, however, that many in
Germany question whether the U.S. will be willing to accept
continued German leadership of RC-North in view of the
increased U.S. presence.  Ambassador Murphy assured him
that the U.S. had no issues working for the German command in
the North.
Murphy

CONFIDENTIAL: WESTERWELLE ON AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, TAC NUKES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000164 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2020
TAGS: OTRA MARR NATO PARM PINS PREL PGOV GM AF IR
SUBJECT: WESTERWELLE ON AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, TAC NUKES 

Classified By: Classified by Political M-C George Glass for reasons 1.4
 (b,d). 

1.  (C) German FM Westerwelle told Amb February 5 that it was
important to refocus Afghanistan efforts on civilian
reconstruction; that we needed to avoid suggesting German
troops engaged in less risk than other countries; that he did
not invite Iranian FM Mottaki to Germany or seek a meeting
with him; that any discussion of non-strategic nuclear
weapons needed to be conducted at 28 at NATO; and that he
could not influence any decision by the European Parliament
on the SWIFT agreement.  END SUMMARY.
2.  (C) The Ambassador asked about Westerwelle's first 100
days in office.  Though in an ebullient mood, Westerwelle
said things were very difficult (FDP slipped another
percentage point in the polls hours before the meeting).  He
said he had been in France February 4 for a joint cabinet
meeting, but that nothing substantive came of it.  He
observed that one never really knew what was going to happen
with Sarkozy involved. 

--------------
AFGHANISTAN
------------- 

3.  (C) The Ambassador reviewed his own recent trip to
Afghanistan.  He shared his impression that the Germans were
doing a superb job at all levels from the RC-North commander
on down.  He learned how critical mentoring and partnering
with Afghan security forces had become.  He noted that the
U.S. was sending substantial forces to RC-North, where they
would conduct training and be under German command.
Westerwelle responded that this was important for Germany and
for international cooperation.  The Ambassador added that the
U.S. was sending substantial helicopter support as well.  He
said that Germans could be proud of their troops in
Afghanistan.  Westerwelle responded that this was good news.
He said that the London Conference bore an excellent
conclusion, and was particularly useful for its focus on
civilian progress.  He emphasized the importance of
underscoring civilian reconstruction.
4.  (C) With a request for confidentiality, Westerwelle
referred to the January 20 "Bild Zeitung" interview with
General McChrystal, in which the general is quoted as urging
the Germans to take more risks.  Westerwelle recounted that
he himself had had to answer questions about this article for
ten days, explaining that the Germans were not "peace
soldiers" while  other countries provided the combat troops.
He said it was important that German troops not be
"relativized" and cast as second-class troops.  He observed
that Germany had originally deployed 3,500 troops, increased
that mandate to 4,500, and was now planning an increase of
another 500 plus a reserve.  He emphasized that this was a
major contribution compared with other European countries.
5.  (C) The Ambassador noted that he had gained the
impression in Afghanistan that police training was more
challenging than he had originally understood.  Troops were
usually required to provide force protection.  But German
police training was the best.
6.  (C) The Ambassador asked how the prospective February 26
Bundestag debate to extend the Bundeswehr mandate in
Afghanistan would play out.  Westerwelle said the question
was how large a majority would approve the new mandate.  He
said that SPD caucus chief Steinmeier displayed good will on
this issue.  However, SPD chairman Gabriel wanted to
politicize the issue for domestic political gain.
Nevertheless, he thought some in the SPD would support the
new mandate.  However, Westerwelle expected no support from
the Greens.  Westerwelle noted that the May NRW state
elections were also affecting the issue in a negative way.
That said, he said he could not see Steinmeier opposing the
larger mandate.  He hoped the Ambassador would speak with
Steinmeier. 

------
IRAN
------ 

7.  (C) Asked about the February 5 visit of Iranian FM
Mottaki to the Munich Security Conference, Westerwelle
emphasized that he (Westerwelle) had not invited Mottaki to
come to Germany, and Westerwelle had also not requested a
meeting with Mottaki.  Rather, it was Mottaki who was asking
to see Westerwelle.  Westerwelle said he had still not
decided whether he would talk to Mottaki or not.  He
reflected concern that Tehran might try to exploit Mottaki's
visit to Germany as a distraction, and continue executing
people during the visit.  In any case, Westerwelle said his
position was exactly the same as the U.S. on Iran, and he
would share the results of any meeting with Mottaki, if it
took place. 

BERLIN 00000164  002 OF 002 

8.  (C) Westerwelle said he would meet Russian FM Lavrov and
(separately) Chinese FM Yang February 5.  He suggested that
Moscow had been changing course on Iran sanctions since the
Qom revelations.  The Russians now saw Iran as playing games
on the nuclear issue.  However, he observed that China was
"hesitant," or even in opposition to sanctions.  Reflecting
on his recent visit to China, Westerwelle said he had not
perceived any "good will" there at present.  He said he would
ask Yang again about Iran and then share the results with the
U.S.  Westerwelle opined that it was important also to focus
on Brazil as an opinion leader in the Third World.  He noted
that President Lula had received Ahmadinejad warmly several
months ago.  He added that he was uncertain what the Saudis
thought, but that the other Persian Gulf countries seemed to
be in an existential panic about the Iranian nuclear program. 

-----------
TAC NUKES
----------- 

9.  (C) Touching briefly on arms control, Westerwelle stated
unequivocally that tactical nuclear weapons was an issue for
NATO.  He said that when he had received Kissinger, Schulz,
Perry and Nunn on February 3 to talk about their global zero
proposal, tactical nuclear weapons was not discussed.  He
said that the four statesmen were very supportive of
President Obama. 

----------
TFTP
--------- 

10.  (C) The Ambassador raised the challenge of getting the
European Parliament to approve an agreement to share data
with the U.S. on tracking terrorist finance.  The Ambassador
noted the extensive efforts of the Treasury Department and
other U.S. agencies to explain the importance of the program
to our common security.  He asked how one could get better
support for the program.  Westerwelle replied that the German
government had been able to come up with a solution for
itself a few months ago when the issue first surfaced.
(Comment: In fact, German Interior Minister de Maziere's vote
to abstain in the EU Council vote on TFTP on November 30
reflected the complete deadlock within the Coalition
Government between TFTP advocates in the CDU-controlled
Interior Ministry and TFTP opponents in the FDP-controlled
Justice Ministery. End Comment.) However, Westerwelle said
that now that the issue was in the European Parliament, he
had no ability to influence it.  He said that he was very,
very aware of the Secretary's interest in this issue.
Nevertheless, he had a sense that almost all groups in the
European Parliament had concerns with the proposed agreement.
 He emphasized that this was not an issue that only concerned
his party, the FDP, but rather many others as well.
11. (C) Westerwelle shared that he had not yet appointed a
new Coordinator for German-American cooperation. 

----------
COMMENT
--------- 

12.  (C) Westerwelle (who spoke with ease in English) was in
a buoyant mood and more confident on his issues than we have
seen him so far.  He seemed ready to defend any intimation
that he was less than supportive of a troop surge (Defense
Minister zu Guttenberg told the Ambassador two days ago that
Westerwelle had worked for no increase of German troops for
Afghanistan, see Berlin 157) with invocations of the
importance of civilian reconstruction.  On Iran, he leapt at
the chance to tell us he had not invited Mottaki.  His dodges
on both tactical nuclear weapons and terrorist finance were
all but practiced.  His comment that he was unable to affect
the vote in the EU Parliament on TFTP was a bit disingenuous;
on February 4, an MFA official acknowledged to visiting
Treasury officials in Berlin that German MEPs were in fact
leading the charge against TFTP in the EU Parliament with the
tacit support of the FDP, if not of specialists in the
Justice Ministry and MFA themselves. Westerwelle still cuts a
good image in meetings and in the press here, even though his
party continues a bout of free fall in the polls.  His
ministry, though, still wonders (privately to us) where he
gets his policy direction from.  END COMMENT.
13.  (U) The Ambassador did not have the chance to clear this
cable before departing Berlin. 

Murphy

TOP-SECRET CIA-REPORT: NORTH KOREA’S ENGAGEMENT: PERSPECTIVES, OUTLOOK, AND IMPLICATION

DOC_0001346397

TOP-SECRET: SARAH PALINS TELEPHONE HACK REVEALED

TOP-SECRET: CHINESE RESEARCH ON HIGH MICROWAVE AND EMP-WEAPONS

Doc011

TOP-SECRET FROM THE CIA ARCHIVES: BIN LADIN PREPARING TO HIJACK US AIRCRAFT AND OTHER ATTACKS

DOC_0001110635

STRENG VERTRAULICH: DAS SCHILY-EL-MASRI-DOSSIER

schily-el-masri_schily-el-masri-antworten-11-10-2006

schily-el-masri_schily-el-masri-befragung-12-10-sta-m-03-11-2006

schily-el-masri_schily-el-masri-sta-m-nachforderung

schily-el-masri_schily-el-masri-sta-m-fragen-18-05-2006

TOP-SECRET: CIA ARCHIVES DOCUMENT-WARNING OF WAR IN EUROPE

DOC_0001486834

SECRET: THE SAUDI SHI’A: WHERE DO THEIR LOYALTIES LIE?

VZCZCXRO1004
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHRH #3312/01 1221455
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 021455Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6969
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2585
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0526
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 RIYADH 003312 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

DHAHRAN SENDS
PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS SA
SUBJECT: THE SAUDI SHI'A:  WHERE DO THEIR LOYALTIES LIE? 

REF: A. RIYADH 3301
     B. RIYADH 1196
     C. RIYADH 888 

Classified by Consul General John Kincannon for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d). 

-------
Summary
------- 

1.  (S) Some Sunni Arab leaders, including Egypt's President
Mubarak and Jordan's King Abdullah, have recently publicly
questioned the loyalties of Arab Shi'a populations in the
Middle East.  Privately, senior Saudi officials raise similar
concerns.  Given the ongoing sectarian conflict in Iraq,
increasing regional tensions vis-a-vis Shi'a Iran, and the
tenuous status of Saudi Shi'a within their own country, the
question of whether Saudi Shi'a loyalties belong primarily
with Saudi Arabia - or, alternatively, to their
coreligionists elsewhere in the Gulf - is a timely one.  It
is also of central concern to U.S. strategic interests in the
region, given the concentration of Saudi Arabia's Shi'a
population in its oil producing areas. 

2.  (S) Our conclusion, based on discussions with a broad
spectrum of Saudi Shi'a contacts over the past eight months,
is that most Saudi Shi'a remain committed to the agreement
reached between the Saudi Shi'a leadership and King Fahd in
1993-4, whereby Shi'a leaders agreed to pursue their goals
within the Kingdom's political system in return for the
King's promise to improve their situation.  Saudi Shi'a have
deep religious ties to Iraq and Iran and are inspired by the
newfound religious freedom and political power of the Iraqi
Shi'a; they also have a lengthy history of persecution by the
Al-Saud and face continuing discrimination (ref B).
Nonetheless, their leaders still appear committed to working
for reform from within, a strategy that, thanks to King
Abdullah, is slowly bearing fruit.  In our view, it would
require a major internal or external stimulus to move the
Saudi Shi'a toward confrontation with Riyadh.  Such stimuli
could include a major shift in SAG policy or leadership, the
spread of uncontained sectarian violence to the Kingdom, or a
major change in regional security arrangements, especially
escalating regional conflict involving Shi'a (ref C).  Absent
these circumstances, the vast majority of Saudi Shi'a are not
likely to demonstrate significant external political
loyalties, either to Iran or to any inchoate notion of a
"Shi'a crescent."  End summary. 

--------------------------------------------- --------
A Tactical Choice:  Advocating for Rights from Within
--------------------------------------------- -------- 

3.  (SBU) At 1.5 to 2 million strong, the Shi'a comprise 10
to 15 percent of Saudi citizens.  They are concentrated in
the Eastern Province (EP), particularly the oasis areas of
Qatif (where the population is overwhelmingly Shi'a) and
Al-Ahsa (a mixed Sunni-Shi'a area).  Saudi Shi'a do not have
the breadth of tribal and clan ties to Iraq and Iran as do
the Shi'a of Kuwait and Bahrain, though at least one major
Shi'a tribal confederation, the Al-Tamim, are present in
Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. 

4.  (SBU) The Wahhabi Saudi state has a long record of brutal
persecution of both Saudi Shi'a and Shi'a living elsewhere in
the region.  During the military raids of the first and
second Saudi states in the 18th and 19th centuries, Shi'a
were a frequent target of Wahhabi Saudi violence, including
an all-out attack on major Shi'a cities in southern Iraq and
the desecration of holy sites there.  When the founder of
modern Saudi Arabia, King Abdulaziz, conquered what is now
the EP, his fanatical Ikhwan army went on a murderous
anti-Shi'a rampage.  A watershed moment in this troubled
history came in 1979 when thousands of Shi'a, angry at the
state, inspired by the Iranian revolution, and organized by a
young group of leaders, most notably Hassan Al-Saffar, took
to the streets of Qatif in protest.  The SAG cracked down,
killing a number of the protesters and arresting many
activists.  Hundreds of Shi'a, including Al-Saffar, went into
exile, initially to Iran but later leaving Iran for Syria,
Lebanon, the UK, the U.S., and other western countries.
Al-Saffar and many of his political allies returned to Saudi
Arabia in the mid 1990s after reaching a deal with King Fahd
in 1993-4.  The King agreed to allow the exiles to return, to
release Shi'a detained in the Kingdom, and to take steps to
improve the situation of the Shi'a; for their part, the
returning Shi'a agreed to cease their opposition activities
and pursue their goals within the Saudi system. 

5.  (C) Why did the exiled Shi'a return?  According to
Mohammed Al-Mahfooth, one of their number and now
editor-in-chief of a journal on contemporary Islamic issues,
"There were two main reasons.  First, we realized that, as a
minority in Saudi Arabia, we could never hope to change the
regime by revolution, as we might have thought in 1979.
Second, we felt we were losing touch with our communities
here, and we were not effective at helping them to develop
from abroad.  So we decided to come back and work for our own
rights from within."  We have heard similar explanations from
other Shi'a who were part of the exile movement.  As a group,
exiled and indigenous leaders made an important tactical
decision in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Realizing that
they could not wrest control over their destiny from the SAG
by opposition and confrontation, they changed their goal to
realizing their civil rights as Saudi citizens and their
tactics to pushing for reform from within.  The same tactical
calculus remains relevant today. 

6.  (C) Shi'a activists have consistently emphasized to us
their continued commitment to pushing for civil rights and
reform within the system; in the words of one of their
leaders, "Any place there is room, we are trying to use it."
We see considerable evidence that the Shi'a are indeed taking
full advantage of every opportunity, especially with the
ascension of King Abdullah, whom the Shi'a view as friendly
to their aspirations.  They were active participants in the
petition movement in the last years of King Fahd's reign,
signing petitions calling for reform both as a community and,
as individuals, in conjunction with other (Sunni) reformers.
The Shi'a successfully organized to win all the municipal
council seats in EP areas where they enjoyed demographic
predominance.  The Qatif municipal council, with Jafar
Al-Shayeb as its president, will likely prove to be the most
organized and active of any in the EP. 

7. (C) The Shi'a are also pushing the boundaries of what the
SAG allows in terms of civil society (ref A), organizing
unregistered but tolerated activities ranging from regular
cultural and political forums to computer and astronomy clubs
to underground film showings.  Of the five people appointed
to the Dammam branch of the National Society for Human Rights
(NSHR), at least four are Shi'a activists, including
Al-Shayeb.  The Shi'a are pushing for greater religious
freedom and a reduction in discrimination through the NSHR
and via direct appeal to senior SAG leaders, albeit with
limited success.  Pointing to these activities and to their
vision of a Saudi Arabia where all citizens enjoy civil
rights, some of our contacts argue that the Shi'a are the
true Saudi nationalists and reformers. 

8.  (C) Another indication that the Shi'a are, at least for
now, committed to working within the system is that Shi'a
leaders and activists from a variety of backgrounds are
gravitating toward this tactic and that they are actively
building bridges with other reform elements in Saudi society.
 The returned exiles are the most politically active Saudi
Shi'a, were the major force in brokering the 1993-4 deal with
King Fahd, and are in the forefront of most of the
initiatives mentioned above.  (Note: While they do not form a
single political block, they are sometimes referred to as
"Shirazis" because at the time of their exile many of them
followed the late Ayatollah Mohammed Al-Shirazi, who
advocated that clerics should play a greater political role
in demanding Shi'a rights, although Shirazi opposed the
concept of wilayat al-faqih.  End note.)  Other Shi'a
activists, both secular and religious, have also adopted the
tactic of pushing for reform from within, although they do
not have the same broad organizational networks of the
Shirazis.  These activists include former leftists like Najib
Al-Khunaizi, who hosts one of the regular cultural forums in
Qatif, and purported Saudi Hezbollah leader Hassan Al-Nimr,
who participated in the most recent National Dialogue in
Abha.  The Shirazis, Al-Khunaizi, Al-Nimr, and other Shi'a
leaders are also making efforts to reach out to secular and
religious reformers from Sunni society, trading visits to
each other's forums and majlises and seeking other means for
dialogue. 

--------------------------------------------- ----
Iran:  Religious Ties but Few Political Loyalties
--------------------------------------------- ---- 

9.  (S) While there are strong religious ties between the
Saudi Shi'a and Iran and the potential for Iranian influence
in the EP is a legitimate concern, especially given the
increasing bellicosity of Iranian rhetoric and policy, our
best assessment is that, under prevailing conditions, the
Shi'a are not looking to Tehran for political guidance. 

10.  (S) As argued in ref C, given the importance of the EP
to Saudi Arabia's oil industry, Iran has a strategic
rationale for laying the groundwork to exert its influence.
It also has a history of doing so.  The Iranian revolution
inspired the Saudi Shi'a to rise up in opposition in 1979,
and the Iranians played a role in organizing Saudi Hezbollah
in the 1980s.  Most Saudi Shi'a clerics have studied
extensively in Iran, especially Qom, and many politically
active Shi'a spent time in Iran in the early and mid 1980s.
A militant Saudi Shi'a group, at least inspired if not
directed by Iran, carried out the attack on the Al-Khobar
military barracks in the summer of 1996.  More recently, a
few of our Shi'a contacts have claimed that there are active
pro-Iranian networks in the Qatif area and alleged other
signs of Iranian activity, although a much larger number of
others discount these claims.  (Note:  Recent sensitive
reports from other channels also suggest possible Shi'a links
with militant Shi'a in Iran, Iraq, and/or Lebanon.  One
report suggests that Iranian-affliated Iraqi militias may
have begun low-key efforts to establish contacts in the EP,
and another report suggests that one Saudi Shi'a may have
visited a Lebanese Shi'a leader to seek financial support.
End note.) 

11.  (S) The vast majority of our Shi'a contacts, however,
have told ConOffs that they see no evidence of current
Iranian efforts to exert political influence in the EP.  Our
contacts, who include community activists, political leaders,
journalists, businessmen, cultural figures, academics, and
sheikhs, many of whom studied in Iran, are also generally
skeptical of Iranian motives as they pertain to Saudi Arabia.
 We heard over and over variants of the following statement:
"We were used by Iran before, and we won't let it happen
again.  Their interests are completely different than ours."
Indeed, the exiled Shirazis appear to have left Iran in the
mid 1980s because it became clear they were being used:
several contacts independently told us that the group left
because they refused Iranian pressure to organize or take
credit for sabotage operations against Saudi oil
installations. 

12.  (C) Time and time again, Shi'a sheikhs have explained
that the Saudi Shi'a prefer to study in Najaf or Karbala
(where Arabic is spoken everywhere, including outside the
religious community), have much stronger historical ties to
religious institutions in Iraq, and studied in Qom only
because Saddam Hussein's regime made it impossible for them
to study in Iraq.  They also caution that a Shi'a who has
studied at a hawza in Qom would not necessarily share a
pro-Iranian religious or political perspective and note that
all the important ayatollahs, including those from Najaf,
have hawzas in Qom.  All of our contacts concur that among
Saudi Shi'a who emulate a marja' or mujtahid, the large
majority of Saudi Shi'a follow Iranian-born but Iraq-based
Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, with the rest divided among a
number of other ayatollahs. 

13. (S) The current role and activity of Saudi Hezbollah
remains a question mark about which we have been able to
develop only limited information.  Some contacts claims the
group no longer exists, but prevailing evidence suggests that
it encompasses a small group of religious figures who believe
in the concept of wilayat al-faqih, emulate Iran's Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i as their marja', but have few
current followers.  Our contacts report that its leaders are
not very active politically, do not take their cue from the
Iranian regime, and do not espouse violence (at least not
currently, in all three cases).  While we continue to seek
additional information on Saudi Hezbollah, what limited
knowledge we have supports the views espoused by our
contacts.  We do not know of any anti-SAG or anti-American
violence ascribed to any Saudi Shi'a group since the Khobar
Towers bombing in 1996; at least one of Saudi Hezbollah's
purported leaders has participated in the National Dialogue
(suggesting that the SAG does not consider the movement or
the individual as much of a threat and that he supports the
Dialogue's concept); and we have heard that other Shi'a
leaders have, over time, convinced Saudi Hezbollah's leaders
that violence would not help the Shi'a cause.  We cannot rule
out the possibility that Iran or its proxies could recruit
and train small Saudi Shi'a cells to carry out disruptive or
terrorist activities.  However, we cannot see such cells
developing a broad following given the present Shi'a
leadership and their strategy unless there are major changes
in the regional political landscape. 

------------------
The Impact of Iraq
------------------ 

14.  (C) The Saudi Shi'a follow events in Iraq with intense
interest.  In stark contrast to non-Shi'a Saudis, most Shi'a
express support for the U.S. intervention in Iraq despite the
current strife and violence.  Many Shi'a contacts have
explicitly thanked ConOffs for the U.S. role in freeing their
coreligionists in Iraq from Saddam Hussein's oppressive
regime and helping them obtain political power commensurate
with their numbers.  Saudi Shi'a feel deep emotional and
religious ties to Iraq and look forward to visiting Shi'a
holy sites and participating in religious festivals there as
soon as the security situation permits.  The expanded
political and religious freedoms for Shi'a in Iraq have
empowered Saudi Shi'a to push further than they previously
dared against SAG restrictions on religious freedom and civil
society.  For example, contacts have linked expanded Ashura
celebrations in Qatif, as well as more cautious expressions
of Shi'a identity elsewhere in the Kingdom, directly to the
new situation in Iraq. 

15.  (S) However, although Saudi Shi'a are certainly aware
that Shi'a form a significant part of the population on the
Arab side of the gulf, to date we have seen no indication
that the Saudi Shi'a have any realistic vision of a pan-Arab
Shi'a political block.  Any such realization of an Arab
"Shi'a crescent" would have to be led by Iraqi Shi'a, and at
this point, as several contacts have noted to us, domestic
challenges occupy their full attention.  Saudi Shi'a are not
currently traveling to Iraq in significant numbers, and
political and religious contacts between Saudi and Iraqi
Shi'a post-Iraqi liberation, while they have occurred, appear
to have been limited to date. 

--------------------------------------------- ---
The Future of the Shi'a Strategy and U.S. Policy
--------------------------------------------- --- 

16.  (S) Will the Shi'a strategy of seeking to realize their
rights as Saudi citizens by engaging the SAG hold firm over
the next several years?  We believe that it will, as long as
the SAG does not backtrack on reform through a change in
policy or leadership and/or as long as there are not
compelling external pressures or influences that change their
calculus of interests.  Although Shi'a leaders have
frequently expressed to us their frustration with the slow
pace of reform and with the continued discrimination against
the Shi'a community, they have invested a great deal in the
strategy of engagement and it is slowly bearing fruit in the
form of some advances in religious freedom (in Qatif at
least) and civil society.  If the SAG does backtrack, e.g. by
clamping down harshly on unlicensed civil society
organizations or undoing the limited measure of religious
freedom recently gained by the Shi'a, or if other elements of
the current equilibrium change, the strategic calculations of
the Shi'a leadership could change as well.  While we have not
seen any signs of radical young Shi'a leaders who disagree
with the goals or tactics of the current leadership, such
leaders could emerge if sectarian violence initiated by Sunni
extremists spreads uncontained to Saudi Arabia, if the
employment situation for young Shi'a worsens, if Ayatollah
Sistani is succeeded by a more radical cleric as marja' to
most Saudi Shi'a, or if conflict breaks out with Iran. 

17.  (S) The argument outlined above, that the Saudi Shi'a
remain committed to a strategic choice to push for
realization of their rights as citizens from within the Saudi
system and, under current conditions, do not entertain any
serious external political loyalties, has several important
implications for U.S. policymakers.  Most Saudi Shi'a
currently see their interests as directly aligned with U.S.
interests in key respects, particularly with the U.S.
interest in promoting participatory governance and human
rights in the Middle East as an antidote to extremism.  They
appreciate any pressure the U.S. puts on the Saudi government
to reform, although they wish the U.S. would increase this
pressure and worry that other interests, such as regional
stability and security of the oil supply, cause the U.S. to
draw back from urging greater steps toward political reform. 

18.  (S) The most important implication of this argument is
therefore that it is unlikely that the vast majority of Saudi
Shi'a would support Iranian or Iranian-proxy interference in
Saudi Arabia as long as the current equilibrium holds,
particularly the promise for gradual reform.  King Abdullah
embodies this promise of reform, particularly for the Shi'a,
and with good cause:  no less a figure than Prince Talal bin
Abdulaziz told the Ambassador that King Abdullah has decided
to give Saudi more religious freedom as part of an effort to
better incorporate them into Saudi national life.  By
supporting the reform process, the U.S. is also playing a
role, an important one in Shi'a eyes, in maintaining the
current equilibrium.  (Comment:  As suggested in ref C, the
USG can certainly use SAG concern about potential Iranian
influence as one means of urging the SAG to grant fuller
rights to its Shi'a citizens.  End comment.)  A secondary,
more tactical implication is that the Saudi Shi'a currently
make natural allies in U.S. efforts to promote political
reform and human rights in Saudi Arabia.  Post is already
directing some programmatic resources in this direction and
will explore this potential further in a later cable. 

-------
Sources
------- 

19.  (SBU) This cable draws on hundreds of conversations over
the past eight months between CG, PolOff, and PAO and a
diverse group of Saudi Shi'a contacts, as well as on related
observations and on publicly available sources such as Saudi
Shi'a websites and other reports.  We have reported many of
these conversations and observations in previous cables
(NOTAL), including RIYADH 964, RIYADH 179, RIYADH 42, 2005
RIYADH 9142 (reform, Iran, Iraq); RIYADH 3306, RIYADH 1741,
RIYADH 1380, 2005 RIYADH 7589, 2003 RIYADH 2698 (reform);
RIYADH 1706, RIYADH 1377, RIYADH 1252 (civil society); RIYADH
1461, RIYADH 280, RIYADH 275 (Shi'a leadership); 2005 RIYADH
9048, 2005 RIYADH 8565 (Iraq, Iran); RIYADH 1053 (Iraq); 2005
RIYADH 8741 (Iran); RIYADH 2840 (reactions to Mubarak); and
2005 RIYADH 8323 (EP governance). 

(APPROVED:  KINCANNON)
GFOELLER

CONFIDENTIAL: OKINAWAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE CHINA THREAT OR LACK THEREOF

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 NAHA 000103 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/26/2031
TAGS: MARR PINS JA CH TW
SUBJECT: OKINAWAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE CHINA THREAT OR LACK THEREOF 

REF: A. A.  TOKYO 1301
     B. B.  TOKYO 1153
     C. C.  EMBASSY TOKYO TRANSLATION OF FEBRUARY 24 SANKEI SHIMBUN ARTICLE.
     D. D.  FUKUOKA 17
     E. E.  NAGOYA 11
     F. F.  TOKYO 822 

NAHA 00000103  001.2 OF 008 

CLASSIFIED BY: Thomas G. Reich, Consul General, Consulate
General Naha, State.
REASON: 1.4 (d) 

1.     (C) Summary: Despite China's rapidly expanding economic
and military activities, including in waters near Okinawa,
Okinawans claim they do not share America's or Japan's sense of
threat from China.  While many mainland Japanese officials and
influentials say they recognize China as a potential threat to
regional security and stability, even most conservative
Okinawans do not believe a Chinese threat to Japan (or
elsewhere) necessarily means a threat to Okinawa.  Many
Okinawans identify with China culturally and believe China sees
them as a separate people from the Japanese.  Some also say
Okinawa, over the centuries, has received better treatment from
China than from Japan or the United States.  These attitudes
combine to produce an Okinawan perspective that is markedly
different from that of mainland Japan, and which is a factor in
local attitudes toward U.S. military bases in Okinawa.  End
summary. 

------------------
China Rising
------------------ 

2. (SBU) In recent years, China's economic expansion and growing
military capabilities have attracted a great deal of attention
in Japan, although somewhat less in Okinawa.  The two leading
Okinawan newspapers generally appear reluctant to feature
articles about the potential negative impacts on regional
security associated with China's rise, mostly because the
newspapers fear this line of thought will serve as an implicit
justification for the continued existence of U.S. military bases
on the island. 

3. (SBU) Nevertheless, Okinawans who make the effort to read
mainland Japanese newspapers can find ample coverage of Japan's
concerns.  Some widely reported Chinese activities have a very
direct connection to Okinawa.  For example, Japan, China and
Taiwan have competing claims to an island chain 250 miles west
of Okinawa, known as the Senkakus in Japan and Diaoyu in China.
The governments of Japan and China have disputed the islands'
sovereignty for years and more recently have both made moves to
develop undersea resources near them (see, e.g., refs. A, B).
The media have reported China has erected drilling platforms in
the disputed territory. 

4. (SBU) China has also stepped up military air and sea
activities in the area, prompting Japanese Self Defense Forces
to respond.  According to national broadcaster NHK, Japan Air
Self Defense Forces scrambled to intercept Chinese military
aircraft above or near the East China Sea 30 times between April
and September 2005, more than twice as often as they did in all
of 2004.  Chinese maritime activity also occasionally makes the
news.  The November 2004 Chinese submarine incursion into
Japanese waters within Okinawa Prefecture drew a rare Chinese
apology for a ""technical error.""  The mainland Japanese media
have suggested this was not the only Chinese submarine intrusion
near Okinawa. 

--------------------------------------------- --------------
------------------------------
Different Perspectives of ""Mainland"" Japanese and Okinawans
--------------------------------------------- --------------
------------------------------ 

5. (C) In mainland Japan, concern over China's military buildup
is frequently aired.  For example, in January the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) General Affairs Chairman Akio Kuma noted
that if China chose to swallow up Taiwan, it would be easy
enough for it to swallow up Okinawa, too, in the absence of U.S.
forces.  In February the opposition Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ) issued a statement that it was ""inevitable that China's
military buildup and its moves to line up marine interests from
the viewpoint of the Japanese people are recognized as an actual
threat to Japan"" (ref. C). 

6. (U) Typical of many Japanese academics' views was a February
9 article by (Japan's) National Defense University Professor
Tomohide Murai stating that the most efficient way for the
United States to project power throughout the world was to link
with regional partners, and that Japan, by its very location,
was a key partner in the Pacific.  Murai noted the Chinese
recognized the strategic importance of Okinawa, calling it (as
does the United States) the ""keystone of the Pacific."" 

7. (SBU) In Okinawa, however, many - probably most -residents
have a substantially different assessment of China.  In general,
Okinawans perceive little potential threat from China; many
people here note China and the Ryukyu Kingdom had peaceful
relations for centuries prior to the 19th Century Meiji
Restoration in Japan.  To be sure, there are Okinawans who are
as concerned about China's destabilizing possibilities as are
many mainlanders, but this is not the prevailing view on the
island. 

8. (C) As vignettes of Okinawa's relaxed attitude toward China,
we note the following conversations.  During a September 2005
office call, reformist Ginowan City Mayor Yoichi Iha told us he
believed China posed no threat to Okinawa.  In October 2005 Kin
Town Mayor Gibu underscored his support for the U.S.-Japan
alliance but complained the GOJ had never explained what threat,
exactly, the alliance deterred.  In March, former Socialist
Party Diet Member and candidate for Okinawa City mayor Mitsuko
Tomon made the same complaint. 

9.  (C) We asked why a look at a map of the region surrounding
Okinawa and current stories regarding China's expansion didn't
provide Okinawans enough information for them to judge for
themselves.  Tomon replied the GOJ and USG were like the boy who
cried wolf, pointing to China and claiming that something awful
might happen, but nothing ever did.  Okinawans were undisturbed,
Tomon claimed, by Chinese incursions.  Chinese fishing boats
crossing the sea boundary did not affect Okinawan fisheries as
Okinawans worked only in its inner seas.  In a separate
conversation, he Okinawan Federation of Fisheries echoed Tomon's
claim, but added that their members avoided the Senkakus because
they were ""politically difficult.""  The Chinese might be
drilling near the Senkakus, and claim the Senkakus for
themselves, Tomon noted, but these were essentially peaceful
activities for the GOJ to settle.  Because of Okinawa's history
as the Ryukyu Kingdom, it had a very different view of China
than did the Japanese mainland.  Historically speaking, Tomon
commented, Japan and the United States had been more harmful to
Okinawa than China had ever been. 

----------------------------------------
A Ryukyuan History Primer
---------------------------------------- 

10. (U) By entering into close trading relationships with both
China and Japan in the 14th and 15th centuries, the Ryukyu
Kingdom enjoyed a lengthy period of prosperity in the years
before 1609.  As George Kerr notes in his book Okinawa: The
History of an Island People, ""the islands were independent.
They were in constant communication and at peace with
neighboring states.  Okinawans were in the happy position of
freedom to adopt what they wanted, and to remain indifferent -
or at best mildly curious - about foreign artifacts and
institutions for which they felt no pressing need.  China loomed
as the neighbor of unquestioned superiority, and Okinawans were
in close and constant communication with Japan, but were
overwhelmed by neither.""  Many Okinawans today regard this
period as the Golden Age of their history, and view it as a
basis for their belief that China sees Okinawa a place entirely
separate from Japan. 

11. (U) The Golden Age ended in 1609, when the southernmost clan
in mainland Japan (the Satsumas of southern Kyushu) sent an army
to assert control over Okinawa and extracted increasingly
burdensome tributes.  The Satsumas then took over the lucrative
trade with China through Okinawa, continuing it despite the
Tokugawa Shogunate's closed country (sakoku) policy. 

12. (U) After Commodore Perry and his black ships helped trigger
the Meiji Restoration, Japan began vigorously securing and
expanding its borders.  In 1872 Japan formally abolished the
Ryukyu Kingdom and annexed Okinawa, over Chinese protests.
Okinawa pleaded with China and the United States to intervene.
Four-party discussions dragged on for decades until the
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, which settled the issue in Japan's
favor as far as the western powers were concerned. 

13. (U) Japan instituted a top-down assimilation program for
Okinawa that gained momentum when met by a bottom-up
assimilation movement following Japan's success in the
Sino-Japanese War.  Practical-minded Okinawans became convinced
they would benefit from closer identification with Japan.  Early
editorials of the Ryukyu Shimpo, dating as far back as 1893,
asserted that Okinawa could develop only by fully assimilating
with Japan. 

14. (U) Over the following 50 years, many Okinawans saw military
service, including during the battle for Okinawa, as a chance to
prove they were true Japanese.  However, the battle, which
killed perhaps a third of the Okinawan population, came as a
shock to most of the survivors, who experienced or heard stories
of atrocities against Okinawans by Japanese troops.  In the
years after the war, a home-grown historical interpretation of
the battle took solid root in Okinawa, which holds that Tokyo
had always intended to sacrifice Okinawa in a battle designed to
consume as many U.S. forces as possible, to stall and weaken an
eventual attack on the mainland. 

15. (U) The United States directly governed Okinawa through a
military high commissioner from 1945 to 1972, 20 years longer
than the rest of Japan.  During this period, U.S. forces
forcibly seized land for bases.  By the early 1960s, a movement
advocating reversion to Japan began among Okinawans, leading to
large-scale demonstrations against the U.S. administration in
the late 1960s and early 1970s.  Okinawa reverted to Japan May
15, 1972. 

16. (SBU) The reunion was a victory for all Okinawans (though
many were dismayed at the remaining numbers of U.S. facilities
and forces), and anti-U.S. protests were dramatically reduced
following reversion.  With reversion, the GOJ sharply increased
infrastructure development, and the general standard of living
greatly improved.  However, in the years since 1972, many
Okinawans have called for lessening the island's economic
dependence on GOJ transfer payments.  Okinawa remains the
poorest prefecture in Japan, with the highest unemployment rate
in Japan, and many argue that Okinawa needs to become more
economically independent. 

--------------------------------------------- --------------
-----------------
Okinawan Analysis: Split Identity, Affinity with China
--------------------------------------------- --------------
----------------- 

17. (SBU) The above history still shapes Okinawans' world views,
including their sense of identity.  In December 2005 the
University of the Ryukyus announced the results of a telephone
survey of Okinawans, in which 40% of respondents, when asked how
they identified themselves, said they were Okinawan.  A smaller
percentage said they were both Okinawan and Japanese (36%), and
just over one in five identified themselves as Japanese (21%). 

18. (SBU) This history also shapes how Okinawans view the GOJ
and actions that are presented in the world press as
provocations to China, most notably visits by the Prime Minister
to Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine.  While many mainland Japanese are
reportedly uncomfortable with the visits, if push comes to shove
between China and Japan, opinion polls show that most side with
Japan's right to do as it pleases.  We believe most Okinawans
side with China.  Typical of this attitude is Masaru Yamada,
treasurer of Okinawa City, who recently criticized Koizumi's
visits to Yasukuni Shrine. He told us he doubted China would
ever accept Koizumi's explanations of the visits, any more than
he himself did.  Okinawans and Chinese held similar views of the
visits, he explained, because they shared the experience of
having been ""prisoners of war"" of the Japanese. 

19.  (U) Local newspaper editorials have also pointed to the
Yasukuni visits as unnecessary barriers to bilateral and
regional cooperation that the GOJ could, and should, remove.
Although an exaggeration, a recent Ryukyu Shimpo article
reporting on the study of Okinawan identity concluded with a
warning that GOJ policies, particularly as they related to bases
and transformation, could influence Okinawans' opinions on
whether to remain part of Japan. 

20. (SBU) Many Okinawans believe that China sees them
differently, and more warmly, than it sees the rest of Japan.
They point out that Taipei International Airport, when posting
place names in Chinese characters, lists flights to/from
""Ryukyu,"" not Okinawa.  A May 2005 Ryukyu Shimpo report claimed
that, because of Okinawa's history, it could become an
intermediary peacefully linking China and Taiwan.  By offering
an independent, international contribution, Okinawa could
renounce its title of ""(strategic) keystone of the Pacific"" and
become a ""keystone of goodwill.""  A June 2005 Ryukyu Shimpo
opinion piece contrasted the hospitality the Chinese granted
Okinawa Governor Inamine and his party when they visited Beijing
with Beijing's snubbing of PM Koizumi.  ""The extreme attention
provided Okinawa, with its deep historical connection to China,
was conspicuous in its contrast.  To look at it the other way
around, it was an intense dig at the GOJ,"" commented the Shimpo. 

21.  (SBU)  Chinese Ambassador to Japan Ki Ou (phonetic from
Japanese pronunciation) visited Okinawa April 24, on a trip
sponsored by the OPG, Okinawa Economic Association, and Okinawa
Visitors and Convention Bureau.  Ou masterfully played to
Okinawans' sense of exceptionalism and desire for a new golden
era of lucrative Sino-Okinawan relations.  Ou cited the
historical and cultural links between China and the Ryukyus and
said he immediately felt comfortable on this first visit to
Okinawa.  Over the past 25 years China's economic expansion had
far outpaced its military expansion, Ou claimed, and its defense
capabilities were reasonable for a country of China's area and
population.  China alone, of the five original nuclear powers,
had offered to eliminate all nuclear weapons if the others would
only agree to do the same.  Okinawa and China should again
travel together the path of peaceful development, Ou stressed,
and tens of thousands of Chinese tourists annually were sure to
follow. 

-----------
Caveats
----------- 

22. (SBU) Okinawa's exceptionalism is not based entirely on
history and feeling; it is used to practical effect.  Okinawans
claiming to feel no threat from China often use this to bolster
arguments that bases should be eliminated from Okinawa.  For
example, when asked specifically about Chinese military
activities near Okinawa, such as the November 2004 submarine
incursion, former Diet member Tomon grudgingly admitted that the
incident was regrettable.  She hastened to add, however, that it
alone did not justify the concentration of U.S. forces and
facilities in Okinawa. 

23. (SBU) The claim of exceptionalism is useful even for
conservatives who support the alliance and those who profit from
our base presence.  Conservative Okinawans could be seen as
playing good cop to reformists' bad cop, in order to squeeze the
maximum concessions from the GOJ and USG. A number of Okinawan
leaders probably assert this exceptionalism because they believe
it useful in leveraging concessions from the USG and GOJ in
return for Okinawan shouldering the burden of U.S. military
bases. 

24.  (SBU) Economic self-interest also helps explain Okinawa's
keenness to engage China.  In this, Okinawan governments and
businesses have motives similar to those of other provinces now
scrambling to find new sources of income as Koizumi's reforms
reduce the outward flow of GOJ largess.  The former Secretary
General of the LDP in Okinawa, Kenjiro Nishida, told us his main
motivation for founding the Okinawa-China Friendship Exchange
Association was to boost the number of Chinese tourists to
Okinawa.  He noted his Chinese counterparts met him more than
halfway, being well funded by their Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
 ConGen Fukuoka and Consulate Nagoya have identified identical
local motives to engage China, as well as signs of China's
welcoming this engagement (Refs. F, G).  The Chinese leadership
may remember Sun Tzu's maxim, ""when he is united, divide him.""
Regardless of how cool relations are between Tokyo and Beijing,
there is no evidence this has had an effect on Okinawa's ties
with China. 

25. (SBU) That being said, Okinawan businesspeople whose
interests directly conflict with China are not as relaxed about
Chinese expansion.  Local developer Tadashi Zayasu told us he
owned part of an interest in a drilling application in the East
China Sea near the Senkaku Islands.  Zayasu said the GOJ had
approved a drilling application filed by the partnership, d.b.a.
Teikoku Oil.  The application was filed in 1970, but the GOJ did
not approve it until July 2005.  Zayasu mused that the GOJ
seemed bent on helping the Chinese at the expense of Okinawans.
Why else, he asked, would the GOJ have funded a Chinese pipeline
to support their exploitation of the fields while sitting on a
Japanese company's application for over thirty years? 

-------------------------------
Comment/Conclusion
------------------------------- 

26. (SBU) The above caveats notwithstanding, Okinawa's sense of
affinity with China and feeling of distance from Japanese
interests give this place a unique perspective on Sino-Japanese
relations, and it shapes the local environment for U.S. military
bases.  Due in part to this, many Okinawans are unconvinced that
our bases in Okinawa are needed to defend Japan -- or at least
not to defend Okinawa.  Some in the GOJ leadership may value the
domestic political benefits of appealing to Japanese nationalism
over the benefits of improved Sino-Japanese relations (ref. F).
The Yasukuni visits, and Chinese reactions to them, are having
the opposite effect on attitudes in Okinawa.  Such acts
strengthen the sense in Okinawa that the LDP leadership, and the
GOJ more broadly, ignore the victims of militarism.  Okinawans'
cultural identification with China, combined with a sense of
serial betrayal by the GOJ, fuels local suspicion of GOJ motives
on current political-military issues.
REICH

CONFIDENTIAL: CUBA: NUN COMMENTS ON FIDEL’S HEALTH

VZCZCXRO6508
PP RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHKW
RUEHLA RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHSR RUEHTM
RUEHVC
DE RUEHROV #0262 3491610
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151610Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY VATICAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0591
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0619
C O N F I D E N T I A L VATICAN 000262 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/15/2016
TAGS: PREL CU VT
SUBJECT: CUBA:  NUN COMMENTS ON FIDEL'S HEALTH 

REF: 04 Vatican 1401 

CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Sandrolini, Deputy Chief of Mission,
EXEC, State.
REASON: 1.4 (d) 

1. (C) Summary.  A prominent abbess in Rome described her recent
visit to Havana and commented on the state of Castro's health in
a December 12 meeting with Ambassador; she also suggested some
possible contacts for the USG.  The abbess has been
controversial in the past.  End summary. 

2. (C) Ambassador Rooney called on Mother Tekla Famiglietti,
Abbess General of the Brigittine Order of the Most Holy Savior,
on December 12.  Mother Tekla -- in charge of the Brigittines
for some 25 years and sometimes called ""the most powerful woman
in Rome"" -- had just returned from a visit to Cuba.  She had
hoped to meet Fidel Castro, whom she had befriended some years
earlier (reftel) at the inauguration of Mexican President
Vicente Fox. 

3. (C)  Mother Tekla said that during this trip she found a
different attitude among priests, nuns, and government contacts;
there is a feeling of impending change resulting from the coming
end of the Fidel era.  People want change, though some of those
close to Fidel are threatened by it.  Mother Tekla commented
that Cubans would be less agitated in Cuba itself than in Miami
when the changes begin.  She hoped the USG would not wait for
Castro's death to begin opening up, but would instead act now to
relax the embargo and help people; this would also steal a march
on others, such as China, who are already on the ground. 

4. (C) Mother Tekla said she had been to Fidel's house many
times before, typically meeting first with his private secretary
Carlos Valenciaga Diaz.  She had intended to do so this time,
but then felt that Castro was now too weak and ill.  Diaz told
her that Fidel has lost 20 kilos and is a shadow of his former
self; he does not have cancer but is bleeding from the stomach.
A room in Castro's house has been converted into a hospital room. 

5. (C) Mother Tekla said she works with Licencia Caridad, head
of the ministry for religious affairs, and Eusebio Leal Spencer,
whom Castro put in charge of getting a new facility built for
Mother Tekla.  She thinks Spencer may know some people who might
be of interest to the USG as potential leaders once a government
change has occurred. 

Comment
-------------- 

6. (C)   Mother Tekla is well known in Rome (if sometimes
controversial), and we have reported on meeting her in the past.
 Reftel describes a flap over her 2004 visit to Havana with
Cardinal Sepe for the opening of the Brigittines' house there,
which Castro used as a propaganda opportunity to the
embarrassment of the Holy See.  We report this conversation for
its possible interest in terms of news about Fidel's health, and
the suggested contacts. 

ROONEY

CONFIDENTIAL: COURT ACQUITS NAJIB’S EX-ADVISOR IN MURDER TRIAL

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1839
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2672
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0510
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 0082
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 000959 

SIPDIS 

FOR EAP/MTS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2028
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KJUS KDEM MY
SUBJECT: COURT ACQUITS NAJIB'S EX-ADVISOR IN MURDER TRIAL 

Classified By: Political Counselor Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b and
 d). 

Summary and Comment
-------------------
1.  (SBU) High Court Justice Mohamad Zaki on October 31
acquitted Political Analyst Abdul Razak Baginda, former
advisor to Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, of the
charge of abetting the murder of Mongolian national Altantuya
Shaariibuu in October 2006, but ordered the continuation of
the murder trial for two policemen.  Defense lawyers
announced they sought to call to the stand two men who have
linked DPM Najib to the case:  Razak's former private
investigator Balasubramaniam, who has disappeared from
public, and controversial blogger Raja Petra who is detained
under the Internal Security Act.  The trial of the two police
defendants is set to continue November 10.  In immediate
commentary, political opposition leaders, including Anwar
Ibrahim, did not focus on Razak's guilt or innocence, but
called into question the conduct of the proceedings and
suggested a cover-up to protect DPM Najib. 

2.  (C) Comment:  Many observers anticipated Razak's
acquittal given the prosecution's poor performance, Razak's
connections to DPM Najib, and the alleged and
widely-perceived political manipulation in the case.  The
Razak verdict momentarily attracts more attention to the
allegations of Najib's linkages to the case; so too would the
testimony of either Balasubramaniam or Raja Petra, though it
is not clear either man will be able to take the stand.
Allegations stemming from the Altantuya case, however, have
not prevented Najib from securing all the nominations so far
for the UMNO party elections.  Absent dramatic and compelling
new evidence prejudicial to the DPM, the Altantuya case will
not slow down Najib's drive to become Malaysia's next Prime
Minister.  End Summary and Comment. 

Razak Acquitted, Trial for Policemen Continues
--------------------------------------------- -
3.  (U) High Court Justice Mohamad Zaki on October 31
acquitted Political Analyst Abdul Razak Baginda, former
advisor to Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, of charges
of abetting the murder of Mongolian national Altantuya
Shaariibuu in October 2006, but ordered the continuation of
the murder trial for two policemen.  Embassy FSN Political
Assistant attended the judgment hearing.  The ruling came
roughly two years after Razak's arrest, and followed a
lengthy 17-month trial involving the presentation of 84
witnesses.  The prosecution had argued that Razak had asked
the policemen to murder Altantuya, Razak's former lover who
had harassed Razak for money.  The judge ruled that the
prosecution team failed to prove a prima facie case against
Razak, and ordered his release.  The judge found a
sufficiently strong prosecution case against the two police
defendants, Chief Inspector Azilah Hadri and Corporal Sirul
Azha Umar, charged with carrying out Altantuya's murder.  At
the time of the crime, Azilah and Azha were members of the
protection detail for DPM Najib. 

Defense to Call Controversial Witnesses
--------------------------------------- 

4.  (U) The Justice requested the defense to begin their
arguments later on the afternoon of October 31, but the
defense requested and was granted a continuance as their
witnesses were not available.  In the day's most surprising
turn, Kamarul Hisham, lead defense counsel for one of the
accused police officers, stated he wished to place on the
witness chair Razak's private investigator P. Balasubramaniam
and Malaysia Today editor Raja Petra Kamaruddin.  Both
witnesses have previously made sworn statements linking DPM
Najib to the murdered Altantuya, and in the case of Raja
Petra, implicating Najib's wife in the murder.
Balasubramaniam, who was an early witness for the
prosecution, has not been seen publicly since he issued a
sworn statement in July on DPM Najib's links to the Altantuya
case, and then retracted the statement the next day,
allegedly under duress according to some accounts.  Raja
Petra is currently detained under the Internal Security Act
(ISA).  (Note: Although the court may order Raja Petra's
presence as a witness, Section 18 of the ISA gives the Home
Minister discretion to ignore the court order.  End note.)
The Judge set November 10 for the defense to begin its
presentation. 

5.  (SBU) For the October 31 judgment hearing, a crowd of
approximately 200 waited outside the courthouse while some
100 (primarily family members of the defendants and
journalists) filled the packed courtroom.  Razak's family
appeared confident and remained calm throughout the whole
hearing and showed no sign of surprise in Razak's acquittal.
The verdict also appeared to come as no surprise to the
attending crowd.  The victim's father, Setev Shaariibuu,
attended the judgment and afterward through an interpreter
expressed his disappointment to reporters:  "I am not
satisfied.  My daughter (knew) only one Malaysian and that is
Razak Baginda.  Now my daughter is dead and Baginda is freed.
 The country (Malaysia) has lost credibility..." 

Opposition Suggests Cover-Up
----------------------------
6.  (U) In immediate comments, political opposition figures,
who have suggested repeatedly that the government had engaged
in a cover-up to protect DPM Najib, did not focus on Razak's
guilt or innocence, but called into question the conduct of
the proceedings.  Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim noted, "On
a personal level, I wish Razak Baginda well, but the issue
here resolves around the court procedure and investigations.
There is a general and growing perception that the
investigation was not done professionally, that there is a
clear motive to cover up."  Anwar also drew attention to
recent Internet revelations of an SMS exchange between Najib
and Razak Baginda's former lawyer in which Najib reportedly
wrote that Razak "will face a tentative charge but all is not
lost." 

KEITH

AMBASSADOR ADVOCATES FOR BOEING AND CBP WITH AER

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INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
RUEHBL/AMCONSUL BELFAST 0373
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000493 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC/ROBERT MCLAUGHLIN
COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC/ADVOCACY CENTER OR PAT NUGENT
DHS FOR CBP/JENNIFER SAVA 

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAIR ECON ETRD EI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR ADVOCATES FOR BOEING AND CBP WITH AER
LINGUS CEO 

REF: DUBLIN 361 AND PREVIOUS 

DUBLIN 00000493  001.2 OF 002 

1.  Summary: In a May 2 meeting with Aer Lingus CEO Dermot
Mannion, the Ambassador advocated Boeing aircraft for the
carrier's long-haul needs and sought Mannion's help in
pushing the Dublin Airport Authority (DAA) to upgrade U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) operations in Ireland.
Mannion said that the Boeing offer was attractive, and he
noted that Aer Lingus would decide between Boeing and Airbus
at roughly the same time as the carrier's likely stock
flotation in September.  He also observed that Aer Lingus
could enjoy the full benefits of trans-Atlantic Open Skies
only if Dublin's new terminal were sized to accommodate
rising passenger volume and to enable CBP to conduct full
pre-clearance (adding agricultural and customs checks to
passport screening.)  Mannion added that Aer Lingus needed
clarity on the prospects for the U.S.-EU aviation agreement,
including the phase-out of the Shannon Stop requirement, in
order to start planning for the 2007-2008 winter travel
season.  Post will continue efforts to press the case for
both Boeing and CBP in our regular discussions with industry,
the Irish parliament, and the GOI.  End summary. 

Advocacy for Boeing
------------------- 

2.  In a May 2 meeting with Aer Lingus CEO Dermot Mannion,
the Ambassador strongly advocated Boeing's 787 Dreamliner for
the carrier's long-haul needs.  Mannion replied that Aer
Lingus would probably decide between Boeing and Airbus at
roughly the same time as the carrier's stock flotation,
expected in September.  He added, however, that aircraft
orders might also have to await the Dublin Airport
Authority's decision on the size of Dublin's planned second
terminal, which would determine the number of gates available
to Aer Lingus planes (see para 4).  He noted that "the door
remains very open to Boeing," and he observed that Aer Lingus
would take advantage of Ex-Im Bank financing options if
Boeing were to win the aircraft bid.  Mannion also recounted
his efforts to quash press reports that Airbus had secured
Aer Lingus' long-haul aircraft orders, following on the
carrier's deal to acquire four Airbus A-330s in 2006-2007 for
intra-European service.  Noting recent reports on the Airbus
A-350's design flaws, the Ambassador stressed Post's
intention to continue advocacy for Boeing.  Mannion
recommended that emboffs speak with members of the airline's
newly formed aircraft purchases evaluation team. 

Needed Clarity on U.S.-EU Open Skies
------------------------------------ 

3.  Aer Lingus needs clarity on prospects for the U.S.-EU
aviation agreement, including the U.S.-Ireland annex, to plan
future trans-Atlantic service, said Mannion.  He explained
that Aer Lingus sold seats 300 days in advance and was
already preparing its tentative schedule for the 2007 summer
season.  A delay until October 2006 in the signing of the
U.S.-EU agreement would only give Aer Lingus enough time to
plan for the 2007-2008 winter season.  Mannion expected,
however, that Aer Lingus would launch service to San
Francisco in 2007 as the first of the three additional U.S.
points that Aer Lingus would be permitted to serve under the
U.S.-Ireland annex to the U.S.-EU agreement.  He also
remarked that, due to the uncertain timing of the U.S.-EU
agreement, the Irish Department of Transport intended to
re-engage with USG negotiators on the U.S.-Ireland annex
during U.S.-EU aviation discussions the week of May 8.
(Under the annex, October 29, 2006, is the start date for the
phase-out of the current "Shannon Stop" requirement, by which
U.S. and Irish carriers may operate one non-stop flight
to/from Dublin for each non-stop flight to/from Shannon.) 

Right-sizing Dublin Airport for Aer Lingus and CBP
--------------------------------------------- ----- 

4.  With the April 5 Irish Cabinet decision to privatize Aer
Lingus through a stock flotation, the carrier's next goal was
to ensure that Dublin Airport's planned second terminal would
meet the carrier's needs, observed Mannion.  He noted that
the Dublin Airport Authority (DAA) had aimed to submit the
planning application for the new terminal this month, a
target that now would not be met.  Mannion cautioned that
further delay with the planning application would seriously
jeopardize the terminal's scheduled opening in 2009.  On the 

DUBLIN 00000493  002.2 OF 002 

upside, the delay had allowed Aer Lingus more time to consult
with the DAA on the terminal size required to accommodate the
carrier's rising passenger volume projections.  The
Ambassador cited an April 28 Irish Times report that Aer
Lingus and Ryanair had convinced the DAA on the need to
expand the planned terminal, at a possible extra cost of euro
100 million.  Mannion responded that whereas Aer Lingus had
had regular contact with working-level DAA officials on the
terminal, the DAA Board of Directors had refused to consider
expansion until this past week. 

5.  Aer Lingus could enjoy the full benefits of
trans-Atlantic Open Skies only if the new terminal were also
configured to enable U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
to conduct full pre-clearance, adding agricultural and
customs checks to passport screening, remarked Mannion.  The
Ambassador said that he was focused not only on the DAA's
plans to accommodate CBP in the new terminal, but also on
dealing with mounting passenger congestion in CBP's current
facilities over the next two summers, especially with the
likely onset of bilateral Open Skies.  Mannion pointed out
that a delay in the terminal's opening till 2010 would
exacerbate pressures on CBP staff.  He added that CBP would
be key to Aer Lingus' plans to link its new Dublin-Dubai
service with established Dublin-U.S. flights in 2007, since
Middle Eastern passengers would prefer to be pre-cleared
outside the United States.  Mannion and the Ambassador agreed
to continue coordinated approaches to the DAA on CBP's needs,
with emboffs noting the possibility of moving sooner to full
pre-clearance in the more spacious Shannon Airport. 

Comment: Pressing the cases for Boeing and CBP
--------------------------------------------- - 

6.  This was the Ambassador's third meeting with Mannion
since he assumed his Aer Lingus post last summer, and in each
discussion the Ambassador has urged Aer Lingus to choose
Boeing and to choose quickly, with orders for the 787
Dreamliner now backed up to roughly 2011.  In previous
discussions, Mannion noted difficulties in placing orders
during ongoing negotiations with labor about the stock
flotation, lest he create doubts about his commitment to
reduce the carrier's reported euro 340 million pension
deficit with the flotation proceeds.  The Irish Cabinet's
April 5 decision to proceed with the stock flotation has lent
certainty to Aer Lingus' ability to raise equity for the
aircraft orders.  We are concerned, however, that the Dublin
Airport sizing issue might become another reason for delay in
Aer Lingus' aircraft purchase decisions. 

7.  Post will continue to press the case for upgrading CBP
operations at Dublin and Shannon Airports.  In a recent
dinner with Irish Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, the
Ambassador described the potential advantages of full
pre-clearance for Dublin as a trans-Atlantic hub, leading one
committee member to raise the issue in Parliament the next
day.  Shannon Airport has also hired a U.S. consultant to do
a feasibility study on Shannon's ability to move to full
pre-clearance.  We look forward to receiving from CBP
headquarters an updated standards document that outlines for
airports the logistical requirements for CBP to provide full
pre-clearance.
BENTON

TOP-SECRET FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE NSA: American Cryptology during the Cold War; 1945-1989

cold_war_iv

CONFIDENTIAL: OECD: REPORT OF MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 003181 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR EB/IFD/OMA, EUR/ERA, INL/C, L/LEI AND L/EB
DOC FOR ITA/MAC/MTA/KOZLOWICKI, OGC/NICKERSON/MANSEAU
DOJ FOR CRIMINAL DIVISION/FRAUD SECTION/MMENDELSOHN/JACOBSON
USEU FOR MRICHARDS
PASS TO US SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISION/ENFORCEMENT/RGRIME,
INTL.AFFAIRS/TBEATTY 

FROM USOECD 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2012
TAGS: KCOR ECON EINV ETRD PREL OECD
SUBJECT: OECD: REPORT OF MARCH 12-14, 2007 MEETING OF THE
WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY 

Classified By: A/DCM CURTIS STONE FOR REASONS 1.5 (B AND D) 

1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  At its March 12-14 meeting, the OECD Working
Group on Bribery (WGB) conducted Phase 2 peer-review evaluations
of Portugal and Ireland's implementation of the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention ("Convention").  The WGB called on
Portugal to raise awareness of foreign bribery in both the
public and private sector, to be more proactive in detecting,
investigating and prosecuting foreign bribery offenses, and to
take measures to disallow undocumented, confidential expenses.
Lead examiners advised that the GOI's poor participation in the
original on-site visit left them with little basis to assess
Ireland's implementation and enforcement efforts.  Ireland
acknowledged this problem and agreed to an additional on-site
visit within one year.  The WGB assessed UK efforts to implement
the Convention in context of a Phase 2 written follow-up review,
continued discussions on the UK's discontinuation of the
BAE/Saudi Arabia investigation, and released a public statement
expressing serious concerns.  The WGB also announced its
decision to conduct a supplemental, Phase 2 bis examination of
the UK.  Japan reported on results of its self-assessment of
obstacles to effective enforcement.  The WGB completed Phase 2
follow-up reviews of Japan and Switzerland and established
mandates for two sub-groups to review anti-bribery instruments
as part of the possible revision of the 1997 Revised
Recommendation, which outlined best practices in areas such as
accounting, auditing and public procurement, non-tax
deductibility of bribes and other measures to combat foreign
bribery.  END SUMMARY. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Portugal Phase 2 Evaluation - paras 2-3
Ireland Phase 2 Evaluation - paras 4-6
Japan Self-Assessment - paras 7-10
Phase 2 Follow-up Reports - para 11
-- Japan Written Follow-up - paras 12-13
-- UK Written Follow-up - paras 14-19
-- UK:  BAE/Saudi Arabia - paras 20-24
-- Switzerland Written Follow-up - paras 25-26
-- Revision of Anti-Bribery Instruments- para 27
-- Deferral of Tour de Table - para 28
-- Outreach Activities - para 29
-- 2006 Annual Report- para 30
-- Other Items - paras 31-34 

PORTUGAL PHASE 2 EXAMINATION 

2. (U) Lead examiners Brazil and the Netherlands briefed on
results of the Phase 2 on-site visit to Portugal, identifying
key deficiencies in Portuguese enforcement efforts.  Although
Portugal had made significant legislative efforts to implement
the Convention, it has had no foreign bribery prosecutions or
serious investigations.  While many government actors are
involved in anti-corruption efforts, they are not active.  More
vigorous action by the private sector is also required.  The
Portugal delegation reported that the on-visit had made a very
positive contribution to Portugal's revision of its criminal
code.  Since the visit, the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of
Economy and the Export Promotion Agency had carried out a major
dissemination campaign to inform all Portuguese missions abroad,
major business associations and the largest Portuguese companies
about foreign bribery obligations. 

3. (U) WGB members called on Portugal to take measures to
disallow undocumented, confidential expenses; establish an
autonomous definition of foreign public officials; clarify
reporting obligations and procedures within the public service
and accounting and auditing professions; provide additional
resources and training to law enforcement authorities to
proactively detect, investigate and prosecute foreign bribery;
E 

raise awareness among public officials on preventing, detecting,
reporting and investigating foreign bribery, including raising
awareness among law enforcement authorities about special rules
to establish nationality and extra-territorial jurisdiction in
foreign bribery cases, specifically the absence of a dual
criminality requirement; and to work more closely with the
private sector and civil society to raise awareness and to
develop effective prevention strategies. 

IRELAND PHASE 2 EXAMINATION 

4. (SBU) Lead examiners New Zealand and Estonia reported on a
wholly unsatisfactory on-site visit to Ireland in October.
Inadequate preparation and participation by the GOI left them
with little basis to assess Ireland's implementation and
enforcement efforts.  They advised that the total absence of
awareness raising activities on foreign bribery in Ireland had
demonstrated the low priority given to Ireland's application of
the Convention.  There have been no prosecutions of foreign
bribery in Ireland.  No law required public officials to report
foreign bribery allegations, no whistle-blowing legislation was
in place for the private sector, and overlapping statutes
prohibiting foreign bribery contained differing elements which
could impede enforcement efforts. 

5. (U) Lead examiners reported that since the visit, Ireland had
recognized the serious problems with the evaluation and
demonstrated that it intended to give higher priority to
implementing the Convention.  Senior Irish officials announced
that a Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) bill had been
approved by the government, which intended to move quickly to
introduce it to Parliament.  The Irish delegation advised that
the bill will broaden the definitions for bribery and foreign
public officials and introduce extraterritorial jurisdiction.
They also reported that Ireland would consider including
whistle-blower protection in the new bill.  The Irish del said
the peer-review examination had been valuable and Ireland wanted
to adopt best anti-bribery practices.  A group of senior Irish
officials would be convened to review and implement WGB
recommendations. 

6. (U) The WGB concluded that Ireland had not fully met its
Phase 2 monitoring obligations, but accepted Ireland's
invitation to carry out a Phase 2 bis examination with another
on-site visit within one year.  The WGB recommended that Ireland
strengthen its foreign bribery legislation; consolidate or
harmonize the foreign bribery offense under the two overlapping
statutes to remove inconsistencies; expand corporate liability
for foreign bribery; clarify the scope of the relevant
legislation for companies; amend its laws to confirm that bribe
payments are not tax deductible; and ensure that Irish citizens
and corporations can always be effectively prosecuted for
foreign bribery offenses committed outside Ireland by promptly
establishing nationality jurisdiction under the Prevention of
Corruption (Amendment) Act 2001. 

JAPAN SELF-ASSESSMENT 

7. (SBU) The Chairman noted that the main difficulty with
Japan's Phase 2 examination was whether the system was geared to
generate cases and whether one could effectively initiate an
investigation.  Japan conducted a self-assessment to determine
legal and procedural impediments to the effective investigation
and prosecution of foreign bribery.  Japan had established an
inter-agency task force, which met 12 times, and held
consultations with experts, prosecutors and police.  The GOJ
concluded the greatest obstacles were inadequate investigative
leads, the lack of reliable whistle-blowing information,
insufficient responses from Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA)
requests, limited information on investigative methods used by
other countries and insufficient foreign language abilities. 

The Japanese del noted authorities needed to disseminate
information about the foreign bribery offense more widely, more
fully grasp the state of internal auditing and internal control
systems, and raise awareness regarding the Japanese
whistle-blower law that went into effect in June 2005. 

8. (SBU) The Japanese delegation committed to raise awareness of
whistle-blower protection, utilize MLA requests early and
actively, conclude bilateral MLA agreements, actively use
voluntary investigative measures at the earliest possible stage
and exchange information among police, prosecutors, experts and
civil society.  The Japanese del suggested greater focus on the
prevention of foreign bribery is appropriate, commenting that
cases and convictions were not the only criteria of success.
The Japanese del noted that a potential foreign bribery case
involving Japanese firm Kyudenko's activities in the Philippines
was under investigation. 

9. (SBU) Lead examiners United States and Italy applauded Japan
for completing the self-assessment.  The US noted that Japan's
passive approach to investigation and emphasis on maintaining
secrecy at the sacrifice of advancing cases needed to be
addressed.  Not only did the placement of the foreign bribery
offense in the Unfair Competition Prevention Law (UCPL) rather
than in the Criminal Code appear to reduce awareness, but the
entities responsible for pursuing investigations (Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and Ministry of Justice
(MOJ)) provided conflicting guidance.  The U.S. also highlighted
that the whistle-blower law did not apply to employees of
Japanese companies based overseas.  The principal recommendation
of lead examiners was on-going consultation and monitoring of
Japan's enforcement efforts.  The Italian lead examiner echoed
US comments, and urged Japan to bring a case and build
experience in how to start prosecutions.  He also noted that the
GOJ had shared no information about the Kyudenko case until
reports had appeared in the press. 

10. (SBU) The Japanese del responded that the GOJ has been
proactive in ordering Japanese representations abroad to report
foreign bribery allegations, that prosecutors are trying to
identify evidence and have added enhanced MLA efforts, and
defended the Japanese emphasis on secrecy to avoid destruction
of evidence by suspects.  In the 6 months since the
whistle-blowing law had been enacted, 2,000 reports had been
made, but the Japanese del conceded it needed to raise awareness
about the protection offered.  The Chairman commented that the
key issue appeared to be how Japan can develop an allegation
into a filed case. 

PHASE 2 FOLLOW-UP REPORTS 

11. (U) Within one year of the WGB's approval of the Report of
Phase 2 Examination, countries must, at a minimum, provide an
oral report on steps they have taken or plan to take to
implement the WGB's priority recommendations.  A detailed
written follow-up report must be provided within two years. 

JAPAN WRITTEN FOLLOW-UP 

12. (SBU) Lead examiners U.S. and Italy reported that Japan had
complied with many Phase 2 recommendations.  Japan reported it
had reformed the UCPL to extend statutes of limitation,
requested MLA on two occasions, raised awareness of foreign
bribery, including of amendments to the corporate tax law and
income tax law expressly denying tax deductibility of bribes to
foreign public officials, and distributed amended 2007
Guidelines to prevent foreign bribery.  The WGB found that Japan
had not implemented: 

- Rec. 1(iv) to raise awareness of foreign bribery among the
legal profession; and 

- Rec. 5(c) to clarify that UCPL prohibits all cases where a
foreign public official directs transmission of benefit to a
third party. 

The WGB found that Japan had partially implemented a number of
recommendations, including: 

- recommendation in preamble to Phase 2 recommendations re:
assessing impediments to effective investigation and
prosecution, make use of MLA at non-"filed" investigative stage,
increase law enforcement coordination and address difficulties
encountered in establishing and enforcing territorial
jurisdiction; 

- Rec. 2(b) for METI to establish a formal system to effectively
process allegations of foreign bribery 

- Rec. 2(d) on improving whistle-blower protection for those
reporting directly to law enforcement authorities; 

- Rec. 3(a) to ensure all activities under article 8.1 of the
Convention are prohibited, including off-the-books accounts. 

 - Rec. 5(b) to ensure METI guidelines on facilitation payments
conform to the Convention and Commentaries. 

The WGB found that Japan had satisfactorily implemented other
specific recommendations, but some follow-up recommendations had
not been the subject of sufficient practice and required
continued follow-up. 

13. (SBU) The WGB agreed that, in order to continue moving this
positive process forward, Japan should provide a Phase 2 bis
follow-up report in one year.  This will allow Japan and lead
examiners to consult and exchange views on progress being made
and for a brief report to the WGB.  The WGB agreed that both the
written follow-up and the self-assessment would be published,
along with a summary of the discussion. 

U.K. WRITTEN FOLLOW-UP 

14. (SBU) The WGB found that the UK had implemented a number of
the WGB Phase 2 recommendations, but failed to enact
comprehensive foreign bribery legislation.  The U.K. had no
foreign bribery prosecutions and its decision to drop the BAE
Systems plc investigation relating to Saudi Arabia highlighted
WGB concerns.  The WGB found that the UK had made progress since
its March 2005 Phase 2 examination in raising awareness (e.g.
appointment of a UK anti-corruption coordinator); in continuing
to encourage Overseas Territories to adopt anti-bribery
legislation (UK verified compliance of Guernsey's legislation
with the Convention and Jersey's enactment of a foreign bribery
statute, but not yet extended the Convention to either island);
in providing additional resources to facilitate MLA and in
increasing capacity to investigate allegations of foreign
bribery (e.g. new Metropolitan Police/City of London Police unit
investigating foreign corruption allegations).  Since March
2005, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) had launched 6 new
investigations and had worked on 23 vetting files in an attempt
to develop enough information to open a case file.  The UK del
expressed its optimism that its first foreign bribery
prosecution could be launched in 2007. 

15. (C) The UK del claimed its existing law implemented the
obligations of the Convention, but noted the UK remains
committed to fundamental reform of its bribery laws.  A Home
Office consultation report had concluded that no consensus
existed for moving forward a draft 2003 bill to enact
comprehensive corruption legislation.  The issue has been
referred to the Law Commission, which was expected to prepare a 

new draft bill within 18 months.  WGB lead examiners France and
Canada underscored that 6 years had passed since the Phase 1
examination recommended the UK enact comprehensive foreign
bribery legislation.  France noted this delay sent a negative
message regarding the UK's commitment to implement the
Convention as a whole. 

16. (C) US del said the UK position that current legislation is
adequate to effectively implement the Convention was rebutted by
concrete evidence that it was not.  US del also noted that the
WGB should ask the UK to do what it had asked Japan to do:
identify the structural problems that have prevented cases from
moving to indictment.  The Chairman commented that the WGB had
long been doubtful regarding the UK's reliance on its
principal-agent element of bribery.  The UK del noted that
evidentiary problems raised by some UK officials regarding the
BAE/Saudi investigation gave a distorted view of the
deficiencies of UK law, calling the Saudi case "wholly unusual,
if not exceptional" given the involvement of an absolute
monarchy. 

17. (U) The WGB found that the UK had failed to implement: 

- the recommendation in the preamble to the Phase 2 to enact at
the earliest possible date comprehensive foreign bribery
legislation; 

- Rec. 3(a) to proceed with adoption of reforms clarifying and
unifying UK accounting legislation with IAS to ensure fraudulent
accounting offense is in full conformity with Article 8 of the
Convention; 

- Rec. 5(a) to amend where appropriate the Code for Crown
Prosecutors, the Crown Prosecution Manual and other documents to
ensure investigation and prosecution of foreign bribery is not
influenced by considerations of national economic interest, the
potential effect upon relations with another state or the
identity of the natural or legal persons involved (Article 5 of
Convention); and 

- Rec. 5(c) to broaden the level of persons engaging the
criminal liability of legal persons for foreign bribery. 

The WGB also concluded that the UK had partially implemented 9
recommendations and satisfactorily implemented 8
recommendations. 

18. (U) Following a further discussion of the BAE/Saudi
investigation (see below), the WGB agreed that it would conduct
a Phase 2 bis review of the UK focused on progress in enacting a
new foreign bribery law and in broadening liability of legal
persons for foreign bribery, examining whether systemic problems
explain the lack of foreign bribery cases brought to prosecution
and addressing other issues raised by the discontinuance of the
BAE/Saudi Arabia investigation.  The review will include an
on-site visit to be conducted by March 2008. 

19. (C) An extensive discussion of how the WGB would make public
this decision followed.  The UK stridently objected to any
engagement with the media by the Chair regarding the review and
asked that only a WGB press release be issued.  The Secretariat
argued that OECD practice is to be as open as possible with the
media, while respecting the confidential nature of the
discussions.  After many delegations expressed confidence in the
Chair, the WGB agreed to allow the Chair to brief the press,
accompanied by OECD Legal staff and the director of the
Financial and Enterprise Affairs Directorate.  Bilateral
interview requests made in the following several days would be
referred to the Secretariat. 

TERMINATION OF BAE/SAUDI ARABIA INVESTIGATION 

20. (C) Lead examiner France noted a number of issues were still
outstanding regarding the BAE/Saudi Arabia investigation,
including the materiality of the UK's national security
rationale.  Lead examiner Canada said it accepted the
explanations given by the UK for reasons for discontinuing the
investigation, but had serious concerns about the UK's legal
framework and adequacy of its corporate criminal liability
legislation.  US del asked whether the UK could provide any
assurances that BAE was not continuing to make corrupt payments
to Saudi officials and that MOD officials were not continuing to
participate in the alleged corrupt payments.  The U.S. also
asked about evidence preservation and whether UK national
security concerns would pose an impediment to providing MLA to
other states. 

21. (C) The UK del, which included Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, SFO, Ministry of Defense Police, Department for
International Development, Metropolitan Police and office of the
Attorney General (AG) officials, reported that the SFO was
reviewing the aftermath of the decision to discontinue in light
of its duty to ensure that the MOD Police, Export Credit
Guarantee Department (ECGD) and other bodies received all
relevant information to help them carry out their public duties.
 The UK del advised that since no one has been charged and found
guilty, there are limitations on actions the UK government can
take and other fora must accept their responsibilities in
considering the case.  The UK del advised that no evidentiary
material would be returned until the judicial review has run its
course.  The SFO did not see a reason why national or
international security would prevent the UK from responding to a
request for MLA. 

22. (C) The Chairman inquired further into the reasons for
discontinuance and asked whether the WGB should not deplore a
threat by a sovereign state to stop fundamental cooperation, if
Saudi threats to stop counter-terrorism cooperation were the
basis of the national security interests involved.  He inquired
about how precise Parties must be in identifying risks and the
immediacy of danger posed before invoking national security.
The UK del advised that the SFO Director had considered only
national and international security grounds in reaching his
decision to discontinue the investigation.  The judicial review
would address whether the decision-making process was valid and
whether the decision was in conformity with Article 5 of the
Convention.  The Swiss del noted that it continued to be very
concerned about the effect of the UK decision, that it implied
that the UK would not prosecute allegations of foreign bribery
by its firms in Saudi Arabia, depriving other parties of a level
playing field there and possibly in other countries. 

23. (C) In response to an OECD legal advisor's inquiries whether
the UK recognized international public policy and public
interest factors in favor of prosecution, the UK del (AG rep)
confirmed that the UK recognized that bribery was contrary to
international public policy and that the nature of bribery as an
offense was a powerful factor for prosecuting the act.  In the
BAE/Saudi matter, however, he advised that the SFO Director had
considered protecting national security an even more important
factor.  The UK AG shared this view, and also considered that
the case was unlikely to lead to successful prosecution.
Regarding the basis for identifying the national security risk,
the UK del said the UK ambassador to Saudi Arabia had considered
the risk that Saudi Arabia would withdraw counter-terrorism
cooperation to be real and that all who expressed views had
shared that assessment, including the UK's security services.
In response to an OECD legal advisor's query about whether the
ECGD had the right to refuse to provide official support to BAE
Systems in the future in light of the allegations in this case,
the UK del said it could not speak for the ECGD, which had its
own duties to implement anti-corruption policies and the right 

to insist that BAE Systems provide due diligence information. 

24. (C) US del stressed the difficulty in assessing from the
outside the factors taken into account in the UK's decision.
While concerns remained about the particular case, more critical
was what the case had revealed regarding the UK's legal
framework for preventing foreign bribery.  As the Convention
approaches its tenth anniversary, the WGB must demand that all
parties meet their obligations and maintain high standards.  The
French del spoke of the need to convey a clear message to the
business community and civil society that payment of bribes to
foreign public officials was no longer an acceptable competitive
advantage.  The Canadian del agreed that abandonment of the
investigation created a problem for the Convention.  Following a
discussion which frequently underscored the need to defend the
Convention, and which weighed the merits of various next steps,
France, Italy, New Zealand Greece, Chile, Germany, Ireland, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, Turkey, Switzerland, and the US del
all expressed continuing serious concerns about the UK's
decision and spoke in favor of the WGB (1) issuing a strong
statement to the public relaying those concerns and (2)
conducting a Phase 2 bis review of the UK focused on Convention
implementation.  Although Germany and Canada expressed a
preference for waiting until the results of the UK domestic
judicial review, a position strongly favored by the UK, WGB
consensus ultimately opposed such a delay. 

SWITZERLAND WRITTEN FOLLOW-UP 

25. (SBU) Switzerland reported that its Phase 2 examination had
contributed to greater awareness of its obligations under the
Convention and had spurred long-term cooperation among federal
and cantonal-level authorities, the Swiss business community and
civil society.  Switzerland reported that 23 foreign bribery
cases were initiated in 2005 and 2006, of which 17 were in
connection with the UN Oil for Food program.  A total of 19
cases were still in the investigative stage and four were
closed.  No charges were pressed nor rulings handed down during
the period.  Informed by comments from lead examiners Hungary
and Belgium, the WGB found that Switzerland had taken efforts to
raise awareness, but further measures targeted at small and
medium-sized enterprises and cantonal-level authorities were
required to fully implement WGB recommendations.  Switzerland
had fully implemented: 

- Rec. 3(a) to consider establishing a formal obligation for any
federal authority, civil servant or public official to report
indications of possible bribery to authorities and 

- Rec. 3(d) to consider extending mandatory reporting
obligations for auditors to report to prosecutorial authorities
evidence of possible corrupt practices by those whose accounts
they audit if executive bodies refrain from taking action. 

26. (U) Discussion of Switzerland's follow-up report revealed
certain difficulties encountered by the WGB in distinguishing
between full and partial implementation of recommendations and
highlighted the need for precision in recommendation text.  In
several instances Switzerland had taken action in response to
recommendations, but measures had not yet been finalized.
Switzerland contended it had nonetheless fully implemented the
recommendations.  The WGB ultimately found that Switzerland had
only partially implemented the remaining 8 recommendations. 

REVISION OF ANTI-BRIBERY INSTRUMENTS: DRAFT MANDATE FOR
SUB-GROUPS 

27. (U) The WGB agreed that Chairman Pieth and Vice-Chair
Gavouneli would serve as chairs of two ad hoc sub-groups on (1)
criminalization and (2) prevention issues, involving areas such
as export credit, official development assistance, public 

procurement, auditing and non-tax deductibility.  The sub-groups
are to be open and informal and their task will be to assist the
WGB in completing proposed revisions to anti-bribery instruments
by December 2007.  This would include likely revision of the
1997 Revised Recommendation (requiring approval by the OECD
Council) and possible clarification in Commentaries regarding
interpretations of the Convention. 

TOUR DE TABLE DEFERRED 

28.  (U) The WGB deferred reviewing country enforcement actions
on foreign bribery and UN Oil-for-Food cases to June, given the
press of other agenda items. 

OUTREACH ACTIVITIES 

29. (U) The Secretariat briefed on outreach activities,
including the anticipated signature in April of a Memorandum of
Understanding with the Organization of American States to
strengthen the fight against corruption in the Americas.  The
Secretariat also agreed to provide suggestions on next steps for 

SIPDIS
WGB outreach to China. 

ANNUAL REPORT 

30. (U) The WGB approved the 2006 draft annual report, after
agreeing to a UK request to delete a reference to the BAE/Saudi
investigation.  US del noted that there was nothing
inappropriate with the proposed reference, but did not object to
its deletion.  The French del noted that reference should be
included in the 2007 Annual Report. 

OTHER ITEMS 

31. (U) The Italian delegation briefed on the invitation by the
Government of Italy to hold a Prosecutors' Meeting in Rome in
November as part of an event marking the 10th anniversary of the
Convention in November or December 2007, which may involve
ministerial participation. 

32. (U) The Netherlands del noted that differences in WGB
Parties' positions regarding UNCAC issues have complicated UNCAC
implementation.  They proposed including an agenda item for the
October WGB plenary meeting to exchange ideas about how to
organize in preparation for the second UNCAC Conference of State
Parties. 

33. (U) The US del suggested, with support of Dutch and Swiss
colleagues, that prosecutors plan to meet on the margins of the
June plenary for a brainstorming session to discuss the
usefulness of a prosecutors' forum.  The UK requested that this
be scheduled for the same day as the Tour de Table to facilitate
attendance.  The Chair suggested that the prosecutors also
provide guidance to the Italian delegation regarding the agenda
for the 10th anniversary event. 

34. (U) The June WGB plenary meeting will take place June 19-21,
2007.  (Ad hoc sub-groups were subsequently scheduled to meet on
June 18.)
MORELLA

CONFIDENTIAL: TERRORIST FINANCE: IARA AND FIVE OFFICIALS, JTJ

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUBLIN 001598 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR EB/ESC/TFS (BSTEPHENSON), S/CT (TKUSHNER),
EUR/UBI, IO/PHO (APEREZ),
NSC FOR MRUPPERT,
TREASURY FOR JZARATE,
AND OFAC DIRECTOR (RWERNER) 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2014
TAGS: ETTC KTFN EFIN PTER PREL CVIS ECON LVPR
SUBJECT: TERRORIST FINANCE: IARA AND FIVE OFFICIALS, JTJ
DESIGNATION (LISTS 62 & 63) 

REF: A. STATE 222164 

     B. STATE 222244
     C. STATE 219924 

Classified By: POL/ECON COUNSELOR MARY DALY FOR
REASONS 1.4.(B) AND (D) 

1.(C) Summary. Emboff, drawing on reftel points, spoke on
October 19 to Maurice Biggar, Deputy Director for
International Terrorism & Illicit Drugs and his colleague,
Eoin Duggan, at the DFA.  According to Biggar and Duggan the
USG domestic designation of IARA is an issue of concern as it
targets an Irish citizen, Ibrahim Buisir.  The GOI has no
information on JTJ operations within Ireland.  The IARA
designation came as a surprise, but not an unwelcome one.
Ireland does not currently have legal recourse to freeze
assets of suspected terrorism financiers.  The GOI also does
not have far-reaching intelligence capabilities, so greatly
appreciates information-sharing and cooperation with the USG.
 If both such designations are approved through the UN 1267
Sanctions Committee, the EU will follow suit, thereby
requiring legal action in Ireland and allowing Irish
authorities to freeze assets of Buisir.  The Irish are likely
to welcome such action.  End Summary. 

--------------------------------------------- -------------
List 62: The Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA), Ibrahim
Buisir
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 

2.(C) Biggar had no new information to report regarding the
IARA; however, Ibrahim Buisir, who was named last week as
having ties to Al-Qaeda, is certainly of interest as a dual
Irish-Libyan with links to terrorist financing.  Buisir's
designation on the US domestic list came as a surprise to the
Irish, and the Irish government would have appreciated a
heads up.  That said, the Irish also consider Buisir to be a
problem.  Recently, they tried to prosecute him for credit
card fraud but he was released on a technicality.  He is now
living on welfare. 

3.(C) The USG domestic designation of Buisir does not change
his status.  As an Irish citizen, he is free to move his
assets and to travel, both within country and abroad.
Current Irish law does not allow for the arrest of an
individual suspected of terrorism financing unless the EU has
designated the person.  (Note: A criminal and terrorism law
is pending ratification this fall.)  If the USG designation
is pursued and approved by the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee,
the EU will automatically adopt it, allowing Ireland's
Central Bank legal means to freeze his assets.  The process
from the EU approval to Irish application usually takes a
matter of days.  The Irish are likely to welcome this
designation. 

4.(C) Buisir has successfully used the press to gain sympathy
in the past.  The DFA has concerns that he may do so again,
claiming persecution by the USG.  To date, though, only one
article has made it in the press regarding the designation
and Buisir has refrained from public comments. 

--------------------------------------------
List 63: Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad (JTJ)
-------------------------------------------- 

5.(U) The GOI has no information on current activities of
Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad (JTJ) in Ireland.  The DFA
welcomes this designation and information sharing on
terrorism financing.  Biggar emphasized that, as with Buisir,
the Irish government cannot act until the UN and EU have
acted. 

----------------
Working Together
---------------- 

6. For the purposes of better understanding the GOI, it is
important to highlight the eagerness and willingness the DFA
expressed regarding the fight against terrorism.  Biggar
mentioned that the DFA and the Gardai (Irish national police)
do not have as close a working relationship as they would
like. As a result, information sharing is limited and rare.
Thus, the USG briefings with the DFA are well received and
appreciated.  The free flow of information is always welcome.
KENNY

CONFIDENTIAL: NORTHERN IRELAND – CONTROLLING THE VIOLENCE

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AMCONSUL BELFAST POUCH)
AMCONSUL EDINBURGH POUCH)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 16998 

TERREP 

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPRP PTER PGOV MARR MCAP UK EI
SUBJECT:  NORTHERN IRELAND - CONTROLLING THE VIOLENCE 

REF:  A) LONDON 16351  B) LONDON 5653 

1.  CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 

2.  SUMMARY:  THE RECENT ESCALATION OF IRA ATTACKS,
WHICH HAVE INCLUDED NOT ONLY MORE KILLINGS IN NORTHERN
IRELAND BUT ALSO BOMBINGS AT UK MILITARY BASES IN
CONTINENTAL EUROPE AND THE FIRST BOMBING IN BRITAIN
ITSELF SINCE 1984, HAVE CAUSED HMG TO REEXAMINE ITS
EFFORTS TO CONTROL IRA TERRORISM.  THE INITIAL PROGNOSIS
BY OFFICIALS IN LONDON IS THAT THERE IS NOT A GREAT DEAL
MORE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE SHORT TERM OTHER THAN TO
INCREASE ALERT LEVELS AND OTHER PRECAUTIONS AGAINST
TERRORIST ATTACKS AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, KEY
GOVERNMENT OFFICES, AND OTHER LIKELY IRA TARGETS. 

THE IRA MIGHT BE PLANNING ATTACKS DIRECTLY AGAINST OR TO
COINCIDE WITH CERTAIN UPCOMING EVENTS, INCLUDING THE
BEGINNING OF THE CORONER'S INQUEST IN GIBRLATAR INTO THE
KILLING THERE OF THREE IRA TERRORISTS LAST JANUARY, AND
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONFERENCE AT BRIGHTON IN OCTOBER. 

THE ATTACKS HAVE NOT WEAKENED THE GOVERNMENT'S RESOLVE
TO CONTINUE WITH ITS CURRENT POLICIES, WHICH INCLUDE
TRYING TO RECTIFY CATHOLIC GRIEVANCES IN NORTHERN
IRELAND.  THERE HAVE BEEN NEW DEMANDS TO INCREASE UK
MILITARY FORCES IN ULSTER AND TO REINTRODUCE THE
PREVENTIVE INTERNMENT OF KNOWN IRA ACTIVISTS; THE
GOVERNMENT HOPES THESE STEPS WILL NOT BE NECESSARY AND
FOR NOW HAS NO SUCH PLANS. 

UK OFFICIALS ARE PLEASED WITH PROGRESS IN GAINING THE
COOPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN DUBLIN IN THE FIGHT
AGAINST THE IRA, BUT ALSO ARE CONVINCED THAT THE IRISH
REPUBLIC COULD DO MORE TO HELP.  PERHAPS THE SHOCK OF
THE CURRENT WAVE OF ATTACKS, SAYS HMG, WILL ACCELERATE
THE IMPROVEMENT IN SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO
GOVERNMENTS.  LONDON HOPES THAT IMPROVED INTRA-EUROPEAN
COOPERATION IN COMBATTING TERRORISM WILL HELP TO
MINIMIZE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IRA ATTACKS ON BRITISH
MILITARY FORCES STATIONED IN EUROPE. 

END SUMMARY. 

THE IRA PLAYS TO THE NEWS AND CHALLENGES LONDON TO REACT
--------------------------------------------- -----------
3.  THE RECENT ESCALATION OF TERRORIST ATTACKS BY THE
IRA, INCLUDING BOMBINGS OF UK MILITARY TARGETS IN
CONTINENTAL EUROPE AND THE FIRST IRA BOMBING IN BRITAIN
ITSELF IN FOUR YEARS, HAS REFOCUSED ATTENTIONS IN
WHITEHALL ON THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING IRA TERRORISM.
WHAT THE KILLINGS BY THE IRA HAVE NOT DONE IS UNDERMINE
EITHER THE THATCHER GOVERNMENT'S RESOLVE TO STICK TO ITS
POLICIES ON NORTHERN IRELAND OR THE CONSERVATIVE
POLITICAL CONSENSUS BEHIND THOSE POLICIES. 

4.  THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE AND HMG POLICE OFFICIALS
CALCULATE THAT THE IRA PLANS ITS ATTACKS MAINLY FOR NEWS
VALUE.  SPOKESMEN FOR THE IRA AND ITS POLITICAL WING,
SINN FEIN, HAVE CONFIRMED THIS IN RECENT INTERVIEWS WITH
JOURNALISTS.  THE IRA WANTS ITS ATTACKS TO SHOCK THE
PUBLIC IN BRITAIN AND WEAR DOWN BRITISH DETERMINATION TO
STAY IN NORTHERN IRELAND.  THE UK SUNDAY NEWSPAPER "THE
OBSERVER" REPORTED ON AUGUST 7 THAT IRA SOURCES TOLD ITS
REPORTERS THE AUGUST 1 BOMBING OF AN ARMY DEPOT IN
LONDON (REFTEL A) WAS UNDERTAKEN ON THE BORDER OF PRIME
MINISTER THATCHER'S OWN PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCY WITH
THE HOPES THAT IT WOULD KILL MANY SOLDIERS (ONE DIED IN
THE BLAST) AND FORCE MRS. THATCHER TO RETURN EARLY FROM
HER AUSTRALIA VISIT. 

5.  THE BOMBINGS HAVE EMBARASSED THE GOVERNMENT BUT NOT
NEARLY SO MUCH AS THE IRA APPARENTLY WOULD LIKE.  SO
FAR, IT HAS STIFFENED RATHER THAN WEAKENED LONDON'S
RESOLVE.  AND, WHILE THE KILLINGS HAVE SCORED INTENSIVE
NEWS COVERAGE, THEY PROBABLY HAVE NOT INCREASED
SIGNIFICANTLY THE NUMBERS OF BRITONS WHO AGREE WITH THE
"TIME TO GO" MOVEMENT FOR A BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM
ULSTER.  THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS THAT MANY ORDINARY
CITIZENS DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
AND OTHER POTENTIAL TERRORIST TARGETS CANNOT BE
PROTECTED BETTER.  IN UK TELEVISION INTERVIEWS, SEVERAL
PEOPLE WHO LIVE NEAR THE NORTH LONDON ARMY BASE ATTACKED
ON AUGUST 1 SAID THEY HAD ALWAYS BEEN AMAZED THAT
SECURITY WAS SO LAX AT THE BASE.  BUT MANY OTHER
BRITONS, EVEN WHILE THEY WINCE AT EACH DAY'S TALLY OF
BOMBING VICTIMS, DO NOT EXPECT THEIR GOVERNMENT TO BE
ABLE TO FEND OFF TERRORISTS EVERY TIME.  THEY APPEAR TO
UNDERSTAND, AS EX-PRIME MINISTER STANLEY BALDWIN TOLD
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS IN 1932, THAT DESPITE ANY
PRECAUTIONS "THE BOMBER WILL ALWAYS GET THROUGH." 

THE ESCALATION WAS EXPECTED
---------------------------
6.  SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND TOM KING
DECLARED IN LATE JULY THAT THE IRA WAS BECOMING
INCREASINGLY "INCOMPETENT," AS EVIDENCED BY A SERIES OF
BUNGLED ATTACKS IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN WHICH INNOCENT
BYSTANDERS WERE KILLED OR INJURED INSTEAD OF MEMBERS OF
THE SECURITY FORCES.  THE RECENT ESCALATION OF KILLINGS
CAME SO FAST AFTER KING'S STATEMENT AS TO SEEM PROMPTED
BY IT.  THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) TOLD US THAT
KING'S PRONOUNCEMENT WAS OVERLY OPTIMISTIC AND WAS NOT
REFLECTED IN ANY RELAXATION OF VIGILANCE BY THE POLICE
AND MILITARY FORCES.  SECURITY OFFICIALS HAVE KNOWN THE
IRA WAS MERELY PAUSING AND WAS OVERDUE FOR A COME-BACK. 

7.  NIO OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT EVER SINCE UK SECURITY
FORCES REVEALED THEIR PENETRATION OF IRA COMMUNICATIONS
WHEN THEY KILLED EIGHT IRA TERRORISTS IN MAY 1987 AT
LOUGHGALL, NORTHERN IRELAND, THE IRA HAS BEEN HOLDING
BACK WHILE IT CHANGED ITS METHODS.  THE TERRORISTS HAVE
AMASSED TONS OF ARMAMENTS, CHIEFLY FROM LIBYA, BUT HAVE
BEEN FEELING THEIR WAY WITH NEW PROCEDURES FOR MAKING
AND COMMUNICATING DECISIONS.  THE KILLING OF CIVILIAN
BYSTANDERS AT ENNISKILLEN IN DECEMBER OF LAST YEAR AND
IN SEVERAL OTHER APPARENTLY BUNGLED IRA ATTACKS SINCE
THEN PROBABLY WAS DUE IN PART TO A DECENTRALIZATION OF
IRA DECISION-MAKING.  TO AVOID LEAKS AND INTERCEPTS,
LOCAL IRA UNITS WERE TOLD TO OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY.  SAS
AND POLICE SPECIAL BRANCH UNITS HAVE EXCELLENT
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES WHICH THE IRA CORRECTLY ASSUMES
INCLUDE "MOLES" IN ITS OWN RANKS.  THE SAFETY WARNING
FOR THE IRA, AND THE BOAST OF UK AUTHORITIES, IS THAT IN
NORTHERN IRELAND "EVERY TREE HAS ITS SPECIAL BRANCH." 

8.  AFTER MORE THAN HALF A YEAR OF PREPARATIONS, UK
OFFICIALS TOLD US, THE IRA PLANNED A SERIES OF ATTACKS
WHICH WAS TO INCLUDE THE GIBRALTAR BOMBING IN JANUARY.
THE FAILURE OF THAT ATTACK (REFTEL B) AND THE REVELATION
THAT ONCE AGAIN UK SECURITY OFFICIALS WERE AWARE OF ITS
PLANS PROBABLY CAUSED THE IRA TO DELAY OR DEFER OTHER
ATTACKS.  IT WENT AHEAD WITH BOMBINGS DIRECTED AGAINST
UK MILITARY PERSONNEL IN OTHER COUNTRIES OF EUROPE,
APPARENTLY SECURE IN THE BELIEF THAT AT LEAST ONE
"ACTIVE SERVICE UNIT" EMPLACED TO OPERATE IN GERMANY AND
THE NETHERLANDS HAD NOT BEEN DETECTED BY EITHER UK OR
LOCAL SECURITY OFFICIALS.  WHATEVER ATTACKS HAD BEEN
PLANNED IN BRITAIN ITSELF PROBABLY WERE JUDGED TO BE
MORE RISKY AND WERE DELAYED AGAIN, BUT UK AUTHORITIES
WERE CONVINCED THEY WOULD OCCUR EVENTUALLY. 

9.  UK SECURITY OFFICIALS KNEW OF MANY IRA MEMBERS AND
SYMPATHIZERS IN BRITAIN AND WATCHED THEM AS CLOSELY AS
POSSIBLE.  BUT WHEN THE ATTACK CAME IN NORTH LONDON ON
AUGUST 1 IT WAS BY A "SLEEPER," AN INDIVIDUAL OR A UNIT
OF THE IRA NOT KNOWN BY SPECIAL BRANCH TO BE IN ENGLAND
AND READY FOR AN ATTACK HERE.  THERE MIGHT BE, OF
COURSE, OTHER TERRORISTS IN BRITAIN PREPARING FOR
ADDITIONAL ATTACKS.  MINISTRY OF DEFENSE CONTACTS TOLD
US THAT A GREAT MANY DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS HERE ARE
"SOFT TARGETS" SUCH AS RECRUITING OFFICES AND URBAN
DEPOTS WHERE IT IS NOT FEASIBLE TO INCREASE SECURITY
PRECAUTIONS SIGNIFICANTLY.  IF A WELL-TRAINED IRA UNIT
IS POISED AND EQUIPPED FOR ANOTHER ATTACK, SAID THE MOD,
IT COULD WELL FIND ITS MARK. 

INTERNMENT FOR THE IRA IN ULSTER?
---------------------------------
10.  WHILE THERE MAY NOT BE MUCH MORE BY WAY OF
PRECAUTIONS THAT CAN BE TAKEN IN BRITAIN, THE SITUATION
IS DIFFERENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND.  SOME BACKBENCH
CONSERVATIVE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT HAVE REACTED TO THE
RECENT ATTACKS HERE AND IN ULSTER BY DEMANDING THE
REINTRODUCTION OF INTERNMENT, THE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT
TRIAL OR FORMAL CHARGES IN COURT OF KNOWN MEMBERS OF THE
IRA AND OTHER VIOLENT GROUPS, BOTH CATHOLIC AND
PROTESTANT. 

11.  INTERNMENT WAS ADOPTED IN AUGUST 1971 WHEN 450
MEMBERS OF THE IRA WERE ROUNDED UP BY THE ARMY AND
POLICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN "OPERATION DEMETRIUS."
100 OF THOSE ARRESTED HAD TO BE RELEASED BECAUSE OF
INSUFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE TO BE CERTAIN OF THE CHARGES
AGAINST THEM, SO THAT THE COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE IRA
APPARENTLY WAS LEFT INTACT.  OPPONENTS OF INTERNMENT NOW
CONCEDE THAT CURRENT INTELLIGENCE IS SO MUCH BETTER THAT
A NEW ROUND-UP PROBABLY WOULD SUCCEED IN GREATLY
DISRUPTING IRA PLANS.  TOM KING SAID RECENTLY THAT THE
OPTION OF INTERNMENT REMAINS "UNDER REVIEW," BUT OUR
CONTACTS IN GOVERNMENT TOLD US THAT IRA ATTACKS WOULD
HAVE TO BE FAR MORE SERIOUS FOR THE OPTION TO BE
CHOSEN.  HMG KNOWS THAT ADOPTING INTERNMENT WOULD BE A
PROPAGANDA VICTORY AND A RECRUITMENT BOON FOR THE IRA.
ALSO, INTERNMENT VERY LIKELY WOULD NOT WORK UNLESS IT
WAS ADOPTED SIMULTANEOUSLY BY THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND,
WHICH UK OFFICIALS REGARD AS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY. 

THE UK WANTS MORE HELP FROM IRELAND
-----------------------------------
12.  UK OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT ONE KEY TO SUCCESS IN THE
WAR AGAINST IRA TERRORISM IS IMPROVED SECURITY
COOPERATION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND.  THEY THINK
THAT DUBLIN HAS NOT YET FELT COMPELLED TO PUT ITS WEIGHT
FULLY AGAINST THE TERRORISTS IN PART BECAUSE THE IRA,
EVEN THOUGH IT DECLARES THE DUBLIN GOVERNMENT IS
"ILLEGAL" AND THAT THE IRISH POLICE AND MILITARY ARE
LEGITIMATE TARGETS FOR ATTACK, HAS WISELY REFRAINED FROM
ENDANGERING ITS SANCTUARY ON THE IRISH SIDE OF THE
BORDER BY ATTACKING THE REPUBLIC'S OFFICIALS AND ARMED
FORCES THERE. 

13.  THERE WERE EVENTS IN 1987 WHICH EMBARRASSED THE
DUBLIN GOVERNMENT INTO GREATER ACTION, SAY UK OFFICIALS,
SUCH AS THE CAPTURE OF THE ARMS SHIP EKSUND AND THE
REVELATION THEREFROM THAT THE IRA HAD BEEN IMPORTING
LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARMS FROM LIBYA INTO IRELAND TO BE
USED AGAINST FORCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND.  THE SUBSEQUENT
FAILURE OF THE INTENSIVE EFFORT OF IRISH FORCES IN
"OPERATION MALLARD" TO FIND MANY OF THOSE ARMAMENTS, AND
THE PROLONGED INABILITY OF THE IRISH POLICE IN LATE 1987
TO CAPTURE THE RENEGADE EX-IRA MEMBER AND RAMPANT
CRIMINAL DESI O'HARE, THE POPULARLY STYLED "BORDER FOX,"
EMBARRASSED IRELAND AND ITS SECURITY FORCES STILL MORE.
NIO OFFICIALS TOLD US THEY BELIEVE IT IS MORE USEFUL NOW
TO USE EACH ADDITIONAL IRA ATTACK, AND THE PRESUMPTION
THAT THE IRA TRAVELS RELATIVELY FREELY IN THE REPUBLIC
AND HAS MUNITIONS STORED THERE, AS ARGUMENTS TO PROD
DUBLIN INTO MORE COOPERATION. 

14.  AT A RECENT EC MEETING IN HANOVER MRS. THATCHER
ONCE AGAIN CONFRONTED IRISH PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY OVER
THE NEED FOR DUBLIN TO BE MORE HELPFUL.  ACCORDING TO
CABINET SOURCES HERE, HAUGHEY CONCEDED THAT IRELAND'S
POLICE AND MILITARY DO NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO
COOPERATE FULLY WITH BRITISH FORCES IN STOPPING THE
IRA.  IN RESPONSE TO THATCHER'S OFFER TO EITHER EXTEND
BRITISH ASSISTANCE IN THE FORM OF TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT
OR TO ARRANGE SUCH ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES IF
NECESSARY, HAUGHEY PROMISED HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD
REASSESS THE NEED FOR TRAINING AND OTHER SECURITY
IMPROVEMENTS. 

NO END IN SIGHT
---------------
15.  HMG OFFICIALS REGARD THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM
AS A PERENNIAL IRRITANT WHICH WILL NOT GO AWAY IN THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE.  NO ONE WILL FIND A SOLOMONIC WAY TO
SATISFY THE CONTRADICTORY DEMANDS OF UNIONISTS AND
REPUBLICANS.  THE PERCEIVED GRIEVANCES OF BOTH SIDES
WILL CONTINUE TO GENERATE CONFLICT.  WITH NO NEAR-TERM
SOLUTION IN SIGHT, THE PRINCIPAL GOALS OF GOVERNMENT ARE
TO KEEP VIOLENCE DOWN TO TOLERABLE LEVELS IN NORTHERN
IRELAND, STOP THE SPREAD OF IRA ATTACKS TO BRITAIN AND
ELSEWHERE, AND RECTIFY THOSE OF THE GRIEVANCES
UNDERLYING THE CONFLICT WHICH ARE LEGITIMATE. 

16.  THE GOVERNMENT IN LONDON BELIEVES THAT CONTINUED
IRA TERRORISM IS INEVITABLE.  THEY LIKE TO POINT OUT,
HOWEVER, THAT THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND, EVEN
WITH THE RECENT ESCALATION, IS VERY MUCH LESS THAN IN
THE PEAK YEAR 1972 AND IN MOST INTERVENING YEARS.  UK
OFFICIALS ARE CONFIDENT THEY CAN KEEP THE KILLINGS IN
ULSTER TO NOT MUCH MORE THAN CURRENT LEVELS WITHOUT ANY
INCREASE IN SECURITY FORCES THERE.  IRA ATTACKS IN
BRITAIN ITSELF AND IN EUROPE ARE A DIFFERENT MATTER.
COUNTER-TERRORISM TIES AND COOPERATION AMONG EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES HAS IMPROVED DRAMATICALLY IN RECENT YEARS, AND
THE UK IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THE IRA CAN BE HELD
IN CHECK OUTSIDE OF NORTHERN IRELAND EVEN THOUGH ATTACKS
WILL CONTINUE TO OCCUR. 

17.  THERE ARE MANY EVENTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND WHICH
MIGHT BRING IRA ATTACKS, SUCH AS THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY
OF THE MAZE PRISON ESCAPES ON SEPTEMBER 25 AND SEVERAL
DIFFERENT DAYS WHEN CATHOLIC OR PROTESTANT ORGANIZATIONS
WILL BE HAVING PUBLIC MARCHES.  IN ADDITION, THERE ARE
SEVERAL UPCOMING EVENTS AND ANNIVERSARIES WHICH COULD BE
CONSIDERED AS POSSIBLE PERIODS OF INCREASED THREAT OF
IRA TERRORIST ATTACK IN BRITAIN AND EUROPE.  PROMINENT
AMONG THEM ARE: 

-- THE BEGINNING, NOW SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 6, OF THE
INQUEST BY THE GIBRALTAR CORONER INTO THE KILLING OF
THREE IRA TERRORISTS THERE LAST JANUARY. 

-- THE ANNUAL CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONFERENCE, OCTOBER
11-14.  THE CONFERENCE WILL BE AT BRIGHTON THIS YEAR,
THE SAME PLACE WHERE AN IRA BOMB CAME CLOSE TO KILLING
MARGARET THATCHER AND A MAJOR PART OF HER CABINET DURING
THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN 1984. 

-- 1989 WILL MARK THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF BOTH THE
INTRODUCTION OF BRITISH TROOPS INTO NORTHERN IRELAND AND
THE CREATION OF THE PROVISIONAL IRA.  1989 COULD BE A
BAD YEAR FOR COMMEMORATIVE TERRORISM. 

PRICE

Jan Palach Week, 1989: The Beginning of the End for Czechoslovak Communism

Washington, D.C., August 1st, 2011 – The brutal suppression by Czechoslovak Communist authorities of commemorative ceremonies for “Palach Week” 20 years ago this month marked the beginning of the end of the regime in the annus mirabilis 1989, according to secret police, Communist Party, and dissident documents posted today on the Web by the Czechoslovak Documentation Centre (Prague) and the National Security Archive (www.nsarchive.org) at George Washington University (Washington, D.C.).

Various independent civic initiatives (also known in the official Communist press as “anti-state” and “anti-socialist forces”) had planned to lay wreaths at the site in Prague’s main Wenceslas Square where the student Jan Palach in January 1969 had burned himself to death in protest against the repression that followed the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.  Also planned was a pilgrimage to the rural cemetery where Palach’s ashes were interred.

But the Communist secret police cracked down with beatings, tear gas, and mass arrests, including the dissident playwright and future Czechoslovak president Václav Havel.  The repression occurred at the exact moment in January 1989 that the signatory countries to the Helsinki Final Act (the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or CSCE) were meeting in Vienna, and drew widespread protests from abroad, including from U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, leading Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov, and perhaps most eloquently, American playwright Arthur Miller.

Today’s Web posting includes never-before-published documents from Czechoslovak archives, including the secret police reports on the demonstrations in January 1989 and the internal Communist Party briefings and instructions (the Party line) to cadres about the events of January.  Also included are key Charter 77 and other dissident and samizdat statements, and several international protests of the time.

The posting republishes the detailed chronology of events in January and February 1989, originally written by the Czechoslovak Documentation Centre for its quarterly publication Acta (Vol. 3, No. 9-12), compiled and edited by Jan Vladislav in collaboration with Vilém Prečan, titled “Czechoslovakia: Heat in January 1989” and ultimately printed in December 1989 just as the “velvet revolution” toppled the Communist regime and put former prisoner Havel in the presidential office in Prague Castle.

Leading the posting is Professor Vilém Prečan’s essay “Palach’s Legacy: An Appeal to Czechoslovaks in the 1989 Struggle for Freedom.”   The final section of the posting includes the digital image of an original letter from Palach himself in 1969, urging the occupation of Radio Prague and a call for a general strike.  Only days later, he burned himself to death.

“These documents posted on the Web today are the Internet equivalent of the wreath that Václav Havel tried to place in Wenceslas Square in January 1989,” remarked Thomas Blanton, director of the National Security Archive at George Washington University.  “We don’t face arrest like he did for this commemoration, but we do have the responsibility of never forgetting those sacrifices, both by Jan Palach, and by everyone who made the peaceful revolutions of 1989.”

Section 1: The Meaning of “Palach Week”

Prague January 1989 (CSDS collection)

Essay.  January 2009, Prague – Vilém Prečan, “Palach’s Legacy: An Appeal to Czechoslovaks in the 1989 Struggle for Freedom”
Translation by Derek Paton.

Document 1.  January 10, 1989, Prague – Statement by the Movement for Civil Liberties: Jan Palach’s Challenge
CSDS Prague, Palach Week Collection.
Translation by Alice and Gerald Turner (pseudonym “A. G. Brain”), published in Acta, Document 4.

Document 2.  February 5, 1989, Prague – Ludvik Vaculik: Communism is best-ial
Libri prohibiti, Prague, Ludvik Vaculik Collection.
Translation by Alice and Gerald Turner (pseudonym “A. G. Brain”), published in Acta, Document 55.

Document 3.  February 16, 1989, Prague – Statement by the Movement for Civil Liberties: Paths to democracy in the wake of the January events
CSDS Prague, Palach Week Collection.
Translation by Alice and Gerald Turner (pseudonym “A. G. Brain”), published in Acta, Document 61.

Section 2: Primary Sources on “Palach Week” January 1989

Prague January 1989 (CSDS collection)

Document 4.  January 1989, Prague – A flyer in which five independent initiatives invite citizens to participate on January 15 in a Jan Palach memorial in Prague, as well as a January 21 pilgrimage to his grave in the village of Všetaty (30 km north of Prague).
CSDS Prague, Palach Week Collection.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 5.  January 16, 1989. Prague – Internal information (No. 53) on the events of January 13 to 15, 1989, provided by the Communist Party (CPCz) to Presidium members and candidates and to CPCz Central Committee secretaries.  The briefing gives times and places of the various “unauthorized assemblies” and detentions, the number of security forces (2200 from the SNB and 1300 from the Peoples’ Militia), the recommendation that the militia be equipped with batons for next time and that security “prepare a closed-off area into which the crowd will be pushed….”
National Archive Prague, ÚV KSČ (CPCz CC), Documentation, 1989.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 6.  January 17, 1989, Prague – The Charter 77 statement addressed to the governments participating in the CSCE, then meeting in Vienna.  The Charter statement says “only time will tell” if “the signing by 35 states of a document whose clauses some of them neither observe nor have any obvious intention of doing so, will nevertheless help to stimulate an improvement in the human rights situation,” and points out that those arrested during the Palach Week memorials were in custody “not for planting bombs, but for laying flowers.”
CSDS Prague, Charter 77 Collection.
Translation by Alice and Gerald Turner (pseudonym “A. G. Brain”), published in Acta, Document 21.

Document 7.  January 17, 1989, Vienna – Speech and press conference by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz at the conclusion of the CSCE meetings, including his denunciation of the Czechoslovak authorities for their repression of the Palach Week commemorations with “rubber truncheons, tear gas, and water cannons” “in direct violation of the commitments just solemnly given by the Government of Czechoslovakia.”
U.S. Department of State Bulletin, March 1989, pp. 50-54.

Document 8.  January 17, 1989. Prague – Internal Party information (No. 54)on the events of January 16, 1989 on Wenceslas Square, Prague, provided to CPCz Presidium members and candidates and to CPCz Central Committee secretaries.  This briefing describes the arrests of Havel and other Charter 77 representatives “whose bouquets were confiscated by the officers present.”  Attached is an appendix to the previous Internal Party information 53, listing individuals who received medical treatment (for injuries including bone fractures, concussion, and shoulder dislocation) after the repression of the January 15 “anti-social events.”
National Archive Prague, ÚV KSČ (CPCz CC), Documentation, 1989.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 9.  January 18, 1989, Prague – Internal Party information (No. 55) on the events of January 17, 1989, as provided to CPCz Presidium members and candidates and to CPCz Central Committee secretaries.  The briefing reports that the “so-called independent initiatives” continued “to intensify the pressure on the state organs,” which had to clear Wenceslas Square twice on that day.  The Party line is that the security forces used only “moderate measures,” but also of course water cannons.
National Archive Prague, ÚV KSČ (CPCz CC), Documentation, 1989.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 10.  January 19, 1989, Prague – Internal Party information (No. 56) on the events of January 18, 1989 in Prague, provided to CPCz Presidium members and candidates and to CPCz Central Committee secretaries.  The briefing notes that both American and British diplomats are among the crowd, “a provocational assembly of anti-socialist elements” that numbered at least 1,000 at the statue of St. Wenceslas, plus “around 2000 spectators.”  Instead of attacking as on previous days, the security forces “remained hidden at their readiness and reserve locations and prepared for immediate commitment” but did not intervene.
National Archive Prague, ÚV KSČ (CPCz CC), Documentation, 1989.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Prague January 1989 (CSDS collection)

Document 11.  January 19, 1989, Prague – Eyewitness accounts of the January 19th demonstration and repression, compiled from reports telephoned to Radio Free Europe.  Witnesses describe the police attacks as the “most brutal” of the week, and note the relative restraint of the uniformed SNB police compared to the riot police units, also called the “strong-arm squad” or “Jakeš’ smurfs.”
CSDS Prague, Palach Week Collection.
Translation by Alice and Gerald Turner (pseudonym “A. G. Brain”), published in Acta, Document 29.

Document 12.  January 22, 1989, Prague – The head of the State Security Karel Vykypěl provides a concise report to the Minister of the Interior František Kincl on the Palach memorials and “provocational assemblies” between January 15 and 21, 1989.  The report states that these events “clearly displayed the mounting aggressiveness of the adversarial community” and blames the “signatories of Charter 77 and the other so-called independent initiatives.”
ABS (Archive of Security Units) Prague, A 34/1-1497, MBO Jan Palach 1989.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 13.  January 24, 1989, Prague – The CC CPCz Secretary General expresses thanks to the members of the People’s Militia for their participation in suppressing the demonstrations, and assures them that the “decisions…taken by the organs of the party and state… for the maintenance of security and order in the center of the capital city… have been accepted with full understanding” by “the absolute majority of our population.”
National Archive Prague, ÚV KSČ, Miloš Jakeš Office, 1989.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 14.  January 25, 1989, Prague – Memorandum of the Government of the Czech Socialist Republic on the events in Prague of January 15 to 21, 1989.  The government formally states its support for “the decisive measures taken by the security units” and declares “that the vast majority of our citizens condemns” the Palach memorials and gatherings.
National Archive Prague, ÚPV ČSSR (Office of the ČSSR Government), Memoranda and decisions of Government sessions, 1989.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 15.  January 25, 1989, Prague – The Minister of the Interior František Kincl provides Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec with a detailed report “on the anti-social activities of anti-socialist elements on January 15-22, 1989, in Prague and in Všetaty… and on the security measures taken to secure calm and public order.”  The report includes specific details on the demonstrations and repressions of January 19, including crowd estimates (on the low side) of 2500 persons who “fled toward the lower part of the square” after “security units intervened” at 17:15, but “were prevented in this by a coordinated intervention by the People’s Militia.”  The report also describes the repression of the Všetaty pilgrimage on January 21, including the presence of foreign diplomats from the U.S., Canada, Great Britain, and Denmark.  On January 21, the report states, “449 persons were identity checked,” “227 persons were sent back,” and “another 222 persons who refused to change their minds about continuing to Všetaty were taken for questioning.”
National Archive Prague, ÚPV ČSSR (Office of the ČSSR Government), Memoranda and decisions of Government sessions, 1989.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 16.  January 29, 1989, Roxbury, USA – Arthur Miller denounces the imprisonment of Václav Havel, and describes his arrest as “simply an attempt to call back the smoke that Palach sent billowing into the sky.”
CSDS Prague, Václav Havel Collection, Box 13.
Published in the samizdat journal Lidové noviny, under the title “Where is the future?” and subsequently in Acta, Document 48.

Document 17.  January 29, 1989. Moscow – Noted Soviet dissidents Yelena Bonner, Andrei Sakharov, and others send a message to the heads of states participating in the CSCE, describing the repression in Prague as a “blatant violation of the Vienna accords.”
CSDS Prague, Palach Week Collection.
Translation by Alice and Gerald Turner (pseudonym “A. G. Brain”), published in Acta, Document 47.

Document 18.  February 21, 1989. Prague – Václav Havel’s final statement as defendant at the Prague 1 District Court.  Havel dissects the indictment’s use of the words “anti-state” and “anti-socialist” as “no more than a derogatory label for all citizens who inconvenience the regime for whatever reason….”
CSDS Prague, Václav Havel Collection, Box 13.
Translation by Alice and Gerald Turner (pseudonym “A. G. Brain”), published in Acta, Document 66.

Section 3: Documentation from 1969

Document 19. [January 6, 1969, Prague.] – Jan Palach, in a letter to the student leader Lubomír Holeček, proposes a student occupation of Prague Radio and the broadcast of a call for a general strike.
ABS (Archive of Security Units) Prague, H-682/1. Fascimile in Petr Blažek, Patrik Eichler, Jakub Jareš et al.: Jan Palach ´69. Prague: Togga, FF UK, and ÚSTR, 2009, pp. 600–602.
Translation by Todd Hammond.

Document 20.  January 21, 1969, Washington D.C. – The Central Intelligence Bulletin of the CIA, circulated to top U.S. government officials on the day after the inauguration of new president Richard Nixon, reports that “[t]housands of disaffected youths yesterday marched in the streets in memory of Jan Paluch [sic], a 21-year-old student whose self-immolation has aroused the entire population” of Czechoslovakia.
National Archives & Records Administration (College Park, Maryland), CIA CREST Database.

Document 21.  January 21, 1969, Washington D.C. – The top National Security Council staff person for Eastern European matters, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, informs national security adviser Henry Kissinger: “the regime will have to decide whether to attempt to master the situation by itself or to let the Soviets do it.  It will probably prefer the former course to minimize brutality, even at the risk of thereby making itself a Soviet tool.”
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States series, 1969-1976, Volume XXIX, pp. 203-204.

Document 22.  February 3, 1969, Prague – The U.S. Embassy cables Washington with an assessment of the “growing assertiveness of conservatives and ‘realists’ in wake of emotional upsurge evoked by Palach suicide” and remarks that the “Palach self-immolation was major setback for hardliners, arresting trend toward public apathy on which they count.”
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States series, 1969-1976, Volume XXIX, pp. 204-206.

Document 23.  February 26, 1969, Washington D.C. – The Central Intelligence Bulletin of the CIA reports that the latest “suicide-by-fire in Prague’s Wenceslas Square” [by 19-year-old student Jan Zajic] “is not likely to generate widespread public disturbance or precipitate a political crisis as did the Palach affair in mid-January” because “the population has become more or less inured to such incidents by over 30 self-immolation attempts.”
National Archives & Records Administration (College Park, Maryland), CIA CREST Database.

Section 4: The chronology of January – February 1989

The chronology of the events of January and February 1989 before and after the “Palach Week,” written by the Czechoslovak Documentation Centre for its quarterly publication Acta, in Vol. 3, No. 9-12, Winter 1989, compiled and edited by Jan Vladislav in collaboration with Vilém Prečan, titled “Czechoslovakia: Heat in January 1989” and ultimately printed in December 1989.

SECRET//NOFORN: CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: APRIL 2 PSC DEBATE AND NEXT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001510 

SIPDIS 

NOFORN 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2014
TAGS: PARM PHUM PREL PINR EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: APRIL 2 PSC DEBATE AND NEXT
STEPS FOR U.S. 

REF: A. USEU TODAY 04/06/04
     B. BRUSSELS 1464
     C. STATE 68263
     D. PRAGUE 390 

Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 

-------
SUMMARY
------- 

1. (S/NF) The EU Political and Security Committee (PSC)
discussed the EU arms embargo on China during a heated 90
minute exchange on April 2.  PSC Ambassadors generally agreed
that the issue -- of whether, when and how to lift the
embargo -- should be sent back down to working groups for
further study before being presented to political groups for
a decision.  France objected, however, and succeeded in
getting agreement to discuss the issue at the April 26 FMs
meeting (GAERC) -- but failed in its campaign to secure an
early decision.  The debate will likely continue well into
the Dutch EU Presidency.  This cable draws on a detailed
readout and a sensitive internal report provided to Poloff by
UK and Hungarian contacts (please protect accordingly), as
well as background provided in recent days by other
interlocutors.  It also offers a strategy for continuing US
engagement. 

--------------------------------------
PSC Reacts Badly to Latest US Demarche
-------------------------------------- 

2. (S/NF) PSC Ambassadors reportedly arrived at the April 2
meeting to find copies of ref C demarche sitting on their
otherwise empty desks.  The demarche was received badly
because it gave the impression that "big brother was
watching," and because it appeared timed as a heavyhanded and
hubristic attempt to influence the PSC, according to our UK
contact.  Some reps, led by Greek Ambassador
Paraskevoupoulos, objected to the Council Secretariat's
distribution of the demarche under Council Secretariat cover
and with a Secretariat identifying number.  He argued that
the document had no business being circulated by the
Secretariat, and insisted that it be stricken from EU 

SIPDIS
records.  Ambassadors also reacted against what they
perceived as the threatening tone of our demarche. 

3. (S/NF) The Financial Times' front page article on April 2
about the US demarche campaign also enflamed the Ambassadors
because it appeared directly aimed at Friday's PSC
discussion.  Irish Ambassador Kelleher reportedly opened the
meeting by waving the article in the air and imploring his
colleagues to protect the confidentiality of internal EU
deliberations.  Poloff pointed out that the timing of the
latest US demarche was a coincidence, as we were previously
unaware that the PSC was scheduled to discuss the issue on
that day.  (COMMENT: Our demarche was received badly not so
much because of its substance, but because of the way it was
presented.  Our UK contact faulted the Irish and the Council
Secretariat for the way the demarche was handled in the PSC, 

SIPDIS
and also the awkward timing that made it seem, along with the
FT article, tailor-made to influence the April 2 discussion.
END COMMENT). 

-----------------------------------------
National Positions: France versus Denmark
----------------------------------------- 

4. (S/NF) According to our UK contact, France staked out a
"zero flexibility" position on lifting the embargo, and is
opposed to any talk of applying conditionality (i.e. by
insisting on further human rights progress by China and/or
strengthening the Code of Conduct prior to lifting the
embargo).  The Danes are reportedly still leading the
opposition, and have circulated to EU partners a list of ten
human rights conditions that they believe China should meet
before the embargo is lifted (we have not yet obtained a copy
of this list).  Other EU Member States are lining up
somewhere in between, although "all agree in principle" that
the embargo should be lifted if certain conditions are met.
The debate from now on will focus on defining conditions and
timing. 

5. (S/NF) Following is a summary of national interventions
made at the April 2 PSC: 

-- France: The embargo is anachronistic and must go; willing
to discuss timing but not conditionality because China would
not accept human rights conditionality; likewise would be
contradictory to enhance the Code of Conduct specifically for
China while also lifting the embargo; opposed also to making
Code of Conduct legally binding; wants issue to remain
political; opposed to sending it down to working groups. 

-- Denmark: Any decision to lift the embargo must be linked
to specific Chinese steps on human rights; EU also needs to
review Code of Conduct to ensure that lifting the embargo
does not result in increased arms sales to China. 

-- Germany: EU must consider regional impact of lifting the
embargo; now is not a good time to lift embargo (COMMENT: The
Germans appear to have moved closer to the Danes in recent
weeks, and are now the largest EU member state with serious
reservations about lifting the embargo.  One report of the
discussion suggests that "the tough German position, coupled
with the strength of US views, might be tempering French
enthusiasm."  END COMMENT). 

-- UK: Should be further study by working groups to identify
implications for human rights and regional stability, and to
examine options for strengthening Code of Conduct (COMMENT:
Our Hungarian contact reports that the UK is fundamentally
closer to the French end of the spectrum than the Danish.
The UK, like France, does not favor making the Code of
Conduct legally binding.  END COMMENT). 

-- Greece: Should explore gestures China could make on human
rights without explicitly linking them to lifting the
embargo; should not link regional stability to lifting
embargo; "provocatively" proposed that the Code of Conduct be
made legally binding.  (COMMENT: Our contacts report that the
Greek position on lifting the embargo is closer to France
than any other Member State.  END COMMENT). 

-- Ireland: Supports sending the issue back to working groups
(in part to keep the EU from making any decision during its
Presidency). 

-- Netherlands: Central consideration should be possible
release of political prisoners from the 1989 Tiananmen
crackdown. 

-- Czech Republic: Supports French position that issue should
remain political; silent on other points (COMMENT: Our UK
contact said that the Czech position is generally understood
to be informed by that country's interest in selling radar
equipment to China, as described ref D.  END COMMENT). 

-- Sweden: Working groups should further study issues of
human rights, regional stability, and enhancing the Code of
Conduct. 

-- Austria: Should explore gestures on human rights that
China could make but avoid linkage to lifting the embargo;
should conduct a general (i.e. non China-specific) review of
Code of Conduct. 

-- Italy: Intervened with same points as Austria. 

-- Belgium: More discussion needed of implications, including
on human rights, of any decision to lift embargo. 

-- Commission: Took no position on lifting embargo but said
EU should remain focused on human rights. 

Other member states did not intervene in the PSC discussion. 

-------------------------------------
Timeline: Back to the Working Groups?
------------------------------------- 

6. (S/NF) The PSC will meet again on this issue on April 7,
when it is expected to approve an "issues paper" which will
then be sent through COREPER to FMs for discussion at the
April 26 GAERC.  According to our UK and Hungarian contacts,
the paper is intended as a tour d'horizon for the GAERC
discussion.  It will not contain recommendations, and FMs are
not expected to take a decision.  Instead, they will likely
send the paper back down to the PSC for re-examination.  Most
PSC Ambassadors, having satisfied the French desire for a
ministerial discussion in April, will then press France to
accept the majority preference for sending the issue back to
the working groups.  The working groups would need two to
three months, minimum, to complete their assessments and
submit their papers to the PSC (EU working groups are
comprised of capital-based experts who rarely meet more than
once per month).  The relevant working groups are COHUM
(human rights), COASI (Asia Directors), and COARM
(conventional arms exports). 

7. (S/NF) What all this means is that the debate will likely
continue well into the Dutch Presidency.  Already, Member
States are beginning to look toward the December EU-China
Summit as a possible timeframe for any decision to lift the
embargo.  We have heard they are also looking at the US
electoral calendar and quietly wondering whether it would be
worth holding off their decision until November or December
in the hopes of sneaking it past the US radar.  They have not
and will not discuss such issues openly, even amongst each
other in the PSC, but our UK contact confirms that quiet
conversations and suggestive comments are going on in the
wings. 

---------------------
Next Steps for the US
--------------------- 

8. (S/NF) Our efforts have managed to slow down the momentum
in favor of removing the arms embargo, but have not killed
this idea outright.  In addition to the ongoing diplomatic
dialogue on this issue, we recommend the following steps to
help us keep the pressure on European governments: 

-- We should coordinate closely with Japan, and perhaps also
the ROK.  According to numerous EU interlocutors, the
Japanese have become increasingly active on this issue, but
their efforts appear so far uncoordinated with our own.
While this may have served our interests in the sense that it
gave the Europeans the impression that Japan's concerns were
genuine and not dictated by Washington, it is now time to
begin coordinating our efforts, so that Europeans recognize
that other key players in the region share our regional
stability concerns. 

-- We should engage the European Parliament, and particularly
members of its Human Rights Committee.  The EP is already on
record opposing an end to the embargo.  By calling attention
to EU deliberations and ongoing Chinese human rights abuses,
the EP could increase the political heat on member state
governments against any decision to lift the embargo. 

-- We should consider increasing our public statements and
press briefings for European audiences, on the assumption
that more scrutiny by European publics would help our views
on this issue, especially as regards human rights. 

-- We should increase our engagement with institutional and
member state representatives to the COHUM, COASI and COARM
working groups.  In this way we could ensure that our views
on human rights, regional stability and the Code of Conduct
are fully understood by those experts who will be supplying
recommendations to the political groups for discussion. 

-- Additionally, as suggested ref B, we recommend the USG
begin considering options for how the EU might strengthen
controls on arms exports to China in a post-embargo scenario.
 The worst case for us would be for the EU to lift its
embargo without having in place some sort of new mechanism
for controlling the transfer of arms and sensitive
technologies to China. 

Schnabel

TOP-SECRET: CUBAN CRISIS 1961- ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE NATIONAL SECURIYT AGENCY (NSA)

operators_chatter

pilot_training_feb_1

pilot_training_june_19

radar_installed

soviet_arms

soviet_freighters

soviet_merchant_shipspanish_speaking_pilots

TOP-SECRET: Cuban Missile Crisis Document Archive – 1960 from the NSA Archives

soviet_arms

Afghanistan and the Soviet Withdrawal 1989 20 Years Later

Alexander Lyakhovsky

Washington D.C., July 31st 2011 – Twenty years ago today, the commander of the Soviet Limited Contingent in Afghanistan Boris Gromov crossed the Termez Bridge out of Afghanistan, thus marking the end of the Soviet war which lasted almost ten years and cost tens of thousands of Soviet and Afghan lives.

As a tribute and memorial to the late Russian historian, General Alexander Antonovich Lyakhovsky, the National Security Archive today posted on the Web (www.nsarchive.org) a series of previously secret Soviet documents including Politburo and diary notes published here in English for the first time.  The documents suggest that the Soviet decision to withdraw occurred as early as 1985, but the process of implementing that decision was excruciatingly slow, in part because the Soviet-backed Afghan regime was never able to achieve the necessary domestic support and legitimacy – a key problem even today for the current U.S. and NATO-supported government in Kabul.

The Soviet documents show that ending the war in Afghanistan, which Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev called “the bleeding wound,” was among his highest priorities from the moment he assumed power in 1985 – a point he made clear to then-Afghan Communist leader Babrak Karmal in their first conversation on March 14, 1985.  Already in 1985, according to the documents, the Soviet Politburo was discussing ways of disengaging from Afghanistan, and actually reached the decision in principle on October 17, 1985.

But the road from Gorbachev’s decision to the actual withdrawal was long and painful.  The documents show the Soviet leaders did not come up with an actual timetable until the fall of 1987.  Gorbachev made the public announcement on February 8, 1988, and the first troops started coming out in May 1988, with complete withdrawal on February 15, 1989.  Gorbachev himself, in his recent book (Mikhail Gorbachev, Ponyat’ perestroiku … Pochemu eto vazhno seichas. (Moscow: Alpina Books 2006)), cites at least two factors to explain why it took the reformers so long to withdraw the troops.  According to Gorbachev, the Cold War frame held back the Soviet leaders from making more timely and rational moves, because of fear of the international perception that any such withdrawal would be a humiliating retreat.  In addition to saving face, the Soviet leaders kept trying against all odds to ensure the existence of a stable and friendly Afghanistan with some semblance of a national reconciliation process in place before they left.

The documents detail the Soviet leadership’s preoccupation that, before withdrawal of troops could be carried out, the Afghan internal situation had to be stabilized and a new government should be able to rely on its domestic power base and a trained and equipped army able to deal with the mujahadeen opposition.  The Soviets sought to secure the Afghan borders through some kind of compromise with the two other most important outside players—Pakistan, through which weapons and aid reached the opposition, and the United States, provider of the bulk of that aid.  In the process of Geneva negotiations on Afghanistan, which were initiated by the United Nations in 1982, the United States, in the view of the Soviet reformers, was dragging its feet, unwilling to stop arms supplies to the rebels and hoping and planning for the fall of the pro-Soviet Najibullah regime after the Soviet withdrawal.

Internally, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan did everything possible to prevent or slow down the Soviet withdrawal, putting pressure on the Soviet military and government representatives to expand military operations against the rebels.

Persistent pleading on the part of Najibullah government as late as January 1989 created an uncharacteristic split in the Soviet leadership, with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze suggesting that the withdrawal should be slowed down or some forces should remain to help protect the regime, while the military leadership argued strongly in favor of a complete and decisive withdrawal.

According to the American record, Shevardnadze had already informed Secretary of State George Shultz as early as September 1987 of the specific timetable for withdrawal.  But many senior officials did not believe the Soviet assurances; in fact, deputy CIA director Robert Gates famously bet a State Department diplomat on New Year’s Eve 1987 that Gorbachev would make no withdrawal announcement until after the end of the Reagan administration.  Gates believed the Chinese saying about the Soviet appetite for territory: “What the bear has eaten, he never spits out” – and only in his memoirs did he admit he was making “an intelligence forecast based on fortune cookie wisdom.”  (Robert Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York:  Simon&Shuster, 1996, pp. 430-431).  Of course, Gates’ hardline views on Gorbachev would take over U.S. policy as the George H.W. Bush administration came into office in January 1989.

By this time, however, the Soviet leaders well realized that the goal of building socialism in Afghanistan was illusory; and at the same time the goal of securing the southern borders of the Soviet Union seemed to be still within reach with the policy of national reconciliation of the Najibullah government.  So the troops came out completely by February 15, 1989.  Soon after the Soviet withdrawal, however, both superpowers seemed to lose interest in what had been so recently the hottest spot of the Cold War.

Najibullah would outlast Gorbachev’s tenure in the Kremlin, but not by much:  Within three years Najibullah would be removed from power and brutally murdered, and Afghanistan would plunge into the darkness of civil war and the coming to power of the Taliban.  Twenty years later, the other superpower and its Cold War alliance are fighting a war in Afghanistan against forces of darkness that were born among the fundamentalist parts of mujahadeen resistance to the Soviet occupation.  In such a context, the language and the dilemmas in these 20-year-old documents still provide some resonance today.

This posting is also a tribute to and a commemoration of one of our long-standing partners in the pursuit of opening secrets and writing the new truly international history of the Cold War.   General Alexander Lyakhovsky passed away from a heart attack while standing on a Moscow Metro platform on February 3, 2009, less than two weeks before the 20th anniversary of the end of the war in which he served as an officer, and which he studied for many years as a scholar.  He is survived by his wife Tatyana and their children Vladimir and Galina.

The National Security Archive mourns the passing of our dear friend and partner, Alexander Antonovich.  It is fitting and proper that here we express our deepest appreciation for his remarkable knowledge, his scholarly and personal integrity, and his generosity both in expertise and the documents that he always shared with us, while he educated us and the world.  His memory lives on in all of us who ever read his work, heard him speak, or best of all, listened to him sing the sad songs of the Afghan war.

— Svetlana Savranskaya, director of Russia programs, Thomas Blanton, executive director, National Security Archive, and Malcolm Byrne, Deputy Director, National Security Archive.

Documents:

Document 1. Memorandum of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Conversation with Babrak Karmal, March 14, 1985

In his first conversation with the leader of Afghanistan, who was installed by the Soviet troops in December of 1979, Gorbachev underscored two main points: first that “the Soviet troops cannot stay in Afghanistan forever,” and second, that the Afghan revolution was presently in its “national-democratic” stage, whereas its socialist stage was only “a course of the future.” He also encouraged the Afghan leader to expand the base of the regime to unite all the “progressive forces.” In no uncertain terms, Karmal was told that the Soviet troops would be leaving soon and that his government would have to rely on its own forces.

Document 2.  Anatoly Chernyaev Diary, April 4, 1985

Chernyaev reflects on the “torrent of letters” about Afghanistan received recently by the Central Committee and the Pravda newspaper.  They reflect the growing dissatisfaction of the population with the drawn-out war and the consensus that the troops should be withdrawn.

Document 3 Anatoly Chernyaev Diary, October 17, 1985.

At the Politburo session of October 17, 1985, General Secretary Gorbachev proposed to make a final decision on Afghanistan and quoted from citizens’ letters regarding the dissatisfaction in the country with the Soviet actions in Afghanistan.  He also described his meeting with Babrak Karmal during which Gorbachev told the Afghan leader: “we will help you, but with arms only, not troops.”Chernyaev noted Gorbachev’s negative reaction to the assessment of the situation given by Defense Minister Marshal Sergey Sokolov.

Document 4.  Politburo Session, June 26, 1986.

The Politburo discusses the first results of Najibullah’s policy of national reconciliation.  Gorbachev emphasizes that the decision to withdraw the troops is firm, but that the United States seems to be a problem as far as the national reconciliation is concerned.  He proposes early withdrawals of portions of troops to give the process a boost, and proposes to “pull the USA and Pakistan by their tail” to encourage them to participate in it more actively.

Document 5 Politburo Session, November 13, 1986.

The first detailed Politburo discussion of the process and difficulties of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, which included the testimony of Marshal Sergei Akhromeev.

Document 6 Politburo Session, January 21, 1987

The Politburo discusses the results of Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Head of the Central Committee International Department Anatoly Dobrynin’s trip to Afghanistan.  Shevardnadze’s report is very blunt and pessimistic about the war and the internal situation.  The main concern of the Politburo is how to end the war but save face and ensure a friendly and neutral Afghanistan.

Document 7 Politburo Session, February 23, 1987

Gorbachev talks about the need to withdraw while engaging the United States and Pakistan in negotiations on the final settlement.  He is willing to meet with the Pakistani leader Zia ul Khaq, and maybe even offer him some payoff.  The Soviet leader also shows concern about the Soviet reputation among non-aligned countries and national liberation movements.

Document 8 Politburo Session, February 26, 1987

In his remarks to the Politburo, General Secretary returns to the issue of the need to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan several times.  He emphasizes the need to withdraw the troops, and at the same time struggles with the explanation for the withdrawal, noting that “we not going to open up the discussion about who is to blame now.”  Gromyko admits that it was a mistake to introduce the troops, but notes that it was done after 11 requests from the Afghan government.

Document 9  Colonel Tsagolov Letter to USSR Minister of Defense Dmitry Yazov on the Situation in Afghanistan, August 13, 1987

Criticism of the Soviet policy of national reconciliation in Afghanistan and analysis of general failures of the Soviet military mission there are presented in Colonel Tsagolov’s letter to USSR Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov of August 13, 1987.  This letter represents the first open criticism of the Afghan war from within the military establishment.  Colonel Tsagolov paid for his attempt to make his criticism public in his interview with Soviet influential progressive magazine “Ogonek” by his career—he was expelled from the Army in 1988.

Document 10  CC CPSU Letter on Afghanistan, May 10, 1988

On May 10, 1988, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR issued a “closed” (internal use) letter to all Communist Party members of the Soviet Union on the issue of withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.  The letter presents the Central Committee analysis of events in Afghanistan and Soviet actions in that country, the problems and the difficulties the Soviet troops had to face in carrying out their mission.  In particular, the letter stated that important historic and ethnic factors were overlooked when the decisions on Afghanistan were made in the Soviet Union. The letter analyzes Soviet interests in Afghanistan and the reasons for the withdrawal of troops.

Document 11 Politburo Session January 24, 1989

This Politburo session deals with the issue of the completion of the withdrawal and the post-war Soviet role in Afghanistan, as well as possible future development of the situation there.  The discussion shows the split among the Soviet leadership with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze arguing for leaving some personnel behind to help protect the Najibullah regime or delaying the full withdrawal.

Document 12 Excerpt from Alexander Lyakhovsky and Vyacheslav Nekrasov, Grazhdanin, Politik, Voin: Pamyati Shakha Masuda (Citizen, Politician, Fighter: In Memory of Shah Masoud), (Moscow, 2007), pp. 202-205

Document 13  Excerpt from Statement of the Soviet Military Command in Afghanistan on the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops, February 14, 1989

On April 7, 1988, USSR Defense Minister signed an order on withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.  In February 1989, the Defense Ministry prepared a statement of the Soviet Military Command in Afghanistan on the issue of withdrawal of troops, which was delivered to the Head of the UN Mission in Afghanistan on February 14, 1989—the day when the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan.  The statement gave an overview of Soviet-Afghan relations before 1979, Soviet interpretation of the reasons for providing internationalist assistance to Afghanistan, and sending troops there after the repeated requests of the Afghan government.  It criticized the U.S. role in arming the opposition in disregard of the Geneva agreements, and thus destabilizing the situation in the country.  In an important acknowledgement that the Vietnam metaphor was used to analyze Soviet actions in Afghanistan, they military explicitly referred to “unfair and absurd” comparisons between the American actions in Vietnam and the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

Document 14. Official Chronology of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan with quotes from documents from the Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow.

Books By Alexander Lyakhovsky
Grazhdanin,Politik,Voin, Plamya Afgana and Zacharovannye svobodoj

 

CONFIDENTIAL: Lords of the Narco-Coast: Part II – Community Reaction

VZCZCXRO2713
RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS
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DE RUEHMU #0013/01 0071743
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R 071743Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0368
INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/USAID WASHDC 0004
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAGUA 000013 

SIPDIS
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/07
TAGS: SNAR SOCI ASEC PGOV PHUM PREL KCOR NU
SUBJECT: Lords of the Narco-Coast: Part II - Community Reaction
Divided, FSLN Blames U.S. for Crisis 

REF: A) 2009 MANAGUA 1149 (LORDS OF NARCO-COAST PART I)
B) 2009 MANAGUA 1051 (PRIMER ON MISKITO INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT)
C) 2009 MANAGUA 1047 (MISKITO INDEPENDENCE RALLY TURNS DEADLY)
D) 2008 MANAGUA 1517 AND PREVIOUS (FRAUD IN RAAN ELECTIONS)
E) 2008 MANAGUA 419 AND PREVIOUS (GON SUSPENDS RAAN MUNICIPAL
ELECTIONS) 

CLASSIFIED BY: Robert J. Callahan, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(A), (B),
(D) 

SUMMARY 

1. (C): On December 8, after a plane laden with cocaine and cash
crash-landed in the remote, small village of Walpa Siksa in the
North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN), a deadly confrontation
took place between Nicaraguan anti-drug units and drug smugglers
allied with some number of local residents.  This message is the
second in a series that reports on the Walpa Siksa incident and its
immediate aftermath, and explores what these events have revealed
about the actual state of organized trafficking operations in
Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast. 

2.  (C) In the aftermath of the incident, public reactions have
been divided.  Some regional politicians and leaders of the
indigenous Yatama political party have called the incident and
subsequent government operations in the region a new "Red Christmas
Massacre" - a reference to the Sandinistas' deadly attacks on
indigenous Miskitos in the 1980s, assertions the military contests
are false.  Religious leaders have denounced these same political
leaders for turning a blind eye to the increased drug activity.
Former Vice President (and ex-Sandinista), Sergio Ramirez, has
decried the presence of trafficking organizations as a national
security threat, while a senior current FSLN official accused the
United States, specifically the CIA, of "promoting" the drug trade
to destabilize the country.  Underneath all lies a subtext of the
perennial rivalry and racial conflict between Nicaragua's Pacific
(Hispanic) and Atlantic (Afro-Caribbean and Amerindian) cultures.
Yet, also through the dissonance, the Walpa Siksa incident and its
aftermath seem to indicate stronger linkages between drug smugglers
and local communities in Nicaragua's Atlantic region than
previously believed.  END SUMMARY 

REGIONAL POLITICIANS BLAME THE MILITARY - SEEK A NEW CRISIS  

3. (C) The Walpa Siksa village, where the December 8 incident
occurred, is in a region historically controlled by Yatama; the
regional, indigenous Miskito political party.  Much of Yatama's
leadership itself has been co-opted by the ruling Sandinista Party
(REF D) over the last few years.  Even so, regional politicians and
several Yatama leaders have taken to the airwaves, primarily on
their new Yatama radio station (reportedly funded by the
government), to condemn the Nicaraguan military for its continuing
operations in the vicinity of Walpa Siksa and Prinzapolka.  These
leaders, including Brooklyn Rivera, a Yatama National Assembly
Deputy; Reynoldo Francis, Governor of the North Atlantic Autonomous
Region (RAAN); Roberto Wilson, the RAAN Vice Governor; and
Elizabeth Enriquez Francis, former mayor of RAAN capital Bilwi (and
ex-wife of Governor Francis), have used Miskito-language radio
broadcasts from the new station to claim that the Nicaraguan
anti-drug unit had violated human rights in pursuing its
investigation and by detaining suspects from Walpa Siksa.  These
leaders vehemently denied that these coastal communities support,
house and abet drug smugglers, as had been charged by some critics.
Rivera told national media that "the soldiers are all from the
Pacific coast.  There has been racism, robberies and looting of
indigenous people's homes."  Other Miskito leaders claim that the
soldiers have killed livestock and stolen food donated to the
community by the World Food Program. 

4. (C) Rivera, Francis, Wilson, and Enriquez have all called for
and even led several protests against police and navy forces
stationed in Bilwi, creating a new crisis in the region.  They have
denounced the "human rights violations" by the anti-drug unit
against the "innocent" indigenous people and claim that the
military "occupation" of Walpa Siksa is rife with abuses.  This
racially-charged agitation led some in the Miskito community to set
up illegal road blocks at the town of Sinsin, preventing traffic on
the only road between Bilwi and Managua.  There were also attempts
to take over the Bilwi International Airport and the capital's main
wharf.  These Yatama leaders and radicalized supporters have
demanded that the Navy cease all operations on the Atlantic Coast,
withdraw from the region, and immediately release the roughly two
dozen suspects detained in Walpa Siksa and Prinzapolka.  (see
SEPTEL).  Rivera also told reporters that the Walpa Siksa community
elders had decided to abandon their community if the military did
not depart or carried out its plan to establish a permanent
presence in the area. 

MORAVIAN CHURCH LEADER CONDEMNS GOVERNMENT COLLUSION 

5. (U) The Moravian Church is the largest denomination on the
Atlantic Coast and a large majority of indigenous Miskitos belong
to it, making the church the moral authority in the region; even
more so than the Catholic Church.  On Friday, December 13, Moravian
Church Superintendant Cora Antonio issued a grave statement against
the local Walpa Siksa community leaders, police officials and
military officials in the Atlantic, whom she claimed knew about the
narco-trafficking base in Walpa Siksa, but took no action until the
recent plane crash.  Antonio, who will finish her two-year term in
January 2010, complained that drug smugglers had established their
networks unchallenged by the GON and exploited the extreme poverty
on the Coast.  She also claimed that elected officials, including
Francis, Wilson, and Lidia Coleman, the mayor of nearby
Prinzapolka, as well as police and military authorities, "knew from
the beginning of the installation of this narco-traffickers' base,
but never did anything about it."   She also stated that in certain
Caribbean communities the narco-traffickers exercised the highest
authority, above that of the community judge, the village elders,
even the pastor or "sindico," and that they frequently commanded
the "last word" on community decisions.  Antonio also said the
Moravian Church had recently removed a reverend from the Walpa
Siksa village out of fear that he would be physically attacked for
preaching against drugs from the pulpit. 

WIHTA TARA ALSO SAYS MILITARY SHOULD LEAVE 

6. (U) Other non-FSLN-aligned indigenous leaders took aim at the
President Ortega and at the military's recent actions.  The Wihta
Tara of the Miskito Nation, aka the Rev. Hector Williams, who
denounced the Managua government and called for Miskito
independence, told the media that Columbian drug traffickers had
already left, so the military should leave as well.  NOTE: The
Wihta Tara (Miskito for "great judge"), was elected by the Council
of Elders of the Miskito Nation and leads Miskito separatist
movement that mounted protests which were violently suppressed this
past October (REF E)  END NOTE.   Williams stated that "the army is
after the money that they think is hidden in the community."
Building on the racial inequality theme, another separatist leader,
Steady Alvarado, publicly questioned why the military felt it could
take actions in the indigenous communities that it would never
attempt on the Pacific Coast.  The Miskito Council of Elders itself
issued a statement on December 12 blaming President Ortega directly
for the "tortures, persecutions and death of our community members
in Walpa Siksa."  It also accused Ortega of being "incapable of
neutralizing" drug trafficking activity on the Atlantic Coast, and
for again "bearing a grudge" against the Coastal peoples, "like he
did during the Navidad Roja (Red Christmas Massacre)."  NOTE: The
Red Christmas Massacre occurred in 1981, when Sandinista military
operations in the Atlantic Coast killed dozens and forcibly
relocated hundreds of Miskitos thought to be collaborating with the
Contras. END NOTE. 

ARMY CHIEF DENIES RIGHTS VIOLATIONS - YIELD "NOT ONE INCH TO
NARCOS" 

7. (U) General Omar Halleslevens, Commander of the Nicaraguan
military, told reporters that the Army would not leave Walpa Siksa,
nor would it stop searching neighboring communities for drug
traffickers.  He insisted that the Army would remain and would take
appropriate measures to protect the area from again becoming a
haven for drug trafficking.  Halleslevens denied accusations that
the military had violated human rights, saying "our line has been
from the very beginning to respect life, human rights, private
property and the law ... as we are completing our duty to support
the police in applying the law."  He further declared that the
military would "not give a rock, nor even an inch of the national
territory, to narco-traffickers" and called on government
institutions and the population to support law enforcement in its
fight.  NOTE: Thus far, Post has no/no credible evidence of human
rights violations by law enforcement related to this operation.  We
continue to monitor the situation closely and will report relevant
developments if they occur.  END NOTE. 

FORMER FSLN VICE PRESIDENT CONDEMNS NARCOS, BLAMES GOVERNMENT 

8. (U) Adding to the chorus of concern about the absentee national
government was author and former Nicaraguan/FSLN vice president,
Sergio Ramirez, who said in an op-ed that the strong
narco-traffickers presence on the Caribbean Coast threatened
Nicaragua's sovereignty and territorial integrity.  He believed
that the "narco-traffickers will promote the separation of the
Caribbean Coast (REF E) and already have the social base to do it"
because of the significant resources drug smugglers enjoy and the
rampant political corruption in the region.  Ramirez also said the
confrontation between the anti-drug units and the Walpa Siksa
community demonstrated that criminal organizations had achieved
enormous influence on the Atlantic Coast while the "government does
not do anything to stop the problem." 

FSLN LEADER BLAMES THE U.S., CIA FOR THE CRISIS, MAY CANCEL
ELECTIONS 

9. (U) In contrast, during December 16 interviews, Steadman Fagoth,
a Miskito indigenous leader, former Contra commander, and now
ardent Ortega supporter, told FSLN-controlled media that United
States had created the Walpa Siksa crisis.  Fagoth, who is also
president of the Government's Fishing Authority (INPESCA), spoke to
Multinoticias Channel 4, owned and operated by the Ortega-Murillo
family, and to "El 19," the official on-line newspaper of the
Sandinista Government.  He claimed that the United States, through
the CIA, was trying to provoke an uprising in the Atlantic Coast
against the government by supporting narco-criminals.  He added
that Alberto Luis Cano, the fugitive Colombian drug leader and
passenger of the crashed drug airplane (see SEPTEL-Part I) had been
hired by the CIA to promote an uprising among the native
population, by playing on the racial animosity between Nicaragua's
Pacific and Atlantic populations.  Perhaps Fagoth's most troubling
comment was that because of the current unrest, the government
might delay regional elections scheduled for March 2010.  

COMMENT 

10. (C) In the cacophony following the Walpa Siksa incident,
statements of FSLN official Steadman Fagoth are perhaps the most
politically ominous.  Fagoth is a regular proxy for Ortega's
Atlantic policy.  His remarks frequently represent test balloons
for how Ortega perceives the situation and how the President seeks
to position himself against any fallout.  Fagoth's anti-U.S.
accusations are outrageous, but not unexpected -- that the United
States and CIA employed a drug trafficker to created this crisis,
destabilize the region and overthrow the government.  He made
similar accusations about the United States and CIA when the Wihta
Tara announced the separatist movement several months ago.  In
2008, the GON delayed RAAN municipal elections (REF E) on dubious
grounds.  Thus Fagoth's comment about delaying the March 2010
regional elections may indicate Ortega's true intent: freeze
everyone in place. 

11. (C) The Walpa Siksa incident and its aftermath aggravated
underlying tensions and divisions that persist in the Atlantic, and
may have exposed new evidence about the nature and extend of
narco-trafficking activity.  Serious concerns about threats to
national security and sovereignty have been raised by critics of
the government.  Some community leaders, such as Moravian
Superintendent Cora Antonio, have spoken out about what they see as
rampant drug corruption and political collusion by RAAN political
leaders.  We find it odd that these same political leaders, such as
Rivera, Francis, Wilson and Enriquez agitated against military
counter-drug operations, and virtually denied the existence of any
narco-trafficking activity.  At a minimum, their efforts to fan
latent racial resentments seem self-serving re-election efforts in
the run-up to regional elections.  For its part, the military
denies any human rights abuses in this, its largest anti-drug land
operation in the Caribbean in years.  In a subsequent message we
will provide more detail about the figures caught up in the Walpa
Siksa incident and outline some of the networks and relationships
that we believe traffickers may have been able to establish.
CALLAHAN

CONFIDENTIAL: Lords of the Narco-Coast: Part I – Deadly Confrontation

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/21
TAGS: SNAR SOCI PGOV PHUM PREL KCOR ASEC NU
SUBJECT: Lords of the Narco-Coast: Part I - Deadly Confrontation at
Walpa Siksa 

REF: MANAGUA 1051 (MOSQUITO COAST INDEPENDENCE) 

CLASSIFIED BY: Robert J. Callahan, Ambassador, State, Embassy
Managua; REASON: 1.4(A), (B), (D) 

1. (C) SUMMARY: On December 8, after a plane laden with cocaine and
cash crash landed in the remote, small village of Walpa Siksa in
the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN), a deadly confrontation
took place between Nicaraguan anti-drug units and drug smugglers
allied with a some number of local residents.  Stories of how the
clash came to pass on December 8 are divergent, but the Walpa Siksa
incident,  the ensuing actions of regional leaders and local
residents, as well as the enhanced posture of security forces seems
to indicate there are stronger linkages between drug smugglers and
local communities than previously believed.  This message is the
first in a series that reports on the Walpa Siksa incident and its
immediate aftermath, and explores what these events have revealed
about the actual state of organized trafficking operations in
Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast.  END SUMMARY 

WALPA SIKA: THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT 

2. (C) On Tuesday, December 8, a Nicaraguan anti-drug unit clashed
with suspected drug traffickers, leaving two sailors dead and five
other government security forces wounded.  The following account of
events is based on Government of Nicaragua (GON) official briefings
and conversations between senior GON law enforcement/military
officials and Embassy personnel.  On Tuesday, December 8, a
Nicaraguan anti-drug unit combined force of navy and national
police traveled to the remote, small village of Walpa Siksa in the
North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) to investigate reports of a
plane crash linked to drug smugglers.  The joint patrol arrived in
the evening and was ambushed by civilians from the remote village,
who were allegedly defending the drug traffickers.  In the melee,
two sailors were killed, and three other military personnel and one
police officer were severely wounded.  One villager from Walpa
Siksa was also killed.  On Wednesday, December 9, a joint
Nicaraguan navy-army patrol returned to Walpa Siksa to detain those
suspected of involvement in the ambush, only to find the community
abandoned of all males.  On Thursday, December 10, anti-drug forces
from the Navy confronted an additional group of drug smugglers near
the community of Prinzapolka, in which one suspect was killed and
another wounded.  Two more were detained, and the fifth suspect
escaped.  Subsequent missions by the anti-drug unit over several
days resulted in 20 suspects arrested (18 in connection with the
first clash), and confiscation of a powerboat, several guns,
ammunition, small quantities of drugs and $177,960 in cash.
Nicaraguan security forces have seized and are now operating out of
several homes in the Walpa Siksa community that are believed to
have housed drug smugglers.  The military has announced plans to
establish a permanent presence in the area to discourage drug
traffickers from using it as a base of operations any longer. 

3. (U) Capt. Roger Gonzalez, newly-installed chief of the
Nicaraguan naval forces, told the press that "we understand there
is a Colombian criminal, suspected drug trafficker, [Alberto Ruiz
Cano] who has $500,000 and has armed certain area individuals, and
we are searching for him."  Police investigators revealed that Ruiz
Cano, whose real name is Amauri Pau, was illegally issued a
Nicaraguan national identity card (cedula) and owns several
properties and businesses in Managua believed to be involved in
money laundering (see SEPTEL).  Ruiz Cano is also believed to have
been on the crashed plane and is suspected of leading the December
8 attack against the anti-drug unit.  Officials detained two
Colombians -- Ruiz Cano's father [Fernando Melendez Paudd known as
"el Patron"] and his cousin [Catalina del Carmen Ruiz] -- but
neither has been willing to talk to police about Ruiz Cano or his
whereabouts.  Ruiz Cano's associates have hired attorney Julian
Holmes Arguello to defend them.  The presence of Holmes Arguello, a
well-known and expensive attorney, has reinforced official
suspicions about Holmes own possible drug connections. 

WALPA SIKSA: EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNTS -- EARLY "WHITE" CHRISTMAS OR
FAILED DRUG RESCUE? 

4. (U) The national daily newspaper El Nuevo Diario "END"
(left-of-center) has provided continuous coverage of the Walpa
Siksa incident, since it came to light on the evening of December
8th.  According to the paper's accounts, events leading up to the
deadly December 8 firefight differ somewhat from the official
account.  The paper's sources, who requested anonymity for fear of
possible reprisals from traffickers, other residents and the
government, stated that the plane crash-landed in the Walpa Siksa
cemetery on Sunday, December 6 at 11 a.m.  The impact killed the
pilot and co-pilot instantly, and broke the plane into several
pieces scattering packets of cocaine and bundles of dollars in the
debris.  Walpa Siksa residents quickly discovered the dead pilots
and one crash survivor, to whom they gave medical attention.  They
were also surprised at the large quantity of cocaine the plane was
carrying.  According to the paper's sources, some community elders
wanted to immediately contact the police and navy about the plane
crash and drugs, but others argued that it would be better to
divide the cash and drugs within the community and then burn the
plane to hide the evidence.  According to the media reports, the
latter group prevailed and armed themselves with weapons (pistols,
AK-47 rifles) that had been stored since the 1980's.  According to
the eye-witness accounts, on December 7 at 2 p.m. two boats with
approximately 40 Colombian narco-traffickers, who were "armed to
the teeth," arrived in Walpa Siksa to rescue the pilots and the
third passenger (known as "el Jefe" or "the boss," believed to be
Alberto Ruiz Cano), and to recover the plane's lost "merchandise."
The Colombians spent the night of December 7 and all day December 8
trying to convince the community to return the missing drugs and
cash.  According to END reports, when the narco-traffickers learned
that a government anti-drug unit was coming from Bilwi to
investigate the plane crash, they armed the community in order to
repel the Navy.  As soon as the two Navy boats arrived, the
narco-traffickers opened fire on the sailors, who also shot back,
killing four community members [NOTE: only one death in the
community has been confirmed. END NOTE].  The navy boats returned
to Bilwi at 7 p.m. with their dead and wounded.  On December 9, the
wounded civilians from Walpa Siksa were taken to a nearby village
and, by the afternoon, the Walpa Siksa village was evacuated
because villagers feared reprisals by the Government. 

5. (C) Our Embassy contacts on the ground in the RAAN have relayed
an account similar to that reported in the newspaper, but that
differs on some important details.  According to our sources, on
Friday, December 4, an airplane carrying hundreds of pounds of
cocaine and sacks of cash ran out of fuel on its way to a
clandestine runway in the RAAN and was forced to make an emergency
landing on the beach near Walpa Siksa.  The plane's pilot and two
passengers, allegedly Colombians, suffered minor injuries and were
sheltered by the local community.  Members of the community quickly
emptied the airplane of its cargo, estimated to be approximately a
half-ton of cocaine separated into individual one kilo packets.
Our contacts told us that word of the plane crash quickly spread
throughout the coastal communities and on Saturday morning,
December 5, several local merchants left Bilwi with their boats
full of commercial goods and food to sell to the community with its
sudden new windfall.  By Saturday evening narco-trafficker "rescue
boats" carrying approximately 40 Colombians and Hondurans
(reportedly from Honduras and San Andres) arrived in the community
to save the pilot/passengers and recover the drugs and cash.  Over
the ensuing three days, village elders urged by the narco "recovery
team" tried to persuade the community to sell the cocaine packets
back at a price of $3,000 a kilo.  According to our contacts, the
major sticking point was that the $3,000 price was only half the
$6,000 per kilo price that locals knew they could get by taking
their windfall slightly up the coast to Honduras.  When one group
of Walpa Siksa residents ultimately refused to sell back their
stash to the narco-traffickers, they were attacked and robbed of
their "windfall."  This group subsequently traveled to Bilwi on the
morning of Tuesday, December 8, and filed a formal complaint with
the police there, which confirmed rumors of a drug-plane crash.
Our contacts told us that it was this formal complaint that lead to
the government dispatching the counter-drug unit to investigate at
Walpa Siksa.  The anti-drug unit arrived in two boats to Walpa
Siksa at approximately 6 p.m.  Our contacts told us that there had
been no ambush when they arrived, but rather an "amicable" meeting
between law enforcement and village elders.  However, things turned
sour after one of the Colombians from the "rescue team," who was
drunk and under the impression they were under attack, shot his
automatic weapon into the group of uniformed sailors, killing one
and seriously wounding several other counter-drug unit members.
Our contacts told us that the "ambush" story was fabricated later
by authorities to account for their dead and wounded. 

COMMENT 

6. (C) Walpa Siksa has obliged us to revise our views about the
nature and extent of trafficking activity on the Atlantic.
Previously, our assessment had been that the majority of the local
indigenous Miskito villages were too xenophobic to actively support
outsiders (even Nicaraguans from the Pacific side of Hispanic
descent) in transporting drugs (or, frankly, any other activity)
for extended periods.  We had also believed that local interaction
with traffickers had been intermittent, and normally took place
upon the instruction or advice of a small number of corrupt
political and indigenous leaders in the region.  We maintain our
basic assessment is still valid; however, all three versions of the
Walpa Siksa incident reveal evidence that there is likely a much
higher degree of cooperation and support than we previously
believed between foreign drug trafficking organization and, at
least, the more remote local communities of Nicaragua's Atlantic
Coast.  In some cases there may be persistent and pervasive
relationships within an entire community.  We fear that it now
appears that organized criminal elements may have made major
inroads within some remote coastal communities, convincing them to
join forces by offering perhaps the only secure and steady
employment opportunity on the Coast - maintaining drug trafficking
supply routes.  Nicaragua's Atlantic is a key mid-point for an
increasingly busy transit corridor of South American drug shipments
bound for the United States.  It is also the most underdeveloped
and economically backward region of the country and has been
generally ignored by the current and previous central governments
in Managua.  This combination of political neglect, limited
economic opportunity and daily shipments of drugs creates
conditions for a possible "perfect storm" where Nicaragua's
Atlantic Coast could degenerate into an ungoverned "Narco-Coast,"
with serious repercussions for Nicaragua's political stability and
U.S. counternarcotics cooperation.  In subsequent messages we will
address reaction to Walpa Siksa by local, regional and national
figures.  We will also provide more detailed reporting about the
key figures caught up in the Walpa Siksa incident and outline some
of the networks and relationships that we believe traffickers have
been able to establish.
CALLAHAN

STRENG VERTRAULICHES DOKUMENT DER DEUTSCHEN BAHN ZUR NEUPOSITIONIERUNG

CONFIDENTIAL: VATICAN WARY OF LEFTIST LATINOS

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E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/23/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KIRF PREL VT MX VE
SUBJECT: VATICAN WARY OF LEFTIST LATINOS
 REF: A. REFS: A) LARREA-MARTIN EMAIL; B) CARACAS 3757; C) VATICAN 551 ET AL.; D) VATICAN 552 

     B. A) LARREA - MARTIN 12/9 EMAIL; B) CARACAS 3757; C) VATICAN 551 ET AL.;
D) VATICAN 552 

VATICAN 00000562  001.2 OF 002 

CLASSIFIED BY: Peter Martin, Pol/Econ Chief, Vatican, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 

-----------
Summary
----------- 

1.  (C)  The Ambassador shared ref (a) points on Venezuela's
nefarious influence in the region with Holy See internal affairs
chief (Vatican number three) Archbishop Leonardo Sandri December
17.  Some points were news to Sandri, but he was not surprised
and said he shared U.S. concerns about Chavez and other leftist
leaders in Latin America.  An interlocutor from the Vatican MFA
as well told the Ambassador that he and his superiors were wary
of connections among these leaders.  Neither prelate thought the
Vatican would become more aggressive in speaking out against
these figures, both because of recent history and the potential
for a backlash against the Church.  The Ambassador will see FM
Lajolo after the holidays to continue this dialogue.  End
Summary. 

-------------------------------
Sandri Under No Illusions
------------------------------- 

2.  (C)  The Ambassador met with Archbishop Leonardo Sandri
December 17 for a wide-ranging conversation on the Church in
Latin America.  Sandri, an Argentine and former nuncio to
Venezuela, is the chief of Vatican internal operations and
generally regarded as the Holy See's number three behind the
pope and Secretary of State.  Ambassador discussed ref (a)
points, emphasizing the danger Chavez poses to the governments
around him.  Sandri was aware of some points, but others came as
news to him.  In any case, he was not surprised. Sandri said he
was convinced that Chavez was dangerous from the time he took
office and Sandri was stationed in Caracas.  The archbishop said
he had taken a harder line than the U.S. Embassy at the time,
who told him to "wait and see" what Chavez did in office. 

-------------------------
Holy See Concerned
------------------------- 

3.  (C)  According to Sandri, who said he knew the pope's
thinking on the subject, the Holy See is concerned about a
general leftward shift in Latin America.  He mentioned concerns
about several figures who seemed to be looking to Castro and
Chavez, including Mexico's Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador.  Holy
See MFA Country Director for the U.S. and Mexico Monsignor Paolo
Gualtieri told the Ambassador in a separate meeting December 15
that his superiors in the MFA were of a similar mindset.  They
see the connections between Chavez, Castro, and other leftist
politicians in Latin America, and are concerned about the
dangers they present on many levels. 

---------------
What to Do?
--------------- 

4.   (C)  While the Vatican agrees that these figures are
dangerous, it sees the question of how to deal with them as more
complicated.  The Ambassador's conversation with Sandri tracked
closely with the description of the pope's concern on Venezuela
noted in ref (b).  However, Sandri stuck to the previous Vatican
line on engagement there; he did not see the Holy See changing
its non-confrontational approach to Chavez given the recent
history between Venezuela and the Holy See (ref c).  He
responded favorably to the idea that direct aid from the U.S.
Catholic Church to the Venezuelan Church to help the latter
build up its social programs could help counteract Chavez's
appeal and blunt his attacks on the Church.  Gualtieri noted
that in the case of someone like Lopez Obrador, the Church had
to be careful not to overstep its bounds into politics, no
matter how it felt. He said Masonic groups and some segments of
Mexican society were ready to pounce on bishops or clergy who
strayed into the political realm (ref d). 

------------
Comment
----------- 

5. (C)   The Holy See continues to feel that a
non-confrontational approach to Chavez is the right strategy for
the time being, but the Vatican hierarchy is under no illusions
about the danger of Chavez and kindred souls - and the
connections between them.  Sandri has great influence in the
Vatican and as a former nuncio to Venezuela his views on that
country carry particular weight.  But his formal competency is
the internal affairs of the Church.  The Ambassador will see
Gualtieri's boss, FM Lajolo, after the holidays to continue this
dialogue, as Lajolo has the lead on all questions of foreign
policy.
ROONEY

CONFIDENTIAL: VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT IGNORES USG OVERTURES ON AVIATION

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RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION
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RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F 1 D E N TIA L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000269
SIPDIS
HQ SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD TREASURY FOR MMALLOY COMMERCE FOR 4431/MAC/WH/JLAO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2019
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL ETRD EINV EAIR VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT IGNORES USG OVERTURES ON AVIATION
REF: 2008 CARACAS 647
CARACAS 00000269 001.2 OF 002 

Classified By: Economic Counselor Damall Steuart for reasons 1.4 (b)and(d). 

1. (C) SUMMARY: A Venezuelan private sector organization advocated strongly for the Venezuelan civil aviation
authority (INAC) to support the issuance of visas for F AA inspectors and to meet with the Embassy to discuss visa
matters. The Venezuelan govemment (GBRV) has not acceded to either request. While five intemational airlines recent1y
received a disbursement of dollars from Venezuelan exchange control agency (CADIVI), no US carriers were inc1uded.
Charge Caulfield's request to meet with CAD IVI to discuss US company requests for dollars has also gone unanswered. END SUMMARY.
LOCAL SUPPORT FOR THE USG HAS NOT BUDGED THE GBRV 

2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told Econoffs in January that
INAC wanted a solution to its US visa issues with an emphasis on obtaining visas for Venezuelan military pilots. On February 11, the AlDCM called
INAC and offered to discuss visa matters with INAC President
Jose Martinez. Although XXXXXXXXXXXX met with Martinez and encouraged him to meet with the AlDCM, INAC has yet to
respond to the Embassy's offer. 

3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX was also a strong proponent of an FAA visit. Two of Venezuela's three FAA-certified aircraft maintenance facilities have lost their certifications as F AA inspectors have been unable to obtain visas. The third
facility will lose its certification in June 2009. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that this situation is extremely detrimental for
Venezuelan businesses in the aviation sector, but that he and
his association members have been unsuccessful in convincing
the Venezuelan govemment to issue FAA visas. (Note: After
failing in their second attempt to obtain visas, F AA
inspectors withdrew their passports from the Venezuelan
Embassy in early February.) 

FOREIGN EXCHANGE PAIN 

4. (C) On February 10, the Charge requested a meeting with CADIVI to discuss the outstanding dollar requests by US businesses in all sectors. CAD IVI has not responded to the Charge's request to date. All three US carriers with
operations in Venezuela strongly support a meeting between
the Embassy and CAD IVI and would be willing to provide whatever documentation Post might need for their sector.
(Note: CADIVI is the agency that administers the GBRV's currency controls. To receive US dollars at the official
exchange rate for transactions such as dividend repatriation
and operating costs, a company must obtain CAD IVI approval. There are no reliable figures for how much money US companies as a whole have requested from CADIVI, but most believe the number is in the billions. See reftel for more information on CADIVI.) 

5. (C) On February 17, Econoffs met with XXXXXXXXXXXX
And XXXXXXXXXXXX. Both said they would encourage CAD IVI President Manuel Barroso to respond to the Embassy's request. However, neither was optimistic. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out that
the Vice President ofIATA had come to Venezuela twice for appointments with CADIVI but Barroso "stood him up" both times. 

6. (C) Three months ago when it became c1ear that Venezuela's
supply of dollars would dwindle, XXXXXXXXXXXX said,
Barroso started approving all dollar authorizations personally. The approvals are "completely arbitrary" according to XXXXXXXXXXXX who argued that Barroso is a military man and a "mini Chavez" who
"wants all the power in his own hands." XXXXXXXXXXXX said Barroso recent1y asked Chavez for another year as the head of CADIVI and Chavez agreed as Barroso used to be a member of Chavez' personal security detachment and remains his "good
friend." Nevertheless, XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that CADIVI was not discriminating against US airlines when it recent1y disbursed
dollars to five non-U S carriers. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that there are simply not enough dollars to go around. American Airlines,
the largest operator in the Venezuelan market, is awaiting
the most substantial dollar disbursement of any airline. 

COMMENT 

7. (C) While there is strong private sector support for increased bilateral cooperation on aviation issues, the GBRV
chooses not to respond to USG overtures. Sources in the sector report that sorne in INAC want to accept the Embassy's repeated offers to begin a dialogue on technical issues. However, INAC officials current1y answer direct1y to the Venezuelan Vice President who does not seem disposed to increasing cooperation with the USG. (A more detailed discussion of intemal INAC operations will follow septel.) US airlines, and indeed the intemational business community, are increasingly concemed with the difficulty in obtaining dollars from CAD IVI in part due to the rumored possibility that the GBRV may devalue in the near future. The GBRV unfortunately seems uninterested in their concems.
GENNA TIEMPO

SECRET: ITALY REQUESTS ASSISTANCE FOR ANTI-PIRACY

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRO #0433/01 1061348
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 161348Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1935
INFO RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0273
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T ROME 000433 

SIPDIS 

OSD FOR MAGGIE SADOWSKA
EUR/RPM FOR CHRIS DAVY AND PETER CHISHOLM
EUR/WE FOR CHRIS JESTER AND PAMELA SPRATLEN
AF/RSA FOR MIKE BITTRICK AND JUN BANDO 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2019
TAGS: MASS MARR EWWT KCRM PBTS PGOV PHSA PREL AORC

SUBJECT: PIRACY: ITALY REQUESTS ASSISTANCE FOR ANTI-PIRACY
OPERATION 

REF: WASLEY-JESTER-SADOWSKA EMAILS 4-15-09 

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Elizabeth Dibble for
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 

1. (S)  The Government of Italy sent U.S. Embassy Rome an
unclassified Note Verbale on April 16 thanking the USG for
assistance provided thus far in the deployment of Italian
Special Forces to Djibouti for possible use in an anti-piracy
mission and requesting continuing assistance as needed.  The
note, sent in unclassified channels to speed up the process,
was generated in response to our requirement that any further
USG assistance in support of the Italian anti-piracy mission
be requested via Diplomatic Note. 

2. (S) Background: The Italian-owned and flagged tugboat
Buccaneer was taken by pirates in the Gulf of Aden on April
11.  The ship has 16 crew members on board: 10 Italian, 5
Romanian, and 1 Croatian, and is currently about one nautical
mile from the coast of Somalia.  The Italian military has
requested permission from the Government of Djibouti and
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) to use
Camp Lemonier in Djibouti as a logistical staging area in
preparation for a possible rescue mission.  The GOI assures
us that it has obtained all the necessary landing permits
from the Government of Djibouti.  It has already landed one
aircraft in Djibouti with approximately 29 logistical support
staff, currently housed at Camp Lemonier, to prepare for the
staging.  The mission, if it happens, will not/not be
launched from Djiboutian soil, and the GOI is currently
considering other options that do not entail a rescue
mission.  Italy may use its Frigate MAESTRALE, currently
deployed to the region as part of EU operation ATALANTA, and
which is currently shadowing the pirates, to launch the
operation, or may make use of other vessels.  Italy may
request helicopter, intel, and other logistical support from
the U.S. as the need arises, but currently its request is
limited to logistical support to house units at Camp
Lemonier. 

3. (S) Post has stressed to the GOI the need to provide as
many details as possible about the potential operation in a
timely manner, as well as the need to coordinate fully with
the Government of Djibouti.  The Defense Attache is in
contact with the Italian Military and Poloffs are in contact
with the MFA Operations Center as the situation evolves, and
will provide additional operational details as they become
available. 

4. (SBU) The translated text of the Note is as follows
(Italian original will be emailed to EUR/WE): 

BEGIN TEXT 

"Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

Rome, 4/16/2009
Prot. 0129432 

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Italy
presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States
of America and, in consideration of our shared efforts in the
fight against terrorism and piracy, has the honor to express
its full appreciation for the assistance provided to the
"Training Mission" sent to Djibouti. 

The sending of the mission, as well as the deployment of the
Italian Frigate "MAESTRALE," forms part of the efforts
undertaken by the Government of Italy in the struggle against
piracy. 

While noting that the Authorities of Djibouti have provided
the necessary visas and aircraft landing authorizations, the
Italian Government is particularly grateful to the Government
of the United States of America for having hosted this
mission at Camp Lemonier.  The Italian Government, in
addition, is grateful to the Government of the United States
of America henceforth for any further assistance that it
might provide in the future. 

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in expressing its full
gratitude for the collaboration, takes the opportunity to
extend to the Embassy of the United States of America
reassurances of its highest consideration."

END TEXT 

DIBBLE

TOP-SECRET: The Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev 1989

Washington, DC, July 31st – The National Security Archive publishes its fourth installment of the diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, the man who was behind some of the most momentous transformations in Soviet foreign policy at the end of the 1980s in his role as Mikhail Gorbachev’s main foreign policy aide.  In addition to his contributions to perestroika and new thinking, Anatoly Sergeevich was and remains a paragon of openness and transparency, providing his diaries and notes to historians who are trying to understand the end of the Cold War.  This section of the diary, covering 1989—the year of miracles—is published here in English for the first time.

After the “turning point year,” 1988, the Soviet reformers around Gorbachev expected fast progress on all fronts—domestically in implementation of the results of the XIX party conference and further democratization of the Soviet system, and internationally following the groundbreaking UN speech of December 1988, especially in the sphere of nuclear arms control and in integrating the Soviet Union into Europe.  However, those hopes were not realized, and the year brought quite unexpected challenges and outcomes.  By the end of the year, no new arms control agreements would be signed, but the Berlin Wall would fall, nationalist movements would start threatening the unity of the Soviet Union, and popular revolutions would sweepEastern Europewhile the Soviets stuck to their pledge not to use force.  By the end of 1989,Europewas transformed and the Cold War had ended.  Anatoly Chernyaev documented all those changes meticulously and reflected on their meaning in real time.

For Chernyaev, the year began with an argument over the final withdrawal of Soviet forces fromAfghanistan.  Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze tried to delay the full withdrawal of troops and to send an additional brigade to help the Afghan leader Najibullah repel attacks of Pakistani-supported mujahaddin and stabilize his government.  Chernyaev and Alexander Yakovlev actively opposed that course of action on the grounds that it would cost hundreds of lives of Soviet soldiers and undermine Soviet trustworthiness in the eyes of international partners.  The troops were withdrawn on schedule by February 15, 1989.

Domestically, the most important event was the first contested election to the Congress of People’s Deputies on March 26, 1989.  Chernyaev himself was elected as a Deputy, but expressed unease about being among the 100 candidates on the “guaranteed” party list.  His reflections on the electoral campaign and the results of the elections show his sincere belief that the Soviet system could be transformed by deepening the democratization and his concerns over the limitations and resistance by the conservative elements within the party.  The electoral campaign takes place at the time when the economic situation deteriorates quite significantly, leading to unprecedented discontent of the population and ultimately miners’ strikes in the summer.

An important theme of 1989 is the growing nationalism and the threat of possible breakup of theSoviet Union—“the nationalities bomb.”  On this issue, Chernyaev seems to understand the situation much better than Gorbachev, who until very late does not comprehend the fact that the Baltic states genuinely want to leave the Soviet Union, maybe up until the human chain of protesters forms on August 23, 1989.  Gorbachev believes that they could be kept in by negotiations and economic pressure.  The events inTbilision April 9, 1989, where the police killed 20 civilians trying to disperse nationalist rallies, should have been a wake-up call.  Chernyaev wonders if Gorbachev understands all the depth of the nationalities issue or if he is still under the influence of the Soviet official narrative of harmonious relations between ethnic groups under socialism.

The summer of 1989 brings the Solidarity victory in the Polish elections and the start of the Hungarian roundtable negotiations culminating in the first non-communist government in Eastern Europe inPolandand the Soviet acceptance of those events.  On the heels of the Polish and Hungarian breakthroughs comes the change of leadership inEast Germanyand the almost accidental yet fateful fall of the Berlin Wall.  In this case, just as on the issue of nationalism, Chernyaev shows a much better understanding of its true meaning than most other Soviet leaders.  In the fall of the Wall, he sees an end of an era, the true transformation of the international system, and a beginning of a new chapter in the European history.  The start of the process of German reunification and theMaltasummit signified the end of the Cold War.

However, for Chernyaev, his position notwithstanding, the year’s main concern was the domestic developments in theSoviet Union, and specifically the insufficient progress in radical economic and political reform.  A lot of entries deal with his disappointment in Gorbachev’s slow or ambivalent actions where he seems to be siding with conservatives, his inability to move more decisively even on the issues that he himself proclaimed, such as land reform.  Chernyaev’s main lament is that Gorbachev is losing time and political power as a result of his indecisiveness while the opposition is growing strong using “the Russian factor” and becoming more anti-Gorbachev and siding with Yeltsin more and more often in the Congress of People’s Deputies.

All through the tumultuous events of 1989, Anatoly Chernyaev remains at Gorbachev’s side, faithful to the ideas and the promise of the reform, but at the same time more and more critical at the weaknesses and inconsistencies of his boss and growing more dissatisfied by the emerging distance in their personal relationship.  The last entry of the year, for December 31, is written in the form of a letter to Gorbachev, expressing all his disappointments and worries about the fate of the reform.  The diary entries allow historians an opportunity to see the days of 1989 as they unfolded, through the eyes of a most perceptive and involved participant.

The Chernyaev Diary was translated by Anna Melyakova and edited by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

CONFIDENTIAL: ITALY: PIRATES RELEASE BUCCANEER CREW WITHOUT

VZCZCXRO4374
PP RUEHFL RUEHNP
DE RUEHRO #0944/01 2291429
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171429Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2536
INFO RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 0648
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0448
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0276
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 1594
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0193
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 0799
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 3753
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 0185
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 3961
RUEHFR/UNESCO PARIS FR PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3032
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 4853
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000944 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2019
TAGS: PREL PHSA SO IT

SUBJECT: ITALY: PIRATES RELEASE BUCCANEER CREW WITHOUT
RANSOM PAYMENT 

REF: ROME 00930 

Classified By: Charge d'affaires Elizabeth Dibble for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d). 

1. (C) Summary: On August 11, Poloff met with Massimiliano
D'Antuono, Deputy Head of the MFA Crisis Unit, to discuss the
details of the release of the MV Buccaneer crew which was
taken hostage by pirates off the coast of Somalia. A Somali
pirate is quoted in the press as saying that a four million
euro ransom had been paid.  This conflicts with Foreign
Minister Frattini's statement that "Strong political work
with local authorities as well as an Italian warship that was
standing by with Special Forces finally made the pirates
understand there was no other solution than to release the
ship."  D'Antuono affirmed that the hostage release was the
result of diplomatic, military and intelligence efforts.  He
asserted that the Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) of Somalia was instrumental in the
negotiations with the pirates because of his
family/clan/tribal links.  End summary. 

Background
- - - - - 

2. (C) On April 11, the deep water tugboat MV Buccaneer was
slowly towing two large barges at 4-5 knots in the Gulf of
Aden. Because it was moving too slowly to join a convoy, and
because its rear deck was designed to be low to the water
line, the crew of 10 Italians, 5 Romanians and 1 Croat was an
easy target for Somali pirates.  According to D'Antuono, a
couple of hours after the ship was commandeered, one crew
member was able to push a distress button calling for help.
The ship's owner received an email from the Buccaneer with
its location coordinates, but he correctly identified the
message as a ruse because ""the English used was better than
anything the crew was capable of.""  The pirates were able to
anchor the ship in a cove on the Somali coast.  After 2-3
weeks, the Italian Navy ship San Giorgio arrived in the
vicinity to take up a position approximately eight miles off
the shore.  Italian Special Forces, who arrived on the San
Giorgio, routinely positioned themselves and their small
boats in close proximity to the Buccaneer so that they could
react within 20-30 seconds to an assault by the pirates on
the hostages.  D'Antuono implied the pirates knew the Special
Forces had positioned themselves within striking distance
even if they were not able to visibly locate them. 

3. (C) The Crisis Unit worked under the direct supervision of
the "highest levels" of the MFA to negotiate the hostages'
release.  D'Antuono described a "three-pillar approach using
diplomatic, military and intelligence resources."  He
traveled to Somalia with Margherita Boniver, FM Frattini's
Special Envoy for Humanitarian Emergencies, to leverage
Italy's "special relationship" with Somalia and the GOI's
current support for the TFG.  Meetings with the TFG Prime
Minister Sharmarke served to exert pressure on the pirates by
virtue of family/clan/tribal relations.  Asked for specifics,
he demurred that "the Prime Minister was the one who made the
release happen." 

4. (C) D'Antuono emphasized that under Italian law, no ransom
could be paid to release the sailors.  He stated that the
owner of one of the barges offered to pay a ransom, but was
informed that proceeding with that course of action would
result in prosecution by the Italian courts.  In contrast to
the barge owner's interactions with the GOI, he described the
governments of Romania and Croatia, whose nationals were also
being held captive, as being completely supportive of the
GOI's lead role in the negotiations. 

5. (C) Without discussing details, D'Antuono stated that at a
certain point, the Special Forces from the San Giorgio were
cleared to board the Buccaneer after all of the pirates had
vacated the ship.  The Special Forces took control of the
ship and set sail with the crew to Djibouti.  After a medical
assessment in Djibouti, the crew flew to Italy where they
will brief the prosecutor's office in Rome responsible for
handling such cases for possible future action.  D'Antuono
believed the crew was treated reasonably well with the
exception of a "beating of one of the Romanians" by the
pirates.  He mentioned that, at least once, the crew was
taken ashore to offer relief from the cramped quarters of the
ship. 

6. (C) D'Antuono emphasized the GOI's aversion to resorting
to a military operation because of the negative Italian
public opinion that would likely follow any loss of life.  He
suggested that headlines describing fatherless children would
have been a public relations disaster for the GOI, especially
as the world focused its attention on Italy as the host of
the G8 Summit in June. 

Ransom Paid?
- - - - - - - 

7. (C) Andrew Mwangura, of the Mombasa-based East African
Seafarer's Assistance Programme was quoted in the press as
saying that the pirates received a four million euro ransom.
Sometimes described as an intermediary between pirates and
those who pay ransom, his role, if any, in the release of the
Buccaneer crew is not clear.  D'Antuono stated that the MFA
is "familiar with" Mwangura, but dismissed his claims of a
paid ransom as "a marketing technique."  He reasoned that
releasing a crew without receiving a ransom would set an
unprofitable precedent.  He assessed claims of having
received a ransom as a necessary strategy to protect the
economic value of the pirates' illicit activities. 

8. (SBU) In terms of what the GOI did offer the TFG, if not
the pirates, an MFA statement describes financial support in
2009 dedicated to ""Somali institutions and to the peace
process"" totaling 13 million euros.  Additional money has
been disbursed through the Italian Development Cooperation.
(see reftel) 

Comment
- - - - 

9. (C) The official line on the Buccaneer release is a
substantial but incomplete accounting of factors that brought
this situation to a peaceful conclusion.  Gaining the release
of the Italian vessel and hostages was a top priority, albeit
low profile effort, for the Italian government.  Prime
Minister Berlusconi himself reportedly made many of the early
critical decisions.  Italy, with U.S. assistance, moved
quickly to ensure that it had a full range of options
available to resolve the issue, including the strategic
positioning of elite forces ready to engage in an
extraction/rescue operation if necessary.  These efforts were
buttressed by Italy's re-energizing its relations with
Somalia and engaging in a high profile ""embrace"" of its
former colony.  In spite of Italy's slashed overseas budget,
it has dedicated significant development and humanitarian
assistance to the TFG and announced its commitment to re-open
an embassy in Mogadishu at the June 2009 International
Contact Group on Somalia meeting held in Rome.  A logical
quid pro quo for Italy's new engagement was TFG action to
resolve the hostage crisis.  Adamant denials that Italy paid
ransom, directly or otherwise, have been accompanied by
claims of ignorance of TFG initiatives to liberate the
hostages.  The GOI was acutely aware of the strong USG
opposition to the payment of ransom in this case and we
believe that resulted in Italy relying heavily on the TFG to
deliver its citizens.
DIBBLE

CONFIDENTIAL: BAHAMAS UNLIKELY TO PRESSURE ARISTIDE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NASSAU 000766 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF HA BF
SUBJECT: BAHAMAS UNLIKELY TO PRESSURE ARISTIDE 

Classified By: DCM Robert M. Witajewski, Reasons 1.5(b) and (d) 

Summary 

1.  (C) After returning from the OAS/CARICOM meeting on Haiti
in Miami, Foreign Minister Fred Mitchell dismissed the
possibility of invoking the democracy provision of the OAS
Charter in the case of Haiti.  He acknowledged problems with
democracy in Haiti, but made it clear that the Bahamian
government preferred continued engagement with President
Aristide to any type of public confrontation.  He also
announced a decision to provide $500,000 in economic
assistance to Haiti, while admitting that it would not do
much good if the political situation did not improve.
Mitchell's main concern is doing whatever he can to slow down
illegal immigration from Haiti - a key domestic political
imperative - and he has been fruitlessly pursuing an
immigration accord with the Government of Haiti for several
months.  A high official at the Foreign Ministry, although he
proclaimed himself "not competent" to comment on Haiti policy
(or much of anything else), confirmed that Haiti believes it
must stay engaged with the Aristide government to prevent a
mass migration.  End Summary. 

Democracy in Crisis... 

2.  (U) Upon his return from Miami, Foreign Minister Mitchell
discussed the situation there with the press.  He admitted
that the CARICOM Foreign Ministers were "frustrated with the
situation in Haiti, and said that Aristide had put the
international community "in a difficult position" by not
living up to his commitments.  He spoke frankly about Haiti's
failure to: select an appropriate police commissioner, arrest
an important fugitive involved in political violence, and
plan for elections.  While he placed some of the blame for
the lack of progress toward a political solution on the
opposition, he acknowledged the government's greater share of
blame and discussed the reasons why the opposition might feel
threatened and unwilling to make concessions. 

... But Need to Give Aristide Another Chance 

3.  (U) However, Mitchell went on to say that he thought it
was "likely that the deadline will be extended," and Aristide
should be given yet another chance to meet his commitments.
He pointed out that The Bahamas, in his opinion has no
choice: "We cannot afford to disengage from Haiti because
disengaging for us is not an option."  According to Mitchell,
the issue of Haitian migrants and the potential for mass
migration is the key issue for The Bahamas.  Such a mass
migration must be prevented at all costs, and Mitchell made
it clear that he believed the best way to do that was
continued engagement with the Aristide government in an
attempt to improve Haiti's political and economic situation. 

4.  (U) Mitchell was dismissive of the possibility of
invoking the democracy provisions of the OAS Charter, saying
that although "Some people argue that's the case in Haiti ...
I think that is taking it a little bit too far."  He
described the U.S. position on Haiti as "hard-minded", and
called for continued dialogue.  Mitchell also announced a
$500,000 economic assistance package for Haiti.  In
announcing it, he acknowledged that the assistance would
likely not do much good unless the political impasse were
resolved.  Mitchell defended the package, however, by
reiterating that the Government of the Bahamas must do
whatever it can to improve the economic situation in Haiti
because of the impact The Bahamas would likely feel if
further economic and political crisis resulted in a mass
migration.  He made it very clear that this is the paramount
issue for The Bahamas. 

Who Is Competent Then? 

5.  (C) DCM and POL/ECON section chief raised the issue of
Haiti with Ministry of Foreign Affairs Undersecretary for
Political Affairs Marco Rolle in an April 15 meeting
requested by Rolle to go over the list of pending items
between the Embassy and the MFA.  Rolle, despite being the
number three official at the Ministry of Embassy (he is the
Bahamian equivalent of Undersecretary Grossman) and having
accompanied Mitchell to both Miami and the press conference,
told us that he "was not competent" to talk about Haiti
policy with us.  He couldn't even confirm any details about
the aid package the Minister had announced in his presence.
Nor could he comment on progress made toward an immigration
accord with Haiti or the upcoming visit by Mitchell to Haiti
in late March beyond confirming the dates (May 22-23).  The
one specific response we received to a question was whether
or not Foreign Minister Fred Mitchell planned to make any
trips or telephone calls to Haitian counterparts prior to the
April 30 OAS meeting in Washington.  The answer is: No. 

Consistently Not Competent 

6.  (C) Inability to provide specific responses to queries
was a consistent theme of our conversation with Rolle.  Of
the fifteen pending items on our agenda, he was unable to
comment meaningfully on any single one of them, and could not
point to MFA progress in resolving any of the issues which
have been pending anywhere from 2-3 weeks (dip notes
regarding a trade dispute, RBDF training and a proposal to
form an anti-alien-smuggling task force) to 6 years (request
for a bilateral work agreement).  Rolle, a career civil
servant with no background in foreign affairs, has only been
with the ministry for about seven months, so it can be
understood that he might not be familiar with every issue,
but we would think he could do better than 0 for 15.  The
Bahamian civil service has honed sloth and delay disguised as
deliberation and consensus-building to a fine art.
Comment 

7.   (C) We believe the bottom line for The Bahamas on Haiti
is their fear of mass migration and doing anything that might
trigger an outflow.  Mitchell in particular has made
conclusion of an immigration agreement his top foreign policy
priority.  Our sources in the Immigration Department tell us
the negotiations are not going well, stalled over Haitian
insistence on an amnesty for the 30,000 - 100,000 Haitians
already in The Bahamas (most illegally).  Such a concession
would be suicide for Mitchell in the xenophobic Bahamian
political landscape.  Pursuit of this agreement and any other
means to slow down migration will continue to push any
concerns for democracy and human rights into the backseat.
While The Bahamas will remain engaged on Haiti, the Christie
government will resist any effort to put real teeth into any
diplomatic effort to pressure President Aristide, preferring
(endless) conversation and dialogue to the alternative. 

BLANKENSHIP

CONFIDENTIAL: HAITIAN AMBASSADOR TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC RESIGNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANTO DOMINGO 007536 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR WHA/CAR, DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USOAS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR DR HA
SUBJECT: HAITIAN AMBASSADOR TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC RESIGNS:
ANOTHER BLOW TO ARISTIDE 

REF: A. PORT AU PRINCE 2540
     B. SANTO DOMINGO 4930 

Classified By: ACTING DCM MARY B. MARSHALL FOR REASONS 1.5 B/D 

SUMMARY 

1. (C) On December 18 the Haitian Ambassador to the Dominican
Republic Guy Alexandre called on the Ambassador and Acting
DCM to confirm his resignation.  The sudden news (prompted by
the violent December 5 crackdown on student demonstrators in
Haiti) was widely covered December 16 while Ambassador
Alexandre was out of the country visiting his wife in Puerto
Rico.  Ambassdor Alexandre's resignation is due to what he
described as "incompatible principles" with Arisitide's
government.  Composed but staunch in his resolve, Alexandre
assured the Ambassador that he has no plans to seek asylum in
the United States for now.  Requesting asylum, he explained,
would "further complicate Dominican-Haitian bilateral
relations" and would not be in his nor Haiti's best
interests.  Instead, Alexandre said he would seek residency
in the Dominican Republic and teach at a university.  End
Summary. 

ALEXANDRE RESIGNS AS AMBASSADOR TO THE DR 

2. (C) Ambassador Guy Alexandre met with the Ambassador and
Acting DCM on December 18 to discuss his recent resignation.
He said that he had planned to leave his post in January 2004
after Haiti's independence bicentennial celebrations, which
would have also marked two years in his assignment.  However,
he could not ignore the recent violence against students in
Haiti because of his strong links to the academic community
there.  According to Alexandre, police officers broke both
knees of one of his friends, a vice-rector at a university
(Ref A).  The December 5 violence, he lamented, "produced an
irrevocable situation that cannot be easily fixed,"
following months of extreme polarization and resulting chaos. 

3. (C) According to Ambassador Alexandre's contacts in Haiti,
there are daily protests or preemptive crackdowns by police
on potential protests.  He warned of an upsurge in armed
civilians looking for trouble.  Alexandre expressed his
concern that the environment in Haiti is ripe for
confrontation, which might subside briefly during Christmas
but is sure to resume in January.  He commented that Haiti
has minimal capacity to maintain order and that "none of the
Haitian politicians realize that the country is a ticking
time bomb." 

REMOVE ARISTIDE...THEN WHAT? 

4. (C) Ambassador Alexandre criticized opposition groups'
preoccupation with forcing Aristide's departure without
considering the consequences.  He emphasized that Aristide's
exit will not solve Haiti's socio-economic problems.
Alexandre also criticized his countrymen for their focus on
grabbing power rather than tackling the difficult problems of
health, education and infrastructure.  The Ambassador asked
Alexandre whether there are clandestine movements in the
Dominican Republic working to overthrow Aristide, to which
Alexandre responded that he does not know of any such
activity.  He acknowledged that some disgruntled former
Haitian military officers reside in the Dominican Republic,
but said most of the pressure on Aristide originates in
Haiti.  He recalled the 1991-94 period when many Haitians
fled the country, but claimed there was no no mass migration.
 During that time Alexandre personally assisted 30 Haitians,
including a former Army chief. 

DOMINICAN-HAITIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS 

5. (C) Less than three weeks before his resignation,
Ambassador Alexandre met with the Ambassador on December 1 to
discuss concerns about Dominican-Haitian bilateral relations.
 He was disturbed about the GODR's apparent nonchalant
investigations regarding the Haitian bodies discovered along
the border in September (Ref B).  Alexandre also said the
GODR is not doing enough to document Haitians.  He complained
that the GODR often uses Article 11 of the Dominican
Constitution (providing that anyone born on Dominican soil is
Dominican except offspring of diplomats or foreigners in
transit) to deny citizenship to Haitians for being
"foreigners in transit."  Ambassador Alexandre also blamed
the failure of the 2001 OAS initiative on a lack of OAS
impartiality (Note: This argument was reiterated at the
follow-up meeting on December 18.  End note). 

ALEXANDRE'S ONWARD PLANS 

6. (C) Alexandre said he currently plans to reside in the
Dominican Republic, not flee to the United States.  He was
traveling to Puerto Rico when his resignation hit the press
and returned quickly thereafter.  He emphasized his desire to
get involved in academia and denied having strong ties to
successful Haitian expats in the United States.  Alexandre
did ask the Acting DCM (Consul General) that his B1/B2
nonimmigrant visa be transferred to his tourist passport.
Alexandre said the GOH had not yet accepted his resignation.
He claimed to have no interest in politics because he "knows
too well what Haiti needs."
HERTELL

CONFIDENTIAL: ANXIOUS PRIME MINISTER REQUESTS MEETING ON HAITI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NASSAU 000364 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL SMIG BF HA
SUBJECT: ANXIOUS PRIME MINISTER REQUESTS MEETING ON HAITI 

REF: A) NASSAU 211 B) NASSAU 212 C) NASSAU 263 D)
     NASSAU 322 

Classified By: CHARGE ROBERT M. WITAJEWSKI FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 

- - - -
Summary
- - - - 

1  (C)  At a special luncheon function to honor Junior
Achievement on February 19, Prime Minister Christie twice
came to the Charge's table to request an "urgent" meeting the
morning of February 20, later set for 12:30 in the PM's
office.  As events in Haiti continue to deteriorate, the
sense of vulnerability by the Government of the Commonwealth
of The Bahamas (GCOB) at being overwhelmed by mass Haitian
migration continues to grow.  In this light, both the PM and
Foreign Minister Fred Mitchell have exerted considerable time
and energy in recent weeks to mediate peace talks between
President Aristide and the opposition (reported reftels A, B
and C).  Increasing deterioration in conditions in Haiti are
also reinforcing the Bahamian Government's sense of
dependence on the United States in the event uncontrolled
Haitian migrant outflows occur.  At the 60 minute meeting on
February 20 in his private office, PM Christie updated Charge
on recent developments on Haiti from his Government's
perspective.
END SUMMARY 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -
FOREIGN MINISTER BRIEFS THE UN
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - 

2. (C)  Christie initiated the discussion with a report on
Foreign Minister Mitchell's just-concluded presentation at
the United Nations General Assembly that morning.  The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs later faxed the Embassy a copy of
Mitchell's speech, which focused on the CARICOM proposal,
including a constitutional role for a Prime Minister, rules
governing protests and demonstrations by the opposition, the
professionalization of the Haitian National Police, and
additional security and economic support.  FM Mitchell also
called for the international community to "provide immediate
security assistance to bring stability to Haiti, including
helping the legitimate authority of Haiti to restore law and
order and disarm the elements that now seek to violently
overthrow the government, and who have interrupted
humanitarian assistance."  Mitchell continued using -- for
him -- unusually strong language: "Those armed gangs who seek
now to overthrow the constitutional order should be urged to
lay down their arms and if not they should be disarmed." 

3. (C)  Christie related to Charge that in New York Mitchell
had sought out and obtained additional support, particularly
from Central and South American countries, for the CARICOM
approach.  Christie was particularly proud that Bahamian
efforts had resulted in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Argentina
agreeing to send police or military to Haiti as he observed,
wryly, that these three countries did not normally agree with
the U.S. of late.  Christie also announced that FM Mitchell
and Assistant Secretary Roger Noriega would fly to Haiti
Saturday to continue to work all sides of the issue.
Christie spoke authoritatively about conversations between FM
Mitchell and A/S. Noriega and between Mitchell and NSC
Western Hemisphere Director Tom Shannon. He also indicated
that he had been in contact with members of the U.S.
Congressional Black Caucus to allay their "deep concerns"
about the "good faith" of the U.S. and others in seeking a
resolution to Haiti's crisis. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
A RELUCTANT ROLE IN HAITI FOR MITCHELL?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

4. (C)  The Prime Minister described his week of frantic
conference calls on the Haitian crisis and a U.S. preference
for the Bahamian Foreign Minister to play a new, and
significant on-going role in Haiti as the third member in a
tripartite committee that, Christie seemed to believe would
effectively serve as a kind of "Council of Wise Men" in
governing the country.  Christie said that as he understood
current plans, the council would be composed of three
members: a representative from the Haitian Opposition, an
independent Haitian Prime Minister, and Bahamian FM Mitchell
representing Caricom and others.  According to the Prime
Minister, however, President Aristide had expressed
reservations about the constitutionality of formally creating
such a body.  However, Christie continued, he believed from
his conversations with him that President Aristide would
accept an arrangement in which the same group would
"informally" advise him on matters. 

5. (C)  Continuing his exposition, Christie then went on to
say that his preferred solution would be for the United
States or the French to assume the leadership of this body
and supply the "third member" rather than The Bahamas. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - -
PRIME MINISTER WORKS THE PHONES IN NASSAU -- DEFERS TO U.S.
AS "TOP DOG"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - 

6. (C)  The Bahamian Prime Minister appeared comfortable in
his newly-assumed role of international mediator. He noted
that he had spoken "at least a dozen times" with Haitian
President Aristide of late, and this week alone reported that
he had spoken with the Haitian President at least once each
day.  Explaining his frequent telephone conversations, PM
Christie declared that, given the urgency of the situation,
he did not want to risk having his message diluted or
distorted "by leaving (the resolution of the crisis) to
ambassadors." 

7. (C)  Noting that President Aristide had claimed that
"bandits" were responsible for attacking the Opposition, not
government forces, PM Christie said that each time he spoke
with Aristide he had stressed the importance of Aristide
appealing directly to the U.S., France, or Canada for
assistance in re-equipping Haitian police so that law and
order could be restored.  Christie indicated some sympathy
for Aristide's claimed plight, telling Charge that "there is
simply no way that a demoralized police force of less than
5,000 can maintain law in order in a country of more than 7
million."  Christie seemed hopeful that the U.S. would
reconsider its position against supplying the Haitian police
with lethal weapons, and at a minimum do more to support the
Haitian police with non-lethal support. 

8. (C)  Christie indicated his preference for continued
direct high-level involvement in Haiti.  He felt that it was
important that he and others at the head of state level
continue to involve themselves in the situation and interact
directly with Aristide in order to reinforce the urgency of
the situation. Christie said that it had been his idea to
contact South African President Thabo Mbeki to try to involve
him in Haiti.  It would be appropriate, he said, for the
world's "newest black nation" to help the world's "oldest
black nation."   At regular intervals during the one-hour
meeting, Christie reiterated the pleas for assistance to
restore law and order in Haiti made by himself and others to
Secretary Powell, President Bush, Secretary General Annan,
and the O.A.S. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SYMPATHIZES WITH ARISTIDE'S CONCERNS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

9. (C)  Christie stressed his agreement with his Foreign
Minister that the best resolution would be an agreement that
conferred some "dignity" to Aristide.  Christie specifically
sympathized with Aristide's complaint that he (Aristide) was
being asked to take unconstitutional actions.  The Bahamian
Prime Minister indicated that based on his conversations with
Aristide, he believed that Aristide was not opposed to
working with the opposition on the joint appointment  of a
new Prime Minister and subsequently a new cabinet, but is
objecting to being left out of the process or becoming a
figurehead for the remainder of his term in office.  Christie
also made clear his position that President Aristide is
Haiti's legitimately elected constitutional leader.  But
Christie then coupled this principled stand with an
evaluation of the state of the Haitian opposition from his
position as a practicing politician.  "Even with a year to
organize," he said, "the opposition will not match Aristide's
level of support, and would lose if Aristide decided to run
again, which he will not." 

10. (C)  In this vein, Christie volunteered what he thought
might be the outcome of the February 21 talks in Port au
Prince, Christie said that he assumed that the United States
had the power to achieve a solution.  Christie said that he
was confident that A/S Noriega "had the clout" to bring
Haitian Opposition leader Apaid around, and that once Apaid
signed on to an agreement, the rest of the Opposition "would
follow" in permitting President Aristide to serve his term
out since they couldn't organize themselves to win an
election now. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
TURNING TO THE U.S. IN EVENT OF AN OUTFLOW FROM HAITI
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

11. (C)  Turning from the crisis in Haiti to the consequences
for The Bahamas if that country's political instability
results in a migrant outflow, PM Perry Christie went on at
great length to reiterate his determination to build a deep
water port at Great Inagua that would serve as his country's
strategic southern base.  As he lamented: "The Haitian
problem isn't going to go away for years to come."  Given
this reality, he was convinced that the Royal Bahamian
Defence Force (RBDF) will always need to patrol the country's
vast southern waters.  Moreover, he continued, the drug
problem will always be there, and The Bahamas faces a
consistent problem of fish poaching in by neighboring
countries.  According to Christie, "Last year the Dominican
Republic exported $2 million in conch, and their ain't no
conch in Dominican waters!"  Clearly, he declared, it is in
the best interests of The Bahamas to have a deep water port
and refueling station at its southern tip.  Christie
reiterated the common interests of the United States in
having access to a similarly-situated facility and again
asked for the Charge's help in obtaining U.S. funding for
construction of a harbor and breakwater at Great Inagua. 

12. (C)  Charge responded that the U.S. would like to support
the Bahamian plan, but that it had been extremely difficult
to get RBDF and National Security officials to go beyond
global declarations and obtain specific plans regarding GCOB
intentions on Great Inagua.  Given budgetary constraints in
the United States, Charge explained that until specific plans
were forthcoming, backed up by a GCOB actually committing its
own funds, U.S. agencies would be reluctant to even consider
blocking off possible funding.  Noting that the U.S. was
already looking at FY 06 budgets, Charge urged the Prime
Minister to accelerate internal GCOB decision-making on Great
Inagua.  The Prime Minister agreed, indicating that his
government is willing to work out the details immediately. 

13. (C)  In addition to construction of a southern strategic
base in Great Inagua, the Prime Minister also revealed that
he was in negotiations to conclude an agreement with Royal
Caribbean Cruise Line to build a deep water port at Great
Inagua.  Though the island is currently barren, it is home to
more than 50,000 pink flamingos, a huge Morton Salt plant,
and at least one nice beach.  He was hoping that the flamingo
national park would provide cruise ship passengers with an
interesting diversion to the normal Caribbean port of call.
Christie took on board Charge's suggestion that costs of
constructing a base on Great Inagua could effectively be
reduced if any Royal Caribbean construction were to be made
part of the GCOB's plans. 

- - - - -
NO ASYLUM
- - - - - 

14. (C)  Regarding what The Bahamas would do in the event
that large numbers of Haitians started appearing on Bahamian
territory, the Prime Minister indicated that he would turn to
the United States to effect repatriation.  The Bahamas, he
said, simply had no capacity to maintain large numbers of
migrants for any period of time.  Declaring that he had no
concert with "those liberals" on this issue, he declared that
there would never be asylum in The Bahamas for Haitians.  The
total population of The Bahamas was, he said, "less than that
of a small town in the United States.  We simply cannot do
what Amnesty International and other groups would insist on
us." 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
OPERATION COMPASSION HAS A NEW RELEVANCE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

15. (C)  Christie was surprisingly well versed on the
proposed latest iteration of Operation Compassion, a joint
patrolling exercise that involves enhanced communication and
coordination between the RBDF and the U.S. Coast Guard.  PM
Christie reported that the Cabinet had discussed
participation in "Op Compassion" the previous day and had
approved Bahamian involvement.  As the Haitian crisis has
evolved, the GCOB has deliberately taken steps in its public
comments to publicize an increased RBDF presence in southern
Bahamian waters.  Charge indicated that we believed that the
USCG would be prepared to engage in planning discussions for
this iteration of Op Compassion as early as March 3-4. 

16. (C)  However, as Ref D reports, only four of the eight
RBDF vessels capable of long range patrolling are
operational.  Charge queried the Prime Minister on the return
to service date of the HMBS Bahamas noting that effective
Bahamian participation in this six-month extended "Op
Compassion" required that there be at least three functioning
RBDF vessels (the HMBS Bahamas, Nassau, and Yellow Elder) so
that one would be on station 24/7 throughout the exercise.
Similarly, Charge noted that the logistics of keeping a
Bahamian vessel on site 24/7 also presumed that the RBDF
vessels would re-fuel and re-provision at Guantanamo Naval
Base rather than make extended return trips to its home port
of Coral Harbour in New Providence.  Finally,  Charge noted
that we would need assurances of the commitment and
cooperation of RBDF Commodore Rolle to commit the necessary
assets to the operation.  PM Christie responded that the
repairs have started and completing them is a government
priority.  He also acknowledged Commodore Rolle's reluctance
to commit the necessary assets by explaining that Rolle
claims he needs to keep some ships in reserve in the event of
other problems in other areas of the country.  The Prime
Minister said that he overrode the Commodore's objections by
asking him rhetorically, "What other crisis could impact on
The Bahamas right now that is more critical than preventing a
migrant outflow from Haiti?" 

17. (C)  Closing this part of the discussion,  the Prime
Minister also urged the U.S. to simplify matters by providing
fuel to RBDF vessels at no cost, as the relative costs are a
mere "drop in the bucket" for the U.S.  As Charge responded
that refueling costs to the GCOB would probably be much lower
at Guantanamo than in Nassau, the Prime Minister jokingly
accused Charge of "trying to nickel and dime me!" while
thanking him for not yet pressuring him for an Article 98
agreement in the meeting. 

- - - -
COMMENT
- - - - 

18.  (C)  The fact that the over-programmed Prime Minister
would budget more than one hour for a meeting on one day's
notice speaks to the overriding importance Haiti has in local
politics.  PM Christie is clearly committed to remaining
engaged on finding a solution to the Haitian problem, and
accepts that this is currently the dominating project of his
Foreign Minister, who is also the Minister of Public Service.
 While his decision-making style may be protracted and
indecisive, Bahamian Prime Minister Perry Christie is also an
impressive, dynamic, charismatic  and ebullient presence and
an indefatigable seeker of consensus.  For the purpose of
promoting peace in Haiti, his personality compliments that of
Foreign Minister Mitchell, which is steadier, stealthier, and
more methodical.  Given The Bahamas' proximity to Haiti, both
feel The Bahamas has no choice except engagement.
WITAJEWSKI

CONFIDENTIAL: BAHAMAS GOVERNMENT SEEKS SUPPORT FOR FUTURE UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NASSAU 000384 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2014
TAGS: BF HA PGOV PREL SMIG
SUBJECT: BAHAMAS GOVERNMENT SEEKS SUPPORT FOR FUTURE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON HAITI 

REF: A) NASSAU 211 B) NASSAU 212 C) NASSAU 263 D)
     NASSAU 322 E) NASSAU 364 

Classified By: Charge Abdelnour Zaiback for reasons 1.5 (B) and 1.5 (D) 

- - - -
SUMMARY
- - - - 

1) (C) On February 24, Acting Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Permanent Secretary Marilyn Zonicle separately demarched each
UN Security Council member with representation in The Bahamas
for support for a possible UN Security Council meeting on
Haiti that may be requested by Jamaica Prime Minister
Patterson as early as Thursday.  The original plan was to
request the Security Council to meet on February 25 on Haiti,
however, President Aristide asked that the meeting be
deferred for 24 hours while he pursued the ongoing
negotiations.  For its part, The Bahamas seeks the active
support of the U.S. as the "most important" member of the
Security Council as it engages on a full scale diplomatic
press to achieve peace in Haiti.  If diplomacy fails, The
Bahamas believes that military assistance will be essential,
and is willing to contribute troops to a multinational effort
to maintain law and order.  END SUMMARY 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
FOREIGN MINISTER MITCHELL ON STAND BY TO NEW YORK
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

2) (C) Anticipating that Prime Minister Patterson would make
the request for the Security Council to hold a special
session on Haiti tomorrow, FM Mitchell had already packed his
bags and made plans to fly to New York tonight.  Patterson
and CARICOM delayed making the request for the session only
because Aristide convinced them that the opposition and
rebels could still agree to CARICOM's peace plan.  However,
as the situation on the ground in Haiti continues to
deteriorate, Zonicle anticipates that Mitchell will fly to
New York tomorrow for a requested Security Council special
session on Thursday. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SIX TALKING POINTS FOR PROJECTED SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

3) (C) Follows are the six talking points presented to Charge. 

i) (C) Pending the outcome of the OAS/CARICOM-sponsored
negotiations between the Government and the Opposition in
Haiti, the CARICOM countries may request the convening of an
emergency meeting of the Security Council to address the
matter, considering the deteriorating situation in that
country and the inability of the Haitian National Police
(HNP) to deal with the insurgency. 

ii) (C) An open debate in the Security Council would allow it
to pronounce on the matter and would provide Haiti with the
opportunity to request military/police assistance,  and,
perhaps, increased humanitarian assistance, as may be
necessary.  Haiti is reluctant to take the matter to the
Security Council before the current political negotiations
have been exhausted and wishes to avoid the matter being
dealt with on "parallel tracks" by OAS/CARICOM and the UN. 

iii) (C) While France has indicated a willingness to send
military assistance to Haiti, the specter of French troops in
Haiti at this time is a very sensitive issue, particularly as
France is the former colonizer and Haiti is currently
"celebrating" the 200th anniversary of discarding that yoke.
A joint dispatch under the UN banner would be more palatable. 

iv) (C) With the United Nations, CARICOM Ambassadors are
seeking the support of the Group of Latin America and the
Caribbean (GRULAC) for the initiative and a meeting of the
GRULAC to discuss the matter is being convened Wednesday
afternoon.  Brazil and Chile, the two members of GRULAC on
the Security Council have indicated their support for the
initiative.  Other member of the GRULAC that have voiced
strong support are Mexico and Venezuela. 

v) (C) Beyond the GRULAC, CARICOM Ambassadors are in touch
with Canada and France, as well as with President of the GA,
Ambassador Colin Granderson of the CARICOM Secretariat, and
the other Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs in
seeking to garner support for the initiative and move it
forward, as appropriate. 

vi) (C) It has been said, although not officially announced
that, Ambassador Reggie Dumas, of Trinidad and Tobago, has
been appointed as the Special Advisor on Haiti by the UN
Secretary-general.  Perhaps, the stigma of a direct request
from Haitian authorities for military assistance could be
alleviated by having the request channeled through the
Special Advisor. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BAHAMAS VIEW ON OUTSIDE INTERVENTION CLARIFIED
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

4) (C) Charge and Political Chief sought clarification on
Mitchell's vision for outside intervention.  In recent days
Mitchell has made several statements that international
support for Haiti's police was crucial, including "to disarm
the rebels if they did not disarm themselves."  Zonicle
relayed that the first priority of The Bahamas is the
principles in the CARICOM proposal, most notably reinforcing
the ability of the Haitian police to maintain law and order.
However, if this fails, Zonicle reiterated Mitchell's oft
stated plea of late, that "law and order must be restored."
Zonicle volunteered that The Bahamas was prepared to
contribute troops, "perhaps as many as 100."  While the
preferred mechanism is the United Nations, Zonicle confirmed
Mitchell's view that any outside intervention would be
preferable to continued and increased chaos. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BAHAMIAN AMBASSADOR TO CARICOM SEEKS INSIGHTS ON RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN OPPOSITION AND REBELS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

5) (C) Ambassador to CARICOM Leonard Archer sought Charge's
insight on the relationship between the rebels and the
opposition, but in the exchange of views it became clear that
all sides knew about the same.  Several rebel leaders have
connections with the former military.  While the opposition
may currently feel that they are the beneficiaries of rebel
activity, they may soon learn that "the enemy of my enemy is
not always my friend."  Archer is an experienced diplomat who
has studied Haiti at length. 

- - - -
COMMENT
- - - - 

6) (C) As reported reftels, The Bahamas is seized on the
Haitian crisis.  It is certainly Foreign Minister Mitchell's
dominant preoccupation.  It is also clear that The Bahamas
regards U.S. leadership and engagement on Haiti as crucial to
any peaceful outcome.  As has also become increasingly
explicit in Mitchell's recent statements, while The Bahamas
and CARICOM lobby for peace, they have concluded that a
peaceful outcome without international intervention is
increasingly unlikely.
WITAJEWSKI

HOLY SEE COMMITTED TO STABILITY FOR HAITI

UNCLAS VATICAN 000882 

SIPDIS 

SENSITIVE 

DEPT FOR EUR/WE (LEVIN); WHA/CAR 

E.O. 12958 N/A
TAGS: PREL PHUM HA VT
SUBJECT: HOLY SEE COMMITTED TO STABILITY FOR HAITI 

-------
SUMMARY
------- 

1.  (SBU) FOLLOWING ARISTIDE'S RESIGNATION AND DEPARTURE
FROM HAITI, THE HOLY SEE TOLD US THAT THE HAITIAN BISHOPS
    WERE READY TO WORK ACTIVELY WITH A PROVISIONAL
ADMINISTRATION TO HELP ENSURE A PEACEFUL TRANSITION OF
POWER.  THE SECRETARIAT OF STATE IS IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH
THE HAITIAN BISHOPS AND PAPAL NUNCIO IN PORT-AU-PRINCE, AND
HAS URGED THEM TO EXERT A CALMING INFLUENCE ON THE
POPULACE.  END SUMMARY. 

-----------------------------------------
BISHOPS READY TO WORK WITH NEW GOVERNMENT
----------------------------------------- 

2. (SBU) THE HOLY SEE'S DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER PIETRO
PAROLIN TOLD THE DCM MARCH 4 THAT THE HAITIAN BISHOPS AND
THE VATICAN NUNCIO WERE READY TO WORK WITH A NEW
TRANSITIONAL HAITIAN ADMINISTRATION TO ENSURE A PEACEFUL
RESTORATION OF ORDER.  PAROLIN SAID THE PAPAL NUNCIO TO
HAITI HAD BEEN IN ROME DURING THE HEIGHT OF THE CRISIS BUT
HAD NOW RETURNED TO PORT-AU-PRINCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
HELP FACILITATE THE TRANSITION AND WORK WITH THE BISHOPS TO
ENCOURAGE CALM AND PATIENCE AMONG THE HAITIAN PEOPLE.  THE
DFM EXPRESSED INTEREST IN LATEST DEVELOPMENTS ON THE
GROUND, AND ASKED ABOUT THE NEWS REPORTS ABOUT ARISTIDE'S
CLAIMS OF BEING FORCED TO RESIGN, WHICH DCM EMPHASIZED HAD
NO BASIS IN FACT.  PAROLIN VOICED NO REGRET AT ARISTIDE'S
DEPARTURE, NOTING THAT THE FORMER PRIEST HAD BEEN AN ACTIVE
PROPONENT OF VOODOO. 

-------------------------
IT WAS TIME FOR HIM TO GO
------------------------- 

    3.  (SBU) EVEN BEFORE ARISTIDE'S DEPARTURE, POPE JOHN PAUL
II HAD APPEALED TO HAITIANS "TO MAKE THE COURAGEOUS
DECISIONS THEIR COUNTRY REQUIRED," AND HAD URGED THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND AID ORGANIZATIONS TO DO WHAT
THEY COULD TO AVERT A GREATER CRISIS.  THIS WAS SEEN AS A
VEILED REFERENCE TO ARISTIDE'S LEAVING POWER.  SINCE
FEBRUARY 29, THE VATICAN HAS HAD NO OFFICIAL PUBLIC COMMENT
ON ARISTIDE'S RESIGNATION; HOWEVER, THE VATICAN'S CARIBBEAN
AFFAIRS DIRECTOR MONSIGNOR GIORGIO LINGUA SAID THAT THE
HOLY SEE SAW NO OTHER WAY OUT OF THE CRISIS AND THOUGHT THE
FORMER PRIEST HAD TO GO.  LINGUA SAID MARCH 3 THAT IT WAS
IMPORTANT THAT AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE QUICKLY RESTORE ORDER
IN HAITI SO THAT A PEACEFUL GOVERNMENTAL TRANSITION COULD
TAKE PLACE.  HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT A POLITICAL SOLUTION
SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED FROM OUTSIDE.  LINGUA SAID HE SAW
SEVERAL HOPEFUL SIGNS THAT THE TRANSITION COULD OCCUR
WITHOUT A BLOOD BATH, POINTING OUT THAT REBEL LEADER GUY
PHILIPPE SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN CONVINCED TO STAND DOWN AND
ESCHEW POLITICAL POWER IN LINE WITH HIS INITIAL PROMISE
THAT HIS SOLDIERS WOULD COOPERATE WITH INTERNATIONAL
FORCES. 

-----------------------
CATHOLIC RELIEF AT RISK
----------------------- 

4.  (U) ROME-BASED MEDIA HAVE REPORTED THAT CATHOLIC CHURCH
RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING U.S.-BASED CATHOLIC RELIEF
SERVICES (CRS) HAVE SUFFERED CONSIDERABLE LOSSES OF FOOD
STOCKS AND VEHICLES BECAUSE OF LOOTING -- WHICH CRS
OFFICIALS REPORT IS CONTINUING.  DFM PAROLIN NOTED THAT THE
    HOLY SEE WOULD APPRECIATE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT TO RESTART
THE RELIEF PIPELINES AND GET THE NEEDED FOOD AND SUPPLIES
OUT TO THE PEOPLE IN NEED. 

NICHOLSON

CONFIDENTIAL: CARICOM SURPRISED, UPSET, BUT NOT ANGRY BEING LEFT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NASSAU 000487 

SIPDIS 

NSC FOR TOM SHANNON 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV SMIG HA BF
SUBJECT: CARICOM SURPRISED, UPSET, BUT NOT ANGRY BEING LEFT
OUT OF ARISTIDE'S DEPARTURE 

Classified By: CHARGE ROBERT M. WITAJEWSKI FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 

SUMMARY
- - - - 

1.  (C) Charge and Political Officer met with the Bahamian
Ambassador to Haiti, Dr. Eugene Newry, and the Under
Secretary in the Consular Section at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Bahamian-Haitian expert, Mr. Carlton Wright, on
March 8, 2004 to discuss Bahamian views of the current
situation in Haiti.  Ambassador Newry claimed that Caricom is
not "angry" with the U.S. involvement in the departure of
Aristide, but rather was "surprised" by the abrupt
decision-making, and Caricom's lack of involvement.  Newry
downplayed incendiary phrases in Caricom's statement on Haiti
such as expressing "alarm and dismay" as matter-of-fact
descriptions of members' disappointment, but on a positive
note he was quick to say that Caricom will be satisfied as
long as their 10-point action plan remains the basis for
post-Aristide Haiti and is implemented "as quickly and
painlessly as possible." Only history, declared Newry, can
determine whether or not ex-President Aristide left
voluntarily, because neither he (i.e., The Bahamas) nor his
regional colleagues were involved in that process. Bahamian
officials were extremely complimentary and positive about
joint U.S.-Bahamian efforts to deter or interdict intending
Haitian immigrants.
END SUMMARY. 

"LIKE A RIVER, THINGS MUST MOVE ON"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

2.  (C) At a meeting with the Charge, Bahamian Ambassador to
Haiti, Dr. Eugene Newry, characterized Caricom's harshly
worded "Statement on the Situation in Haiti" as "frank," but
was not a message of "anger."  In fact, he said he and fellow
Bahamian officials were quite pleased that changes being
implemented now in Haiti, such as the Tripartite Council and
the Council of Eminent Persons, come straight from the
10-Point Caricom Plan for Haiti.  In Newry's opinion, the
only place in which Caricom has disagreed with the Opposition
was in its desire for the Democratic Platform to be the only
political group. 

3.  (C) Although Ambassador Newry suggested that Caricom's
members were irritated with the lack of consultation and the
abruptness by which Aristide left office, he also indicated
that Caricom is pleased, nonetheless, that its plan is
apparently still being implemented.  As he put it, "a rose by
any other name is still a rose."  He said he will leave it to
the historians to determine what exactly happened on the
night Aristide fled Haiti.  However, he concluded, Caricom
needs to get over its pique because "like a river, things
must move on", and he understood that Haiti cannot advance
without the help that only the United States with the
ancillary support of other "major powers" such as Canada and
France could deliver. 

WHEN WILL CARICOM RE-ENGAGE?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

4.  (C)  When asked at what The Bahamas would "re-engage" in
Haiti, Ambassador Newry ardently argued that neither Caricom
nor The Bahamas has ever "disengaged" from Haiti.  He
stressed that he only left Haiti for "consultations" with the
Bahamian Government, and that as the only Caricom ambassador
actually resident in Haiti, he plans to return "shortly."
When pressed, however, Ambassador Newry acknowledged that he
couldn't define a time frame.  But, he hastened to add, from
Nassau he was in "daily contact" with Ambassador Foley and
both pro-Aristide and opposition figures in Haiti. 

5.  (C)  From a personnel standpoint, Ambassador Newry
admitted that Caricom would not be involved in the initial
multinational interim force in Haiti, but said that Caricom
would be willing to participate -- if only symbolically -- in
the follow-on stabilization UN presence.  He thinks that this
stabilization phase could start as early as the next 60 days. 

INTERIM HAITIAN GOVERNMENT - NOT TOO SHABBY
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

6.  (C)  Ambassador Newry told Charge and political officer
that he was pleasantly surprised with the transition now
occurring.  He indicated that it was a good sign that the
Haitian people overall had focused their mistrust and dislike
on the ex-President.  He said that his contacts with the
opposition has assured him that they would continue to work
with the Lavalas party and that the party itself had not been
tainted by the same image of corruption as was ex-President
Aristide.  Newry also found to be positive the fact that the
interim government retained some of the people closely
associated with ex-President Aristide in positions of power.
Ambassador Newry took this as a sign of good faith on the
part of the opposition. 

7.  (C) Discussing the composition of the interim authority,
Ambassador Newry was optimistic.  He knew personally and
professionally many of the members of the Tripartite
Committee as well as the Council of Eminent Persons and
considered them of high calibre.  He also considered it an
asset that these individuals were not predominantly
attorneys, but rather surgeons, sociologists, and other
professionals. 

8. (C)  The Bahamian representative in Haiti believed that it
would be premature to try to hold elections in the near
future.  In his view, he thought that it would take at least
90 days for the interim government to re-establish itself.
Newry did not believe that the country's political parties
would be prepared to hold meaningful elections for at least
twelve to eighteen months, at best. 

9.  (C)  Asked about the danger of the interim authority
using the period until elections to consolidate its power and
thereby arrange to win the forthcoming elections, Ambassador
Newry said that this had been anticipated by Caricom in its
action plan.  As a consequence, one of the key elements in
Caricom's action plan was a stipulation that no one in the
transitional government in Haiti can run for office once the
permanent government is established.  Ambassador Newry saw
this provision as a "sign of maturity" and a way to  prevent
innumerable problems. 

U.S.- BAHAMIAN COOPERATION
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

10. (C)  Turning to U.S.-Bahamian cooperation to prevent an
outflow of Haitian migrants to either The Bahamas or to the
United States, the Bahamian Foreign Ministry officials were
effusive in their praise of the current effort. The U.S., and
Bahamian, presence in the Windward Passage had "never been so
successful" in deterring an outflow of illegal migrants,
Newry declared.  While noting the costs of such an on-going
operation, both Newry and Wright acknowledged that it was
still much less expensive for The Bahamas that would be the
total costs of detaining, maintaining, and then re-patriating
illegal Haitian migrants once they reached The Bahamas. 

COMMENT
- - - - 

10.  (C)  Ambassador Newry was perhaps overreaching in trying
to put a positive spin on Caricom's March 3 statement on
Haiti and reflecting more of the real politik position that
The Bahamas takes regarding Haitian migration than the more
ideological position of some of the other, less affected,
Caricom members. Newry has also briefed both the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet en banc on the situation in Haiti
and his effusive praise of U.S.-Bahamian cooperation in the
Windward Passage reflects the realism of Prime Minister Perry
Christie and Deputy Prime Minister Cynthia Pratt than Foreign
Minister Fred Mitchell.  Surprisingly, Newry downplayed
ex-President Aristide's attempt to remain engaged from afar.
He did not think that Aristide's attempts to regain support
via press encounters in the Central African Republic would
impact on future Haiti developments.  His one caveat was that
Aristide's Lavalas Party is still extremely organized,
especially relative to the loose coalition of opposition
"parties" united only by a negative...their opposition to
Aristide.  His fear was that Aristide's support network would
re-group in time for the next set of elections while the
Opposition coalition would fall apart fall once the "negative
force," i.e., Aristide, disappeared from the scene as an
effective player.
WITAJEWSKI

NIGERIA OFFERS ARISTIDE A “STAGING POST”

UNCLAS ABUJA 000506 

SIPDIS 

SENSITIVE 

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL HA NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA OFFERS ARISTIDE A "STAGING POST" FOR A FEW
WEEKS 

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED, NOT FOR PUBLICATION ON THE
INTERNET OR INTRANET. 

1. (SBU) In response to what it said was a request from the
Caribbean Economic Community (CARICOM), on March 22 the GON
offered Haitian ex-president Aristide refuge in Nigeria for a
few weeks before moving on to another destination.  President
Obasanjo's press spokesman, Oluremi ("Remi") Oyo, issued a
press release (text below) to that effect and said much the
same thing in interviews carried by BBC radio and other
outlets. 

2. (SBU) The press release says the GON agreed after
consultations with African leaders, the African Union
leadership, the USG and "other concerned authorities."  Staff
at the Foreign Ministry and at the office of the National
Security Advisor told us March 23 they learned of the offer
from the press, and know nothing about such consultations.
The Presidency told us Aristide has not yet responded to the
offer (as of noon March 23), and said it had no information
on the USG and other consultations mentioned in the press
release. 

3. (SBU) COMMENT:  Two items seem important:  Will Aristide
come, and if so under what terms?  Confusion over what was
agreed when Charles Taylor came to Nigeria has long been a
problem.  Taylor is not the only political exile in Nigeria,
which has a history of offering asylum to fleeing leaders.
Post requests guidance from the Department on discussing
Aristide with the GON, and talking points for the public on
whatever USG role there may or may not have been in the
Nigerian offer to Aristide. 

4. (U) Begin text of the Nigerian Presidency press release: 

NIGERIA GRANTS CARICOM REQUEST ON FORMER HAITIAN LEADER 

The Caribbean Economic Community (CARICOM) under the
leadership of Prime Minister P.J. Patterson of Jamaica, has
requested Nigeria to consider giving former President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti "a staging post" for a few
weeks until his movement to another destination. 

After receiving the CARICOM request, Nigeria undertook
widespread consultations with African leaders, the leadership
of the African Union, the U.S. Government and other concerned
authorities. 

Following the concurrence received after those consultations,
Nigeria has agreed to grant the request from CARICOM. 

Oluremi Oyo (Mrs.)
SSA to the President 

end text.
ROBERTS

CONFIDENTIAL:BAHAMIAN PERSPECTIVE ON CARICOM AND HAITI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NASSAU 000733 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHSA HA BF CARICOM
SUBJECT: BAHAMIAN PERSPECTIVE ON CARICOM AND HAITI 

REF: SECSTATE 71329 

Classified By: Charge Robert M. Witajewski for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

SUMMARY
- - - - - - - - - 

1.    (C) Charge hosted a lunch for the Bahamian Foreign
Minister Fred Mitchell, and Foreign Ministry Permanent
Secretary, Ms. Patricia Rodgers on March 29.  A/DCM and
Consular Section Head also participated.  The discussion
covered a number of topics: The dynamics of
recently-completed Caricom heads of government
inter-sessional meeting, Caricom-U.S. relations, status of
Bahamian ratification of the bilateral Comprehensive Maritime
Agreement (CMA), the status of ex-Haitian President Jean
Bertrand Aristide, and Caricom,s request of UN investigation
of the events related to Aristide,s resignation and
departure from Haiti.
End of Summary 

CARICOM INTER-SESSIONAL MEETING IN ST. KITTS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 

2.     (C) The Charge began the discussion by asking Foreign
Minister Mitchell "How did the meeting go in St. Kitts?"
Mitchell responded that Caricom,s statement reflected the
aggregate view of Caricom members, however he continued, the
Bahamas maintains its own views on these matters.  Mitchell
revealed a bit of internal Caricom dynamics in his response.
According to FM Mitchell, there was a definite "north-south"
division within Caricom on Haiti.  In contrast to the more
categorical positions taken by Grenada, Guyana, Surinam, and
Trinidad and Tobago, he claimed, the "northern Caribbean
countries"  who have more concrete interests  took  more
"considered" positions regarding Haiti because of their
geographic proximity.  The northern Caribbean countries, he
continued, are obliged to deal with the realities and are
also cognizant of the importance of their relations with the
United States and thus are more careful in balancing their
interests with Caricom and the U.S.  The southern Caribbean
members are more detached from the practical issues and are
guided by political agendas, according to the Bahamian
Foreign Minister. 

3.    (C) Continuing on the Haiti theme, Foreign Minister
Mitchell expressed the view that the United States
overreacted to Jamaica,s offer to let ex-President Aristide
reside in the country and to Caricom,s declarations.  He
appeared to be arguing that Caricom was entitled to express
its views and not necessarily be held accountable for them.
Mitchell also claimed that despite Caricom,s verbal shots at
the United States over recent events in Haiti, there would be
little net impact on overall U.S.-Caricom relations...as long
as the United States didn't "overreact." 

4.    (C) Expressing irritation at Caricom,s cumbersome
decision-making style, Mitchell complained that too much time
was wasted by the ceremonial opening and closing of the
sessions as each successive host felt compelled to spend time
and money on needless pomp and circumstance.  He also
expressed annoyance at the prolixity of his colleagues,
noting that had not each government head not insisted on
"getting their own paragraph" into the final declaration,
they might have both accomplished more and not have been
forced to hold their closing press conference at 2 a.m. in
the morning. 

CARICOM,S SPECIAL ENVOY AND CALLS FOR AN INVESTIGATION
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

5.         (C) Regarding the naming of Caricom,s "special
envoy" to address the Haiti issue, Mitchell indicated that
Caricom had been unable to reach consensus on who this person
should be by the end of the inter-sessional and that this
would be subject to continued intra-Caricom negotiations.  He
said that personally hoped that it would be an individual who
both had prior diplomatic experience and someone closer to
The Bahamas, position on Haiti than that of some eastern
Caribbean states.  He discounted the prospect of anyone from
The Bahamas being selected for this role. 

6.    (C) Asked to clarify Caircom,s call for an
investigation into the circumstances of Aristide,s
resignation, Mitchell sought to downplay its significance.
He said that he personally envisioned the "investigation" as
equivalent to resolution of a "routine credentials challenge"
to a government such as occurs at the UNGA or another
committee.  If the LaTortue government is seen to be
exercising effective control in the country then, thought
Mitchell, it ought to be seated in Haiti,s chair at the UN
without controversy, Mitchell claimed.  He  explicitly sought
to minimize the scope, the impact, and the significance of
the Caricom-requested investigation -- but without indicating
whether his views reflected a broader Caricom view, those of
the Bahamian Cabinet, or his own personal view of an exit
strategy out of Caricom's dilemma. 

7.    (C) Questioned about recognition of the LaTortue
government, FM Mitchell reiterated his previous statements
that most Caricom members, as does The Bahamas, follow the
"Estrada Doctrine" when it comes to recognition and rather
than making value or moral judgments about a government, will
recognize whomever exercises effective control in Haiti as
that country's legitimate government.  He assured the Charge
that The Bahamas would not break with its long-held policy of
dealing with any government in control in Haiti, pointing out
that bilateral relations between The Bahamas and Haiti had
never been suspended during the transition from Aristide to
LaTortue  Foreign Minister Mitchell complained that the press
has exaggerated the recognition controversy and that matters
were not as bad as they appeared to be.  He noted that
Haitian Prime Minister LaTortue had called him personally and
assured him that press reports on Haiti refusing to permit
the return of the Bahamian Ambassador to Haiti were totally
untrue.  Mitchell also cited repeated phone conversations
between LaTortue and Jamaica's Prime Minister P.J. Patterson,
who apparently had a close working relationship in the past,
as evidence that Caricom and the new Haitian government could
work together.  He said that he expected the Haitian
Ambassador to return to The Bahamas in the near future as
well. 

Ex-President Jean Aristide in Jamaica
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

8.    (C) The Foreign Minister insisted that the United
States should not be concerned with, or opposed to,
Aristide,s presence in the Caribbean.  He argued that a
perceived "Banishing Policy" has racial and historical
overtones in the Caribbean that reminds inhabitants of the
region of slavery and past abuse.  The Charge inquired on
what would happen if Aristide were to meddle with Haitian
internal affairs and give his supporters the impression that
he is still a player in the future of Haiti.  Foreign
Minister Mitchell was emphatic that Jamaica will not allow
Aristide to play such an intrusive role and would "deal" with
Aristide if such a situation were to arise. 

COMPREHENSIVE MARITIME AGREEMENT
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - 

9.    (C) Queried about the status of ratification of the
comprehensive maritime agreement (CMA) that has now been
negotiated over the last 18 months, FM Mitchell reported that
due to the document,s significance and complexity it had
been decided to prepare a formal briefing to the entire
Cabinet.  Optimistically, Mitchell thought that this could
completed in two cabinet sessions over a two-week period.
Questioned about the need for such a time-consuming review of
what is essentially a codification and rationalization of
existing agreements, Mitchell again wistfully muse about how
the Bahamian cabinet decision-making process might be
improved.  He related that he had learned as a result of his
Caricom attendance that in other Commonwealth countries,
debate and intervention on issues in the cabinet is
restricted to their ministers whose portfolios are directly
impacted by the issue, or ministers that assert fundamental
issues of principle.  In contrast, Mitchell intimated, in the
Christie Cabinet of the Bahamas operates much less
efficiently since any minister can intervene and express a
view on any issue before the government. 

JOINT TASK FORCE MEETING
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

10.   (C) Queried about his preferences for a date for the
next session of the Joint Task Force on Illegal Drug
Interdiction (JTF), Mitchell expressed agreement for an early
summer meeting in late May/early June.  He agreed with
Charge,s suggestion that the JTF would best be held
following ratification of the CMA and successful
implementation of a major anti-drug round-up that is being
planned for the near future so that participants could review
both past successes since the last JTF meeting and consider
specific goals to be accomplished for the coming year. 

COMMENT
 - - - - - - - - - - 

11.   (C) Foreign Minister Mitchell was his usual
business-like self during lunch as he pursued his agenda of
downplaying the consequences of a division between Caricom
and the United States on Haiti.  Underlying many of
Mitchell's arguments was the premise that Caricom/The Bahamas
as small countries take (and are entitled to take) principled
stands while the United States necessarily engages in real
politik. 

12.  (C)  Despite a life-long career as a politician in a
country were politics is personalized to the extreme, neither
kissing babies nor making small talk comes naturally to Fred
Mitchell.  He prefers to deal with agendas expeditiously and
then engage in philosophical discussions or reviews of
international relations drawing on his seminars at Harvard,s
Kennedy School.  Holding two time-consuming portfolio,s
(managing the civil service and foreign policy) is also
taking its toll on Mitchell,s private time.  Mitchell told
Charge a year ago that he hoped to write a twelve-chapter
(one chapter for each month of the year) book combining
policy, history, and personal ideology to be published on his
fifty-first birthday.  Ruefully, he admitted that he hasn,t
progress beyond chapter four.
WITAJEWSKI

WEISUNG 4 ZUM EINSATZ DER BUNDESWEHR – MEMO 4 ABOUT THE BUNDESWEHR

weisung-nrf-4

GEHEIMES PROTOKOLL ZUM ABLAUF DER LOVE PARADE 2011 – SECRET MEMO ABOUT THE PROJECTED COURSE OF THE LOVE PARADE IN 2011

loveparade2010_loveparade-2010-anlage-19-vertrauliches-ablaufkonzept-15-01-10

STRENG VERTRAULICH: INTERNES PAPIER DER DEUTSCHEN BANK ZUR KUNDENBETREUUNG

The Impact of the Financial Services Meltdown on The Global Economy And The Meltdown on The Global Economy And The Private Equity Private Equity Industry

The Impact of the Financial Services Meltdown on The Global Economy And The Meltdown on The Global Economy And The Private Equity Private Equity Industry

by David Rubenstein, Co- Founder, Carlyle Group

caryle-group-financial-crisis-2008

Günther Wallraff “Der Aufmacher” – Unzensiert

wallraff-aufmacher-unzensiert

The 10 Most Influential Media People This Year (According To The TIME 100)

Time 100It’s that time of year again.

Time magazine has released the Time 100, its annual list of the 100 most influential people in the world, as it does every year, to be followed by a swanky party next week at the Time Warner Centre (to which I am told press are no longer allowed to attend).

Unlike its annual Person of the Year, Time doesn’t rank the Top 100, but merely lists them grouped in categories and pairs them with fun write-ups done by equally high profile people.

You can see the full list and accompanying write-ups here.

Julian Assange

Julian Assange

Give Time extra credit for their profile pairing on this one.  Here is Germaine Greer on Assange:The media were easily convinced that WikiLeaks was a person, and unaware of how vulnerable he really was, Assange played the part to the hilt. Egregious to the last, he is convinced that his prosecution for rape in the Swedish courts was engineered by vengeful U.S. intelligence, unable to grasp the plain fact that his callous treatment made two women angry enough to seek redress.

There were many scoops but few surprises amid what we learned from WikiLeaks. Regardless of what happens to Assange, which he will almost certainly not deserve, the construction of stateless, secure and indestructible Internet drop boxes cannot be undone. Secrets will never be safe again.

Michele Bachmann

Michele Bachmann

Rush Limbaugh: If she were liberal, she’d be celebrated from the mountaintops. But she’s conservative. So because she is smart, talented and accomplished and a natural leader — not to mention attractive — the left brands her as a flame-throwing lightweight. They underestimate her at their own risk.

Arianna Huffington

Arianna Huffington

 Belinda LuscombeIn 2005, with little more than her impregnable charm, thicket of friends and contacts and outsize chutzpah, she launched the golden goose of news websites (or of any business) — popular, adroit, cheap as chips to run and named after her.

Hung Huang

Hung Huang

Diane Von Furstenberg: These days Hung, 49, is hugely influential in Chinese culture, tweeting with humor and intelligence to 2.5 million people. She runs a fashion magazine called iLook, owns a store featuring Chinese designers and recently became the director of the first design museum in China…What makes Hung unique is that she understands America, its pragmatism and practices, yet she remains a true Chinese patriot.

Saad Mohsnei

Saad Mohsnei

Rupert Murdoch:  Through his ownership of newspaper and TV properties, he has become, without a doubt, the most influential media figure in Afghanistan and plays a big role in shaping public opinion there. He has shown great courage in publicly and strongly criticizing the Karzai government for corruption and incompetence. He hasn’t been afraid to show men and women on TV—a practice the Taliban did not allow.

Ayman Mohyeldin

Ayman Mohyeldin

Dan Rather: Many journalists did good work in Egypt at the country’s — and the region’s — historic turning point, but none matched Mohyeldin, 31. He put us in the middle of the action and took us behind the scenes…By dint of his experience, persistence and talent, he lifted the profile and reputation of the al-Jazeera network. And for one brief, shining moment, he was the best in the world.

Joe Scarborough

Joe Scarborough

Michael Bloomberg: As a group, cable-­television talk-show hosts are not exactly known for independent political analysis that is free of partisan favoritism, but that is exactly what makes Joe Scarborough, 48, so ­refreshing—and so important. Joe’s approach to politics is the same as mine: call ’em like you see ’em, and even if people don’t agree with you on every issue—and they won’t—they will respect you for being honest.

Hu Shuli

Hu Shuli

Adi Ignatius: After a dispute with her publisher, Hu left the magazine in 2009 and set up Caixin Century, now a paragon of reporting brilliance in China. In February it ran a commentary on Egypt that any savvy reader would link to China. “Autocracy creates turbulence,” it read, “democracy breeds peace.”

Oprah Winfrey

Oprah Winfrey

Ted Turner: She has not only made it to the top with the cards stacked against her, but she has ­also made extra­ordinary contributions to our global community through her philanthropic efforts.

Mark Zuckerberg

Mark Zuckerberg

Image: Ap

April Capone: I never knew when I created a Facebook account to connect with friends, relatives and constituents that I would find one of my residents who needed a kidney. But there was Carlos Sanchez, like some sort of cyberspace SOS on my NewsFeed, contacting as many people as he could to find a new chance at life….Would I have been his donor without Facebook? We’ll never know. But Facebook allowed me to sit quietly in my office and say to myself, You’re up! Answer this call!

Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/time-100-assange-zuckerberg-oprah-100-2011-4?op=1#ixzz1TcEB50FE

CONFIDENTIAL: DOMINICAN POLITICS #8: FERNANDEZ, THE RIO GROUP

Viewing cable 04SANTODOMINGO6213, DOMINICAN POLITICS #8: FERNANDEZ, THE RIO GROUP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SANTO DOMINGO 006213 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR WHA, WHA/CAR, WHA/EPSC, INL;
NSC FOR SHANNON AND MADISON;LABOR FOR ILAB; USCINCSO ALSO
FOR POLAD;TREASURY FOR OASIA-LCARTER;
USDOC FOR 4322/ITA/MAC/WH/CARIBBEAN BASIN DIVISION
USDOC FOR 3134/ITA/USFCS/RD/WH; DHS FOR CIS-CARLOS ITURREGUI 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2014
TAGS: DR ENRG HA PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: DOMINICAN POLITICS #8: FERNANDEZ, THE RIO GROUP
AND HAITI 

REF: STATE 243180 

Classified By: DCM Lisa Kubiske.  Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). 

1.  (C) Summary.  When the Rio Group summit of November 4 got
to the agenda item on
Haiti, Dominican President Leonel Fernandez asked for
hemispheric help in
re-instilling democracy in that &narco-state,8 but he put a
big front wrong in
advocating the inclusion in the process of former president
Jean Bertrand
Aristide.  Following a November 6 conversation with the
Ambassador, Fernandez agreed that Aristide was distinct from
Lavalas, and said he meant to say that groups with broad
popular support needed to be included in the process.  The
Ambassador and several other ambassadors see President
Fernandez November 16 to discuss Haiti further, per reftel. 

2.  (C)  Dominicans are continually worried about the other
half of Hispaniola,
and with good reason -- perhaps a million Haitians reside in
the Dominican
Republic already, many of them undocumented.  The February
2004 hostilities in
Haiti did not cause any significant cross-border movements
but the Dominican
military temporarily reinforced the border and the Dominican
Congress
precipitately voiced its opposition to any eventual proposal
to establish
refugee camps on national territory. 

3. (C)   The official press release from the presidency
offers an account of the Dominican positions at the meeting.
(See para 4 below.)  It includes two
elements of concern two us:  a calculated reference to
Aristide and a quote
from Hugo Chavez blaming &a large part of the disorder in
that brother country8
on the United States.  Chief of staff Danilo Medina said that
the press release
was not cleared elsewhere in the palace.  See septel for
discussion of the Dominican-Venezuelan questions. 

4. (U)  Following is our informal translation of the release,
which played
extensively in the Dominican press: 

- - - - - - - - - - - 

(begin text) 

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.  The presidents of Latin America
declared their
determination to provide concrete help to Haiti in
establishing a true
democratic order where institutions function and all
participants may be
brought together for a dialogue on the future of the country. 

Responding to a proposal by President Leonel Fernandez, the
heads of state and
government meeting at the XVIII Rio Group Summit agreed in
the need for the
re-establishment in Haiti of peaceful coexistence and
institutional order, so
that in the future a constitutional convention may be
assembled. 

President Fernandez, who offered an analysis of the
historical roots of Haiti,s
ingovernability, stated that in that Caribbean nation there
exists a power
vacuum and a great scarcity as a clandestine economy
functions based on
narcotics trafficking. 

&Haiti, a theme of discussion of the Latin American leaders
participating in
this summit, is a narco-state subjugated to poverty and human
degradation, such
that we the countries of Latin America have the historical
responsibility of
going to its aid,8 he emphasized. 

He said that within a democracy there should be participation
of all sectors,
and that in Haiti there is a political leader with great
popular support, Jean
Bertrand Aristide, who should be involved in the process for
a democratic
solution and establishment of stability and democracy. 

The Dominican leader called on the Rio Group to make a
profound analysis of the
Haitian situation, given this immense undertaking, so that
the presence of the
MINUSTAH can be transformed in a clear and decisive manner to
cooperate in
building a true state of laws. 

The Dominican president,s analysis of the Haitian crisis was
seconded and
approved by 11 of the presidents present, who in their
remarks expressed
support to the Dominican initiative seeking immediate support
for Haiti. 

President of Venezuela Hugo Chavez, who will visit the
Dominican republic this
Saturday, said, &We should go to the aid of Haiti, but a
great deal of the
fault for the disorder in that brother country lies with the
United States.8 

The president of Paraguay Nicanor Duarte said that countries
meeting here
should offer support for building a true democracy in haiti,
with sovereignty
and with respect for its cultural roots. 

The president of Panama Martin Torrijos backed the position
of the Dominican
leader and said that he was ready to offer cooperation in
elections, welcoming
the position of President Fernandez. 

At the same time, the Vice President of El Salvador, Ana
Vilma de Escobar,
spoke of the need to restore order and to organize a
constitutional convention
in which all participants can find consensus and will respect
the rules of the
game. 

&We should carry out a crusade to recover multi-lateralism,
so that we can work
at establishing order in Haiti, and then work in favor of a
civilized
co-existence where conversations about the future can
begin,8 commented the
president of Bolivia, Carlos Mesa.
When his turn came, the president of Guatemala, Eduardo Stein
Braillas,
affirmed that the efforts to assist the Caribbean nation
should be carried out
jointly with the United Nations, but added the self-criticism
that the
countries of Latin America did not take decisions concerning
that nation when
they faced the need to do so. 

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, November 4, 2004.  Office of
Information, Press, and
Public Relations. 

(end text) 

- - - - - - - - - - - 

5. (C)  The Aristide comment appeared to come out of nowhere.
 Fernandez had
not previously discussed Aristide by name in conversations
with us, or with our French and Canadian counterparts. 

6. (C) Perhaps the greatest surprise for us was the palace's
presumption that
there would be no downside.  The next-day in-house press
analysis by
Fernandez's strategy unit concluded that there was "no risk"
associated with
his comments and that Fernandez was "presenting himself as an
element of
international cooperation." 

Fernandez Backtracks
- - - - - - - - - - 

7. (C) On November 6, during a pull-aside at a social event,
the Ambassador admonished Fernandez that his reference to
Aristide was a serious mistake, one
that had the potential of further inflaming a situation
already dangerous for
the Haitian people and for the international peacekeeping
force.  Fernandez
replied that given popular support for Lavalas, it would have
to be part of the
situation.  The Ambassador was direct: Aristide had led a
violent gang involved
in narcotics trafficking and had squandered any credibility
he formerly may
have had.  "Nobody has given me any information about that,"
Fernandez
replied.  The Ambassador insisted that no supporter of human
rights and
democracy could in good conscience allow Aristide and his
close supporters back
into the situation in Haiti.  Fernandez listened and
eventually agreed to
distinguish between Aristide and Lavalas.  He asked for any
information on
Aristide that the United States might be able to share with
him. 

7. (C) On November 9 the Ambassador, DCM and EcoPol chief
questioned
presidential chief of staff Danilo Medina about the reference
to Aristide.
Medina suggested that the President hadn't meant Aristide,
but rather the
Lavalas political movement; the Ambassador questioned that
interpretation.
Emboffs pointed out that Aristide had been named in the press
release and
questioned the inclusion in a Dominican press release of the
anti-U.S. remark
by Chavez.  Medina professed not to have seen or cleared the
release, which had
been drafted by the press office. He said that in future,
press texts would be
routed through his office before release. 

8.  (C)  The Ambassador meets with President Fernandez  to
discuss Haiti (using reftel talking points) on the evening of
November 16, accompanied by the French, Canadian, British and
Spanish ambassadors.  We will report septel on the results of
that discussion.
HERTELL

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SECRET: FRENCH SHARE CONCERNS ON POSSIBLE ARISTIDE RETURN

S E C R E T PARIS 004660 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2015
TAGS: PREL FR HA SF
SUBJECT: FRENCH SHARE CONCERNS ON POSSIBLE ARISTIDE RETURN
TO HAITI 

REF: STATE 121144 

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d). 

1.  (C) Poloff and Embassy Africa Watcher delivered reftel
demarche July 1 to both MFA DAS-equivalent for Central
America and the Caribbean Gilles Bienvenu and MFA AF
PDAS-equivalent Elisabeth Barbier.  Bienvenu stated that the
GOF shared our analysis of the implications of an Aristide
return to Haiti, terming the likely repercussions
"catastrophic."  Bienvenu actively sought our thoughts on
next steps to prevent Aristide from returning.  Initially
expressing caution when asked about France demarching the
SARG, Bienvenu noted that Aristide was not a prisoner in
South Africa and that such an action could "create
difficulties."  However, Bienvenu later offered to express
our shared concerns in Pretoria, perhaps under the pretext
that as a country desiring to secure a seat on the UN
Security Council, South Africa could not afford to be
involved in any way with the destabilization of another
country.  Barbier, speaking on behalf of the AF bureau,
however, did not foresee any problems at all in delivering a
demarche in Pretoria. 

2.  (S) Bienvenu speculated on exactly how Aristide might
return, seeing a possible opportunity to hinder him in the
logistics of reaching Haiti.  If Aristide traveled
commercially, Bienvenu reasoned, he would likely need to
transit certain countries in order to reach Haiti.  Bienvenu
suggested a demarche to CARICOM countries by the U.S. and EU
to warn them against facilitating any travel or other plans
Aristide might have.  He specifically recommended speaking to
the Dominican Republic, which could be directly implicated in
a return attempt.  Both Bienvenu and Barbier confided that
South African mercenaries could be heading towards Haiti,
with Bienvenu revealing the GOF had documented evidence that
10 South African citizens had come to Paris and requested
Dominican visas between February and the present. 

3.  (C) Comment: France seems to share our analysis and
concerns regarding any attempt by Aristide to return to
Haiti.  They appear eager to prevent such an occurrence and
could be valuable, both bilaterally and within the EU, in
convincing other countries to avoid involvement in any plans
by Aristide.  End Comment.
STAPLETON

A Different October Revolution: Dismantling the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe

East German demonstrators take to the streets in Leipzig, October 9, 1989.

Washington, D.C., October 9, 2009 – Twenty years ago today, crowds of East German demonstrators took to the streets in Leipzig starting their own October revolution that would bring down the Berlin Wall a month later. Ironically, these massive peaceful crowds of about 70,000 people gathered in the streets and squares of Leipzig just two days after the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the German Democratic Republic and the visit by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to Berlin. GDR leader Erich Honecker’s security forces were faced with a choice—to apply the Chinese Tiananmen model or to go along with their Soviet patron’s advice not to use force. They chose the latter, and several days later Honecker was sent to retirement and replaced with reform Communist Egon Krenz on October 17, 1989.

Soldiers removing barbed wire from the Austria-Hungray border.

To mark this anniversary, today the National Security Archive publishes the first in a series of document postings on the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe. The documents come from the forthcoming book Masterpieces of History:  The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989, ed. by Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton and Vladislav Zubok (Central European University Press, 2010), which grew out of the Archive’s groundbreaking conference on the end of the Cold War in Europe at Musgrove Conference Center in May 1998. The documents in the book include formerly top secret deliberations of Soviet, U.S. and East European decision makers, memoranda of conversations and intelligence estimates. Most of the documents are published here in English for the first time.

The documents show that the Berlin Wall actually started falling on March 3, 1989, when Hungarian Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth informed Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev of the decision of the Hungarian Central Committee to “completely remove the electronic and technological defenses from the Western and Southern borders of Hungary.” The Soviet leader did not react negatively to the news, but rather just said that “we are also becoming more open.” This decision by the Hungarian reform communists and Gorbachev’s acceptance of it made the first crack in the Berlin Wall. In May, the first dismantling of technological defenses started on the southern border of Hungary. Over the summer, the Hungarians negotiated most actively with West German representatives and kept their Soviet ally informed, but tried to circumvent the East Germans. On August 19, Hungary organized its famous Pan-European picnic, where people were encouraged to come picnic along the Austria-Hungary border near Sopron. A section of border was opened and some East German citizens were able to escape to Austria. The fate of the Wall may well have been sealed on September 11, 1989, when the Hungarian reform Communist government of Miklos Nemeth took down its own iron curtain—the barbed wire on the border with Austria—thus allowing East Germans who were vacationing in Hungary or taking refuge in the West German Embassy to escape to the West.

These events provoked an outraged reaction from the East German government. By early September, they saw the possibility that the trickle of East Germans would turn into a real flood if Hungary opened its border completely. The German communists (SED) discussed the situation on September 5, looking for options to prevent the opening of the border. One of the options—following the traditional approach of the Brezhnev Doctrine—was to try to convene a meeting of foreign ministers of the socialist bloc to put pressure on the Hungarians. However, that option was opposed by the Soviet representatives. East German attempts to reach out to their Hungarian and Soviet counterparts were met with stalling tactics until the borders were finally open on September 11.

As the flood of East Germans through Hungary undermined what was left of the prestige and legitimacy of the Honecker regime, the German Democratic Republic was preparing to celebrate its 40th anniversary. Gorbachev reluctantly agreed to come and to meet with the SED Politburo. During the celebrations, East Germans overwhelmingly expressed their support for Gorbachev in sharp contrast to their opposition to Honecker, which was immediately noted in the mass media. In his conversations with Honecker and the Politburo members, Gorbachev tried to stick to his compromise line of not interfering in internal affairs of fraternal countries, but eventually he did just that by warning them that “life punishes those who come too late,” and telling them a story about old leaders who cannot push the cart any more. Those statements were correctly heard by the East German communists as a push from the Soviet general secretary to change their own leader, which they did on October 17.


Read the Documents
At this stage, the East German communist leadership is just catching up to the fact that the Hungarian communists have already decided–with some support from Moscow–to open their borders to the West.  The scenes of East Germans hiking en masse to the Austrian border and flocking to embassies in Prague and Budapest while awaiting train tickets to the West, would dramatically degrade what little GDR prestige remained from its higher-than-average living standards in the bloc.  In this record, we see the unvarnished discussions of the GDR leadership, featuring repeated attacks on the Hungarians for doing the bidding of the FRG, and “betraying socialism.”  This discussion takes place two months after Gorbachev’s candid conversations with Kohl whom he treated as a peer and partner to an extent that would have appalled the members of the SED, although some may have feared as much in light of evidence such as that cited below–that the Soviet Foreign Ministry is trying to prevent the GDR from calling a foreign ministers’ meeting to rein in the Hungarians.
In this discussion, East German Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer seeks reassurance from the Soviet ambassador to East Berlin in the midst of the refugee crisis precipitated by Hungary’s decision to open its border with Austria.  Ambassador Kochemassov tells Fischer that his colleagues are in fact actively rebuking both the West Germans and the Hungarians.  In particular, Moscow’s envoy to Bonn, Yuli Kvitsinsky, is a hard-line holdover who has been blasting the FRG for encouraging the East German émigrés, and “condemn[ing]” repeated statements by politicians to the effect that the GDR’s days are numbered.  The latter remark comes in the wake of highly-publicized comments by the U.S. ambassador to the FRG, Vernon Walters, in the International Herald Tribune predicting the speedy reunification of Germany.
This personal letter from the GDR’s man in Budapest to the foreign minister reports on his recent talks with Rezső Nyers.  Responding to East Berlin’s condemnation of Hungary’s émigré policy, Nyers claims that the border openings are “only a temporary measure.”  But Ambassador Gerd Vehres dismisses this and other comments from the Hungarians as “an attempt at stalling and deliberately misleading the GDR.”  Rather than understand the flight of so many East Germans as a popular judgment on the regime, the SED is only able to conceive it as “a coordinated and successful attempt by the imperialist states …”
This diary entry, written on the eve of Gorbachev’s visit to an East Germany in crisis, describes the Soviet leader as anxious and ambivalent about the radical changes underway in Eastern Europe, yet determined not to say anything that will prop up the hard-line Honecker.  Chernyaev knows what the drafters of American national security policy at this time do not, that “the total dismantling of socialism as a world phenomenon has been taking place”–and it is a spectacle Chernyaev applauds.  Here is striking proof of the profound radicalization of political thinking that is unfolding inside the reform-minded echelons of the Soviet political elite.  Chernyaev has by now resolved his personal doubts in favor of supporting the anti-communist “revolutions” in Eastern Europe.  However, while he clearly sees the future of the Soviet Union on the path of total rejection of the Leninist-Stalinist legacy, Gorbachev’s own thinking in this period is more complex and, unlike Chernyaev, is not completely free from the “syndrome of Leninism.” In particular, Gorbachev still seems to nurture an ideological belief in “democratic socialism” as a road for Eastern Europe, and the GDR in particular.
In his conversation with Erich Honecker, Gorbachev is careful and ambivalent trying not to openly push or provoke the East German leader, according to his proclaimed policy of non-interference in the allies’ internal affairs.  While the Soviet leader praises the GDR achievements and gently admonishes Honecker that the party should seize the initiative lest it becomes too late, Honecker is more assertive in his criticism of the Soviet glasnost and “unacceptable” publications in the Soviet press.  He presents the situation in his country as stable, his party in control and poised to achieve a breakthrough in the scientific and technological revolution.
When Gorbachev visits Berlin in early October, thousands of East Germans are already pressing to leave the GDR and demonstrations against the regime are taking place in Leipzig and elsewhere.  Chernyaev’s notes of the discussions with the SED Politburo show the Soviet leader actually pushing for leadership changes–contrary to his own repeated insistence about staying out of bloc “personnel” matters.  While not even mentioning the refugees, Gorbachev reminds the East Germans about the crises of the 1970s when the leadership felt the need to accelerate reforms.  “Life itself will punish us if we are late,” he says. He goes on to tell a story about the miners of Donetsk, where “some leaders cannot pull the cart any more, but we don’t dare replace them, we are afraid to offend them.”  There could hardly be a clearer reference to Honecker and, sure enough, within 10 days the SED Politburo replaces him with another of those present at this meeting, Egon Krenz.
Events are moving quickly in the GDR, marked by the beginning of maneuverings in the SED Politburo against Honecker.  Here Chernyaev records a conversation with Gorbachev and  Shakhnazarov in which the Soviet leader refers to Honecker with an obscenity for not stepping down gracefully and thus preserving “his place in history.”  Chernyaev and Shakhnazarov doubt a graceful exit is possible for the East German party boss, who “has already been cursed by his people.”


Notes

1. For most recent publications and  reviews about the peaceful revolution in Germany see Charles S. Maier, “Civil Resistance and Civil Society:  Lessons from the Collapse of the German Democratic Republic in 1989,” in Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash ed., Civil Resistance and Power Politics (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009),  Christof Wielepp, “Montag abens in Leipzig,” in Thomas Blanke and Rainer Erd (eds.), DDR-Ein Staat Vergeht (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch verlag, 1990), Wolf-Jurgen Grabner, Christian Heinze, and Detlev Pollack (eds.), Leipzig in Oktober:  Kirchen und alternative Gruppen im Umbruch der DDR—Analysen zur Wende (Berlin: Wichern-Verlag, 1990).

CONFIDENTIAL: BAHAMAS GOVERNMENT SEEKS SUPPORT FOR FUTURE UN

Magister Bernd Pulch

Viewing cable 04NASSAU384, BAHAMAS GOVERNMENT SEEKS SUPPORT FOR FUTURE UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NASSAU 000384 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2014
TAGS: BF HA PGOV PREL SMIG
SUBJECT: BAHAMAS GOVERNMENT SEEKS SUPPORT FOR FUTURE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON HAITI 

REF: A) NASSAU 211 B) NASSAU 212 C) NASSAU 263 D)
     NASSAU 322 E) NASSAU 364 

Classified By: Charge Abdelnour Zaiback for reasons 1.5 (B) and 1.5 (D) 

- - - -
SUMMARY
- - - - 

1) (C) On February 24, Acting Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Permanent Secretary Marilyn Zonicle separately demarched each
UN Security Council member with representation in The Bahamas
for support for a possible UN Security Council meeting on
Haiti that may be requested by Jamaica Prime Minister
Patterson as early as Thursday.  The original plan was to
request the Security Council to meet on February 25 on Haiti,
however, President Aristide asked that the meeting be
deferred for 24 hours while he pursued the ongoing
negotiations.  For its part, The Bahamas seeks the active
support of the U.S. as the "most important" member of the
Security Council as it engages on a full scale diplomatic
press to achieve peace in Haiti.  If diplomacy fails, The
Bahamas believes that military assistance will be essential,
and is willing to contribute troops to a multinational effort
to maintain law and order.  END SUMMARY 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
FOREIGN MINISTER MITCHELL ON STAND BY TO NEW YORK
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

2) (C) Anticipating that Prime Minister Patterson would make
the request for the Security Council to hold a special
session on Haiti tomorrow, FM Mitchell had already packed his
bags and made plans to fly to New York tonight.  Patterson
and CARICOM delayed making the request for the session only
because Aristide convinced them that the opposition and
rebels could still agree to CARICOM's peace plan.  However,
as the situation on the ground in Haiti continues to
deteriorate, Zonicle anticipates that Mitchell will fly to
New York tomorrow for a requested Security Council special
session on Thursday. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SIX TALKING POINTS FOR PROJECTED SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

3) (C) Follows are the six talking points presented to Charge. 

i) (C) Pending the outcome of the OAS/CARICOM-sponsored
negotiations between the Government and the Opposition in
Haiti, the CARICOM countries may request the convening of an
emergency meeting of the Security Council to address the
matter, considering the deteriorating situation in that
country and the inability of the Haitian National Police
(HNP) to deal with the insurgency. 

ii) (C) An open debate in the Security Council would allow it
to pronounce on the matter and would provide Haiti with the
opportunity to request military/police assistance,  and,
perhaps, increased humanitarian assistance, as may be
necessary.  Haiti is reluctant to take the matter to the
Security Council before the current political negotiations
have been exhausted and wishes to avoid the matter being
dealt with on "parallel tracks" by OAS/CARICOM and the UN. 

iii) (C) While France has indicated a willingness to send
military assistance to Haiti, the specter of French troops in
Haiti at this time is a very sensitive issue, particularly as
France is the former colonizer and Haiti is currently
"celebrating" the 200th anniversary of discarding that yoke.
A joint dispatch under the UN banner would be more palatable. 

iv) (C) With the United Nations, CARICOM Ambassadors are
seeking the support of the Group of Latin America and the
Caribbean (GRULAC) for the initiative and a meeting of the
GRULAC to discuss the matter is being convened Wednesday
afternoon.  Brazil and Chile, the two members of GRULAC on
the Security Council have indicated their support for the
initiative.  Other member of the GRULAC that have voiced
strong support are Mexico and Venezuela. 

v) (C) Beyond the GRULAC, CARICOM Ambassadors are in touch
with Canada and France, as well as with President of the GA,
Ambassador Colin Granderson of the CARICOM Secretariat, and
the other Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs in
seeking to garner support for the initiative and move it
forward, as appropriate. 

vi) (C) It has been said, although not officially announced
that, Ambassador Reggie Dumas, of Trinidad and Tobago, has
been appointed as the Special Advisor on Haiti by the UN
Secretary-general.  Perhaps, the stigma of a direct request
from Haitian authorities for military assistance could be
alleviated by having the request channeled through the
Special Advisor. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BAHAMAS VIEW ON OUTSIDE INTERVENTION CLARIFIED
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

4) (C) Charge and Political Chief sought clarification on
Mitchell's vision for outside intervention.  In recent days
Mitchell has made several statements that international
support for Haiti's police was crucial, including "to disarm
the rebels if they did not disarm themselves."  Zonicle
relayed that the first priority of The Bahamas is the
principles in the CARICOM proposal, most notably reinforcing
the ability of the Haitian police to maintain law and order.
However, if this fails, Zonicle reiterated Mitchell's oft
stated plea of late, that "law and order must be restored."
Zonicle volunteered that The Bahamas was prepared to
contribute troops, "perhaps as many as 100."  While the
preferred mechanism is the United Nations, Zonicle confirmed
Mitchell's view that any outside intervention would be
preferable to continued and increased chaos. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BAHAMIAN AMBASSADOR TO CARICOM SEEKS INSIGHTS ON RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN OPPOSITION AND REBELS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

5) (C) Ambassador to CARICOM Leonard Archer sought Charge's
insight on the relationship between the rebels and the
opposition, but in the exchange of views it became clear that
all sides knew about the same.  Several rebel leaders have
connections with the former military.  While the opposition
may currently feel that they are the beneficiaries of rebel
activity, they may soon learn that "the enemy of my enemy is
not always my friend."  Archer is an experienced diplomat who
has studied Haiti at length. 

- - - -
COMMENT
- - - - 

6) (C) As reported reftels, The Bahamas is seized on the
Haitian crisis.  It is certainly Foreign Minister Mitchell's
dominant preoccupation.  It is also clear that The Bahamas
regards U.S. leadership and engagement on Haiti as crucial to
any peaceful outcome.  As has also become increasingly
explicit in Mitchell's recent statements, while The Bahamas
and CARICOM lobby for peace, they have concluded that a
peaceful outcome without international intervention is
increasingly unlikely.
WITAJEWSKI

DIE OFFIZIELLE LISTE DER SPITZEL IN DER TSCHECHOWSLOWAKEI ZUM DOWNLOADEN

Tom Moak: Der große Unterschied zwischen Aufarbeitung und Aufklärung

Aufarbeitung
Aufarbeitung oder Recycling bedeutet Gewinnung von Rohstoffen aus Abfällen,ihre Rückführungin den Wirtschaftskreislauf und die Verarbeitung zu neuen Produkten (stoffliche Verwertung).

Zur Aufarbeitung Recycling geeignet sind vor allem Lumpen, Eisen, Papier, Glas, Pappe,

Kartonagen, Nichteisenmetalle und Kunststoffe. Voraussetzung für die stoffliche Verwertung

ist eine möglichst sortenreine Sammlung der Wertstoffe oder ihre leichte Abtrennung (Sortierung,Abfalltrennung.)

Es hat den Anschein, einige der nach der deutschen Wiedervereinigung etablierten Institutionen, die angeblich das Unrecht

in der DDR aufarbeiten wollen oder sollen, wollen mit ihrer “Aufarbeitung” genau so den politischen Müll und die Abfälle

aus der ehemaligen DDR, das Unrecht und ihre Aktivisten zur Wiederverwendung recyceln und in unserer Gesellschaft installieren.

Dazu gehört auch eine mangelnde Aufklärung der Öffentlichkeit,(Desinformation) eine Verheimlichung der Täter und deren Untaten, die

zum Teil immer noch in verantwortlichen Funktionen Platz genommen haben und als Krönung des ganzen sogar in Parlamente eingeschleust wurden.

Aufklärung ist die vollständige Offenlegung des Unrechts, und die vollständige Information über die Schuldigen


und deren Entfernung aus verantwortlichen Funktionen.

Wahlspruch in 2011   zum Jahr der Demokratie

Aufklärung
Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbst verschuldeten Unmündigkeit.

Unmündigkeit ist das Unvermögen des Menschen,  sich

seines Verstandes ohne Leitung eines Anderen zu bedienen.
Selbstverschuldet ist diese Unmündigkeit,  wenn die Ursache derselben

nicht am Mangel des Verstandes,  sondern der Entschließung und des

Mutes liegt,  sich seiner ohne Leitung eines anderen zu bedienen.
Sapere aude!
Habe Mut,  dich deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen

ist also der Wahlspruch der Aufklärung……
Immanuel Kant  –  Was ist Aufklärung?   Anno Domini 1783

. . und hier sind Beispiele der

Aufarbeitung
Bock zum Gärtner gemacht
TOP 1…sollen hier schon wieder Akten vernichtet werden ?

Na aber Hallo!…. die Nummer kennen wir doch schon “Lieber Politiker”


Aufklärung

Aufklärung ist die vollständige Offenlegung des Unrechts, die vollständige Information über die Schuldigen

und deren schonungslose Entfernung aus verantwortlichen Funktionen und dem öffentlichen Leben.

“Die öffentliche Diskussion über das Unrecht einer Diktatur wird diesmal unter Lebenden stattfinden!”

Wer seinerzeit für das MfS gearbeitet hat, war Helfer der öffentlichen Verwaltung,
mag er in der Diktatur das auch im verborgenen getan haben,

seine “Spitzeltätigkeit” gehört nicht zu seiner schützenswerten Privatsphäre.

” Die Betroffenen Opfer und die Öffentlichkeit haben ein Recht auf die Wahrheit! “

Somit bleibt nun zu hoffen das endlich alles klar ist!
Beispielhaft für die Aufklärung halten es die neuen Mitglieder in der Europa Union u. a. wie,

  • die Regierungen der Tschechischen Republik die auf der Homepage des Innenministeriums

in Prag die Namen der Täter und der Schuldigen per Gesetz zum Download bereit hält.

Evidenční podklady, zveřejněné podle §7 zák 107/2002Sb Download

·           und die Slowakischen Republik  die auf dem Regierungsserver per Gesetz

die Listen mit den Namen der Täter und Schuldigen veröffentlicht und zum

Download bereit hält.        Zum Beispiel hier: Bratislava
Regierungsserver der Slowakischen Republik Nation’s Memory Institute